Oxfordshire County Council v M & Ors

These proceedings have been extraordinarily protracted. They commenced on 12^th April 2024 following the birth of B, with the Local Authority making an application for care orders for both A and B. The statutory deadline of 26 weeks expired on 11^th October 2024, and the timetable has been extended in 8-week intervals from then to this final hearing which takes place in week 79 by my calculations.

M moved to this area in July 2023, having started a relationship with F1. There is a long history of social services involvement with M dating back to her childhood. She is a vulnerable person both in terms of her diagnoses and also in terms of her childhood experiences.

F1 is also vulnerable. He is the father of B. His relationship with M ended in April this year.

F2 was in a relationship with M until around 2022. He engaged with these proceedings very late in the timetable and only sought to be joined as a party in February 2025, though he had been aware of the proceedings from June 2024. He is the father of A but has had no relationship or contact with him, having only met him briefly when A was a small baby. It has been necessary to redact certain evidence and information from documents served on F2 to protect M and F1 given concerns about risks posed by F2, and F2 does not know the identity of B as part of the protections put in place. F2 has also been involved in other public law proceedings elsewhere in relation to another child with a different mother, those proceedings having concluded just before F2 sought joinder to these proceedings. His late engagement with these proceedings has contributed to their lengthy timescale.

There have been various assessments during the proceedings of M and F1’s ability to parent A and B, which have sadly concluded that they cannot safely parent A and B, either together or separately. Issues about assessment, as well as difficulties with the Local Authority ensuring that final evidence was filed with Agency Decision Maker approval (ADM) have contributed to the length of these proceedings.

There has also been cognitive assessment of M and F1, conducted by Dr Schoeman, which highlighted their challenges and vulnerabilities.

On 8^th October 2024, following a period of residential assessment of M’s ability to parent A and B, the children were placed in foster care where they have remained since. This placement was an early permanence placement so carried with it the possibility of the children remaining there long term if they could not return to the care of a parent. To their very great credit, M and F1 have bravely made the child-focused decision to accept that they cannot care for A and B.

F2 also accepts that he cannot care for A in circumstances where he is subject to an Interim Sexual Risk Order as a result of numerous allegations of sexual offences, he suffers from poor mental health which causes his behaviour and emotional presentation to be unpredictable and frightening for a child, and at times he is unable to remember his actions. He also accepts that he does not have the ability to parent A safely, and would not be able to achieve a good enough standard of parenting within A’s timescales. I also acknowledge that this acceptance by him that he cannot care for A is putting A first.

There are no alternative carers assessed as able to care for the children. Although the paternal grandparents of B had indicated recently that they might wish to be considered to care for B, they have had the benefit of a meeting with the social worker and Guardian to understand the issues and the professional conclusion that A and B should not be separated. They have therefore not put themselves forward, which I also accept is a child-focused decision as it acknowledges that A and B’s welfare requires that they must be placed together. The Together and Apart Assessment completed in July this year reinforces how important it is for A and B not to be separated.

When this final hearing was originally listed in April 2025, it was on the basis that M and F1 would be opposing the Local Authority final care plans for adoption. By the time of the pre-trial review (PTR) on 15^th September 2025 before me it was clear that M and F1 had made the very difficult and brave decisions that I have noted not to oppose the final care plans. F2 had accepted that he could not care for A well before this point. The remaining issues for the final hearing after the PTR appeared to be around post adoption direct contact for M and F1, and whether it was in A’s welfare interests for there to be a session of contact between him and F2 before any adoption order were to be granted.

On the morning of this final hearing commencing, issues had narrowed considerably as a result of extremely constructive and productive discussions between the advocates and parties. The Local Authority and Guardian were able to agree a form of words for the final care plans which addressed the issue of post-adoption direct contact and work to support this between A and B and M and F1. F2 was also in agreement with the Local Authority final care plan for A and no longer sought to pursue a case for him to have a one-off session of direct contact with A.

Threshold for the purposes of section 31 was agreed on 28^th August 2025 and is in the bundle at A325-A327. Having considered the unchallenged evidence filed in the Bundle for this hearing, I adopt those findings as my threshold findings in this case.

A schedule of welfare findings was also agreed on 4^th September 2025 and appears in the bundle at A328-A329. Again, having considered the evidence in the bundle I adopt these as my welfare findings in this case.

I note the wording that has been agreed between all parties at court today, and which will be inserted into the final care plans for the children. This wording records the positive benefits of post-adoption contact for A and B, that the Local Authority supports the principle of annual direct contact between M and F1 as originally proposed by the Guardian, professionally supervised, the life story work to be undertaken with A and B, the intention to complete this work with the current allocated social worker given her lengthy and significant involvement with the children, that there will be a meeting between M and F1 and the children’s carers, facilitated by the adoption agency, prior to which M and F1 will be supported by the adoption agency’s birth relative support team, that work will be undertaken by the carers and their supervising social worker post placement orders being granted, the Attach Team will remain available to support the carers, and wording sets out expectations of the parents remaining engaged with the adoption agency birth relative support team to enable updated risk assessments to be completed and work done prior to each direct contact and those risk assessments will consider each parent separately and each child separately to recognise the very different experiences and needs of the children. The amendment also records that the social worker will produce a shared narrative which can shared with the carers, M and F1 as well as all professionals involved with the children. With the agreed form of wording incorporated, I endorse the final care plans for A and B as being in their welfare interests. Sadly, as I have already set out in this judgment, there is no prospect of them being safely cared for by any of their parents and no alternative kinship carers who could care for them either. Adoption is therefore the only realistic prospect for A and B and that is my finding based on the unchallenged evidence before me.

Understandably neither M nor F1, who both have parental responsibility, have felt able to consent to placement orders. F2 does not have parental responsibility for A so his consent is not required. Having considered the unchallenged evidence in the bundle, I am satisfied that A and B’s welfare requires that I dispense with the consent of M to the making of placement orders, and that B’s welfare also requires that I dispense with the consent of F1 to the making of a placement order too.

I will therefore grant final care orders to the Local Authority in respect of A and B, dispense with the consent of M and F1 to the making of placement orders (noting that this only applies in respect to F1 and B since he also does not have parental responsibility for A), and grant placement orders for them too.