London Borough of Camden v M & Ors

The court is concerned with the welfare of PM. PM is 1 year and 4 months old. PM’s mother is the First Respondent and father is the Second Respondent.

The Applicant Local Authority is London Borough of Camden represented by Mr Barry McAlinden.

M is represented by Mr Martey of Counsel. The mother is also supported by an advocate, Ms Lumsdaine at court.

F is represented by Ms Hayford of Counsel. The F has had a Kurdish Sorani interpreter present at court to assist him, in and out of court.

Ms Pepper of Counsel appeared on behalf of PM thorough his Guardian, Ms Faith Hummerstone.

The maternal grandfather has attended parts of the final hearing with permission of the court.

I should add that the attendance of the mother and the father have been excused as they found it difficult to attend and hear judgment, and so I proceeded on the basis that the parties have all been represented by Counsel who ensured that all relevant arguments and points were made on behalf of their clients. I am grateful to them for their assistance.

In this judgment, I refer to the parents as M and F, the maternal grandfather as MGF and the professionals as PCA assessor, allocated social worker as ASW and Child’s Guardian as CG. I refer to the Applicant as the LA. No disrespect is intended in doing so.

The LA seeks a care order and a placement order at the conclusion of these proceeding. Its plan is for PM to be adopted. The LA threshold sets out the risk of harm to PM from M’s mental health and cognitive difficulties, the conflict in the relationship between the M and F and the injuries suffered by PM which were attributable to the care given to him by M.

During the course of these proceedings, M has conceded aspects of the threshold but denies harm to PM from her mental health, causing injuries to PM or harm from her relationship with F. M’s primary position is that she seeks to care for PM. In the alternative she supports placement with MGF and his wife. Her third position is placement with F. Her final position is placement in long term foster care while she undertakes further work to address the concerns. She opposes adoption.

F’s position is he seeks to care for PM. He concedes aspects of the threshold but also denies harm to PM from the conflict in the parental relationship. At this final hearing, F seeks adjournment of making final orders to allow a further parenting assessment of him. He wishes for PM to remain within the family. He opposes adoption.

The CG supports the LA’s care plan for care and adoption orders. The CG invites the LA to assess P’s foster carer as a prospective adopter for him before other adoptive placements are considered. She endorses the care plan with respect to contact but invites the LA to consider MGF and his wife in post-adoption contact arrangements subject to risk assessment and their acceptance of any decision the court makes.

M is 29 years old, and F is 32 years old.

M, and her sister S, have been previously known to various local authorities during their childhood. There is an extensive history around missing episodes, neglect, exploitation, sexual health and mental health concerns when M was a child. M is known to another local authority as a looked after child since 2007. M was placed in foster care at the age of 17 due to concerns about her mental health, alcohol, drug use and being at risk of child sexual exploitation. There were also significant and numerous allegations of physical harm and two separate allegations of sexual abuse perpetrated by MGF which were not the subject of any findings or police action. The MGF says that he went through proceedings to gain custody of his daughters. There are no papers in respect of this.

M is vulnerable. She has a significant mental health history. She was admitted to a mental health unit from January to April 2023 with psychosis. She also has a history of anxiety, depression, and suicidal ideation, with the last episode reported in December 2023 by London Ambulance Service (LAS).

The LA first became aware of PM on 12.02.24 through a referral from midwifery services. M presented at midwifery services as a “late booker”, at 24 weeks pregnant. The midwifery team were concerned about M’s history of misuse of alcohol and substances, and her mental health difficulties. They were also concerned by M’s allegations relating to emotional abuse and coercive control from F and his misuse of alcohol. There was an enquiry under section 47 of the Children Act 1989 (the “CA 1989”) carried out two days before PM was born and an initial child protection conference was convened for two weeks later.

At the time of PM’s birth, the hospital raised concerns that M may have learning difficulties and in relation to her inability to be awake and alert. The LA identified the MGF as a source of support for M and PM (despite historic concerns). MGF agreed to stay with M when she and PM were discharged home following the birth. There was a working together agreement which set out that MGF would supervise contact between PM and F.

The MGF travelled back and forth between London and Wales (where he lives) and then returned to stay in Wales as his wife went into hospital. The LA then increased their level of monitoring of PM in his mother’s sole care to weekly visits.

Health professionals were concerned about PM’s poor weight gain, attributed to incorrect feeding advice being given to M by the health visitor. PM was readmitted to hospital on 04.04.24. PM was made subject to a child protection plan under the category of neglect on 17.04.24.

On 15.05.24, the LA received a notification from the police: F had contacted them on 11.05.24 to report that M was drunk and had left PM in the care of a male friend, Mr B, while she went to visit a female friend who takes cocaine and drinks a lot.

On 16.05.25, the MGF took PM to Wales to meet his wife. This was intended to be for a couple of days, but M then went to join them on 17.05.24. It was anticipated that M and PM would remain in Wales for a week or so, but due to her previously making unsafe arrangements for childcare, she was asked to stay with her father in Wales for longer while the LA made further plans for her and PM. The LA agreed a safety plan with the M and MGF, linking in with local services in Wales.

The LA proposed that M and PM move to a mother and baby unit. M was asked to do so under s.20 of the CA 1989 but refused and said she would be returning to London to care for PM independently. The LA then initiated these proceedings, seeking an interim care order with a view to PM and M moving to a mother and baby unit for a residential parenting assessment. At a court hearing on 05.07.25, M refused to go to the unit voluntarily and the court found that the test for interim separation was not met, which was the LA’s contingency. PM remained living at home with PM under no order, with a written agreement in place, which by then included daily social work visits.

On 18.07.24, M and PM were not at home for a social work visit. On 19.07.24, home visits were completed by the SW, health visitor and by CG. PM and M were both observed to have unexplained injuries. The LA convened a strategy meeting that day with the outcome that the social work team would visit the home with a view to taking PM to hospital for a child protection medical. This was not required as, that same day, M called the emergency services following sustaining injuries in a kitchen fire. M and PM were transported to hospital by ambulance. PM was examined at hospital and found to have 12 injuries, including to his face, head, knees and toes, which were thought to be non-accidental. PM was taken into police protection late on 19.07.24 and M was arrested for child cruelty. M was given bail conditions not to have any contact with PM, unless supervised by the LA. F was abroad at this time visiting his critically ill mother.

PM was made subject to an interim care order on 22.07.24 and the court approved his placement in foster care. PM was discharged from hospital on 24.07.24 and placed in foster care in Hampshire, where he remains to date.

The proceedings have been managed by the court since then and comes before me for final hearing.

The legal framework is not contentious. Ms Pepper on behalf of the CG has provided an excellent summary of the relevant legal framework which is agreed by the parties, and I adopt.

A court cannot make a care order unless the circumstances at the relevant date are as set out in s31(2) Children Act 1989:

In respect of threshold and the disputed findings, the burden is on the LA to prove the findings on the balance of probabilities.

Fact-finding hearings: In Re JS [2012] EWHC 1370 Fam,

There is no obligation on a party to prove the truth of an alternative case put forward by way of a defence and the failure by that party to establish the alternative case on the balance of probabilities does not of itself prove the local authority’s case: Re X (No. 3) [2015] EWHC 3651 (Fam) and Re Y (No. 3) [2016] EWHC 503 (Fam).

I also bear in mind Peter Jackson LJ in Re B-M [2021] EWCA (Civ) 1371 at [23]–[25], in which he said at [25]:'No judge would consider it proper to reach a conclusion about a witness's credibility based solely on the way that he or she gives evidence, at least in any normal circumstances. The ordinary process of reasoning will draw the judge to consider a number of other matters, such as the consistency of the account with known facts, with previous accounts given by the witness, with other evidence, and with the overall probabilities. However, in a case where the facts are not likely to be primarily found in contemporaneous documents the assessment of credibility can quite properly include the impression made upon the court by the witness, with due allowance being made for the pressures that may arise from the process of giving evidence. Indeed, in family cases, where the question is not only “what happened in the past?” but also “what may happen in the future?”, a witness's demeanour may offer important information to the court about what sort of a person the witness truly is, and consequently whether an account of past events or future intentions is likely to be reliable.'

The child’s welfare is paramount. The court must take into account all of the relevant circumstances in the case, in particular the welfare checklist at s.1(3) CA 1989. In respect of the placement order, the court’s paramount consideration is the child’s welfare throughout his life [s.1(2) Adoption and Children Act 2002 (“ACA 2002”)].

I remind myself that a placement order with a plan for adoption is one of the most draconian steps a court can take. I am mindful of the guidance under Re B (Care Proceedings: Appeal) [2013] 2 FLR 1075, and the need for proportionality when the court examines whether or not to sanction the placement of a child for adoption. Such a course should only be approved as a last resort where all else fails, and the court must be satisfied that there is no practical way of the authorities or others providing the requisite assistance and support and where the child’s welfare dictates that ‘nothing else will do’.

I also remind myself of the well-known case of Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 114, that, although the child’s interests are paramount, the court must never lose sight of the fact that those interests include being brought up by the natural family, unless the overriding requirement of the child’s welfare makes that not possible, and that the court considers all the realistic options before coming to a decision.

I have considered the decision of Hedley J in Re L [2007] 1 FLR 2050 and in particular that the court must be careful to avoid, “the temptation of social engineering” and that “The best person to bring up a child is the natural parent. It matters not whether the parent is wise or foolish, rich or poor, educated or illiterate, provided the child’s moral and physical health are not in danger. Public authorities cannot improve on nature.”

The court must evaluate all the realistic options, undertaking a global, holistic and multi-faceted evaluation of the individual child’s welfare, taking into account all the negatives and positives of each option. There should be a balancing exercise in which each option is evaluated, weighed and compared before determining which option best meets the duty to afford paramount consideration to the child’s welfare. [Re: BS (Children) (Adoption Order: Leave to Oppose) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146].

The court’s scrutiny of the care plan is limited by statute [s.31(3A) CA 1989]. The court is required to consider the permanence provisions and contact only. The court must consider contact before making any placement order.

Assessments/ Delay - In Re S (Parenting Assessment) [2014] 2 FLR 575, Munby P considered extensions to the 26-week timetable and further assessment. In particular:

No second assessment can or should be ordered unless the court is satisfied it is necessary to assist the court to resolve proceedings justly: “In determining whether an assessment is “necessary”, the court must adopt a robust and realistic approach, guarding itself against being driven by what in Re S (A Child) [2014] EWCC B44 (Fam), para 38, I described as “sentiment or a hope that ‘something may turn up’.” [Re R[2014] EWCA Civ 1625 para 66]

Delay is likely to prejudice the child’s welfare.

The 26-week time limit is mandatory and may only be extended if s.32(5) is satisfied. As MacDonald J reminded practitioners in London Borough of Enfield v E (Unconscionable Delay) [2024] EWFC 183, ‘the prompt determination of care proceedings under Part IV of the Children Act 1989 is not a mere aspiration. It is what the law requires’.

The no order principle applies: the court should not make an order unless it would be better for the child to do so than not.

Article 8 and Article 6 of the ECHR are engaged. The child and each parent have a right to respect for their family life. Orders must be necessary and proportionate to the risk of harm.

The case was heard over 7 days from 22^nd July 2025 – 30^th July 2025.

The evidence has been contained within two bundles – a main bundle and a supplemental bundle which was added to over the course of the hearing. Taken together there are in the region of 2,000 pages of evidence, all of which I have considered carefully.

It is important to acknowledge all parties agree that M and F love PM dearly, as does MGF. They are in court trying to do their best for PM.

I have met parents for a fraction of their lives and entirely accept that how they present in court is not how they present outside court or in intimate settings. I am to assess their evidence on that. I consider their evidence alongside the evidence available – contemporaneously.

As I have noted, this is a case in which the learning-disabled status of the parents requires careful consideration, both as to the Court’s process, but also, importantly, in evaluating the supportive efforts taken in the past and what can be offered in the future. The parents have a right not to be discriminated against and it is crucial an ‘easy’ option of removal is not adopted in place of a ‘harder’, but more considered structure of support. That being said, this is not a case in which the matters are before the Court simply as a result of M being learning disabled. As will be examined in the fact-finding process there are significant issues which require the LA to be involved irrespective of the cognitive abilities [difficulties?] of the M or mental health difficulties of the parents.

In terms of witnesses, I now turn very briefly to my impression of each witness from whom I have heard.

I first heard from ASW. She was allocated to PM’s case in December 2024. She is the author of the father’s parenting capacity assessment dated 7^th February 2025; the LA final evidence – statement dated 14^th May 2025 and the final care plan dated 19^th May 2025. She acknowledged that the parents love PM a lot, but she highlighted the risks to PM from M’s mental health and cognitive difficulties; from the conflict between the parents and from the parents’ and family’s ability to care for him safely. ASW accepted that M is working with Change Grow Lives (CGL) now, but she was of the view that this is recent and unlikely to be sustained. ASW told the court that although contact between P and his parents is positive, both parents had shown an inability to commit to the frequency of contact on offer. ASW gave evidence that M had declined support of the adult social services. She considered that even with 24/7 support M would struggle to care for PM safely. In respect of the F, she maintained that he could not care for PM. She pointed out that despite various adjustments offered by her to accommodate the F in her parenting assessment of him, he had not engaged in the parenting assessment consistently and could not demonstrate continued commitment to P in contact either. ASW agreed that PM has had excellent care from the foster carer and that it is the LA’s intention to assess the foster carer as an adopter in the first instance. I found ASW to be fair and balanced in her evidence with a clear eye on PM’s welfare.

Ms K, the parenting assessor for M, gave evidence next day. She is the author of M’s parenting capacity assessment dated 2^nd May 2025. In that assessment, Ms K concludes “M presents with some meaningful strengths in her parenting, particularly in structured and supported environments. During family time, she demonstrates affection, attentiveness, and a desire to meet PM’s needs—especially in areas such as play, learning and hygiene. However, when PM was in her care there were clear patterns of neglect, emotional dysregulation, poor judgment, and risk exposure. I am concerned that M has been unable to demonstrate meaningful insight into the concerns related to PM’s care. This means M is at risk of not meeting PM’s needs were he to return to her care. I am concerned with the severity of physical harm PM experienced in M’s care, as well as repeated failures to seek medical help, despite multiple requests and recommendations from different professionals. I am concerned M would minimise PM’s health needs in the future, which leaves him at risk of medical neglect”. In her oral evidence, Ms K maintained her recommendations that M could not provide safe care to PM. The updating hair strand test, which was positive for cocaine and alcohol, further worried her. Ms K set out the steps she took to engage and assess M considering the cognitive difficulties and recommendations by Dr Bayliss, clinical psychologist instructed in these proceedings who had assessed M’s cognitive abilities Ms K explained the areas of assessment and M’s limited engagement with the assessment. She did not consider that M could safely care for PM. I found Ms K a helpful and fair witness who was able to give clear answers based on her assessment of M.

I heard next from Ms Wilkins, the special guardianship (“SG”) assessor, who had undertaken the assessment of the MGF and his wife. In her SG report dated 3^rd February 2025, Ms Wilkins concluded “In summary, MGF and his wife’s experience in caring for children is marked by their emotional support, and adaptability. They have demonstrated a long-term commitment to their children, despite numerous challenges. However, the history of injuries, allegations of abuse, and difficulties in behaviour management raise significant concerns. Their pattern of non-engagement with support services and the emotional impact on their children make me very concerned about their capacity to care for a young baby. Even if the worries and risks could be mitigated by a high level of support, to ensure that PM were able to remain with family, I am concerned that the history in the chronology shows that MGF and his wife have consistently struggled to engage with services and have already during PM’s life not always been forthcoming with their worries about M’s capacity to care for PM”. The SG assessor confirmed that since her report, she had received a positive reference from MGF’s wife’s friend, Zoe. This had not altered her recommendation. Ms Wilkins readily acknowledged that there were a number of positives in the care that MGF and his wife could offer but it was her assessment that the concerns and worries outweighed the positives. Ms Wilkins was cross examined at length by Mr Martey about relying on historic concerns to assess MGF and his wife negatively. She was clear that the historic concerns were a part of the picture but that for her the ‘crux’ was that MGF and his wife had noted their concerns about M’s care for PM while they were with them but not raised it with the professionals. They had failed to act protectively.

Ms Wilkins was an impressive witness who gave clear and helpful evidence. She gave clear, consistent and reasoned evidence. She dealt with all points put to her in a clear and comprehensible manner.

Dr Kalambettu, the consultant paediatrician, gave evidence. He is a joint expert instructed to give an opinion in respect of PM’s injuries. I refer to the substance of his oral evidence below, but it was consistent with his findings. Dr Kalambettu was a straightforward witness.

The MGF gave evidence twice. MGF has not provided a statement but has filed a detailed email setting out his challenge to the SG assessment. In his detailed email, MGF was clear that he loves his grandson and wishes to care for PM. This came across in his evidence as well. He described the pride he felt at holding PM when he was born. MGF accepted that he had struggled with the M, and her sister, S, when they were younger because of “their own issues” but that he now had a close relationship with both his daughters. He addressed a number of historic issues that had been raised in the SG assessment, denying the concerns. The MGF rowed back significantly from the concerns he had previously set out relying on complaints from the M, about the F, telling the court that he had not seen the F be abusive towards M (which was contrary to his report of bullying to the LA previously). MGF said that he had heard M and F argue on the phone which had been a concern, but he considered the F to be a good dad, that he had had a beer with the father but had not seen him drink excessively and was helpful to his daughter. He denied seeing PM over a video call on 18^th July. His evidence around the injuries PM sustained was confusing because his evidence about when he spoke to M and PM and what he saw shifted as his evidence progressed. He said that his daughter was a good mother and, in his view, both parents could have contact with P, unsupervised (subject to one supervised session to test basic parenting). MGF was clearly at court to support his daughter. He was visibly on hand to assure his daughter, including from within the witness box. However, I was extremely concerned about his evidence with respect to P’s injuries and M’s alcohol and substance misuse. This was further cemented by the MGF’s evidence the next day when the LA had obtained his MG11 statement, setting out the interview he gave to the police in which he raised significant concerns about the F and reported to the police seeing injuries to PM. The MGF’s evidence was unreliable, shifting, uncertain to pin them down and opportunistic in how it was given.

The M gave evidence next. M has vulnerabilities. She has been supported throughout by her advocate, Ms Lumsdaine. M has found much of this final hearing quite difficult. She presented as emotional and distressed when there has been any discussion about the injuries to PM, which was understandable. M attended remotely from Mr Martey’s chambers for Dr Kalambettu, the paediatrician’s evidence and for her own evidence. M was polite but evidently distressed during much of her evidence. She required time to understand and process what was being asked. The M has provided 1 [one] statement in the proceedings. This is a brief document. The M’s evidence was confusing – she could not recall the events of July last year. She could however recall with clarity, 2 incidents with neighbours and her and F arguing with police call outs pre-dating that. Her evidence was also contradictory – she had maintained that she had not seen the extent of injuries to PM but accepted that she had changed PM and had seen them when changing him. The M’s evidence on not attending the PCA or missing contact sessions was also difficult to pin down. Overall, the M’s evidence was evasive, unreliable and inconsistent. There were aspects of M’s evidence which left me believing that she was choosing what to recall rather than being unable to do so. I was left with the impression that M avoided answering questions or pleading ignorance on issues which put her in a difficult position evidentially.

F gave evidence with the assistance of interpreter, Mrs Ahmed. He was polite and composed throughout except when talking about his own mother’s illness and passing, when he became emotional. F gave responses in a straightforward fashion. His evidence was a combination of selective frankness and concerning lack of insight. He accepted that there was conflict between him and M but then said police call outs reflected the normal arguments between parents. He agreed that he had seen marks on PM during a telephone call he had with the M when he was abroad and that he had asked M to take PM to the doctor, although he did not follow up on this personally and he sent his friend, Mohammed, to check on M and PM, which she suggested she did not know about but did refer to F’s friend visiting/”checking up on her. Much of F’s evidence focussed on him and the M. He said very little about PM. His responses about the arrangements in place to care for PM, if placed with him, displayed a lack of thought or care. I found the F’s evidence tended to minimise the concerns and provide an unrealistic picture of his own abilities.

I heard from the CG. Her final analysis dated 7^th July 2025 sets out her enquiries and recommendations, reviewed and considered in due course. She gave considered and thoughtful evidence. CG had noted injuries to PM and M on 19^th July when she had gone over to the house. CG described in some detail her concerns and observations arising from this visit. CG also acknowledged the real positives about M, F and MGF’s love and care for PM. However, she maintained her view that adoption is now in PM’s best interests. The CG in my assessment took a wholly independent approach and was willing to support a more positive approach to post-adoption contact. The CG was clear about the benefits to PM from post-adoption contact, provided it was safe and did not undermine his placement. The CG is very experienced and was able to deal with all points put to her with care and with compassion, but with absolute clarity. She was resolute in her evidence and gave sound reasons for her conclusions.

The Local Authority’s final threshold document has been the subject of changes over the course of this final hearing to reflect my comments and the evidence.

The M and F dispute that the threshold is crossed as pleaded by the LA and disagree as to the extent to which it is crossed. I am required to carry out a fact-finding exercise. The LA plead in their final threshold document as follows: PM is at risk of significant physical harm in the care of his mother; he is at risk of physical and psychological harm from his parents’ mental health and substance/ alcohol issues and he is at risk of emotional harm and physical harm through exposure to parental conflict, abusive and threatening behaviour.

The LA seeks findings that P is at risk of significant physical harm in the care of his mother as follows: “Notwithstanding that PM was on a child protection plan and that M was subject to daily visits, at a time and date between 17.7.2024 and 19.7.2024, PM suffered the following injuries:

“Abrasions consistent with friction burns. The abrasions required in-patient hospital treatment for over 2 weeks. These injuries took place at different times, were caused by significant force, caused P significant pain and P would have been very distressed as a result. These injuries were inflicted intentionally by the mother. The mother did not seek medical assistance for P and did not tell professionals about the injuries.

“A laceration to right side of forehead. This injury was inflicted negligently by the mother.

“A bruise on right side of face. This injury was inflicted negligently by the mother.

“A minor head injury. This injury was inflicted negligently by the mother.”

On 19^th July 2024, PM was noted to have 12 marks on his body [E67] at UCLH. Of these 10 of the marks noted were considered to be non-accidental in nature by the assessing doctor.

As set out in the chronology above, the court had refused the LA application for an ICO on 5^th July 2024. PM had spent time in Wales on 15.5.25 to 4.7.25 and back in London in his mother’s sole care on that day. Pursuant to a WTA, PM was subject to daily visits by the LA undertaken by the SW or other agency workers at their behest.

PM and M were seen by the then allocated SW, Ms Kurtulaj [SW] on 15^th July 2025 when M was shown a residential unit, which the SW was encouraging M to attend with PM. M did not want to go.

SW then visited the M and PM on 17^th July at 12.30 pm. She did not have any major concerns about PM who was described as “his usual bubbly self”. He was clean and the home was tidy. According to the SW chronology [C48], M alerted SW that her sister S had gone into labour so she will not be in London for a home visit the next day.

M and PM were not seen by anyone on 18^th July 2024, despite efforts. SW had called M to arrange a visit, but M had said she was unwell with ‘food poisoning’ and did not want to pass it on. On the same day, the CG attempted a visit to M’s house which was a pre-arranged visit. The address given to CG was incorrect, but M told the CG at 10 am that she was already out of the house and visiting her sister in hospital so the CG could not attend.

M’s evidence about the timings of her movements on 18^th July were unclear on the stand. She repeatedly said that she could not recall when she went to see her sister and what transport she took and what time. M eventually said that she thinks she went at 3 pm and back before PM’s bedtime around 5 pm. This is consistent with what she told the SW. She was unable to see her sister as the hospital visiting time was over. In her evidence, M did not describe any events or incidents of concern with respect to PM on 18^th July.

On 19^th July at 9.30 am, the SW conducted an unannounced visit. M let her in after SW buzzed multiple times. SW noticed marks on PM’s chin and nose, a red mark around PM’s cheeks with a greenish bruise around it. The marks were observed to be covered in Sudocrem. M presented as ‘off’ in terms of her behaviour and the way she was acting with PM, shielding him away from SW. When SW advised taking PM to the doctor, M told SW that medical attention was not necessary as they would tell her to put Sudocrem on anyway.

On 19^th July, the CG visited P and M at 12.15 pm. The CG noted a circular mark on his chin around 1cm in diameter. CG describes the injury as ‘weeping’. CG noted the marks around his nose and bruise on his cheekbone. In her oral evidence, the CG remarked that she had seen the facial bruises including the cut on the head. The CG had not seen any other injuries on PM as he was wearing clothes that covered the rest of the body. The CG in her written and oral evidence, emphasised that she was worried about the injuries to M – cuts to the back of M’s knuckles on both hands and cut to M’s foot which resulted in her hobbling and struggling to make PM’s bottle. M told the CG that she had stood on a piece of glass when outside without shoes. She thought she had cut herself on glass that might have fallen out of rubbish although she also told the CG that she couldn’t have as she doesn’t use glass.

The health visitor (“HV”), Mr Dickinson visited on 19^th July at 2.30 pm. M told the HV that she had cut her foot last night from outside her door. HV also noted the injuries to PM’s face including the chin, under the nose, bruise to the cheek. HV also remarks on the injuries to M’s hands and foot which he examined. She did not seek medical attention for PM.

LAS call log records that M called the ambulance and fire brigade on 19^th July because of a chip pan fire incident. Both emergency services attended. The incident resulted in M sustaining oil burns to her arm. She ran out with PM from the flat. M handed PM over to the ambulance service who noted multiple injuries on child “that appear to have occurred within last few days/week”. M and PM were taken to A&E at UCHL where the bruises on PM were noted. M told the professionals that no one had cared for baby except her. PM was in UCHL from 19 – 24^th July 2024.

UCHL notes by Dr Olivia McNeill, ST3 in Paediatrics records that the M was spoken to in adult A&E. She was distressed. M’s explanations for injuries were not consistent with the -injuries noted on PM’s knees which were described as abrasions on bilateral knees. The bruise on the right side of head was described as unlikely to be consistent with the mechanism of M dropping the phone on his face. PM looked unkempt and smelled of faeces and cigarette smoke. PM’s Groin creases were noted to be red and raw with dried, crusted stool in (his) creases [E67].

There are 9 pictures in the bundle [E67 – E85] of the injuries taken at the hospital on 20^th July 2024, a body map [E86] and UCHL discharge summary dated 24.7.24 [E87 – E92]. PM’s skeletal survey and bloods were reported to be normal.

Dr Kalambettu, consultant paediatrician instructed in these proceedings concluded as follows:

“PM has sustained multiple abrasions with loss of skin and oozing at certain sites which are suggestive of application of significant force and most likely to be non-accidental (inflicted). It is not possible to provide a timeline of the injuries and may have occurred in the days between the welfare check visits by the social worker. The injuries are most likely to be caused by friction such as rubbing or dragging against a rough surface such as carpet. The injuries are not likely to be self-inflicted such as rolling over and falling off a seat as the lesions (abrasions) require application of significant force by an adult. There is no indication that there is an organic cause or non-traumatic cause for the sustenance of these injuries. PM and M have had injuries at the same period and there is a strong possibility that the event may be common to both”.

Dr Kalambettu explained the individual injuries as follows:

Dr Kalambettu found that the timeframe for sustaining the injuries was between 17^th and 19^th July 2024. In his opinion abrasive injuries were inconsistent with the M’s explanations of falling from the sofa. In his oral evidence, he maintained his conclusions. He clarified that difference between fresh versus not fresh injury. He confirmed that “fresh injuries” meant before examination and “not fresh” could be within the 2-3 days. On cross examination from M, he accepted that he had not assessed PM, and had carried out his assessment on papers including the photos and other medical evidence. He had not examined M so could not speak to her injuries. He could not confirm the mechanism that would explain the injuries save that the mechanism described by the M could not explain the injuries sustained by PM. This included falling from sofa onto a concrete floor or a 4-month-old wearing ill-fitting shoes or rolling over. In his opinion, abrasive injuries as noted on PM would only arise if force or pressure was applied resulting in loss of skin as seen on M. He could not quantify the force used, but it would not be a part of normal handling. PM would have been distressed and in “severe” pain. The carer would have known as PM would be in discomfort. He agreed with Mr McAlinden that the angles of the injuries on different parts of the body were not indicative of a single event. It could have happened over different times within the same overall timeframe which would explain the angles and presentation of the injuries.

MGF had a video call with M on 18^th July. In the statement of the Team Manager (“TM”) [C69], it is said that MGF told the TM:

“he had seen the baby over a video call on Thursday 18th July where M had been at home and he had noticed some marks but that was all. He was not concerned and felt that the baby was not injured really. His view was that the baby did not need to get checked out by a medical team and he was quite relaxed about it all”.

In the MG11 dated 22/7/24 – a digitally signed document that he gave to the police, he says this “On Thursday 18th July I had a video call with M and I said:

“Where’s baby?”, and when she showed me him on the phone I saw some marks and I asked her what it was, and she said “I don’t know”. I put it down to possible friction burns when he’s rubbed his knees and face into the mattress or carpet, but I can’t be sure”.

In his oral evidence, he resiled from this, telling the court initially that he had not seen PM over the videocall and not seen the marks to PM. He could not recall the time of the videocall. He had been unable to see any marks. His evidence did not ring true considering his contemporaneous discussions with the SW, the TM and the police which he has not sought to correct until he gave evidence.

F’s evidence is that he was in Iran visiting family. He had a video call with M and PM on 18^th July. He left a voice note he sent on 18^th July 2024 to the SW stating that he saw PM on the day and noted injuries. M had told him it was a rash and would not tell him what had happened. In his oral evidence, he expanded on this stating that the M had drunk 2 glasses of wine that day (18^th). When asked by Ms Pepper how he knew it was 2 glasses, F said M had told him that is what she had had. He described how he had called and asked to see PM. He had seen injuries to his face, head and knees and had been alarmed. He had asked M what had happened, but she had hung up on him. Following repeated calls, M had answered and said PM had rashes. He had told her to take PM to the doctors. He was concerned enough to send his friend, Mohammed, to check on M and PM. M had not answered the door when Mohammed had come over. F did not think that M had injured PM and believed that PM had fallen off the sofa as described by M. He thought that PM, aged 4 months, might have tried to crawl causing friction burns. Ultimately, he did not know what had happened, but he agreed it was serious.

M has given different explanations for the injuries to P. She has told the father and SW initially that they were ‘rashes’. She has spontaneously mentioned to the SW and CG ‘carpet burns’. In the hospital, she told the doctor, that she had placed PM in a bouncy chair. She told LAS that the injuries happened in PGM’s “Jolly jumper”. In the assessments she told Dr McDermott that she might have had an episode. M told Dr Bayliss that she had been drinking the evening her son was injured. In her oral evidence, M struggled to give evidence around the injuries telling me that she could not remember when she had noticed the injuries or her movements on 18^th July as it had happened so long ago. This was markedly different to her evidence regarding incidents with F in 2023 which she was able to recall with some certainty. When asked about the injuries to the toes, she said she had not noticed them before and thought it was from the shoes she had put on P. She could not offer details or description of what these shoes looked like as she had thrown them out. In court, she said that the injuries had happened on 18^th July but on re-examination, she said that the injuries had happened on 17^th July. She described that P had been sat on the sofa with a u-shaped pillow behind him. She had gone to the bathroom and heard him cry. She came to find him on the floor. M could not recall if he hit his head. He was crying and she wanted to comfort him. Her evidence about the visit to her sister was vague and lacking in any detail. She could not say when she had sustained her own injuries to her hands and foot. M remembered that P was not in pain which is why she did not take him to doctor. She did not remember the CG visiting at all. She denied speaking to Dr McDermott or Dr Bayliss as reported. She denied causing harm to P. When asked about why she did not tell her family or professionals about the injuries if it happened on 17^th July, she broke down and said she was scared about what would happen if she did. I note that it is likely that the M would have noticed the injuries to P when she changed him for bed or the next day. Her evidence that she did not notice the injuries to his toes did not ring true.

PM was born at 35 weeks and 3 days. At the time of his injuries, he was 4 months old and pre-mobile. I note the Dr Kalambettu’s evidence that he would not be expected to crawl or walk. He would be able to hold his neck up when sitting. PM had also slipped out of his mother’s arms when 2 days old when she was heavily medicated. This required him to spend 2 days in NICU under observations.

M had followed the advice from the HV which had been incorrect and resulted in PM losing weight and another admission to hospital at 2 weeks.

There is no evidence that PM suffers or suffered from any underlying health conditions which would explain the injuries or marks. The other medical tests confirmed this.

The M and F have their own vulnerabilities. M is assessed with cognitive difficulties and the F with PTSD and one record of depression. M has spent time in care as a child. She has had difficult and traumatic experiences. F has had his own difficult experiences including the loss of his mother recently in November 2024.

M has a support network in MGF and his wife, and in F. However, at the time of the injury, they were not around. M was, on her own case, caring solely for P when he sustained injuries.

M has epileptic episodes. She spoke about experiencing blackouts as a result of this and that her contact with PM had to be reduced as a result of her epileptic seizures following his removal from her care. Although she told me that this was a recent occurrence, I have not seen any medical evidence to confirm this.

The M has a history of self-harming behaviour. M says this is not a current concern and there is no medical evidence to support this either.

F reports a conversation with the M on his return from Iran, when he asked M what had happened. M had allegedly responded “What if I got drunk and decided to throw the baby out of the window, then what? What it I am scared when I am drinking”. He agreed he had said this but again confirmed that he did not think she had done this. M was also asked about this and agreed that she had this conversation with F but that she had been talking about it generally.

PM was seen by 3 professionals on 19^th July before the LAS. None of them describe him as distressed which Mr Martey submits is contrary to Dr Kalambettu’s evidence that PM would have been distressed. I accept the description by SW, TM, CG and the firefighter regarding PM’s presentation on 19^th July. However, I do not consider this to be inconsistent with Dr Kalambettu’s evidence that PM would have been distressed when he sustained the injuries, which on M’s evidence was on 17^th July. M’s evidence was that he was crying, and she was comforting him. F reports PM crying when he called on 18^th July as well.

CG agreed that in the M providing her the incorrect address on 18^th was genuine. However, I note that the CG also said that the M reported already being out of the house to meet her sister at 10 am. This is inconsistent with her evidence that she went to her sister at 3 pm. Furthermore, M informed the SW and TM the night before that all visits should be cancelled on 18^th. The timing of her informing them is significant – midnight to SW and earlier in the night to TM. I further note that when the professionals visited on 19^th July, the M was notably avoidant, and all professionals noted that PM’s injuries had been slathered in Sudocrem. All this tends to show the injuries had been sustained and M was aware of them on 17^th July, and she took steps to avoid discovery of them by professionals afterwards.

M called the emergency services on 19^th July after the fire. She took steps to leave the flat with PM and allowed him to be seen by the emergency services. She was herself hurt in the fire and distressed and medicated in the aftermath of the fire at the hospital.

The events from 17^th – 19^th July are unusual. M was not seen by any professional on 18^th July It is not clear what was happening on this day and what time. M did not tell the family about PM’s fall on 17^th July. She did not seek medical advice despite F telling her to. On 19^th - SW noted her as being odd and holding PM in an awkward way. She spontaneously told the SW and CG that the injury on the chin was like “burns” or “carpet burns”, something that MGF repeated to the police (without having seen the pictures or having seen marks on PM according to him). M had a further incident where she cut her foot (she says on glass); had injuries to both her hands and knuckles (for which there is no plausible explanation) and, shortly after, there was the chip pan fire causing burns to her arms. The picture is one of escalating concerns as to what was happening for PM and M.

A further inconsistency is that the hospital report that they changed “the bandage wrapped around the knee injury” for PM. In her oral evidence, M said she had put plaster on his knee injury which pulled the skin off. M had not said this before to anyone else – medical staff, police or professionals.

I weigh in the balance that the expert opinion from Dr Kalambettu with all the submissions made with respect to his assessments based on photos and the caveats about the quality of the photos affecting his timing. However, having considered the photos and in light of his evidence, I am not satisfied that this affected his assessment of the injuries considerably. Dr Kalambettu agreed that the injury to the left big toe could have been accidental, but M’s explanation was not plausible.

Lastly, I have specifically reminded myself that just because M may not have told the truth about some of P's injuries, does not mean she is lying about everything or all his injuries.

When I have considered all the pieces of the evidence separately and in context with each other and when I have stood back and considered the wide canvas, as I must, I am satisfied to the requisite standard that the local authority has proved that:

The LA seeks a finding that:

M had an assessment by Dr Uma McDermott dated 6^th Jan 2025. This concludes that:

“Her history would be consistent with diagnoses, according to the International Classification of Diseases (ICD 11), of (i) Personality disorder, severity unspecified, (ii) harmful pattern of use of alcohol and, (iii) 6C45.1Z Harmful pattern of use of cocaine, unspecified.”

Dr McDermott is a joint expert who was instructed to undertake a psychiatric assessment of M. Her expert opinion is based on the assessment she undertook and consideration of the M’s records. Dr McDermott’s opinion is that M’s reported history is consistent with the diagnosis of personality disorder. She describes this as a relational disorder. I note that M has previously accepted that she suffers from anxiety, depression, self-harm, suicidal ideation and has not consistently engaged with recommended therapy. Dr McDermott considers her mood instability as part of her personality disorder. I note that although M did not accept the diagnosis of personality disorder on the stand, she has not set out her challenge to Dr McDermott either in her written evidence or by way of questions. I accept Dr McDermott’s professional opinion that there is a harmful pattern of alcohol and cocaine use by M. This is consistent with the evidence before me and M’s acceptance of alcohol and cocaine use, albeit, in her evidence, historically. The HST and PETH results dated 13/5/25 confirm excessive alcohol and cocaine use recently.

M has chronic addiction issues with alcohol and/or drugs, including committing offences involving use of alcohol.

M accepts this.

M is not open and honest about her drug and alcohol use.

SW accepted that M has on occasions been open about her alcohol use. M was candid in her evidence to the court that she used alcohol excessively after PM’s removal from her care as she was in a bad head space. In my judgment, M has not consistently been open and honest with professionals. M said she did not drink with PM in her care. This is contradicted by the evidence of F that she drank 2 glasses of wine on the day of the injuries. She told Dr Bayliss the same. She denied this to the other professionals. M had also left PM in the care of Mr B on 11/5/24. She was reported to have drunk alcohol to excess in the lead up to doing so. She left PM in the care of a man, she understood to be F’s cousin, for several hours, but who was, by all accounts, effectively a stranger.

M accepts that she has cognitive impairment but disputes it is significant. On her behalf, Mr Martey pointed out that M sat through hours of evidence which was difficult for her; she participated in the proceedings fully; Ms K (parenting assessor) acknowledged her availability to PM in contact sessions and accepted that M is able to learn as demonstrated by her ability to navigate the venues over the course of this hearing. Dr Bayliss, clinical psychologist, filed her report on 18^th September 2024. She undertook tests of M and concluded:

“On the basis of my assessment, I was of the opinion that M does have significant cognitive difficulties. M’s overall full-scale IQ (FSIQ) score was 67, which is in the extremely low range and at the 1st percentile particularly in areas of spelling, comprehension, perceptual reasoning, working memory and processing speed.”

Dr Bayliss recommended strategies for professionals when dealing with M. This was adopted by the parenting assessor and the court. Although it is commendable that the M attended and participated in the proceedings, I agree with Dr Bayliss that the M’s cognitive impairment is significant. M was supported by her advocate in court. She struggled in her evidence to recall details or dates. She felt unable to engage with certain areas of the evidence and expressed her distress when others gave evidence which she considered to be negative. MGF described M as often getting ‘muddled up’ and being unable to cope.

F suffers from PTSD and there is a medical reference to F having had depression.

F accepted this in his evidence.

F has chronic alcohol addiction issues; there is one HST for Father over the period .

F accepted this. He told the court that he did drink excessively when his mother was critically ill and on her passing which he struggled with.

Taken together these diagnoses and issues impact adversely on the parents’ ability to parent P consistently and safely, putting him at risk of psychological and physical harm.

This allegation is made out.

The LA seeks a finding that the parents’ relationship involved arguments and conflict with themselves and others, which resulted in the police being called on several occasions and F being convicted of an offence of the use of threatening and abusive behaviour.

M and F both accepted in their evidence that prior to PM’s birth, they did drink together. They both also accepted that on occasions their arguments led to police call outs. On behalf of F, Ms Hayford invited me to pay particular attention to each of the police call outs before I make adverse findings. I do so now. I note that there were police call outs on 29.1.22 and 14.2.23 noted in the police disclosure as domestic incident. Both these incidents note that M and F had been drinking and then had an argument. On 23.5.25, the police are called out due to a ‘heated exchange’ due to money. There is a further call out on 17.6.23 – M called the police as she was unable to get keys to retrieve her stuff back from F. F alleged that they were not separated and that M gets aggressive when they drink. M was then assisted by police to get her belongings and return to Dartford. The police record an allegation of rape that M makes against F on 17.6.23 [Supp 47- 48]. M did not wish to answer any questions regarding the rape and has not pursued these findings at court. She did however remember a trip to Brighton and was clear that F had not paid for her or her friends to get back to London in an Uber. There have been other call outs – 14.1.24 there was an altercation with a neighbour due to noise. This resulted in M who was then pregnant getting elbowed in her stomach during the exchange. At hospital, F attended on the day after PM’s birth. The staff noted arguing and bickering. On 5.5.24, after PM’s birth, M called the police concerned that F was threatening to visit but then called to say that “it was all okay”. On 11/5/24, F called the police to report M had been drunk and left PM at his address in the care of Mr B. In their oral evidence, M and F both variously minimised these call outs. M by denying the details of the allegations and F saying that arguments are a normal part of a couple’s relationship. Whilst I accept that I should not elevate bickering to much more as submitted by Ms Hayford, this is not a picture of couple’s normal bickering. It is not in my judgment a regular feature of a couple’s relationship for the police to be called out or to need to intervene in domestic relationships. The picture is one of arguments and conflicts between the parents. These have escalated to a point that the M or F have felt the need for the police to intervene. I therefore make the finding sought.

The LA claims the parents have a co-dependent relationship in which F exerts controlling behaviour towards M, including telling M that he did not want PM to be born by telling M to “kill it’ and insisting on the baby being named “P”. There are two aspects to this pleading. One, that the parents have a co-dependent relationship. This is clearly made out on the evidence of all parties. M has sought support from the F when low [such as on 11/5/24]. She cites him as a support if PM is returned to her. MGF told the Court that F is often in the background when he speaks to his daughter. He has been a source of support to his daughter. F has also relied on M for support. She translates for him. When he was in Willesden Court on charges on 20.2.24, she did not attend her contact with PM and instead supported and comforted F. In his evidence, F says that whatever the decision regarding PM, if PM is returned to him or M, he and M will be involved in his care. There is a co-dependent relationship.

With respect to coercive and controlling behaviour, M and MGF rowed back from their previous descriptions of F as controlling and coercive significantly. MGF told the court that he had not seen any behaviours indicative of control except arguments over the phone in which M gave as good as she got. M also rowed back stating that she did not understand his culture before but now she did and did not think this was controlling. I find it hard to reconcile the length of their relationship with each other with M’s recent realisation that his behaviour may be attributable to his culture. Against this backdrop are the following:

M’s relationship with F puts PM at risk of exposure to parental conflict, abusive and threatening behaviour resulting in emotional and psychological harm. As a result of my findings above, this allegation is made out.

There are three elements to threshold. The harm must be actual or likely, it must be significant, and it must be due to parenting that is not reasonable. All three of these elements are satisfied on the concessions and findings made. Having made those findings and applying the threshold test to them, the Court proceeds to consider welfare and proportionality evaluations as a separate exercise.

I turn now to the welfare evaluation in this case.

PM is 14 months old. F chose his name. PM is of dual heritage background with M being white British and F being Kurdish Iraqi from Iraq. PM is described as a happy and content little toddler who does not at present exhibit any challenging behaviours. He is a resilient little boy and loved by all those around him. He is observed to be relaxed, comfortable, and content with his foster carer, responding well to stimulation and praise.

PM is too young to be able to ascertain his wishes and feelings. It is clear that he is much loved by his parents and by MGF and his wife, and that when they spend time with him, PM greatly enjoys the time with them and benefits from the warmth and affection he receives from them. It is also clear to me that PM loves M and F and his family. One might infer a likely wish to remain a part of his family if possible. One might additionally infer a wish to have a settled and safe home life. Little more can be said under this heading.

PM was born at 35 weeks’ gestation and his birth weight was 2.46kg. As set out above, he had admissions to hospital after birth. Whilst in M’s care, she ensured that PM received his immunisations.

PM suffered significant injuries at 4 months of age which I have made findings in respect of. A development report dated 24.6.25 noted that PM had multiple wounds to his face, legs and toes. He had to have bandages on his knees from his admission to hospital in July through to September 2024, and this restricted his movement as well as tummy time. The range of movement in his knees was felt to improve significantly after his bandages were removed. Though some gross motor skill delays were noted, the report sets out that PM has now been discharged from physiotherapy and is making good developmental progress now.

In May 2025, as part of carer’s feedback, FC shared that when PM first came into her care, she noticed he was hypervigilant and showed signs of being wary. However, since then, he has grown in confidence and appears comfortable in his current home. The CG’s evidence was that the hypervigilance is not normally noted in children who have secure attachments with their primary carers. In her evidence, ASW opines that it is likely that PM experienced significant emotional trauma that may explain his hypervigilance.

PM is not yet in an educational setting but, from contact notes, it appears he is bright and inquisitive. MGF told the court that PM traced the alphabets with him during contact and was keen to explore the alphabets.

The professionals agree that PM will need safe, attuned care. ASW and CG agree that PM is ‘thriving’ in the foster care placement.

PM shares a range of needs with all children of his age. As a vulnerable child of 14 months, he remains entirely dependent on his caregiver for her emotional and physical security. His emotional needs are for a stable and consistent level of predictable care. His needs are not met by a volatile and uncertain/unstable home life in which he might be exposed to conflict and risk of harm. Over the medium term his emotional needs would be met by a care giver who allows PM to develop individually, offer comfort and support to understand his experiences. A carer who is able to act protectively. It would be highly damaging were PM to find himself in the confused situation faced by M when she was an adolescent which placed her at risk of harm from sexual exploitation, substance misuse and negative associations. His emotional needs would also likely be hampered were he to grow up in a family setting with conflict between the adults who have their own personal challenges in life.

PM needs stability of placement and of primary carer. He has experienced disruption and physical harm. He needs to be protected as much as possible from any more disruption and change that are not a necessary and normal part of everyday life. PM may potentially have additional needs in the future and may develop mental health difficulties, a feature of his parents’ difficulties. His needs are likely to change over time and there will need to be much open, honest and cooperative engagement with professionals throughout his childhood and beyond.

There are three possible changes of circumstances with respect to PM. The first arises if I decide to return PM to M, F or MGF. Whether he would be safe in their care individually or with support, whether they would be able to meet his needs and keep him safe from harm is the central question in this case, and I will turn to that in a moment.

The second change is that PM will remain living in long term foster care while further assessments are undertaken of F or M. M proposes to undertake the work with CGL that is likely to take 24 weeks or more, subject to her engagement with them. This option has the significant disadvantage that there will be a delay in PM achieving permanency, but PM will remain with carer he is familiar with and who is committed to caring for him in the long term. F does not propose to undertake any specific work as such but is willing to be subject to further assessment of his parenting capacity, as he says the previous assessment does not offer a true picture of his abilities to care for his son. The same disadvantages arise for PM as set out above. The advantage would be that the delay could mean that PM might be placed with either of his parents eventually.

The third option is that I make the adoption order in which case PM will be placed with an adoptive family. The impact is significant both legally and in real terms by severing/restricting the ties with his birth family. This will have an obvious and profound impact on PM. In the first instance this effect will be as to his legal status. It will cut the legal ties he has to his parents on a permanent basis. But it will also have similar effect in relation to her wider family. In the first instance he will see his contact with his parents and MGF reduced and potentially terminated. This will have emotional consequences. Over the longer term there will likely be an emotional impact as PM comes to understand his adopted status. He is likely to face a challenge in understanding why his life took this course and may struggle with the implications of having lost his birth family. It would not be surprising if this undermined his understanding of himself and has an emotionally destabilising impact upon him. He may have deep questions to ask which may not be capable of being answered by those around him. Taken together these features have the potential to be significantly damaging for PM and will require careful and insightful responses to ensure his welfare needs are secured. In PM’s case I do not overlook the additional cultural aspects which may not be capable of being mirrored in any adoptive placement. This is a further identity feature that would need to be managed and fostered with real care.

I should add that PM has remained with the current foster carer for over a year. He was placed with her when 4 months old. The professionals report a close bond between the FC and PM. If removed from her care, he will experience the loss of that relationship and bond. If PM’s FC is positively assessed as an adoptive carer for him, he will benefit from continuity of care and building on the attachments he has already formed. PM’s carer will be able to support his emotional, physical and other needs being familiar with these.

Throughout this judgment I have referred to a range of personal characteristics held by PM to include his age, sex, and cultural background and heritage. In her evidence, the CG acknowledged that this was an important aspect of his future placement and one that would be assessed. When asked by Mr Martey, what would happen if the carer could not or would not promote his culture and heritage, the CG responded that the carer would not pass the assessment.

In foster care, PM’s cultural and identity needs have been met through contact with M, F and MGF and his wife. F would like PM to grow up in the Muslim faith but would not force this on him. F also speaks Kurdish Sorani. PM is spoken to in English. Within the care plan, it is noted that in Early April 2025, upon F’s request, PM’s head was shaved as part of Islamic practice. This is something that normally takes place upon birth. FC visited the barbers with PM. This involved shaving his head and collecting all the hair and FC donated this to Islamic Relief. At M’s request, FC provided some of his hair to M for keepsake. The CG added that the FC had taken PM to the local barber who was also Iraqi and offered links and opportunities for PM to participate in cultural events and with the community. This is a positive for PM.

The Family Finding Statement of XX from Adopt London North dated 17.6.25 that states that on an anonymous search of the database, there are no ALN adoptive families that could consider PM. However, following the making of placement orders, a more tailored search could be undertaken. The CG accepted that it was unlikely that a perfect match would be found to meet PM’s dual heritage, which is diverse (by which she means the ethnicity of his parents). However, the CG was confident that the search for an adoptive carer would ensure that his identity needs would be promoted. This appears to be consistent with the statement of XX.

I note that the LA intend to assess the FC before they consider placement with any other adoptive carer as she has expressed a wish to adopt PM. This approach is supported by the CG and in her assessment reflects what PM needs. The FC has already made efforts to promote PM’s cultural identity and heritage and if placed with her, she will continue to do so.

Turning to harm, I have dealt with harm at length as a part of the fact-finding exercise and threshold above.

PM has suffered significant physical harm caused by his M. This has resulted in long-term impacts upon PM who has suffered pain, injuries and medical intervention as a result.

PM has suffered disruption in his young life. He was removed from his mother’s care at 4 months old. He has suffered the loss of his primary carer and the disruption in the bond between them as a result.

PM is at risk of significant harm from his mother's mental health. In addition to her diagnoses of personality disorder, harmful use of substances and alcohol, M suffers from anxiety, depression and has historically self-harmed. When overwhelmed, M can act impulsively and present as emotionally dysregulated. M does not accept the diagnoses (except anxiety and depression) which raises concerns about her insight. Putting it plainly, M cannot address the concerns unless she accepts there is a problem. Dr McDermott concludes that M does not have insight and lacks the ability to think reflectively. She remarks that the M has been non-compliant with treatment and therapy over the years. Dr McDermott opines that P would be at risk of harm if he were returned to her care prior to her serious and long history of alcohol and substance misuse was addressed by way of meaningful engagement in therapeutic intervention. M needs to address her alcohol, substance misuse and her underlying personality difficulties by engaging in specialist therapeutic interventions demonstrating abstinence and engagement for at least a year. M told the court that she does not accept the diagnosis of PD. She is now engaging with CGL, which she finds helpful although she says she does not need the help to address her alcohol use. CGL are looking at working with M over the next 12 weeks to assess her for a residential detox which is likely to take a further 12 weeks. This work is yet to start and given the M’s evidence about the necessity of this approach, it appears likely to fail. PM remains vulnerable to risks from his mother’s mental health relapsing.

M has significant cognitive difficulties. This in itself does not pose a risk of harm to PM. Dr Bayliss concludes that M “has pronounced impairments in executive functioning, particularly in the areas of attention, memory, and cognitive flexibility. These deficits are likely to have a direct impact on her ability to make sound decisions, especially under stress or in complex situations.” Within the supported environment of a contact centre, M has managed to demonstrate positives – being attentive and attuned to PM for the short period and in a contained environment. PM would be at risk from his M’s difficulties if placed in her care.

Similarly, PM is at risk from F’s mental health. He accepts that he has been assessed in the past with PTSD and on one occasion he was suffering from depression for which he was prescribed medication. F’s evidence with respect to his mental health was dismissive. He did not consider that he needed any therapy or help to address his mental health needs. The evidence before me is that F can become emotionally dysregulated resulting in altercations. He has had altercations over parking spaces, spitting at strangers and convicted over an altercation with neighbours. In Court, F was entirely polite and cooperative. However, F has not presented as such with others. PM is at risk of exposure to harm from his F’s mental health and emotional dysregulation.

M and F have both used alcohol excessively. Both have described circumstances in which they have used alcohol as a coping mechanism. M in her evidence said she used alcohol after PM’s removal from her care, and the F misused alcohol when his mother became critically ill and she died in November 2024. I have already made a finding around the harmful use of alcohol with respect to M. In her evidence, M did not see this as a problem anymore. She told me that she was no longer drinking alcohol for the last 10 years. Her last PEth and hair strand test [HST] dated 13.5.2025 suggests excessive alcohol use with ETP and ETG readings over the limit. The F says that he does not have a problem with alcohol and does not need support with this. His HST and PEth results dated 17.1.25 show alcohol use over the limit in a period covering 08 October 2024 to 06 January 2025. F tested negative for all the drugs tested. The M’s substance misuse remains a concern. Her HST dated 13.5.25 is positive for cocaine. PM remains at risk from her M’s alcohol and substance misuse and her F’s alcohol misuse.

I have made findings regarding parental conflict and dynamics. Given my findings about the codependent relationship with features of controlling behaviour, PM would be at risk of exposure to harm – physical, psychological and emotional. In my judgment, the relationship between the parents remains codependent and fragile. PM would be at risk from the parental conflict and dynamic if placed in either parents’ care.

Both M and F have demonstrated inconsistent engagement. This has been a feature of these proceedings, more so for F than M. Both M and F have been offered further parenting assessments within these proceedings. Their lack of engagement with the parenting assessment is notable. As set out, Ms K and ASW set out the various adjustments made and offered to both parents in their respective assessments, with limited success. Having considered the assessments and heard the evidence, I remain unclear as to the reasons for sporadic engagement with the assessments and contact sessions offered. I note further that the SW has additionally had difficulties in contacting F. F said that he struggled with appointments due to his mother’s passing. In the lead up to her passing, he would spend hours on the phone to her. Whilst I have the greatest sympathy for his loss, his mother passed in November 2024. His engagement thereafter has remained inconsistent with professionals. M has pleaded her ill health as reason for being unable to fully engage and attend contact. M and F have been unable to demonstrate consistent engagement with professionals. M has maintained since 19^th July 2024 that she did not know what has happened to PM to cause the injuries. She gave sworn evidence in which she maintained this. Her admission through Mr Martey that she had a blackout which may have resulted in injuries to PM is significant. M chose to mislead professionals and the court for over a year which has prevented the right investigation being undertaken for PM and the right support being offered to her.

M and F lack of engagement is reflected in the contact offered as well. LA have provided schedule of contacts. Both M and F have missed a number of contact sessions. M told the court that she had reduced her contact as a result of her epilepsy. She was worried about her blackouts which are a recent occurrence due to stress and the impact on PM. I note that this has not happened during any of the contact sessions M has attended and begs the question of risk of harm to PM from this. F told the court that he reduced his contact from 2 to 1 hour during Ramadan and then due to an accident in April 2025 which left him bedridden for a month. He declined video contact as he did not want to alarm PM. It is now July – nearly 3 months after the accident. F has attended court and participated. He has not asked contact duration or frequency to be reconsidered or increased in his evidence. This demonstrates a lack of commitment to PM and an inability to prioritise his needs.

PM has spent time with his MGF and his wife. Due to them being in Wales, the frequency of contact is once a month. PM has enjoyed his contact with MGF and wife. However, there are complex family dynamics at play. Ms Wilkins in the SG assessment highlights that there have been historic concerns about MGF and his wife’s care of M and her sister, S, which led to poor outcomes for them in their childhood and for M as an adult. There are historic allegations of physical abuse, neglect and sexual abuse which had been made by S and M when they were in MGF’s care. No findings were made, and Mr Martey invites me to exercise caution in placing any weight on these historic concerns. However, in her evidence Ms Wilkins told the court that historic concerns are relevant particularly when looking at MGF’s ability to manage and protect PM. From her enquiries, across several LA’s involved with the family when M and S were young, there was a pattern of the family moving boroughs and disengaging from services that would have supported M and her sister’s needs. In Ms Wilkins opinion, if the moves were precipitated by social services involvement, it demonstrated an inability to work with professionals and engage with the difficulties. If it was not as a result of social services involvement, it created instability and removed M and S from the support that could have addressed the concerns. In his evidence, the MGF agreed that there had been a number of moves and he acknowledged that it resulted in disengagement with services. However, he did the best he could and would do no differently. I agree that this lack of reflective ability, would place PM at risk of similar concerns if placed in his care.

MGF and his wife also cared for PM from 15.05.2024 – 04.07.2024. M joined them unexpectedly on 16.5.24 as she reportedly missed PM. Ms Wilkins describes “During this time, MGF is described having “real alarm bells, as she (M) didn’t want to go out with him, had to be prompted to do everything, she just wanted to go out”. MGF expanded on this, saying “She was worried about taking him out because he was crying. In your mind you’re thinking – is she coping? Is she struggling too much? I was really worried about her not waking up to him at night”. I asked them what they were doing when they had these red flags? MGF shared that they did all they could. MGF added that “it was almost like she wasn’t there because we were still doing everything.” In her evidence, Ms Wilkins was of the view that their lack of action in respect of these concerns with professionals was significant. MGF rowed back considerably from these concerns stating that it was not that bad; M is a good mother; her alcohol use is not an issue (despite telling IVA assessor that she could drink herself to death – he said this was just an expression). In his evidence, asked by Ms Pepper if he was concerned or curious about PM’s injuries which followed shortly after their stay with them,he said he was and had asked M about the injuries but because she was agitated, he “did not push it”. The CG expressed her concerns about MGF’s lack of insight in his responses in the witness stand and prioritising M over PM’s needs and welfare. PM would be at risk of harm if MGF is unable to act protectively or put boundaries in place.

PM is a lovely little boy. He is loved by his parents and MGF and his wife with and it is clear that he loves them too. Contact has been positive when it has taken place. M and F have at times been able to meet PM’s basic needs. Both parents have shown attuned care and warmth towards PM in contact. The professionals agree that within the contained environment of the contact centre, the parents have been able to demonstrate positive interactions with PM.

M has been undergone two parenting assessments. Ms K undertook a parent assess model approach which is tailored to parents with learning difficulties. Mr K also implemented the recommendations of Dr Bayliss. M showed limited engagement with the assessment. Ms K acknowledges some of the positives in M’s care by stating “M presents with some meaningful strengths in her parenting, particularly in structured and supported environments. During family time, she demonstrates affection, attentiveness, and a desire to meet PM’s needs—especially in areas such as play, learning and hygiene”. However, Ms K was clear that, when PM was in M’sr care, there were clear patterns of neglect, emotional dysregulation, poor judgment, and risk exposure. Ms L told the court that she was concerned that M had been unable to demonstrate meaningful insight into the concerns related her care of PM and it is her view that M is at risk of not meeting PM’s needs were he to return to her care.

M has engaged with other assessments, already highlighted, which raised concerns about her functioning and abilities in light of her assessed needs. M has struggled to consistently attend contact with PM. This has improved more recently since the frequency was reduced. The risks in the M's care are highlighted above and are significant. M does not show insight into these concerns and her evidence to the court begs serious questions about her ability to meet PM’s needs in the short, medium or long term. She has her own significant needs which require significant level of support.

F has also had two parenting assessments. F’s initial PCA was undertaken by SW, and could not be completed by her. F’s mother was critically ill and he had to fly home to his family which resulted in him not being able to complete the PCA . The Court approved a second assessment which was limited due to his lack of engagement. It sets out the risks to PM from the F and the concludes that the F is unable to offer safe attuned care to PM. F’s time with PM in contact is positive although his attendance is inconsistent. The PCA highlighted that F’s limited engagement prevented a fuller exploration of the areas of concern and support. F has acted protectively on occasions such as when M left PM in the care of Mr B, by calling the police and on 18.7.24 by notifying SW about the marks he noted on PM’s body. However, he has not always followed through his concerns. He did not inform the police of his concerns as he did not have a SIM, and he did not chase up on M taking PM to hospital on 18th July. Despite expressing concerns about the injuries, F did not show concern about PM in M’s care or curiosity as to how the injuries happened on the in evidence. He has been involved in altercations and events that have impacted his engagement and health. Further, F’s responses as to the practicalities of PM, were PM to be placed in his care, demonstrated a gross lack of understanding of his son’s needs. He said that if placed with him, F would need to notify the council (as his cannot have a child in his flat) which he had not done; he had not made enquiries about nursery or GP. Of course F can do this if I make the orders, however F’s responses betrayed a lack of thought as to what it would mean for PM to be in his care and how PM’s needs would be met. F has never cared alone for PM. He had not initially told his family of PM’s existence. His financial circumstances are unclear and arrangements as to who would care and support unclear. The professionals say a further assessment would not afford the court a different picture of the F’s parenting. F has his own vulnerabilities which require support and therapy which he does not think he needs.

The MGF has had two assessments - a viability assessment which raised concerns about his insight and understanding and did not recommend further assessment. Despite this, the LA commissioned an SGO assessment by Ms Wilkins. This is challenged as being inaccurate. Mr Martey states that it relies heavily on the past. Ms Wilkins readily acknowledged the love that MGF has for PM and positives of contact, but she was clear that the risks in MGF’s care far outweighed the positives. In his evidence MGF pointed out that, despite the difficulties with M and S, they now share a very close bond with them. His wife speaks to his daughters more than him. He receives PIP for his back troubles, which only flare up in the winter. He is able to travel as often as necessary to support M in caring for PM. He stated clearly that M was a good mother and would be able to care for PM. He also said that F was a good father. Admirable as it is that the MGF now has positive relationships with his daughters, Ms Wilkins was of the view that the history of family conflicts, mental health challenges by both M and F, and lack of safeguarding action and continued lack of insight highlight the unsuitability of a placement with MGF. The CG and ASW in their evidence agreed with this.

Can these risks be mitigated through support and/or therapy? M is engaging with CGL now and since January this year. Her HST results in May 2025, despite her engagement, remain a concern. CGL are considering the highest level of intervention. This will involve prehab work for 12 weeks and subject to M’s engagement with this, a 12-week detox. It is commendable that M is now taking steps to address her alcohol use although, as set out earlier, her acceptance of the necessity of this work begs questions about her commitment to it. This work is yet to start.

M has been offered assessment by adult social services before by ASW. I have seen a text exchange between M and ASW where M explains their role and urges M to engage with this. M declined this. During the course of this hearing M has emailed them and intends to engage with the Care Act assessment which will consider her needs and look at support.

Dr McDermott recommends specialist intervention with respect to M’s diagnosis of personality disorder. M does not accept this diagnosis or the need for therapy.

Dr Bayliss recommends assessment of ADHD for M. The status of this assessment is unknown.

F also requires work to address his alcohol misuse. He does not consider this is necessary telling the court that he can control this. The HST dated 17.1.25 contradicts this.

F was visibly emotional when talking about his mother, being unable to be with her when she died. He was, by his own evidence deeply affected by her passing. He has not taken up the offer of bereavement counselling offered by ASW.

The complex family dynamics has been a feature of the family since before these proceedings. I note that the family have been offered family therapy through CAMHS and other services in the boroughs M and S were living. This had not been taken up by the MGF and his wife. MGF did not consider that he needed any support or work to look after PM, but would be willing to do any work if considered necessary or directed. There is no confidence that this will be taken up again if offered.

In relation to domestic violence work and insight, the work M previously had been referred to with respect to domestic abuse had to be closed as M did not attend. The F has not done any work around his understanding of domestic abuse. This is work yet to be done, for M and F to demonstrate an improved insight into the abuse and for M to safeguard herself in the future.

F has limited support in the UK. He relies on M and her personal network for support. This was evident from the evidence provided. Although he told the court that he previously concealed PM’s birth from his family, he said they now know and are keen to see PM. Such a change is not supported by the evidence overall. F has made no attempts to seek or promote contact between PM and his wider family. F is close to his family who remain in Iraq. The details of what support they could offer remains unclear.

M relies on F, MGF and her stepmum for support. She speaks very positively about them. They have travelled to London on a number of occasions to support her and PM. However, beyond this, M’s personal support network is limited. MGF and his wife live in Wales. They have their own set up there and their own health issues that have previously prevented them from being fully available to PM and M. The LA confirmed that an FGC was offered to the family network but declined in 2024. Another FGC has not been requested by the family.

Ms Wilkins was of the view that further work would not assist with MGF and his wife’s insight without the acceptance of concerns. The MGF’s responses with respect to M’s drinking, mental health and PM’s injuries were alarming and betrayed a real lack of insight. When asked by me what level of supervision or support M and F would need to see PM, if he was placed in their care, MGF said, in his opinion, beyond one supervised session to ensure basic parenting, supervision was not required. This was following an exploration of the injuries to PM and his acceptance that PM had been injured in M’s sole care.

The professionals are of the view that there is no amount of work or support that can be put in place to mitigate the risks to PM, if placed in the care of M, F or MGF. I agree.

There are 4 realistic options before me: (i) adjourn the final decision for further assessment of F (ii) placement with M/MGF and (iii) long term foster care or (iv) adoption.

The advantages of adjourning for the assessment of F are:

The disadvantages are:

I am not satisfied that a further parenting assessment of F is necessary. The court already has ASW’s parenting assessment, limited by F’s engagement with the assessment. Despite its limitations, it answered the questions about the F’s insight, commitment and ability to work with professionals, which has been adopted and expanded upon by the CG in her final analysis. The court has had the benefit of feedback from contact centres and other professionals. In my judgement, there are no gaps that need further assessment. I refuse the application for a further parenting assessment for the F. There is no evidence to suggest that this delay is purposeful or warranted.

The benefits to placement with M or F are substantial. M and F love PM dearly. M is committed to PM. She described missing PM when he was away from her and her despair when he was removed from her care. M’s interactions with PM have been observed to be positive and acknowledged by all professionals. In M’s care, PM’s identity needs will be met, and PM would be able to maintain relationships with her natural family. PM would see F, although the evidence on how this would be managed were unclear. He would be able to see and spend time with MGF.

Similarly, F is also committed to PM. His contact with PM is noted to be positive, albeit inconsistent. In his F’s care, the identity needs would be met, and he would be within the family fold spending time with M and wider family.

Similarly, the placement with MGF has many advantages. MGF loves PM deeply. He described time spent with PM vividly. A placement with MGF would carry the advantage of PM being with the wider family, maintaining those relationships and being able to see his M and F, albeit with support. It would meet his identity needs.

When considering the disadvantages of a placement with M, F and/or MGF, I have firmly in mind the words of Hedley J in Re L. It is not the court’s role to separate children from their parents because those parents have experienced mental health difficulties or have a difficult past. The issue is whether M, F or MGF’s care will meet PM’s needs.

In this case, the M, F and MGF have all been assessed negatively. The M’s assessments – parenting, psychological and psychiatric, highlight concerns about her ability to meet PM’s needs consistently. F’s PCA similarly highlights concerns about his ability to meet PM's needs safely.

M has caused physical, emotional and psychological harm to P. She has failed to prioritise PM when she has felt overwhelmed and not sought help or support when PM has been injured. The professionals have concluded that M is unable to meet PM’s needs independently or with support. M presents as vulnerable and fragile in her own right. In his conversation with the Children's Guardian, the MGF said that M could not parent alone but changed his stance in his oral evidence.

The lack of transparency, with respect to what happened to M and PM in July last year begs the question about M’s ability to work openly and honestly with the professionals. PM will be at risk from exposure to M’s mental health, the conflict in the relationship between the parents – it is likely that F will seek to be involved with PM if placed with M – and M’s inability to safeguard from conflict and harm is significant.

The MGF has been assessed thoroughly, and the assessment does not recommend placement with him and his wife. MGF’s personal circumstances – his ill health, his inability to safeguard and parent his own children, and his lack of insight into the risks, are considerable.

I have already highlighted the concerns the professionals hold about the MGF’s failure to report the “red flags” he and his wife saw in respect of M’s care of PM, against the backdrop of the injuries that followed. MGF’s evidence to the court, in the presence of M, which contradicted his previous concerns to professionals and police, suggests an inability to robustly safeguard against the risks posed by M and demonstrates a reactive approach, rather than a proactive approach.

Further, having assessed the MGF’s, M’s and F’s evidence really carefully and giving them every allowance of how difficult it is, in my view all have an entirely unrealistic view of their own abilities and also the needs of PM.

The pressures on MGF would increase drastically were PM to be in their care. By his own admission MGF intends to support M’s mental health needs, and support S and her children. He also supports his wife, who has her own health needs. In my view,MGF would struggle with caring for PM, with his own emerging individual need and the stresses it brings.

For the reasons I have already highlighted, M, F and MGF do not have support network that they can rely on. Their own problematic relationships are a concern. MGF does not find M to be a reliable witness, including with respect to concerns she has shared with him about F. M did not tell him about injuries to PM because she was concerned about the consequences. MGF is unaware of the extent of his daughter’s alcohol and substance misuse. He does not consider her mental health difficulties to be significant. Similarly, F told the court that despite raising numerous concerns about M’s self-harming when drunk, getting aggressive when drunk, and their conflicts when drunk, this is not a concern for him. I have no confidence on the evidence that the parties would abide by any boundaries or orders dictating their arrangements. MGF’s evidence on this was lacking and he did not consider any restrictions or support necessary.

I have already set out the support that has been offered, declined or awaited. I accept that under a statutory framework of a care order, or supervision order, M, F or MGF would be entitled to support from the LA. However, this in my judgment would not address the risks from M’s negligent or harmful care. The LA had in place a robust package of monitoring and support in July 2024. Despite this, PM came to significant physical harm. Any intervention is limited by the lack of transparency and insight on behalf of all parties. In the circumstances, any statutory framework to support the placement would be ineffective.

M proposes that PM could remain in foster care under an interim care order [interim care order] whilst she undertakes the work with CGL, and she subsequently applies to discharge the ICO after completion of the work.

The advantages are that PM would be with FC who knows him and is committed to his care. PM would continue to have contact with M, F and MGF. The assessment of the FC is due to take 12 weeks in any event, so the delay would not necessarily be prejudicial.

However, the disadvantages of placement in long term foster care are significant. The CG was clear that this would not be her preferred outcome for PM, who is 14 months old. He would be subject to the LA checks and interventions which come with being a looked after child. There would be stigma about being a looked after child and there are no guarantees with respect to his continued placement in his current placement. He would experience disruption and instability if that happens. Further, if M is unable to make the necessary changes and/or seek his return to her care; he could remain in FC for the remainder of his childhood or the next 16 years. He will not have permanency. The professionals are clear that this option is not tenable or in his best interest.

If PM were to become adopted, it will sever his legal ties with family. He will lose the opportunity to grow up within his natural family. He will lose the benefit of the loving and affectionate relationships he has with each of her parents and MGF and his wife. His understanding of his identity would likely be limited to life story work and indirect letterbox contact.

I have already set out some of the challenges and disadvantages that may arise from PM being adopted. There is a risk that no adoptive placement will be found for the PM, in which case he will have an extended period of uncertainty about his future. There is a risk that an adoptive placement may break down. If that were to happen it would be devastating for this child to once again lose the connection with his primary carer.

The placement order application report is a document which persuades me, in combination with everything else, that PM’s welfare will be safeguarded and promoted by the making of such an order. The professionals argue that PM deserves permanency and stability which the making of a placement order will afford. I was pleased to hear from tASW and the CG that there is some optimism about PM remaining with his FC as his adoptive carer.

I come now to the balancing exercise, comparing the placement options. Delay is generally seen to be against the interests of the children, and that is certainly so in this case. PM has experienced significant harm and disruption. In those circumstances, I do not consider that it would be right to defer this decision. And so, I must compare the options as they stand now. When I consider the pros and cons of each of the realistic options, I reach the conclusion that the only viable option for this child is adoption. It is the only means by which PM will receive the stability and security that he needs to thrive and reach his full potential.

I dispense with the consent of the M and F to the making of a placement order because the child’s welfare requires that I should do so, for the reasons I have already given. I acknowledge how draconian an intervention this represents. However, in the context of this case, I am satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate. In this case, nothing else will do.

In this case the welfare of the child throughout his life requires that I make a care order and a placement order and I approve the plan for adoption.

I turn now to contact. The local authority’s plan for contact is a reduction in contact following the making of final orders. It is set out in the care plan as follows: Should Care and Placement Orders be granted, contact between PM and his parents would gradually reduce, and would become once per week for a month, then once a fortnight for a month, and then once per month until an adoptive placement has been finalised. It is recommended that extended family members can attend contact once up to three times a year until adoption matching has been progressed. There is an agreement that following the making of final orders that post adoption contact between PM and his parents and MGF will be considered. The CG recommends that subject to their acceptance of my decision and risk assessment, M’s and MGF’s contact can be considered jointly. This will ensure that PM sees his MGF, if M is unable to attend.

The welfare of the child remains my paramount consideration. There is a real benefit to PMin having a stepped reduction in contact so that he can adapt over time to seeing his parents less frequently.

Whilst I acknowledge that contact has been and remains positive, it is imperative that contact remains positive. The post-adoption contact is subject to the parents and MGF being able to come to terms with my decision and being able to put PM’s stability first. If they are able to do so, then the LA intend to have discussions with prospective adopters around contact post-adoption as part of their searches. However, they do not intend to limit the searches to only adopters who will facilitate this. I agree that this flexible approach best meets PM’s needs moving forward.

I adopt the LA’s care plan in respect of contact. I make no orders in respect of contact, but I do invite the LA to consider contact post adoption, particularly for MGF.

I want to thank the parents and MGF for their attendance at what has been a difficult and emotive hearing, and to the LA and Guardian for their assistance. I thank the advocates for their assistance and for their representations on behalf of their clients.