IMPORTANT NOTICE
This judgment was given in private. The judge gives permission for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of this judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.
IN THE FAMILY COURTSITTING AT WOLVERHAMPTON WV25C50296
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989
Before:
HIS HONOUR JUDGE REDMOND
Re E (expert costs) [2025] EWFC (B)
SHROPSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL
-and-
MOTHER
FATHER
A SEPARATELY REPRESENTED CHILD
THE CHILDREN
Solicitor for the Local Authority: Ms Blackmore
Solicitor for the Mother: Ms Dosanjh
Solicitor for the Father: Mr Davis
Solicitor for the Separately Represented Child: Mr Hughes
Solicitor for the Children: Ms Jones
JUDGMENT
This is an ex tempore decision about costs in an application for expert evidence under Part 25 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 for a psychological assessment of the family in an exceptional situation where there has been inter-familial abuse. There are four children, one of whom is residing under local authority care in a residential placement.
All parties consent to the application and it is abundantly clear to the court that it is necessary to justly resolve the proceedings. It clearly lies far outside the expertise of the social worker and the children’s guardian. Indeed, only two senior psychologists have suggested that they could undertake such a complex piece of work and to do so within reasonable timescales even though those themselves take us well outside the normal timetable for these proceedings.
In those circumstances, I do not need to rehearse the details or intensity of the sexualized behaviour, which is very sadly appearing to cascade down the sibling group. It is serious and it is actively harmful. It involves multiple siblings of various ages and appears to be evolving. The full details of the case or the children are not contained within this judgment to preserve their anonymity.
The reason for this judgment is one of cost and I have referred myself to the approach in Re K and Re S [2025] EWFC 100 and the approach of the working group as to experts. This clarified the approach to be taken as to costs in care proceedings where an expert assessment was necessary. It is not the case that local authority’s ought to be routinely covering shortfall in expert rates and the court gave guidance as to how that should be properly approached.
This local authority has recently declared an emergency financial crisis and are under certain obligations as to how they may authorize their own finances. They have the court’s sympathies for the position they find themselves in. They are unable to agree in the interim to cover the shortfall due to their own statutory obligations and the application process, which would likely fail without a full outcome from the LAA.
I have considered the list at paragraph 29 of Re K and Re S and in short would say the following to each heading:
All efforts, by the children’s guardian and indeed by the authority itself, to identify an expert with the requisite experience and expertise has been undertaken. Only two have come forward to confirm they have such ability to do the work and they are both outside of the prescribed rates. This is far from a run of the mill assessment and I would consider such to be exception in terms of its material and indeed of the seniority of the experts required. It is a complex piece of work that will require skill and seniority.
No such expert that is within rates has been found despite a search to do so, primarily due to seniority and ability to undertake the specific and highly specialised piece of work.
This authority are not being considered routinely as a source of funding, rather the court is faced with a situation where it has to balance delay with giving directions for costs.
I look to the guidance at paragraph 29(iv) and it is entirely right that such approach is followed. I have also looked at the interim approach endorsed by the Court of Appeal at paragraph 33 in that there could be agreement or court order to provide for local authority funding on an interim basis once the LAA process and any challenge has run its course. In this situation it seems unlikely that would come to fruition but without such confirmation the legally aided parties are not able to commit to the instruction. The amended guidance at paragraph 2.4 now makes clear that any agreement or court order of this description is of no relevance to an LAA decision whether to grant prior authority.
The children’s team have moved swiftly and already put in the application and it is simply paused waiting for my order that it is necessary before it can be considered. The parties are all clear that this assessment, which itself will take some time due to its nature and sensitivity must not be delayed. Therefore, I will order the authority to make up the shortfall in the interim, if all other avenues fail which include:
The application for prior authority to the LAA, which I very much hope will be granted in these circumstances. Such must be argued fully and include all relevant material for the LAA to consider.
A request for an internal review were that application to fail.
The provision of full reasons why any application failed, so that all parties may understand the reasoning.
At least active consideration (including by the local authority) of judicial review, noting the funding of the same and delay.
The local authority is invited to assist the legally aided parties in the submission to the LAA and if there are any material or arguments they consider ought to be included to promptly bring those to the attention of the children’s team.
I note the comments in Re K and Re S regarding there being no readily available route of appeal to an LAA decision short of judicial review or the internal review process. I know that parties will consider that fully. I also note the lack of guidance as to the amount of prior authority funding, though am hopeful that the comments by the President in that case will have assisted the LAA to consider its policy on the same in how it approachs these difficult applications with the stretched resources that it has. I will confirm within my order why I endorse the parties’ view that this assessment is exceptional, has a specific complexity and requires a professional of the seniority of the practitioners put before me. Such funding decisions remain a matter for the LAA and a route has been provided above for funding.
I am satisfied that the requested evidence is necessary to justly resolve the proceedings and that the conditional funding order is justified following the principles of Re K and Re S.