Bournemouth Christchurch and Poole Council v A Mother & Ors

I am concerned with: R, [who] is seven years old; and S, [who] is six years old. The children’s mother is […], and their father is […].

The Local Authority commenced these proceedings on 24 March 2025, at which time it sought Interim Care Orders.

On 4 April 2025, Interim Care Orders were made by me. I also made a Non-Molestation Order, excluding the father from the children’s school and the route to and from school from the mother’s home. That Non-Molestation Order sits alongside another Non-Molestation Order, and I will come back to the details of that.

The children have remained living with the mother throughout the proceedings.

The judgment I gave on 4 April 2025 was transcribed, and I do not need to rehearse what I said at that time. The judgment sets out the Local Authority’s initial evidence, as well as other evidence, the relevant law and my concerns at the time (on the basis of the test in section 38 of the Children Act 1989).

I will come back to the procedural history later, which I think is relevant to the issues before the Court now. The Court has carefully case managed this case throughout. The case has been listed for yesterday and today for a Final Hearing.

I have read a very full bundle of evidence, and I have been assisted during the course of it by the legal representatives of the Local Authority, the mother, and the Guardian, and by the father, who appeared in person.

I have heard evidence also from a number of witnesses, and I will come back to those in due course.

The fact that I do not mention something now does not mean that I have not fully considered it. It is impossible, as you will appreciate, for me to refer to absolutely everything that I have heard and read.

The parties’ positions, in summary, are these: the Local Authority seeks Final Care Orders for both children. The Care Plans are for the children to remain in the care of their mother, and the Local Authority proposes supervised contact between the children and the father once each month. The Local Authority would seek to review whether it should apply to discharge the Care Orders once arrangements for the children’s contact with the father have been safely and consistently established. It thinks that that will take at least six months. In the alternative, the Local Authority seeks Supervision Orders.

The mother supports the Local Authority’s Care Plans, as does the Guardian. The Guardian submits that the Non-Molestation Orders in place should be extended for five years, and I have heard submissions from the parties also in relation to the making of a section 91(14) order.

The father opposes the Local Authority’s Care Plans. He disputes that threshold is met. Further, or alternatively, he disputes that the Local Authority has followed appropriate processes in getting to this point in the proceedings. He invites the Court to make no order in these proceedings, and to consider also discharging the Child Arrangements Order – made by DJ Lacey, on 3 July 2024 in Private Law Proceedings, under case number BH23P00600 – in its entirety. He seeks, in essence, a shared care arrangement, and what he explained would be “freedom from the constraints” imposed by the Court’s orders.

The father also applied, after all of the evidence had been completed, for permission to ask questions of the mother in cross-examination about his proposed Parenting Plan. He had been given a mechanism at the IRH to seek for the mother to give live evidence, if he wanted her to do so, which would have necessitated the appointment of a qualified legal representative. He did not follow that process. In any event, the father’s position throughout (as I have indicated) has been one for shared care. The evidence about the mother’s parenting is positive, and I did not see that his extremely late application was likely to add anything to the overall evidence, so I dismiss that application.

The father also applied at the same time for the Court to defer making final decisions until after his criminal proceedings have concluded. Those involve allegations of breach of the Non-Molestation Order, originally made in 2023, which are but one aspect of the evidence in the case before me.

I do not see that the decisions that I need to make are contingent on the outcome of the criminal proceedings. I remind myself about section 1(2) of the 1989 Act. All of the evidence in these proceedings is now complete. I have already dealt with the relationship between the criminal proceedings and these proceedings, in the judgment that I gave on 4 April 2025. The standard of proof is higher in criminal proceedings. In all the circumstances, I also dismiss that application.

There is no dispute in relation to the jurisdiction of the Court. Both children are resident in England and Wales.

The issues for the Court focus primarily on R and S and their needs. In determining questions about their upbringing, it is R and S’s welfare that is of the Court’s paramount consideration, and in the context of the application before the Court, it is their welfare throughout their childhood that is relevant.

Other principles also derived from section 1 of the Children Act 1989 include that any questions about R and S’s upbringing are ones that the Court should try and resolve without delay, because delay is likely to prejudice their welfare. I should not make any order unless I think it would be better for R and S than not making an order.

Subject to any questions around the risk of harm, the presumption is that the involvement of both of their parents in R and S’s lives will further their welfare. So when parents separate, what follows from that is that the starting point is that children should remain in contact with the parent that does not administer their day-to-day care. That starting point is, of course, subject to questions around their welfare.

When coming to the conclusions that I do in this judgment, I have had regard to the considerations referred to in section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989.

Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights is engaged. So orders that I make have to be weighed against the right of those affected to respect their private and family life and their home.

I can only make a Care Order or a Supervision Order in the circumstances set out in section 31 of the Children Act 1989, and that involves me giving consideration to the question of whether the children are suffering (or likely to suffer) significant harm, and whether that harm is attributable either to the care given to them (or likely to be given to them) if I do not make the order sought, that not being the care reasonable to expect a parent to give to the children. That is usually referred to as “threshold.”

“Harm” has a particular meaning in that context. It is set out in subsections (9) and (10), and what the Supreme Court has reminded me, in the context of the case called Re B (Care Proceedings: Appeal) [2013] 2 FLR 1075, is that this is a fact-specific exercise. Significant harm contemplates something more than commonplace failure or human inadequacy. It requires something considerable, noteworthy or important. It need not be intentional or deliberate, leading to a deficiency in parental care.

In resolving disputed issues of evidence in this court, where a person asserts a particular fact, it is that person who has to prove it. The burden in relation to matters supporting its application is, therefore, on the Local Authority. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.

I have reminded myself of the binary impact of decisions made in the Family Court. There is a case, Re B [2008] UKHL 35, which deals with that.

I have reminded myself that it is common for witnesses to lie in the course of an investigation or hearing. They can do so for all sorts of reasons. For example, shame, misplaced loyalty, fear or distress. It does not follow that just because somebody lies about one thing, that they have lied about everything else: R vLucas [1981] QB 720.

I have also reminded myself of the fallibility of witnesses, something examined in a bit more detail in a case called Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Limited & another [2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm). Fallibility affects a witness’ reliability rather than their credibility.

During this hearing, I have heard direct evidence of things said, done or experienced by witnesses, themselves. I have also heard some original evidence. For example, descriptions of things said, relied upon for the fact they were said, rather than necessarily for the truth of their contents.

I have also heard hearsay evidence, things not experienced by witnesses directly, but which are relied upon for the truth of their contents. In relation to hearsay, generally speaking, hearsay evidence will carry less weight; in particular, when it is in competition with direct evidence.

Nobody has sought that the children give live evidence, and so Re W (Children) (Abuse: Oral Evidence) [2010] 1 FLR 1485 considerations have not arisen during the course of these proceedings. There is some evidence of direct work having been undertaken with the children, and records produced of what the children have said during the course of that direct work. There has not been any challenge to the way in which that direct work has elicited information from the children, and that is important, when I consider (for example) the ABE Guidance, and the sort of comments about children’s evidence set out in a case called Re P (Sexual Abuse: Finding of Fact Hearing) [2019] EWFC 27, by McDonald J.

The opinion evidence is to be considered in the context of all of the other evidence: A County Council v K, D & L [2005] EWHC 144 (Fam); Tower Hamlets v MK [2012] EWHC 426 (Fam). I also have firmly in mind the bounds of the expertise of those experts and professional witnesses who have given opinion evidence in this case: Re S [2009] EWHC 2115 (Fam).

Turning to my overall impression of the professionals’ evidence, I heard from Katie Brewster, the currently allocated social worker; Laura Dormer, who completed the Parenting Assessments; Lorna Mawby, the Guardian; and also Dr Abbie Pearce, who was a psychologist. All of those witnesses came to court, in my assessment, with a clear intention of assisting me to make decisions. Each of them was, during the course of their evidence, able to reflect on their opinions and recommendations, and say whether they agreed with propositions put to them during the course of cross-examination or not.

There was no need for me to hear live evidence from the mother, and I did not, and I have already addressed the application made by the father at the conclusion of the hearing.

The father’s evidence, given both in writing and orally, contained a fair amount of reference to ideals, and in an imaginative or poetic way. He gave, during the course of his live evidence, extremely long answers to questions, which I thought went well beyond simply providing context. I doubt that that was in an effort to frustrate the ability of the Court to conclude this hearing within the time estimate. For example, when he was offered the opportunity for a break, he said he wanted to continue with his evidence. There was evidence that he had thought about how his own aims might be achieved, and he was keen to provide detail around that orally, notwithstanding the extended explanations in his written statements. He had a tendency to deflect questions asked of him; in particular, where there was potential criticism of him, and to answer a different question to the one asked. In those ways, it seemed to me, he had sought to control the narrative that he gave to the Court.

The Local Authority’s amended threshold document refers to concerns about the father’s poor mental health, neglect of the children’s physical and emotional needs by the father, and other emotional harm to the children, directly and indirectly caused by the father's behaviours.

Although, in his initial response to threshold, the father had accepted some of the Local Authority’s threshold pleadings, his response to the amended threshold had retracted from that somewhat. Between the two statements, the father had parted company with his solicitors and, as I say, he has represented himself during the course of this hearing.

It is necessary for me to explore the evidence about quite a number of topics, therefore.

In terms of the background, the parents were in a relationship from about 2015. R was born in September 2017 and S then in January 2019. The parents separated, as I understand it, in or about February 2022.

On 27 April 2023, the Court made a Non-Molestation Order, on the application of the mother against the father without notice to him, and that was under case number BH23F00183. That order was made final on 12 May 2023, on the basis of no admissions being made by the father and no findings having been made by the Court.

Subsequently, the children were subject to Child in Need planning, from August 2023.

On 13 October 2023, there is a description of an incident in the Local Authority’s evidence, whereby the father is said not to have been due to have contact. However, he attended at the school, barged past a member of school staff, his aim being to remove the children from school. That is described as a distressing incident for the children, which resulted in police involvement.

The children were on Child Protection Plans from December 2023. The children were the subject of Private Law Proceedings, as I have indicated, which concluded on 3 July 2024. On that date, the Court had made a Final Order that the children live with the mother and spend time with their father, including unsupervised time and overnight time. Handovers were to be facilitated by the maternal grandfather, […], on the corner of […] in Bournemouth.

Public Law Outline started in October 2024, which included pre-proceeding assessments of both parents and a psychological assessment of the father, which I have referred to in my judgment of 4 April 2025, and which I will come back to shortly.

There have been a significant number of applications in the Family Law Act proceedings, and the latest version of the Non-Molestation Order was made by DJ Nother, on 20 March 2025. That extended the Non-Molestation Order until the end of August this year. That is after the date, as I understand it, by which the father’s criminal trial (in respect of the allegations that he breached that Non-Molestation Order) will have concluded.

Immediately after that order was made on 20 March 2025, the father applied to vary it, to allow for handovers at the mother’s home in […].

The Local Authority’s evidence within these proceedings includes reference to a significant agency involvement, including MARAC referrals, flowing from breaches of the Non-Molestation Order. Those are set out in some detail. They include stalking and harassment by the father of the mother, various breaches of the Non-Molestation Order, for example uploading pictures to social media, threatening to attend the family home and doing so, abusive communications via the Parenting app, text messages and song lyrics being sent in large quantities.

The father has a style of writing and speaking, which in my judgment makes it quite difficult to discern at times precisely what he says about those sorts of concerns. I will come back to the threshold pleading in due course though, as that is in issue.

During the PLO process, the Local Authority was concerned about the father cancelling sessions with the parenting assessor and meetings. Although the parents had started to communicate again via the Parenting app, in February 2025, the Local Authority was concerned about the propriety of the way in which the father was conducting those communications, such that a social worker intervened. A contact schedule was in place, but the father sought to vary arrangements and demanded contact outside of the scope of the schedule. His communications have been characterised as accusatory and relentless. He is also said to have been confrontational with school staff.

As I say, on 24 March 2025, the Local Authority issued these proceedings. An initial hearing took place on 25 March 2025, the next day, and the Court then gave directions through to the contested ICO hearing, which came before me on 4 April 2025.

In the meantime, on 1 April 2025, the father made a contempt application against the mother, in respect of the Private Law Children and Family Law Act proceedings.

I explained, in the judgment that I gave on 4 April 2025, why I thought that application to have been misconceived. The father ultimately applied to withdraw that application, and I gave him permission to do that on 6 May 2025. In his final evidence, the father said that he had recognised that “even the stress associated with the contempt proceedings was having a tremendous negative impact on the delicate dynamics.”

Also on 4 April 2025, I dismissed an application from the father to adjourn the ICO hearing and, as I say, I made the Interim Care Orders sought. I also made that additional zonal Non-Molestation Order against the father, for the protection of the children.

At some stage after the hearing on 4 April 2025, the father ceased to have representation of solicitors and counsel, even though he has an entitlement to public funding in the context of these proceedings. He told the Court that he felt let down by his previous solicitors, and he said that he was unable to find anyone else to represent him. In any event, he has been fully involved in the case management of this case, including the timings for the giving of evidence during the course of this hearing.

On 9 May 2025, I dismissed the father’s application, dated 20 May 2025, to vary the Non-Molestation Order made in the Family Law Act proceedings, as well as his oral application to vary the Non-Molestation Order that I had made on 4 April 2025. I certified both of those applications as to totally without merit.

On 16 May 2025, the father made applications for variations of contact arrangements and for discharge, again, of the Non-Molestation Order, made on 4 April 2025. Those were, essentially, a repetition of the applications dealt with at the hearing a week earlier. I dismissed the applications on paper, on 20 May 2025, and certified them as totally without merit, for the reasons given in the recitals to my order.

The father had exercised his right to appeal the orders that I made on 4 April 2025, and his appeal was dismissed on 30 May 2025 and was certified as totally without merit.

On 16 July 2025, the father applied for permission to cross-examine the psychological expert at this hearing and also to strike out the Local Authority’s application. I granted the former application, at a hearing on 21 July 2025. I dismissed the latter application at the same hearing and certified it as totally without merit.

On my calculations, therefore, the father has made six applications in these proceedings, which have been certified as totally without merit.

The father has been charged, as I have said, with breaches of the Non-Molestation Order and the criminal proceedings are ongoing. He told the Court that he was going to enter a not guilty plea at the next case management hearing, against the backdrop of his previously having sought (or considered seeking at least) a stay of the criminal proceedings as an abuse of process.

The father was clear, also, that he would appeal the order that I make today if he were to disagree with it, which chimes with what the Guardian had recorded in paragraph 4 of her initial analysis. The father had thought that the Guardian had, in fact, misinterpreted what he had said.

A psychological assessment of the father was completed by Dr Abbie Pearce. That is incorrectly dated. It was completed on 28 February 2025. In addition, Dr Pearce has provided an addendum report, dated 11 July 2025, in response to written questions from the father, and (as I say) on 21 July 2025, I gave permission to the father to cross-examine Dr Pearce at this hearing.

Dr Pearce confirmed, in cross-examination, that the testing under what is described as Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory IV formed only part of her overall assessment and that she did other work, which fed into her assessment.

Dr Pearce concludes that the father’s responses indicate longstanding personality traits of a histrionic, narcissistic and paranoid nature. Whilst his responses were not indicative of an acute episode of serious mental illness, they suggested low mood.

Dr Pearce observed that the father demonstrates a superficial comfort with himself, which can border on the grandiose. When difficulties are highlighted, he is likely to minimise the seriousness of such difficulties, or find fault in other people, as a defensive strategy. She was of the view that relationship tensions were likely to affect his somewhat fragile self-esteem and lead to temporary emotional dysregulation and that he was quick to deprecate those who refused to accept his superior self-image.

All of that was evidence which Dr Pearce maintained in cross-examination, and her view was reinforced, she said, by what she had since read, having had full access to the bundle.

In my judgment, the father’s tendency to express himself in a colourful way, by reference to literature, was interesting of itself, but also in the sense that it supported Dr Pearce’s views of his personality traits. Indeed, the way in which he has conducted himself throughout this hearing has been largely consistent with the views expressed by Dr Pearce, I thought.

Dr Pearce assessed the father to suffer from moderate depression and mild anxiety, and she concluded that his defensive and rigid responses obstructs his ability to engage with concerns in a meaningful way. She thought he minimises or denies the harm he might cause; instead, seeking to find fault with others in a way which deflects criticism of himself.

No diagnosis was made of an identifiable psychiatric disorder, but it is noted that the father’s mental records were not available during the course of the assessment.

Dr Pearce’s conclusions in those respects were, in my judgment, supported by the way in which the father gave his evidence during the course of these proceedings, as well.

Dr Pearce considered that the father’s minimisation of issues and emotional defence – namely a tendency to transform failures into successes and to externalise blame – was likely to be a longstanding coping style deployed by the father, rather than being a transient coping style borne of the current situation.

She had been asked (in the father’s written questions) whether the father’s presentation might have been affected by the fact that he spent less time with his daughters, and she considered that that might have contributed to his anxiety or low mood, but that it was unlikely that he was experiencing PTSD or complex trauma as a result.

Dr Pearce was clear that the father had capacity to engage in the proceedings. It was interesting that she even went so far as to say in cross-examination that the father used the language of a psychologist during her assessment of him. But, she also said, some of that language was not used entirely appropriately, which suggested that he had simply been keen to try and show her how intelligent he is. She referred to his style having been grandiose on several occasions during the course of her oral evidence; other examples being his tendency to refer to poetry and to represent himself as a hero in his story.

She concluded that what seems to hinder the father’s ability to engage more fully with the proceedings and the professionals is an emotional defensiveness, and she thought that the father was unable to accept that his relationship with the mother was over.

Dr Pearce also concludes that because the father is not able to fully engage with the concerns of the Local Authority, it was not possible for her to be confident that he is currently able to prioritise the needs of the children above his own, or that the father would be able to work meaningfully with the Local Authority, the mother or her wider family, and other professionals in an open and honest manner.

She saw no evidence that the father is motivated to reflect on his behaviour or the effects and to sustain changes to how he behaves in relation to the mother. In that context, she was doubtful that therapeutic intervention was likely to be beneficial.

That said, Dr Pearce recommends various therapies, to be engaged with for between three and six months, should the father express a willingness to reflect on his own behaviour and take responsibility for making the changes. She recommended psychological therapy, namely the cognitive analytic therapy, brief psychodynamic therapy, or EMDR.

I asked Dr Pearce how one could assess whether the father has insight and is ready to start therapeutic work. Her concerns were that the father was consistently seeking to place blame on other people, as a way of defending himself from his own painful feelings. She thought he was not reflecting on his own thoughts and behaviours and how those could impact his daughters, in particular. She said that evidence of insight would require him to be able to demonstrate introspection. What feeds into that is the father’s own evidence, during which he appeared to say that he did not consider that he needed the therapy recommended, at all, even at this stage.

When I asked Dr Pearce how one could measure that therapy had resulted in the changes that the professionals wanted to see, she said that that would require a reassessment, which could be undertaken by the treating therapist, if the treating therapist were an appropriately qualified clinical psychologist or psychiatrist. They would need to be astute to the risks of pseudo-engagement or disguised compliance. She thought that the three types of therapy that she had recommended would also assist to avoid there being potential for the father to undergo therapy as a tick box exercise.

The benefit of the work would be to improve the father’s ability to take responsibility for his own behaviours, to engage more meaningfully with others, and to improve his own wellbeing. That would then have more positive benefits in overall terms for R and S, and no doubt the mother, as well.

The father was asked whether he had identified any therapists, in the light of Dr Pearce’s recommendations. He did not, in fact, directly answer that question. But he referred instead to a programme that he had researched, called ACORN, which – as I understand his evidence – is a recovery programme for male survivors of domestic abuse.

The mother’s Parenting Assessment concluded positively. I do not need to go into any more detail than I set out in the judgment that I gave on 4 April 2025. Ms Dormer’s Parenting Assessment of the mother was not the subject of challenge during the course of these proceedings.

The father’s Parenting Assessment concluded negatively. Ms Dormer was cross-examined by the father about how she conducted her assessment. Whilst Ms Dormer had made reference to the psychological report of Dr Pearce, she was very clear in her evidence that she had not relied wholly on that report. Her assessment was based also on the work that she had undertaken herself, and the conclusions she reached, she explained, dovetailed (to an extent) with the views of Dr Pearce. She explained the method or the way in which she had approached the assessment, which had started with an assessment plan being sent to the father before the work started, and then the assessment having been conducted in accordance with that plan.

Ms Dormer concluded that the father was unable to respect legal boundaries. He exhibited persistent controlling behaviour and emotional manipulation of both the mother and the children, which posed a significant safeguarding risk. She said that whilst he maintains that he is acting in the best interests of R and S, his actions demonstrated prioritisation of his need for control over their emotional wellbeing.

Protective factors, she thought, needed to be put in place, to ensure that R and S were not subjected to further emotional distress or exposure to coercive behaviours. She gave recommendations, focusing on limiting direct contact, ensuring structured and predictable contact arrangements, and prioritising the children’s need for emotional security over parental disputes.

She expressed views about the ways in which R and S had been impacted by ongoing parental conflict, coercive control, and emotionally volatile behaviours exhibited by the father. Both children, she noticed, have shown signs of emotional distress, heightened anxiety and insecurity.

Ms Dormer set out certain recommendations and protective measures. Those are that: the father is to adhere to court orders and professional safeguarding measures; the father is to engage in the therapies, with intervention, to address emotional regulation and reflective parenting; the father’s contact with the children is to continue to be supervised or monitored; the father is to engage in parenting work, focused on emotional awareness and child-centred parenting; and that the father’s contact is to be structured, so it minimises exposure to conflict and emotional distress, ensuring predictability, security and emotional stability for both the girls.

Taking those matters in reverse, Ms Brewster told the Court that the quality of supervised contact with the father, when it is taking place, has been good. R and S clearly enjoy their time with their father, and Ms Brewster describes a variety of activities, which they have undertaken with the father, which were clearly positive. Ms Dormer was also very clear that the children clearly derive benefit from their relationship with their father.

The father has raised issues, during the course of the proceedings, about bruising seen to R’s arm. Ms Brewster gave an extremely comprehensive answer to the father’s question about that. R had made no allegation which suggested that she had been harmed as a result of care given to her. The bruising, which was apparent, was not consistent, for example, with pinch marks. No concerns have been raised by the school. R had had a medical for other purposes, which had revealed no concerns in relation to the bruising. So, the Local Authority concluded that it did not meet the threshold for a section 47 investigation, but the Independent Reviewing Officer and the Guardian were notified.

The Guardian was cross-examined about it, as well, by the father, and she expressed no concerns about these being non-accidental injuries, in the context of R being a clearly active child.

The father does not accept that outcome. He was clear, during this hearing, that he believes that the maternal grandfather inflicted the bruise on R; although, I am bound to say, I did not understand his explanation as to why he was so certain it was the maternal grandfather who was to blame, notwithstanding the context that he purported to provide. He remained angry about the situation, he said. He thought that the police were right to take no further action because a prosecution was not needed. But he was critical of the Local Authority’s decision not to convene a strategy discussion, which he thought was wrong.

Concerns have also arisen, during the course of these proceedings, about the inconsistency of the father attending contact. Ms Brewster thought that that may have contributed to the children’s distress, when, for example, contact which did take place was coming to an end.

The father has acknowledged, in his evidence, that he perhaps prioritised the prosecution and his litigation, rather than contact. At the IRH on 18 June 2025, I sanctioned certain rules, to avoid the children being disappointed that contact, which they thought was going to take place, was not taking place, and to avoid wasted trips to the contact centre.

Ms Brewster confirms that that was a start to addressing the situation. Better consistency has meant that the children’s ability to manage their emotions when contact with the father has ended has improved. But Ms Brewster considered that there was still a long way to go, to ensure consistency for the children.

Ms Dormer, too, thought that there was a need for a supervision of contact. That was in connection with the risks of emotional volatility and coercive behaviours from the father. In her oral evidence, she told the Court that R and S had witnessed dysregulated adult behaviour, which would have been frightening for them and distress arising from parental conflict, and she considered that the need for supervision was ongoing, until such time as the father had developed insight and completed the therapy recommendations.

The Guardian gave similar evidence to that.

Ms Dormer did think that supervised contact could move from the confines of the contact centre building to the community, if there were consistency in terms of the contact that was taking place.

The father, to his credit, told the Court that he would take up the supervised contact proposed by the Local Authority, if the Court were to order it.

Ms Brewster told the Court that the parenting work that the father says he has undertaken was not the same as the parenting work recommended by Ms Dormer. The work that the father has done were not evidenced-based parenting assessments, to support coparenting practices, emotional stability and conflict resolution strategies, which was what was intended by Ms Dormer.

Ms Dormer, too, thought that the work needed to be more in-depth, because the issues (as she saw them) were longstanding and entrenched, and there was a need to monitor the father’s progress against the objectives. Ideally, she thought that the parenting work would be face-to-face work. But she would envisage, in any event, that a report would be provided at the end of the work, to demonstrate what had changed.

The Guardian thought that the father could usefully undertake work as a perpetrator of domestic abuse. She referred, for example, to a Building Better Relationships programme, which of course may be available to the father in the context of any work that he does through HM Probation Services. An alternative may be a Domestic Abuse Perpetrator programme.

I have dealt with Dr Pearce’s recommendations for therapy. I will come back to recommendations that the father adheres to rules set.

The father was not really able to articulate any deficits in his parenting, other than that he was unable to get R and S to school on time sometimes. But he did think that there would be other examples.

He maintained the position, in his oral evidence, that whilst there are things which humans – all humans – can do to improve, there was nothing which would merit making Public Law Orders. He thought that the ideal outcome would be to take family arrangements out of the court environment. He thought that he might pick up some tips from the parenting work that had been recommended, but I was left with the clear impression that he did not think that he had anything substantive that he needed to learn.

The Local Authority seeks a Care Order, in order to share parental responsibility, so that it can provide additional safeguards for the sake of the children. The Local Authority, as I say, has confirmed that it will review the position after six months.

Ms Brewster took the view that the father’s insight at this stage remains lacking; in other words, he does not see that his own behaviours impact R and S. Challenges which remain, she thought, included those around father’s communications with the mother and the maternal family, and the children then getting caught up in that, and that has been an issue which has persisted for a significant period of time.

The Local Authority’s evidence refers to concerns in November 2023, for example, of inappropriate conversations or communications via the Parenting app. She considered that the father needs to reflect.

Ms Brewster also thought that consistency for the children is another challenge. The father did not accept that his inconsistency in adhering to contact arrangements in the past was either true or had an impact on the children. Set against that, though, was that he thought that more clarity was needed; although, he did not think that the order of 3 July 2024 was unclear.

The Local Authority does not support the idea of unsupervised contact or shared care. As I say, the Local Authority’s proposal is for supervised contact once a month. But of course, if the Court grants the Care Orders sought, the Local Authority has an obligation to keep contact under review.

The father has proposed a working agreement. Neither Ms Brewster nor Ms Dormer considered that a working agreement was enough to secure the welfare outcomes needed for the children at this stage. Ms Dormer referred to the alleged breaches of the Non-Molestation Order and the inappropriate use of the Parenting app, for example.

Ms Brewster was asked a series of questions by the father, intended to flush out whether the Local Authority had failed to follow due process, in terms of engagement of the independent reviewing officer with the care planning for the children.

I am satisfied, having listened to Ms Brewster’s evidence, that the Local Authority has followed due process in that respect, and so I reject the father’s submissions that it had not.

Ms Brewster confirmed that the Local Authority is willing to fund therapeutic work recommended by Dr Pearce and the parenting work recommended by Ms Dormer. Neither of those types of work have started yet.

Initially, Ms Brewster explained that that was because the father had refused the intervention. There then appears to have been a meeting with the father – I think at some point in June 2025, she said – and since then, the father has agreed to engage with that work. There has been a delay in the work starting, because there has been a need to make a reference to the Local Authority’s brokerage team to source that work.

The Local Authority supports the application for a section 91(14) order, and it refers to the need for the father to focus on the work required.

The father remained broadly true to his written evidence, except his initial response to threshold (and I will come back to that, in a moment), and I do not need to summarise all of the written evidence that he has given.

He appeared to say, at one point in his evidence, that he wanted to reunite with the mother, so that they – the parents and the girls – could, once again, be a family unit. He was asked about that, again, on behalf of the Guardian, and ultimately, he said that he saw that as a possibility. He thought that the Local Authority was wrong to have issued proceedings and that that, in itself, caused the children harm. He also said that the maternal grandfather had escalated issues. He clearly apportioned a great deal of blame towards the maternal grandfather, and the father said of the maternal grandfather that there was a difference between his having enabled relationships, in terms of child arrangements, and the maternal grandfather’s own accountability.

The father did not accept that he was fixated in his own wishes and feelings. Fundamentally, when he was asked whether he had accepted that he had caused the children harm by his actions, his answer was, I thought, quite unclear. He tried to apportion some blame towards the mother and thought that he and the mother needed to work more closely together.

The Guardian’s views, ultimately, were not changed after hearing all the parties’ evidence, and her evidence is set out in her initial analysis and her final position statement.

In relation to threshold, the father is right that the proceedings were issued on 24 January 2025, which is the relevant date for the purposes of paragraph 2.

In his initial response to threshold, dated 31 March 2025, the father had – as I have understood it – accepted that he had, at times, poor mental health, but only when the children were not in his care. He did not accept neglect, and he denies the other allegations were to do with his parenting.

Notably, the father refused to accept that the contents of that statement were true, during the course of this hearing. I was not sure whether that was because he had not seen the document that had been prepared on his behalf and approved it, or whether it was something else. I did not really understand his reluctance in that respect, in that the Court had had that document before it; for example, at the hearing on 4 April 2025, when it was discussed in some considerable detail.

At that hearing, on 4 April 2025, certain concessions were made in submissions on behalf of the father, which I recorded in my judgment. He, however, no longer accepted during this hearing (in accordance with the recital to the order I made on 4 April 2025) that the children had been exposed to emotional harm, as a result of parental conflict, some of which was due to his own behaviour.

The Local Authority’s threshold has since been updated, and the father has responded to that separately in writing and during the course of this hearing. His position now is that threshold is not met for the making of any Public Law Orders.

In relation to the father’s mental health, I was satisfied – after hearing their evidence – that the opinions of Dr Pearce and Ms Dormer were valid. Both had identified – in different but overlapping ways – that the father’s need to feel that he is in control has, at times, impacted his ability to prioritise the wellbeing of R and S. My conclusions are also informed by views I have reached about the father’s litigation, which I will return to shortly.

I do find, taking those things together – and, in particular, considering the views of Dr Pearce – that paragraph 4 of threshold is proved.

Paragraph 5 refers to concerns around the father’s capability of meeting the children’s basic needs. The father disputes these aspects of threshold. Given that the Local Authority has the burden of proving them, I have some sympathy with the father’s position that the Local Authority has not served witness evidence from the relevant school staff, for example, who have made the observations that are recorded in the evidence.

Of course, we do have the school’s records and correspondence within the disclosure. The father could, himself, have obtained the statement. But fundamentally, the school’s documents stand as hearsay, and Ms Dormer’s comments on these issues derive from, I think, the same sources, rather than from her direct observations, something which she accepted in cross-examination.

When assessing the father’s evidence – that his attendance to the children’s basic needs is good enough – I have asked myself why the school would have lied about the matters it had recorded in its report of 1 April 2025. I do not think that it is likely that it would have been motivated to do so.

I also have in mind that Ms Dormer’s recommendations in relation to parenting work are not directed really at basic care, but more towards the coparenting relationship between the parents and the father’s responses in the context of the children’s emotional needs.

On balance, in my judgement, whilst I accept that the children turning up to school, having not had the most nutritious breakfast perhaps, or with dirt on their clothes, is not desirable, and probably that is something that requires improvement, I do not consider that the Local Authority has proved that those things meet the test of significant harm, taken at their highest. Similarly, the sleeping arrangements probably need to be addressed, if they have not been already. But on their own, those issues, I thought, were unlikely to warrant the making of Public Law Orders.

Paragraph 6 is an allegation that the father was likely to have caused the children emotional harm. In my judgment, paragraph 6(a) is proved. The father does not seem to deny the allegation in his response to the amended threshold, and my conclusions are informed by an issue that I am going to come back to shortly.

In his response to the amended threshold document, the father does not seem to deny the circumstances of paragraph 6(b), when he is alleged to have thrown a table at the mother in front of the children and then forced her out of the family home at some stage before the parties separated. The father accepted that he did all of that in his oral evidence but said that it was his response to the mother having tried to provoke him to hit her, so his actions were – he urged the Court to accept, in a sense – ones which defused the situation.

Even if the father is right about that – and I do not think he is – that must have been a frightening incident for the children, something which the father seemed unable to accept, in what he said was the sterile environment of this courtroom. The father did not acknowledge that the incident had had any bearing on the matters now before the Court, and that it was unhelpful to have aired it at all. I do not agree with that, and I find the allegation proved.

Paragraph 6(c), the incident at school in October 2023, involves a factual matrix which is broadly agreed. What is interesting about the father’s evidence is that he accepts that he was triggered at the time of that incident and that the context was that he was aggrieved about the behaviour of the maternal grandfather. What the father does not demonstrate in his evidence, in my judgment, even now is insight into the impact of his behaviour on the children, or specifically R, in the context of that incident, in terms of putting her in the middle of the adult conflict. I accept the school’s evidence, that this was traumatic for the girls.

Although the father contests the idea that R – rather than S, I think, as it is set out in the threshold document – was capable of checking his phone, and was critical about my observation that six and seven year olds are probably more technologically minded than I am, what is clear from the direct work that Ms Dormer undertook with the children is that both R and S expressed (in different ways) that they felt that the father’s behaviour could be unpredictable and that they were worried about the father’s attitude towards the mother. I did not conclude that what the children are said to have said to Ms Dormer was untrue. So on balance, I, therefore, find paragraph 6(d) proved.

Similarly, that direct work supports the threshold allegations in paragraph 6(e), (f) and (i), which are also consistent with the other evidence before the Court. I find all of those allegations proven, and – for the avoidance of doubt – my concern about paragraph 6(e) is not so much that the sleeping arrangements were inadequate, but the perception of S that she was being treated differently to R.

Paragraph 6(g) is supported by the school disclosure, on the basis that the father was not in the school at the time. I do not see that the facts either can realistically be contested by him, and he does not seek to do so. However, I accept that there may be any number of reasons why the children present as tearful, and so I do not find this particular allegation proven, of itself.

Paragraph 6(h), in relation to supporting the children with homework, is an allegation which the father accepts is an area he could improve on. I do not accept the fact that because the children are six and seven years old, and not studying for their GCSEs, absolves him of his responsibility in that respect. But I do accept that the issue, by itself, would be unlikely to result in the Court making Public Law Orders.

The father does not deny paragraph 6(j), and indeed some of his evidence supports the contention that he has not been consistent in attending contact. He was clear, in cross-examination, that he had not gone to contact sessions because of the way in which his body he reacted to circumstances in which he had found himself. I will return to the issue, in terms of the evidence since the relevant date of threshold. But I do find the allegation proved.

The concern that I have is that the father did not attend contact because it was too much for him, rather than because there was a sound welfare basis for not going. He was able to see – but only after seeing the Local Authority’s evidence – that R was disappointed that he had not turned up for contact. My concern is that he had not foreseen that as a likely outcome, before he had made that decision not to go.

I am satisfied, therefore, from the evidence that the children have not only suffered harm but are also at risk of suffering harm in the future. I am satisfied that the harm was, and is, attributable to their father and that his parenting fell below what the Court would objectively consider to be reasonable.

The realistic options that the Court is invited to consider by the parties are essentially limited to one, but different variations of it. There is no contest that the children should continue to live with the mother. The question that the Court has to deal with is the time that R and S spend with the father.

The father, ultimately, seeks a shared care arrangement, probably free from the restrictions imposed by court orders. The other parties seek that the Court makes Care Orders and other orders. The exercise that the Court, therefore, conducts is in assessing what is the least interventionist approach in all of the circumstances.

When considering the welfare considerations, including those in section 1(3), there are a number of matters that are relevant for all purposes.

The first is that there is very clear evidence that both parents love R and S. Nothing that I say is intended to diminish that deep love that both parents have for their children.

The second is the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the children. R and S clearly love their parents on my reading of all of the evidence that is before the Court, and they clearly both see both of their parents as important figures in their lives.

The Guardian described the children as a little guarded in the way in which they expressed themselves. But it is reasonable to assume also, given the law that I set out at the start, that provided it is safe, both R and S would wish to either live with, or have the involvement in their lives, of both of their parents. They would want to live with them or have regular contact with them, if they could not.

Thirdly, at six and seven years old respectively, the children are reliant on their primary care givers to be able to meet most of their day-to-day needs, whether those are their physical, emotional or developmental needs. What follows from that is that both R and S need to receive care which is both safe and predictable. They would wish to live in a home where they are loved, well cared for and feel secure.

Social workers sometimes talk about timescales. Sometimes it is unclear what social workers mean about timescales for children. But what we do know, because it is enshrined in law, is that delay is prejudicial for children.

I am conscious that the evidence that I have referred to paints a picture of a long period of instability for the children, since the parties’ separation about three-and-a-half years ago. That represents, to put it in context, about half of the children’s lives.

Those matters, I think, are relevant to the parents’ capacity to meet the children’s needs, and in this case the evidence is that the mother is able to meet the children’s day-to-day needs and to provide the sort of safe, attuned and consistent care that I have referred to.

Although the father appeared, at times, to be seeking to challenge the Parenting Assessment of the mother, and he has raised issues around bruises caused he says by the maternal grandfather, fundamentally his final evidence envisages that there would be a shared care arrangement involving both parents for the children, and what follows logically from that is that he has no real safeguarding concerns for the children when they are in the care of their mother.

The consequence of that is that my focus is necessarily on the parenting of the father.

The issues for the father’s care of the children are not, to a material extent, about day-to-day basic care; although, as I have said, there are some issues in relation to routines, nutrition, hygiene and sleeping arrangements, which I have addressed separately.

The quality of supervised contact is good. However, I bear in mind that that takes place in an environment which is, to some extent, artificial, because it is designed to protect children and, generally speaking, the supervision of contact, in itself, causes parents to behave well during the course of it.

The significant concerns are about the father’s ability to provide attuned care on a consistent basis, and to protect them from harm flowing from adult conflict and his own emotional wellbeing.

So, when considering questions of harm that R and S have suffered (or are at risk of suffering), the factors informing the sources of risks relate, in my judgment, primarily to how the father presents, both in terms of the coparenting relationship with the mother and as a parent to R and S, against the backdrop of parental conflict and his insight.

Sometimes children exposed to dysregulated adult behaviour can find themselves at risk of physical harm, because they are caught in the crossfire. Fortunately, that does not appear to have been the experience of R or S, save perhaps in relation to the incident whereby the table was thrown.

In other circumstances, children are at risk of emotional harm because they witness behaviour which is, in itself, frightening or upsetting. Children caught in the centre of their parents’ conflict can often start to feel conflicted themselves. That can manifest itself in all sorts of ways and perhaps not straightaway. For example, children can start giving mixed messages, saying one thing to one parent and another to the other. On other occasions, children can start to align with one or other of their care givers.

Furthermore, it seems to me that when parents do not have a full understanding of the impacts of their behaviour on the children, that can, in itself, affect their ability to conduct adequate assessments of risk and to respond reliably, or to prioritise the children over other things and to protect them from harm.

The children clearly have a positive relationship with the father, and he has been present throughout their lives. There are many benefits associated with their parents’ involvement in their lives. For example, R and S grow up with their parents’ love, their sense of belonging, the benefits of the wider family support network, and those sorts of things.

However, in my judgment, there is clear evidence that the father has either not come to terms with the fact of the parents’ separation, or that he harbours ill will towards the mother and her family as a result of it.

I have outlined the procedural history in some detail quite deliberately. That, in itself, illustrates in my judgment how the father has used litigation post-separation as a form of abuse directed at the mother. I do not believe, for example, that his contempt application – made shortly after these proceedings were commenced – was for a purpose other than to put the mother under pressure and to try and control outcomes for himself. He told me – directly, in fact – at the hearing on 4 April 2025, that he did not want to see the mother punished.

However, if it was not that, what was it? The children’s welfare was already in issue in these proceedings. He did not need, therefore, to try and undermine the order made on 3 July 2024, at the conclusion of the Private Law proceedings, or the restrictions which were in place as a result of the Non-Molestation Order. His focus could, and should, have been on the future, in prioritising the needs of R and S, keeping them safe, and keeping the mother safe. The father had access to legal advice and representation. The outcome of a contempt application was never likely to achieve a variation in child arrangements; the objective is, generally speaking, to punish those who are found in contempt of court or to deter future breaches.

In my judgment, it is highly likely that the contempt application was made as a form of abuse against the mother in those circumstances, and I am going to make a finding to that effect.

What the father’s litigation also shows amply, in my judgment, is that when the father does not like outcomes that are imposed on him, he finds them difficult to accept. He then tries – relentlessly, I think – to push the boundaries of what he is, or is not, permitted to do; or he attempts to control outcomes in other ways.

That is consistent also with the views expressed by Dr Pearce, Ms Dormer and Ms Brewster, all of whom gave a variety of different examples of the father doing exactly that.

Another example was the father’s application on the afternoon of 20 March 2025, after a hearing of the application that very morning, to further amend the Non-Molestation Order. The Non-Molestation Order prevented the father from entering […] in Bournemouth, but he wanted to be able to effect handovers before and after contact at the front door of the maternal grandparents’ home, with monitoring by the Ring doorbell camera. However, the Child Arrangements Order provided for handovers to take place at the end of the road. There was no need for the amendment to give effect to the Child Arrangements Order, and in my judgment, he simply wanted to be able to engage more directly with the mother and her family.

The problem is that the father sees his own objectives as his end goal, and misses in the process the impact on others, including his children. The father accepts in his statement of 6 June 2025, that he got his priorities wrong. For example, that he prioritised his appeal of my order of 4 April 2025 over having regular and consistent contact with his children. He told the Court that his rationale had been to tackle the adult issues in the court arena, but I did not understand why he could not have had contact at the same time. He said that he had been misguided when I asked him about that. I inferred that, if he had been misguided, it was by himself, and that then underlines the deficit in his ability to promote the children’s welfare over what is going on in his own mind.

The father has, throughout these proceedings, applied to discharge or vary orders without sound basis, sometimes running the same arguments twice as an abuse of process. He has applied to adjourn significant hearings. He applied, after the IRH, to strike out the Local Authority’s substantive application, and (as I have already said) he has made two applications at the conclusion of all of the evidence in these proceedings, which in themselves (had they been granted) would have resulted in further delay.

Whilst I accept that parents are entitled to challenge applications brought before the court, to test the evidence and to fight for the best relationship they can have with their children, what is of concern in this case in my judgment is that the father has given priority to the litigation and has, in the process, lost sight of the needs of his children. Indeed, even the way in which he conducted his cross-examination during this hearing tended to suggest that his insight into the children’s needs was a clear work in progress. He did not see the impact on the mother, with whom the children live, and all of that was supported by the views of Dr Pearce.

On that point, having read and listened to the father’s evidence, he has in my judgment shown zero insight into the impact of his behaviour on the children and the mother. It was submitted, on behalf of the Guardian, that it was startling, in fact, how little insight he has shown during the course of this Final Hearing, and I agree. He thinks that he is right, and that everybody else is wrong.

I do not agree with him. His behaviour has been abusive, in a variety of ways, established by the threshold findings that I have made and by the finding I have just made about the way in which he has used litigation as a means of perpetuating abuse against the mother.

Set against that is that the father sees himself as the victim. He has been considering engaging in work as a victim of domestic abuse, rather than perpetrator work, which is consistent, of course, with the Local Authority’s evidence that he does not see his behaviour as the problem.

Taking another example, in the father’s cross-examination of the Guardian, the Guardian articulated her view was that the father was a perpetrator of domestic abuse. It was clear again – from the father’s reaction – that he did not see that, at all, in his own behaviours.

Until the father has been able to show true introspection and an intrinsic understanding of the need to bring about change, I can see why Dr Pearce has doubt about the father’s ability to engage meaningfully with the therapeutic work that she has recommended, to sustain change for the benefit of the children. That, in my judgment, is also likely to apply to the parenting work recommended, which has, as I have said, as its focus parental behaviours and coparenting.

The father’s draft working agreement does set out some admirable objectives. However, fundamentally, I do not consider that the father really believes that change needs to be made by him.

I am satisfied, though, that the sort of change that is articulated by Dr Pearce and Ms Dormer is needed. The father has shown no sign that his behaviours have changed since proceedings began, which poses ongoing risk for the children, and the mother with whom the children live. The ongoing risk of emotional harm to them is, therefore, in my judgment, high.

That is notwithstanding that the Non-Molestation Order has been in place for several years, and that other measures have been put in place, such as the maternal grandfather facilitating handovers, all of which were designed to reduce risk for the children of being exposed to parental conflict. The father, in fact, suggested during the hearing that it was advantageous for the mother to have had no communications with him, in a way which I inferred he thought was a way of her manipulating him. He, in contrast, did not reflect on whether he had had any part to play in the mother not wanting communications with him. The father characterised the restriction on communications as “suffocating and unhelpful.”

That, in my judgment, gives me little confidence that a relaxation of the current restrictions would not then result in the father’s harassing and abusive behaviour increasing once again, or communications from the father to the mother being abusive, in themselves. He accepted that communications with the mother and maternal grandparents was something which was challenging and that there was room for improvement on his part, and so perhaps there is a glimmer of hope there.

In addition, the evidence is that when the children have been in the care of the father, they have been exposed to adult issues or behaviours and have felt distressed as a result.

For those same reasons that I have already expressed, I do not see that a shared care agreement is workable at this point in time, and indeed I do consider that there remains a need for the father’s contact to continue to be supervised. The idea of there being no Child Arrangements Order in place, at all, is even less attractive, in my judgment.

The exposure of the children to harm, as a result of the father’s behaviour, has been capable of eventuating in actual harm in an instant. The supervision of contact has, at least, provided a safe environment in which the children can have a positive relationship with the father, whilst also maintaining some boundaries, and which ensures the wellbeing of the mother with whom they live.

I have considered whether I could conclude proceedings by making Private Law Orders for supervised contact. That is, of course, possible. But the issue with that is that the mother is then left holding the ring in terms of arrangements, because the Local Authority’s role would effectively be diminished or fall away. A contact supervisor’s role only goes so far. The problem with that, in my judgment, is that it exposes the mother to a risk of harm, which she has not been able to manage in the past, even with the best will in the world and the assistance of the maternal grandparents, or with the protection of the Non-Molestation Order.

The Local Authority’s position is that the mother should not be left having to engage with the father at this stage in relation to child arrangements directly, a position supported by the Guardian and the mother, and a position with which I also agree.

The impact on the mother of the father’s abuse is likely, in my judgment, to impact her emotional wellbeing, and then that has an indirect impact itself in turn on R and S. Even during these proceedings, there have been concerns around handovers effected outside the contact centre. That is notwithstanding the Local Authority’s involvement with the children for a significant period. They have been on Child in Need Plans, Child Protection Plans, they have been through PLO, and concerns have remained even since the making of the Interim Care Orders.

I said, on 4 April 2025, that I considered that the time for advising, befriending and assisting had passed. I have seen no real improvements in welfare terms for R and S since these proceedings began, and I agree with the submission made on behalf of the Guardian, that that is all down to the behaviour of the father. In particular, it is to do with the father’s lack of recognition that he needs to take responsibility and do things differently, and that leads me to the clear conclusion that he remains very early in his own journey.

The severity of the residual risk for the children and the mother, with whom they live, therefore remains high, as I have just said.

A Care Order at home is an exceptional order to make. I have considered Re JW (Child at Home under Care Order) [2023] EWCA Civ 944,the Best Practice Guidance, at paragraphs 34 to 37, of the Public Law Working Group March 2021 report, and Appendix C of the April 2023 report on supervision orders. I struggle to see how a Supervision Order can be made to work, given that which I have just set out. However, what the Local Authority proposes is to progress the work identified by Dr Pearce and Ms Dormer, with the father under a Care Order and to maintain the relationship between the children and their father in a managed way. With proportionality in mind, it would intend to review that after six months.

In six months, I agree that we will have a better idea as to how well the father is progressing against the objectives of the work that has been proposed. There is no need for these proceedings to be kept alive in the meantime, because the work that the father needs to do will clearly take some time.

In the meantime, I have reached the clear conclusion that the Local Authority needs to continue to share parental responsibility, to assist to manage the risks. A relaxation of the order in place now, in my judgment, would be likely to place R, S and the mother in the position whereby they need to bear the burden of addressing the father’s shortcomings.

That would represent an adverse impact on their Article 8 rights, because their ability to improve outcomes is non-existent in all the circumstances. The orders sought by the Local Authority interfere with the Article 8 rights of the father more. But fundamentally, for the reasons I have just set out, the ball is in his court, and it is up to him to engage with the work that has been identified.

Dr Pearce has set out how she thought the father’s progress could be measured; in other words, through a further report, as to the outcome of his therapy, and through the outcome of further parenting work.

So the father has a clear roadmap in that respect, in terms of what the output of the work which is proposed that he undergoes should (or will) produce.

If the father does not bring about change, then it may be the case, of course, that the father’s contact with the children will need to be restricted further; for example, for an order for indirect contact only, which may – in itself – mean that the Local Authority’s Care Order is no longer required. Alternatively, if the father does make positive progress – and I sincerely hope he will – the Care Order will likely be capable of being discharged and either a new Child Arrangements Order substituted on its own, or perhaps with a Supervision Order in addition. It is likely that all of that will require consideration afresh, depending on the evidence of the progress made by the father.

Either way, I can see why the Local Authority’s plan for a Care Order is likely to be time limited and that the father’s contact will need to be considered again.

So for all of those reasons, I do consider that the making of Care Orders is both necessary and proportionate, and given what I have just said about the need to start again, I consider that I should discharge the Contact Order, set out in paragraphs 3 to 11 of the Order of 3 July 2024, in its entirety.

The Local Authority’s contact proposals at this stage are appropriate, in my judgment. As I have said, it will have an obligation to keep them under review. The Guardian articulated, in her evidence, that she saw the monthly contact as a minimum.

The Non-Molestation Order, made on 27 April 2023, has subsequently varied – most recently, on 20 March 2025 – and should be further amended, in my judgment, to include a zonal restriction, to cover the mother’s new address and the road in which she will be living, as well as the address where she currently lives.

I am satisfied, having regard to the test in section 42 of the Family Law Act 1996, which has been considered through the case law, including usefully in a case called DS v AC [2023] EWFC 46, that there is evidence of ongoing molestation perpetrated by the father. I have expressed those reasons already, and I consider that there is an ongoing need for the intervention of the Court to control that behaviour.

The Non-Molestation Order that I made on 4 April 2025 should also continue. That may, of course, also need some further amendment if the mother is moving house – something which perhaps we should consider when drafting the orders.

In terms of the duration, given that it has been three-and-a-half years since the parties’ separation, given the lack of apparent change in all of that time, in my judgment, it would be proportionate to extend both orders, to a date which is four years from now. That is working on the basis that it will take at least six months for the father to demonstrate change, although I think actually, for the reasons I have outlined, it will take him longer than that. That will then be followed by a period of time, during which he will be expected to show that those changes can be sustained, and during that period the ongoing protection of the Non-Molestation Order, in my judgment, should remain in place.

I have expressed concerns about the volume of litigation instigated by the father or brought about as a result of his lack of insight into the impact of his own actions. He has a clear roadmap, as I have said, in terms of what he needs to do and what evidence he needs to be able to produce, in due course, to show that he has made change. That can be minuted in the recitals to the order that I make, so that he can remind himself of that roadmap, as and when he needs to.

I have considered the making of an order under section 91(14), in the context of section 91A of the Children Act 1989, and Practice Direction 12Q.

The making of an order would restrict the father’s ability to make applications for orders under the 1989 Act, and I consider I should make that order, also for a period of four years. It is not a bar on a meritorious application, which the father may make, supported by the sort of evidence that I have just referred to. But it does provide a filter on the applications.

The mother seeks for a direction that she would wish not to be notified of any application made by the father, unless permission is given to the father to pursue it. That is in order to further protect her emotional wellbeing. I am content to direct that, as it is she who has asked for that direction.

In addition, I have considered whether an extended or general Civil Restraint Order should be made against the father. That, in my judgment, would complement the making of a section 91(14) order, because it extends the filter to other types of litigation, and I have in mind specifically the Family Law Act 1996 applications.

The father has submitted that he will apply to discharge Non-Molestation Orders, if he is acquitted at the end of the criminal proceedings, which increases my concerns. Given that I do not have a jurisdiction to make an extended or general Civil Restraint Order, I am going to direct a transcript of this judgment at public expense, so that I can refer that issue to the designated family or civil judge to consider. [See BCP Council v A Father and A Mother [2025] EWFC 315 (B) for that subsequent consideration.]

Finally – and I did not hear submissions about this – I understand that the father did not pay the application fees due on his applications, dated 16 July 2025. I am, therefore, proposing – subject to hearing from him as to whether he has now paid those fees – that by four o’clock on 6 August 2025, he pays the application fees, in the sum of £190, or that he demonstrates by the same date that he is entitled to help with the fees, such that he is entitled to a fee remission. In that respect, I gather he has told the portal team that he has a Legal Aid certificate. But the problem with that is, of course, that he has dispensed with the services of his solicitors, and so the Legal Aid certificate has not been transferred to another firm.

So just as a summary: I am going to declare and order that the section 31 criteria have been met; I will grant the Local Authority’s applications for Care Orders; I approve the Local Authority’s Final Care Plans; I approve the contact arrangements in the Care Plans in respect of the father’s contact; I am going to direct a transcript of this judgment; discharge paragraphs 3 to 11 of the Child Arrangements Order of 3 July 2024; I have set out how I am going to vary and extend the Non-Molestation Orders; impose a section 91(14) Order; and there is that direction in relation to application fees.