EF (A Child) (Care and Placement Orders), Re

This is an ex tempore judgment in this case which has come before me today for an issues resolution hearing/early final hearing. The case concerns EF who was born in January 2025 and is accordingly almost six months’ old. EF has been cared for by foster carers for much of his short life. EF’s placement with his foster carers was underpinned by an interim care order which was made on 13 January 2025.

The applicant in this case is North Tyneside Council, represented by its in-house solicitor, Ms Chloe Armstrong. EF’s allocated social worker is Julie Coleman. The first respondent is EF’s mother, AB. She has not meaningfully engaged with these proceedings but is represented today by Mr Robert Hackett, her solicitor. She has not attended the hearing, but I am satisfied that Mr Hackett’s firm has made extensive attempts to contact her and to make her aware of this hearing. Mr Hackett tells me that there has been sporadic email contact, but nothing since March of this year. That was about the time that the mother ceased to engage with family time with EF. The second respondent is EF’s father, CD. He is named on EF’s birth certificate and therefore holds parental responsibility for him. He has not engaged in these proceedings and has only attended one session of family time with EF in April. The third respondent is EF through his Children’s Guardian, Sarah Raine of Cafcass. She was represented today by Mr Peter Crawley, her solicitor.

The Local Authority applied for care orders in respect of EF on 9 January 2025. The local authority’s plan for EF is that he be placed for adoption. A placement application was therefore made on 13 June 2025. The mother and father’s position in relation to these applications are unknown due to their failure to engage meaningfully with the proceedings. The Guardian fully supports the Local Authority’s plan in relation to the outcome for EF.

This matter was dealt with on brief submissions by agreement with the parties. The key issue for me to determine is whether a final care and placement order should be made today in respect of EF.

Turning to the legal framework governing public law orders, the burden lies on the Local Authority to prove all of the allegations which it makes. The appropriate standard of proof is the civil standard of the simple balance of probabilities. I have reminded myself of the case of Re: B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35 and in particular the speech of Baroness Hale. Any findings I make must be based on evidence and not on speculation and a decision on whether the facts and issued have been proved to the requisite standard must be based on all the evidence and should have regard to the wider context of social, emotional, ethical and moral factors, see A County Council v The Mother, The Father & X, Y & Z [2005] EWHC 31 Fam. In determining whether the Local Authority has discharged the burden upon it, the Court looks at what has been described as a broad canvass of the evidence before it. The role of the Court is to consider the evidence in its totality and to make findings on a balance of probabilities accordingly. Within this context the Court must consider each piece of evidence in the context of all of the other evidence, see Re: T (Children) [2004] EWCH Civ 558.

Neither parent has responded to the Local Authority’s threshold document and are therefore deemed to accept the threshold by virtue of the standard directions order made on 10 January 2025. In any event, I am satisfied on the evidence before me that all of the threshold and welfare findings sought by the Local Authority are established. The threshold findings principally concern the mother’s substance misuse, her mental health and the mother’s failure to seek any ante-natal care in respect of EF. The welfare findings principally relate to the failure of the parents to engage in family time or with these proceedings or with professionals. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the threshold for making public law orders which is set out in section 31 of the Children Act 1989 is crossed.

It is plain that, sadly, neither parent has provided any care for EF for some time, nor seeks to do so. The Local Authority sought to identify alternative family members who could care for EF. The assessments in relation to these potential carers were either negative or, in some cases, the potential carers declined to be assessed. The start position for EF is that there are no realistic options that would allow him to remain within his birth family.

Accordingly, the key issue which I must decide today in relation to EF’s future is whether I should approve the Local Authority’s care plan and make care and placement orders in respect of him. In determining that issue I bear firmly in mind that EF’s welfare is my paramount consideration, and I have reminded myself of the provisions of the welfare checklist set out at section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989. I approach the Local Authority’s application on the basis that the best place for any child is within their wider birth family, unless there are clear welfare grounds to prefer an alternative. My job is to consider whether EF could be cared for by any member of his birth family to a satisfactory standard within an appropriate timescale and not whether he might be better off being adopted.

In considering the Local Authority’s plan for EF and the placement order application, I must consider whether it accords with his welfare throughout his life to be made subject to a placement order. In doing so I am guided by the extended welfare checklist at section 1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. Section 1(4)(c), the likely effect upon him of having ceased to be a member of his family, and section 1(4)(e), the harm he has suffered and is at risk of suffering, appear to me to be the most significant matters. If I conclude that a placement order accords with EF’s welfare, I would have to determine whether his welfare requires me to dispense with the first and second respondents’ consent to the making of such an order. In relation to that issue, I remind myself of the guidance in Re: P (Placement Orders: Parental Consent) [2008] EWCH Civ 535. It is trite law that I must be satisfied that any orders I make are a lawful, necessary, proportionate and reasonable response to EF’s sad predicament.

The granting of a care order, let alone endorsement of a plan for adoption, represents a drastic curtailment of the rights of the parents, and EF himself, under Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, that could only be justified by pressing concerns for his welfare. When construing both the domestic and Convention law, I have in mind the judgment of the Supreme Court in Re: B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33 which was followed by the Court of Appeal decisions in Re: BS [2013] EWCA Civ 1146, Re: P (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 963 and Re: G (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 965. These cases forcibly make the point that placement for adoption is a very extreme thing and a last resort to be approved only when nothing else will do. Both the domestic and Convention case law require a high degree of justification before adoption can be endorsed as necessary in Convention terms or required by the 2002 Act.

Sadly, the only realistic plan for EF is a plan of adoption. His parents are unable and/or unwilling to care for him. There are no options within his wider birth family. Given EF’s age, neither long-term foster care nor residential placements are appropriate. There are no reasons to think that it would be difficult to place EF with potential adopters. Adoption for many younger children subject to care proceedings offers them the best chance of being cared for in a loving, stable family. In many cases that is the option that best meets their welfare needs throughout their life. Rejecting that option for a child is not something to be done lightly.

Adoption is, of course, no panacea, and adopters face all the problems of life encountered by other parents with the added complications that they are caring for a child who is not their birth child. Adoptions can and do break down occasionally with disastrous consequences and adoption would sever EF’s relationship with his birth family.

In looking at all the evidence, I must assess whether adoption best meets EF’s welfare needs throughout his life. I have, like the Guardian and the Local Authority, come to the clear conclusion that EF’s welfare needs are best met by offering him the chance of finding a forever family.

In the light of my conclusion as to which option best meets EF’s welfare needs it follows that I make a placement order in respect of him and dispense with the consent of the first and second respondents to the making of such an order. I also approve the Local Authority’s care plans including their proposals for contact. I also direct that a transcript be obtained of this judgment, grant permission for any relevant documentation to be disclosed to prospective adopters and make the usual order for public funding assessments of the legally aided parties.