S and T (Children: Domestic Abuse)

These proceedings concern 2 children, S who is now aged 8 and T who is now aged 4. Their mother is referred to in this judgment as ‘M’ and their father is referred to in this judgment as ‘F’.

These are long running private law children proceedings. The main application is F’s application for a child arrangements order issued on 6 October 2022. There are also now cross applications for non-molestation orders issued on 3 March 2025 (F) and 4 April 2025 (M).

The matter was listed before me for final hearing on 12 June 2025. I heard oral evidence on that day from Ms Brundish (the Cafcass Family Court Adviser) and from M and F. I then adjourned the matter for M and F to file written submissions which I received on 26 June (M) and 2 July (F).

The primary issues for determination at this hearing are:

The decisions that I have reached on those issues are as follows:

In this judgment I shall set out my reasons for reaching these decisions.

I shall also identify in this judgment some of the difficulties that were encountered before and during the hearing. These are by no means unique to this case, but cumulatively they made the Court’s task more difficult than it might have been. In so doing, I make no criticism of any member of the court staff or of Ms Gillan.

M is 38 and F is 37. Both are educated professionals in responsible employment. M works as a teacher and F works as an engineer. M has a British heritage. F’s heritage is from Country X. His English is good but it is not his first language.

The parties formed a relationship in 2012 and cohabited, with some periods of separation, until about May 2022. M left the home she shared with F, taking the children, in August 2022 to live with her parents. From that point F did not see the children (apart from for a week in July 2023) until provided for by my order of 21 October 2023.

This is the fourth written judgment I have produced.

On 13 September 2023 I allowed M’s appeal against a DDJ’s decision to direct a shared care arrangement between M and F. This was a decision made at a directions hearing, without hearing evidence, without making detailed reference to Practice Direction 12J Family Procedure Rules, and in circumstances where the children had not seen F for over a year. I set out my reasons for allowing that appeal in writing (the first written judgment).

On 17 to 19 April 2024 I conducted a 3 day fact-finding hearing into cross allegations made by the parents. On 14 May 2024 I handed down a detailed written judgment (the second written judgment) setting out my conclusions which I summarised as follows:

“The decision that I have reached at this hearing is that the father’s behaviour towards the mother during their relationship was coercive and controlling in the following respects:

(i)

Accusing her of trapping him when she became pregnant with S, alleging that he was not S’s father because she had been unfaithful and calling him “it” during her pregnancy.

I did not make a finding, as I had been invited to by M, that F had physically abused S causing bruising in July 2023. I did not make any findings of parental alienation against M as I had been invited to by F. I observed that both parents had overreported matters to the local authority and the police. I directed a welfare report from Cafcass pursuant to s.7 Children Act 1989 and relisted the case for a Dispute Resolution Appointment (‘DRA’) on 14 November 2024.

In the course of my 14 May 2024 judgment I made the following observations about the parents:

“The mother presented as an anxious and stressed person, very worried about the father and about their children. These proceedings have clearly taken their toll on her. She has struggled during this process to identify the core points in her evidence, preferring instead to provide a great deal of detail and extraneous material. That said, however, the impression I formed of her when she gave her oral evidence was that she was straightforward and truthful.”

“The father presented as very quietly spoken, at times almost inaudible. He had to be reminded to speak louder many times. He was appropriately emotional when discussing his children and his lack of contact with them, but otherwise he came across as generally oppositional and dissatisfied. He very much had a

point, or indeed a number of points, to prove. At times that seemed to me to descend to a childish level. He was reluctant to concede that his response to the mother’s announcement that she was pregnant was hurtful and inappropriate. His concerns appeared to represent point scoring rather than any genuine uncertainty. His concerns about the mother’s description of the children as ‘white British’ seemed exaggerated, particularly where that had never been discussed by the parents. I did not believe some of his evidence… Although quiet and moderate when he initially spoke, by the end of his evidence I formed the impression of someone so consumed by his dislike of the mother and the sense he had been wronged, that he was unable to tell the truth or to reflect upon his own behaviour.”

In the analysis section of my judgment I said this:

“The mother, as I have said, presents as anxious and stressed. The father presents as very quietly spoken but also as oppositional and dissatisfied. I formed the impression that the mother was a truthful witness whereas the father lied and exaggerated on occasions. Their dislike of each other was palpable throughout this hearing as it has been at each hearing. Their relationship was clearly troubled from early on. Both are close to their parents but the relationship between each and the other’s parents was difficult. For the mother there was a language and cultural barrier with the father’s parents. For the father he resented the mother’s geographical as well as emotional closeness to her family, whereas his family was living a considerable distance away in Country X. The father clearly feels culturally different and sees criticism or perceived unfriendliness towards him as being generated by racial, cultural or gender bias.”

I have considered in detail the interim arrangements for the children to spend time with their father on four occasions:

The interim arrangements have also been considered by other judges on other occasions.

The reasons for the delays in this case have been set out in my previous judgments. The greater the delay the more a case develops its own momentum. Events happen. The evidence expands. This case has consumed significant resources. It is questionable in my view whether much has been achieved for these children. The parents remain as anxious, angry, enmeshed and dissatisfied as they were towards the start of this process.

Despite every effort, the first date after the DRA on 14 November 2024 when a court room could be made available for me to hear this matter was 12 June 2025.

I gave case management directions on 14 November 2024 and at a short pre-trial review on 19 May 2025.

On 14 November 2024 I directed as follows:

“7.

Permission to the parties to file a further statement of evidence setting out a) any relevant events since the fact-finding hearing, b) their response to the s.7 Cafcass report, c) the order that they seek and the reasons why by 10 May 2025.

8.

The parties’ statements of evidence shall be no longer than 12 sides of A4 and prepared in 12 font with 1.5 line spacings.”

“11.

No document other than a document specified in an order or filed in accordance with the Rules or any Practice Direction shall be filed without the court’s permission.”

As F is a perpetrator of domestic abuse, and M is the victim of that abuse, I made ‘Special Measures’ directions, including a prohibition against F cross examining M pursuant to s.31T Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (as inserted by s.65 Domestic Abuse Act 2021). I gave directions for the appointment by the court of a Qualified Legal Representative (‘QLR’) to cross examine M on behalf of F.

As at the hearing on 19 May it appeared that no QLR had been appointed. It is not uncommon for there to be no QLR available or willing to accept appointment on the terms offered. I therefore directed F to file proposed written questions in advance of the hearing on 12 June, so that I could ask those questions on his behalf.

I also provided for a timetable for the hearing to ensure the evidence was completed within that day. Given the direction for written statements of evidence, I said that there was to be no substantive evidence in chief.

Allowing for inclusion of my previous written judgments, the previous court orders, the reports from Ms Brundish and the 24 pages of written evidence provided for in my directions, the bundle for the hearing ought comfortably have been within the 350 page limit provided by paragraph 5.1 Practice Direction 27A, Family Procedure Rules.

On the morning of the hearing on 12 June 2025 I was presented with two bundles of documents from M and four from F. The total page count was over 1,200 pages.

F was unable in his preparation for the hearing to distinguish between a statement of evidence and a position statement. The final version of the ‘position statement’ he supplied combined both evidence and argument. It complied with my direction in terms of its length, but it was evidently not written by him. It cited 24 purported case references. When I asked him about this F readily admitted he had used AI (a large language model) to generate parts of this document. The case references were entirely worthless (and used up valuable narrative space). Some may have been hallucinations. The propositions said to be supported by these cases were clearly auto generated and relevant paragraph numbers were not supplied. When I tried, I could not find passages in the judgments to support the propositions advanced.

M’s document again complied with my direction in terms of length, but M then exhibited a narrative “chronological log of concerns and contact issues”, taking her considerably over the permitted page count. Like F, M appeared unable to distinguish between a statement of evidence and a position statement and she also added purported case references into her document. M readily admitted she had used AI to generate parts of this document. Again, these references were entirely worthless.

Other documents presented by both M and F were interspersed with narrative comment, thus extending significantly the ‘narrative’ portion of the bundle outside of the ‘position statements’ filed.

The court room allocated to the case on 12 June was narrow and did not easily accommodate a screen to prevent M having to see F, as had been directed as part of the special measures. This created something of a trip hazard. It was a hot day. The air conditioning unit in the court room was not working. The windows opened but there was building work outside. F is, as I had commented in my 17 May 2024 statement, softly spoken. I apologised to the parties for all this; it was not ideal.

No QLR attended to ask questions on behalf of F. It was difficult to identify why that was. Neither party sought an adjournment and, in any event, that would have been unconscionable given the further delay that would have resulted.

M’s first answer in chief was to invite me to consider as part of her evidence ‘all the material she had filed’. When I intervened to say that no permission had ever been given for her to file this material, M launched into an impassioned and angry monologue about F, his conduct, and the unfairness of the process. Having allowed her some time to vent her feelings I reminded her that I had directed that there would be no substantive evidence in chief. M clearly felt it unfair for me to case manage the proceedings in the way that I had attempted to do.

There were times when M referred to her expectation that “the court” would be a body available to assist her in managing communication issues with F. Following the decision by the police not to take any further action in relation to F’s recent criminal complaint about her (see below), M read the letter she received as prohibiting any communication with F directly, so she refused to serve documents for these proceedings upon him. Eventually, in the days before the hearing, I had to ask a member of the court staff to intervene to assist. In her oral evidence M suggested “someone from the court” might explain the decisions reached to F’s parents.

F was less vocal about his dissatisfaction during the hearing. However, I note that in his written closing submissions he did not hold back from expressing his views:

“After the most recent hearing, I was left feeling like a second-class citizen. Despite presenting concrete evidence, particularly in relation to the stalking incident, I felt borderline ridiculed during my submissions. My words were not given the respect or consideration that any parent deserves. The experience was demoralising. I left the courtroom feeling as though my background, financial limitations, and lack of legal representation made me less worthy of being heard. Even the court-appointed Qualified Legal Representative (QLR), who I had been told would assist, was not present on the day. This further contributed to the sense that I was left to face a highly technical and emotionally charged process without the support or fairness I had been promised.

I deeply fear that the court may hold prejudice – consciously or unconsciously regarding my financial situation and my origin. I come from a modest background, and I cannot afford high-priced legal teams. But I am no less a father, and my children’s needs are no less important. They deserve the presence of their father in their lives, just as I deserve the opportunity to parent them without unjustified barriers.”

“From the outset, despite presenting clear and compelling evidence – particularly regarding the stalking behaviours demonstrated by [M] – I have felt dismissed, disbelieved and unsupported. The tone and handling of this case, combined with my inability to secure legal representation due to financial hardship, have created an uneven playing field”

I was left with the impression that however much time or resource is allocated to M and F and however much care is taken by the court to attempt to facilitate a fair process and to achieve the best outcome for S and T, it will never be enough. Both M and F need to take responsibility for resolving their issues calmly and in a measured way, drawing in third parties only when strictly necessary. Both would benefit from therapeutic assistance with this.

On 15 November 2024 (the day after the DRA) F cancelled contact on the morning of the session, he told the contact centre that he was unwell. At the next contact date, 30 November 2024, M reported that T was unwell with vomiting and a persistent cough. She had been off school. M decided not to send T or S to contact with F. S had said he did not want to attend without T although she tried to persuade him. F objected on the basis that M should have provided evidence of S’s illness. He said she should either “bring the children to the centre for an evaluation or arrange a video call with the centre staff”.

On 14 December 2024 and 11 January 2025 M discovered AirTags clipped to the children’s clothing following contact. F did this, says M, “without my knowledge or consent, constituting covert surveillance and a serious breach of both safeguarding principles and personal autonomy”. She had previously suggested using an AirTag on S, “to support transitions”, but F had refused raising concerns she would track or stalk him. When M raised his use of AirTags with F he apologised and said that the tracking devices had been used as a precaution because S had previously gone missing in his care. He said he had asked the Centre to remind him to check the children prior to handover to ensure the tags were removed. M says she found his response “unconvincing” and “reflects an ongoing pattern of control and surveillance”. She reported F to the police.

On 25 January 2025 both children told M that they had visited a restaurant during contact. They were served by someone “who knew Daddy”. M discovered that the restaurant was registered to F’s partner. She also discovered that F had a significant role in running the restaurant and appeared to have been advocating for the business with the council. M viewed this as a breach of the contact conditions and notified the contact centre. On 8 February 2025 M says that the children told her they had visited the same restaurant and were served by a woman “with long hair and thick glasses like mummy”. M comments that F has introduced staff at the restaurant owned by his partner, and managed by F, to the children and on one occasion “an unknown female was brushing T’s hair in a public setting… These encounters raise safeguarding and emotional safety concerns”.

When M raised this with F he said that he found her “objection to the children experiencing Country X’s food and culture”“deeply concerning”. He saw her complaints as an attempt to alienate the children from their heritage. M covertly recorded the children after the contact visit to F on 25 January 2025 to obtain confirmation that they had visited the restaurant.

Additionally, on 8 February 2025, F took the children swimming. Later that evening, according to M, T “made a spontaneous safeguarding disclosure that F had exposed his penis to her while changing after swimming. S corroborated the incident independently. I took advice, assessed the risk, and raised this safeguarding issue with F on 19 February. He did not deny the allegation”. F explains that this is “another deeply misrepresented accusation”. The incident occurred in a public changing room. F was changing with the children and “there was a brief moment of accidental exposure – entirely unintentional and natural given the environment”.

On 14 February 2025 F says that at about 1pm on that day he was having lunch with his partner when he “noticed M and her father loitering… a short distance from the restaurant”. His partner also observed them. When they looked again M and her father “appeared to be hiding”. Shortly afterwards he saw them drive past the restaurant. M was “visibly attempting to hide her face”.

On 16 (or possibly 26) February 2025 an ambulance was called by F and his partner for his partner’s young adult daughter. The ambulance note produced records that she had a “left arm tremor (normal for patient)”. Advice was given to eat and drink normally, to rest and call 999 if symptoms worsened. F says that she suffered “an anxiety induced seizure… directly linked to the stalking incident reported by the applicant.” This incident evidences, according to F, “the serious psychological impact on the applicant’s family” of M’s actions and “supports the necessity of protection not just for the applicant, but for household members”.

On 17 February 2025 M covertly recorded the children talking in the car. They told her that they get an Uber to the restaurant with F and that they have the same Uber driver each time. M says “This suggests consistent use of the same driver, which is unlikely with Uber and may not align with licenced Uber protocols and implies the use of a private or informal third-party driver”.

On 18 February 2025 F formally reported the alleged incident on 14 February to the police. When setting out the background he made reference to “a litigation battle regarding our children” but said nothing about the findings of domestic abuse that had been made against him. M says about this that F “falsely alleged that I had stalked him, would damage property, and knew his address”. She describes this as “a strategic retaliatory filing intended to undermine safeguarding reports and mislead the court”. The impact of the ‘false allegations’ raised by F in his police report and injunction application are, she says, that a suspect marker has been placed against her name which may affect her teaching career and enhanced DBS status. He is using this process “to try to control where I could lawfully go” and represents coercive control.

On 3 March 2025 F applied for a non-molestation order against M, and requested that the order be made without giving notice to M. He sought special measures to protect him from M. He said that the events of 14 February had caused “severe distress” to himself and his partner. It has caused “significant harm to my mental health” and that his level of stress, anxiety and fear has “become unbearable”.“Her stalking behaviour has escalated to the point where I have been unable to sleep properly and have had to take time off work due to extreme anxiety and exhaustion”. He has called in sick to work because he fears she will attempt to stalk him at his workplace. He fears being stalked during time he spends with the children so he has suspended contact “as I do not feel safe”. He fears violence from M’s father. He has had to move home previously due to M’s stalking behaviour. He is “constantly worried” about the safety of his partner and her property.

On 4 March 2025 F’s without notice application for a non-molestation order came before HHJ Willans. He determined that “This application does not warrant a without notice hearing. A single allegation is made of stalking. It is far from clear this amounts to an actionable course of conduct let alone a basis for a without notice hearing”. He listed the application before me to be considered alongside the Children Act matters. F decided to pursue his application undaunted, or so it appears, by the negative comments of a senior judge.

On 22 February, 8 March and 22 March 2025 F cancelled contact, on each occasion on the morning of contact. On 23 March S asked M why his father did not want to see him, whether his father was sick or on holiday. F explains that his decision to cancel contact “was the direct result of psychological trauma stemming from the respondent’s stalking behaviour”.

On 27 March 2025 the police wrote to M to record that they were taking no further action on F’s 14 February stalking allegations. They warned her “not to make any direct or indirect contact with your ex-partner”. It was that sentence that M read as prohibiting her from serving court documents on him. They wrote to F on the same day to signpost services available to him. F relies on this as “evidence that the police took the matter seriously and recognised the behaviour as domestic abuse / stalking. Supports legitimacy of applicant’s report”.

On 31 March 2025 M reported F to the police. She says she was advised by the police and advised by an Independent Domestic Violence Adviser to apply for a non-molestation order which she did on 5 April 2024. Her statement in support contains numerous AI generated case references which are, as with her other documents, distracting and unhelpful. It sets out her complaints about F on a wide range of issues. It sets out no clear basis for seeking a non-molestation order. She says “Following the pattern of events… I was advised that the conduct may constitute harassment and that I should apply for a protective order under s.42 FLA 1996.”

On 19 April 2025 the children reported to M that they had been to the restaurant and swimming. T reported that F had removed her underwear due to soiling. M says, “this pattern of reporting ‘issues’ with T’s underwear appeared to be increasingly used to suggest maternal neglect, and raises questions about underlying motives and narrative-building”. M raised her concerns with the Centre.

F cancelled contact again on the morning of 3 May 2025. M says that F has cancelled 5 contacts in total since the beginning of the year, all on the morning.

On 31 May 2025 M cancelled contact. She said that T was unwell and that S refused to attend without her. F says “despite multiple courteous requests for medical documentation to verify T’s condition, no such evidence was provided.” He says M’s actions “reinforce a continuing pattern of parental alienation and hostility”.

The parties have found themselves unable to co-operate with the use of a parenting app. M says F uses the app inappropriately, issuing lengthy accusatory messages, demanding medical documentation and making repeated false allegations of ‘alienation’, ‘stalking’ and ‘harassment’. He frequently uses, she says, controlling or inflammatory language. He rejects or minimises her “safeguarding issues”. She therefore ceased to engage with F within the App. From reading the selections from the app I have been provided with, both M and F mimic solicitor’s correspondence in their communications. Their messages are overly long and formal. Both have used this as a forum to continue their dispute rather than to convey simple messages for the benefit of their children.

M raises concerns about the contact centre overriding and / or undermining her parental decision making.

Ms Brundish’s s.7 report is dated 25 October 2024. On 4 October 2024 she filed a s.16A risk assessment. On 11 June 2024 her colleague, Kirsten Connor, filed a s.16A risk assessment.

M has reported to Cafcass that she is scared of F and highly anxious about the current arrangements. She raised concerns about the impact of the current arrangements on herself and the children. S had been vomiting before spending time with his father and is “very wobbly” before and after the spending time arrangements. M said that she feels F continues to try and control her through the arrangements and has not provided her with his address or any means of contacting him when the children are spending time with him. M reported feeling very distressed, worried about future court hearings, feeling scared of the father and worried about reporting worries due to the risk of escalating F’s behaviour towards her. She presented as very tearful and upset during her conversion with the adviser.

Ms Brundish noted that M’s mental health has been impacted by the domestic abuse she has experienced, but there have been no concerns raised to suggest that this in turn impacts upon her ability to meet the children’s needs. However, both children are likely attuned to M’s emotional wellbeing so it is important for the court to consider the impact of these proceedings and the spending time arrangements on M as this will impact on S and T and possibly the care they receive from M. Overall, Ms Brundish has no concerns about M’s ability to meet the physical, emotional and educational needs of the children.

Ms Brundish charted in some detail the presentation of, and the progress made by, each of the children. T is described as friendly and sociable, working at her age-related expectations, with no separation difficulties, displaying age-appropriate skills in all areas. There are no current safeguarding concerns for her. S transitions happily into school on most days and meets with his learning support assistant. He did struggle with transitions in 2023 and it is anticipated he is likely to do so again. Adjustments are made for him in light of his diagnosed ASC, ADHD and associated sensory needs. He has an EHCP. He has an AirTag fixed to his clothes at school in case he runs off. He is fine with this. He is spontaneous in his interactions and will say what is in his head without a filter. He is working towards his age-related expectations. There are no current safeguarding concerns for him. When thinking about his needs, he is considered vulnerable due to his ASC and ADHD and requires support from those around him to keep him safe, understand his needs, be attuned to what he is feeling and advocate for him. F’s observations of S’s needs differ from those observed by M and by his school, and she considers it is possible that he masks behaviours during his time with F or that F is less attuned to his needs.

When meeting with M and the children Ms Brundish observed warm and loving interactions between them indicating they have a positive relationship. She noted the “mostly positive” reports about F’s time with the children from the contact centre, both when contact was fully supervised and for the handovers but she is mindful that supervision only occurs for a relatively small proportion of the contact. When she asked S whether he enjoys the time he spends with his father he did not respond. When she asked him whether he wanted to spend more, less or the same time with F he said “the same” but was not able to explain why. T indicated that she enjoyed her time with F in the community but did not like the contact centre. M reports that S is very unsettled in the time before and after he is with his father. Ms Brundish considers this is due to S’s needs and the impact of the transitions but also that he may be impacted by the domestic abuse from F “which is causing him to feel dysregulated around spending time arrangements”.

In her discussions with F he disputed or denied all the findings made by the court and sought to minimise his behaviour. He sought to blame M for the difficulties in their relationship rather than accepting accountability for his behaviour. She spoke to F’s partner and also completed a virtual home condition assessment of their property. Ms Brundish asked her whether she understood the concerns about F. She said she was aware that M had made allegations about him, but that those allegations had been proved to be untrue. This indicates to her that F has withheld the findings made by the court from his partner.

She notes that under PD12J it is important to consider the impact that spending time arrangements have on the parent who experienced domestic abuse and this may in turn impact on the care they can provide to their children. M’s mental health has been impacted and she reports being afraid of F and does not feel able to raise issues with him due to fears that he criticises her and reports her to the police or the local authority. Any further distress that she experiences will subsequently impact on the children.

The conclusion that she reaches is that time spent by F with the children should be supervised. Although this represents a further change for the children they did seem to transition well to the one period of supervised time in July 2024. She says these visits should be fortnightly and be in the community where possible to allow the children to continue the activities they enjoy with their father. The cost of this should be paid by F. Following the end of these proceedings, F should be encouraged to engage in an intervention “that rigorously challenges domestically abusive behaviour, highlighting the impact on victims, including the child”. Any further application by F should be supported by proof of engagement in such an intervention. This would enable Cafcass to undertake a further risk assessment to consider his learning from the programme including his insight into the impact that domestic abuse has had on M and the children with a demonstration that he has now adopted a more child focused approach. In light of F’s partner’s belief that M’s allegations have been proved to be untrue, she cannot be a protective factor for the children.

In her oral evidence, Ms Brundish said that she had made a recent referral to the local authority due to the parties’ cross applications for non-molestation orders. The local authority decided to take no further action as welfare issues for the children remain before the court. Her recommendation remains as set out in her report; indeed, the more recent information she has seen reinforces that recommendation. She does not support the extension of contact proposed by F. She remains concerned about the safety of the current arrangements which expose the children to the risk of future abusive behaviour. F has shown no insight into the findings made against him and his reporting of M to the police is a concern. He presents to services as if he is the victim. This impacts on M and the children. He did not mention to the police that he has been found to be the perpetrator of domestic abuse upon M. That was misleading. He has lied to his partner.

She agreed it was “not helpful” for M to have recorded the children but this has to be seen in the context of domestic abuse and her feeling that she is not being believed. M’s behaviour has to be seen “in the vortex” of M being a victim of domestic abuse. Time away from M for the children will increase her anxiety because she worries about the safety of the children in F’s care. M now feels she has to take the children to the GP “every time they sneeze” so there is a record and this creates unnecessary professional intervention. M is always “second guessing” F’s reaction. M is fearful and F is frustrated and angry.

She accepted she had not seen the children with F but she has had sight of the reports from the contact centre. She does not dispute that there is a positive relationship between F and the children, but without targeted intervention that contact is not safe. S, in particular, is vulnerable and supervision would ensure he is not influenced or exposed to coercive and controlling behaviour. She accepted she had not had any independent verification of what M was telling her about S’s reactions after contact. These have been very lengthy proceedings and a s.91(14) order would be helpful in her view to set out a time frame for F to engage in domestic abuse focused work.

F’s decision to miss 3 contacts in a row is significant, in her view. If it is true that F was so emotionally impacted that he needed to suspend his time with the children, then that indicates the situation is escalating and this is impacting directly upon the children.

I have read her Children Act and Family Law Act documents. I have set out much of what she reports there in my summary of events since November 2024.

M maintained in her oral evidence that she is terrified of F, she needs protection and “someone to step in and say stop it”. She fears he will disappear with the children to Country X. She maintained F had “exposed his penis to my daughter”. Despite my attempt to move her away from this formulation of what happened, she held fast in her view that it was an accurate description. It was a “shocking thing”. If she had become aware of this in her professional role it would have triggered a safeguarding investigation. She “might” have been in the area of the restaurant on 14 February because this was in a local shopping area but she was not “stalking” him. She recorded the children because he demands proof and does not take her word as real, “I am being told my reality isn’t real”. She has to provide evidence to be believed. Just because he is not punching her in the face does not mean his behaviour is not triggering for her. She has no issue with his family seeing the children as long as it is supervised. She was more reluctant to concede that F’s partner could meet the children, “why does she need to have a major role in this”. When pressed she said “he will overly rely on her to do the parenting” and then “who will be there to manage the restaurant?” if they are both at contact.

She ceased using the parenting app because “it was not beneficial”. F was trying to make himself out to be the victim. There is now no communication. If she tries to update him on day to day matters it “opens up an opportunity for coercive control”. She is content for communications to resume, “but he needs to be brief”. She maintained she had made her non molestation application because she was “strongly advised” by domestic abuse professionals to do so.

I have read F’s Children Act and Family Law Act documents. Again, I have set out much of what he reports in my summary of events since November 2024.

In reference to the domestic abuse findings made against him, he says it is “crucial” to note that there were no findings against him of physical abuse or parental alienation. He has consistently complied with court directions and has actively cooperated with assessments and contact arrangements. He denies breaching the current order by involving third parties, saying that during contact “the children were exclusively with me”. He notes Ms Brundish did not observe the children in his care and that the supervision notes from the contact centre are positive. He disputes M’s descriptions of S after contact as “unsubstantiated claims”. If accurate, “it is more plausible that such dysregulation is triggered by the hostile interrogation and emotionally charged atmosphere they return to, rather than contact itself...”. He is withholding his address from her as “a privacy right, not an act of aggression or control”. He reiterates his claim of “sustained stalking behaviour” by M with “grave consequences for my entire household”, creating “a climate of fear and distress” “culminating in a medical emergency”. He raises “serious concerns” about M’s “emotional regulation and mental stability”. Her behaviour during the hearing on 19 May 2025 (where she was in person and appeared visibly upset) was, in his words, “erratic, emotionally charged and, at times, deeply inappropriate for the setting. This apparent instability raises safeguarding concerns”.

It is “deeply unfair and unsustainable” that he is now solely responsible for covering all the costs associated with contact. He does not benefit financially from his partner’s restaurant. The contact expenses have “placed a notable financial strain on me”. He seeks an order for the equal sharing of costs associated with contact “thereby reinforcing fairness, shared responsibility and the best interests of the children”.

F considers that “the ongoing restriction on third party presence during contact is no longer appropriate. It prevents the children from forming relationships with their extended family and support network.” He also considers that a bilateral s.91(14) order is necessary to bring stability to the children’s lives and shield them from further procedural harm. There is, he says, “a clear narrative: ongoing obstruction, controlling and emotionally harmful behaviour” by M. Her recording of the children “subjected the children to emotional distress and weaponised them in litigation without professional support”.

F relies on the reports of his time with the children from the contact centre. I have previously reviewed the supervisor’s notes of the contact that has been taking place which include the handover notes for the unsupervised contact. As at November 2024 I recorded that the notes are extremely positive about how the father interacts with the children and how they respond to him. There is positive physical interaction with the children hugging their father. They are happy and excited to see him. The children tell their father they are having a good time with him and do not wish to leave. During unsupervised time with him the children return happy. They report having had fun with him. No issues of concern have been raised. Comments are made about the mother being emotional about contact and workers reassuring her that the children are okay.

I have reviewed now the most recent notes of the handovers. The interactions between F and the children remain positive with the children presenting as happy and relaxed. There is a reference to the maternal grandfather returning the AirTags as F had forgotten to take them off the children. On 8 February 2025 M said, in front of the children, that F had broken the court order by taking them to the restaurant and that “she will take him back to court”.

In his oral evidence F told me that in relation to the findings “at this stage I accepted it all. I have been trying to seek some sort of closure on this”. He has worked hard not to repeat any of what he did in his current relationship. He does not accept he lied previously, “I accept I had a different perception of things”. The fact-finding outcome “is not debatable at this point”. He has to accept it and move on. He did not accept he had made allegations against M as a way of ‘point scoring’. He has been misrepresented, “I did not have the best of solicitors”. He struggles, he said, to express himself. He is an introvert, not talkative and has extreme anxiety about what is going on. English is not his first language.

He maintains he has been unfairly treated and has not been heard. Not only because of his heritage but because “I am a man. I see the statistics. In Family Court cases men are treated differently. The institutions discriminate against fathers”. He has formed this impression from his engagement with social networks and online forums. He accepted his communication has been influenced by what he has read there. He is undergoing therapy but to deal with his anxiety rather than his previous behaviour. This has been funded by his parents.

F says in his closing submissions that he is a committed, safe and loving father. He wants to support his children’s growth, celebrate their milestones, help with their homework and be present for the big and small moments in their lives. They should have two homes, two loving families and a future free from conflict. In the event that the court “is to deny the reasonable requests I have made… then I will be left with no choice. I cannot continue a process that has stripped me of dignity… The mental distress, anxiety and overwhelming sense of being treated unfairly have deeply affected my wellbeing, and it is with that in mind that I state this will be the final time I engage in litigation regarding this matter.”

To set out the legal framework in a case such as this does not require the citation of extensive authorities, as each parent has attempted to do. More relevant are the statute, rules and practice guidance which govern the determination of private law children disputes between parents, and in cases where domestic abuse has been established. I set this out below so that both parents know I have considered it and why, as I have said, the AI generated case law they produced to me was worthless, indeed misleading.

The Court’s powers to make child arrangements orders are set out in s.8 Children Act (‘CA’) 1989. They include the power to make orders setting out the time that a child is to spend with a parent. S.11 of that Act provides that an order under s.8 may contain directions as to how it is to be carried into effect and may impose conditions which must be complied with.

Under s.1(1) of the Act, in determining any question with respect to the upbringing of any child the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration.

Further, under s.1(2), any delay in determining that question is likely to prejudice that child’s welfare. Under s.1(2A) a court is to presume, unless the contrary is shown, that the involvement of both parents in the life of that child will further the child’s welfare.

When a court is considering whether to make, vary, or discharge a s.8 order the court shall have regard to the matters set out in the ‘welfare checklist’ at s.1(3). I will analyse those factors below.

On the issue of domestic abuse, Practice Direction 12J provides as follows:

The leading authority on cases where domestic abuse has been alleged and / or found remains Re H-N and Others (children) (domestic abuse: finding of fact hearings) [2021] EWCA Civ 448. The President, King LJ and Holroyde LJ in a jointly produced judgment, said:

“[4] Despite the high volume of cases, the need to identify and, where necessary, decide upon issues of domestic abuse is a matter that is rightly afforded a high level of importance in Family Court proceedings. Where past domestic abuse is found to have taken place, the court must consider the impact that abuse has had on both the child and parent and thereafter determine what orders are to be made for the future protection and welfare of parent and child in the light of those findings. Depending upon the circumstances, such orders may substantially restrict, or even close down, the continuing relationship between the abusive parent and their child.”

“[31] The circumstances encompassed by the definition of ‘domestic abuse’ in PD 12J fully recognise that coercive and/or controlling behaviour by one party may cause serious emotional and psychological harm to the other members of the family unit, whether or not there has been any actual episode of violence or sexual abuse. In short, a pattern of coercive and/or controlling behaviour can be as abusive as or more abusive than any particular factual incident that might be written down and included in a schedule in court proceedings (see ‘Scott Schedules’ at paragraph [42]–[50]). It follows that the harm to a child in an abusive household is not limited to cases of actual violence to the child or to the parent. A pattern of abusive behaviour is as relevant to the child as to the adult victim. The child can be harmed in any one or a combination of ways for example where the abusive behaviour:

The court’s powers to make order prohibiting a party from making any further application without permission are set out in s.91(14) CA 1989 as supplemented by s.91A. PD12B FPR 2010 provides the following Guidance as to the use of s.91(14):

“13A Orders under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989

13A.1 Under section 91(14) of the 1989 Act orders are available to prevent a person from making future applications under that Act without leave of the court. Section 91(14) leaves a discretion to the court to determine the circumstances in which an order should be made. These circumstances may be many and varied.  They include circumstances where an application would put the child concerned, or another individual, at risk of harm (as provided in section 91A), such as psychological or emotional harm. The welfare of the child is paramount.

13A.2 These circumstances can also include where one party has made repeated and unreasonable applications; where a period of respite is needed following litigation; where a period of time is needed for certain actions to be taken for the protection of the child or other person; or where a person’s conduct overall is such that an order is merited to protect the welfare of the child directly, or indirectly due to damaging effects on a parent carer. Such conduct could include harassment, or other oppressive or distressing behaviour beyond or within the proceedings including via social media and e-mail, and via third parties. Such conduct might also constitute domestic abuse. A future application could also be part of a pattern of coercive or controlling behaviour or other domestic abuse toward the victim, such that a section 91(14) order is also merited due to the risk of harm to the child or other individual.

13A.4 In proceedings in which domestic abuse is alleged or proven, or in which there are allegations or evidence of other harm to a child or other individual, the court should give early and ongoing consideration to whether it would be appropriate to make a section 91(14) order on disposal of the application, even if an application for such an order has not been made (since the court may make an order of its own motion – see section 91A(5)).

13A.5 Section 91(14) orders are a protective filter – not a bar on applications – and there is considerable scope for their use in appropriate cases. The court should refer to Practice Direction 12Q for guidance on section 91(14) applications and orders.”

Practice Direction 12Q provides the following additional guidance:

“4.

Duration

4.1

Sections 91(14) and 91A are silent on the duration of a section 91(14) order. The court therefore has a discretion as to the appropriate duration of the order. Any time limit imposed should be proportionate to the harm it is seeking to avoid. If the court decides to make a section 91(14) order, the court should explain its reasons for the duration ordered.

5.Types of application

5.1

Sections 91(14) and 91A give a discretion to the court as to the types of application under the 1989 Act that can be made subject to permission from the court. If the court decides to make a section 91(14) order, the court should consider which types of application should be specified in the order, and it should explain its reasons.”

There is also express reference to s.91(14) in PD12J as I have set out above.

The case law under s.91(14) has to be read in light now of s.91A, PD12J and PD12Q.

The question of how the costs of supervised contact are to be funded was considered by Arbuthnot J in Griffiths v Griffiths [2022] EWHC 113 (Fam). In the course of her judgment she said as follows:

The court’s power to make a non-molestation order is set out in s.42 Family Law Act 1996. In deciding whether to exercise my powers under that section, and in what manner. I must have regard to all the circumstances including the need to secure the health, safety and wellbeing of F and of the children. The significance of making such an order is underlined by s.42A which makes the breach of such an order a criminal offence. As set out in the Family Court Practice (2.645[1]), the criteria for the making of such an order are that there must be evidence of molestation, the applicant must need protection and the judge must be persuaded that judicial intervention is required to control the behaviour which is the subject of the complaint. In Re Al M (Non-Molestation Application) [2020] EWHC 3305 (Fam), [2022] 2 FLR 179 the President of the Family Division said, at paragraph 35:

“What is needed to justify the intervention of the court is some form of deliberate conduct which has the effect on the applicant of harassment to such a degree that the court's protection is called for. The negative impact on the applicant can include elements of psychological and/or emotional harm. The conduct of the respondent, whilst being deliberate, does not need to have been with the intention of causing that harm.”

Finally, I should mention the Covert Recording Guidance issued by the Family Justice Council in May 2025. As is recognised in that Guidance, “The covert recording of children rarely promotes a child’s welfare whatever the intention” (para 1.5). This is developed in the body of the Guidance as follows:

My impression of F remains very much as set out in my May 2024 judgment. He was, again, appropriately emotional in his evidence when discussing his children and the restrictions placed upon his time with them. He remains quietly spoken. There is a mismatch between his written documents and his oral presentation, which may be partly explained by his use of AI. He remains oppositional and dissatisfied.

He clearly does not accept the findings that I previously made. His expressed desire to seek ‘closure’ and to blame his solicitors is a way of minimising his conduct and its impact on M and his children. On occasion, he can be dishonest. He has not told his partner the truth about the findings against him, which is concerning. He misled the police, by omission, when reporting M’s alleged harassment of him without mentioning the domestic abuse findings made by this Court.

It should not need to be said, but F is not experiencing discrimination or unfairness on the grounds of his gender, his status as a father or because of his heritage or culture. This Court has done everything possible to minimise any disadvantage he may have experienced through his lack of legal representation or through the fact that English is not his first language. It is unfortunate that no QLR was available to ask M questions on his behalf, but the directions that I gave prepared for that eventuality and most of his questions were asked by me of M. F has not been helped by his engagement with online forums and the views expressed there.

My impression of M remains, again, very much as I set out in my May 2024 judgment. There are times during hearings where she appears anxious, stressed and angry. She struggles at times to differentiate between what is important and what is not. She is a victim of F’s domestic abuse which will, undoubtedly, have had a significant impact upon her emotional presentation and her self-confidence. However, this does not mean she is free to act unreasonably or in ways that do not serve the best interests of her children.

Like F, M sees the court process as having been fundamentally unfair. For the avoidance of doubt, I make it clear that she is not experiencing discrimination or unfairness on the grounds of her gender, her status as a mother or because of her heritage or culture. This Court has done everything possible to minimise any disadvantage she may have experienced through her lack of legal representation during much of the litigation and to make adjustments as necessary to reflect the fact she is a victim of F’s domestic abuse.

The palpable dislike that M and F feel for each other has not dissipated. Indeed, it appears to have increased. What is apparent to me, but may not be obvious to them, is how they mirror each other’s behaviours. Their use of AI generated documents in very similar formats, their ‘solicitor-like’ communications on the app, their cross applications for non-molestation orders, their over involvement of third party agencies, their exaggerated interpretations of minor events – each probably started with one was mirrored by the other. Recognise it or not, M and F remain enmeshed with each other. Each desperately seeks third party validation and each see such validation even when it is not there. Examples are F’s misreading of the standard signposting information after his ‘stalking’ complaint and M’s interpretation of the advice received from domestic abuse agencies.

Neither M nor F agree with the current arrangements for F to see S and T. Those arrangements have become increasingly sporadic over recent months. Like Ms Brundish, I see F’s cancellation of 5 sessions of contact as significant. There has also been a troubling escalation of events between M and F, leading to increased third party involvement. The current arrangements are not working in the best interests of these children.

F has clearly and obviously been taking the children to his partner’s restaurant so that his partner might spend time with them. At every hearing he has sought to be able to take the children to the home that they share and has expressed dissatisfaction when that request has been refused. Taking his children to the restaurant is the next best thing. It may be that the children do not realise who she is, but F will have used the opportunity to introduce them to his partner. This represents a breach of the direction I gave on 2 February 2024, and restated in subsequent orders.

F’s response to M’s challenge on this issue was to claim that she was objecting to the children experiencing Country X’s food and culture so as to alienate the children from their heritage. I am satisfied that this was not M’s intention and F well knows that this is not the reason for her objection to the children being taken there. F’s complaint represents little more than feigned offence and deflection.

I am satisfied that M was outside the restaurant on 14 February 2025 with her father. She did not actually deny this. It is unlikely this was accidental, more likely driven by curiosity. This was a Friday, so not a day when F would have been seeing the children. I accept that she attempted to hide when she realised he had seen her. That was childish, but probably a spur of the moment decision. F probably did see M drive past later in her car.

That said, the restaurant is on a busy road and connected to a major town centre. It is geographically local to M. There is no reason why she should not walk past the restaurant or look inside through curiosity. Even in the context of these parties’ relationship, her actions do not represent harassment or stalking behaviour.

I have considered what to make of F’s reaction – his exaggerated language when describing this, his report to the police, his claim that this prompted a medical emergency for his partner’s daughter, his cancellation of 6 weeks of contact, his application for a non-molestation order.

Taking his reaction at face value; it is extreme, a gross overreaction. M poses no threat to his personal safety or the safety of his partner and her daughter. Neither does her father. It does not represent behaviour which should trigger a medical emergency, a referral to the police or an application for a non-molestation order. HHJ Willans was right to question whether what happened provided grounds for the grant of a non-molestation order; it does not. F’s application is without merit and is dismissed.

I am surprised to hear that M interpreted the advice she was given as support for the proposition that the issue of a meritless application by F provided her with grounds to issue her own non-molestation application against F. There are other remedies available to control or curtail meritless litigation. Even if she is right, M should have been able to stand back from the situation and recognise that F’s wrong step does not justify a step in the same direction by her. M’s cross application is equally without merit and is dismissed.

Meritless applications such as these draw scarce court resources away from applicants who genuinely and urgently require protection.

F routinely takes the children swimming in a public swimming pool. S and T appear to enjoy that activity. Given their ages, and their genders, F needs to use a family changing room to change his clothes and those of the children. Anyone who has been a single parent in that situation will recognise that at some stage the adult and each of the children may be naked for a brief period of time.

Some families will have no inhibitions about children seeing their parents naked. Some may be more reserved and will take steps to ensure that does not happen. Even with a more reserved family, changing in these circumstances runs the risk that there will be a brief episode where an adult may be naked. M’s deliberate use of language, that F “exposed himself”, and her references to the needs for “safeguarding” intervention represents an overreaction to what happened. F is these children’s father. M’s clear intention is to imply some sexual motivation for his actions. This is unwarranted and unfair to F.

M’s decision to record S and T on two occasions after contact with F was misconceived. As set out in the Guidance, such recording is almost never justified and rarely produces material of evidential value. It draws children directly into the adult dispute. It was an invasion of their privacy and a breach of trust. To the extent it was suggested that F’s actions as perpetrator of domestic abuse towards M, and M’s position as the victim of that abuse, justifies M’s actions, I disagree. M should have remained focussed on the welfare of her children and her actions were not in their best interests.

S is a child who requires the use of AirTags to keep him safe when at school. There is a risk he may run or wander. He wears those AirTags with M’s approval. It does not cause her or the school a problem. It was not unreasonable for F to decide to use AirTags himself when out with S. It is plausible when this happens that, on occasion, F might forget to remove the AirTags requiring M to return them to the Contact Centre once she has noticed. M’s reaction to discovering the Tags again represents an overreaction. It did not mean that F was trying to exert “control” or “surveillance” as M alleges. It is difficult to see what F would gain by this. He knows where M lives and which school S attends. There is no suggestion F has ever approached M or the children outside of the permitted contact time.

Turning then to look at the factors set out in s.1(3) CA 1989, ‘the welfare checklist’.

The ascertainable wishes and feelings of the children in light of their age and understanding

Their physical, emotional and educational needs

The likely effect on them of any change of circumstances

Age, sex, background and other relevant characteristics

Any harm which they have suffered or are at risk of suffering

The capability of each of their parents, and of any other relevant person, to meet their needs.

Unfortunately, F’s capability to meet these children’s needs is more questionable. On the positive side, the reports of his time with the children are good and they enjoy the time they spend with him. However, I have made findings of domestic abuse in his relationship with M. He does not accept those findings. In part F denies events alleged to have taken place but, as set out in my May 2024 judgment, there are also incidents or allegations where he has attempted to justify his behaviour. For example, when he accused M of lying about her fertility concerns in order trap him. It is troubling that F has lied to his partner about the Court’s findings. He shows no insight into what he did wrong and there remains a risk that his abusive behaviour will be repeated in the future. Not only did he miss three contacts in a row in the earlier part of this year, he did not inform the children of this until the day of each contact. The irregularly of contact has certainly not been in these children’s best interests. Assuming this is driven by a mental health crisis, as F suggests, this direct impact on F’s time with his children is concerning.

F’s partner’s capability to meet these children’s needs is largely unknown. However, I agree with Ms Brundish that she cannot be a protective factor when she is unaware of the findings made against F, indeed she believes M’s allegations against him have been shown to be untrue.

The range of powers available to the court

I accept, as outlined by Ms Brundish, that the impact of F’s behaviour on M is an important factor as emphasised by PD12J and Re H-N. Domestic abuse, including coercive and controlling behaviour, will cause a victim to be frightened of provoking an outburst or reaction from the perpetrator, so that she is unable to prioritise the needs of her child. It also creates an atmosphere of fear and anxiety. It risks inculcating, particularly in boys, a set of values which involve treating women as being inferior to me. S is particularly vulnerable to this given his diagnoses. F shows no insight into his behaviour, its impact on M or the risks this poses to his children. Without such insight I accept Ms Brundish’s central conclusion that unsupervised contact with F is not safe.

Moreover, I am very concerned about F’s reaction to the 14 February 2025 incident. His reaction was, as I have indicated, out of all proportion to what took place. If indeed, this provoked a mental health crisis for F and for his partner and her daughter, this is deeply troubling. It indicates a need for therapeutic work and time to heal and rebalance.

F’s proposals for the commencement of staying contact and a move towards shared care are opposed by M and fall well outside the recommendations made by Ms Brundish. I agree with Ms Brundish’s conclusions that such an outcome can only be considered once F has shown some insight into his past behaviour and has engaged in an intervention which rigorously challenges domestically abusive behaviour. Without this, such an outcome would risk exposing the children to further coercive and controlling behaviour and would risk exposing them to the views F holds about M, about her mental health and about her parenting.

This Court has maintained the existing pattern of contact, against professional advice, because that contact appeared to be stable, meeting the needs of the children for a relationship with their father, and did not appear to risk exposing them to emotional harm. In my judgment, however, the balance has now decisively shifted. Having heard all the evidence, and in particular having considered recent events, it now appears that the existing contact is not stable and does risk exposing the children to harm.

The incident of 14 February 2025 was minor. F’s reaction to this drew in third parties such as the police and the court, created a medical emergency in his family, caused him to be off work and, most significantly, caused him to cancel contact with his children on three occasions in a row. I agree with Ms Brundish that F’s cancellation of contact is significant. It indicates a father in crisis and unable to prioritise the needs of his children.

I therefore decide that F’s contact going forward should be professionally supervised. This should be for up to 5 hours each fortnight.

Ms Brundish saw no objection to F’s parents and his partner seeing the children if there is to be professional supervision. M does not oppose F’s parents seeing the children and I agree this would be beneficial. It is not likely to be frequent as it can only take place when F’s parents are visiting this country. M opposes F’s partner seeing the children. I was puzzled by her reasons for this, particularly when she suggested that this might leave his partner’s restaurant short staffed. It seems to me that his partner should be able to attend supervised contact on occasions, so she can have some involvement in their lives. It should not however be every contact. Broadly it seems to me that she should be permitted to attend every other session, or on a monthly basis.

F asks me to consider again the question of who should pay for the costs to be incurred by way of professional supervision. Following the decision of Arbuthnot J in Griffiths v Griffith, that must remain F’s responsibility. Professional supervision is required because of F’s abuse of M and because of his overreaction to the events of 14 February 2025. As Arbuthnot J said, “there must be a very strong presumption against a victim of domestic abuse paying for the contact of their child with the abuser”.

I do not have sufficient information to judge whether F can or cannot afford to fund professional supervision for 5 hours each fortnight. If he cannot then, inevitably, the time he spends with his children will be reduced. It may need to be confined, on some occasions, to the contact centre. Sadly, contact has been sporadic this year in any event. I hope F will be able to prioritise seeing his children. I mean this both in terms of his spending priorities but also in ensuring he attends contact when it has been arranged.

This litigation has been ongoing now for approaching three years and at times it has been relentless. Both parties need a break from court proceedings and, most importantly, the children need a break. F needs time to reflect and engage in therapeutic intervention. In my view there needs to be a s.91(14) order to provide some respite. Balanced against that, I recognise that supervised contact is not ideal and should not remain in place for any longer than is necessary. In my view the order should remain in place for just under 18 months, so until 31 December 2026.

I hope both parents can listen to what I have said and reflect. Both have cause to do so.

I am disappointed that M decided to cease communicating with F via the parenting app. That represents a safe and appropriate way of ensuring communication between parents on important issues that affect their children. M proposes no alternative beyond no communication or reliance, inappropriately, on third parties. It my view it is important that a level of communication is restored. It is incumbent on both parents to keep such communication to what is necessary and factual. Just because one parent communicates inappropriately on the app does not justify the other parent doing so.

In the longer term I would encourage both parents to seek therapeutic intervention specifically to focus on their relationship as parents to two children. It is striking, as I have said, how they remain enmeshed and mirror each other’s behaviour. This needs to be explored and addressed.

M raises a number of ancillary matters in her documents. She seeks to continue an order preventing F from removing the children from the jurisdiction. There is no recent evidence of any threat to do so and M is protected by the making of a ‘lives with order’ in her favour. I will not, therefore, continue the prohibited steps order.

Ms Gillian seeks orders on behalf of M to limit F’s parental responsibility by providing M with “overriding consent” on matters of medical treatment or education. There is no formal application for such orders and the basis of this ‘informal’ application is not clear. It is not suggested that F has been obstructive on such issues. It was not raised by Ms Brundish in her report or in the questions asked of her. I can see no justification for the making of such orders and so decline to do so.

That is my judgment.