Sheffield Designated Family Court
48 West Bar,
SHEFFIELD
S3 8PH
Before :
H.H. Judge Marson
Between :
BARNSLEY METROPOLITAN BOROUGH COUNCIL | Applicant |
- and - | |
(1) THE MOTHER (2) THE FATHER (3) THE CHILDREN | Respondents |
Ms J. Southcote-Want (instructed by Barnsley MBC) for the Applicant
Mr D. Foster (instructed by Howells Solicitors)for the First Respondent Mother
Mr L. Dodgson (instructed by Howard & Co Solicitors) for the Second Respondent Father
Mr A. Taylor (instructed by Norrie, Waite & Slater Solicitors) for the Third Respondent Children
Hearing dates: 07, 08, 12, 13 and 15 August; 4 and 19 September 2025
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on the 19 September 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives
IMPORTANT NOTICE This judgment was given in private. The court permits publication of this judgment on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of this judgment the anonymity of the child and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including the parents, their legal representatives, legal bloggers and representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court. |
H.H. Judge Marson
The original version of this judgment included the names of the subject children, parents, other family members and all professionals involved with the family, and specific dates were identified. In this published version names have been changed to preserve the privacy and anonymity of the family concerned.
The court is concerned with the welfare of two girls, Jemma who was born in 2016 and is aged 9 years, and her sister Jess born in 2019 aged 6 years. The children are the subject of proceedings brought by Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council which has been represented at this hearing by Ms Southcote-Want. I may refer to Barnsley MBC hereafter as “the local authority”.
The children’s parents are [Mrs name redacted] and [Mr name redacted]. [Mrs] has been represented by Mr Foster, and any references in this judgment to ‘the mother’ are references to [Mrs]. [Mr] has been represented by Mr Dodgson and likewise, references to “the father” refer to [Mr].
Jemma and Jess are represented by the children’s guardian, Ms Hilda Mulcahy, who in turn has given her instructions to Mr Taylor.
The substantive application before the court is brought by the local authority under section 31 of the Children Act 1989. It was issued following an incident which occurred at the family home on the 2 August 2024 involving the parents and the children’s older sister, Maria who, at the relevant time, was aged 22. During the incident Maria sustained an injury to her ear and the Police were called to the family home by the mother. Maria, supported by her next youngest sister, Erin, who was then aged 18 years, was taken by the Police to hospital for treatment of her injury.
The local authority asserts that whilst at the hospital Maria made a number of allegations against her parents which included they had assaulted her that evening, together with other incidents of physical and emotional abuse and excessive physical chastisement which were taking place within the family home. It asserts that such behaviour by the parents is part of a longstanding pattern of abusive parenting to which Jemma and Jess are likely to be exposed to directly, or indirectly by witnessing it being inflicted upon their sisters. The parents, and indeed Maria and Erin, deny this to be the case. The children’s guardian does not seek any particular findings and does not consider the sort of incident which took place on the 2 August 2024 is common within the household. However, the guardian does consider witnessing the event would have been frightening and unsettling to Jemma and Jess and there is the possibility they are at risk of being exposed to similar behaviour in the future, from the mother in particular.
There are additional facts contained within the schedule of findings pleaded by the local authority which are agreed by the parents. Those facts include the mother’s mental health diagnosis of a bipolar affective disorder which is managed by a monthly depot injection of Aripiprazole (an antipsychotic medication) and her past behaviour, when she has been unwell, can be frightening and unpredictable.
The mother accepts that between 2018 and February 2024 there were numerous occasions when she was not compliant with her medication and her mental health deteriorated, leading her to experience auditory hallucinations (hearing voices), not sleeping well, and breaking objects around the family home or trying to pull curtains down or break windows. The parents accept one or more of their four daughters have witnessed the mother when her mental health has deteriorated and this is likely to have been upsetting for them. However, the parents, and the mother in particular, do not accept these historic incidents cross the statutory threshold, not least because they were not concerns in August 2024 when this local authority intervened to take its protective measures.
The local authority accepts the mother has been compliant with her medication since March 2024 when she was admitted to hospital under the Mental Health Act 1983 for assessment. The mother’s care co’ordinator, [name reacted] has provided written evidence to the court and confirms there have been no issues with the mother’s compliance with her treatment since starting Aripiprazole in March 2024 and there have been no incidents or deterioration in the mother’s mental health since this date. The mother continues to engage positively with her care team.
It is primarily the local authority’s allegations about what happened on the 2 August 2024 and the veracity of what Maria allegedly told health care and other professionals at the hospital was happening at home which remain in dispute, and this is a finding of fact hearing to establish whether those allegations are capable of being established by the local authority on the balance of probabilities to satisfy the statutory threshold.
The Law
In describing the background and in the narrative parts of this judgment, I may address matters upon which the parties do not agree. I may give my findings on any disputed matters as they arise and when doing so, I apply the following principles derived from the judgment of the former President in the case of Re X (Children)(No. 3) [2015] EWHC 3651 (Fam) Munby P. which records the relevant principles in relation to fact-finding hearings as drawn from the judgment of Baker J. (as he then was) in A Local Authority v (1) A Mother (2) A Father (3) L &M(Children) [2013] EWHC 1569 (Fam). They may be summarised as follows:
(1) The burden of proof lies at all times with the local authority;
The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities;
Findings of fact in these cases must be based on evidence, including inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence and not on suspicion or speculation;
Evidence cannot be evaluated and assessed in separate compartments. When considEring cases of suspected child abuse the court must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to a conclusion whether the case put forward by the local authority has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof;
The opinion of experts needs to be considered in the context of all the other evidence;
The court must be careful to ensure that each expert keeps within the bounds of their own expertise;
The evidence of the parents and any other carers is of the utmost importance. It is essential that the court forms a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability;
it is common for witnesses in these cases to tell lies in the course of the investigation and the hearing. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for many reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear and distress, and the fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything else (see R v Lucas [1981] QB 720).
To those eight principles, the former President adds a further three points:
The legal concept of balance of probabilities must be applied with common sense;
The court can have regard to inherent probabilities but this does not affect the legal standard of proof;
The fact that a respondent fails to prove on a balance of probabilities an affirmative case that s/he has chosen to set up by way of defence, does not of itself establish the local authority's case.
"It is the local authority that seeks a finding that FM's injuries are non-accidental. It is for the local authority to prove its case. It is not for the mother to disprove it. In particular it is not for the mother to disprove it by proving how the injuries were in fact sustained. Neither is it for the court to determine how the injuries were sustained. The court's task is to determine whether the local authority has proved its case on the balance of probability. Where, as here, there is a degree of medical uncertainty and credible evidence of a possible alternative explanation to that contended for by the local authority, the question for the court is not 'has that possible alternative explanation been proved' but rather it should ask itself, 'in the light of that possible alternative explanation can the court be satisfied that the local authority has proved its case on the simple balance of probability'."
Lies and Credibility
As the President, McFarlane LJ observed in Re H-C (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 136 at paragraph 97:
A family court, in common with a criminal court, can rely upon a finding that a witness has lied as evidence in support of a primary positive allegation. The well-known authority is the case of R v Lucas (R) [1981] QB 720 in which the Court of Appeal Criminal Division, after stressing that people sometimes tell lies for reasons other than a belief that the lie is necessary to conceal guilt, held that four conditions must be satisfied before a defendant’s lie could be seen as supporting the prosecution case as explained in the judgment of the court given by Lord Lane CJ:
“To be capable of amounting to corroboration the lie told out of court must first of all be deliberate. Secondly it must relate to a material issue. Thirdly the motive for the lie must be a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth. The jury should in appropriate cases be reminded that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour from their family. Fourthly the statement must be clearly shown to be a lie by evidence other than that of the accomplice who is to be corroborated, that is to say by admission or by evidence from an independent witness.”
The decision in R v Lucas has been the subject of a number of further decisions of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division over the years, however the core conditions set out by Lord Lane remain authoritative. The approach in R v Lucas is not confined, as it was on the facts of Lucas itself, to a statement made out of court and can apply to a “lie” made in the course of the court proceedings and the approach is not limited solely to evidence concerning accomplices.
In the Family Court in an appropriate case a judge will not infrequently directly refer to the authority of R v Lucas in giving a judicial self-direction as to the approach to be taken to an apparent lie. Where the “lie” has a prominent or central relevance to the case such a self-direction is plainly sensible and good practice.
One highly important aspect of the Lucas decision, and indeed the approach to lies generally in the criminal jurisdiction, needs to be borne fully in mind by family judges. It is this: in the criminal jurisdiction the “lie” is never taken, of itself, as direct proof of guilt. As is plain from the passage quoted from Lord Lane’s judgment in Lucas, where the relevant conditions are satisfied the lie is “capable of amounting to a corroboration”. In recent times the point has been most clearly made in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division in the case of R v Middleton [2001] Crim.L.R. 251. In my view there should be no distinction between the approach taken by the criminal court on the issue of lies to that adopted in the family court. Judges should therefore take care to ensure that they do not rely upon a conclusion that an individual has lied on a material issue as direct proof of guilt.
In Lancashire County Council v The Children and Others [2014] EWHC 3 (Fam) at paragraph 9 of his judgment and having directed himself on the relevant law, Jackson J (as he then was) said:-
‘…where repeated accounts are given the court must think carefully about the significance or otherwise of any reported discrepancies. They may arise for a number of reasons. One possibility is of course that they are lies designed to hide culpability. Another is that they are lies told for other reasons. Further possibilities include faulty recollection or confusion at the time of stress or where the importance of accuracy is not fully appreciated, or there may be inaccuracy or mistake in the record-keeping or recollection of the person hearing and relaying the account. The possible effect of delay and repeated questioning upon memory should also be considered, as should the effect of one person on hearing accounts given by another. As memory fades, a desire to iron out wrinkles may not be unnatural; a process that might inelegantly be described as “story-creep” may occur without any necessary inferences of bad faith.’
The importance of following these principles was reinforced in the decision made by the Court of Appeal in Re A, B and C (Children) [2021] EWCA Civ 451 and the judgmentof Macur LJ. In paragraph 52 the learned judge states:
“It is quite possible that the tribunal may conclude that, in the particular circumstances of the case, the integrity and substance of the uncorroborated evidence of the child complainant is sufficiently compelling to lead them to determine that the alleged perpetrator’s denials must be a lie. In others the tribunal may reasonably determine that it is incumbent to look for other evidence in support”.
And at paragraph 54:
“That a witness’s dishonesty may be irrelevant in determining an issue of fact is commonly acknowledged in judgments, and with respect to the Recorder as we see in her judgment at [40], in formulaic terms…But this formulation leaves open the question: how and when is a witness’s lack of credibility to be factored into the equation of determining an issue of fact? In my view, the answer is provided by the terms of the entire ‘Lucas’ direction as given, when necessary, in criminal trials.
Chapter 16-3, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the December 2020 Crown Court Compendium, provides a useful legal summary:
A defendant’s lie, whether made before the trial or in the course of evidence or both, may be probative of guilt. A lie is only capable of supporting other evidence against D if the jury are sure that (1) it is shown by other evidence in the case, to be a deliberate untruth; i.e. it did not arise from confusion or mistake; (2) it relates to a significant issue, (3) it was not told for a reason advanced by or on behalf of D, or for some other reason arising from the evidence, which does not point to D’s guilt.
The direction should be tailored to the circumstances of the case, but the jury must be directed that only if they are sure these criteria are satisfied can D’s lie be used as some support fotr the prosecution case, but that the lie itself cannot prove guilt…”
The application of the above guidance was further clarified by Peter Jackson LJ in the case of Re H (Children: Uncertain Perpetrator: Lies)[2024] EWCA Civ 1261.
Para 21: “The court’s view of a witness’s overall credibility and reliability will naturally contribute to its evaluation of whether it can accept their evidence on the critical issues. If it concludes that lies have been told, it will consider what weight, if any, should be given to that aspect of the matter, after due consideration of any explanations have been offered. That is part of the normal process of sifting and weighing the evidence, and explaining the result. The family courts encounter many forms of bad behaviour and they are used to assessing their true significance for the issue in hand. There is no special rule of evidence for lies.”
Para 22; “I would therefore make one observation about the description of good practice in Re A, B and C. At [58(iii)] it is said that the court should seek to identify the basis on which it can be determined that the only explanation for the lie(s) is guilt. That draws on the slightly different jury direction in the Crown Court Compendium… which requires that a lie is only capable of supporting other evidence against a defendant if the jury are sure that it was not told for a reason advanced by or on behalf of the defendant, or for some other reason arising from the evidence, which does not point to the defendant’s guilt.” Para 22
Para 23: “Relying on a literal reading of Re A, B and C, Mr Barnes further argues that the court is required to exclude a lie from consideration altogether in any case where it cannot be satisfied (to whatever standard) that the only explanation for it is to conceal guilt. I do not accept that submission. There will be some cases where the ultimate finding is so critically dependent on the assessment of the particular lie – that the court may out of caution wish to direct itself in accordance with Re A, B and C. ….. It will be sufficient for the judge to recall that the true significance of a lie must be carefully assessed, for all the well-known reasons noted by the judge in the present case. A general exclusionary rule, exclusively directed at lies, would be inconsistent with the duty on the court to consider all the evidence. Once it has done that, its conclusion in an individual case may be that the lie was told to conceal guilt, but that is a conclusion, not a test…Any other approach would hamper the court in carrying out its important assessment of credibility and its evaluation of particular issues of fact.
The dicta of Peter Jackson J (as he then was) in Re BR (Proof of Facts) [2015] EWFC 41. In particular paragraphs 4-7:
The court acts on evidence, not speculation or assumption. It acts on facts, not worries or concerns.
Evidence comes in many forms. It can be live, written, direct, hearsay, electronic, photographic, circumstantial, factual, or by way of expert opinion. It can concern major topics and small details, things that are important and things that are trivial.
The burden of proving a fact rests on the person who asserts it.
The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities: Is it more likely than not that the event occurred? Neither the seriousness of the allegation, nor the seriousness of the consequences, nor the inherent probabilities alters this.
Where an allegation is a serious one, there is no requirement that the evidence must be of a special quality. The court will consider grave allegations with proper care, but evidence is evidence and the approach to analysing it remains the same in every case. In my view, statements of principle (some relied on in this case) that suggest that an enhanced level of evidential cogency or clarity is required in order to prove a very serious allegation do not assist and may lead a fact-finder into error. Despite all disclaimers, reference to qualitative concepts such as cogency and clarity may wrongly be taken to imply that some elevated standard of proof is called for.
Nor does the seriousness of the consequences of a finding of fact affect the standard to which it must be proved. Whether a man was in a London street at a particular time might be of no great consequence if the issue is whether he was rightly issued with a parking ticket, but it might be of huge consequence if he has been charged with a murder that occurred that day in Paris. The evidential standard to which his presence in the street must be proved is nonetheless the same.
The court takes account of any inherent probability or improbability of an event having occurred as part of a natural process of reasoning. But the fact that an event is a very common one does not lower the standard of probability to which it must be proved. Nor does the fact that an event is very uncommon raise the standard of proof that must be satisfied before it can be said to have occurred.
Similarly, the frequency or infrequency with which an event generally occurs cannot divert attention from the question of whether it actually occurred …
The court must guard against the danger of reversing the burden of proof. The burden remains at all times upon the local authority to prove the facts alleged to the requisite standard, and it is not for a respondent to disprove facts or present an alternative explanation for events. The risk however of inadvertently reversing the burden of proof by according improper weight to a respondent’s inability to provide an explanation for these most serious allegations, which include detail which may seem to have experiential characteristics is particularly acute. Re M (Fact-finding: Burden of Proof) [2013] 2 FLR 874 at 881:
‘The burden of proof lies on the local authority to prove the case against the parents. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities, and that means the same in this kind of case as in every other, a simple balance of probability. Suspicion is not proof, and the burden must always remain on the local authority and should not be reversed…’
and
‘That, too, was the effect of the judge's view of the case: that absent a parental explanation, there was no satisfactory benign explanation, ergo there must be a malevolent explanation. And it is that leap which troubles me. It does not seem to me that the conclusion necessarily follows unless, wrongly, the burden of proof has been reversed, and the parents were required to satisfy the court that this is not a non-accidental injury.’
In relation to the issue of similar fact evidence and propensity, I have reminded myself of the judgement of Peter Jackson LJ in Re S (Children: Findings of Fact) [2023] EWCA Civ 1113 para [30]:
“I also consider that the judge was in error in relation to the issues of propensity and hindsight bias. The question of propensity or similar fact evidence arises where an individual's behaviour in other circumstances makes it more likely that he will have behaved in the manner now alleged: see R v P (Children: Similar Fact Evidence) [2020] EWCA Civ 1088, [2020] 4 WLR 132 at [23]. In that case, the question was whether a man's behaviour towards one partner was admissible in relation to allegations made by another partner. Here, the court was concerned with a sequence of events within the same family. Self-evidently, one finding about a parent's behaviour towards a child might be relevant to another similar allegation and there was no need to resort to the concept of propensity or to erect artificial barriers around the assessment of evidence. Similarly, the well-known concept of hindsight bias cannot deflect the court from making a common-sense assessment of the evidence as a whole, and I do not understand the judge’s apprehension that the local authority was asking him to do something unusual or impermissible”.
I have reminded myself of the judgment of Sir James Munby, then the President of the Family Division in the case of Re A [2015] EWFC 11 at paragraphs 14 - 17, and noted this approach was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Re B:
§14. It is vital always to bear in mind in these cases, and too often they are overlooked, the wise and powerful words of Hedley J in Re L (Care: Threshold Criteria)[2007] 1 FLR 2050, para 50: “society must be willing to tolerate very diverse standards of parenting, including the eccentric, the barely adequate and the inconsistent. It follows too that children will inevitably have both very different experiences of parenting and very unequal consequences flowing from it. It means that some children will experience disadvantage and harm, whilst others flourish in atmospheres of loving security and emotional stability. These are the consequences of our fallible humanity and it is not the provenance of the state to spare children all the consequences of defective parenting. In any event, it simply could not be done”.
§16. I respectfully agree with all of that. It follows that I also agree with what His Honour Judge Jack said in North East Lincolnshire Council v G & L [2014] EWCC B77(Fam), a judgment that attracted some attention even whilst I was hearing this case: “I deplore any form of domestic violence and I deplore parents who care for children when they are significantly under the influence of drink. But so far as Mr and Mrs C are concerned there is no evidence that I am aware of that any domestic violence between them or any drinking has had an adverse effect on any children who were in their care at the time when it took place. The reality is that in this country there must be tens of thousands of children who are cared for in homes where there is a degree of domestic violence (now very widely defined) and where parents on occasion drink more than they should, I am not condoning that for a moment, but the courts are not in the business of social engineEring. The courts are not in the business of providing children with perfect homes. If we took into care and placed for adoption every child whose parents had had a domestic spat and every child whose parents on occasion had drunk too much then the care system would be overwhelmed and there would not be enough adoptive parents. So we have to have a degree of realism about prospective carers who come before the courts.”
§17. There is a powerful message in these judgments which needs always to be borne in mind by local authorities, by social workers, by children’s guardians and by family judges.
These are the factors and legal guidance which I have borne in mind, and when I say I have considered the law it is against this background but also that of the Human Rights Act 1998. This is plainly right because the consequences for this family are serious with the potential to affect the long term care planning for Jemma and Jess.
I have read the electronic file of evidence provided during the course of this hearing which includes the statements and documents filed by the local authority; the parents; the children’s guardian, and disclosure information from the South Yorkshire Police (SYP) and Barnsley Hospital. I have received and read written submissions from all parties, for which I am grateful.
The court has heard oral evidence from 10 witnesses in the following chronological order.
Maria (Eldest sister of the subject children);
Erin (Sister of the subject children);
Witness 1 (A nursing Associate at Barnsley Hospital Foundation Trust);
Witness 2 (A named Nurse for Safeguarding at Barnsley Hospital F.T.);
Witness 3 (A physician associate at Barnsley Hospital F.T.);
Witness 4 (A Staff Nurse at Barnsley Hospital F.T.)
IO Sarah Clayton (Investigations Officer with SYP);
Rebecca Lartey (Former allocated social worker);
The Mother (the mother, supported by an interpreter);
The Father (the father, supported by an interpreter).
It should be recorded that even where I do not refer to any particular piece of oral or written evidence during the course of this judgment it has nevertheless been taken into consideration. Whilst many issues were raised during the course of the hearing and in the written submissions, I have determined only those which, in my opinion, require resolving to determine the disputed issues at this hearing justly.
It should also be noted that where reported speech is given in italics in this judgment it may be taken directly from the written evidence or from my contemporary notes of the oral evidence, and where it is from the latter it is materially and factually accurate but it is possible that some quotations may not be verbatim due to the speed at which the note was written during the oral evidence.
The hearing has been conducted as a hybrid hearing with one witness participating remotely via the CVP to accommodate their availability, and the other parties and witnesses attending court in person. No party has raised any concerns regarding the format of the hearing during the hearing itself.
THE BACKGROUND AND ALLEGATIONS
The following is set out to understand the context of this judgment and is agreed or unopposed unless stated otherwise.
In May 2024, Maria returned home from University in London following the successful completion of her second year exams. She made the decision not to return to University, not least because she was experiencing abusive behaviour from her ex-partner in London who is referred to in the evidence as Mr X [name redacted]. The abuse consisted of controlling behaviour and financial abuse when he fraudulently used funds from Maria’s student loan to his own advantage. He went on to threaten the use of violence, and other threats were made towards Maria by gang members with which Mr X was involved. Maria stated in evidence Mr X did not actually use violence against her or her family in Barnsley but the threats of it were sufficient to cause the parents to install security cameras in the family home. In January 2024, Maria discovered she was pregnant and underwent a termination of that pregnancy. All of these challenges understandably caused Maria to want to move back home and to be with her family.
In due course, Maria obtained employment in Barnsley in a role which involved working late nights and shifts. The 2 August 2024 was her third working day and her first working shift, the previous two shifts having been training dates.
The precipitating incident arose in the early hours of the 2nd August 2024. Maria’s evidence to the court is that she had expected to finish work in the early hours of the morning but when she turned up for work she was told she may finish early, at 11pm. After finishing work, instead of going straight home she went to visit her friend, [N] and on the way bought a bottle of Captain Morgan’s rum, arriving at [N’s] house around midnight where they proceeded to drink the rum together. Maria agrees she did not want her parents to know she was at [N’s] or drinking alcohol and sent a text to the mother in which she lied and said she was on her last break at work. Maria’s explanation for not being truthful about this is because her parents don’t drink alcohol, they are quite strict Christians, and whilst they don’t prevent Maria from drinking alcohol they would not approve of it. Maria also knew the mother would be worried about her whereabouts because of the recent concerns involving Mr X.
Maria’s evidence is that by the time she left [N’s] house she was ‘quite drunk’, she had not drunk alcohol for a while and it affected her quickly. Maria agrees she later told hospital staff she had drunk two to three glasses but accepted in her evidence she had drunk much more than this. In her written evidence she states herself and [N] had consumed the best part of a 1 litre bottle of rum between them, and in her oral evidence she said “I went to ASDA to buy a 1.5 litre bottle, I got that and we almost finished the bottle and I took some home in my flask” . Maria stated “I didn’t think I was that drunk until I had to call the taxi and the taxi people couldn’t understand me”.
The parents and Erin agree Maria was drunk when she arrived home in the early hours of the morning around 3.30am. The mother’s unchallenged description of Maria when she arrived and got out of the taxi is that she was: “walking as if she wanted to fall on the floor…zig zagging, not steady, walking in a zig zag”. Erin agreed her sister was capable of holding a conversation; “but it was waffle and she babbled on a bit…she was not speaking coherently”. I accept the parents and Erin are being truthful about this because it is corroborated by the unchallenged statements of PC Hutchinson and PC Morton who attended the family home after the incident shortly after 4am. Both officers confirm that when they arrived Maria was intoxicated with slurred speech, glazed eyes, and a little unsteady on her feet.
The mother agreed she had become increasingly worried and anxious when Maria didn’t arrive home after work at the expected time, and Erin confirmed the mother had woken her up to enquire whether she knew where Maria may be. The mother’s anxiety was fuelled by the concerns relating to Mr X and the lack of knowledge about where her daughter was in the middle of the night. The mother accepted that after she received the first text message from Maria in which Maria asserted she was on a break at work, she became increasingly suspicious Maria was lying to her about being at work, especially once she spoke to Maria on the phone and could hear [N’s] voice in the background of the call.
At the point in the chronology when Maria arrived home drunk, the mother accepts she was angry, worried and concerned because Maria had not been honest about where she had been or who she had been with and because she had been drinking to excess. Erin told the court her parents didn’t come across as annoyed or angry to her, she described them as ‘worried and concerned’.
The parents agree that once Maria entered the family home she said she wanted to go to bed. Erin told the court “At first Maria wanted to go upstairs to her room. Mum and dad wanted to talk to her but Maria wasn’t being responsive, they insisted and then she said she was going to leave. She may not have said those words specifically but that is how it came across”.
In her oral evidence the mother candidly accepted she made a mistake at this point and instead of letting Maria go to bed to sleep off the effects of the alcohol, she told Maria she wanted to have a “a quick chat before she went to sleep. I wanted to ask her where she was because I could feel she was not at work”. The local authority asserts this led to an argument between the mother and Maria although the mother did not attach the label of an ‘argument’ to the discussion which followed. The mother was not asked whether this was because Maria was incapable of conducting an argument due to her intoxication. The mother told the court “I asked her where were you, I started asking ‘was she at [N’s]?’ and then she started saying ‘You don’t trust me, no, I was working”. I am persuaded it is likely some form of disagreement did take place at this point between Maria and the parents because Erin agrees her parents insisted on talking to Maria at a time when Maria was not being responsive or capable of having a meaningful conversation which is likely to have been frustrating for them and for Maria, and this evidence is consistent with the evidence from PC Morton who arrived a short while later and noted Maria’s speech was slurred. I consider it unlikely Maria was in a fit enough state to conduct much of an oral argument but she was able to convey by more limited words and actions that she wanted to leave.
All four adults who were in the living room that night; the parents, Maria and Erin agree Maria indicated an intention to leave. I consider it makes little difference whether she expressly stated a wish to leave the house or leave the room, it was, unfortunately, what precipitated an escalation in the incident. The mother told the court this caused her to “stand and block the door so Maria wouldn’t leave the house, she wasn’t steady, she was very drunk and vulnerable and I was very worried. I went to block the living room door with my body so she couldn’t leave the house….Her [Maria’s] hands were on me and she was going to the door handle and trying to pull it. She tripped over because she was drunk, she couldn’t stand up….I didn’t want her to go out in the night whilst she was drunk so I was trying to calm her down and if she doesn’t want to live with us anymore she could go in the morning but she started smashing the candles in the house. I can’t recall whether she started throwing candles before she was on the floor or whilst on the floor”.
Erin’s evidence corroborates the mother’s account. Erin told the court her mother “was trying to barricade the door. Maria was not forced or thrown to the floor, she just fell or slipped to the floor”.
Whilst Maria was on the floor, the mother told the court she could recollect Maria being face down; “When she fell down she was facing the floor, she was moving too much, I couldn’t hold her still and I tried to tie her hands, and that was wrong. Mariawas moving too much, she was trying to get up because she wanted to leave. I pulled the dressing gown cord from [the father’s] gown, I was standing between Maria’s legs. Yes I tied her hands, I don’t recall what [the father] was doing at that point. The mother told the court she didn’t tie Maria’s hands very well because Maria easily removed the dressing gown cord herself.
Again this account is supported by Erin who told the court her father “was trying to stop Maria from leaving and to keep her down, she was face up, on her back. Dad was using his hands to stop her getting up but she was being forceful and yes, it was physical”. Erin was also able to recollect her sister being face down on the floor at one point with her hands behind her back, and Maria was trying to bite her father’s arm and he pushed her head away from his arm to prevent this.
In her own evidence, Maria told the court she could not recall the incident clearly due to the alcohol she had consumed which affected her memory but she could recall saying she was going to leave and telling her father she was going to bite him. She agreed she didn’t want her parents to look in her bag and find the flask of rum because they would have then known she had been drinking, and she recalled feeling angry with her parents because they didn’t believe her when she told them she was at work and hadn’t been drinking. Maria agreed she fell over because she was drunk, she could recall her hands being tied together but not who did it. Maria agreed her parents and sister who were sober are likely to have the better recall of the incident.
The father agrees with much of the above but his recollection differs slightly in that he could recall the mother asking Maria why she was lying about where she had been and Maria denying lying about it. The father stated “What [the mother] was saying was true but it was not the time to ask that question”. He agreed that at the time it didn’t occur to him to stop the mother from questioning Maria but afterwards he reflected on what he could have done differently and agreed he should have intervened to allow Maria to go to bed.
The father could recall the mother wanting to look inside Maria’s bag to retrieve her mobile phone which Maria had borrowed, and this led to both the mother and Maria pulling at the bag with Maria refusing to hand over the phone. In her oral evidence, Maria agreed the mother wanted to look in her bag and she didn’t want her to. She said this was because “I didn’t want to show I was drinking. If she had seen the flask and smelt what was in it she would have known. I felt angry because she didn’t believe me I wasn’t drinking and was at work”.
Maria could recall falling over because she was drunk and hitting her head on the floor but the father could also recall the mother instructing Maria to sit on the floor. The evidence is unclear whether there were two separate occasions when Maria was on the floor or only one, but all four adults agree Maria ended up on the floor, was protesting about wanting to leave and the parents were doing their best to prevent this. The parents agree this led them to restrain Maria by tying her hands together whilst she was on the floor with the father’s dressing gown cord. The father could recall trying to tie Maria’s feet together with a jacket as well but that didn’t work. In their evidence, both parents expressed remorse and regret for their actions towards their daughter.
Erin denied her sister was forced or thrown to the floor by the parents and told the court; “she was not forced or thrown to the floor, no, she just fell or slipped to the floor….[the father] was trying to stop her from leaving and to keep her down. Maria was face up, laid on her back, he was using his hands to stop her from getting up”. Erin could also recall Maria being face down with her hands behind her back at one point.
At some point whilst Maria was on the floor being restrained by the father the mother left the room to go upstairs and get dressed, and whilst doing so called for the Police to attend. When she came back down again she saw there was blood on Maria’s ear which then caused her to make a second call for an ambulance. The mother stated she was not in the room when Maria injured her ear and she did not know how it happened.
Erin agrees her mother was not in the room at this point and she thought Maria injured her ear on the side of the glass coffee table as she was trying to get up off the floor. Maria could recall banging her head on the floor but could not recall how she hurt her ear other than it may have happened when she fell down. The father agrees the injury to Maria’s ear was caused during the incident but he could not recall at precisely which point.
The parents, Maria and Erin all agree Jess and Jemma did not see the incident because they were upstairs in bed when it happened, but the children were woken up by the noise of it and by Maria going into their room to say goodbye when she left with the Police Officers. The parents concede it would have been emotionally harmful to Jess and Jemma to have seen or heard the incident in the family home.
PC Morton and PC Hutchinson were the two Police officers who arrived at the family home around 4am and took Maria to hospital accompanied by Erin. They corroborate the parents account that some form of disturbance and/or argument had happened at the property as “food appeared to be thrown around and there were some ornaments on the floor”. When they spoke to Maria she disclosed no offences to them but they noticed a cut to her ear; “it was established that during an altercation the earring was caught and became dislodged causing the cut”. PC Hutchinson’s recollection is that Maria told her “there had been a scuffle with her mum and as a result Maria’s ear was cut. I remember a small cut injury to one of Maria’s ears”. PC Hutchinson confirms Maria appeared to be intoxicated, tearful, emotional and unsteady.
Once at the hospital Maria is seen by a series of professionals some of whom have given evidence to the court. The local authority asserts Maria gave a different account of what had happened at the family home that night to various health professionals which, if true, would amount to an assault upon her by her parents. The local authority alleges Maria told the truth at the hospital and she is the victim of domestic abuse perpetrated by her parents. Furthermore, that such assault is part of a longstanding pattern of behaviour by both parents where they use excessive physical chastisement and physical/emotional abuse to control and manage the behaviour of their children. As a consequence, it asserts both Jess and Jemma are likely to suffer significant harm in the future arising from the same parenting being provided to them.
The parents agree that in the past the mother has used unacceptable, excessive physical chastisement to correct Maria’s and/or Erin’s behaviour. Maria and Erin also agree with this and they have told the court how it was their mother, as the primary carer, who did this but not their father. The parents, Maria and Erin all agree this level of chastisement has not been repeated since 2019 when social care spoke to the mother about her parenting following an incident where the mother used unreasonable and excessive physical chastisement towards Erin.
The local authority asserts the mother has poor mental health and alleges the children have witnessed frightening adult behaviours which have caused them significant emotional harm and placed them at risk of physical harm and neglect. However, despite being invited by the court at the conclusion of the evidence to re-draft the findings it seeks to reflect the evidence the court has heard, it has failed to plead how or why this is attributable to the care being provided or likely to be provided by either parent, especially the father, to cross the statutory threshold at the date of intervention as opposed to it being a consideration at any future welfare hearing. There is no evidence of any deterioration in the mother’s mental health which may have contributed towards the index incident on the 2 August 2024.
The parents, and the mother in particular, accept the incidents pleaded by the local authority which relate primarily to her hospital admissions and the deterioration in her mental health which precipitated those admissions, but she does not accept those sad and historical incidents pass the statutory threshold at the relevant time the local authority intervened.
It is correct the father was not in the country at the time some of the pleaded incidents occurred because he was waiting for a visa to come to the UK, and for that reason he cannot be held responsible for anything which did or did not occur at that time. For the more recent incidents, he submits he has always supported and encouraged the mother to take her medication and if the mother’s mental health has deteriorated he has always taken steps to contact the mother’s mental health team or the police. It is noted, he was not challenged in cross examination about this. The father accepts witnessing any deterioration in the mother’s mental health has been and is likely to be upsetting to the children if it were to happen in the future, but he has done all he can to minimise the impact of it by calling the mental health crisis team.
The children’s guardian also accepts the incidents are factually correct and notes the parents were not challenged about what they said about those incidents, and she commends the family as a whole for recognising the mother’s ongoing compliance with her medication is likely to benefit everyone in the future.
The final two findings sought by the local authority relate to allegations the parents have not been open or honest regarding their parenting methods because they have continued to use excessive physical chastisement after social care advised them against this in 2019, which in turn demonstrates an inability to make and sustain positive change. These two findings are predicated on the court making the earlier findings in the schedule and if, as the parents assert, the incident in August 2024 was a one-off incident, these two findings fall away.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
In the schedule of findings sought at the outset of this hearing, the local authority sought a finding that Maria was not drunk in the early hours of the 2 August 2024. It now resiles from seeking that finding and accepts in its written submissions the weight of the evidence in this case indicates that Maria was “under the influence of alcohol”. I do not accept that concession goes far enough when the evidence the court has from the parents, Maria and Erin, corroborated by two independent Police officers whose evidence the local authority has chosen not to challenge, supports a significant level of intoxication due to alcohol. It must follow, the local authority also has to accept that when Maria spoke to Witness 2 and told her: “Maria advised she has consumed alcohol historically but at no point had she drunk alcohol in the days/hours leading up to the assault”, that Maria did not tell the truth to Witness 2.
This conclusion is consistent with Maria’s oral evidence. Contrary to the local authority’s case, Maria agrees she did not tell the truth to the various professionals who she spoke to after she arrived at the hospital. Maria told the court she didn’t admit to anyone she had been drinking or that she was not fully sober, she said she had felt ‘angry and passionate’ towards her parents, and all this combined together to cause her to exaggerate and/or lie about the events which had happened when she spoke to the health care and other professionals. She also said she was tired, exhausted having been up all night, and in pain from the injury to her ear which was yet to be treated more than 7-8 hours after her admission to the A&E department. Maria’s contention is that the hospital staff prioritised speaking to her about the events of the evening rather than providing appropriate medical treatment. Given the lengthy delay in her ear injury being sutured, one can understand why Maria would hold this opinion although it may have had had as much to do with a lack of available medical staff. Maria told the court “I felt like I had sobered up more by the time I spoke to hospital staff. I wouldn’t say I was completely sober. I was still angry and had it in my system. I was able to speak but when I got home I was slurring my words”. I accept this account, none of it reflects well on Maria who has conceded she has told multiple lies to a variety of people, and it is supported by the evidence of Erin. It has taken some courage by Maria to admit to the impact her behaviour and the lies she has told has had upon her family and I commend her for making those admissions.
In contrast, the local authority asserts Maria had fully sobered up by the time she spoke to the various healthcare and other professionals at the hospital and the information she gave to them, which form the basis of the findings it seeks to satisfy the section 31 threshold criteria, was the truth.
The local authority asserts the hospital staff would not have made a referral to the safeguarding team unless Maria had made these allegations, and it relies on how Erin would pull her hood over her head and place her fingers in her ears when Maria spoke of the abuse she had experienced. It is agreed that at no point did Erin, who was present throughout, intervene and tell any of the professionals that Maria was lying to them, and the local authority relies on Erin’s passiveness as tacit support for the fact Maria was telling everyone the truth.
The local authority further asserts that the historical incidents which have been conceded by the parents are consistent with the information given by Maria at the hospital, and on the basis of similar fact evidence it asserts this makes it likely the use of physical and emotional chastisement within the family home has continued throughout the intervening years.
In analysing the volume and extent of the evidence before the court I do not propose to recount in great detail the evidence the court has heard fromhospital witnesses 1, 2, 3, 4; IO Sarah Clayton or Rebecca Lartey but it has all been very carefully listened to and evaluated. I consider each of those witnesses were doing their best to assist the court and to tell the truth from their various perspectives but this court has the advantage of seeing and hearing the wide canvas of evidence as a whole, first hand and there is no substitute for that advantage.
In reaching my conclusions I consider the more accurate evidence is likely to be that which is obtained closest to the incident as it evolved on the 2 August 2024. I consider and accept the risks associated with a person giving repeated accounts as described by Mr Justice Jackson in the case of Lancashire CC v Others [2014] EWHC 3 set out above, and the discrepancies which may arise from doing so.
When PC Morton and PC Hutchinson attended the family home in the early hours of the 2 August, Maria made no allegations about being assaulted and the Police established the cut to her ear was caused during an altercation whereby “the earring was caught and became dislodged causing the cut”. This is the first contemporaneous account of what had happened and I accept it for that reason. Even though the Police Officers’ statements were not prepared until February 2025, the content of them is consistent with the contents of the crime report they filed only a few hours later at 5.14am on the 2 August which adds to its accuracy; “Victim has came back to home address in drink and has became irate (sic) and began to kick off in the property, beginning to throw items around in the house. The suspect (mother) has attempted to restrain her and in the process has clipped the victim’s earring off causing it to rip off and cut the victim’s ear”.
After Maria was discharged from hospital, she did not return home immediately. Based upon different information different Police officers were given at the hospital, the parents were arrested with bail conditions in place not to contact Maria which they abided by. On the 3 August 2024, Maria was spoken to by DC Hey and she told DC Hey she did not wish to pursue any complaint against her parents. Maria was spoken to again by DC Hey on the 6 August 2024 and Maria was “adamant she did not wish to pursue the investigation. When speaking with Maria she stated she thought this had been blown out of proportion and she may have caused the injury to her ear on the corner of the table, and she hadn’t been assaulted. However, she remained at the hotel as she didn’t want to live with her parents”.
There is no evidence Maria had any contact with her parents during this period or that they instructed her what to say. Maria’s decision not to return to live with her parents demonstrates her capacity for independent decision making free from any control by her parents. I cannot identify any reason why she would consistently tell PCs Morton and Hutchinson and DC Hey she had not been assaulted by her parents unless she was telling the truth about it. There is no evidence the parents influenced her to say it.
The four persons who were in the room at the time the incident occurred and who are the only ones with direct knowledge of it are the parents, Maria and Erin. Their respective accounts and recollections given in evidence to the court are similar but not identical. I find this adds to their individual reliability because at the time the incident unfolded it was a highly emotional and stressful situation where none of the adults had any cause to consider or appreciate the importance of retaining an accurate account in their heads. A person’s attention may be triggered by a different sight or sound during the event and, in turn, may be recollected with different emphasis or sequencing in their individual memory. It does not mean they are not each telling the truth.
The parents, Maria and Erin have all candidly admitted they have discussed and reflected upon the events of the night in question to address as a family how best to ensure it is never repeated. I have considered whether there may have been any collusion between them to mislead the court but I am satisfied there is not. Firstly, because the local authority has not identified any evidence upon which such a conclusion could properly be drawn or inferred, and secondly because these four witnesses did not automatically agree with the contents of each other’s written statements when asked in cross examination about them and were able to give their own independent account. One example is given by Erin when she said she didn’t recall the mother and Maria having a disagreement over Maria’s bag or pulling the bag between them. She said “I remember there was a bag and I remember my mum had the bag at one point but I don’t recall a ‘tussle’ over the bag”, even though it would have been easier for Erin simply to accept the veracity of her father’s statement in its entirety.
I am persuaded that what happened at the family home on the 2 August 2024 was precipitated by and attributable to the behaviour of both of these parents as well as Maria, but it did not constitute an assault by the parents upon their adult daughter and I do not find them to be directly responsible for the injury Maria sustained to her ear. The deficits in the parents’ behaviour and the risks which flow from it are limited to their inability to manage the situation in a way which did not cause it to escalate out of control, which in turn caused them to use escalating and unacceptable measures of restraint to prevent Maria from leaving the family home. I accept their motives for doing so may have been well intentioned; to keep Maria safe from harm whilst she was drunk in the context of being fearful she would leave the family home and place herself in a vulnerable situation, set against a backdrop of threats being made by Mr X to their daughter’s welfare, but none of this excuses the level of restraint they used by tying Maria’s hands together whilst she was on the floor or attempting to tie her feet together as the father described. This was physically harmful to Maria because restraint, even when used by trained professionals, has the potential to cause really serious harm. Both parents accept they participated in this activity and they are correct to concede it should not have been done, it was ill-judged, disproportionate and unnecessary. If it was to be repeated it would be harmful to any person upon whom it was inflicted.
I now turn to analyse the likelihood of repetition of this incident and the information shared by Maria at the hospital, and the local authority’s assertion the events at home on the 2 August is an example of a pattern of ongoing behaviour by the parents. The findings sought in paragraph 7 of the amended schedule are largely conceded to be factually accurate by the parents but they submit those incidents are all historical and pre-date the social worker giving the mother advice about her parenting in 2019. If that is correct, then there is no ongoing pattern of behaviour at the time the local authority intervened to protect the children and the main thrust of paragraph 7 fails.
The local authority did not challenge Maria’s evidence about her own presentation at the hospital save for the parts where Maria asserted she was exaggerating or not telling the truth when she told professionals about what had happened at home. The local authority asserts, in summary, the effects of the alcohol upon Maria would have worn off as time progressed and what Maria later told the various health care and other professionals was the truth.
The evidence of [a triage nurse] provides a statement based upon Maria’s medical notes, she has no further recollection of events. It is recorded that [the triage nurse] assessed Maria at 5am on the 2 August 2024 (Footnote: 1) and she recorded: - ‘states parents have accused her of coming home late + they hand cuffed both arms + legs together + hit head against table causing injury to ear. Maria does not feel safe at home. Maria states, had multiple assaults previously from parents’. No loss of consciousness or vomiting was noted. [the triage nurse] notes she is unable to comment if Maria was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of her assessment as this is not documented.
This recording does not significantly advance the local authority’s case or contradict what the parents or Maria and Erin say happened at home on the 2 August. It is agreed the mother used excessive physical chastisement towards Maria and Erin in the past when they were children and there is nothing in this entry which suggests it had happened more recently.
Witness 4 (emergency department sister) was the health care professional who next treated Maria chronologically on the 2 August. Witness 4 confirms she did not make any notes and her statement made some 9 months after the incident on the 21 May 2025 is based upon her recollection and reading the notes of other witnesses. Witness 4 told the court her interaction with Maria was brief and she could not recall the event. Maria was under Witness 4’s care between 05.30am – 7am, when she handed over to Witness 1. Witness 4 states, Maria appeared distressed, stating she had been tied up by her parents as they questioned where she had been after work. Maria had a wound to her ear which she stated she sustained during the alleged assault by her parents. Maria said she had been tied up and forced to the floor by parents where she sustained the wound to her ear. Maria stated this was not the first time the alleged abuse had occurred and stated that she did not feel safe to return home. Her sister was present with her in the Emergency Department. Maria stated that she had two younger sisters at home who were in bed at the time of the alleged assault. Witness 4 is unable to comment upon whether Maria was under the influence of drugs/alcohol.
Again, this evidence does not significantly advance the local authority’s case or contradict what the parents or Maria and Erin say happened at home on the 2 August other than the use of different terminology. It does not establish what is simple repetition from the evidence of other witnesses or what may have been added to by way of ‘story-creep’. Witness 4’s oral evidence could not assist with that issue as she could not recall much about the incident to add to her written statement.
Witness 1 (nurse associate) provided a statement dated 20 January 2025. Between 7am and 7.30am Witness 1 received a handover from Witness 4 and was “made aware there were some safeguarding concerns with Maria against her parents”. There is no detailed contemporaneous note of what was said or exchanged between Witness 4 and Witness 1 which may have influenced her approach towards Maria.
Maria is reported to have told Witness 1 she had sustained the cut to her ear when she was thrown to the floor “however, she was unsure whether this happened to her earring being caught on the table or whether it had been pulled from her ear” . Maria said she returned home from work late, her parents believed she was drunk and as a result they had tied her up and beaten her up. Witness 1 notes in her statement that Maria did not appear intoxicated and did not smell of alcohol. Maria is alleged to have stated the abuse had been happening more frequently; however, this was the first time her parents had tied her up.
In cross examination, Witness 1 agreed Maria was distressed and upset but was unable to comment on whether or not she was intoxicated other than Maria was talking in sentences ‘and not stumbling’. In cross examination, it was put to Witness 1 that the suggestion of ongoing abuse was misunderstood and her answer was; “ I don’t recall them [Maria and Erin] saying this has never been done before so it gave me the judgment it had happened in the past but not to the extent of the A&E visit”. Witness 1 agreed she had not focused on any previous dates or times any abuse may have happened but effectively inferred it had. Witness 1 stated, quite understandably, that, “we have to assume people are telling us the truth in order to give them proper care” and she agreed it was not her place or role to challenge what she is told.
Due to her concerns, Witness 1 referred Maria onto the hospital safeguarding team. The form completed by Witness 1 records ‘patient has stated to myself and the safeguarding team she is often beaten with slippers and a belt…’ but there is no record of the questions and answers asked and given by Maria and no record of the period to which Maria may have been referring to; whether this happened to her as a child or, as Witness 1 inferred, as an adult. Witness 1 agreed she only asked the questions she considered to be relevant and there are no specific questions for her to follow in such scenarios to provide to the court by way of examples.
The next health care professional who is in contact with Maria is Witness 3 (physician associate). In her oral evidence, Witness 3 confirmed she had no recollection of any events in respect of Maria apart from what she has recorded in Maria’s medical notes. Witness 3 agreed the notes record she assessed Maria at 08.28 hours on the 2 August and there is no record as to whether Maria was intoxicated or not. It states; “Around 3am returned from work at warehouse, 2nd shift. Parents questioned where Maria had been. Unclear how the situation escalated but Maria reports mum and dad have tied up wrists and ankles w bandages then forced her to the floor. As going to the floor she hit right side of her head on edge of glass table. Table did not smashed (sic). Mum has then said things have gone too far and called Police. Sister witnessed these events”. What is not recorded in Witness 3’s witness statement but which does appear in the entry she made in Maria’s medical notes (Footnote: 2) is that: ‘Maria says nothing similar has happened previously. She does not wish to go home and has nowhere else to stay’.
Witness 2 is a named nurse for safeguarding children employed by Barnsley Hospital and she has provided a main witness statement dated 10 January 2025. Witness 2 states she met with Maria, along with Witness 1, at approximately 08.50am on the 2 August 2024. Witness 2’s written statement does not state the end time of their meeting but there is a clinical note written up by Witness 2 which was saved electronically at 11.41 hours after the meeting had taken place. In her oral evidence Witness 2 explained there was a preliminary conversation for 10 -15 minutes before completion of the full DASH (Domestic Abuse, Stalking, Harassment & Honour Based Abuse) assessment form was commenced. The form was completed using handwritten notes and then typed up in the electronic format which appears in the court bundle before disposing of the handwritten notes. If the clinical notes were not saved and written up until 11.41 hours and were written up ‘within 10 minutes of leaving the emergency department’ this was, by any measure, a lengthy meeting during which Maria was still awaiting medical treatment for her ear injury.
Witness 2 asserts Maria was happy to do the DASH assessment and it is agreed Witness 2 completed this form with Maria. The information which Witness 2 has recorded and which she asserts was given to her by Maria includes an allegation that ‘beatings’ from her parents are a regular feature, stating these occur weekly with her mother as the primary perpetrator, and that she would not speak to the police or support a prosecution because her mother has bi-polar which Maria believed to be the cause of her abusive behaviour. Maria is alleged to have said on this occasion ‘the beating’ occurred because her parents believed she had been out drinking. It is agreed Maria said she had not drunk alcohol in the days/hours leading up to the alleged assault.
Witness 2 asserts Maria alleged she had been ‘hog tied’ with her hands and feet tied behind her; that she was beaten by both of her parents, and that her head bounced off a glass coffee table causing the laceration to her ear. Maria is alleged to have said alcohol consumption was not permitted by her parents and despite attempting to have some independence she would be beaten to ‘keep her behaviour in check’. It is asserted Maria said her parents managed her movements and prevented any personal social media accounts. Witness 2 states Maria appeared tired, in pain and distressed from events, but did not appear under the influence of alcohol. It is submitted Maria was able to speak fluently and could understand complex questions regarding the alleged assault and her lived experience in the family home. Witness 2 notes Maria did not smell of alcohol.
In cross-examination Witness 2 agreed she had proceeded on the basis Maria had not consumed any alcohol because this is what she had been told, and she had not spoken to either of the two Police Officers who attended the family home and brought Maria to hospital to obtain their factual evidence or perspective. Nor did she speak to Witness 3 who was given conflicting information about nothing similar having happened previously and how this may have affected the accuracy of what she was recording in the DASH form.
Both Maria, and Erin who was present, dispute the nature and extent of the recordings made by Witness 2. For example, both rejected the use and meaning of the expression ‘hog-tied’ and denied this was an expression Maria knew or would use. I am persuaded they are likely to be telling the truth about this because there is no mention of this expression in the clinical notes made on the 2 August which Witness 2 asserts are a direct duplication of her handwritten notes, and no mention of Maria demonstrating what she meant by this expression. The use of this term appears for the first time in Witness 2’s January statement but there is no mention of Maria demonstrating in that statement what she meant by it. I am not persuaded this is an expression likely to have been used or demonstrated by Maria and it is more likely this is Witness 2’s label and interpretation. This conclusion is more consistent with Witness 2’s entry in Box 1 of the DASH form labelled “Current Situation” on page F90 of the case lines bundle: “Was tied up with arms behind back and feet bound or restrained although Maria and her sister Erin are unable to remember the exact details”.
Elsewhere in the DASH form there are other discrepancies, eg in her clinical notes, Witness 2 states Maria informed her that, “continued beatings are a regular feature “weekly” in the family home and the mother is the primary perpetrator”, whereas in Box 13 of the DASH assessment Witness 2 has recorded; “Maria is unable to determine how often the abuse happens but possibly weekly”.
I accept Witness 2 has tried her best to assist the court but consider these discrepancies to be important when they are consistently rejected by the person who is alleged to have said them (Maria) and who has no identified motive for fabricating her rejection; Maria’s evidence is supported by the witness, Erin; and elsewhere Maria’s evidence is supported by a contrary version of events she gave to another health care professional, Witness 3 very shortly before it was alleged to have been said. It causes me to question the reliability and accuracy of Witness 2’s recording and I consider the risks identified by Jackson J: that “As memory fades, a desire to iron out wrinkles may not be unnatural; a process that might inelegantly be described as ‘story-creep’ may occur without any necessary inferences of bad faith” is applicable here by way of explanation.
I accept that some of the information recorded by Witness 2 is likely to have been provided to her by Maria because Maria admitted she was angry, emotional and lying when she said it, and probably had exaggerated to Witness 2 and [the triage nurse] amongst others. Maria explained, “I was safe to go home but I didn’t want to go home because I was angry about why I was being questioned about coming home late from work”. In respect of the questions being asked by Witness 2 to complete the DASH form, Maria said; “I was saying yes to everything because I just wanted to get it over and done with, I was saying yes, yes, yes, no, no, no, to get it done with” . “I knew I shouldn’t be lying but after I had lied I didn’t want to get caught in the lie so I kept on with the lie that I was not drinking so I wouldn’t get caught for drinking or lying”.
Where allegations have been denied or retracted by Maria I have considered carefully the reasons for why this may be the case, and in particular the submissions advanced by the local authority for why it suggests this may be the case. Maria’s reliability and credibility is in issue when she has admitted to lying to her parents about her whereabouts and her drinking on the evening of the 2 August, and she has admitted to lying to a number of professionals at the hospital. It causes the local authority to seek to rely on parts of her evidence which support its case but to reject other parts which undermine it which is never an attractive position for a local authority to find itself in. Ms Southcote-Want has done her best with the complex evidential situation she is faced with and she was able to cross-examine both Maria and Erin who were called to give evidence by Mr Taylor to assist the court.
I have borne in mind that people do tell lies for many different reasons and the fact they have lied about some things does not mean they have lied about everything. In order to unpick which aspects of Maria’s evidence is likely to be truthful I have taken into account the wide canvas of evidence at my disposal, as I am obliged to do, to reach my conclusions and I am persuaded of the following:
Firstly, I find Erin to be a credible and reliable witness. Unlike Maria’s evidence, her evidence has remained consistent and she has not shied away from providing evidence which does not always present her parents or her sister in a positive light. She agreed what happened in the family home on the 2 August was wrong and “just escalated out of nowhere” but she was very clear that neither of her parents hit her sister or hit her sister’s head on the floor.
Erin knows her sister well and was of the opinion Maria was still in an intoxicated state when she arrived at the hospital. Given the volume of rum Maria admitted to consuming and her presentation to the Police officers at the house, I am persuaded Erin is likely to be telling the truth about this. There is no evidence from the professionals who first spoke to Maria namely, [the triage nurse] or Witness 4 to contradict her evidence. I am persuaded Erin is likely to be correct when she told the court: “When she was answering questions to the social worker she was not completely sober, that’s not right at all, she wasn’t completely clear but was making more sense (than earlier)”.
Erin did not accept Maria told Witness 1 the abuse was happening more frequently at home, and confirmed, in any event, that it wasn’t true. Whilst Erin agreed she had the hood of her jumper pulled over her head at the hospital as described by Witness 1, she rejected the inferences drawn by Witness 1 and the local authority for why she did this. Erin told the court she had done this because “I was upset by the whole situation and getting really overwhelmed. I was mainly upset to see my sister in that state, she was tired, drained and upset. Some things she said, I would look at her thinking, you’re not saying the right thing. Some of the things she was saying were not true and I was thinking, ‘why are you lying and why are you exaggerating?’. I didn’t speak to the professionals but I did speak to Maria and say I don’t think you are making sense right now. I may have said, ‘why are you saying this?’, I did question her and she didn’t really respond, she was tired”. …. “In that moment I was really overwhelmed. I was shocked about how it turned out and I had my hood up because I was crying. I felt I had to be the strong person for Maria, seeing her in that state, her ear, and we didn’t know if it was internal bleeding in her head. The doctors were saying they needed to see if the bleeding was internal or external”. Erin broke down and was crying in her oral evidence when she said this in direct contrast to her smiling and happy presentation when she spoke of the visits she makes to see her parents and sisters on her trips home from University.
I accept Erin’s evidence on this issue, her explanation is plausible and was expressed authentically, she was in a situation she had never encountered before and deeply worried about her sister. I do not accept Erin’s lack of intervention or active confrontation of her sister should be construed as tacit acceptance that what Maria was saying was true. I consider Erin’s explanation is more likely, and she would have found it very difficult to suggest to professionals in front of her sister that Maria was telling lies when the same suggestion by the mother earlier in the evening that Maria was being dishonest was one of the contributing factors to the incident escalating out of all proportion and Erin was aware of that fact.
Erin told the court that Maria did not directly tell the healthcare professionals the physical abuse was happening in the present, but she could understand from her sister’s presentation and how Maria was expressing herself that she may have given this misleading impression to the various professionals she spoke to. I accept this evidence, it is consistent with Maria’s account in her oral evidence that she had said at the hospital that she “felt like she had beaten” not that she had been beaten. Also that she may have said to the health care professionals she was forced or thrown to the floor but they key detail she was trying to convey was that she was on the floor.
Erin denied the parents prevent herself or Maria from accessing social media or having social media accounts or control their movements in any way. I accept Erin is telling the truth about this, it is consistent with Maria and Erin being free to attend different Universities in different cities both a considerable distance from the family home and having access to social media on their mobile phones. There is no persuasive evidence to support this finding at all and I accept, if it was said by Maria to Witness 2, it was another lie by Maria at the time it was said.
Erin prepared and submitted her statement to the court after receiving legal advice paid for by the local authority. Erin could recall an incident of physical violence towards her by her mother in 2019 when her mother hit her across her hands with a USB charging cord, and she could recall a social worker coming to visit to talk to her mother about how to discipline children by not hitting them. Erin told the court her mother took this advice ‘on board’ and it didn’t happen again after that. Her father has never physically assaulted her and she has never witnessed either of her parents being abusive to Jemma or Jess other than an occasional ‘tap on the bottom if they are really naughty but usually the punishment is more taking away their iPad if they misbehave, or grounded or no sweets, etc”.
I cannot identify any cogent evidence which undermines Erin’s account and I accept it in its entirety, and where it corroborates Maria’s account I accept Maria is telling the truth about those aspects of her life. I accept Erin’s account that Jemma and Jess are not being abused at home by the parents and although they have been chastised by being smacked, which the parents accept, it has never gone beyond this.
I do not condone or trivialise a parent’s use of physical chastisement in any form, and many professionals take the view this is inherently harmful and inappropriate. But I also have to accept that many reasonable parents in society do use this as a method of chastisement and section 58 of the Children Act 2004 does not prohibit the use of smacking by a parent as a method of reasonable chastisement in England, unlike in Scotland which banned it in 2020 or Wales in 2022. I cannot conclude therefore, that smacking a child with nothing more to indicate the severity or physical harm of doing so is significant, is a fact which crosses the statutory threshold when the law permits it.
I do, however, consider the repeated threat to smack a child has a different impact and does cross the statutory threshold because it affects a child’s emotional wellbeing, it fosters an atmosphere of intimidation and anxiety, and is likely to cause significant emotional harm if the threat is being made persistently. The mother accepted she has, and does, threaten to do this to Jemma and Jess to correct their behaviour, and she concedes this is not acceptable parenting and must not be repeated. The impact it is likely to have on the children is demonstrated by Jemma’s concern she will be slapped because her tights are wet and she should not have to carry such anxiety.
In reaching my conclusions I have also borne in mind the evidence the court has in the psychiatric opinion prepared by the court appointed expert, Dr Nimmagadda, consultant psychiatrist dated 7 May 2025. Dr Nimmagadda was specifically asked to consider the mother’s mental health history and if her mental health were to relapse, what are the risks which are likely to emerge and to whom. His response indicates the mother is likely to become aggressive and violent to family members, neighbours, strangers and mental health professionals. I understand and appreciate this opinion is one which fuels the local authority’s concerns regarding the mother’s mental health but perhaps more significantly, this is a family which has had frequent contact with outside professionals who are involved to support the mother’s mental health, and none of them have made a referral to social care expressing concerns for the safety of Jemma or Jess. These are not invisible children.
Accordingly, whilst this is a risk which has the potential to materialise, I am not persuaded it is one which has materialised since March 2024, and it was not manifesting itself at the time this local authority intervened to protect the children. Provided the mother remains compliant with her medication it is a low, manageable risk as Dr Nimmagadda has opined: “At the current time, given that [the mother] is on depot antipsychotic medication, the chances of relapse is much less as this is given regularly, lessening the chances of a relapse”.
I have also taken into account the evidence provided by the children’s school which is consistent with the children not being excessively chastised at home. The only entries of concern are in January 2023, when Jemma said “my tights are wet, my mum is going to slap me”, and September 2023 when Jess stated at school “If she does anything bad at home both mum and dad smack her but not hard.” Jess was asked when was the last time this happened but she couldn’t remember. On the 5 August 2024, Jess was spoken to on her own by Rebecca Lartey. Jess told Ms Lartey “When Maria was getting in trouble, we were upstairs, and I could hear shouting. It makes me feel sad. When I get in trouble, they just beat (Footnote: 3) me, it’s not hard, I don’t even cry”. Both children have given a consistent account to a number of different professionals that they are not smacked often and not hard.
I have carefully considered the submissions made by the children’s guardian that in the context of this case there is a risk such behaviour could become harmful if it were to occur more frequently or escalate in a manner similar to that which happened on the 2 August 2024, but I have been persuaded the likelihood of this risk is a low one. I find it is unlikely to materialise for the following reasons;
Firstly, because neither Maria or Erin made any allegation, false or otherwise, to any professional in August 2024 that Jemma and Jess were being physically harmed by the parents or were at risk of being so.
Secondly, because Jemma and Jess have consistently stated otherwise. They have been given the opportunity to say otherwise but instead they indicated a positive picture of their homelife; DC Hey visited Jemma and Jess on the 2 August and asked them if they knew why Maria was in hospital. They told her Maria was in hospital as her ear was bleeding and they said she had fallen down. DC Hey’s pocket notebook entry records Jemma and Jess telling her: “Maria has run away and then she fell, her ear was bleeding. Maria was trying to hurt the family, the adults in the family and she was acting crazy. The girls said they were sleeping when they heard screaming and banging, they did not know who was screaming and banging. Maria then came to give them a hug and kiss, as she was running away, she was acting weird. They said they were happy with their mum and dad, that it was a nice home, they had not seen them hurt Maria. Their mum sent them to the naughty corner and talked to them if they were in trouble and dad told them off and to say sorry. Erin and Maria argued with mum and dad if they stayed out late, sometimes they’d sleep at friends if they asked first, if they didn’t ask, they were in trouble”.
Thirdly, no professional who is or has been involved in the family in any capacity has witnessed or made a reference to excessive physical chastisement being used towards Jemma or Jess as a concern prior to 2 August 2024, and the mental health professionals who are involved are alive to the risks which exist and likely to be monitoring for them.
Finally and of some significance, both parents made additional admissions in their oral evidence of incidents where they have either slapped Maria across the cheek (the mother) or smacked Jemma on the bottom (the father) which no one would have known about had they chosen not to mention them. The mother admitted there were occasions when Maria and Erin were children when she hit them with a stick, a slipper and her hand, and whilst she could not recall the use of a belt on one occasion, she does not suggest Maria or Erin are wrong about this. The mother accepts she has hit or smacked the younger children with her hand or a slipper on their bottom but not hard and leaving no injury.
I am persuaded the admissions and concessions made by the parents would not have been made unless they were truthful but they do not support a finding they are part of an ongoing, persistent pattern of behaviour which culminated in an assault upon Maria on the 2 August 2024.
Conclusions
When I evaluate the totality of the evidence before the court I am persuaded to accept the submissions made on behalf of the mother that the only evidence adduced by the local authority to support its contention there is ongoing, excessive, physical chastisement taking place in the family home are the comments made by Maria at the hospital. When I balance this against Maria’s explanations for why she said she lied to those professionals, explanations which I find to be plausible; the evidence I have set out above; Erin’s evidence; the evidence of the parents who accepted from the outset of these proceedings that their behaviour on the 2 August 2024 was wrong; and the absence of concerns from other professionals who are involved with this family, I consider it is more likely the incident on the 2 August 2024 was an isolated, unhappy event.
For the avoidance of doubt, I do find the section 31 statutory threshold to be crossed but for the reasons set out above I do not make all of the findings sought by the local authority. Those which are approved by the court are set out in the schedule at the end of this judgment, the others are only relevant to the welfare considerations which the court must address in due course.
The parents and professionals now need to reflect on this judgment and the findings I have made, and I make it very clear that the findings I have made do not mean Jemma and Jess cannot be rehabilitated home. In the light of the findings I have made I would like the local authority to formulate a safety plan with the family to include acceptable methods of boundary setting, and which does not involve any form of physical chastisement or threat of physical chastisement.
I readily acknowledge how upsetting it has been for Jemma and Jess, as well as for all of the adults in this family, to have been separated for the past year. This family has endured separation for over 13 months. This must have been immensely challenging and upsetting for all of them and it is essential that the next steps are taken swiftly to ensure the rehabilitation of this family if that is considered possible. I have every hope and expectation that it will be.
I remind the parties this is a final determination of these facts which are sought as part of the threshold criteria in this case and, for that reason, any application for leave to appeal must be made within 21 days following the handing down of this judgment. The order of the court made on the 19 September 2025 will have this reminder recorded on the face of it.
H.H. JUDGE MARSON
19th September 2025
THE SCHEDULE OF FACTS APPROVED BY THE COURT TO SATISFY THE SECTION 31 STATUTORY CRITERIA
The Court finds the threshold criteria contained in section 31 of the Children Act 1989 to be satisfied, and at the time the local authority intervened to protect Jemma and Jess there is a likelihood they will suffer significant harm, and the likelihood of harm is attributable to the care likely to be given to them by their parents, not being that which is reasonable to expect a parent to give to them.
The Applicant Local Authority seeks to rely on events occurring on or before the date on which it first intervened to protect the children (Re M (Minor) (Care Order: Threshold Conditions) [1994] 2 AC 424).
The Applicant Local Authority also seeks to rely on events occurring since that date which are capable of proving the state of affairs at the date of intervention (Re G (Care Proceedings: Threshold Conditions) [2001] 2 FLR 1111).
The significant harm likely to be suffered is physical and emotional harm, and impairment of their development by seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another.
Physical harm
The children are at risk of significant physical harm in the parents’ care, due to the following: -
In the early hours of 2 August 2024, the parents physically restrained their adult daughter, Maria causing her significant physical and emotional harm. The particulars are: -
On the 2 August 2024, Maria resided in the family home. Maria returned home in the early hours of 02.08.2024. The parents told Maria they believed she had been drinking alcohol and was drunk. Maria was significantly intoxicated with alcohol.
Maria and her mother argued. Maria wanted to leave. The mother physically blocked the living room door to prevent Maria leaving the room.
The parents physically restrained Maria on the floor to prevent her from leaving. Maria was temporarily unable to move her arms or legs as she was physically restrained by both parents. The mother tied Maria’s hands behind her back as she was lying face down on the floor with the cord from the father’s dressing gown. The father continued to hold Maria down when the mother left the room to get dressed. During the incident Maria’s head hit a glass coffee table.
The physical force and restraint used by the parents upon Maria was not necessary, proportionate or reasonable.
As a result of the incident, Maria suffered a wound to her right ear lobe extending into antitragus region and swelling to the right temporomandibular. Maria attended the Emergency Department of Barnsley hospital at 04:53 hours on 2 August 2024 where Maria’s wound was cleaned and sutured.
If Jemma and/or Jess were to be subjected to similar levels of restraint in the future it is likely to cause them significant physical and emotional harm.
Emotional harm
On 2 August 2024 Jemma and Jess were woken up in the night by the sound of screaming and banging arising from the above incident. The children saw the (bleeding) injury to Maria’s ear. The children were sad, confused and scared. The children’s exposure to hearing the ill-treatment and restraint of Maria is likely to impair their development and cause them significant harm as defined by section 31(9) of the Children Act 1989.
The mother has threatened Jemma and Jess with the use of physical harm to manage their behaviour, telling the children, “I will beat you”. The making of such threats is likely to place the children at risk of significant emotional harm.
Findings Relevant to the Welfare Considerations
Prior to 2019, the mother used physical force which was physically and emotionally abusive to control and manage the behaviour of Maria and Erin. In particular:
When Maria and Erin were children, there were occasions when the mother hit them using her hand by way of an open palm slap, or a slipper or a stick.
On one occasion the mother hit Maria with a belt.
In 2019, when Maria was around 16 or 17 years old, the mother slapped her to the face (her cheek) using an open palm. Maria had re-entered the family home after going outside to smoke, and upon her return she lied to her mother about what she had been doing. The mother shouted at Maria.
In 2019 the mother excessively physically chastised Erin (then aged 13) using a phone cable, causing linear marks to her arm. Erin was heard screaming by a neighbour who contacted the police.
The parents have both smacked Jemma and Jess on the bottom using a hand or a slipper.
When Maria was a teenager, aged 17 or 18 years old (attending college), the mother saw an image of Maria on social media and told her she was dressed like a prostitute.
The Mother’s Mental Health
The mother has a diagnosis of a Bipolar Affective Disorder. For many years the mother experienced significant fluctuations in her mental health. Between October 2015 and February 2024, the mother was admitted to hospital 13 times. The mother’s mental health has been stable since March 2024 with no episodes of relapse or incidents of concern due to her compliance with her depot medication.
Historically, when the mother has been acutely unwell, the children witnessed frightening adult behaviours. In particular: -
On or around 10 September 2018 Maria (then aged 16) contacted the police because the mother was breaking things in the home and was trying to get out of the house through the windows. The family, including Jemma (aged 2), were frightened. When the police attended the mother was standing in the back garden holding Jemma. The mother’s behaviours had been escalating over a few weeks because the mother had stopped taking her medication. The mother was detained under the Mental Health Act 1983.
On or around 5 August 2019 the mother was detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 due to a deterioration in her mental health. Maria (then aged 17) reported there had been a decline in the mother’s mental health which the mother had been in denial about. The mother experienced a manic episode where she was not sleeping and was hearing voices.
In or around November 2020 Maria (then aged 18) contacted the police because the mother was trying to leave the house during a mental health crisis. The mother bit Maria and pulled Jess’s (then aged 1 year) hair. The mother was detained under the Mental Health Act 1983.
On 17 November, 18 November and 19 November 2021 and the 10 December 2021 the police attended the family home due to the mother’s frightening and at times, violent behaviour which the children witnessed. On 10 December 2021 the mother was detained under the Mental Health Act 1983.
On 6 February 2024 Erin (then aged 18) contacted the police because the mother was behaving in a violent and aggressive manner. The mother’s behaviour had become ‘serious’ the previous day. The mother was shouting, trying to pull the curtains down and smash windows. Jemma and Jess (then aged 7 and 4) were present in the home throughout, and likely to have been aware of the incident. The mother bit and hit the father whilst he tried to restrain her. The mother was admitted to hospital for assessment.
Prior to 28.02.2024 the mother failed to take her medication consistently leading to relapses in her mental health condition. Previously, the mother lacked the insight to accept the necessity of taking her antipsychotic medication consistently to prevent a mental health crisis. Since March 2024 the mother has complied with her Aripiprazole medication and engaged with her mental health team. The mental health professionals are confident the mother’s compliance with her medication is accurate because they are responsible for administering her injections.
ENDS