Local Authority v Mother & Ors

This hearing relates to the interests of B. B is 13 years old. It relates to the issue as to whether the court should permit the local authority, supported by his mother and his children’s guardian, from withholding disclosure of the psychological report upon B dated March 2024 prepared by Dr. Jaime Craig (“the report”) from his parents. The parents have had a summary of the report but the father seeks sight of the full report.

The issue arises out of an application for contact by the father and cross- applications by the local authority (issued on 18 February 2025) for orders, including orders under the inherent jurisdiction against the father. They are listed for final hearing, but this judgment arises out of the discrete issue of the disclosure of the report of Dr. Craig.

B is a vulnerable boy. It is necessary to sketch something of the history to begin to understand why he presents as he does. I have taken part of what follows from an agreed summary of the background. The recent proceedings have been allocated to and heard by District Judge Gordon, including the care order by virtue of which the local authority share parental responsibility with B’s parents. Unfortunately, due to her long-term absence, she has not been able to manage the present applications.

I am grateful to counsel for all parties for their assistance. I have received submissions today and this is an ex tempore judgment dealing with my reasons for concluding that the application by the local authority to withhold disclosure of the report should be dismissed.

The local authority are represented by Helen Crowell. The allocated social worker is SW.

The father is represented by Lorraine Cavanagh KC and Mark Steward.

The mother is represented by Matthew Carey.

B is represented by Stephen Mallinson taking his instructions from the children’s guardian, CG.

The reader would benefit from sight of the detailed and agreed chronology of the background set out at A10, in addition to which there is a litigation chronology, starting in 2012 and running to 3 February 2025, which provides a snapshot of the level and pace of intervention in B’s life over much of his life.

B was initially subject to public law proceedings in 2013 that arose out of an issue as to an injury to his [redacted]. Those proceedings were conducted before His Honour Judge Barnett. They led to a shared care arrangement from that point until 31 October 2019, when there was a significant incident which became the subject of a judgment given by District Judge Gordon on 11 November 2021 (G51).

Following that incident there were private law proceedings issued in November 2019. At that point, and it has been the case ever since, B has refused to have any contact with his mother.

There was then a succession of section 37 directions until the local authority determined to issue care proceedings on 1 February 2021 (case number [redacted]). District Judge Gordon on 10 March 2021 sanctioned B’s removal from his father’s care into foster care. The father sought to appeal that decision and I refused him permission to appeal, both on paper and at an oral hearing.

A care order was granted following a judgment given by District Judge Gordon on 11 November 2021 sanctioning B’s placement in residential care and giving a discretion to the local authority pursuant to section 34(4) CA 1989 to refuse contact to the parents. It is fair to say the judgment is detailed in its analysis of the issues.

District Judge Gordon did not regard the circumstances of the incident as far back as 31 October 2019 as amounting to a form of abuse, but was concerned as to the impact of behaviour, whether deliberate or not, although some of it was found in her judgment to have been deliberate, to cause an alienation between B and his mother.

There were elements of dishonesty in the father’s case which were noted by her, and, as a result of the overall impact upon B, she determined that time and what she described as “sophisticated therapy” would be required to rebuild his relationship with the maternal family.

There has been engagement, at times, with therapy: first, with an art therapist between April 2022 and December 2022.

There were controversial issues in the sense of the reasons for the changing description of views by B as to his wishes and feelings regarding a relationship with his father or with the paternal family, and as to the impact of the father’s behaviour.

The contact with his father has, on any view, been sporadic and, essentially, appears to have stopped prior to his application to this court in December 2024 for an order for contact.

This is not the first such application, because an application was listed before District Judge Gordon following the father’s desire to promote his relationship with his son. On 2 February 2024, District Judge Gordon dismissed the father’s application made in December 2023, essentially 12 months before the present application.

What was understood and what was known was that the local authority were looking at obtaining an updated psychological assessment, because the recommendations made by Dr. Evans, who had given a psychological assessment within the care proceedings, had not led to any change in B’s attitude towards contact with his mother. There were clearly concerns in relation to the lack of progress in relation to a relationship with his father, and a move which had occurred to foster care was seen as an important step in normalising him from which to build some level of progress.

Consequently, with the dismissal of that application, there were no extant proceedings, and the local authority commissioned a psychological report of B by Dr. Jaime Craig. Dr. Jamie Craig is a well-known consultant child psychologist and chartered psychologist, and he produced a report dated March 2024. He was also instrumental in the provision of a summary of the conclusions of his opinion evidence from that report which was conveyed to the parents on 12 March 2024.

What followed was the completion of an updated parenting assessment of the father, which, in terms of conclusion, concluded negatively. Dr. Craig was part and parcel of that process, having been consulted, for example, on 12 September 2024 (A15 and E25, paragraph 6.18). Dr. Craig expressed a view that B’s support network, carers and social worker needed to stop asking B his wishes and feelings surrounding family time; instead, he should be told that he can see his parents at the family centre once per month supported by staff, should he choose to do so, but he would not otherwise be questioned or encouraged. Contact, in other words, should be led by B.

The father was informed that B did not wish to see him at a scheduled contact on 29 November 2024, and, shortly following that, on 12 December 2024, he made his application.

After the father’s application was issued there came a range of applications by the local authority, so that, in simple terms, the issues now currently before the court are as follows:

I offer that potted summary of the issues to indicate that the scope of the hearing concerns central matters to the nature of the father’s relationship with B.

The summary of Dr. Craig’s report, provided to the parents on 12 March and with the knowledge of B, can be seen at various points in the bundle from C80 to E1, or E24, paragraph 6.6 to 6.16. The terms of that summary are as follows:

“● B has a quite clear understanding of his situation and demonstrated a thoughtful capacity to weigh the pros and cons of a change to this.

•

My strong recommendation is that every effort is made to maintain B in his current foster placement and school placement where it appears his needs are very well understood and met.

•

At the present time there is not a need for therapeutic support services to address current psychological difficulties.

•

B needs not to have excessive displays / pulls on his affections through gifts and messages, or be further exposed to the ‘point scoring’ and competition over him between his parents.

•

It would also need to include a clear communication that any such contact would be on B’s terms, at a time and frequency of his choosing with no expectations of progression from this or demands.

•

It is important that this is not taken to mean an urgent attempt to restart contact, I make no such recommendation and would prioritise B’s placement stability as the main vehicle for progress. I would not that this is merely something B may choose at some point in the future, should he wish to.

•

I would recommend that B is given a very clear message from all the adults in his life that there will be no direct, or indirect pressure on him to have direct communication with either of his parents, but that the door will remain open for him to do so – should he wish it.

•

The attempts to repair relationships against his will and growing experience of the parental competition over him, attempts to coerce him appear to have been experienced as overwhelming and something anxiety provoking to avoid.

•

Maintaining this progress will in my view require a very clear message to B that his wishes are being respected and that this new found stability is being prioritised over desires to repair his relationships with his parents.

•

Indeed, it is likely that his experience of this being respected and a resultant decrease in perceived pressure to have contact with his parents that might best promote the possibility that he would consider reconnecting with them in the future.

•

He has developed a trusting relationship with his carer and views her as a source of reliable support, advice and guidance. This is protective for his wellbeing and needs to be protected by both the adults and professionals (in words and actions) in his life as his primary factor in his developing resilience.”

The full report was, at the hearing first before me, permitted into the proceedings. That arose from my questioning of the local authority as to their position regarding the report, given that the social care evidence appeared to place reliance upon the psychological assessment. The local authority accepted that they sought to rely upon the report and should seek to apply to restrain disclosure of it pending final positions being adopted as to its disclosure to the parents. I restrained disclosure pending this hearing.

The important point is that the report is now part of the evidence in this case. The court has had the opportunity to see it, and so has the children’s guardian.

Following that decision, a further request for expert evidence, principally (as I recall) coming from the guardian, was made to provide opinion evidence regarding the impact upon B of the disclosure of the report to his parents, being an area which he had been reassured about would not occur when he gave permission to work with Dr. Craig, the concern being that by providing such report to his parents, and by in some way undermining any confidence he had placed in that process, any progress he was capable of making would be undermined, but, further, he may disengage and refuse to accept reliable sources of support to his own disadvantage.

Dr. Craig was accordingly instructed jointly to deal with what I shall term “the disclosure issue” and did so on an agreed letter of instruction and in the form of a report dated 11 March 2025 (E20).

Dr. Craig referred to the change in B’s behaviour from April 2024 to the presentation in January 2025 described by his previous social worker, PSW, (paragraph 7.1 to 7.5) as “significant information”.

I observe that the genesis of his report was that it would not be shared with the parents, which is why the summary was provided. B engaged with the assessment and, in a way which is described as “important and significant”, agreed in January 2025 to work with Polaris, an organisation commissioned by the local authority to provide therapeutic support. It appears that he has not currently changed his mind about being open to working with Polaris.

Dr. Craig identifies, from a psychological perspective, the competing risks at paragraphs 5.9 to 9.11. He is unable, as a psychologist, to assess what any parent would do with the information if given the opportunity and whether they would use it better to understand the position or seek to assert a level of coercion or pressure. That is a relevant factor given the background of findings made by District Judge Gordon. He was quite careful to avoid seeking to formulate a view which would be outside the scope of his instructions and his competence. The risk, nonetheless, would be of B experiencing further pressure or coercion, if that were the outcome.

The central risk would be that, if B became aware that the report had been disclosed to his parents, then he might lose trust in those caring for him and thus his willingness to seek support when needed may be lost or negatively impacted. This risk is amplified, in his opinion, if it causes him to withdraw from the current psychological support he is receiving from Polaris. Dr. Craig would be

“very concerned that his being aware of the disclosure of the psychological report against his wishes sabotaging such therapeutic support before it began, particularly given the reports of his mental health functioning and quite paranoid presentation to his GP a week following my phone call with the social worker.” (Paragraph 9.10)

Dr. Craig opines at paragraph 9.11 that, on balance, he does not feel able to support the sharing of a psychological report with the parents, at least, confidently, offering an opinion that the risks outweigh the benefits. This reflects, in my judgment, at best a partial assessment of the position focused on the area within Dr. Craig’s expertise. Ultimately, the balance must be struck by the court and, in my judgment, Dr. Craig’s report must be understood in the context in which he was providing it, given that he was very careful to understand his role and the court’s role when assessing issues such as the likely reaction of the parents, as described in paragraph 10.2.

He observes that there is a link between the existence of proceedings and “poorer psychological functioning” (paragraph 11.1), which is a feature he says is relevant.

He agrees that, psychologically, B’s ignorance of the proceedings “most likely protects his wellbeing”, giving the accounts that he has “developed significant anxiety, making it difficult for him to leave his home due to fear of seeing his father or other paternal family members, and how that has prevented him from going out and going to school, and reported fears of being watched” (Paragraph 12.3).

Dr. Craig, given the passage of time from his assessment, was reticent about proffering an opinion about the impact upon B about being informed of proceedings and having the opportunity to be engaged. He opines that one could “anticipate at least as poor a response in terms of his emotional, psychological and functioning presentation as that seen in response to his engaging in previous proceedings. It is also important to recognise that this would add to an already deteriorated picture”. (Paragraph 13.1)

Fundamentally, irrespective of the sad loss of B’s foster care placement, which was at the time of his original report thought to be a significant component of the stability which would assist B in making positive moves forward, Dr. Craig was clear that his core recommendation remained unchanged:

“The principle of his being given confident stability in his placement. His need is for predictability and stability which is primarily achieved in a placement.” (Paragraph 15.2)

In responses to questions dated 25 March 2025 (E34), Dr. Craig noted that, in the event that B finds out that he was not given an opportunity to participate, then Dr. Craig thought it likely that:

“B could feel angry and mistrustful if he discovered he was not given the opportunity to participate if he became aware and he may be thought able to do so in principle. He may also feel a degree of relief, but he may be less likely to share/communicate that.” (Paragraph 4.18)

Dr. Craig thought it “highly unlikely that B’s view in relation to the psychological report being shared would be different if asked again” and “noted that his being asked again about this has potential risk to his wellbeing” (Paragraph 6.2).

The local authority have set out the applicable law within their skeleton argument (paragraphs 9 to 18). The principles relevant to withholding evidence from a party are well established. They were originally articulated in the speech of Lord Mustill in re D (Minors) (Adoption Reports: Confidentiality) [1996] AC 593. I quote the five principles taken from the speech:

“(1)

It is a fundamental principle of fairness that a party is entitled to the disclosure of all materials which may be taken into account by the court when reaching a decision adverse to that party…

(2)

…[T]he court should first consider whether disclosure of the material would involve a real possibility of significant harm to the child

(3)

If it would, the court should next consider whether the overall interests of the child would benefit from non-disclosure, weighing on the one hand the interest of the child in having the material properly tested, and on the other both the magnitude of the risk that harm will occur and the gravity of the harm if it does occur.

(4)

If the court is satisfied that the interests of the child point towards non-disclosure, the next and final step is for the court to weigh that consideration, and its strength in the circumstances of the case, against the interest of the parent or other party in having an opportunity to see and respond to the material. In the latter regard the court should take into account the importance of the material to the issues in the case.

(5)

Non-disclosure should be the exception not the rule. The court should be rigorous in its examination of the risk and gravity of the feared harm to the child and should order non-disclosure only when the case for doing so is compelling.”

These principles were applied by Munby J, as he then was, in Re B [2001] 2 FLR 1017, although they were framed in the context of the limited qualification, where strictly necessary, to respect a person’s Article 8 rights in the context of disclosure of documents which the other party would otherwise be entitled to have without any qualification of their Article 6 right to a fair trial. At paragraph 89 he said this:

“It is for those who seek to restrain the disclosure of papers to a litigant to make good their claim and to demonstrate with precision exactly which documents or classes of documents require to be withheld. The burden on them is a heavy one. Only if the case for non-disclosure is convincingly and compellingly demonstrated will an order be made. No such order should be made unless the situation imperatively demands it. No such order should extend any further than is necessary. The test, at the end of the day, is one of strict necessity. In most cases the need for a fair trial will demand that there be no restrictions on disclosure. Even if a case for restrictions is made out, the restrictions must go no further than is strictly necessary.”

The court has considered this in the context of other scenarios which may involve a potential breach of Article 3 of the Convention, such as R (Children: Control of Court Documents) [2021] EWCA Civ 162, and Re A (A Child) (Family Proceedings: Disclosure of Information) [2012] UKSC 60. In this area, the court is required to respect the unqualified right to a fair trial in Article 6. That does not necessarily require the person whose rights are in issue having sight of every document or every class of document. That will require the court to undertake the analysis indicated by Munby J, as he then was, focusing upon there being necessity and proportionality underlying the minimum necessary in terms of restriction on the right to access to all of the documents to enable the Article 8 rights of the other party to be respected.

The most recent authority assessing the issue of non-disclosure in the context of proceedings relating to the welfare of the child is the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re T (Children: Non-disclosure) [2024] EWCA Civ 241. Peter Jackson LJ said this in paragraphs 20 through to 22:

“Non-disclosure

20.

The approach to an application for relevant evidence to be withheld from a party to proceedings is well-established. In Re D (Minors) (Adoption Reports: Confidentiality) [1996] AC 593, [1995] 2 FLR 687, the issue was whether statements made by children could be withheld from a parent, in that case in adoption proceedings. Lord Mustill summarised the matter in this way:

‘(1) It is a fundamental principle of fairness that a party is entitled to the disclosure of all materials which may be taken into account by the court when reaching a decision adverse to that party…

(2)

… the court should first consider whether disclosure of the material would involve a real possibility of significant harm to the child.

(3)

If it would, the court should next consider whether the overall interests of the child would benefit from non-disclosure, weighing on the one hand the interest of the child in having the material properly tested, and on the other both the magnitude of the risk that harm will occur and the gravity of the harm if it does occur.

(4)

If the court is satisfied that the interests of the child point towards non-disclosure, the next and final step is for the court to weigh that consideration, and its strength in the circumstances of the case, against the interest of the parent or other party in having an opportunity to see and respond to the material. In the latter regard the court should take into account the importance of the material to the issues in the case.

(5)

Non-disclosure should be the exception not the rule. The court should be rigorous in its examination of the risk and gravity of the feared harm to the child, and should order non-disclosure only when the case for doing so is compelling.’

21.

These principles aptly apply to the present case, where the welfare of a subject child is relied upon as justifying non-disclosure. They have been extended since the advent of the Human Rights Act 1998 to encompass applications for non-disclosure based on a risk of harm to others, for example: Re B (Disclosure to other Parties) [2001] 2 FLR 1017 and Re A (Sexual Abuse: Disclosure) [2012] UKSC 60, [2013] 1 FLR 948.

22.

A court that is asked to authorise non-disclosure in the interests of a child should therefore ask itself these questions:

(1)

Is the material relevant to the issues, or can it be excluded as being irrelevant or insufficiently relevant to them?

(2)

Would disclosure of the material involve a real possibility of significant harm to the child and, if so, of what nature and degree of probability?

(3)

Can the feared harm be addressed by measures to reduce its probability or likely impact?

(4)

Taking account of the importance of the material to the issues in the case, what are the overall welfare advantages and disadvantages to the child from disclosure or non-disclosure?

(5)

Where the child's interests point towards non-disclosure, do those interests so compellingly outweigh the rights of the party deprived of disclosure that any non-disclosure is strictly necessary, giving proper weight to the consequences for that party in the particular circumstances?

(6)

Finally, if non-disclosure is appropriate, can it be limited in scope or duration so that the interference with the rights of others and the effect on the administration of justice is not disproportionate to the feared harm?”

In those paragraphs of the judgment Peter Jackson LJ sets out a structured approach towards the task at hand which is aimed to deliver the strictures set out within the authorities starting from Re D. The short point is that I adopt that structure and seek to apply it to the facts of this case.

The local authority accept that the report of Dr. Craig is relevant. They accept that to assess it would require the father to understand and, where appropriate, be able to challenge the reasoning contained in the report. Without sight of the full report he would be denied that opportunity.

In order to seek to address this issue they have suggested a number of solutions, two of them only in submissions within the hearing today. The first suggestion, which is voiced within the skeleton argument, is that the current summary prepared by Dr. Craig should be sufficient read in light of the father’s initial acceptance of his conclusions within his statement at paragraph 171, on pages C130 to 131. In other words, Dr. Craig’s report is of relevance but of peripheral relevance, given the contest is not about his conclusions but about the actions of the local authority, the actions of the father, and an assessment as to the welfare imperative at this time.

The second solution proposed by the local authority is that the court could undertake some kind of review procedure in the absence of a formal closed material procedure to ensure that the summary was amended to reflect as much as possible of the reasoning of Dr. Craig without exposing the elements of the forensic interview undertaken with him and B.

The third solution was that the court should in fact not determine the local authority’s application today but should adjourn it to await the fixture on 8 and 9 May when the court is currently due to resolve the outstanding applications so far as possible.

The extent to which the local authority have sought to find creative ways of meeting the problem rather underscores the gravity of the problem itself. The father needs to understand the report before he can develop a forensic position and focus of questioning. The report has been admitted and is relied upon by the local authority. The forensic interview, absent some minimal redaction for confidential and irrelevant points of detail, is critical to the assessment and the conclusions which have been revealed.

The proposal would impact on the conduct of the hearing. For instance, what could Dr. Craig say when asked a question if that would lead to the need for the relevant part of his report or a part of the forensic interview to be disclosed? What impact would disclosure, in the face of cross-examination, have upon the father’s right to a fair trial and to the proper conduct of a trial, given the resources the court had allocated to the hearing? Would then the court have to consider elements of the report being disclosed to the father at each step along the journey of that forensic task when the father’s advocate, hampered as they would be without prior knowledge of the reasoning for the report, would be almost bound to seek to expose the reasoning in order to set forth any arguments which may arise? In other words, if the report is relevant and sufficiently central to the issues, then, in my judgment, it is unreal to suggest that this could be an appropriate way to proceed to guarantee a fair trial and to further the overriding objective in terms of the court hearing proceeding in a regular fashion.

Finally, I accept that there is no fair way to develop the summary, which would be a nuanced and careful task the boundaries of which are not clear in the absence of a closed material procedure, which no party regards as furthering the overriding objective.

The notion of the fact finding taking place would defer the issue of disclosure and would, undoubtedly, delay a resolution of these proceedings. It is not clear to me that one can undertake any sensible analysis of facts to inform all of the applications currently before me without understanding at least the part played by the psychological evidence alongside the social care evidence and any factual evidence in terms of events or issues which are said to be relevant to a welfare factor. This is not a case, in my judgment, which is going to be helped with a separation of fact finding from welfare evaluation: quite the contrary. The facts and the scope of the fact finding can only be controlled, in my judgment, if they are wedded to the welfare issues which the court is required to resolve.

The father has acknowledged, and if he had not acknowledged I would have made clear, that injunctive orders may be made of a similar vein to those utilised in the Re T case in order to protect the interim position pending the court having a proper opportunity at the hearing already listed to determine what the arrangements should be in terms of his role in B’s life and whether there should be, for example, injunctions cast in appropriate terms for the future.

The local authority have already exercised control over areas of B’s liberty within their parental responsibility to seek to avoid the risk of inappropriate communication. To that would be added injunctive orders and the knowledge that, if the father were in the interim period to take any surreptitious step to in any way undermine B by providing the information, not only would he place his own liberty at risk but, frankly, his application would disappear as a result. It would be the surest way to guarantee an end to his role in B’s life because of that step. All of those seem to me to be relevant factors the court should bear in mind when looking at measures which can be utilised to address risk.

That would also provide an opportunity for the local authority and the guardian to develop their own strategy and analysis, and in so far as it is relevant to set that out for the court, as to B’s involvement in the proceedings, and as to the questions as to whether he should be told, if so when he should be told, and, if so, by what means and with what support he should be told, not merely of this issue but of the broader context of the decisions which will inevitably flow from the final hearing already listed.

For this purpose I shall address the relevant factors in Re T. Addressing the first factor, the report is accepted to be relevant. It was commissioned to inform placement and contact planning. The father has a direct interest in understanding and, if appropriate, challenging the conclusions and how they inform the orders sought against him.

Currently, I can see no viable means for him to participate fairly in the case against him without having sight of the report. I see no way in which I can preserve his Article 6 right to a fair hearing if I deny him the opportunity to see the reasoning of the report. That reasoning will be inherently linked to the forensic interviews, and the forensic interviews will, undoubtedly, reveal information that B has conveyed to him which he had preferred would not be disclosed to his parents. The reality is that there is no way round the court eliciting that information in the context in which it has to decide it has to give a fair opportunity for the father to respond to the allegations and the orders sought against him.

The second issue involves a real possibility of significant harm as a result of the disclosure. I accept that there is a significant but generic risk of harm to B. It is a real risk; it is not fanciful. The nature of the risk is emotional harm if B withdraws from therapy and from his carers which might place his stability at risk. The generic risk is set out by Dr. Craig and it is referred to by TM, team manager, in her statement at paragraph 3.2, at C73.

B is already vulnerable. His presentation in and after January 2025 only serves to underscore the potential impact on his wellbeing of further negative influences. I acknowledge he is anxious and that he struggles to leave the home. I acknowledge that he has suffered with an episode of poor mental health. I acknowledge his school attendance has plummeted. He conveys to me the impression of a person psychologically and physically under siege. That much is clear from the evidence I have heard, including the description given of him by TM, at paragraph 6.2 on C77.

In my judgment, the risk of disclosure is a component of that risk, but there is much more uncertainty about his response when and if he is informed. It seems to me inevitable that, at some point, he will require to understand the outcome of the proceedings, including disclosure of the report. The issue can only be one of when and how far one delays. It is a substantial period of time since he undertook the report with Dr. Craig. It is unclear what progress, if any, has been made with Polaris, and it is unclear what the strategy would be in order to provide him, at an appropriate time, with information about the status of the proceedings or the status of his relationship with his parents at some point in the future.

I fully understand the guardian’s concerns, for example, related in an analysis filed back in 2024 when the matter was before District Judge Gordon, at G22, about the fact that there is a real risk to B’s development as he moves into his late teenage years of being lost, abandoned, and without any sense of belonging. But what is not clear to me is that that clear and obvious risk, which relates to a whole range of potential impacts, is tied to the issue of disclosure of the report, albeit I accept there is a reality of an impact which could occur.

As to the third factor, I accept the father’s submission that there is little evidence of the steps that could be taken to ameliorate adverse consequences as to how B could be informed, be prepared and be provided with explanations, or about the extent of the orders that might be invited to control the position. Much of the framework of that discussion has been in oral submissions today.

As to the fourth factor -- the overall welfare advantages and disadvantages -- a key role for advantage would be to assist the father better to understand the reasoning underlying the report. He will be able to receive legal advice about the quality of assessment which may help him to understand whether the local authority’s plans, in whole or in part, are in the best interests of his son, and to prepare for criticisms made against him of a lack of insight into the issues, having had the opportunity to reflect on the position of his son and why these opinions have been proffered. In a case in which the father has been criticised for a lack of insight, whilst I have no idea whether he will take it on, the opportunity to do so would be a welfare benefit.

The disadvantages are that, if B finds out or is told, he may well feel drawn into conflict and exposed to the risk of being manipulated, thereby undermining his efforts to find a semblance of normality. However, the reality is that proceedings are on foot and the parties agree the evidence of Dr. Craig is relevant. This may be an unavoidable further impact to B but, ultimately, one which requires a firm hand on the timetable and welfare decision making best designed to support him in the longer-term planning for his care.

No party suggests there is any way round considering the evidence of Dr. Craig as relevant to the issues. It is highly unlikely it would be appropriate to engage the services of a new psychologist in the middle of therapeutic work or to put at risk the therapeutic work from Polaris any more than there would be a risk if the report was disclosed and that information was provided to B, either inadvertently or pursuant to a carefully structured plan.

The fifth factor, essentially, is whether B’s interests so compellingly outweigh the rights of his father to be deprived of disclosure so that any disclosure is strictly necessary, giving proper weight to the consequences for that party in the particular circumstances.

In my judgment, they do not compellingly outweigh if there were a balance to be struck. In this case there is no simple equivalence because there is no balance or qualification to the Article 6 right to a fair trial. The balance is as to whether limitation in the disclosure of documents would in fact amount to a breach and whether the limitation which does not amount to a breach can be justified with the weight of justification the authorities require being applied.

It will be apparent from this ex tempore judgment that I already say and determine it fails on the Article 6 point, but, were it not on that simple point alone to fail, I am not satisfied it so compellingly outweighs the father’s rights that it would be right to restrict it in this way.

It is right that the father will have a full opportunity to deal with his criticisms of the local authority’s actions. He has asserted with lengthy evidence information which demonstrates different or inconsistent accounts of B’s wishes and feelings which he will rely upon, but, in my judgment, the father needs, in order to respond to the allegations he now faces and the orders he may now be subject to, more than simply the conclusions of Dr. Craig. His status in the life of his son is at stake. His ability to apply to the court without leave is at stake. The existence of any plan for contact in the future is at stake.

Whilst I agree that much of the challenge will relate to the issues I have described, there will clearly be important material relating to the psychological assessment of B which will inform those welfare decisions. In my judgment, the material cannot be excised fairly. It needs to form a proper part of the hearing listed in May 2025.

The sixth factor really does not arise, but the fact is that the material is needed to inform the hearing on 8 and 9 May. It cannot wait. B cannot wait. The court needs to resolve these proceedings as soon as possible and enable the local authority, within their care plan, to do their best to help B, a vulnerable young person who has suffered much, to be able to make as much progress as possible as he ventures forth into the future as an adult.

Accordingly, by way of an ex tempore judgment, I dismiss the local authority’s application to withhold the psychological report from B’s parents.

I am minded to make similar orders to those made in Re T to enhance B’s Article 8 rights as much as possible without infringing the right of the father to have regard to the report.

I will invite further submissions in terms of the terms of the order as relating to B and to reflect the position in this case.