W (A Child) (Finalisation at IRH), Re

This case is about { } (“W”), who was born on { } 2025. W is 6 months old.

On 17 February 2025 Nottingham City Council (“the Local Authority”) applied for a Care Order and an Interim Care Order. On 8 August 2025 the Local Authority applied for a Placement Order.

The First Respondent to the applications is { } (“the Mother”), who was born on { }. She is { } years old.

The Second Respondent to the applications is { } (“the Father”), who was born on { }. He is { } years old.

I will refer to the Mother and the Father collectively as “the parents”.

The Third Respondent to the application is W. W’s interests are represented through her Children’s Guardian, { } (“the Children’s Guardian”).

This is the judgment of the Court at an Issues Resolution Hearing on 14 August 2025. The hearing concluded at 4:00pm on 14 August 2025. The parents preferred that the Court’s decision be reserved and handed down at a later date. This is that judgment.

I thank the parents for the patient and courteous way in which they listened and participated in the hearing. It is not lost on me that it would have been a very difficult day for them.

At the commencement of this hearing I indicated to the parties, subject to receiving their submissions and hearing any applications, that it appeared that all the issues were capable of resolution at the Issues Resolution Hearing (“the IRH”) and that the Court had the capacity to hear oral evidence should the parties wish.

Practice Direction 12A provides with respect to the IRH:

“ Court identifies the key issue(s) (if any) to be determined and the extent to which those issues can be resolved or narrowed at the IRH

 Court considers whether the IRH can be used as a final hearing

 Court resolves or narrows the issues by hearing evidence”

In March 2022 case management guidance issued by Sir Andrew McFarlane P (Make Every Hearing Count), Sir Andrew McFarlane P called for effective use of the IRH:

“12(j) IRHs need to be more effective. At an IRH, it is the judge’s role to encourage all parties to take a realistic approach. Any suggestion of adjournment or the filing of further evidence at that stage will only be justified if it is ‘necessary’ to determine the remaining relevant issues.”

Writing in A View from The President’s Chambers: July 2024 (31 July 2024), Sir Andrew McFarlane P restated the importance of the effective use of the IRH:

“I have recently visited court centres where the proportion of cases that resolve, or substantially resolve, at IRH is said to be less than 5%, with the result that 95% of cases go on to a final hearing which may be listed many months hence. I have been told of judges being listed for four or five IRH hearings in one day. This information suggests that there may be a misunderstanding (possibly widespread) around the IRH. As PD12A makes plain, the IRH is a hearing at which the court identifies the key issues (if any) to be determined, considers whether the IRH can be used as a final hearing and, crucially, resolves or narrows the issues by hearing evidence.” (emphasis added)

Having regard to all the circumstances of these proceedings, which I will go on to detail, if any case calls for what Sir Andrew McFarlane P described as “robust” case management in A View from The President’s Chambers: November 2022 (29 November 2022) I consider it is this one.

The Mother has diagnoses which include: Emotional Unstable Personality Disorder; paranoid personality traits; anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder. I had regard to the intermediary assessment report prepared of the Mother.

The Mother participated in this hearing throughout with the benefit of an intermediary. During the hearing the Mother had use of a calming object in the form of a stress ball. There were regular breaks during the day, some of significant length. Miss Brooks informed me that she and the Mother had agreed a system by which the Mother would alert her if she did not feel well or needed breaks. I checked how the Mother was during the hearing. At no time was the Court told that the Mother was unable to understand or follow the proceedings. No breaks were requested beyond those proposed by the Court.

It was submitted on the Mother’s behalf that the Mother’s right to a fair hearing required the hearing be adjourned. Asked directly whether it was argued that this hearing had been conducted in a way that was unfair to the Mother, I was told expressly that it was not suggested the conduct of this hearing had been unfair to the Mother.

The case management issues the Court must determine are:

The substantive issues to be determined, if they are not adjourned, are:

These proceedings were commenced on 17 February 2025 shortly after W’s birth. On 19 February 2025 W was placed in the Local Authority’s interim care. The Court sanctioned W’s separation from her parents with placement into foster care. W has remained in the same foster care placement since she was removed from the Mother’s care.

W is not the parents’ first child. She has two siblings: T (born { }) and J (born { }). As recently as 28 November 2022 both siblings were made subjects of Care Orders and Placement Orders. Both siblings have since been made subjects of Adoption Orders.

It is not contentious that: (A) T was cared for by the Paternal Grandmother during those proceedings from December 2020 until around July 2021; (B) the Paternal Grandmother was assessed as being unable to meet T’s long-term needs; and (C) the Paternal Grandmother did not challenge that conclusion in those proceedings. The Court’s order of 28 November 2022 recites:

“Upon the Paternal Grandmother, { }, not attending the hearing, having confirmed to the professionals in the case that she no longer seeks to care for either/both children due to her personal circumstances.” (emphasis as original)

The findings of the Court in the proceedings concerning T and J include the risk of suffering and actually suffering significant harm arising from physical and verbal domestic violence; neglect; poor engagement with mental health services by the Mother and misuse of substances by the Father.

This IRH was listed at a Case Management Hearing on 19 March 2025. That order recites: “The mother has not attended court today in person due to poor health. She has not been able to meet with her solicitor to file her parenting response.” Whilst the order explains the Mother not attending the hearing (“poor health”), it does not explain the inability to meet with her solicitor. Case management orders were made that day which included for the Mother to file her final evidence by 4:00pm 25 July 2025. The Mother has not filed any final evidence.

The Father was joined as a party to these proceedings on 7 May 2025. The Father was ordered to file an initial response to the Local Authority’s evidence by 4:00pm on 11 July 2025. It was not until 7:38pm the day prior to the IRH, 13 August 2025, that the Father filed a response to threshold. His solicitor told me that she accepted responsibility for filing so late because, in fact, the document was approved by the Father on 25 July 2025. That would still have been notably late, even if it was filed then. The Father was ordered to file final evidence by 25 July 2025. It was not until 10:26am on 14 August 2025 (i.e. 4 minutes before this IRH was listed to commence) that the Father filed very brief final evidence. There was no satisfactory explanation for his failure to file his final evidence. I was left with the impression that it was only within the last 24-48 hours the Father decided he wished to care for W and had hitherto not filed his evidence because he was prevaricating in making that decision.

It is not disputed that: the Mother failed to attend 7 of the 13 parenting assessment sessions; the Father attended only one face-face parenting assessment session; the Mother did not attended 18 contacts with W as at 4 July 2025 and the Father did not attend 13 contacts with W as at 4 July 2025.

The Local Authority contends that assessment of the Paternal Grandmother is not necessary nor is there any other reason necessitating the adjournment of the proceedings. The Local Authority presses the making of a Care Order and a Placement Order

The Mother seeks the proceedings be adjourned so that: (A) the Paternal Grandmother can be assessed; and (B) so that she can file evidence and so that her right to a fair hearing can be fulfilled.

The Mother wishes to care for W. I was not given any explanation for how the Mother’s position was sustained considering the Father’s revised position. The Mother opposes the making of a Care Order and a Placement Order.

The Father applies for a case management order that the Local Authority assess the Paternal Grandmother’s suitability to care for W and that the proceedings be adjourned for that purpose.

The Father does not actively put himself forwards to care for W. He does not resist a finding that he be ruled out as a realistic option for W’s future care. It was submitted that if the Court concludes further assessment is not necessary then the Court can proceed to make final orders at this IRH.

The Children’s Guardian concludes that assessment of the Paternal Grandmother is not necessary and the merits of adjourning the proceedings for that purpose are outweighed by the harm that would be caused to W by the delay to the proceedings. The Children’s Guardian urges me to finalise the proceedings today.

The Children’s Guardian supports the making of a Care Order and a Placement Order.

I informed the parties that I did not propose to the determine the Father’s applications as a preliminary matter. Instead, I ruled that I would decide the application alongside the substantive issues after hearing oral evidence. I determined the parties should be afforded the opportunity to provide oral evidence and cross-examine on this application (as well as any other relevant topic), as that cross-examination might cast light on the necessity of what was proposed and determining it summarily as a preliminary issue would deny that opportunity.

The Father relies upon a 5 page witness statement prepared by the Paternal Grandmother, which is dated 13 August 2025. The Paternal Grandmother accepts that social worker { } (“the Social Worker”) approached her in May this year and asked her (the Paternal Grandmother) if she wished to be assessed. The Paternal Grandmother admits that, as recently as June 2025 (just 2 months ago) she felt (and she communicated) that she was not able to care for W.

The Paternal Grandmother now says her health has improved. However, she tells the Court she needs an MRI scan on her spine. She does not say when that will take place other than “at some point in the next 6 weeks” and there is a real possibility that spinal surgery is required. She does not say when that surgery would take place other than to ambiguously say “it may take place in around 2 years.” The Paternal Grandmother concedes she had a negative Special Guardianship assessment and T was “removed” from her care.

There is nothing that corroborates the Paternal Grandmother’s description of her health, which is a curious omission given how prominent an issue her health was in the past. I accept the Children’s Guardian’s submission that the witness statement reflects the Paternal Grandmother’s understanding of what she has been told. The Court has not been furnished with any document from a treating clinician that might inspire confidence in any prognosis or change from the position that rendered the Paternal Grandmother unable to meet T’s long-term needs as recently as late 2022. The Paternal Grandmother says she will have her daughter, Y, available to help her care for W. No evidence is offered from Y that corroborates that willingness or availability.

The Paternal Grandmother’s witness statement falls considerably short of providing any satisfactory explanation why she leaves this request until the parties are through the door of the Court at the IRH.

The Father contends there is a lacuna in the evidence and assessment of the Paternal Grandmother is necessary before the Court could conclude that nothing less than adoption will do. The Father submits that delay will be purposeful and the disadvantage of delay is outweighed by the advantage of exploring what may be the final option for W to remain in the care of her biological family. It is said there is no evidence of the Paternal Grandmother suitability or unsuitability before the Court.

The Social Worker said that an assessment would be “fair”, but did not see it as being necessary. The Social Worker is concerned about the impact of delay on W. I had regard to the Social Worker’s witness statement detailing her efforts to communicate with the Paternal Grandmother (dated 12 June 2025), which is essential reading.

The Children’s Guardian opposes the applications. In persuasive evidence she told me she saw potential advantages, but was very concerned by the questions the Paternal Grandmother’s witness statement raises about her health. The Children’s Guardian was clear that assessment is not necessary, and the harm delay would cause outweighed any merits in adjourning the proceedings for such an assessment. The weight of Children’s Guardian’s evidence was not undermined in cross-examination.

The Court’s case management powers must be exercised giving effect to the overriding objective in rule 1.1 of the Family Law Rules to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost, having particular regard to those matters in rule 1.1(2).

Sections 32(1) and (5) of the Act provide:

“(1)

A court in which an application for an order under this Part is proceeding shall (in the light of any provision in rules of court that is of the kind mentioned in subsection (2)(a) or (b)) —

(a)

draw up a timetable with a view to disposing of the application—

(i)

without delay, and

(ii)

in any event within twenty-six weeks beginning with the day on which the application was issued; and

(b)

give such directions as it considers appropriate for the purpose of ensuring, so far as is reasonably practicable, that that timetable is adhered to.

…

(5)

A court in which an application under this Part is proceeding may extend the period that is for the time being allowed under subsection (1)(a)(ii) in the case of the application, but may do so only if the court considers that the extension is necessary to enable the court to resolve the proceedings justly.”

In Re S (A Child) (Interim Care Order: Residential Assessment) [2015] 1 WLR 925 Sir James Munby P said, (at [33]):

“There will, as it seems to me, be three different forensic contexts in which an extension of the 26 week time limit in accordance with section 32(5) may be "necessary":

i)

The first is where the case can be identified from the outset, or at least very early on, as one which it may not be possible to resolve justly within 26 weeks. Experience will no doubt identify the kind of cases that may fall within this category. Four examples which readily spring to mind (no doubt others will emerge) are (a) very heavy cases involving the most complex medical evidence where a separate fact finding hearing is directed in accordance with Re S (Split Hearing) [2014] EWCA Civ 25, [2014] 2 FLR (forthcoming), para 29, (b) FDAC type cases (see further below), (c) cases with an international element where investigations or assessments have to be carried out abroad and (d) cases where the parent's disabilities require recourse to special assessments or measures (as to which see Re C (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 128, para 34). 

ii)

The second is where, despite appropriately robust and vigorous judicial case management, something unexpectedly emerges to change the nature of the proceedings too late in the day to enable the case to be concluded justly within 26 weeks. Examples which come to mind are (a) cases proceeding on allegations of neglect or emotional harm where allegations of sexual abuse subsequently surface, (b) cases which are unexpectedly 'derailed' because of the death, serious illness or imprisonment of the proposed carer, and (c) cases where a realistic alternative family carer emerges late in the day. 

iii)

The third is where litigation failure on the part of one or more of the parties makes it impossible to complete the case justly within 26 weeks (the type of situation addressed in In re B-S, para 49).

I see the issue at hand, on the Father’s case, as falling into the second of the described forensic contexts. Sir James Munby P went on to observe (at [34]) that:

These observations were cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in Re M (A Child) (Placement Order) [2025] EWCA Civ 214. The Court of Appeal in Re M (A Child) (Placement Order) also cited with approval the observations of Peter Jackson LJ in Re S-L (Children [2019] EWCA Civ 1571 (at [12]-[13]):

Thus, the Court’s task is to deal with considerations that can at times sit in tension with each other: resolving proceedings without unnecessary delay on the one hand and having the information necessary for fair and just decision making on the other. Where this tension exists, speed and timetabling must give way to fair decision making. As Pauffley J said in Re NL (A child) (Appeal: Interim Care Order: Facts and Reasons [2014] EWHC 270 (Fam) (at [40]), “Justice must never be scarified upon the alter of speed.”

Quite properly, the Father submits that the Court must have regard to what is at stake for W. I also remind myself that it is settled that there is no presumption or right for a child to be brought up by a member of her natural family. Re W (A Child) (Adoption: Grandparents Competing Claims) [2016] EWCA Civ 793 McFarlane LJ said:

These observations were cited with approval by the Court of Appeal recently in Re M (A Child) (Placement Order). King LJ said (at [55]):

“As in any case where it is hoped that a family placement can be achieved it is important, as was perhaps not recognised until too late in this case, that there is no presumption or right for a child to be brought up by a member of his or her natural family.”

I remind myself of the general principle that any delay in determining a question concerning the upbringing of a child is likely to prejudice the child’s welfare.

I have given anxious consideration to the application. I conclude the assessment of the Paternal Grandmother sought by the Father and the extension of the timetable to accommodate it are not necessary to resolve the proceedings justly. I dismiss the Father’s applications.

I have come to this conclusion slowly and after thoughtfully reflecting on what is at stake for W, namely the potential for her lifelong separation from her birth family. I have weighed the question of necessity with that grave consideration in mind. In evaluating the merits of the applications, I have borne in mind that there are indications of positively. Those indications of positivity include that the Paternal Grandmother cared for T on a temporary basis; the Paternal Grandmother self-declares improvement in her health; and the Paternal Grandmother claims her daughter, Y will be able to support her care for W. I accept that adjourning for an assessment would have the advantage of the Court knowing one way or the other (subject to a contested process in which the Paternal Grandmother challenged any negative assessment), whether the Paternal Grandmother is a realistic option for W’s care. In that sense, the additional information would be helpful.

In measured and persuasive submissions Miss Beesley argued that the Court was bound to make some assessment at this point of the prospects of the Paternal Grandmother being a realistic option and that assessment could not done without giving significant weight to the following:

I respectfully agree with Miss Beesley’s submissions. These considerations weigh very heavily against the Paternal Grandmother being a realistic option for W’s long-term care. When weighed against the indicators of positivity, I find that the prospects of the assessment being favourable are poor – so poor that it is a feature of the assessment being unnecessary.

I agree with Miss Beesley that the Paternal Grandmother’s witness statement gives rise to concern more than it does comfort. I am deeply troubled by the impact the prospective of spinal surgery may have on the Paternal Grandmother’s ability to care for W and the failure of the Paternal Grandmother within her witness statement to offer anything but the most general timescales for investigations into her health resolving. Furthermore, contrary to the Father’s submissions, the bundle before the Court is not silent on the Paternal Grandmother. The analysis of T’s Children’s Guardian (dated 22 November 2021) states:

“22.

Connected Persons Assessment and SGO Assessment on [the Paternal Grandmother]: conclude negatively due to current drug use, mental and physical health, and the parenting of her own children. The SGO assessment concluded as the same and identified a list of necessary training that she would need to access and the time this is likely to take may not be in T’s time frame.”

The Paternal Grandmother’s witness statement does not engage with these matters in any satisfactory way and, moreover, it does not communicate any insight into why T was removed from her care.

I am affirmed in my conclusion that the assessment is not necessary by the harm I find will be caused to W by the resolution of these proceedings being delayed. On the evidence I have heard, assessment of the Paternal Grandmother will likely take about 4 months. There will then be further delay for the filing of evidence and the listing of another hearing. My experience of local listing practice, of which I am very familiar, leads me to conclude it is improbable a future welfare hearing would take place earlier than 5 months from today’s date. I consider that delay will be unconscionable and highly prejudicial to W. The harm she would suffer would not be trifling, but would instead be of a high order of magnitude and risk her long-term development because it will seriously delay her transition into a final placement at a time she is in her most formative months.

Given how weak the prospects are of an assessment of the Paternal Grandmother bearing fruit and how harmful delay for the purpose of facilitating that assessment would be, adjourning for an assessment would be a grossly disproportionate means of promoting W’s welfare and inconsistent with the Court’s duty to give effect to the overriding objective. Whilst the Social Worker thought it would be “fair” for the Paternal Grandmother to be assessed, what might be “fair” for the Paternal Grandmother personally is not the question I must resolve. Whatever the Social Worker meant by that exactly, it is apparent from what I heard of her evidence that she was not engaging with the question of whether assessment was necessary to resolve the proceedings justly.

The applications for the Paternal Grandmother to be assessed and for the proceedings to be extended for that purpose are dismissed.

The Mother applies for this hearing to be adjourned and, necessarily, for the statutory timetable to be extended beyond 26 weeks. It was initially submitted that the Mother had not had the opportunity to consider the Local Authority’s final evidence. That unsustainable submission was properly withdrawn and it was said the Mother’s right to a fair hearing required she have a further opportunity to respond to the Local Authority final evidence. The Mother accepts the Local Authority’s evidence was filed in accordance with the Court’s case management orders. The Court was told it would be wrong to finalise the proceeding when the Mother has not considered the evidence filed by the Local Authority. I was reminded about the difficulties with the Mother’s physical and mental health. I was told she is now on a waitlist for therapeutic input, but I was provided nothing that corroborates that to be so nor was I furnished with any realistic timescales for it commencing.

Having regard to the Mother’s poor engagement in the proceedings; assessment of her; and her time with W, I asked what was it that the Mother would tell the Court in her final evidence. It was surprising that Miss Brooks held no instructions at all as to what the Mother wanted to say. I was told that Miss Brooks wished to go through the final evidence with the Mother to ensure she understands it because the Mother is yet to consider it.

I direct myself according to everything I have previously set out regarding the determination of case management issues.

In Re C (Children: Covid-19: Representation) [2020] EWCA Civ 734 Peter Jackson LJ traversed the right to a fair hearing afforded to litigants by common law and Article 6 of the ECHR. Peter Jackson LJ said (at [23]):

“A number of aspects of the right to a fair hearing, guaranteed by common law and Article 6 ECHR, are relevant:

(1)

Fairness is case-specific and is to be assessed in relation to the proceedings in their entirety: Ankherl v Switzerland (2001) 32 EHRR 1 at [38].

(2)

There must be protection not only from actual unfairness but also from the risk of unfairness: Kanda v Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] AC 322 (PC) at p.5.

(3)

The right of access to the court must be effective, so that the individual has the opportunity to address all material that might affect the court's decision and is placed in a position to call evidence and to cross-examine: Mantovanelli v France (1997) 24 EHRR 370 at [36].

(4)

The importance attached to the welfare of the child must not prevent a parent being able effectively to participate in the decision-making process: L v UK [2002] 2 FLR 322 at 332.

(5)

The principle of equality of arms entails a reasonable opportunity to present one's case, including one's evidence, in a way that does not place one at a substantial disadvantage to one's opponent: Dombo Beheer BV v The Netherlands (1994) 18 EHRR 213 at [33].”

(6)

The administration of justice requires not only fairness but the appearance of fairness: R v Leicester City Justices ex p Barrow [1991] 2 QB 260; P, C & S v UK [2002] 2 FLR 631 at [91]. However, the misgivings of individuals with regard to the fairness of the proceedings must be capable of being objectively justified: Kraska v Switzerland (1994) 18 EHRR 188 at [32].

(7)

The determination must be made within a reasonable time: Article 6 itself.”

It is not necessary to adjourn the final determination of these proceedings and nor is doing so required to vindicate the Mother’s right to a fair hearing. I consider the Mother has had a fair opportunity to participate in this litigation and further delay would be very harmful for W (as previously described) and not proportionate. In relation to the conduct of the litigation, the Mother:

I accept the Mother labours under real challenges to her physical and mental health and therefore it is not fair to say she is the master of the situation she finds herself in. I accept her health is not wholly within her control. However, I am told the Mother has only recently endeavoured to engage with some services to mitigate the impacts of her health on her. I was told that around 3 August 2025 the Mother heard the voice of her eldest child and contacted an emergency team. An appointment was made, but the Mother missed it because she overslept. She has been told she must now re-engage through her general practitioner. I do not know the timescales for this. It does not appear the Mother does either. Even having the greatest level of sympathy for the Mother and her circumstances, I reject the suggestion she has not had a fair opportunity to participate in the litigation, including by providing instructions on evidence.

In addition to these considerations, I have regard to how the Mother has engaged poorly in other processes connected to the litigation including: (A) her failure to satisfactorily engage with the parenting assessment; and (B) her unsatisfactory attendance at contact with W.

It is not in the interests of justice to adjourn these proceedings for the purposes proposed by the Mother. I find the Mother has had a fair opportunity to participate in the litigation, including to provide instructions on evidence and file evidence. I am affirmed in this conclusion by the serious harm I find W would suffer by delay, which I have previously described. An extension of the timetable of the proceedings beyond 26 weeks is not necessary.

The applications for the proceedings to be adjourned and for the timetable of the proceedings to be extended are dismissed.

The applications to extend the timetable having been dismissed I have proceeded to identify the issues requiring resolution. I find all the issues can be determined at this IRH. I considered it in the interests of justice to do so and afforded the parties the opportunity to call evidence and cross-examine on the substantive issues.

The Court has been presented with over 1,200 pages of written evidence. I will say more about this later. The Social Worker and the Children’s Guardian gave evidence.

I have read all the written evidence carefully. I similarly listened carefully to the oral evidence. This judgment is not intended to be a repetition of everything I considered and my failure to recite a particular part of the evidence does not reflect a failure on my part to consider it. What follows is only intended to be a summary.

The parents were given the opportunity to participate in assessments conducted by { } (“the Assessor”). The Mother attended 6 of the 13 sessions. The Father attended only one face-face session and one telephone consultation. Their commitment to assessment and to seeing W has been poor. The Assessor concludes that whilst the parents have a reasonable understanding of what domestic abuse consists of, they minimise it within their own lives to the point of insignificance. The Mother still struggles to meet her own needs

The Social Worker tells that Court that issues of substance misuse, substance misuse and poor mental health that pervaded proceedings about T and J persist today. The Mother has described the Father to be controlling and to be frightened of him. They remain in a relationship and, whilst they are presently living separately, they plan to resume cohabitation. The Father described ongoing substance misuse earlier in the year. The Social Worker concludes that adoption in necessary and that the parents could not be considered realistic options to care for W.

The Mother has not filed evidence and she did not wish to give evidence during the hearing. She opposes the making of final orders.

The Father relied upon his witness statement filed on the morning of the hearing. He did not wish to give evidence during the hearing. The Father says his relationship with the Mother was toxic, including violence and attributes this, at least in part, to the Mother’s mental health “which made her violent towards [him]”.

He tells me he has engaged with Probation. The Father admits the use of cocaine and denies the use of crack cocaine. He continues to smoke cannabis. The Father claims the parenting assessment of him was “predetermined from the very start”. He opposes the making of final orders.

The Father’s written evidence does not communicate anything that would give confidence he has insight into the circumstances that led to W’s siblings being adopted. They are not even mentioned in the witness statement. Given how recently those proceedings concluded, these omissions reflect poorly on his capacity to provide safe parenting. At the conclusion of the hearing, I was told the Father did not resist the Local Authority’s submission that he is not a realistic option for W’s care.

The Children’s Guardian relied upon her final analysis and gave evidence during the hearing. The Children’s Guardian supports the making of final orders. The Children’s Guardian concludes that W would be subject to significant harm in the care of either or both of her parents. She tells the Court the parents’ inability to safely meet a child’s care has been long standing and enduring. There is no evidence there has been change that would be sufficient to ameliorate the risks. The Children’s Guardian, having weighed the competing options, concludes that W’s placement for adoption is necessary.

When a fact is in dispute, the burden is on the party alleging the fact to be true to prove it is true, in this case the Local Authority. The standard of proof is a simple balance of probabilities. Whether an assertion of fact is true is binary. If the standard of proof is met, then the assertion is fact and treated so for my decision-making. If the standard of proof is not met, then the assertion is not a fact for my decision-making. There is no room for treating suspicion as fact for the purposes of my decision-making.

Any findings I make must be based on evidence, including inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence and not speculation. That evidence can be written or oral and I can rely on hearsay evidence from witnesses who have not given oral evidence. However, I must consider carefully what weight to give that hearsay evidence as I have not had the opportunity to consider how it would have stood up to challenge by cross-examination.

Section 31(2) of the Act provides:

“A court may only make a care order or supervision order if it is satisfied—

(a)

that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and

(b)

that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to—

(i)

the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him; or

(ii)

the child’s being beyond parental control.”

The Court must take into account all the evidence, considering each piece of evidence in the context of the other evidence – surveying a wide landscape – and must avoid compartmentalising.

W’s welfare throughout her life has been my paramount consideration. I assess her best interests within the context of the considerations in section 1(3) of the Act and section 1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. Those provisions are the same with the following important distinctions in the case of an application for a Placement Order including:

“(c)

the likely effect on the child (throughout their life) of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person;”

and

“(f)

the relationship which the child has with relatives, and with any other person in relation to whom the court ... considers the relationship to be relevant, including:

(i)

the likelihood of any such relationship continuing and the value of the child of its doing so,

(ii)

the ability and willingness of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such person, to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop, and otherwise to meet the child’s needs,

(iii)

the wishes and feelings of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such person, regarding the child.”

If I am satisfied the conditions in section 31(2) of the Act are established, I must then consider what order, if any, is in W’s best interests. Anchoring this is the requirement that I should not make an order unless doing so would be better for W than making no order or no less draconian order.

A Care Order, and more so a Placement Order, are draconian orders of the highest order of magnitude. I must only approve a care plan of adoption where nothing else will do to promote W’s welfare interests. A Placement Order may only be made against the consent of a child’s parents if I consider her individual welfare throughout her life requires it should be dispensed with.

Lord Neuberger said in Re B [2013] UKSC 33 (at [104]):

“… adoption of a child against her parents’ wishes should only be contemplated as a last resort - when all else fails.  Although the child’s interests in an adoption case are ‘paramount’ a court must never lose sight of the fact that those interests include being brought up by her natural family, ideally her natural parents, or at least one of them.”

Baroness Hale said in Re B (at [198]):

“Intervention in the family must be proportionate, but the aim should be to reunite the family where the circumstances enable that, and the effort should be devoted towards that end.  Cutting off all contact and ending the relationship between the child and their family is only justified by the overriding necessity of the interests of the child.”

W, the Mother and the Father each have a right to family life. Any order I make would be a State interference with that right to family life and I must not sanction such an order unless doing so is necessary in W’s lifelong welfare interests and proportionate to the risks proved.

At the heart of my thinking has been Hedley J's comments in Re L (Care: threshold criteria) [2007] 1 FLR 2050 (at [49]):

These are not mere words to be cited as part of a judgment. They are an injunction, enjoining this Court from permitting State intervention other than when it is proved by the Local Authority that such draconian intervention is demanded by W’s interests. They are also a command to judge humanely, with the Court’s own fallibility and the imperfection of State intervention in mind. I have endeavoured to do so.

The parties join in presenting a series of proposed findings (see Annexure A of this judgment). I am satisfied, on the basis of the admissions of the parents and the Local Authority’s evidence, which has not been challenged, that each of those matters is proved on the balance of probabilities. I am satisfied that those findings individually and cumulatively satisfy the conditions in section 31(2) of the Act for the making of public law orders.

W is non-verbal. There are no wishes and feelings that can be ascertained.

W is developing appropriately in foster care. She requires love and emotional warmth to develop throughout her minority and adulthood. W requires carers who can meet her physical needs and protect her from neglect. At 6 months old, W is dependent on her carers to meet her needs. She has a long-term emotional need for her long-term placement to be determined without unnecessary delay.

W is 6 months old. She is her parents’ third child. W’s siblings are being raised separately from her and their parents in an adoptive placement.

The Mother loves W very much. I accept W has a special place in the Mother’s heart. She desperately wants to care for W.

The Mother is not capable of consistently meeting W’s basic care needs. She has been observed to lack confidence in caring for W. I accept in its totality, the Local Authority’s evidence concerning the Mother’s inability to meet W’s needs. The Mother’s is unable to prioritise W’s need for safety and her ability to care for W is severely compromised by her failure to promote her own health and wellbeing.

The Father deeply loves W.

The Father does not press himself as a person who can care for W. I accept in its totality, the Local Authority’s evidence concerning the Father’s inability to meet W’s needs. I find the Father is not capable of consistently and safely meeting W’s basic care needs.

W has not suffered significant harm because she was only briefly in her parents’ care after being born. W is at a risk of suffering significant harm by reason of her parents’ inability to safely meet her needs and as described in the Local Authority’s evidence.

Whilst W may acquire life-enduring connections in an adoptive family, she would suffer the profoundly serious harm throughout her life of the loss of connection to her parents. She would lose the opportunity for life-long connection to a shared identity with them. The harm arising from change of that kind is likely to be significant and life lasting. W would lose the opportunity for connection with her wider family members, including her grandparents.

There are no relatives who have been assessed as able to provide W with a secure environment in which she can develop safely with her needs met. Her relatives oppose W’s placement for adoption. They will be devastated if W is to be adopted. Placement for adoption may give rise to the possibility (I can put it no higher than that) of W connecting and developing a relationship with her adopted siblings. It is highly unlikely she could have a life-long relationship with her siblings were she to remain within her birth family.

The Father is not a realistic option for W’s future care. He does not quarrel with that finding. Nor is the Mother a realistic option for W’s future care. The Mother has not engaged in assessment in a satisfactorily way. I regret to find that those deficits in the Mother’s parenting capacity that existed at the time the welfare of W’s siblings was before the Court persist today. It would be so unsafe for W to be in the Mother’s care, whether cared for by the Mother alone or jointly with the Father, and the magnitude of harm W would risk suffering would be so great, that the option of W being cared for by the Mother is fanciful rather than realistic.

In my judgment there are only two realistic options: (A) W’s placement in long-term fostering; and (B) W’s placement for adoption.

Should W be made subject to a Care Order the Local Authority will be equipped with parental responsibility with the power to exercise overriding decision making to keep W safe. W would have the benefit of a care plan and an independent reviewing officer to oversee the progress of W’s plan. W would receive a package of support throughout her minority, including priority access to services. She would receive leaving care services.

It would be a profound advantage that W would be able to maintain a relationship with her parents throughout her minority. She would experience all the benefits of knowing who her parents are and understanding where she comes from. W would avoid the risk of trauma throughout her life arising from the separation caused by adoption.

There are significant disadvantages to W of long-term fostering for the remaining 17 ½ years of her minority. W may experience a sense of stigma of being a child in care, aware that she is different from her peers who are cared for my parents and guardians. W would be subject to slow and bureaucratic decision making of corporate parenting that may be slow and insufficiently responsive to her developing needs, especially as a teenager. W would be subject to ongoing looked after child processes, with frequent meeting with social workers, that would reinforce her difference from others and that she is cared for by the State, rather than by parents. There is a very real risk, which cannot sensibly be ignored, that W may be subject to multiple changes in placement over the next 17 ½ years that would harm her emotional development. She may also experience other children moving in and out of her placement, which would create a sense of instability and repeated fluctuation. Whilst foster carers would care for W and want the best for her, that care cannot be confused with the love and emotional warmth that comes from being in a family unit, adoptive or birth family.

Adoption is the best prospect for W to be raised in a secure and permanent family for the remainder of her life where she would belong to a family, be cared for and have her needs met in a safe and consistent way. W would be loved and have all the emotional warmth throughout her life of that love. W would receive post-adoption support, but otherwise she would be spared the bureaucracy of Local Authority decision making, reviews and the stigma of being a child in care. W would avoid the risk of changes in carers and children moving in and out of her placement.

There are severe disadvantages of adoption. A Placement Order and an Adoption Order are remedies of the highest order of magnitude. The making of a Placement Order is not a neutral act. The simple act of making the order is harmful because of its draconian character. Adoption will irrevocably separate W from her parents as a matter of law and as a practical matter too. The loss of these relationships throughout W’s life cannot be understated. I must evaluate not where W will be in 5 years or even 18 years time, but where she is at 40 years of age, 50 years of age and older. W will grow up not knowing her parents. There is a real possibility that W will suffer trauma and profound psychological harm throughout her life from being separated from her parents. It is not hyperbole to say there is a real risk she may never meet or know them. I further find there is a real possibility that W may experience stigma in her childhood as an adopted person, being different from those children who know their parents. Furthermore, I cannot discount that adoptive placements do also breakdown, particularly in teenage years. A breakdown for W would be very damaging to her emotional development given she would have already experienced the loss of her birth family.

Weighing all these considerations I find that adoption is necessary. It is demanded by the overriding consideration of W’s best interests throughout her life. No other order will promote W’s life-long welfare interests. The advantages to W of adoption outweigh the disadvantages of adoption. They also outweigh the advantages of long-term fostering. I accept W will suffer profound loss and harm through being subject to adoption, however I conclude she will suffer greater harm if I make her subject to a Care Order on a plan of long-term fostering for the next 17 ½ years. A Care Order on a plan of long-term fostering is not a proportionate means of promoting W’s welfare because the harms arising from that outcome outweigh its merits.

I conclude that W’s welfare requires I dispense with parental consent to the making of a Placement Order. I am satisfied Local Authority’s plan is in W’s best interests.

I therefore order that:

That is the judgment of the court.

In this matter no permission was given to depart from Practice Direction 27A. Despite this, a bundle that exceeded 1,200 pages was filed. The bundle:

I regret this has not been an isolated example and I have shared these experiences with the Designated Family Judge for Nottinghamshire.

In T v T and Others (Disregard for Procedural Rules, Adjournment) [2025] EWFC 14(B), Mr Recorder Chandler KC said:

“1.

The family court is used to dealing with cases that have not been prepared properly: bundles that are too large, exclude important documents or contain irrelevant ones; witness statements full of invective and opinion; position statements which are too long and unfocused. The failure to comply with rules, practice directions and guidance, adds significantly to the burdens upon the court in terms of the time it takes to read into a case, concentrate on the key issues and avoid getting drawn down false alleys. The lack of an agreed trial template often leads to unrealistic expectations in terms of the preparation of a judgment, causing cases to go part-heard.

2.

In Re W (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 1177 at [50] Sir James Munby P described "…a deeply rooted culture in the family courts which, however long established, will no longer be tolerated… the slapdash, lackadaisical and on occasions almost contumelious attitude which still far too frequently characterises the response to orders".

3.

In Xanthopoulos v Rakshina [2022] EWFC 30 at [3], Mr Justice Mostyn condemned the husband's "…utter disregard for the relevant guidance, procedure, and indeed orders [as] totally unacceptable", and commented that, despite the warnings contained in judgments such as Re W, "…nothing seems to change".

4.

Too often, lay parties who have waited months for a final hearing, come to court and face the unedifying spectacle of a judge struggling to make sense of a badly prepared case, taking up valuable court time by teasing out issues and arguments which should have been clearly articulated in advance. In many cases, to their credit, family judges manage to keep calm, carry on and roll up their sleeves, hacking through the papers to reach a judgment, even where this involves hours of additional work, which might otherwise have been avoided by an earlier focus on the issues.

5.

But even in the family court, there comes a limit.

6.

And that limit has been grossly exceeded in this case, which has come before this court for a listed 3-day hearing in such a disordered and chaotic state that it is simply impossible to proceed in a fair way.”

I respectfully agree with everything said by Mr Recorder Chandler KC. It applies with equal, if not greater force to the conduct of public law proceedings. Being able to properly prepare for the IRH is essential to making the hearing effective. It is even more crucial when the Court has (usually) at least three IRHs listed in a day.

I am very sympathetic to the heavy workloads of those locally undertaking essential work in this important area of family law. The pressures of that workload are considerable. Those demands can be acknowledged alongside it also being true that when judges are left to divine what the issues are in a case or must wade through voluminous documents that have been unnecessarily included within puzzlingly organised bundles – which, but for being in electronic format might consist of 4 or 5 lever arch files – precious Court time is wasted. When that happens in one case it is significantly more difficult to promote the interests of justice in all cases.