F (A Child) (placement order and failure by local authority to contact wider birth family)

This is a case concerning a little boy called F who was born in early 2024 and is now aged 17 months.

In many respects the facts of this case are nothing out of the ordinary and reflect the type of cases which come before the family courts on a daily basis. But in other respects the facts are unusual, striking, and have given rise to consequences which can only be described as tragic.

The local authority, Bournemouth, Christchurch, and Poole (BCP) sought care and placement orders for F, a position supported by F’s guardian and his father, E. The Mother, D, opposed the making of those orders and supported her mother (the MGM), G, who sought an order for F to live with her and her partner.

The parties are already aware of my decision as they were informed orally at the conclusion of the final hearing on 1st July. There was insufficient time that day for me to prepare a detailed judgment, so the parties were informed of the brief reasons for my decision with more detailed reasons in a full judgment to follow.

In short, I granted BCP’s applications for care and placement orders in respect of F. I also ordered post adoption direct contact between F and the MGM at a frequency of once per month and additional indirect contact at the discretion of F’s carers. I also made a number of findings against BCP and ordered BCP to pay the MGM’s costs in the summarily assessed sum of £15,987.60, payable within 28 days.

My reasons for this are set out below.

The background to this case goes some way to explaining the unusual, striking, and tragic facts to which I have referred.

In April 2022 the Mother gave birth to a little girl, X. BCP commenced care proceedings on 26 April 2023 within which they sought and obtained care and placement orders. Those orders were made on 18 September 2023, and as will become clear, it is relevant to note that the application for a placement order was made on 8 September 2023.

X was separated from her parents under the ICO and placed with foster carers/prospective adopters on 29 June 2023 and has remained there. An application for an adoption order was made on 6 August 2024 and an adoption order was made on 4 October 2024.

As stated above, the Mother gave birth in early 2024. F is a full sibling of X. BCP commenced care proceedings in respect of F on 29 February 2024 and the matter was listed for an urgent case management hearing on 1 March 2024.

On 1 March 2024 an interim care order was made by consent, on the basis that F would remain in hospital as he was not yet fit for discharge, and in the interim a search would be undertaken for a mother and child placement.

Paragraph 19 of the order of 1 March 2024 provided for the papers in the previous set of proceedings relating to X to be disclosed into these proceedings. Those papers should have included the placement application which was made in respect of X, but there is some doubt as to whether the placement application was actually included in the papers that were disclosed from the previous proceedings.

Paragraph 7 of the schedule to that order records that the parties had not identified any possible alternative carers.

The Mother subsequently went to a mother and child placement with F, but for reasons which I do not need to go into, that placement came to an end in June 2024 at which time the Mother consented to F being removed from her care and placed with foster carers.

Significantly, it was at this point in time, June 2024, that F was placed with the same foster carers/prospective adopters who at that time were foster parents to X and who went on to become X’s adoptive parents. This was what is known as an early permanence placement.

BCP initially made an application for a placement order in respect of F on 27 June 2024. Within that application BCP stated ‘there are no other family members or significant other people able to care for F.’

BCP filed a second application for a placement order in 2025. The paperwork supporting that application set out what had been contained in the paperwork for the previous application, what I will refer to as the ‘original’ section, and then included an updated section which contained the relevant information since the previous application in June 2024 (the updated section).

In the paperwork which BCP submitted to the Agency Decision Maker on 19 March 2025, the original section stated:

Reference to H in that paragraph is to the Social Worker for BCP.

Updating information was then provided in the updated section, which stated:

The court has also had sight of the Annex B report relating to X in the previous set of proceedings. That report contained a genogram which clearly recorded G as the maternal grandmother. It also contained a passage which stated:

On 5 October 2024, the MGM contacted BCP. This was the first time there had been any contact between the MGM and BCP. There is no dispute between all parties that the MGM only became aware of the situation regarding X and F a matter of days after the adoption order was made in respect of X. At that time, and during the period covered by these and the previous proceedings, the relationship between the mother and the MGM had broken down and they were not in regular contact and were unaware of each other’s exact whereabouts.

Having made contact with BCP, the MGM was subsequently assessed as a potential carer for F, an assessment which was positive.

Notwithstanding this positive assessment, BCP continued to seek care and placement orders for F, arguing that it was in his best interests to remain living with his foster carers/prospective adopters with whom he had developed a strong attachment, and for him to grow up in the same home as X, his full sibling.

The MGM opposed BCP’s applications.

A significant feature of the background to this case is the timing of the involvement of the MGM in these proceedings.

During the course of submissions on day one of the final hearing (where all parties had agreed the matter could be dealt with by way of submissions only), BCP’s position on the MGM’s involvement was explained as follows.

During the course of further submissions it became clear that this factual position which was presented to the court by counsel for BCP was not in fact correct.

At this stage I make it clear that no criticism is made of Ms Henstock Turner, counsel for BCP at that hearing, for any errors in the factual position which was presented to the court. There is no suggestion that Ms Henstock-Turner said or did anything wrong or that she in any way intended to mislead the court as to the correct position. She was clearly acting on and repeating instructions from BCP. But for reasons which are still not entirely clear to me, those instructions were wrong.

In short, by at least 8 September 2023 and possibly even as early as some time in 2022, BCP was aware of the names and geographical location of the MGM. This much is clear from the genogram I have referred to above which was prepared by BCP on 8 September 2023 in respect of X. The information as to MGM’s geographical location was also contained in a Psychiatric Report prepared in July 2023.

As mentioned above, BCP made an application for a placement order in respect of X on 8 September 2023. During the course of submissions on the afternoon of day one of the final hearing, solicitor for the Father alerted the court and the parties to the fact that having accessed the file from the previous proceedings, she was able to see that the placement application contained the names of the MGM. That placement application was not before the court in these proceedings and had not been seen by Ms Henstock-Turner.

It therefore became apparent that BCP must have known at least the names of the MGM by no later than 8 September 2023, the date of the placement application for X.

I will return to this issue below, but before doing so it will assist to set out details of the procedural history in this matter, the parties’ positions, and the matters which unfolded at the final hearing.

At the commencement of the final hearing on 28 May 2025 the parties’ positions were as follows:

All parties had the benefit of legal representation at the final hearing and all parties agreed that the hearing should proceed by way of submissions only. On day one I heard submissions on behalf of BCP, Mother, Father, and the MGM. During the course of those submissions, the issues I have already alluded to in respect of BCP’s knowledge of the MGM began to emerge.

The submissions continued on day two and the issues continued to grow, to the extent that it became apparent the court was not in a position to conclude matters that day. There was insufficient information before the court to enable it to determine exactly how and when BCP had become aware of the name of the MGM and further, what if anything BCP had done with that information once it had come into its possession.

In addition, it was unclear whether BCP were seeking to maintain a position that the Mother had refused to provide information in respect of her mother (MGM) to BCP when requested. That is certainly a position which had been adopted at times by BCP in its submissions, and it was a position which was denied by the Mother. The Mother's position was that she did not have full details of her mother's address, but that what information she did have she had given to BCP when requested.

Accordingly, the final hearing was adjourned and listed for a further day’s hearing on 1 July 2025. A directions order was made which included the following paragraphs:

In addition, at the hearing on 29 May 2025 I notified the parties that it appeared to me there was at least the possibility of critical findings being made against the social worker and/or BCP and that all parties would need to address me at the adjourned hearing on whether BCP and/or the social worker should be named in any published judgment.

Pursuant to the order of 29 May 2025, the social worker filed a statement dated 27 June 2025. The statement was comprehensive and set out a full chronology relating not only to the proceedings concerning F but also the previous proceedings relating to X. It also exhibited documents in forty-four appendices.

On 23 June 2025 Ms Chapman, counsel for the MGM, filed a skeleton argument in which she set out the position of the MGM and, in particular, the findings the MGM invited the court to make. Those findings were:

On 27 June 2025 the social worker, H. applied for party status in order that she could be represented at the hearing on 1 July and make representations in respect of the findings the MGM was inviting the court to make against her and the proposed naming of her in any published judgment.

At the adjourned hearing on 1 July all parties continued to be legally represented. There was no objection to the social worker’s application for party status and she was separately represented by counsel, Mr Lorie. Ms Henstock-Turner was now led by Mr Krumins.

The parties’ updated positions were as follows:

As to the findings which the MGM invited the court to make, I will first set out BCP’s position in general, as set out in the skeleton argument filed by Mr Krumins and Ms Henstock-Turner:

Turning to the numbered findings sought by the MGM (as set out above) BCP’s position was again set out in their skeleton argument:

The social worker’s position was limited to those matters which related directly to her, namely allegations 3,4,5 and 12. In respect of those allegations her position was:

Before I turn to the issues in dispute, I will deal first with the law. There is no dispute that the burden of proof is on BCP to prove the allegations which it makes, and the appropriate standard of proof is the civil standard on the simple balance of probabilities. I have reminded myself of the case of re B and particularly the speech of Baroness Hale.

In the present case, the central issue I have to decide in relation to F is whether I should approve BCP’s care plans for him to be placed for adoption, or whether I should place him with the MGM.

In determining that issue, I bear firmly in mind that F’s welfare is my paramount concern. I must also have regard to the provisions of the welfare checklist in section 1(3) of the Children Act, what is known as the "no delay" principle set out at section 1(2), and the welfare checklist in section 1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. In that respect I must carefully consider and balance the competing welfare considerations within those two checklists when reaching my conclusions.

I approach BCP’s applications on the basis that the best place for any child is within their family of origin unless there are clear welfare grounds to prefer an alternative. My task is to consider whether F could be cared for by the MGM to a satisfactory or good enough standard. It is not to determine whether he might be better off being adopted.

Importantly, given that BCP advances a plan for adoption, I am obliged to consider whether it would accord with F’s welfare throughout his life to be made the subject of a placement order. In that exercise I am guided by the welfare checklist at section 1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. If I conclude that a placement order accords with F’s welfare, I will then have to determine whether his welfare requires me to dispense with the consent of his parents to the making of such an order. The statutory language in the Adoption and Children Act imposes a stringent test in terms of what must be shown in relation to the child's welfare requiring parental consent to adoption to be dispensed with, namely it has the Strasbourg meaning of necessity, i.e. in the imperative, what is demanded rather than merely optional or reasonable or desirable.

I must also be satisfied that any orders I make are a lawful, necessary, proportionate, and reasonable response to F’s predicament. The granting of a care order, let alone endorsing a plan for adoption, would represent a drastic curtailment of the rights of the parents and F under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which can only be justified by pressing concerns for his welfare.

In constructing both the Convention and also domestic law, I have the assistance of the Supreme Court in re B, a 2013 case, followed by the decisions of the Court of Appeal, particularly re B-S in 2013, and also re P and re G in the same year. All these cases firmly re-emphasise that a placement for adoption is a very extreme thing and a last resort, to be approved only when nothing else will do. Both domestic and Convention law require a high degree of justification before adoption can be endorsed if it is necessary for determining welfare as set out in the Adoption and Children Act.

Although not expressly stated above, it is implicit from all parties’ positions that the threshold for making a care order, as set out in s31 of the Children Act 1989 is met. The final agreed threshold document sets out the areas of concern and in respect of which the local authority rely in establishing the threshold. These include areas of neglect, emotional and physical harm, and lack of engagement.

It is accepted by the parents that they are unable to meet F's basic care needs, including the provision and maintaining of satisfactory home conditions. The parents also accept that they are unable to meet F's basic needs either together or with F in either of their sole care. In addition, the Mother accepts that she experiences issues with poor mental health which put F at risk of suffering neglect as well as emotional and physical harm. The Mother also failed to attend a number of appointments in the months following F's birth, which she accepts put F at risk of suffering neglect as well as emotional and physical harm.

Having accepted the threshold is met, neither parent put themselves forward as a potential carer for F. Both parents clearly love F, but they have had to make the difficult decision that they are not currently or for the foreseeable future in a position to care for him.

Accordingly, the issue the court had to decide was which of the two competing realistic options was in F’s best interests. Should F be made subject to care and placement orders, or should he be placed in the care of the MGM under a special guardianship order or some other form of order. For the reasons set out below, and applying the law as set out above, I was satisfied that the making of care and placement orders was in F's best interests.

The parties were agreed that in the event care and placement orders were made there should be ongoing contact, to include post adoption contact, between the MGM and F. It was also agreed that this should take place in the form of direct contact at a frequency of once per month. Although not party to these proceedings, the court was informed that this position was agreed by F’s carers and prospective adopters.

There was an issue between the parties on the question of indirect contact. BCP, the guardian, and the carers all supported indirect contact taking place on an as and when basis to be determined by the carers. This was opposed by the MGM who sought an order for indirect contact at a frequency of once per month.

There were also issues concerning the findings sought by the MGM against BCP and the social worker. Whilst some of the findings were conceded by BCP, others remained in dispute, namely:

It should be noted that in respect of allegations 3 and 4, all parties accepted that reference to the social worker should be removed. The issue was therefore whether BCP had misled the court.

The next issue related to a paragraph in the social worker’s statement. The MGM objected to that paragraph as being wholly inaccurate and unjustified and sought for it to be deleted. Initially, BCP and the social worker were only prepared to delete the final sentence in the paragraph, but at the commencement of the hearing on 1 July 2025 they indicated a willingness to remove the whole paragraph subject to the court’s permission to do so.

The final issue on paper was the application by the MGM for an order for costs against BCP. I say on paper because in practice the application was not actively opposed by BCP both in respect of principle and quantum, although BCP did not go so far as to consent to the making of the order.

At the adjourned final hearing I heard submissions on behalf of all parties. I also had the benefit of reading the parties’ skeleton arguments. I was also able to read and consider the evidence contained in the main bundle (running to 1,162 pages) and the supplemental bundle containing statements and documents filed since the hearing in May (running to 612 pages).

As stated above, at the conclusion of the hearing there was insufficient time for me to consider, prepare, and deliver a judgment that day. However, I was conscious of the significant delay which had already occurred in this case and of the high levels of anxiety which the parties, particularly the parents, the MGM, and the prospective adopters were experiencing. Accordingly, I informed the parties that I was going to retire to consider my decision and would return later that afternoon to inform them of my decision on the issues in dispute, with my detailed reasons in the form of this judgment following at a later date.

In carrying out my welfare analysis I reminded myself of the following:

I also reminded myself of the principle of proportionality and that the court should make no more interventionist an order than is necessary to meet the needs of F.

All parties accepted there were only two options in this case. Either F is placed with his maternal grandparents under a special guardianship order or some other order, or the local authority is granted care and placement orders under which he would remain with his current carers. No one suggested that long term foster care or any other option would be in F's best interests.

In assessing the two options I took note that F has been placed with his current carers under what is known as an early permanence placement. Such a situation was considered in the case of Re T where at paragraphs 50-51 the then President of the Family Division, Sir James Munby stated:

And also at paragraph 53

Turning to the allegations, I will deal first with those which concern BCP before dealing with the allegation of dishonesty against the social worker.

In respect of allegations 3 and 4, I am quite satisfied that BCP misled both the court and the agency decision maker. In respect of the court, this occurred on multiple occasions, namely various different hearings.

It was submitted on behalf of BCP that whilst there had been mistakes and systemic failings there was no evidence of dishonesty. Further, that a finding that BCP had misled the court included or implied an element of dishonesty and that therefore the findings should not be made.

I did not accept BCP’ submissions. A finding that someone has misled the court does not require a finding that there has been an element of dishonesty. A court could be misled for a number of different reasons including by an honest mistake, by carelessness, and of course deliberately. The dictionary definition of the word ‘mislead’ is:

There can be no sensible dispute that this definition was met in the current case. At a number of different hearings, BCP put information before and made representations to the court which were incorrect. That is accepted by BCP. BCP also accept that this happened as a result of mistakes and systemic failings. It is clear that the incorrect information and representations caused the court and the agency decision maker to ‘have a wrong idea or impression’.

For the avoidance of doubt, I do not find that there was any element of dishonesty when BCP misled the court and the agency decision maker. But the absence of dishonesty should not be taken as minimising the seriousness of the issue. The agency decision maker and the court were being asked to make decisions of the utmost seriousness. It has often been said that short of imposing a sentence of capital punishment, removing someone's child and ordering non-consensual adoption is one of if not the most serious order a court can make. It is therefore essential that when a court or an agency decision maker is tasked with making that decision they must be able to have full confidence that they have been provided with full and accurate information on which to base their decision. That did not happen in this case. They were misled.

As to allegation 6, I find the allegation proven in respect of the period prior to October 2024. That must follow from the mistakes and failings which BCP have accepted. Those mistakes and failings resulted in a significant delay in the MGM being contacted. Clearly, had the MGM been contacted at an earlier stage the assessment of the MGM would also have been undertaken at an earlier stage. However, once the MGM made contact with BCP in October 2024 there was then no delay by BCP in undertaking the assessment of the MGM.

As to allegation 7, the dates speak for themselves. The MGM made contact with BCP at the beginning of October 2024. The first occasion on which BCP arranged and provided family time between F and the MGM was February 2025. In my view it is obvious that that period of approximately five months amounts to delay. The allegation is therefore proven.

As to allegation 8, it is important to distinguish between the position relating to F and the position relating to X. I am seized with the proceedings relating to F. In these proceedings there is no doubt that the MGM is a realistic placement for F. That is accepted by BCP. Further, it is clear from reading the statements and reports that the MGM would have been a realistic placement for F from the outset of these proceedings. Put another way, there is nothing in any of the evidence before the court to suggest there has been some change of circumstances during these proceedings which means the MGM is a realistic option now, but would not have been a realistic option earlier in the proceedings.

In respect of X, it is not possible nor indeed appropriate for me to make a finding in these proceedings as to whether the MGM was or would have been a realistic placement for X in the proceedings relating to her. However, I can and do observe that there is nothing in any of the evidence which has been put before the court in these proceedings which would suggest the conclusions of the assessment of the MGM (i.e. that the MGM is a realistic option) would have been any different had it been undertaken at any stage during the proceedings relating to X.

Turning to allegation 9, I repeat that I am not dealing with the proceedings relating to X. However, it is clear from the chronology contained in the social worker’s statement in these proceedings dated 27 June 2025 that BCP was aware of the name and geographical location of the MGM during the proceedings relating to X. This fact was not lost on BCP, as its position in respect of this allegation makes clear:

As to allegation 11, I must again distinguish between the position relating to F in these proceedings and the position relating to X in the previous proceedings.

In respect of F it is clear that the chances of him being placed with the MGM were significantly reduced as a result of BCP’s failings. As set out above, BCP and the guardian place heavy reliance on the attachment that F has formed with his carers since being placed with them in these proceedings. Clearly, had the MGM been contacted at the outset of these proceedings, the strength of the argument relating to F's attachment with his carers would at the very least be significantly reduced if not eliminated.

It is beyond doubt that had the MGM been contacted at the outset of these proceedings the time it has taken for the matter to proceed to a final hearing would have been greatly reduced. Accordingly, even if F had still been placed with his carers, the time during which he has formed his strong attachment would also have been greatly reduced. Further, it is highly likely, that had the MGM being assessed at the outset of these proceedings, F would have been placed with the MGM when he was removed from his mother's care as opposed to being removed to foster care.

The attachment with his carers is not the only reason BCP and the Guardian relied on in support of the making of care and placement orders. BCP and the Guardian also relied on the importance of the sibling relationship between F and X.

It is not for me to make a finding as to what the court's decision would have been in relation to F had the MGM been contacted at the outset of these proceedings. However, it is clear that the factual basis of the welfare decision would have been significantly different. Not only would the attachment argument in favour of the carers have been weakened or eliminated, there would also have been an attachment argument in favour of the MGM, assuming F had been placed with the MGM when he was removed from the Mother, which as I have said above, would have been highly likely.

That would also have had a knock-on effect on the sibling relationship. F would not have spent the last 13 months living with and developing a close relationship with X.

Absent that close sibling relationship and absent an attachment with his carers, it is by no means certain the welfare decision would have resulted in care and placement orders being made.

In respect of X, I cannot second-guess what the welfare decision would have been had the MGM been contacted at the outset or during the course of those proceedings. However, for the reasons set out in this judgment, I can confirm that I am unaware of any evidence which would suggest the outcome of the assessment of the MGM would have been any different had it been undertaken at any stage during the proceedings relating to X. Without second-guessing what the welfare decision would have been, it is clear the court would have been undertaking its welfare decision on fundamentally different facts had it been doing so in the knowledge that the MGM was a realistic option for X.

I now turn to the allegation of dishonesty against the social worker.

In short, I make no finding in respect of that allegation. That is not to say the allegation is proven or not proven, but I am satisfied that it is neither necessary nor proportionate for me to make a finding on that allegation in order to determine the welfare issues which are before the court.

I accept the maternal grandmother says she has a clear recollection of the conversation which took place between her and the social worker at the beginning of October 2024. The maternal grandmother is clear that in the course of that conversation the social worker told her she had not known or been aware of the maternal grandmother’s name and geographical location. It is clear from the documents disclosed by BCP and indeed from the social worker's own statement that from at least September 2023 the social worker had been aware of the grandmother’s name and geographical location. The social worker does not accept that she told the maternal grandmother she was unaware of her name and geographical location during the telephone conversation at the beginning of October. The social worker's evidence in her written statement was that she has no recollection of saying that to the maternal grandmother.

In considering whether it was necessary or proportionate for me to make a finding in respect of this allegation, I took into account the date of the conversation in the context of these proceedings and the effect or consequences of the alleged words used in the conversation if they had in fact been used.

I was satisfied that when it came to making a welfare decision in respect of F, nothing turned on whether the social worker said what the maternal grandmother alleges. Regardless of what was or wasn't said in that conversation, it is common ground that following that conversation BCP took all appropriate steps to undertake an assessment of the MGM. Accordingly, I was satisfied it would be neither necessary nor proportionate to take up additional court time and cause further delay in these proceedings by hearing oral evidence from the social worker and the maternal grandmother in respect of this allegation.

That brings me to the final numbered allegation, which is more properly described as an invitation by the MGM for this judgment to be published and the social worker and BCP to be named.

All parties were content for this judgment to be published. BCP was content to be named in the published judgment. Accordingly, the only issue in dispute was whether the social worker should be named.

In fact, this issue fell away as a result of my finding in respect of the allegation of dishonesty against the social worker. It was accepted on behalf of the MGM that the social worker should only be named if a finding of dishonesty was made against her. Absent that finding, the MGM no longer sought the naming of the social worker in the published judgment.

The paragraph in question appears on page 10 of the social worker's statement (social work evidence template SWET) dated 20 March 2025. To provide context it needs to be read in conjunction with the preceding paragraph, so both paragraphs are quoted below. Reference to G and her partner is to the MGM, reference to D is to the Mother:

As stated above, at the hearing in May, the social worker and BCP were prepared to delete the last sentence. This concession was not accepted by the MGM and the matter was left as an issue which would have to be dealt with at the adjourned hearing. At the hearing on 1 July, the social worker and BCP confirmed they were prepared either to replace the paragraph with an amended version or remove the paragraph entirely. But to do either required the permission of the court.

I do not see the need for the paragraph to be rewritten. The paragraph was both inaccurate and entirely unjustified. I have no hesitation in giving permission for the paragraph to be removed.

I am critical of BCP and the social worker both for including the paragraph in the first place and then for refusing to agree to its removal until the hearing on 1 July. At the hearing on 28 May it must have been obvious to the social worker that the paragraph was inaccurate and unjustified and yet she was only prepared to agree to the deletion of the final sentence with the rest of the paragraph remaining in place. That was an unreasonable position to adopt, particularly so when by then many of the mistakes and failings made by the social worker and BCP had come to light.

It is quite clear to me that the MGM contacted the local authority as soon as she was made aware of the proceedings concerning F and X. I'm also satisfied that had she known about the proceedings before October 2024 she would have contacted the BCP. For the social worker to say she questioned or wondered to the contrary was at best disingenuous and certainly ill-conceived.

BCP were put on notice at the hearing in May that the MGM would be seeking an order for costs against BCP. That was again confirmed in the skeleton argument filed on behalf of the MGM prior to the hearing on 1 July. The MGM sought an order for costs in the sum of £15,987.60

At the hearing on 1 July counsel for BCP confirmed they were not actively opposing the application for costs and did not seek to put forward any submissions in response. BCP also elected not to make any submissions in respect of quantum.

Technically BCP was not consenting to an order for costs, but in view of their position and their very clear acceptance of their mistakes and systemic failings both before and during these proceedings, I am satisfied this is an appropriate case in which an order for costs should be made. Accordingly, I make an order for costs against BCP and order that they pay the MGM's costs which I summarily assessed in the sum of £15,987.60, payable within 28 days.

During the course of the hearing in May and July I became increasingly concerned at the potential for damage to be caused to the relationship between F's carers and the MGM. The carers are not parties to the proceedings and have not attended any of the court hearings nor had sight of any of the documents. They have therefore had to rely on third hand reports via BCP limited to the issues surrounding direct and indirect contact. All this in the context of knowing there were ongoing court proceedings within which the MGM was seeking to have F removed from their care and placed in the care of the MGM. The obvious tension and anxiety they would have been under would have been far from conducive to establishing and building a positive relationship with the MGM.

Notwithstanding this, I was very pleased to be informed at the hearing on 1 July that one session of direct contact had already taken place since the hearing at the end of May and that the carers had met with the MGM and the session had gone well. Indeed, that direct contact had been not just with F but also with X

Although not an issue for me to determine, it is important to record that BCP have confirmed a willingness and commitment to providing reparative work with the carers and the MGM in order to assist with the building of their relationship going forward. That work is to be outsourced and funded by BCP.

The final matter for me to deal with in this judgment is disclosure of papers, first in respect of a request by the MGM for permission to disclose the papers from these proceedings to their legal advisers in contemplation of bringing separate legal proceedings against BCP, and secondly in respect of the carers.

Initially the MGM’s request extended to permission to disclose the papers into any separate civil proceedings. I was not prepared to accede to that request as once disclosed into civil proceedings the papers would no longer benefit from the cloak of confidentiality. Accordingly, the request was amended to cover only their legal advisors, to which no other party objected.

As to the carers, I consider it essential they are provided with sufficient information to enable them to understand the issues which have arisen during these proceedings and the mistakes and failings of BCP which relate not just to F but also to X. In the first instance they should be provided with a copy of this judgment, but the parties will need to give careful thought to what other documentation should be disclosed to them so that an appropriate application or consent order can be filed with the court.

Of necessity, much of this judgment has focused on mistakes and failings. However, these should not obscure the fact that both F and X are clearly deeply loved by the MGM and the carers.

I am conscious that orders for post adoption contact are relatively rare and certainly rare when contact is at a frequency of once per month. A huge amount of credit goes both to the carers and the MGM for agreeing this level of direct contact and in doing so demonstrating they are able to prioritise the best interests of F and indeed X.

The dignified and child focused way in which the MGM and the carers have conducted themselves have only served to fortify my view that the decisions I have made in respect of F are in his best interests and will ensure an upbringing in which he will be secure, will thrive, will enjoy a strong and close bond with his sibling, and will develop and maintain a strong relationship with the MGM.