M v F

This is a final hearing to determine arrangements for A following findings that I made at a Fact-Finding Hearing (FFH) conducted in March this year. I adopt my judgment and findings from that hearing for the purposes of this final hearing.

The full background is as set out in my previous judgment. Since the FFH, CAFCASS completed an addendum final section 7 report dated 28^th May 2025 (E241-E254), filed an update from A’s school dated 28^th May 2025 (E255-E257), and the parties each filed statements in response to the recommendations in the CAFCASS final report (M dated 10^th June 2025 C156-C162, F dated 17^th June 2025 C163-C184).

The CAFCASS final recommendations were as follows:

A Dispute Resolution Hearing (DRA) was conducted on 30^th June 2025. It was not possible to conclude matters at that hearing, M agreeing with the CAFCASS recommendations but F not accepting them, so a Final Hearing (FH) was listed on 24^th July 2025.

I heard oral evidence from F, but it was agreed by both parties and endorsed by me that it was not necessary for M to give evidence since she agreed with the CAFCASS recommendations and F did not seek to cross examine her.

It was known at the FFH that the CAFCASS officer who had prepared the reports in this case, including the final addendum at the end of May, would not be available for any contested Final Hearing due to maternity leave. It was therefore agreed that CAFCASS evidence would be covered by another CAFCASS officer in her stead. Ms Palayiwa duly attended both the DRA and the FH and gave evidence.

Judgment was reserved as planned at the DRA.

F does not accept any of the findings made against him in the FFH. He disagreed with the CAFCASS recommendations, and he did not accept that there should be a section 91(14) order preventing him from making further applications under the Children Act in respect of A. He did not oppose an order for A to live with M but sought an order for A to continue to see him, initially continuing supervised contact at the contact centre, then moving to unsupervised contact in the community for a period of some months, before ultimately moving to overnight staying contact with him. He opposed the necessity of an order to restrict his parental responsibility and wanted to be consulted about the move from primary to secondary school, but said that he would not otherwise seek to interfere with M making day-to-day decisions about A.

M agreed with the CAFCASS recommendations but submitted through Ms Lucas that a longer period for any section 91(14) order was necessary and proportionate to cover the period when A would move to secondary school and that this would be five years rather than three.

At the welfare stage of proceedings the child’s welfare is the Court’s paramount consideration. The welfare checklist in section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989 sets out the various welfare checklist headings that may be relevant to a particular case. The factual context for the Court’s analysis of what is in the welfare interest of A is as determined at the FFH.

PD12J, particularly paragraphs 35 to 37, is relevant:

Section 1(2A) of the Children Act 1989 creates a presumption that the involvement of each parent in the life of a child will further that child’s welfare, “unless the contrary is shown”. In Re H (A Child: Domestic Abuse) 2024 EWCA Civ 326 the Court of Appeal addressed consideration of whether the contrary was shown and endorsed the judgment of MacDonald J in D v E (Termination of Parental Responsibility) [2021] EWFC 37. To summarise the key points from that latter case, the welfare of the child not only remains paramount but the child’s best interests take precedence over any other consideration; whilst there is a positive obligation to try to promote contact it is not absolute; excessive weight should not be placed on short-term problems and the Court must take a medium and long-term view; contact should only be terminated in exceptional circumstances and where there are cogent reasons for so doing, and as a last resort; the Court has to consider if it has taken all necessary steps to facilitate contact as can reasonably be demanded in the circumstances of the case; the Court must also have regard to the principles set out in PD12J, particularly paragraphs 35-37. The case of Re T-D [2024] EWCA Civ 793 confirmed that section 8 orders can properly be utilised to restrict parental responsibility, as Ms Lucas set out in her position statement, and that such orders are draconian and the court should only interfere with the article 8 rights of a parent in this way in exceptional circumstances.

In relation to section 91(14) orders, the relevant legal considerations are as set out in sections 91(14) and 91A of the Children Act 1989, and as set out in PD12Q. Previous case law about such orders, particularly the leading case of Re P [1999] 3 WLR 1164, may still be relevant as paragraph 2.8 of PD12Q makes clear but are to be viewed through the lens of the changes wrought by Parliament in enacting section 91A.

F does not accept any of the findings made in the FFH, as he made clear in oral evidence to me in this final hearing. His statement suggested that he accepted he had “engaged in questionable behaviour towards M on occasions and that this behaviour has had an impact on A” (C163). However, as submitted by Ms Lucas, in evidence to me he was unable to give any examples of this beyond using some inappropriate language. He was unable to be specific about this inappropriate language and did not accept any of the findings in relation to his verbal abuse of M. He accused M of being “manipulative” when asked by Ms Lucas if he was saying that M lied during the FFH. He also told me that he thought he should have walked away during the November 2020 incident as this was what he usually did but did not accept any wrongdoing in relation to that incident. At its highest, he accepted that he should have walked away during that incident, and that his choice of language at times could have been better, but this falls very far short of accepting the sort of seriously abusive behaviour that I found he subjected M to for a number of years. It also shows no acceptance of the impact of his abuse on A, both directly and indirectly. His lack of insight and acceptance was highlighted in the CAFCASS report, by Ms Palayiwa in her evidence to me, and in submissions by Ms Lucas. Ms Palayiwa described him as being in the precontemplative stage of any change, and I find that this is the case. He has absolutely no insight to the harm that he caused M and A, based on his evidence to me. In fact, it goes beyond a lack of insight and acceptance since he persistently sought to link any criticism of his behaviour to M’s conduct, blaming her for his attempts to circumvent communication via the parenting app in September 2024 and again a few months ago. This was a striking theme in his evidence to me during the FFH and a concrete demonstration then and during this hearing of his inability to acknowledge that it is his behaviour that is the risk to M and to A. Put bluntly, I made findings of some of the most serious domestic abuse that could be inflicted by one person to their partner over a very prolonged period. The complete absence of acceptance of those findings by F is a worrying indicator that he will not be accepted on any properly accredited perpetrator programme. It also indicates that he will not be able to benefit from any appropriate therapeutic input. He has no insight into the need to make any changes to his behaviour and thought processes and therefore remains at high risk of repeating some of the same abusive behaviours.

His evidence to me focused on the fact that he and M are separated, and implied that their physical separation would reduce the physical risk to M and A. However, as Ms Palayiwa explained in her evidence to me, the findings made included that F had subjected M to coercive and controlling behaviour and some of that behaviour was quite “covert”, or “subtle” as I clarified with her. The CAFCASS evidence was clear that there is an ongoing risk of this sort of abusive behaviour from F, noting that he has asked questions of A and behaved in a way that is controlling during contact earlier this year (see for example E248-E249 final CAFCASS report). There is thus a clear risk of him again directly exposing M (and thus A indirectly) to such covert or subtle coercive and controlling behaviour all the while he does not accept or understand what was wrong about his conduct and has done nothing to address this. This risk does not require direct contact or communication between F and M since such coercive control can be attempted via indirect communication and actions such as unreasonable demands or more subtle messages to A in contact implying criticism of M, and it can also include controlling behaviours directly towards A in contact such as forcing A to eat food that he does not want.

It is also significant that, despite his protestations that he has not exposed M to a risk of harm during proceedings, he tried to persuade the CAFCASS officer to facilitate a reconciliation during her enquiries for the August 2023 section 7 report (E195). He asked the police to also facilitate contact with M as I noted in my previous judgment, and sent correspondence to M seeking to reconcile with her. He also accepted emailing M direct in September 2024 as is set out in the final section 7 report at E246 para 22, and that he had done this again a few months ago. He told me in his evidence that he would email M if he did not get an answer via the parenting app within 5 days, and that the last direct email was because of this. He also accepted that he was the one to initiate the email contact, though sought to blame M for also engaging it that email correspondence and, I think, for not responding to the parenting app messages as promptly as he wanted. He also told me when I asked him to clarify what he meant by suggesting that he and M could have “arm length” communication, that he meant use of the parenting app or email for these purposes. He went on to tell me that he wanted to be able to email M and had her number and would use that to text her too if “something really dire happened”. When I asked him what he meant by that, he said “strictly in an emergency” but gave distinctly non-emergency examples of if A fell down at school, for school reports or for sending “some bigger file or some picture that can’t go through the app”. It is clear from this evidence that he saw absolutely nothing wrong in communicating with M outside of the parenting app and in relation to issues that are not emergencies.It is thus more likely than not that he would continue to do this, particularly if he remains extensively involved in A’s life. This would also continue to expose M to a risk of domestic abuse by way of coercive and controlling behaviour, I find. Ms Jones noted in her final report that M is vulnerable arising from the impact of the domestic abuse on her, something that is also clear from the way in which the domestic abuse allegations came out in these proceedings. M clearly struggled to understand the risk that F posed to her in the early stages of the proceedings, and it is clear that she agreed to direct contact between F and A (albeit supervised) not just because she genuinely wanted A to have a relationship with F, but also because she was fearful of the consequences if she pursued fact-finding in relation to the domestic abuse she suffered.

Para 35 of PD12J requires me to consider whether any order for contact would expose A to an unmanageable risk of harm, and para 36 emphasises that an order for contact should only be made if the physical and emotional safety of A and M can be, as far as possible, secured before during and after contact. A has had supervised contact with F for a very prolonged period at this point. As I noted in my previous judgment, these proceedings have been extraordinarily lengthy and, with the benefit of hindsight, the Court’s early acceptance of the parties’ desire to avoid a FFH was perhaps not fully compliant with the expectations of PD12J. I will return later in this judgment to the potential implications of changing arrangements for contact on A, but supervised contact has been deployed as a means of managing the risk that F poses to both M and A. Despite this, and despite what are generally very positive reports of contact in terms of A enjoying it, as noted above there are instances of F saying things that demonstrate further attempts to exert coercive control over M and F has circumvented the limits imposed on communicating with M about arrangements for supervised contact as I have noted. Ms Jones noted at E248-E249 the concerning comments made by F in contact which show a controlling element to F’s approach, and which directly placed A in the situation of “having to react and navigate himself out of difficult conversations and situations” (E249). I accept that it is entirely appropriate for a parent to be concerned if their child has a bruise, or is struggling at school, but the way in which F is recorded as responding implies criticism of M’s care of A and is an attempt to interrogate A in a way that is wholly inappropriate for a child of A’s age. It is also very inappropriate when viewed through the lens of the findings I made and therefore what A has experienced directly and indirectly of F’s coercive and controlling abuse of M, as Ms Jones noted at E249.

The impact on M of the domestic abuse that I have found she has suffered, and the risk of future harm to her arising from domestic abuse is also very significant on the evidence before me. M’s own evidence about this in her final statement is striking. She set out the impact of the proceedings and the anxiety that trying to anticipate what F will do next at C157 and C158. She did so in a very dignified and restrained manner, in my view, given the abuse that she has experienced. The CAFCASS reports produced in these proceedings also clearly recorded the extreme distress and anxiety that M has experienced and continues to experience because of the domestic abuse she has suffered at F’s hands. This exposes her to an ongoing risk of emotional harm, which will potentially create a risk of emotional harm to A by his being indirectly aware of her distress and anxiety no matter what reasonable steps she may try to deploy to hide this from A, since A is bound to be very closely emotionally attuned to his mother and likely to pick up on her emotions despite her best efforts. It also exposes A to a risk of emotional harm arising from M not being emotionally available for A whilst she is crippled by anxiety as she described to Ms Jones, something that Ms Palayiwa also confirmed was likely in her professional opinion on the papers.

Ms Caplan suggested in her closing submissions, and in cross examination of Ms Palayiwa, that it was not ideal that it was not possible for the Court to hear from a CAFCASS officer who had directly spoken to the parents and A. However, F and his legal representatives consented to the approach taken to cover Ms Jones’ evidence in her absence, Ms Palayiwa confirmed that she had read all of the evidence prior to the DRA at which she also attended, and she had the benefit of hearing F’s evidence in this FH. She herself is a CAFCASS officer and therefore has her own professional duties and standards too. As a result, if there was any gap in the evidence from CAFCASS or if she departed from anything within Ms Jones’ analysis and recommendations, I am sure that she would have highlighted this. She clearly agreed with that analysis and recommendations when she gave me her evidence, though. I am thus not sure what Ms Jones being present rather than Ms Palayiwa would have added to this FH and note that the attendance of Ms Palayiwa in fact enabled F to put his case in challenging the CAFCASS report recommendations to someone who was able to respond to those challenges.

In terms of the PD12J considerations, the effect of the domestic abuse on A and the arrangements for where he is living is the first aspect I must consider. F does not dispute that there should be a Child Arrangements Order for A to live with M as recommended by CAFCASS. However, he was very clear that, as he had previously indicated in these proceedings, he intends to move closer to where A is living and told me in this hearing that he has narrowed it down to two properties. Given the severity of the abuse, as well as the complete lack of insight shown by F, there is a real risk that F being physically closer to M and A would inevitably impact on A’s living arrangements by making M feel less safe and secure arising from his tendency to communicate with her outside of the parenting app. He would also be more likely to communicate more frequently with M the more time he were able to spend with A, I find. Ms Jones also noted in her final report at E250-E251 there is a concern that F will seek to use his parental responsibility to coerce or manipulate in the future, which will in turn have an adverse impact on A.

The next consideration is the impact of the domestic abuse on A and its effect on his relationship with the parents. A was directly involved in the incident in November 2020 and exposed to a direct physical risk of harm, as well as emotional harm, arising from the actions of F. He has also been indirectly exposed to the abuse of M by F. As Ms Jones set out in her report “F does not accept any of the findings, he therefore does not understand the harm that A and M have experienced. As F continues to deny the domestic abuse, there is no possibility of F making reparations to A. F cannot support A to develop appropriate values and attitudes” (E247). Ms Palayiwa confirmed this in her evidence and pointed out that there was a risk of this adversely impacting on A’s relationship with M too. Indirectly, A would also be at risk of harm arising from the emotional impact on M of any ongoing abuse from F or continued communication with F since, as Ms Jones and Ms Palayiwa’s evidence made clear, such is the trauma that the abuse has caused M she may at such times be emotionally unavailable to A as well as A having to witness the emotional impact on M.

The Court also has to consider whether F is motivated by a desire to promote the best interests of A or is using the process to continue a form of domestic abuse against M. The evidence of M, CAFCASS and of F himself makes it very clear that F has and is using the process to continue to attempt to coercively control M. F is adamant that he is simply putting A’s needs first, and I do think that he believes this at some level, but his actions show that he has also behaved in concerning ways during contact and in communicating with M which supports a conclusion that he is also motivated by a desire to continue the abuse of M.

The likely behaviour of F during contact and its effect on A is the next consideration. In light of my previous findings, and my findings above, it is likely that F will continue to expose A and M to a high risk of coercive and controlling behaviour during contact. This risk would be heightened during any unsupervised contact, but would also be present during supervised contact based on the instances noted in Ms Jones’ final report and in F’s own evidence to me about his communications with M outside of the parenting app. This risk would also exist in relation to indirect contact if that were to take place frequently, as Ms Jones noted in her report at E249-E250. This includes the emotional harm risk to A arising from the way in which letters from F to A will impact negatively on M’s emotional wellbeing (E249).

The final PD12J para 37 consideration is the capacity of the parents to appreciate the effect of past domestic abuse and the potential for future domestic abuse. As noted earlier in this judgment, F simply does not accept that he has perpetrated domestic abuse in the past and thus does not accept that he needs to make fundamental changes to prevent this in the future. M has a far greater understanding of the abuse she was subjected to than in the initial stages of these proceedings, and she has been referred to support services and is clear that she will engage with those, which will reduce the risk to her in the future. As Ms Palayiwa told me in her evidence, there is also a risk of future domestic abuse in any new relationship that F may have, though there is no evidence that he is in a new relationship at present. Whilst F refuses to accept that he has perpetrated domestic abuse, he remains at very high risk of perpetrating domestic abuse in future and the fact that M and he are physically separated simply reduces the risk to M of direct physical abuse. It does not reduce the risk of other forms of more “covert” or “subtle” forms of coercive and controlling behaviour and he thus remains at high risk of potentially continuing this form of abuse towards M.

The welfare checklist is also part of my considerations in deciding what is in A’s best interests as I noted earlier in this judgment. A’s wishes and feelings in light of his age and understanding is the first relevant heading on that checklist. He is now 6 years old, and his understanding is that of a relatively young child, but one who has experienced the abuse of M by F directly and indirectly. He clearly enjoys his supervised time with F at the contact centre despite his experiences, and he is starting to ask questions about why he can’t spend time with F outside of the centre so would clearly like to be able to do this, as F’s own evidence showed.

In terms of A’s physical, emotional and educational needs, these are clearly being met in the care of M. Supervised contact is largely enabling F to meet A’s needs at present too, though I have noted above the risk to A of F continuing to subject M to coercive and controlling behaviour. This would risk A’s emotional needs not being met. F clearly also has a good understanding of A’s educational needs, and both Ms Jones and Ms Palayiwa accepted that this was also the case in their evidence.

The likely effect on A of change in his circumstances is next. If A were to cease to have direct contact with F this would cause him distress and, as Ms Palayiwa acknowledged when questioned by Ms Caplan, this would also cause him to have a sense of loss.

I have already noted A’s age, but in terms of his background and any characteristics of his which I consider relevant, his parentage and life story is also important. His cultural heritage comes from both of his parents, but I would note that this a shared cultural heritage, so M is capable of meeting his identity needs in this respect. As he grows older, he is going to have questions about why he had to see F in a professionally supervised setting, and for so long. How those questions are answered will be important for him in understanding his story, and I will consider the issues about F answering those questions under the next heading.

The next relevant heading is any harm which A has suffered or is at risk of suffering. As I have already covered earlier in this judgment, A has suffered harm both directly and indirectly from the abuse that M suffered at the hands of F and remains at high risk of harm in future on the evidence before me at this point. He will suffer emotional harm if he were to cease to have direct contact with F since that is against his wishes and will cause him loss, as the CAFCASS evidence showed. However, that harm must be balanced against the risk of future harm arising from domestic abuse. Whilst F remains unable to accept that he has perpetrated domestic abuse and thus unable to change his behaviours, he remains at high risk of continuing to use contact or the exercise of his parental responsibility in relation to A as a means of seeking to coercively control M. In his final evidence, and in Ms Caplan’s submissions to me, it was put that F has started to make changes. This boils down to having seen his GP after the fact-finding judgment, inappropriately obtaining an opinion from the GP about whether F posed a risk of harm to A, and trying to obtain a further appointment with his GP to seek a referral for the therapy recommended by CAFCASS. He also accepted that his GP, and any therapist, should read certain key documents from the proceedings including my judgments and the CAFCASS reports, though he had not shown these to the GP for the first appointment. It is not clear that F would be able to benefit from therapy in a way that would reduce the risk to M, and thus also to A, all the while he refuses to accept that he has subjected M and A to domestic abuse, though. Supervised contact cannot continue indefinitely for A, as both Ms Jones noted in her report and as Ms Palayiwa also confirmed in her evidence to me. This is because it is an artificial and constrained environment for A, and A is going to ask why he can only see F in that setting. Whilst F seems to have dealt with questions about this from A appropriately to date, F was completely unable to tell me how he would answer those questions in future once proceedings have ended, and he can no longer simply say that professionals need to decide. Combined with the risk of F continuing to seek to use direct, supervised, contact as a means of coercive control, this underlines why supervised contact is not in A’s long term welfare interests. The harm that A will be caused by stopping direct contact with F against his wishes and feelings can be mitigated by indirect contact, as the evidence of Ms Jones at E250 makes clear. The frequency of such indirect contact also has to take into account the impact on M of these communications, and the need for a third party to read any indirect communications to ensure they are appropriate to share with A is essential given the evidence of the emotional impact on M of reading communications from F. There is no evidence that M would fail to ensure that any indirect communications from F were passed on to A, and her actions throughout these proceedings also demonstrate that she has put her needs behind those of A in continuing to support contact between A and F despite the extremely serious domestic abuse that she has suffered.

Parenting capability is the next welfare checklist heading. M is clearly capable of parenting A to a good enough standard on the evidence before me, and this is not disputed by F. The only concern about F’s parenting capability is about his failure to reduce the risk of domestic abuse and this raises significant concerns about his ability to keep A safe from that risk.

Finally, the court has to consider the range of orders available under the Children Act. There is no dispute that, as recommended by CAFCASS, there should be a Child Arrangements Order specifying that A should live with M. This will provide A and M with security and stability about where A should live and is thus necessary despite the no order principle. In terms of contact between A and F, I find that it is in A’s welfare interests for there to be no further direct contact between A and F. This is because direct contact, even if supervised for a further prolonged period, would expose A and M to an unmanageable risk of harm before, during and after such direct contact from F’s likely further coercive and controlling behaviour towards M. That risk would be heightened if the element of supervision were removed in the future. Unless and until F is able to accept that he has subjected M and A to extremely serious and prolonged domestic abuse, and is able to make changes to ensure that the risk of his doing so again is reduced to an acceptable level, it is not possible to order safe direct contact between A and F. Some indirect contact is necessary to preserve a link between A and his paternal identity, but the frequency of that indirect contact must be at a level that minimises the potential for that to cause M undue anxiety and further trauma. It would also mitigate any risk of A trying to seek out F himself in later life, as Ms Jones noted at E250. This indirect contact must also be via a means that ensures that M and A are not exposed to those communications without a third party reviewing them and their contents to ensure that they are appropriate. A PO box for such communications, as recommended by Ms Jones in her final report, is also a good way to protect M (and thus indirectly A) from the impact of receiving written communications from F too. Ms Jones also recommended that M should update F about A three times a year, including photographs, via the parenting app to help ensure that F’s indirect contact with A is informed by what has been happening in A’s life. The impact on A of direct contact ceasing can also be mitigated by the support that Ms Jones identified at para 38 E250 in her final report, as well as helping to provide A with a safe narrative as to why he had to stop spending time with F as Ms Jones noted.

Given my findings about coercive controlling abuse of M by F, both in the previous judgment and this, I do find that it is necessary to restrict the exercise of F’s parental responsibility. Such orders are draconian, as Ms Lucas accepted in her position statement for this final hearing and in closing submissions. However, this is an exceptional case given the severity of the abuse that I found F had subjected M to, and the high risk of him subjecting her to further coercive and controlling behaviour through the exercise of parental responsibility for A. As recommended by Ms Jones, M should be able to make day to day decisions about A’s health, education, and applying for passports for him. Ms Jones was clear in her report at E251 that F should be updated about decisions once made, and that he should be consulted in the exceptional circumstance that A needs significant medical treatment, and M agrees with this. F, through Ms Caplan, sought to argue that he should be consulted about the choice of secondary school for A. Given my findings, this is not in A’s welfare interests. It would present F with an opportunity to seek to coerce and control M and, given that it seems from both of Ms Jones’ evidence and that of M, he has had limited involvement with A’s school despite having the opportunity to do so and my finding that he should only have limited indirect contact with A, F would be likely to only have limited relevant knowledge to inform any such decision anyway.

A section 91(14) order is the final recommendation from CAFCASS. It is true that F has not made repeated applications in respect of A and has also not made repeated applications within these proceedings. The Court has to apply the considerations set out in PD12Q as I have already noted. As that practice direction makes clear, they are a protective filter made by the court in the interests of children. They are not limited to circumstances in which a party had made repeated and unreasonable applications, and can include where a period of respite is needed following litigation and where a person’s conduct overall is such that an order is merited to protect the welfare of the child directly or indirectly due to the damaging effects on a parent carer. The practice direction also notes that a future application can be part of a pattern or coercive and controlling behaviour toward the victim. All three of these apply in this case given my findings. These proceedings have lasted for over two years, and they have had a significant emotional impact on M. M and A need a period of respite as a result, but they also need a period of respite to enable them to benefit from the support services CAFCASS has facilitated. M has had to continue to deal with direct email communication from F within the proceedings despite the required protection of the parenting app, and there is a very high risk of F attempting to use further proceedings to exert coercive and controlling behaviour over M given my findings about this risk earlier in this judgment. Any such order is not an absolute bar to applications, it is purely a filter designed to ensure Court scrutiny of the appropriateness of any application, and this strikes the balance between the article 8 rights of M and A and those of F, I find.

The duration of a section 91(14) order recommended by CAFCASS is for three years. As noted by Ms Lucas in her cross examination of Ms Palayiwa and in her closing submissions, this would mean that the order would expire before A has completed primary school. To provide M and A with the necessary protection from further proceedings, I am satisfied that it would not be in A’s welfare interests for F to be able to make an application in relation to A’s schooling before A had moved to secondary school. The specific issues order restricting the exercise of his parental responsibility in relation to choice of secondary school is designed to protect A from F seeking to use this as part of coercion and control of M, and it would not be logical to conclude that this is necessary but at the same time fail to protect M and A from the consequences of F being able to apply to vary this order without leave, I find. The duration of the section 91(14) that I will make in this case is therefore for a period to cover both choice of secondary school and A’s transition to secondary school and will thus last until 30^th September 2030.

The section 91(14) order will cover any applications to vary arrangements in relation to A or orders in relation to A under section 8 of the Children Act 1989. I have considered carefully whether the order should include applications for enforcement under the Act. Since I am ordering indirect contact four times per year, via a PO Box or similar and with a third party (nominated by M) determining the appropriateness of sharing those written communications with F, there is an argument for saying that any enforcement application is unlikely. However, I am mindful that F clearly instructed Ms Caplan to put forward a case that there was a concern that the written communications may not be passed on to A. I am also mindful of the fact that, even with legal advice, it is not uncommon to see enforcement applications where there is no evidence to show that the applicant is likely to be able to prove a breach of the order to the required criminal standard. On balance, to ensure that the section 91(14) order does provide M and A with the level of respite and protection that is required, I am satisfied that enforcement applications in relation to the indirect contact order should also be covered by the order. F would still be able to apply during the currency of the order, whether for enforcement or for another order under the Act in respect of A, if he is able to demonstrate that he has made substantial changes.

The substantial changes I have referred to above, are in relation to the risk of domestic abuse. F would need to provide the following with any application for permission to apply during the currency of the section 91(14) order: