Oxfordshire County Council v M & Ors

This judgment is being handed down in private on [31^st July 2025]. It consists of 47 pages and has been signed and dated by the Judge. The Judge has given permission for the judgment (and any of the facts and matters contained in it) to be published on condition that in any report, no person other than the advocates or the solicitors instructing them (and other persons identified by name in the judgment itself) may be identified by name, current address or location [including school or work place]. In particular the anonymity of the children and the members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that these conditions are strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court. For the avoidance of doubt, the strict prohibition on publishing the names and current addresses of the parties will continue to apply where that information has been obtained by using the contents of this judgment to discover information already in the public domain.

This is the second set of public law proceedings for the children concerned. The family has been known to the Local Authority for about sixteen years. Within the previous proceedings the children were found to have suffered significant harm arising from sexual harm, intellectual/developmental harm, domestic abuse and neglect. M failed to ensure that the children attended school regularly, failed to ensure that their health needs were met, failed to provide them with appropriate guidance, routine and boundaries and failed to protect them from the impact of domestic abuse. Very sadly, the father of A, B, C, D and E died in 2020.

The previous proceedings were before DJ Devlin and concluded on 20^th February 2023 with no public law orders and plans for the children to remain in the care of M, supported by Children in Need plans.

Unfortunately concerns continued about low school attendance, neglect of health needs, and lack of appropriate guidance, routines and boundaries. Further concerns arose in relation to domestic abuse by M’s new partner, F. Drug and alcohol use by both F and M was also a concern.

These care proceedings commenced on 2^nd May 2024, with a first hearing on 16^th May 2024. The interim care plans for A, B, D and E were opposed by M and a contested interim hearing was listed for 7^th June 2024. At that hearing the court approved the Local Authority care plans for removal, but with the caveat that the Local Authority had agreed not to forcibly remove A or B. A Further Case Management Hearing (FCMH) to consider interim placements and interim orders was listed on 11^th June 2024. On 7^th June 2024 B, D and E moved to their respective placements, but A refused to move there. However, by the time of the hearing on 11^th June it was anticipated that A would move to his placement that afternoon. Proceedings were also issued in relation to I on 7^th June 2024 and this apparently prevented timetabling to Issues Resolution Hearing (IRH). It seems as if, because of opposition by F and absence of instructions to A and B’s representatives on the issue, the two sets of proceedings were not consolidated but were directed to run concurrently. A had separately instructed solicitors around July 2024 as best I can work out from previous court orders, with B also becoming separately represented by March 2025.

A did not move as expected on 11^th June 2024. There were further hearings on 21^st June, 24^th July, 31^st July and 1^st August 2024 in relation to A. The Local Authority made an application for a recovery order on 3^rd July 2024. A applied to discharge the Interim Care Order in respect of him on 25^th July 2024. That application was refused on 1^st August 2024 and a Recovery Order granted instead. On that date A finally moved to the same placement as B.

On 21^st June 2024 the cases were timetabled to an IRH on 23^rd October 2024, the cases were still not consolidated at this point but were to continue concurrently.

On 29^th July 2024 M applied for a psychological assessment of A. That application was listed to be considered on 14^th August 2024 but M sought permission to withdraw it at that hearing.

On 21^st August 2024 the Guardian applied for a psychiatric assessment of A. That application was granted on 9^th October 2024, and the resulting report was filed on 6^th December 2024 (E116-E138).

On 30^th September 2024 the Local Authority applied to re-timetable the proceedings. The Local Authority had completed a parenting assessment of M on 9^th September 2024 (C186-C25), that assessment concluding that M could not safely care for any of the children. Very unfortunately the Local Authority failed to progress parallel planning in this case, apparently neglecting to book a permanency medical for E according to the Case Summary produced for an FCMH on 9^th October listed to consider the application to re-timetable. The Case Management Order from that hearing is, however, silent, as to any reason for the failure to adhere to the previous timetable and the extension to proceedings authorised by that order. The case was re-timetabled to an IRH on 26^th March 2025.

A day later than directed, on 21^st January 2025 the Local Authority filed its final evidence. The final care plans were for Care Orders with plans for A to remain in a specialist residential placement, for B to remain in a specialist residential placement separate to A, and for D to remain in long term foster care; for there to be a Special Guardianship Order in respect of E, and for a Care Order and Placement Order with a plan for adoption in respect of I. It is accepted by the Local Authority that C is now too old for the Court to make any public law order. A Final Hearing (FH) was listed commencing on 11^th July 2025 for 7 days, again without the two sets of proceedings being consolidated. A Pre-Trial Review (PTR) was also listed on 25^th June 2025. My first involvement with these proceedings was at the PTR, the FH also being listed before me.

On 28^th March 2025 the Local Authority issued what would become the first of four Recovery Order applications in respect of B. Ultimately on 6^th May 2025 B moved to a new placement elsewhere in the country. Since then, she has not had any unplanned returns home or been subject to a Recovery Order. A further Recovery Order was also sought in respect of A on 9^th May 2025 which led to his return to placement on 11^th May 2025, though it was not necessary to involve the police in his return under that order.

At the PTR it became necessary to re-timetable the final evidence of M and F, who had failed to give instructions to their advocates to enable compliance with the previous directions, and it was also therefore necessary to allow the Guardian further time to file and serve his final analysis and recommendations. Proceedings were consolidated under the older case number, there being no objection to this and an acknowledgement that, if any personal information contained in documents relating to one party needed to be withheld from another party, that information could simply be redacted. The failure to consolidate these proceedings earlier has, however, led to a bundle that is not easy to navigate, and hampered timely production of a clear consolidated threshold document. I eventually received a single consolidated threshold document on the morning of day three of this final hearing. I have appended that document in anonymised form to this judgment.

It is also worth noting that the statutory maximum time limit for conclusion of these proceedings has been exceeded by some margin. The original 26-week deadline was 31^st October 2024. That was extended by various case management orders, culminating in an extension to 6^th August 2025.

I have read all the evidence contained in the consolidated bundle, and heard evidence from the social worker, the parenting assessor, M, F (in part), and the Guardian. The reason that I only heard in part from F was because he became too anxious to enable me to continue despite various participation measures being offered and put in place to enable him to participate. Although he was compellable as a witness, no party sought to compel his return to the witness stand for cross examination, and I did not pursue forcing him to do so, acknowledging that it would probably be a counterproductive exercise in terms of enabling me to hear his evidence on the disputed aspects of the case. He had been advised by Mr Brookes-Baker about the implications for his case of failing to return to complete his evidence.

The Local Authority seeks Care Orders for A, B, and D, with care plans for A and B to remain in residential placements and D in long term foster care. In respect of E, the Local Authority seeks a Special Guardianship Order for E to remain in the care of G. The Local Authority agrees with G that there should be no orders in relation to E spending time with his family, with G planning to facilitate either monthly or six weekly visits for E and M. Although the Local Authority has some concerns about the long-term viability of this plan, it is content to leave decisions about the time that E spends with his family to G. In respect of I, the Local Authority seeks a Care Order and a Placement Order, with a final care plan for adoption for her. C is 17 years old, so the Local Authority cannot seek any public law order in respect of him because the Court has no jurisdiction pursuant to section 31(3) of the Children Act 1989, but the Local Authority plan is to continue to support him under a Child in Need Plan. The Local Authority does not oppose F’s applications for a declaration of parentage and parental responsibility order.

M opposes the Local Authority final care plans for the children and seeks the return of the children to her care. She does not oppose the applications by F for a declaration of parentage and a parental responsibility order for I.

F accepts that he cannot care for I, however he opposes adoption as a final outcome for I. He supports I returning to the care of M. He has also applied for a Declaration of Parentage and a Parental Responsibility Order in respect of I. If a Placement Order is granted, F does not agree with the plan for there to be no direct post-adoption contact.

A and B want to go home to live with M. B has said she will go home regardless of the outcome of these proceedings.

The Guardian largely supports the Local Authority final plans for the children, however, is concerned about the original proposal expressed in its final care plan for letterbox only contact between E and his family given the relationships between his proposed special guardian and E’s family. The Guardian recommends that D’s contact should be revisited and reduced sooner than currently planned given the level of distress that D is experiencing as a result of that contact. Similarly, the Guardian is concerned about proposed contact arrangements for D in light of the impact of current arrangements on him and has invited the Local Authority to reconsider the final care plan in this respect. The Guardian does not oppose the making of a declaration of parentage and the granting of parental responsibility to F in respect of I. He also supports some contact between F and I for the purposes of life-story work for her only, but agrees with the Local Authority that any post-adoption contact for her should be letterbox only to avoid the potential to limit the pool of prospective adopters or the risk of undermining an adoptive placement for her.

In public law proceedings the Court must first consider whether the Local Authority has proved, on balance of probabilities, that at the relevant time the children concerned were suffering or at risk of suffering significant harm as set out in section 31 of the Children Act 1989. If threshold is found proved, then the Court proceeds to consider whether the final care plans are in the welfare interests of the children concerned, by reference to the welfare checklist as set out in section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989. In addition, where adoption is a potential outcome, the Court must also consider the welfare checklist in section 1 (4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.

The Court must also have regard to the article 8 rights of the children and parents, as well as their article 6 rights, in particular in relation to any necessary participation measures.

I have also considered the options for the children applying the considerations set out in Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146.

I have borne in mind the principle set out by Hedley J in Re L (Care: Threshold Criteria) [2007] 1 FLR 2050 that society must be willing to tolerate very diverse standards of parenting. However, the case of Re H (A Child) (Appeal) [2016] 2 FLR 1171 considered the applicability of Re L to welfare considerations, the first instance judge in Re H having quoted Re L in support of a “presumption” in favour of a child’s birth family. McFarlane LJ in Re H made it clear that there is no presumption in favour of a natural parent or family member [89], and pointed out that Hedley J’s remarks in Re L were “entirely directed to the question of the threshold criteria” [89] and that reference to these remarks were “out of place, as a matter of law, in a case where the issue did not relate to the s.31 threshold, but solely to an evaluation of welfare” [93]. As noted in both Re G (Children) [2006] 2 FLR 629 and Re C (A Child) (Special Guardianship Order) [2019] EWCA Civ 2281, this does not mean that parentage is irrelevant, it is an important part of considering what birth parents or wider birth family can contribute to the emotional and identity needs of a child.

Given the issues around analysis of risk in respect of A and B, the case of Re F (A Child – Placement Order – Proportionality) [2018] EWCA Civ 2761 was rightly submitted by Mr Pettit in closing to be relevant. In that case Jackson LJ provided guidance on the analysis of risk to be conducted by the Court, and the things the Court should consider in so doing, which can be summarised as follows:

Since M has a learning disability, as was highlighted by Ms Wise in closing, the cases of Re H (Parents with Learning Difficulties: Risk of Harm) [2023] EWCA Civ 59 and Re D (Adoption) (No 3) [2017] 1 FLR 237 FD are also relevant, as well as the case of Re DS (A Child: Adoption or Fostering) [‘2024] EWCA Civ 948. The latter case referred to and endorsed Re W (Adoption: Approach to Long-Term Welfare) [2016] EWCA Civ 793, making clear that using the term “nothing else will do” was not a substitute for a proper welfare evaluation and it only comes in as a proportionality cross check.

Finally, F has applied for a declaration of parentage and a parental responsibility order in respect of I. The former is governed by section 58(1) of the Family Law Act 1986. As highlighted by Mr Brookes-Baker in his position statement for this hearing, Knowles J considered this in P v Q, F & X [2024] EWFC 85 and concluded that the court did not have a general discretion not to make a declaration of parentage on a best interests or welfare analysis of the impact on the child of making the declaration, simply to decide whether the declaration is manifestly contrary to public policy. Section 4(1)(c) of the Children Act 1989 governs his application for parental responsibility. R H (Minors) (Local Authority: Parental Rights) (No 3) [1991] Fam 151 set out three factors to for a Court to consider in determining applications for a parental responsibility order:

In relation to threshold, the Local Authority initial attempts to produce composite documents are at A130-A134 and A67-A72 in the Bundle. The single composite threshold document referred to above is appended at Annex A to this judgment and was added at A67-A72 in the bundle. Consolidation of these proceedings much earlier would have avoided such a lengthy, complicated and, at times, less than clear set of threshold findings and responses, in my view. It also would have helped M and F, who both have vulnerabilities affecting their ability to process and respond to information, to have given clear responses earlier. As I noted at the PTR, the issues in this case are not really threshold issues. There are previous threshold findings made in the last proceedings, and the majority of threshold allegations relating to the current proceedings are not in dispute. Having considered the evidence in this case in respect of the undisputed threshold allegations, I find that they are proved on balance of probabilities and adopt those undisputed findings as my threshold findings in this case. Threshold is clearly therefore crossed for the purposes of section 31 based on the previous findings and undisputed allegations in the current proceedings. I have therefore considered the necessity and proportionality of determining the remaining disputed threshold allegations. However, these are inextricably linked to the welfare considerations about ongoing and future risk of harm, and parenting capacity, and I have therefore concluded that it is necessary to determine them.

The disputed threshold aspects are limited to the following issues (numbered as in the appended threshold document):

M accepts the facts in the allegation in relation to 1^st January 2024. F accepts that he was at the house with M and the children present, and that he made telephone calls to the police in the course of which he made threats to harm people, including those in the house with him. His evidence about this is extremely limited. It is not addressed at all in his two filed statements and, as I have noted above, he did not complete giving evidence during this hearing. As best I can work out, he seemed to be denying that he made the threats to harm M or the children directly to them, I think trying to imply that making the threats to the police call handler on the phone in the presence of M and the children would not have caused them to be scared and that he did not remember saying what was recorded by the police during the call. The calls were played to him during his police interview, which I have watched, and in that he can clearly be heard making threats to harm those in the house with him. He also accepted in that interview that he said what he did on the recordings, but that he didn’t mean it and didn’t mean to hurt anyone’s feelings by saying what he did. Despite his intentions, what he can clearly be heard saying (with the children and M audible in the background) is extremely abusive and threatening to both call handlers and M and the children. He clearly threatened to harm his unborn child. I accept that he repeatedly said that he was doing this to try to get the police to arrest him, however any child or M listening would have been scared by what he was saying and the way in which he was saying it (which was at times clearly angry and aggressive). This would have caused stress to M and therefore would have adversely affected I who was unborn at the time. This allegation is proved on balance of probabilities.

The next allegation relates to whether M and F caused each other injury during the incident on 26^th October 2024. M accepts that this happened, F does not. The primary police evidence about this was initially missing from the combined bundle, but it was referred to in the addendum parenting assessment of M at C311-C312. The primary evidence was added at G53-G62. It seems clear from this evidence, as well as M’s evidence that she had bruises and injuries caused by F at various points including during this incident, that F did cause her injury during this incident. It is not clear from M’s final evidence in her statement or during her oral evidence to me if she accepts throwing a beer can at F which caused him injury. There is actually no mention in the primary police evidence at G53-G62 of M throwing a beer can at F and this causing him injury. The account in the primary police evidence was taken from H, C, M and F. The police noted that F was located at his mother’s address, and that he was taken to hospital for a cut on his head (G57), however there is no record of F alleging that M threw a beer can at him and that this caused the cut. This allegation seems to have come from what F told Children’s Social Care, as is noted in the parenting assessment at C312, but there is no other evidence to support a finding that M throwing a beer can at F, as she accepts she did, caused him any injury. On balance of probabilities, I find that there was an argument between the two of them on 26^th October 2024, that both had been drinking, and that F threw beer cans at M, attempted to strangle her and punched her, caused her injury, and that M threw a beer can at him during the incident. I am not satisfied that M caused F injury during this incident, however. The rest of the allegation is found proved.

The next dispute relates to whether M knowingly consumed cocaine. She accepts the hair strand test results show that she had consumed cocaine and has consumed alcohol excessively. In respect of cocaine, her evidence to me was that she thinks she may have somehow ingested it without knowing, possibly through kissing F or through it being placed in her drink without her knowing. Her evidence to me was that she never lost consciousness or suffered blackouts when drinking, despite also telling me that she would consume at least two and sometimes three bottles of wine each Friday and Saturday night. She also accepted that she had dyed her hair before each hair strand test, despite being told not to do this and confirming that she understood it might affect the results. Her reason for doing this, she told me, was because she has dyed her hair since she was a child. The hair strand test results for cocaine show medium levels – as is noted in the reports, dyeing hair can result in lower levels of cocaine and alcohol being detected (see for example E143, E146 and E149). F said in his response to threshold that he never saw M ingest cocaine (A-2b). As was noted during the parenting assessment, M at one point alleged that the results had somehow been tampered with but also accepted that they correctly evidenced her alcohol use (C242). This is contradictory and lack credibility as a result. I did not find her credible about her never having been around F when he took cocaine, given how extensive his cocaine use seems to have been on his own admission and as demonstrated by his test results. M was also not credible when she said that she had no idea how cocaine got into her system apart from possibly via saliva when kissing F, or from someone putting it in her drink without her either noticing someone interfering with her drink or apparently noticing the effect of cocaine on her. The expert evidence from the hair strand test result reports for M in section E make it very clear that the levels of cocaine detected were too high to have arisen from indirect exposure as a result of F’s cocaine use and were at a level that is more likely to have been caused by M’s direct consumption of cocaine. As was accepted by the Local Authority, it is possible and credible that M was so intoxicated that she may not remember consuming cocaine, but that is different to whether she knowingly consumed cocaine at the time. The levels of cocaine detected are simply too high and cover such a prolonged period for an explanation of either her drinks being spiked or passive transference from F’s use to be credible, and it is also entirely possible that she may have had higher levels of cocaine detected but for the fact that she dyed her hair before each test as the test results reports also note. In her evidence to me M minimised her use of alcohol and its likely effect on her, simply accepting that it made her “sleepy” and “dizzy” in her evidence to me. Given the test results and the other evidence of M being clearly intoxicated at points as noted in the police disclosure, it seems more likely than not that M was more impaired through her consumption of alcohol than she accepts. I have noted that the actual wording of the allegation does not allege that M consumed cocaine ‘knowingly’, simply that she ingested it with excessive amounts of alcohol, and this posed a risk of harm to the children. However, there is a theme in the Local Authority evidence of concern about M’s ability to work honestly and openly with professionals, and whether M has lied about her cocaine use is an aspect of concern identified in the parenting assessment (see for example C198-C199). It is also something that the Guardian identified as a concern in his analysis and recommendations – see for example E91. It is therefore relevant to determine whether, on the evidence before me, it is more likely than not that M did knowingly ingest cocaine as the Local Authority actually alleged in the written opening prepared by Ms Wise and as put to M in cross examination by Ms Wise, despite the wording of the final composite threshold allegation. On balance, I am satisfied that M did knowingly consume cocaine. The amounts involved over prolonged periods are strongly suggestive of ingesting cocaine in a way that is unlikely to have meant that she was unaware and certainly not after the first hair strand test results.

The next disputed threshold aspect relates to when M became aware that she was pregnant and whether she delayed antenatal care. The social work evidence is clear that they were notified of the pregnancy in August by “several sources” and by F’s family in November. F himself accepted that he knew about the pregnancy in November. When questioned by Ms Wise for the Local Authority, it was difficult to work out what M was saying about this since she agreed that she had been asked by the social worker in November about whether she was pregnant and that she did not access antenatal care until the end of January 2024. I was born in March 2024, so whether she knew about the pregnancy at the end of 2023 or early 2024, by the time she accessed that antenatal care it was late in the pregnancy. M's evidence was that she only found out about the pregnancy quite far into the pregnancy, but she has not explained when she found out in relation to the antenatal appointments. The Local Authority evidence shows that there was an anonymous referral to them about M being pregnant and consuming alcohol (C190), but when seen by the social worker in November 2023 she denied that she was pregnant. She could not explain how F and his family seemed to know about her pregnancy in November when asked by Ms Wise about this, and her evidence about taking a pregnancy test and the results of that was confused, seemingly both saying that it was positive and negative. It is also difficult to understand why she accepted in her original threshold response that she had delayed seeking antenatal care (A28). On balance, she was not credible that she did not know about the pregnancy in November, and I am satisfied that she did know then and that F and his family also knew from that point. Since she did not then access antenatal care until the end of January 2024, and she accepts this, I am also satisfied that this means she was late in accessing antenatal care and this allegation is also proved on balance of probabilities.

Threshold is therefore found crossed for the purposes of section 31.

The next consideration is what is in the welfare interests of the children concerned, taking into account the welfare checklist applicable. In I’s case that welfare checklist is both as set out in the Children Act 1989 and in the Adoption & Children Act 2002 because there is a placement order application for her.

The first relevant heading is the wishes and feelings of the children concerned in light of their age and understanding. The older children have been very vocal and clear about their wishes and feelings, A and B stating that they want to go home and B adding that she will go home regardless of any order made by the court. D has also said that he wants to go home. E is too young to be able to independently articulate his wishes and feelings but would be likely to want to maintain his connection with his family. I is also too young to express her wishes and feelings, but would no doubt want to be brought up by her family and have a relationship with her half-siblings if that was safe for her. It is important to note that the wishes and feelings of the children are in light of their age and understanding. As was submitted by Mr Pettit for A and B, they are older and are competent to given instructions. However, they have also experienced years of significant harm, including neglect of their developmental and educational needs, and all parties agree that they are incredibly loyal to their mother and siblings. It is important to remember that these factors will also influence their wishes and feelings, and that even with clearly stated wishes and feelings from older children, these are not determinative of the outcome, and the Court has to reach an objective conclusion of what is in their welfare interests weighing all of the welfare checklist considerations.

The next welfare checklist heading is the physical, emotional and educational needs of the children. This can also be considered in conjunction with the children’s age, sex, background and any relevant characteristics. C has had various medical issues requiring clinical intervention and also has mental health issues. C is no longer of an age where he is subject to compulsory education, but he has attended special education provision in the past and is not currently in any form of education, employment or training. A and B are older, as I have noted, but still subject to compulsory education. A has a mild learning difficulty and an Education Health and Care Plan (EHCP), has not had his educational needs met in the past, and is currently accessing limited education via his residential placement. B has also had unmet educational needs in the past and is not yet accessing full-time education but has visited potential schools local to her current residential placement with a view to enrolling there. B also requires dental treatment, though all of the older children have not had their dental needs met previously which is likely to mean that they have increased dental care needs in the future. B also presents with some significant behavioural challenges, and it seems is now self-harming from the evidence of the social worker in this final hearing. D also has not had his educational needs met in the care of M, is performing well-below expectations in terms of reading and writing and is subject to an investigation for a possible EHCP but is appropriately accessing education in the care of his foster carers. He is also said by the Local Authority to have chronic impacted memory and is noted by the Guardian to be really struggling with “chaos” associated with family time. E has global developmental delay, autistic spectrum disorder, is non-verbal, also has an EHCP, and has been attending nursery in the care of G. For I, her particular needs are also to be considered under the Adoption and Children Act 2002 checklist. The unchallenged evidence in this case shows that I showed signs of neonatal substance withdrawal and may well have issues arising from M’s consumption of alcohol and cocaine whilst pregnant with I, and there is a plan to assess her for possible foetal alcohol syndrome as a result. There is no dispute that all of the children need parenting that ensures their various needs are consistently met to a good enough standard and that, sadly, M has not been able to provide that in the past for a number of years. The issue is the extent to which M may be capable of doing this in the future, which is something I will consider under the welfare checklist headings of parenting capability and risk of harm.

Also relevant to I’s needs at this point, are F’s applications for a declaration of parentage and a parental responsibility order. It was accepted by both the social worker and Guardian in their evidence, when questioned by Mr Brookes-Baker on behalf of F, that they accept I’s sense of identity and understanding of her history would be assisted by knowing who her father was, and for this to be reflected on her birth certificate. Paternity is not in dispute in this case, and no party opposes the making of a declaration of parentage as sought. There is also no evidence before me to support a conclusion that making the declaration would be manifestly contrary to public policy. That application should therefore be granted. More problematic is the application for a parental responsibility order when I consider the Re H criteria, even though no party opposes this application. F has shown some commitment to I by attending hearings (though not remaining for the entirety of the final hearing), and by participating in the parenting assessment and in speaking to the Guardian. However, he has not seen I for at least 10 months at this point, despite being offered family time. I is only 16 months old, so that means she has not seen her F for the majority of her life and now has no relationship with him. There is therefore no attachment between them to assess the degree of that attachment for the purposes of Re H considerations. The reasons for F applying for the order are the final Re H consideration. F’s final statement addressed this at C-245 para 15, as well as in the application itself. I have considered whether, in light of the domestic abuse issues which include coercive and controlling behaviour to M by F, there is potential for this application to be driven by those issues rather than anything that is in I’s welfare interests or F’s genuine desire to be acknowledged as her father. I also have to consider whether there are reasons to rebut the statutory presumption of F being involved in I’s life being in her welfare interests. If I were to be placed with M, there are orders under section 8 of the Children Act 1989 which could be considered as a means of preventing F from using any grant of parental responsibility for I as a means to further subject M to domestic abuse. However, that would rely on M and F understanding and accepting any limitations on the exercise of his parental responsibility imposed by any such orders. It would also depend on M being able to use any such orders to protect herself and I from the risk of domestic abuse posed by F. I am not confident that M and F would understand or accept any such limitations based on their history, nor that M would be capable of using orders to protect her and I from further domestic abuse. One only has to look at their actions when F has been on police conditional bail. It could be argued that granting F parental responsibility may be academic if I determine that adoption is in I’s welfare interests, since it would simply mean that his consent would have to be dispensed with in order to make a placement order, as Mr Brookes-Baker submitted. However, Mr Brookes-Baker also accepted that a Court does not simply ‘rubber-stamp’ an application by granting something where no party opposes it. I have really wrestled with F’s application for parental responsibility because I am satisfied that he has not shown the sort of commitment to I that one would normally see in care cases and has in fact been absent from the majority of her life at this point by not having any contact with her for 10 months, leading to there being no attachment between them now. On balance, although no party opposes the grant of a parental responsibility order to F, I am not satisfied that it is appropriate to grant him parental responsibility where there is no relationship with her and no evidence of commitment to her by spending time with I. I am also concerned that, if the application were granted if I reach the conclusion that she could be safely returned to the care of M, granting F parental responsibility would be bound to increase the potential for conflict between M and F in relation to arrangements for I and this would expose I to a risk of harm arising from domestic abuse. That risk of harm is not capable of mitigation to an acceptable level by use of protective orders including a non-molestation order or any specific issues order or prohibited steps order to limit the exercise of parental responsibility by F because it seems more likely than not that M will fail to enforce those orders against F.

The likely effect on the children of any change of circumstances is also a relevant checklist heading. The Together and Apart Assessment dated 13^th January 2025 (C318-C357), and the evidence of the social worker and Guardian are very relevant to the consideration of this aspect of the children’s welfare. Overall, the Local Authority care plans for A, B, D, E and I all represent a change of circumstances from living in the care of M in the long term. In the short to medium term, if A and B remain subject to care orders their final care plans would mean that they would stay in their current residential placements. As noted earlier, this would be very much against their wishes and feelings to return to their mother, so would potentially have an adverse impact on them as a long term change to their circumstances, but this has to be balanced against any risk of harm to them arising from any return to the care of M. For C, he would not experience any change of circumstances arising from his care plan if that is endorsed as in his welfare interests as he would remain living at home with M, but a Child In Need Plan would entail ongoing involvement of the Local Authority in his life. D would remain living with his current foster carers if his final care plan is endorsed. E would remain living in the care of G, but under a Special Guardianship Order, if his final care plan is endorsed. I would be placed for adoption if that is concluded to be in her welfare interests, which would mean that her legal relationship with her birth family would be severed. Direct contact with her birth family is not part of the final care plan for her so she would potentially suffer the loss of that connection, which both the social worker and Guardian acknowledged in their oral evidence to me could cause feelings of loss for her when she is older, but equally both gave evidence that this could be mitigated by quality life-story work and, in the case of the Guardian, that I would grow up knowing that she was adopted so it would not come as a sudden shock to her.

As I noted earlier, the headings of harm and parenting capability are inextricably linked in this case. F accepts that he is not capable of parenting I to a good enough standard and, to his credit is therefore not putting himself forward as a sole carer for her. His case, as put by Mr Brookes-Baker, referred to him ‘co-parenting’ I with M, but I note that the parenting assessment of F is negative and F’s own evidence made it clear that he accepted he would need to engage with substance abuse support, provide negative tests prior to spending any time with I, and have any time with I professionally supervised. He is thus a very long way from being able to ‘co-parent’ I with M and seemingly accepts that he poses a risk of significant harm to I arising from his substance misuse issues. It is also abundantly clear on the evidence before me that he poses a significant risk of harm arising from domestic abuse towards M. The threshold findings establish this as a starting point and there is no evidence of change by him that would reduce that risk to an acceptable level for I, I find. In fact, as the police evidence shows, as recently as 10^th May 2025, there was a domestic abuse incident when F was at M’s home. His inability to finish giving evidence in this final hearing was also a demonstration of his being unable to handle moments of heightened stress and his resultant anxiety in a way that would enable him to work constructively with professionals to reduce the risks arising from his volatility. It is also noteworthy that F accepts his various issues have meant that he has not seen I since October last year, despite the Local Authority and Guardian supporting this possibility for I. F’s limited evidence to me about his relationship with M was also concerning, I find. He told me that he only found out that he was no longer in a relationship with M recently. He thought that they remained in a relationship, despite M’s evidence that they were no longer together, and it was clear that he saw no problem in continuing to remain involved with M because of his relationship to I. I am satisfied on balance of probabilities that F is not capable of parenting I to a good enough standard and would pose a very high risk of significant harm to her arising from his substance misuse, volatility and domestic abuse issues. This risk of harm could be mitigated in the short-term if he were able to constructively engage with professionally supervised contact which would include the provision of negative samples prior to contact taking place. This is not, however, sustainable in the long-term as both the Guardian and Social Worker made clear in their evidence to me. It would also require F to actually engage, something he has failed to do since September last year.

In terms of M’s parenting capability there is a very comprehensive parenting assessment of her dated 9^th September 2024 (C186-C250), and an addendum dated 23^rd December 2024 (C306-C317). Both were conducted using the Parent Assess model, as required by the cognitive assessment of M produced in the previous proceedings (Old E9-E30). Ms Davies explored with both the social worker and the parenting assessor the extent to which they adapted their approach to explaining the outcome of the parenting assessment and addendum to M. It seems as if the parenting assessor took the lead on explaining the key points to M, and the summary reports generated for this purpose are appended to the assessment and addendum in the bundle. Ms Davies was critical of their evidence about this and submitted in closing that they did not ensure that M understood as recommended in the cognitive assessment. Ms Davies therefore also submitted that there is a fundamental flaw in the Local Authority case because neither the social worker nor the parenting assessor went through the teaching recommendations with M. However, the social worker and parenting assessor were both clear that they spent about an hour with the parenting assessor going through the summary of the report. That summary is produced in accordance with the Parent Assess model and guidelines, as recommended by the cognitive assessment of M (Old E-12). Both the social worker and parenting assessor were also clear that they were aware of the cognitive assessment of M and the need to check her understanding. The recommendations for working with M in the cognitive assessment were at Old E024-E25 and the relevant ones for the purposes of the parenting assessment were to use simply vocabulary, explain unfamiliar words, state one sentence/fact at a time, provide written information alongside spoken, repeat information/guidance/instruction several times, check her understanding of especially new or complex information by asking her what she has understood in her own words, and provide her with small chunks of information at a time. Using the summary reports after the main and addendum parenting assessment, as the parenting assessor described in her evidence, would have complied with these recommendations. M’s evidence to me about things like ensuring that the children got up on time for school, or went to necessary medical or dental appointments, showed that she thinks it is acceptable for an older child to refuse to do this. Based on M’s evidence to me, it is also clear that she knew what she had to address in relation to her parenting, the issue seems rather more to have been the extent to which M accepted that she had to change how she approached the areas of setting and enforcing boundaries, domestic abuse and substance misuse.

It is not in dispute that a referral to a domestic abuse course was made, and that M has had some work completed with a substance misuse programme, however Ms Davies questioned the social worker and parenting assessor about whether either of these were appropriate for M given her cognitive issues. Ms Davies also criticised the absence of any parenting course around boundaries for M. However, it is important to remember that the assessment of M’s parenting and the provision of support or teaching for her is also in the context of what happened at the conclusion of the previous proceedings and in light of the extent to which M accepted that she needed to make changes prior to and during these proceedings. It is clear to me from M’s own evidence and from what she has repeatedly told professionals that she does not accept that she is not capable of meeting the children’s basic dental, educational and medical needs. She repeatedly told me that she just couldn’t get the older children to go to appointments or school or college but accepted that the social worker could get them to go when the social worker asked them. She accepted that she had problems setting and enforcing boundaries, and that this had been an issue identified in the previous proceedings. She said that she would make sure that all of the children got up in time for school and would have support from family to do this, but the evidence of school attendance while the children were in her care shows that this simply did not happen.

M also told me that she usually gets up around mid-morning and accepted that her consumption of alcohol at weekends would make her sleepy but did not accept that this would mean that she would struggle to get up and take the children to school. It was not clear what family support she would have, since this was not identified during the parenting assessment beyond the possibility of the maternal grandfather assisting as he did with D in the past. However, on M’s own evidence the maternal grandfather has been seriously ill recently, and M is now a registered carer for him. There is also the concern, noted by the Guardian in his evidence to me and in his report at E188, that the maternal grandfather has now been involved in several attempts to undermine the placements of the children, thus participating in placing the children at risk. M did say in her oral evidence to me that her cousin or cousins would also be able to support her. It was not clear whether she was talking about one or more than one cousin, but she did say that one cousin in particular had children who were younger and attended one of the same schools as her children and would thus help with getting the children to that school. However, M also accepted when asked questions about this by Ms Wise that she had not spoken to this cousin or to any of her cousins. It is also not clear what had changed about these cousins or this cousin since the last proceedings when they were not identified as part of M’s support network, nor is it clear why M did not mention them when speaking to the parenting assessor. At best it therefore seems as if M hopes that her cousins may be able to help her, but this is not confirmed as being available in reality.

The evidence from the social worker was also clear that M simply does not accept that domestic abuse is an issue between her and F, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. M also does not accept that she has a problem with either alcohol or cocaine use. The issue around her addressing these concerns is therefore not one of failing to identify appropriate services, but rather her inability to accept that she does have these issues. To put it in terms that are often used by professionals in these sorts of proceedings, M has not yet accepted that she needs to make changes because she does not accept that these are issues and she is in the pre-contemplative state of change at the moment. If she were to move to the stage of accepting that she has these issues, and that she needs to make changes, then the question of signposting her to appropriate services would arise, but she is not yet at that point on the evidence before me, I find.

In terms of her ability to meet the dental, educational, social and emotional needs of the children, particularly those with additional needs, again she would need to accept that she has not been capable of meeting those needs in the past and currently. To her credit, she did work closely with intensive specialist support at the conclusion of the last proceedings. Sadly, despite that incredibly intensive and specialist support (10 hours a day for 3 months), M was not capable of sustaining change and, once that support was withdrawn at the end of the planned period, things very quickly deteriorated for the children in her care again. It was put on behalf of F by Mr Brookes-Baker that M may be able to care for I if she doesn’t have the other children in her care. Of course, this rather overlooks that M would also have C in her care and is not currently meeting his needs and there is thus a proposal for a Child In Need Plan for C. I have also noted that, as noted by the Guardian in his final analysis at E188, M herself does not pose a direct risk of harm to her children, the risk of harm arises from her lack of parenting capability and indirectly from her substance misuse and the domestic abuse issues in her relationship with F. Otherwise, as the Guardian told me in his evidence, she provides a clean house, one hot meal and day and clearly loves her children and displays appropriate warmth towards them. The social worker and Guardian were also very clear in their evidence to me that, to enable M to parent any child in her care to a good enough standard, would require support ‘24/7’, and that is simply unsustainable. As the Guardian pointed out, this would amount to whoever was providing that support effectively parenting instead of M, and that would not be in the welfare interests of children.

In relation to risk of harm, the issues around A and B absconding from their placements are also relevant. As submitted by Mr Pettit on their behalf, and noted earlier in this judgment, the court has to apply the considerations set out in Re F to the risks suggested for them. The type of risk for each is that they may abscond from residential placement; it is also that they may be exposed to significant risk of harm arising from substance misuse, neglect, and domestic abuse including the potential of being caught up in physical incidents. As the Guardian pointed out, A in particular may feel compelled to intervene in any domestic abuse incidents between M and F as both C and H have done at times (the latter by calling the police), but A lacks the skills that C has to defuse and deflect physical threats from F. Both would also be at risk of sexual harm arising from absconding. B is also apparently self-harming whilst in placement, so there is a risk of this continuing if she is not allowed to go home, though I do note that self-harming was an issue with M in 2023 (G9 police disclosure and C190 parenting assessment), and that this is something that was a concern in relation to H in the care of M in 2022 (CH24 chronology). Self-harming may also therefore be something that she has been exposed to in the care of M and could be triggered by other issues than not returning to M’s care.

There is a history of M failing to protect the children living with her from risk of sexual harm in her care, including failing to protect the children from direct exposure to risky individuals in their home. For B in particular, if the history in relation to H is taken into account and M’s failure to address this aspect of risk of harm is also considered, the same type of harm would arise for her whether she absconds from a residential placement or is in the care of M.

The Court also has to consider the likelihood of harm arising. For both A and B there is a strong likelihood of absconding based on their history in residential placements and their stated wishes and feelings, particularly B. There is also, however, a very strong likelihood of harm arising from substance misuse, domestic abuse, neglect and exposure to risky individuals in the care of M.

The consequences of harm are the next aspect to consider. If A and B were to be exposed to risk of harm arising from absconding, the consequences for either could be severe, potentially fatal, as the social worker accepted when questioned by Mr Pettit. Equally, chronic exposure to harm in the care of M would bring with it severe consequences for their long-term wellbeing and future prospects, including their ability to form healthy relationships and keep themselves safe from harmful influences in the future. In relation to the risk of harm from domestic abuse, the consequences of this, especially for A as noted by the Guardian, could also be severe and could include significant physical harm if A were to try to intervene when F was attacking M.

The Court has to then consider what risk reduction or mitigation could be implemented by way of support that could or would be available. For both A and B, they have now been placed in separate placements as part of reducing the risk of A absconding as a result of B encouraging him to do that. Similarly, B moved placement to reduce the risk of her being too close to home and this tempting her to simply go home. The social worker and Guardian both noted that either child could have absconded more frequently and returned home, but latterly B has simply gone as far as a local service station as a result of being encouraged by a resident who is no longer in her placement, and A has simply gone home when he has been closer to it as a result of spending time with C or seeing the Guardian. And, in any event, A has simply gone home without the need for the police to become involved as could have happened under the various Recovery Orders that have been granted for him. I do note, as was accepted by the social worker and Guardian, that B going to a service station which is therefore a transport hub does significantly increase the risk to her. However, the social worker was very clear that both children are engaging with support in the residential placements and forming good working relationships with staff there, and B has also returned to placement when found by staff, so these positive relationships with staff are likely to help to mitigate the risk arising from absconding. It is also positive that both are starting to engage with education, though the social worker and Guardian both accepted that this was extremely limited and likely to take considerable time to reach the point where either A or B were attending education as would meet their needs. However, the significance of this is that it may also be another mitigating factor making absconding less likely for them. In terms of risk mitigation if A and B were living with M, it is theoretically possible that support from the Local Authority under a Child In Need Plan or Supervision Order Support Plan could help to mitigate the risk around education provision as well as neglect of A and B’s medical needs. However, the history supports a conclusion that this is not likely to happen in reality and when one considers what is currently the position for C in the care of M. M told me that C has recently engaged with a support worker about either education or training, but she was not very clear about who this was or what work they were doing with C, and the Local Authority were adamant that this is not something that has come from their official support in this regard. On balance, what M was saying was not credible, so it seems as if C remains at home without any support around engaging with education or training.

I have also considered whether the risks of exposure to domestic abuse could be mitigated by any form of protective order, primarily a non-molestation order. Clearly, both M and F told me that they would comply with such an order. However, regardless of what they told me, the evidence in the bundle and their oral evidence to me strongly suggests that they would struggle to comply. The police evidence shows that, more often than not, it is other people including H who have called the police when F has assaulted M. M herself does not have a good record of calling the police when F poses a risk of domestic abuse to her, and she has also failed to report him to the police for breach of previous bail conditions when he has been at her house having been bailed to stay away (see for example G51). She did say in her statement at C439 that she had reported F in around March this year for breach of his bail conditions, but that was to the social worker not to the police who would be the ones to arrest him if there had been a breach. M and F both clearly told me during their oral evidence that they remain in touch with each other because of being I’s parents. Both clearly saw nothing wrong with this, despite the considerable history of concerns about domestic abuse and the volatility in their relationship. It is also not entirely clear if they have really ended their relationship or not at this point. M told me that they had been separated for several months now, but F told me that he only found out that the relationship was over when M told him recently. At the very least, this suggests that F saw no change in their relationship and thought they were still together based on M’s actions. F also told me that he was not sure what he wanted to happen about the relationship in the future, but that he wanted to ‘co-parent’ with M. Even if they are no longer in an intimate relationship, it seems more likely than not that they remain in close contact, with F supporting M to attend contact as both accepted had happened recently. Given the significant volatility and domestic abuse in their relationship, it seems very likely that even remaining in contact with each other risks them drinking together (as both accept they have done in the past), abusing substances (as F accepts he has done in the past and I have found that M has also done despite her denials), and for there to be further instances of domestic abuse. It is not credible that M would call the police to enforce a non-molestation order, or that she would consistently support a prosecution of F even if another person were to report a breach, such as H or C. The police evidence sadly demonstrates that the number of instances of her supporting prosecution of F are very few and far between. I am not therefore satisfied that a non-molestation order would provide the sort of protection from domestic abuse that the children would need were they to be placed with M.

Finally, a comparative evaluation of the welfare advantages and disadvantages of the realistic options for A and B has to be completed in accordance with Re F. This is also something that I will have to do as part of a holistic analysis of the realistic options for the other children too. In relation to A and B, living at home with M would be in accordance with their wishes and feelings, and would mean that they were at home with their brother and older sister too. It is not disputed in this case that all of the children share a very close, loving relationship with M and are incredibly close and loyal to her and each other. Living at home with M and their siblings would enable that close bond to continue. There is also unchallenged evidence that M is capable of meeting their basic needs for a clean home and adequate food. This would also be the case for the younger children if placed with M, though there is the concern noted about M’s ability to meet I’s basic nutritional needs as a very young baby it is not clear what this may mean for I as she grows older. However, the disadvantages of A and B being placed with M would be the continued risks arising from substance misuse, domestic abuse, and failure to ensure that their medical and educational needs are met. There is also the aspect of concern about her accommodation now. M told me that she has been living with the maternal grandfather because she is concerned about a camera in a neighbour’s garden pointed at her home. As the Guardian told me, the reason for that camera is because of issues of anti-social behaviour at M’s property. M does not dispute that the police have been called multiple times to her home, largely because of domestic incidents involving F, but there have also been issues with drinking and loud partying as the social worker and Guardian told me. M also accepted when questioned by Ms Wise that she is subject to a final warning from her housing provider as a result of antisocial behaviour. Her housing is therefore at risk if she fails to address the concerns of her housing provider and, on the evidence in these proceedings, it seems likely that she will fail to do so. If she remains living with the maternal grandfather, whether because her tenancy is revoked or because she chooses to stay there, as the Guardian told me that would mean her sharing one bedroom with C and H, and any other children who would be living with her and this would be unsustainable. I do note that the Local Authority would have a duty to house her, but I can take judicial notice of the fact that she would be unlikely to be a high priority case if she had lost her previous accommodation as a result of her own actions, and she may face a prolonged period on a waiting list. These disadvantages would also equally apply to the younger children, perhaps more so with E and I who are also likely to have increased medical and educational needs arising from their particular vulnerabilities. D may also have long-term increased educational needs if he does need an EHCP and already has short to medium term increased educational needs as a result of his working well below age-related expectations in some respects.

The social worker and Guardian both acknowledged that the balancing exercise for A and B was finely balanced. I agree that it is finely balanced. In fact, I would categorise it as being invidious for the children concerned since, whatever the outcome for A and B, the evidence clearly demonstrates that there is a risk of serious harm associated with either option of residential placement or return to the care of M. What tips the balance in my view is the engagement with staff and support in their residential placements, and the slow and admittedly early signs of positive engagement by each with education whilst in their placements. When this is balanced against the high risk, high likelihood and serious consequences potentially of remaining exposed to substance misuse, domestic abuse and inadequate parenting in the care of M including failure to meet their educational and dental needs, it means that I have concluded their welfare requires them to remain in a residential unit under the Local Authority care plan and with a final care order for each of them. The emotional need to maintain a relationship with M and their siblings can be met by contact as set out in the care plans for them. It was part of the cases put by M, A and B that contact needed to be more frequent that as set out on in those care plans. The evidence from the social worker about the impact on B of contact before and after, supports a conclusion that more frequent contact would be likely to have an adverse impact on B’s emotional wellbeing as well as risk destabilising her placement in the unit. In relation to A, the risks are also in relation to his emotional welfare and the stability of his placement but arise more from the potential for his family to seek to undermine that placement or from contact in the local area creating an opportunity for him to simply go home. In fact, since there are concerns about the maternal grandfather’s ability to work constructively with professionals at this point, and the impact on A of B’s influence about absconding, the ability of both the Local Authority and the residential placements to monitor that contact will also be in A and B’s welfare interests. I have borne in mind that endorsing a care plan for residential care does represent a significant interference with the article 8 rights of A and B, as well as those of their siblings and M and the most obvious demonstration of that will be around the restrictions placed on A and B (for example around B’s access to a mobile phone) and this includes the limitations of their ability to spend time with their family when they choose. However, this is a necessary and proportionate interference to ensure that they are not exposed to the significant risks and consequences of those risks in the care of M that I have noted earlier in this judgment. I have considered the submissions by Mr Pettit that, at A’s age and also for B, they are close to passing the maximum age for compulsory education and very close to the end of the period during which the Local Authority can share parental responsibility under a final care order. However, it is not as simple as looking at this as an arbitrary cut off for potential access to Local Authority and educational services, as the social worker told me since there is the potential for them to access care leaving services and support and in fact this can be beyond the age of 18.

Similarly, for C, I have considered the two realistic options for him which are no order and not to endorse the final care plan, or no order and to endorse the final care plan of a Child In Need Plan for him. The latter will mean that the Local Authority will continue to intervene in his life, and this will be an interference with his article 8 rights. Again, this is a proportionate and necessary interference to try to ensure that his medical, psychological and educational needs are met, though the latter may now relate more to his ability to engage with training or employment given his age.

For D, the final care plan is one of long-term foster care. His realistic options are therefore either to return to the care of M, or to remain in foster care for the long term. Fortunately, his current foster carers would be able to care for him if I endorse the final care plan for him so this would not involve a move to a new placement, though I do note that there are some inherent potential instabilities involved in foster care which can include a foster carer unexpectedly not being able to continue to care despite initial intentions. It also brings with it the same sort of ongoing involvement from the Local Authority that I have noted above applies to placement options for his siblings. It would enable his needs to be met consistently and to a good enough standard, and I have also paid particular attention to the evidence from the Guardian about the adverse impact on D of being exposed to the sort of ‘chaos’ that happens during family time. It seems clear that D needs consistent, calm and attuned parenting that protects him from this sort of chaos and that the contact plans for him will also achieve this whilst meeting his emotional and identity needs for ongoing contact with his family, I find. Returning D to the care of his mother risks his needs not being met again, and his suffering and continuing to suffer significant harm as happened prior to his removal. On balance, the final care plan for D is therefore in his welfare interests.

The options for E are either to return to the care of M, or to remain in the care of G under a special guardianship order. Return to the care of M would risk his needs not being met and again carry a high risk of continued exposure to significant harm arising from the identified risks of substance misuse, domestic abuse, his educational, medical and additional needs not being met to a good enough standard. The Local Authority now agrees with the Guardian’s recommendations for contact for him with his siblings and his mother, though both accept that it would be a matter for his special guardian to manage that contact and they are not seeking any order to govern these arrangements and nor is G. As a special guardian, G will have priority parental responsibility for him which also means that she will have the final say on the contact that is safe for E with his birth family. E will still be able to spend time with his birth family, organised by his proposed special guardian, and this will meet his emotional and identity needs for the future, I find. An SGO is in his welfare interests.

In relation to I, the realistic options for her are either to return to the care of M or adoption. She is too young for long-term foster care to be a realistic option and, to be fair, M did not seek to argue that this is a realistic option for her. Return to the care of M will expose her to the risks I have identified above in relation to her siblings being cared for by M. In addition, she may have additional needs arising from M’s consumption of alcohol and cocaine whilst pregnant, which may make it even more important that I’s medical needs are met. There is simply no evidence that M has been or will be capable of meeting the medical needs of any child in her care, and this would expose I to high risk of her medical needs being neglected in a way that mean she does not access any treatment or support that she may need. She needs stability and certainty, and I have noted the risks in terms of M’s accommodation above. Adoption is the most draconian public law outcome, as it would completely sever I’s relationship with her birth family. This would also impact on her emotionally and psychologically as the social worker and Guardian accepted. However, as I have also already noted this can be mitigated by quality life-story work. It is also not beyond the bounds of possibility that any prospective adopters for her may be willing to consider some form of direct contact in the future when I is older since, as the Guardian pointed out, adopters are encouraged to think about it. However, there is a risk of her adoptive placement being destabilised by ongoing direct contact post adoption, especially if it is with M and F given their respective issues and inability to accept the depth of those issues. Ms Davies did ask the Guardian about the potential for I to seek out her birth family and the ease with which she would be able to find information about them given the circumstances of the death of M’s first partner. In this day and age, it is relatively easy for many adopted children to access information about their birth family online, often through social media. This risk can be mitigated by good quality life-story work and also by ensuring stability and permanence for I sooner rather than later. Delay in securing stability and permanency may affect her ability to form a strong bond with prospective adopters, something that a court can take judicial notice of, and there is nothing to suggest in this particular case that I is not currently capable of forming such a strong attachment to her permanent carers and that this could thus also provide a protective factor were she to wish to seek out information about her birth family in the future. Adoption is therefore in I’s best interests and is the only realistic option for her to ensure her long-term welfare. It is therefore in her welfare interests to dispense with parental consent to the making of a placement order.

In terms of the orders that I will make in the welfare interests of the children concerned, they are as follows given my findings above:

On 29 February 2023 in [previous proceedings] the court found the children to have suffered harm as set out below. The parenting the children receive has not changed enough and there are ongoing risks of this harm to the children. The ongoing risks are detailed at paragraphs 2 to 5.

C, A, B, D and E continue to have their educational needs neglected by their mother.

The children’s health needs are being neglected:

C, A, B, D, E and I are at risk of exposure to dysfunctional family relationships, aggressive behaviours and/or substance misuse. This risks their emotional health as domestic abuse is harmful to children and also their physical health if caught in the crossfire or have direct exposure to substances:

M presented late for ante-natal care. Despite wider family being aware of pregnancy in November 2023 M did not attend hospital until 30 January 2024 8 weeks prior to I’s birth. (Page 30 hospital notes) (A28) (TVP122, TVP123, TV113 Body worn footage in consolidated proceedings).

M did not wake I for feeds during the night resulting in her entering the faltering growth pathway. (consolidated proceedings- E2)