F v M

This case concerns two boys, S who is eight years old and T who is ten years old.

M is the children’s mother. She was born in China. Around twenty-two years ago, M came to England to complete her university studies and remained living here. She has since renounced her Chinese citizenship. F is their father. He is from Northern Ireland and lives with his partner X in London.

The parties married in 2014. They lived together in Surrey. F worked in London during the week.

The parties’ separated around 2016/2017 although there are also references to it being in 2019. Whatever the position, the separation was acrimonious leading to proceedings relating to financial matters which were ultimately resolved by agreement and an application by M for F to pay private school fees which ended when F lost his job which rendered the application pointless. The parties’ divorce was finalised in 2021.

After the parties separated, the children lived with M and spent every other weekend and half of their holidays with F. This arrangement ended in August 2023 when M stopped contact with the children following an allegation that F had hit them.

This led to an assessment by the local authority which was completed in October 2023. It concluded that there was “no concern for children services to continue to be involved” and the case was closed. The local authority advised the parents “to seek mediation support to address their acrimonious relationship which will continue to affect both children emotionally if this is not addressed.”

Just prior to the local authority’s report, the father issued these proceedings. He sought a child arrangements order “to restore and maintain parental access for my two children… to allow them to continue their relationship with their father.”

Based on F’s application, the court agreed to the instruction of an independent social worker to make recommendations about the arrangements for the children. The report recommended that the children live with M and set out times for the children to spend with F.

The direction of the case changed at a hearing in September 2024 when M applied for permission to take the children to live in Thailand for two years.

M said that her parents lived in Beijing, they were ill, required medical treatment and she needed to look after them. The order made by the court at that hearing noted about the relocation to Thailand that “on confirming that her parents live in Beijing she said the relocation was for educational reasons.”

F opposed the application. An order was made prohibiting M from removing the children from this country and directions were made at subsequent hearings to progress the case to a final hearing of what was now far more contentious litigation.

The parties were given permission to obtain a report from another independent social worker (the first one being unavailable) to consider the relocation application. Orders were also made to allow the children to spend time with F meanwhile.

The independent social worker filed her report in April 2025. It was not in favour of permitting relocation.

At a hearing in April 2025 shortly after the report was served, M abandoned her application for the children to accompany her. Instead, she would go to live with her parents in China for twelve to eighteen months to assist them with medical treatment and general care. However, M wanted the children to visit her. The court therefore gave permission for an expert in Chinese family law to be instructed.

In May 2025, M sought permission to travel to China with the children on holiday for five weeks in July/August 2025.

At the start of the hearing, I was informed that it had been agreed between the parties that the children would live with F whilst M is in China and that on her return, the parties would discuss future arrangements for the children.

The main issue at the hearing was whether M should be given permission to take the children to China for a holiday. Other issues were who should hold the children’s passports and video contact the children would have with M when she is in China.

The parties were represented by experienced Counsel instructed by equally experienced solicitors. I am grateful to the parties’ legal representatives for the professional and thorough way this matter was presented to the court.

A main and supplementary bundle were prepared for the hearing which I have read as well as the parties’ opening and closing written submissions. I am satisfied that I have everything that I need to reach a decision. In doing so, I have considered everything that I have read and been told. This judgment therefore is the court’s decision on the various issues between the parties.

It is convenient at this point to say something about the relevant law.

The starting point is that when making its decision, the court must apply the principles set out in the Children Act 1989.

Section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989 provides that:

“(1)

When a court determines any question with respect to—

(a)

the upbringing of a child; or

(b)

the administration of a child’s property or the application of any income arising from it,

the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration.”

Section 1(3) sets out matters to which the court must have regard, known as the welfare checklist, namely:

“(3)

In the circumstances mentioned in subsection (4), a court shall have regard in particular to—

(a)

the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding);

(b)

his physical, emotional and educational needs;

(c)

the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances;

(d)

his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court considers relevant;

(e)

any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering;

(f)

how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs;

(g)

the range of powers available to the court under this Act in the proceedings in question.”

I remind myself that where I am required to find facts, the burden of proof is the civil standard, namely the balance of probabilities. As Lord Hoffman said in Re B (Children) (2008) UKHL 3520):

“…If a legal rule requires a fact to be proved (a “fact in issue”), a judge or jury must decide whether or not it happened. There is no room for a finding that it might have happened. The law operates a binary system in which the only values are 0 and 1. The fact either happened or it did not. If the tribunal is left in doubt, the doubt is resolved by a rule that one party or the other carries the burden of proof. If the party who bears the burden of proof fails to discharge it, a value of 0 is returned and the fact is treated as not having happened. If he does discharge it, a value of 1 is returned and the fact is treated as having happened”.

Turning to relocation, the starting point must be the wise words of Lord Justice Thorpe in in Re N (Leave to Remove) [2006] 2 FLR 1124:

“I would also observe that [the judge] looked at the balancing exercise very much through adult eyes. He has looked to the concerns of the father, the trustworthiness of the mother; there does not seem to have been much regard to the outcome though the eyes of the child.”

The leading authority is Re R (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 1115 where the court considered a request to take a child to Kenya for a holiday and where Kenya was not a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children 1996 (“the Hague Convention”).

Lord Justice Patten observed in connection with removal to a non-Hague Convention country that:

“23.

The overriding consideration for the court in deciding whether to allow a parent to take a child to a non-Hague Convention country is whether the making of that order would be in the best interests of the child. Where (as in most cases) there is some risk of abduction and an obvious detriment to the child if that risk were to materialise, the court has to be positively satisfied that the advantages to the child of her visiting that country outweigh the risks to her welfare which the visit will entail. This will therefore routinely involve the court in investigating what safeguards can be put in place to minimise the risk of retention and to secure the child's return if that transpires. Those safeguards should be capable of having a real and tangible effect in the jurisdiction in which they are to operate and be capable of being easily accessed by the UK-based parent. Although, in common with Black LJ in Re M we do not say that no application in this category can proceed in the absence of expert evidence, we consider that there is a need in most cases for the effectiveness of any suggested safeguard to be established by competent and complete expert evidence which deals specifically and in detail with that issue. If in doubt the Court should err on the side of caution and refuse to make the order. If the judge decides to proceed in the absence of expert evidence, then very clear reasons are required to justify such a course.”

Referring to comments made in Re K (Removal from the Jurisdiction: Practice) (1999) 1 FLR 1084, Lord Justice Patten added that:

“…applications for temporary removal to a non-Convention country will inevitably involve consideration of three related elements:

a)

the magnitude of the risk of breach of the order if permission is given;

b)

the magnitude of the consequence of breach if it occurs; and

c)

the level of security that may be achieved by building into the arrangements all of the available safeguards.

It is necessary for the judge considering such an application to ensure that all three elements are in focus at all times when making the ultimate welfare determination of whether or not to grant leave.”

It is also worth mentioning comments by Mr Justice Peel in CD -v- EF [2021] EWHC 955 (Fam), namely:

“35.

It seems to me that the same approach applies in connection with removal to a Hague Convention country save that each of the three identified related elements will ordinarily be substantially answered by the availability of the Hague Convention procedure. The magnitude of risk of breach of the order is reduced because of the availability of the Hague Convention procedure, which should ensure a swift return. The magnitude of the consequence of the breach will be reduced by the ability to apply for, and obtain, a prompt return. And available safeguards may be less necessary because of the applicability of the Convention.”

I was also referred to the decision of Mr Justice Baker (as he then was) in WO -v- RO, DO and BO [2017] EWHC 858 (Fam) where a mother from China unsuccessfully sought permission to take the children to China on holiday and decisions in Re K (Removal from Jurisdiction:Practice) [1999] 2 FLR 1084 and Re M (A Child) (Prohibited Steps Order) [2013] EWCA Civ 1115.

I turn now to the evidence.

Mr Jason Tian is an attorney in China who provided an opinion on Chinese family law as it relates to this matter. His report was not challenged and he did not give evidence.

The report is detailed and I do not propose to repeat its contents in detail.

Mr Tian advised that if neither party were habitually resident in China, the Chinese courts would have no jurisdiction. However, if M were in China with the children for a year, she could be considered to have habitual residence and the courts would then have jurisdiction.

He explained the ways by which F could apply for “care and control” of the children. The courts would apply a best interests test and “assess and compare the respective conditions of both parents.”He opined that:

“As to the likelihood of success by the Applicant father, in both cases, if the Respondent mother has stayed in China for up to one year and kids are going to school normally, it is fair to say they have settled in the new living environment, it is no [sic] easy for the applicant father to succeed in getting awarded with care and control of the kids, unless the Applicant father could prove that it is detrimental to the kids’ wellbeing to live with the Respondent mother, or the kid(s) whose age is above 8 years old wishes to live with Applicant father, provided that the Applicant father has the ability to raise the kid(s).”

There was no time frame for any litigation in a “foreign-related case” although the courts would strive to complete a case in six to twelve months. The cost would be around £8000 to £10,000 depending on the lawyers instructed.

It is not possible to obtain mirror orders to reflect orders made in our courts as they are not recognised by the Chinese courts and China is not a party to the Hague Convention. Regarding enforcement, orders from our courts are not recognised and “Sluggish judicial enforcement involving family judgments is still a chronical problem in China.”

Safeguards could be put in place such as the parties agreeing to the jurisdiction of the Chinese courts prior to the establishment of habitual residence and M agreeing to cede “custody, care and control” of the children to F in case she does not return to this country. However, the various safeguards provided “no guarantee of a smooth return…because enforcement by the …father of the winning judgment made by a Chinese court may still face uncertainty in judicial practice…”

I have mentioned the two welfare reports prepared in this case by independent social workers.

The first was by Ms JI in April 2024 and which dealt with child arrangements. She was not called to give evidence.

The second was by Ms VW in April 2025. She gave oral evidence at the hearing. This report addressed M’s substantive application for permission to take the children to Thailand for two years. As I have said, she came down against permitting the relocation.

I shall refer to some parts of her report although that should not be taken as affording those parts prominence over other parts of the report.

Ms VW observed that there was “no stability in contact arrangements at this time.”

She went on to observe that:

“[T] and [S] are aware of their Maternal Grandparents health needs is significant detail. They are passionate about the grandparent’s need for treatment and aftercare and believe without question that their mother needs to care for them. [T] feels strongly that he, [S] and his mother should leave to travel to China without delay to provide that care and that his father is stopping them from leaving. [T] speaks of his mother crying regularly due to her upset at not being with her parents to provide the support before now.

30.

[T] and [S] are too young to understand complex adult feelings and it is emotionally harmful to them to be so involved in their mother’s feelings. They appear to have wholly accepted her view on the matter and see their father as a barrier to their mother being a good child to her own parents. Both children appear to be scared for their Maternal Grandparent’s safety, believing their Maternal Grandfather to be at imminent risk of death. The children’s young age and the amount of adult information they are holding and the views they are keeping are not appropriate and as a result they are experiencing fear, worry and upset, plus anger - particularly with their father.

31.

[T] and [S] do not have the emotional development to understand adult feelings and do not have the skills to process this information effectively.”

Ms VW noted that:

“164.

[T] and [S] have been exposed to parental acrimony that despite considerable professional intervention and recommendations remains. This negative emotional basis for the current parental relationship is well known to [T] and [S] and their emotions are negatively impacted by it.”

She recommended that the children would be “better supported” living with F and X.

Regarding M being a flight risk:

“185.

…There is past experience of mother removing [T] and [S] from China to Thailand without informing father. Weighing up all aspects it is my view that there remains a flight risk and mother should therefore have direct contact with the children in the UK. I am aware this jeopardises the children’s opportunity to spend time with their Maternal Grandparents, however, I am advised that typically they are engaged with their grandparents by mother sharing her video calls with them and translating for the family and this nature of contact can continue…”

By the time Ms VW gave her oral evidence, M’s position had changed such that the issue before the court was M’s application to take the children to China for the summer holiday.

In her oral evidence, Ms VW said that she continued to be concerned for the children; M shared a lot of detail with the children and was keen for them to make decisions themselves especially regarding time spent with F.

She accepted that M was working hard to provide reassurance about the children going to China although she also noted that the Chinese legal system was “sluggish”. Her concern was that the children might not have the “emotional strength or conviction they need” to return to F. M also gave mixed messages about her return to this country and whether she would stay with her parents until they died. Taking the children to Thailand in 2024 without F’s consent was concerning.

Ms VW recommended that M spend four weeks in this country with the children during the summer and F would spend two weeks with them. M should have indirect contact with the children when she was in China twice during the week and once or twice at the weekend. Her position based on welfare considerations though remained that the children should not go to China this summer.

Both parents filed statements and gave oral evidence.

F said that he was opposed to the children going on holiday with M to China. He referred to M as saying one thing and doing another even to professionals. He regarded her as a “flight risk” and referred to her breach of previous orders and not being open with the court. There was no guarantee a trip to China would be temporary. He did not accept that safeguards offered by M were adequate. F referred to a recent incident on 2 June 2025 when M’s behaviour was unacceptable and abusive and when she did not hand over the children to him.

M did not accept that she would not return the children to this country after their trip to China. She had given up her Chinese passport a long time ago and had a long connection going back over twenty years with this country where she had settled; she owned property in London and had her social network in this country. Apart from her parents, she had no real connection to China. M wanted the children to be educated in this country.

I turn now to my conclusions.

I have said that Mr Tain and Ms JI were not called to give evidence. Mr Tain’s report was thorough and very helpful. Ms JI’s report was also useful as it provided yet another independent view about the family and corroborated some of Ms VW’s observations.

I found Ms VW’s report and evidence to be thorough and based solely on welfare considerations. It is a report upon which the court can rely upon. I am satisfied that her conclusions are soundly based.

I was unimpressed with M. I do not believe that she was open with the court. I found her overall approach and behaviour to be concerning and not child focused.

First, M has breached court orders and recitals approved by the court in orders without any proper explanation.

On 14 June 2024, the court recorded and approved the parties’ agreement for M to take the children to China for five weeks in the summer holidays. The approved arrangements also provided for the children to have facetime contact with F once a week.

An order made on 9 September 2024 recorded what transpired. Facetime contact happened only twice on an “ad hoc” basis. M also took the children to Thailand during the trip to China without F’s consent.

M did not acknowledge that the indirect contact had not properly taken place even though it was an established fact. Worse still, her story as to how the Thailand trip came about was the clearest evidence that M felt that she could do as she liked and that court orders did not somehow matter.

M’s story was somewhat muddled and referred to her parents having booked a trip to Thailand and the hotel cost not being refundable. This all ignored the basic fact that she travelled to Thailand without F’s consent and without even mentioning it to him until after the event. She offered no proper explanation for this.

Whilst in Thailand, the children also visited schools. M suggested that the children saw the school just behind a shopping mall they were visiting and wanted to see it. They seem to have then just chanced upon someone who could give them a guided tour and who then referred them to other schools to visit. I viewed M’s account of what transpired not only as complete nonsense but also thoroughly dishonest. I am in no doubt that the visit was planned.

On 17 April 2025, M was ordered to drop off the children’s “belongings” to the F. She has failed to comply with that order. When asked about this in cross-examination, she did not even apologise for the breach of the court order; she simply said that “essential things” had been provided.

Second, there are clearly issues with M ensuring that the children spend time with F for which M gave no clear explanation.

The basis for F’s application to the court was that contact was abruptly stopped in August 2023. However, even in proceedings, contact remains an issue.

Prior to the trip to China in the summer of 2024, the children did not see F for some weeks between 14 June and 23 July 2024.

The children left for China on 23 July and returned on 4 September 2024 when they did not see F until 17 November after arrangements were put in place and ordered by the court at a hearing on 6 November 2025. The court’s order (presumably approved by the judge a few days later) contained a recital that following the hearing, M had not complied with the court’s order for spending time arrangements on 9 November, a mere three days after the hearing.

Third, professionals involved with the family have raised concerns not only about the parental acrimony but also about M involving the children in adult matters, the children’s alignment with her and her general attitude.

M did not accept these views but the evidence is clear that M does not promote the F to the children in any meaningful way. Indeed, having seen M give evidence and given the professional evidence, my concern is that M has that she has tried to influence the children to her way of thinking. This was particularly evident from the children’s attitude to the father stopping them travelling with M.

In a Child and Family Assessment in November 2023, the local authority said that:

“[T] and [S] initially presented as quite reserved but were also able to share their wishes and feelings regarding contact. Neither demonstrated any interest in seeing their father any time soon, and although reference was made by [T] about [S] being hit in the past, he shared no significant concerns, and there appeared to be no great reason other than the boy's showing allegiance to their mother, and the boys not being emotionally connected to their father.”

Ms JI’s report in April 2024 recorded:

“The school noted concerns with regards to the parents' relationship quite early on. In March 2020, [S] expressed confusion around his parents not living together, and also felt he was 'letting his mother down’ by spending time with his father.”

The report also noted that:

“22…They also said they were annoyed that their mother had to 'pay to stay in the house' after the parents' separation and [F] wouldn't pay for their school fees, and they were aware of this as their mother told them.

23.

… I found it concerning that the children seemed to be using language which I would deem unusual for their ages, specifically commenting on concerns around lack of supervision and being unacceptable.. This is indicative that the children have been exposed to adult conversations regarding their care in their father. It is also of note that [T] did not disclose any physical harm perpetrated by his father; and [S] recalled one incident, whereby [M] has reported multiple and repeated incidents. It is also my assessment that [M] has discussed the conflict between the parents with the children, as they are aware of issues within their relationship that they would be unlikely to remember or note, from when the parents lived together, such as [F] not helping with the housework, and issues around the family property. I am concerned the children are being exposed to adult conversations and insights into the breakdown of their parents' relationship and finances, by [M].”

Ms VW made similar observations:

“30.

[T] and [S] are too young to understand complex adult feelings and it is emotionally harmful to them to be so involved in their mother’s feelings. They appear to have wholly accepted her view on the matter and see their father as a barrier to their mother being a good child to her own parents. Both children appear to be scared for their Maternal Grandparent’s safety, believing their Maternal Grandfather to be at imminent risk of death. The children’s young age and the amount of adult information they are holding and the views they are keeping are not appropriate and as a result they are experiencing fear, worry and upset, plus anger - particularly with their father. …

126.

If mother is to be believed she has shared very little with the children about her parents, however, the language the children use is almost identical to their mother’s. The children demonstrate great worry for the wellbeing of their grandparents; indeed they are both of the view that without their mother attending their needs urgently they may die. It is my view that the children have received far too much information, that which is suitable for adults and wholly unsuitable for children so young. They are emotionally harmed by this knowledge and live with fears for their beloved grandparents.

127.

[S] maintains he was hit by his father. Father maintains he did not hit [S], while mother maintains that he did. Previous professionals have considered the matter and concluded [S] will not come to harm in his father’s care and since the original allegation no new allegation has been made. I do not seek to re-examine the matter, satisfied with the recommendations of previous professionals. However, I do acknowledge [S] is experiencing anxiety around contact with his father. [F] seeks to do what he can to heal the relationship with [S] and acknowledges the process will likely be slow. [F] has been open to discussion as part of his engagement with this report on ways he can support [S] in transitions and in their time together. Were family coaching or therapy to become necessary [F] states a commitment to attend.

128.

With commitment by both parents to put the past behind them and focus on what is best for [S]’s current emotional needs, the history can become just that and [S] and his father can move forward. This requires mother to be willing to support the process and no longer pertain to the past or the need for apology. As well as removing choice from the process. I acknowledge this change will be difficult for her, however, I do not doubt her wish for[S] to feel safe and be happy and with her taking the lead in this new era through authority and clear messaging [S] can begin to trust the consistent and unified approach of his parents and can develop into a more settled and positively predictable experience.”

Fourth, M’s view of F was negative.

When asked in cross-examination if he was a good father, she only replied that he was a “good person”. She said later that he could be a good father if he put more effort into it. M was concerned that she did not think the children would get the best care living with F although he was capable. This did not explain though how M justified leaving the children with him for so long whilst she was in China.

Fifth, the incident on 2 June 2025 just prior to the hearing said much about M.

The children were to stay with F on 31 May for a few days. There were problems with S and F suggested to M that the children sleep at her home on 1 June and return to F the following day, 2 June to sleep.

The handover on 2 June produced conflicting versions of what happened.

F maintained that M arrived late in the evening at 8.45pm and had not responded to messages earlier that day. When he answered to door, M walked off down the street with the children following her. F was wearing slippers, so he waited for them although it transpired that they were round the corner of the building on the other side of the street. When he went to collect the children to return to his flat, M spoke abusively to him because he did not follow them down the street. M was not firm with S by telling him to go with F and ultimately, the children went home with M. They did not go to school the following day although M did not tell F.

M disputed F’s version of events. She did not swear at F but was frustrated as she had waited an hour in the rain for F because as she put it, he did not want to get his slippers wet.

I preferred F’s version of events. I do not accept that M stood outside in the rain for an hour. I also saw no reason why M should have given in to the children and taken them back with her. There was also no proper explanation why they did not attend school the next day and why M did not promptly inform F of that fact. This episode seemed to fit with the concerns about M raised by professionals about her parenting. It also said much about her attitude to F and how the children found themselves again in the middle of parental conflict.

I found F’s evidence to be given honestly and trying to assist the court as much as possible.

I disagree with Counsel for M that F’s evidence comprised frail assertions that did not stand up to scrutiny. F’s evidence had to be taken together. It was comprised of a number of threads of concern which together amounted to a worrying whole.

F was clearly perturbed by events such as the unauthorised trip to Thailand, the lack of adherence to contact arrangements, the professional concerns about M and her parenting and how M had taken the children to visit schools in Thailand. It was clear to me that taking his overall concerns together, F was genuinely concerned that a trip to China for the children would be one way only.

F maintained that M made false allegations about him hitting the children. I have referred to the local authority’s report of events and its conclusion. I make no finding on this matter although I take note of the comments made by Ms VW about this incident.

Turning to the welfare checklist, Ms VW’s report addressed this based on a relocation to Thailand for two years. However, her observations are relevant to the proposed holiday in China.

In terms of a proposed holiday in China, my view is that the children would welcome the opportunity to visit their grandparents. They are aware of the grandparents’ situation and health issues and would want to see them and be with M.

Whilst on holiday, I have not seen anything to suggest that M would not be able to address the children’s physical needs anymore than F being able to address those needs in this country if the children remained with him during the summer. Educational needs are not relevant during the summer holidays.

The parental conflict and in particular the deficits in M’s parenting identified by professionals such as involving the children in adult matters, allowing the children to make choices and her attitude towards F are such that the children’s emotional needs are not met by either parent, M taking a larger share of the blame. These matters have also caused emotional harm to the children and reflect on the parents’ capability to offer stable and secure parenting to the children. I regard M as being more responsible than F for this situation.

In the context of a holiday in China, I would not be satisfied that M would ensure that the children were in contact with F. I refer to my view of M and issues with contact in the past. I am satisfied that if the children remained with F during the holidays, that he would facilitate contact with M. I am also concerned that M might influence the children to remain with her in China and that they would not have the emotional strength to resist that suggestion.

In the normal course of events, it could hardly be said that there was a recognisable change of circumstances in terms of a holiday in China; being in a foreign country would be exciting and fun for the children as well as educational and an opportunity to see family. If the children were not returned to this country though, it would be a dramatic change of their circumstances not necessarily in their welfare interests. I am satisfied that in that scenario, they would be shut off from any meaningful connection with F.

Being mixed white British and Chinese boys (Footnote: ¹), a trip to China would be beneficial as the boys could immerse themselves in the culture of M’s birth country and her family. Equally though, a trip to Ireland would offer the same about F’s family and culture. The children are also at an age where a trip to China would help to shape their general worldview.

Standing back at this point, as a starting point, it would seem that a trip to China for a few weeks in the summer would be beneficial for the children and is something they would want to do. However, the court needs to examine whether anything takes this case away from this starting point.

I have referred to the legal approach required; I therefore turn to the first limb being that if permission for the trip to China were given, what is the magnitude of the risk of breach of an order that at the end of the holiday the children must return to this country.

M maintains that there is a low risk of her retaining the children in China.

As I have mentioned, she refers to the fact that she has lived in this country for twenty years; she has a long-standing and deep rooted connection to this country; she owns property in London; her children, her friends and social network are all in this country. Moreover, she has a good professional and social reputation which she would not put at risk by committing a potentially criminal act nor would she want to expose herself to being in contempt of court; she is no longer a Chinese citizen; her parents are her only connection with China; she has no motive for wanting to move to China which is not a place where she would want to raise the children; she has never planned to take the children to live in China preferring Thailand; she promotes F’s relationship with the children and denied being a flight risk. M also denied making false allegations about F as the allegation of hitting the children came from them.

However, set against what M says is my view of M. She has not been open to the court. She has breached orders or reneged on a position that was accepted by the court as recited in its orders. This includes taking the children to Thailand without permission. She has denied the children their belongings in the face of a court order telling her to give them to the children and instead came up with various excuses to suggest that she had complied with the order which were untenable. I also refer to the professional views of the deficits in her parenting. In this regard, Ms VW’s report is compelling as are similar comments made by Ms JI.

The events of 2 June 2025 and the failure to observe contact arrangements demonstrate an unwillingness to promote contact between the children and F. M’s view of F made her attitude towards him very clear. Yet it is remarkable that despite this view of F, M is apparently willing to leave the children with him in favour of staying with her parents for the next year or two. I accept that the Chinese culture places some constraint on M having to care for her elderly parents although given her poor view of F and his abilities as a parent, I really struggle to understand how she is prepared to leave the children behind. Given what must be a scant regard on the part of M for the court’s orders and authority and her general lack of openness and honesty, this raises a real question as to her true intentions.

I accept that M has given up her Chinese citizenship and has ties with this country. But I also remind myself that the evidence suggests that ultimately, M will do as she pleases.

In my judgment, I conclude that there is a very high risk that she would not return the children at the end of the holiday. I have no faith that she would respect any order made by this court. The concerns of F cannot be disregarded given the recent history of this family. Put simply, the M said nothing to assure me that she would respect any order made by the court or the F’s position as the father of her children.

The second matter to address is the magnitude of the consequences of a breach of a court order that the children must be returned to this country after the holiday.

There is no doubt in my mind that the consequences of breach of an order would be immense and result in the children not returning to this country until such time (if ever) that M brought them back because it suited her to do so.

China is not a signatory to the Hague Convention which means that if F issued proceedings in the High Court for the return of the children, there is no guarantee that the order would be respected and enforced.

I also refer Mr Tain’s report. He makes it clear that there is no basis for a mirror order being obtained in China to reflect orders made in this country to ensure the children returned after the holiday. I also refer again to the fact that the Chinese courts might not have jurisdiction for twelve months until M was habitually resident in China which would presumably leave a vacuum where a situation could arise whereby the Chinese courts would not deal with any application made by the F to return the children to this country and any High Court order would not be respected or able to be enforced.

Moreover, if and when the Chinese courts did assume jurisdiction, they would treat the case afresh and consider what was in the children’s best interests based on Chinese family law principles. This would not necessarily be a quick process and there would be no guarantee that F would succeed. Mr Tain’s report seemed to suggest that it would be an uphill struggle at the very least for F. I understand him to mean that there would be a small chance of success for F.

Of course, litigation is also expensive; although M says that F could afford High Court litigation (and I have not seen evidence if he can or cannot so I make no finding), that ignores the point that if litigation were commenced in China, F would have to pay for Chinese lawyers and attend court there which must be expensive. Mr Tain said that his hourly rate for a law firm in Shanghai was £450 per hour. Litigation in this country is also costly.

Thus far, what emerges from the evidence therefore is that if M failed to return the children at the end of the summer, F would be faced with the uncertainty of the Chinese courts accepting jurisdiction and if they did, the uncertain outcome of any proceedings which would take time and cost money by which time, the Chinese courts could well conclude that the children were settled in China and it was in their best interests to remain there. Any proceedings in this country would also be unlikely to yield any result. Enforcement of any order made by the Chinese courts in favour of F might also yield no result.

The expert report offered some solutions to try and ameliorate the situation. I have referred to them but repeat them given their importance. These included the parties agreeing that the Chinese courts have jurisdiction immediately, M agreeing to cede to F the “custody, care and control” of the children if she did not return them, placing the children’s passports in the custody of a third party and M agreeing to pay all legal costs if F had to take legal action. However, Mr Tian accepted that these arrangements were “no guarantee of a smooth return of the kids back to UK because enforcement by the Applicant father or the winning judgment made by a Chinese court may still face uncertainty in judicial practice..”

Accordingly, if M did not return the children at the end of the holiday, the result for F would be a disaster. The children would remain in China and in my view, there would only be a slim chance that they would return to this country after the court process.

The third matter to address is the level of security that may be achieved and built into arrangements to allow the children to travel to China.

M offered a number of safeguards, some just before the start of the hearing.

First, she offered a bond as security for a period of two years by way of providing an executed transfer form for her flat in London in favour of F if she did not return the children within six weeks of any agreed return date. I was told the flat is worth £800,000 although no evidence of valuation was provided.

Second, she offered safeguards as suggested by Mr Tian which I have set out already.

F’s position was that these were inadequate safeguards. Her property could be sold, transferred or remortgaged rendering it valueless or useless, in the period between the children leaving this country and six weeks after their return date. He also did not accept that the additional safeguards which included acceding to the jurisdiction of the Chinese courts would be acceptable as those courts do not recognise orders made in our courts and would therefore start proceedings afresh with the uncertainties of litigation that I have mentioned.

I agree with F. The safeguards suggested by Mr Tian are not acceptable; even Mr Tain doubted their likely practical success. I have also explained why proceedings in China offer no guarantee of anything. Given my view of M, I do not accept that a transfer held in escrow pending the children’s return would be of value. I have no faith that M would act honourably. I accept F’s concerns especially given my view of M.

Turning to more general welfare considerations, I accept that the children would benefit from going on a trip that they welcome and seeing their grandparents who they are concerned about; a visit to China would also benefit their cultural roots. Not allowing the children to go to China would upset them with the risk that it will fortify their view that F stopped them going on holiday. That in turn could affect a smooth transition to them staying with F.

On the other hand, contact with the grandparents with the help of M translating can be achieved by video and the children’s present understanding of their culture can be supported by video contact with M whilst she is in China and exposure to culturally appropriate events, literature, online rescources and food in this country.

The main concerns really amount to the risk of the children being in some way alienated from F due to missing out on their holiday to China and the potential for problems when they live with him against the risk of them not returning from China at all.

I regard the risk of the children not returning from China as by far outweighing the potential problems caused by them remaining in this country over the summer holidays. The children’s welfare would not be served by a trip to China with all the concomitant risks and issues that I have mentioned. The risks of them not returning are too great and cannot be mitigated.

Accordingly, I refuse permission for M to take the children this summer to China. The prohibited steps order must therefore remain in place.

Turning to the other issues, M should have a long holiday in this country with the children of four weeks during the summer. It is important they can spend time with her before she leaves for China and ideally, it should cover her birthday.

When M is in China, she should have indirect contact by video three times a week. Given M’s hostility to F and her attitude generally, my concern is that any more video contact (and certainly daily contact as she wants) could lead to a destabilisation of the living arrangements with F. The parties should agree a suitable time for the video calls which during the week should ideally be after school but at a time when the children are relaxed and can enjoy the session.

M must hand over the children’s passports immediately to F. This can be done through solicitors. The children’s summer holiday in this country cannot commence until the passports are handed over.

Counsel for M referred to the family dog, [P], who is an emotional support for S. M produced a membership letter from ESA Registry Limited which confirms that the dog “provides essential comfort and reassurance” and helps S “manage daily challenges” and enhances his well-being. F cannot take [P] as he lives in a flat and the lease prohibits pets. M says she will have to take the dog to China but he will then not be able to return. M’s Counsel put it that without the dog, it could have “ruinous consequences on the success of their living arrangements with the family and their emotional wellbeing”.

There was no evidence to support the “ruinous consequences.” Moreover, I was told that anyone can apply for a certificate which is granted. Indeed, I searched ESA’s website and saw that there is a registration form that leads to membership and the site offered template letters. I therefore derive nothing from what seems to be a template letter not written by any professional who has met S or T.

Whilst it would be nice for the children if they had their dog, I cannot expect F to seek a change to his lease which may or may not be granted and which might well incur a payment to the landlord. The court cannot involve itself in this matter; all I will say is that I shall leave it to F to see what can be done if having the dog fits with his existing living arrangements and can be permitted. That is for F and X to decide. I have to say though that the production of the certificate and raising this matter frankly suggested bad faith on M’s part.

The final matter to record is that after M returns from China, it is agreed that the parties will then reconsider the living arrangements for the children.

I would be grateful if Counsel could agree an order to reflect this judgment. If any points arise from the judgment or some of the arrangements cannot be agreed, the court should be informed in the next seven days. I shall endeavour to deal with matters on paper if possible.

That is my judgment.