Hull City Council v M & Ors

On the 10^th of July 2024 F hit his daughter, C, across the face several times with a belt, injuring her. Her brother D was present and saw what happened. Her mother, M, was also in the house although all parties appear to accept she was asleep at the time, having worked a night shift.

The family are African (I have not been more specific than that for the purposes of this anonymised Judgment, in order to protect the family’s identity). The parents have 3 older children, all under the age of 18. Those children remain in their home country with extended family members. The father has been in the UK since October 2023 as a student. The mother and the children who are subject to these proceedings joined him in March last year, and therefore only a few months before the family came to the attention of social care.

Between the 10^th of July 2024 and 27^th January 2025, F lied on multiple occasions by telling social workers, the police and the court that what happened to C was an accident which occurred when he was getting dressed in a hurry.

Between those same dates, M told multiple people that she accepted her husband’s account. However, after the 27^th January, and again in her evidence to me on the 3^rd of June 2025, she said that she never believed that what happened to her daughter was an accident. Accordingly, she too lied when she told people she believed her husband’s explanation.

At the outset of my involvement in the case, which was a case management hearing on the 6^th of August 2024, I pleaded with the parents to be honest about what had happened. I did that because it was obvious to me that the father was lying. Indeed, prior to that, at the initial hearing conducted by HHJ Whybrow, he too emphasised the need for honesty.

The children have been in foster care since the 10^th of July last year, initially by s20 agreement of the parents and, since the hearing before HHJ Whybrow on 27^th of July, subject to interim care orders.

Prior to the 27^th of January, F insisted that what happened to C was an accident. More latterly, for example in his response to threshold dated 22.1.2025, he had talked about his regret for ‘one minute of frustration and recklessness’, before going on to repeat that what happened was not intentional. There was, arguably, an emergent admission that there may have been some degree of fault. However, at a hearing that was then listed as an IRH on the 27^th of January, he admitted that he had caused his daughter’s injuries by ‘deliberately striking her with a belt, and that he had also chastised the children by hitting them with an open hand, a belt and a ruler while the children had been residing with their parents in the UK’ (recital to order of 27.1.2025).

That fuller admission, so very late as it was, potentially changed the landscape of what has always been a single-issue case. I therefore directed an updated parenting assessment, based on the father’s admissions and his professed intention never to repeat such behaviour.

The updated assessment was prepared by Ian Forrest, a social worker who, by coincidence rather than design, was allocated to the case after the hearing on the 27^th of January at which the father had made the admissions outlined. He took over from the previously allocated social worker, Chelsey Ammari, who then moved to another local authority.

Ms Ammari’s final evidence, prepared in November 2024, had concluded in part, that

The updated Signs of Safety Assessment prepared Ian Forrest, concludes that,

At this final hearing Hull City Council, represented by Rebecca Miller, invite me to make care orders and approve plans that the children remain in long term foster care.

M and F, who are represented by Piers Wauchope and Avaia Williams respectively, invite me to place the children in the care of the mother. Shortly, before the final hearing which was conducted over the course of 4 days between the 2^nd and 5^th of June 2025, the father moved out of the former family home. The parents have not separated (other than physically): they remain married and in a relationship. However, they say that the father is the one who poses the more direct and obvious risk to the children, and their case is designed to persuade me that the children could be safely returned to the mother.

The children’s guardian, Rebecca Sweeney, who is represented by Sharon Tappin, supports the local authority’s plan and told me in evidence that returning the children to their parents’ care – whether both parents together or M alone – would be ‘profoundly unsafe’.

Threshold is not in issue in this case. It was agreed and found at an adjourned IRH on the 7^th of May 2025. It is recited in the order of that date (B154). Since the threshold is crossed, as per s31(2) of the Children Act 1989, it is open to me to make any public law order or none. C and D’s welfare is my paramount consideration and the welfare checklist in s1(3) of the Children Act 1989 applies.

Both parents remain subject to an ongoing police investigation and bail conditions which prevent them having any direct or indirect contact with anyone under the age of 18, unless supervised by social care. Shortly before the final hearing, the police amended both parent’s bail conditions to include the words ‘unless prior permission [is given] from Children’s Social Care or the Court’. Accordingly, the bail conditions would no longer prevent a plan of rehabilitation.

This is my written Judgment sent out electronically to the advocates on the 17^th of June 2025 and to be handed down at hearing on the 1^st of July. In it, I explain why I have concluded that C and D should return to live with their mother under a Supervision Order with a view, subject to the outcome of the police investigation, to their father also returning to live with them, within the life of the Supervision Order.

Much of the 993 page PDF bundle for this final hearing relates to factual evidence, generated at a time when threshold was in dispute. I have focussed on the evidence with respect to welfare and I can confirm that I have read all of the documents to which I have been referred at the final hearing.

In addition, I heard evidence from Chelsey Ammari, Ian Forrest, M and F and Rebecca Sweeney. M had the benefit of an interpreter. I heard submissions on behalf of all parties.

Chelsey Ammari gave evidence very much in line with her written evidence, which of course was prepared prior to the father’s admissions. She did tell me about a handover meeting she had done with Ian Forrest and the parents, after the 27^th of January hearing. She said that contrary to his apparently frank admissions at the hearing, the father appeared, in her words ‘wishy washy’ and ‘vague’, repeating that he had ‘made mistakes, but without going into detail about what he had done.

Ian Forrest struck me as a reflective witness who thought carefully about the questions and was able to give reasoned answers. Contrary to some of the submissions made on behalf of the father, I did not find Mr Forrest to be lacking in credibility, ‘rigid’ or unwilling to make reasonable concessions. That said, for reasons that are expanded upon below, there is a limit to the value of Ian Forrest’s addendum assessment and I disagree with his overall conclusion that the risks to the children, in the care of their mother, are unmanageable.

M was very quietly spoken and emotional, appearing on the verge of tears even whilst giving evidence in chief. My overall impression is that she has been cowed by the experience of these proceedings and now feels lost and helpless. She said that she did not stop her husband from hitting the children ‘because of our culture and the respect that we give our husbands; that is why I did not do anything about it … so that I would not disrespect him in front of the children’. I asked M why she didn’t tell the court or the social worker that she believed the children for so long. Her answer was ‘the reason I did not say anything is because I was scared; I had only just arrived in this country; and I understand that in this country you cannot beat children’. When the local authority asked her why she lied for so long she said, ‘I was scared and frightened and I didn’t want to put myself in more trouble’.

F was more confident than his wife. He became upset and tearful when he talked about their decision that he should move out of the family home. As expanded on below, I was impressed by the extent to which he appeared to have taken on board learning from the various courses with which he has engaged and had thought about the impact of physical harm on his children.

What came across from both parents was their deep love for their children and their desperation to do anything that might see them returned to their care.

Rebecca Sweeney was for the most part an impressive witness with a ready ability to explain her conclusions. In those circumstances it is all the more important that I set out why I have disagreed with her.

Since threshold is crossed, this case is entirely about welfare planning for the children. It is about the risks and harms that the children will be exposed to and/or suffer as a result of each of the realistic permanence options I must consider. Those permanence options are limited and stark: either the children remain in long-term foster care, or they are rehabilitated to their mother’s care.

The harms that these children have suffered and are at risk of suffering in the future are easy to identify. What is significantly more difficult, in terms of welfare planning, is to balance those risks and harms against one another: they are, so to speak, measured in different units. However, I am clear that any plan for these children brings with it a degree of harm and/or risk.

The most obvious harm that these children have suffered is the physical harm caused by chastisement at the hands of their parents. Most acutely, on 10.7.2024, C suffered physical injury and, so I am told, scarring which remains. The parents accept other occasions on which they have used physical punishment including striking with implements and, in the father’s case, the use of what might be called stress positions. The mother did not use physical punishment on the children in the UK; D confirmed that in his ABE interview (G224). I note in that regard both that she had only been in the UK for a brief period before the children were removed and that she appears to have believed that physical chastisement was not allowed in this country. Nevertheless, when I consider the mother’s case, I assess her as posing a lower risk to the children than the father.

As well as the physical harm arising from such punishment there is the emotional harm of being subjected to that treatment and/or not being protected from that treatment by a parent who is otherwise loved and trusted.

There is the further emotional harm to each of these children of seeing their sibling subjected to such punishments.

There is the significant emotional harm to these children of spending months, whilst in foster care, knowing that their parents were calling them liars and denying that their lived experiences were real. Chelsey Ammari was clear that in every single session she did with the parents, in preparation of her final evidence, they said the children were lying and that she double checked this with the father. She was equally clear that the children were aware of this.

The parents’ protracted dishonesty has had the consequence that the children have been subject to delay and uncertainty for much longer than necessary: if these parents had admitted the truth at the outset, I have little doubt that these proceedings would have been long since over.

All of the above harms are directly attributable to the actions and decisions of M and F.

If the children are returned to the care of their parents, there are obvious risks, that flow from the above, proven, harms.

The first is that, notwithstanding assurances given in their written and oral evidence, the parents will continue to beat and physically punish the children. Ian Forrest’s evidence was that even if the father was not living in the home there was a risk that the mother would take on (primary) responsibility for physical chastisement of the children.

The second risk, arising from the first, is that the children will suffer further emotional damage, including by having any renewed faith or hope in their parents, shattered.

A third risk, in those circumstances, is that the children would come under direct and/or indirect pressure to lie about their lived experiences through fear – theirs and/or their parents’ – that they will again be removed.

The above three risks are linked. If the first does not eventuate, the second and third do not arise.

A fourth risk is that both parents remain under police investigation for what happened on the 10^th of July 2024 and there is a risk, particularly in F’s case, that the children be returned to parental care only to be deprived of it again in the event that the parents receive immediate custodial sentences. It seems to me significantly less likely that the mother will be charged with a criminal offence or, if charged and convicted, imprisoned.

A fifth risk, linked to the above, is that the children might either feel, or actually be, pressured to withdraw their allegations if returned to their parents’ care. I note in that regard that D has said, albeit at a point when his father continued to deny the allegations, that his father had told him in contact to tell people that the parents did not hit the children. There would however be less obvious point in the parents renewing such pressure now that they have made admissions in these proceedings.

Conversely, there are real and identifiable harms that these children will suffer if they remain in long-term foster care.

The children have each consistently expressed a wish to return to their parents’ care and their ascertainable wishes and feelings are a relevant part of my welfare analysis under paragraph 1(3)(a) of theChildren Act 1989. If I approve a plan of long-term foster care, they will suffer the harm of not being in the care of parents they love and who love them. Besides the physical and emotional harms – which, I emphasise, are significant – arising out of over-chastisement, there is no reason to think that these parents are anything other than good and loving parents. The children have settled well in foster care and shown no behavioural issues, which is evidence, in my judgment, that they were receiving good parenting, outside of the threshold matters. I address separately below two particular contact sessions that the local authority (and, in one case, the guardian) rely on in support of their case that the children would be at risk of ongoing harm in the care of their parents; besides those, contact has been a positive, enjoyable and much-looked-forward-to experience for these children.

Whilst it is true that if I approve the local authority’s plans, they will remain under an obligation to consider rehabilitation, there is little in the local authority’s conduct of this case to reassure me that such an obligation would be taken very seriously. The local authority’s addendum assessment was a rushed piece of work, without proper use of interpreters. It emerged in evidence that the local authority has not done anything proactive to promote contact between these children and their siblings, beyond permitting the parents to make video calls during their own contact time. Indeed, the local authority’s care plans are entirely silent on this issue, and they only committed to filing amended plans once the issue had been raised by other parties at the final hearing. Furthermore, the local authority only filed any evidence about the support that could be put in place to keep these children safe at home after I specifically directed it at the IRH on the 7.5.2025: it was not something that had been properly addressed in their final evidence up to that point. All of those factors lead me to conclude that if I approve the local authority’s plans, the local authority are unlikely to work in a focussed manner to assess how and when the children might safely return home. In my judgment there is a near inevitability, if I approve the local authority’s plans, of these children remaining in care at least until, as older teenagers, they are capable of voting with their feet.

Arising from the above, it is inevitable if I approve the local authority’s plans that C and D will suffer the emotional harm of being deprived of a fuller relationship with their siblings and wider family. I must weigh in the balance that through circumstances and choice the parents have disrupted those relationships themselves by moving to the UK, but in my judgment the parents are much more likely to promote a meaningful relationship between C and D and their family than the local authority: the history of this case has proved that already.

The further harm that these children will suffer, if I approve the local authority’s plan, is that they will grow up deprived of any proper connections with their heritage and culture. Throughout the nearly 12 months of local authority involvement in these children’s lives there has been no successful attempt to place them with what might be described as ‘culturally matched’ carers. That is not, in itself, a criticism of the local authority: it is relatively unlikely that a local authority in Hull will have available and approved foster carers for children of C and D’s background. However, with respect to the future, I did find the professional evidence troubling. The local authority appears to have given very little consideration whatsoever as to how the children’s heritage might be promoted in foster-care. Certainly, their care plans are silent on the issue beyond the bland observation that ‘Carers will continue to support C with regards [to] her cultural needs and if she wishes to attend church then they will support this. Further to this, carers will promote continued learning around her heritage and also provide a varied diet that respects her own needs’ (the same is asserted, in terms, for D).

When the guardian was asked about how the children’s cultural needs might be met in foster care, she said, ‘thereneeds to be amended care plans and a meeting with the foster carers, parents and social worker to outline the cultural needs of the children; we could find a different hair dresser; the foster carer could be trained how to meet the children’s hair needs; there is potential of a church – that could be explored – religion is an important part of their life and that is not happening at the moment; there could be reaching out to local church; we could look at African based supermarkets; there could be books and videos; sibling time is a major part of that’. Other than sibling contact, which was mentioned in passing, those issues were not addressed in the guardian’s final report. Beyond that, the fact that the guardian’s evidence was aspirational and ‘future-focussed’ emphasises the extent to which the local authority’s assertion that the foster carers would ‘continue’ to support or promote the children’s cultural needs, is hollow. These children’s cultural needs have not been met. The guardian effectively conceded that in her oral evidence. The local authority’s attention to that issue over the course of the foregoing 11 months instils little confidence that they will attend to it in the future.

In circumstances where a primary plank of the professionals’ case against the parents is that their acknowledgement of wrongdoing and harm lacks ‘depth’, it is unfortunate that those same professionals’ analysis of these children’s cultural needs should remain relatively shallow. In any event, even if the local authority now took seriously its obligation to address these children’s cultural needs, unless approved foster carers of the same cultural heritage were found, the children would still suffer the inevitable harm of not having those cultural needs fully met. The identification of such carers is vanishingly unlikely. In the meantime, hairdressers, supermarkets and videos do not really constitute the richness of a culture.

As well as the above-identified harms if the children remain in long term foster care, there are well documented and often cited risks to children who are looked after on that basis. Placements can and do break down; these children are not difficult to care for but, on the other hand, they have had at least one move of carer already. Many children come to resent the ongoing involvement of the State and the need for permission, for example, for sleepovers.

Risk is quantified both in terms of the magnitude of a particular harm, if occasioned, and the likelihood of its occurrence.

The harm to these children if their parents resumed physical chastisement of them would be grave. That is my assessment of the harm, not merely by way of pain/injury from the immediate punishment, but the emotional harm from breach of trust and the likely consequence of these children once again being removed from their parents’ care. It would, in my judgment, be a catastrophe for these children to be returned to their parents’ care only to experience the types of physical punishment they have experienced in the past.

I am well aware, of course, that ‘reasonable’ physical chastisement of children remains lawful in England. The punishment inflicted on C on the 10^th of July last year is well beyond any such definition. Many of the other punishments described by the children and admitted by the father are likely to fall outside that definition too, if perpetrated in this country. What, I am clear about, however, is that any physical chastisement of these children would be gravely harmful even if technically ‘lawful’ in England. That is because, irrespective of pain/injury, it would be a breach of trust and a breach of reassurances that would have to be given to the children as a precursor to them going home. It is also likely to be extremely distressing for the children in terms of their anticipated future experiences: to use modern terminology, it is likely to be ‘triggering’. Given the safety plans that would also be a prerequisite of these children returning home, it would very likely lead to the children’s further removal from the parents’ care which would, in and of itself, be a catastrophe.

I have set out the above analysis of the magnitude of risked harms to the children in stark terms because it is important that I am clear-eyed and intellectually honest about the harm that might befall these children in the care of their parents. In that regard, I do not disagree with the local authority or guardian.

Where I do differ from the professionals is in my assessment as to the likelihood of those harms occurring. It is not zero. Very rarely can risks be reduced that far and nor is it the job of the court to do so. However, in my judgment, with proper planning, support and supervision, the risks can be reduced to being manageably low.

Both the local authority and the guardian pressed on me that there was no proper depth of understanding demonstrated by the parents and, absent this, the likelihood of the parents resuming physical punishment is high.

Ian Forrest’s involvement in the case came at a crucial time; he was the allocated social worker from 20.2.2025 until 16.5.2025, that is from just after the father had admitted deliberately harming C until just before the final hearing. He was therefore the social worker charged with doing the updating assessment work. He accepted that he had done this on the basis of observing half a family time session and 2 sessions with the parents conducted via Teams on 4 and 6 March 2025 without an interpreter. The booked interpreter was unable to join the first session. For the second session, they joined half-way through but then had a poor connection meaning their contribution was, in Mr Forrest’s view, ‘unproductive’. It is clear to me that the mother, at least, needs an interpreter and that the father’s English is not brilliant: Chelsey Ammari told me that she had used an interpreter when working with the father to check his understanding of key words such as his claim that his children were ‘lying’ about the 10^th July. The guardian also used an interpreter for her meetings with both parents. Ian Forrest’s evidence was that they ‘fought through’ the difficulties of not having an interpreter, adding, ‘my questions weren’t so deep and complex that an interpreter was required’. That conclusion is difficult to accept in circumstances where the mother needs an interpreter, and the primary criticism of both parents is that they were unable to demonstrate sufficient insight into their actions and the impact on the children.

The updating assessment sets out that when Mr Forrest asked the father about occasions, other than the 10^th July, when he had harmed the children,

That accords with Ms Ammari’s evidence about the handover session, and the lack of detail forthcoming from the parents with respect to other occasions on which the children had been subject to physical chastisement. It also accords with Ms Sweeney’s independent view. In her oral evidence she told me that

There are clear problems with the local authority updating assessment of the parents. It was conducted over 2 sessions, 2 days apart, and both remotely. That was never going to be an ideal forum for the parents to demonstrate insight or depth of learning, if that was what the local authority were looking for. There was no interpreter. The mother has been unable to communicate meaningfully without an interpreter and to say that she was unwilling to discuss matters further is therefore an unfair criticism (of her). Chelsey Ammari was also clear that an interpreter had been useful in her work with the father to check his understanding of concepts such as ‘lying’. It would therefore be difficult (or more difficult) for the father to evidence insight or depth of learning without the benefit of an interpreter to translate nuanced concepts such as emotional harm.

In my judgment the guardian’s criticism that the parents lack insight because they talk about their behaviour in terms of their culture is also somewhat unfair. The parents’ cultural background is not irrelevant to the issue at the heart of this case. The parents grew up (as did their children) in a culture where physical chastisement is common. All parties accept that proposition and it is something of which I can take judicial notice in any event. The parents concede that the punishment of C on 10^th July 2024 went well beyond what would be accepted in their culture. But it is not unfair for the parents to point out that their ‘mistakes’ – and for my part I am clear that their ‘mistakes’ are the significant physical and emotional harm they have caused their children – arise in that cultural context. A parent who uses physical chastisement because it is culturally prevalent is much more likely to go too far and injure a child, than a parent who does not otherwise use physical chastisement and/or who lives in a society where physical chastisement is either unlawful or uncommon. Similarly, a wife who has lived, almost exclusively, in a culture where it is unacceptable (or less accepted) for women to challenge their husbands, is much less likely to do so; and the wrong and harmful decision that this mother took, not to challenge the father, can be seen in that context. That is an issue on which, in my judgment, the mother did demonstrate a depth of insight; her explanation for her own lies was very much in line with relevant parts of the Lucas direction as to the reasons for which people lie. I believe her fear, insecure circumstances (being newly arrived in an alien country), and misplaced deference to her husband were all part of the reason that she lied for so long.

Unlike the professionals, I thought the parents did demonstrate insight into what they had learnt, why their previous parenting was wrong, the harm it caused and why they need to change. What I do accept, in deference to the professionals, is that the parents’ insight has been emergent, and I was hearing from them at a later point in their respective journeys.

M told me about the work she had done with HANA, Youth Aspire and Save the Women. When Ms Tappin, on behalf of the guardian, pressed her about what would be different in the future she said, in part, ‘there is a big difference because of everything that has happened and all me and my children have gone through; no one can do that again; not even their father’. I was left with the impression that this mother has learnt a raw and powerful lesson. I have already set out that I thought the mother demonstrated good insight into why she had lied for so long and supported her husband as she did.

F also told me about the work he had done. His answer was detailed and spontaneous: ‘from the first course we had, from Save the Women, we were taught about cultural differences; about what is not acceptable in the UK; and with Save the Women we are told how to have effective communication which is so helpful; HANA told us a lot about safeguarding, child exploitation, and trauma informed practice; and from Family Links they told us how to praise children and not to criticise them and we have been told how to create a boundary and how to create consequences if they don’t listen; and we have been taught how to ignore sometimes, when we are not pleased, so that we allow our stress to go down; and we talked about resilience; and open communication; so that we can be intentional parents’’. He was asked, in chief, what he would do differently in future and again, his answer struck me as detailed and spontaneous. He said, ‘if there is any issue we should understand the reason behind their actions not just criticise; we should try to understand the causes behind their actions; we need to give praise; and let them know the do’s and don’ts and the boundaries so they are aware of the consequences; it gives us more advantage to be connected parents’.

F told me that ‘it is our cultural belief that children should learn what they have done is wrong. We [parents] should learn that there are many other things [i.e. other than physical punishment] you can do that are effective with children’. I thought that showed real insight into what had gone wrong, why and what needed to change.

When F was asked if he would hit his children again, he said, ‘Never because I know the impact it has had on them it has caused them emotional harm; it can never happen again’. He said that it had taken him so long to admit the truth because ‘I have been struggling to come to reality and accept the full consequences of my actions, which I deeply regret. Lack of insight and fear of losing my children are the other reasons it has taken this long to accept’. When Ms Tappin asked him what effect his punishment had on the children, he was able to tell me, ‘being scared because being hit can cause trauma; and for a child to be fearful of a parent can also cause trauma’. He accepted that not only had he caused physical pain and injury to his children, he had caused them emotional harm and damaged his relationship with them.

For the above reasons, I respectfully disagree with the local authority and guardian. I find that the parents have demonstrated an encouraging degree of insight and learning. Beyond that, I found their repeated promise to me that they would not repeat their behaviours of some weight. It may be in reality that their future behaviour is driven more by fear of the consequences (having their children removed again) than complete ‘insight’ into the negative consequences for the children of such behaviour. However, from a safety perspective, the important thing is that the parents never again use physical punishment, not the precise combination of motivators for that outcome.

I remain worried, as are the professionals, about the parents’ apparent reluctance to discuss specific instances of punishment other than the 10^th of July incident. That said, the father paid in somewhat more at the hearing on 27^th January 2025 than he had to, by way of admissions of wider behaviour in the UK. Whilst, ideally the parents might show more willing to discuss specific details I can think of a variety of reasons, including shame and fear, why they might not do so. Ultimately, I do not find that their failure to discuss more specific detail of past behaviours, by itself, unduly increases the risk of future repetition.

I have however specifically taken into account one further troubling and recent piece of evidence that would weigh against me placing trust in these parents. In her meeting with them, on 22 April of this year, the guardian asked the parents if they were living together. They confirmed that they were. Their evidence, to me is that they had already separated by then. The father, in particular, told me that he had explained this to Ms Sweeney. I accept that Ms Sweeney is telling me the truth about what was said on this occasion, which means that the parents have misled her and lied to me (about what they told the guardian). I can’t lightly overlook that. What is clear to me is that the parent’s separation is one of convenience designed to improve the chances of the children being with one of them. On any analysis it was a very recent decision when the parents spoke to the guardian and they remain as husband and wife. I don’t understand why they would mislead the guardian and lie to me, beyond my general impression that they are fearful and desperate to bolster their chances. The father’s bail conditions will preclude him having contact with the children, unless professionally supervised, which offers a degree of protection against the possibility that the parents actually have no intention of remaining physically separate and are trying to deceive the court. The fact that the parents have lied to me about what they told the guardian, does not, as per the Lucas direction, mean that they are lying about other matters. In my judgment, whilst this is a worrying piece of the overall picture, the parents’ fear of losing their children for a second time is sufficiently strong that it is likely to outweigh any urge to breach a safety plan (or, in the father’s case, his bail conditions).

Beyond the proposition that the parents lacked proper insight into their actions, the local authority and, to an extent the guardian, rested much weight on a contact that took place on the 24^th of February 2025 in which F cut D’s hair against his wishes. Mr Forrest’s case, in evidence, and the guardian’s, in submissions, were that this was evidence that despite the work done by the father, he doesn’t listen to D. With respect to the weight that I attach to that contact, I say the following:

The local authority also drew my attention to a contact on the 14.3.2025 in which C asserted that in the previous contact (being 10.3.25) F had said mean things which made D cry. They raised this as a further concern about the father’s parenting. It is unfortunate, in those circumstances, that it took until closing submissions on behalf of F for anyone to point out that the notes from the previous contact did not bear out what C said; the only person who is recorded as getting upset in that contact is M. I can attach little weight to C’s observations in the contact on 14.3.2025 and certainly, in my judgment, there is nothing in either of these contacts which increases the likelihood of these children suffering significant physical, or associated emotional, harm if placed in the care of the parents.

The local authority’s case, supported by the guardian, is that the risk of the children suffering the types of harm evidenced in threshold, if they return to parental care, is unmanageably high. The reasons, in my judgment, that it is manageably low are as follows:

For the above reasons, even though the magnitude of harm to these children if they are again subject to physical chastisement is grave, I find that the likelihood of it recurring is tolerably low and can be lowered still by proper safety planning and support.

The harms that I have identified the children will suffer if I approve the local authority’s plans are significant. The magnitude of that harm is, in my judgment, profound. It will have lifelong and irrecoverable consequences. The outcomes for these children will be radically different if they grow up in foster care rather than with their family. Indeed, given the circumstances of the parents – in the UK on the father’s student visa and, in the father’s case, having made admissions in a family court of what would amount to a crime – there is a real risk that these children might grow up stranded in the UK, a Continent away from their parents and wider family.

In my judgment, it is not a question as to the ‘likelihood’ of the harms being here considered, occurring: they are inevitable and to large extent already occurring. They can be mitigated to some extent by quality contact and active steps to address the children’s cultural needs; but it is no more than mitigation of real harm.

If I formed the view that these children were going back to the type of parenting they received previously, then none of the harms they would suffer in foster care would outweigh that fact. To put it another way, the need to promote these children’s family needs and culture would not outweigh the need to keep the children physically and emotionally safe, if I believed that the parents would resume their previous regime of punishments. It is because I have assessed the risk of that recurring as being low, and manageable, that I have come to the conclusion that these children’s welfare requires I approve a plan that they return to their mother’s care.

It should be clear from the above that even though I have not cited each individual paragraph of the welfare checklist I have had each paragraph firmly in mind throughout my welfare analysis. For the avoidance of doubt:

I am going to make a Supervision Order, placing these children under the supervision of the local authority for 12 months.

I am going to recite as part of the final order that the court finds the children are safe in the care of the mother and therefore permits her to have unsupervised care of them.

I am also going to recite that for reasons set out in this Judgment, including in particular the father’s precarious status as a result of the ongoing criminal investigation, the court does not yet deem it safe for the father to have unsupervised contact with the children and that, for this reason, the court is not permitting anything that is inconsistent with the father’s current bail conditions.

Although it is not their primary plan, the local authority will need to prepare a proper supervision support plan. I am sending this Judgment out electronically in advance of it being handed down in the hope and expectation that the local authority can be well on with, if not completed, that work prior to the 1 July. The support plan will need to cover the detail of the local authority’s already-expressed commitment to supervising the father’s contact, as referenced elsewhere in this Judgment, as well as the other matters addressed in their statement of 16.5.2025.

The local authority, in discussion with the guardian, will also need to prepare a proper Safety Plan. I will expect the parents to sign that plan. It will include, at the very least, a clear commitment by both parents not to use physical chastisement at all on either child, and not to use any stress positions. (It might be helpful for the plan to include agreed forms of punishment that the parents can use such as time out or loss of privileges). It must include a clear commitment by the parents that the father will only have such contact with the children as is agreed and supervised by the local authority, pending at least any resolution of the father’s criminal case.

Any planning that involves the parents, should be conducted with the benefit of an interpreter so that the parents are absolutely clear about what is expected of them.

These parents must be under no illusion that if they breach the safety plan, they are extremely unlikely to be given further chances. In that regard I reserve any future applications with respect to these children to myself.

There needs to be a proper and planned meeting involving the social worker, guardian if available, interpreter and parents, with a view to preparing an agreed script or narrative and for the parents then to explain to the children, in the presence of at least the social worker and interpreter, that (a) they are believed; (b) the parents are sorry for what they have done; (c) the parents are sorry for not telling the truth sooner; (d) the parents love them and want things to be different in the future; (e) that the parents will not use physical punishments - beating, hitting, stress positions or anything else that causes physical pain in future; (f) that the children can tell people, including teachers, if they are worried about things at home; (g) an explanation for why the father is not, currently, living at home.

Once the support plan and safety plan are in place and agreed and once the meeting set out above with the children has taken place, I do not think there needs to be any lengthy transition. The children moved to foster care in one go and settled well; they want to go home and, in my judgment, once the steps designed to mitigate future risk are in place, there is no bar to them returning to their mother. It would, however, be potentially important to the children’s welfare for them to have a proper opportunity to say goodbye to their current carers.

I anticipate that it may not be possible to have all steps in place by the 1 July and if I am correct about that, then I will hear submissions about whether I should finalise proceedings with the parents signing a s20 agreement for the children to remain in care whilst necessary steps are put in place (over a defined and clear time period); or extend proceedings for a short period to allow things to be put in place.

With respect to the father’s position, it is now incumbent on him to sort out his situation within the ongoing criminal investigation. He will need to take advice from his criminal solicitors in that regard as to anything he can do move matters forward. My order will further recite that until the father’s criminal investigation has been resolved (either by way of being closed/NFA or some other disposal, including charge and conviction) he remains bound by the bail conditions and Safety Plan. Once his criminal investigation is resolved, in one of the ways outlined, then, if (a) he remains at liberty; and (b) the mother continues to want to be in a relationship with him, the Safety Plan should be amended to allow for him to return home and resume care of the children (with commitments to not using any form of physical discipline, as per the Safety Plan, remaining in force).

In the event that the father’s criminal investigation is unresolved at the 9 month point, I invite the local authority to give active consideration to an application to extend the Supervision Order.

I invite the local authority to give active consideration to that in any event, if they are of the view that the children’s welfare would be supported by it. That might be particularly relevant if the father has only just returned home.

It is a consequence of the orders I have made above that the children will have at least a period of time, and it may well be several months, in the sole care of their mother who, for reasons I have set out, is much less likely to use physical chastisement than the father. That means that by the point the father might be able to return home, the children and their mother will be used to a different style of parenting. That is also a protective factor and a good foundation for the futures of these children.

The mother has an outstanding application for an Independent Social Work assessment that has not yet been disposed of. The order should set out that that is withdrawn or, if not, refused on the grounds that it no longer necessary to resolve proceedings justly.

Having heard submissions on the point, and no party having objected, I propose to upload an anonymised version of this Judgment to the National Archive.

That is my Judgment.