Q v Q (recognition of overseas divorce)

The parties are of Pakistani heritage, but both are British nationals permanently domiciled in the UK. The respondent has lived in the UK since 2003, the Applicant wife moved to the UK in 2004.

The parties married in Pakistan on 17 July 2007 and set up home together in the UK shortly thereafter.

They have one child, Z, born on 20 November 2009.

The parties’ joint business, a care home in the UK, was incorporated on 9 October 2015.

The former matrimonial home (the FMH) was purchased in the wife’s sole name in December 2017.

In December 2023, the applicant wife started divorce proceedings in the UK, but says that she was not able to complete the application because the respondent husband had destroyed both the original and only copy of the marriage certificate. The wife contacted solicitors in Pakistan to help her in obtaining a replacement.

In early May 2024 the wife instructed her solicitors in Pakistan to prepare divorce papers and issue proceedings for a Khula (the means by which a Muslim woman may apply to end a marriage). The wife gave the FMH as the address for both parties

On 11 May 2024 there was an incident at the family home, following which the husband moved out. He was bailed by the police not to return to the property.

The parties own a second property at [location B]. It is to this address the husband moved. He has lived there since 12 May 2024.

The parties owned a holiday home in Dubai, in the husband’s sole name. The wife understands this to have been sold by the husband and she says she does not know where the proceeds of sale went. The husband said at the hearing on 15 April 2025 that the property had not been sold, and is still owned by him.

On 24 May 2024 the divorce proceedings brought by the wife were commenced in Pakistan.

The wife travelled to Pakistan on 1 July 2024 and attended a hearing at the Court in Lahore.

A provisional decree of divorce was made on 15 July 2024.

The applicant served a copy of the khula on the respondent by WhatsApp message on 31 July 2024. On 9 August 2024, she met with the husband’s assistant. She says he confirmed to her that the husband had received the khula.

The decree was made final on 13 October 2024.

On 31 January 2025 the wife applied in this jurisdiction for permission to apply for financial relief after an overseas divorce under section 13 Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. The application was accompanied by a Form A, witness statement in support, and evidence of the final certificate of divorce obtained by the applicant in Lahore, Pakistan.

The application was listed for a directions hearing on 27 March 2025. If he opposed permission being granted, the husband was directed to file a witness statement setting out the factual basis upon which he opposed the application for permission.

In a witness statement dated 24 February 2025 the husband wrote:

On 11 March 2025 the husband filed a notice of change of solicitors, confirming he was going to represent himself in the proceedings.

On 24 March 2025 the respondent filed a D11 and a further witness statement setting out a change of position. He asserted that the application for ancillary relief should be dismissed, ‘on multiple grounds, including issues with jurisdiction, lack of a bona fide claim for financial relief, improper tactics used by the applicant, and the validity of the Khula divorce proceedings initiated by the applicant in Pakistan which is currently under challenge in Lahore Family Court.’

The respondent was referring to an application filed on his behalf in Lahore on 4 February 2025 seeking to set aside the decree of divorce dated 9 July 2024.

On 25 March 2025, the directions hearing on 27 March 2025 was vacated from the list and re-allocated to a Circuit Judge for further directions.

I saw the parties at a hearing on 15 April 2025. We identified that the husband’s application for the Court to refuse to recognise the Pakistani divorce was brought pursuant to section 51 of the Family Law Act 1986. I directed that statements should be filed addressing the matters set out at section 51(3) of that Act, and listed both the husband’s application for the court to refuse to recognise the Pakistani divorce and the wife’s application for permission to bring her application for financial relief for a hearing on 29 May 2025.

On 2 May 2025 the respondent made a part 25 application for an expert to be instructed to advise the court on the likelihood of the Khula being set aside in Pakistan.

Represented by Mr Dipré, the husband’s first application was for a stay of proceedings until such time as his application to set aside the divorce in Pakistan has been concluded. In the alternative, he sought an adjournment of the hearing in order for an expert in Pakistani law to be instructed to advise this Court on the likelihood of the decree being set aside.

Through her solicitor, Mr Ahmed, the wife invited me to dismiss the application for a stay, refuse to grant permission for an expert, and to proceed to deal with both the applications before the Court.

The husband accepts that, as it stands, the Khula is a valid document, but his position is that due to the way it was obtained, he has grounds to apply to the Court for it to be set aside. In that event, he says the foundation for the wife’s application for financial remedies will fall away. He says what will need to happen is for one of the parties to start divorce proceedings in this jurisdiction.

He proposed that the proceedings should be stayed until such time as that issue is resolved. In the meantime, he suggests the parties could usefully enter into negotiations in respect of the division of the assets of the marriage.

The difficulty with that position is that it holds the parties in a position of uncertainty, as it is not known how long it will take for the proceedings to resolve. At a hearing in Lahore on 22 April 2025, the lawyers on behalf of the husband were not in a position to put their arguments before the Court and sought an adjournment. A further hearing was listed for 31 May 2025, but it was not clear whether that hearing would finally resolve matters, the husband estimated it would take about six months for the proceedings in Pakistan to conclude.

If the husband does not succeed in his application to the Court in Lahore, he will maintain his position that the Court in this jurisdiction should exercise its discretion pursuant to section 51(3) and refuse to acknowledge those proceedings in this jurisdiction. So there is a potential for further delay, once the proceedings in Lahore have concluded, as a hearing would need to be listed to deal with the husband’s application.

The parties have prepared for this hearing, statements have been prepared and lawyers instructed. The Court has set aside a day of time to hear the applications. Should the time for making the submissions on the application be put off indefinitely?

Although the husband has sought to challenge the validity of the Khula, the position remains that the divorce has been issued by the court in Pakistan and has not been suspended or set aside.

If I considered the husband’s application, and decided that I should recognise the foreign divorce, and the husband was later successful in establishing that it should be set aside, would that mean that we have wasted time unnecessarily on considering the issue at this stage of proceedings? I decided that on balance, it would be better to deal with the application. The parties are to be divorce and they will need to resolve the question of the division of assets of the marriage. If this scenario plays out, they can continue to work on resolving those questions. The work will not be wasted. As a protective measure, any order made within the financial proceedings could be made on the basis that it was not to be enforced without permission of the Court, if at that time the husband’s application to set aside was still outstanding.

Having regard to all the circumstances, and weighing these options in the balance, I refused the application for a stay.

I refused permission for an expert. The part 25 was not properly constituted, I was not provided with a CV of the proposed expert, nor costings or timescales for the report.

The questions put to the expert in the draft letter of instruction went to the question of the validity of the divorce obtained in Pakistan. However, that is a matter to be determined in that jurisdiction, it would not help me to form an opinion as to the likelihood or otherwise of that application succeeding. Answers to the questions posed would not assist me in considering the application to refuse to recognise the decree of divorce. The test of necessity was not passed.

I then proceeded to hear submissions in respect of the wife’s application and the husband’s cross-application and reserved this judgment.

On 3 June 2025 the parties’ representatives sent me updating documents concerning the proceedings in Pakistan. I asked them to send me short updating submissions on admissibility, relevance, and weight to be given to these documents, which I received on 6 June 2025.

There is an order dated 31 May 2025, together with a two-page judgment from Judge [name redacted] dismissing the husband’s application to set aside the khula. The judgment and order state there is no right of appeal from this decision.

However, I am given to understand that the husband has now lodged an appeal against this application on the basis that the Lahore judge was biased towards the wife, and that the judgment does not deal with the issue of service.

I have been shown a Court order suspending operation of the order of 31 May 2025, and am told that the next hearing of the appeal is listed for 20 June 2025.

So the position remained broadly the same as it was at the hearing; the divorce continues to be an effective document, but the husband continues to challenge it, and says that this process remains ongoing.

The parties are agreed that if the foreign divorce is recognised, then the wife’s application for permission to bring proceedings for financial remedies in this jurisdiction pursuant to section 13 of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 must succeed.

Section 13(1) requires that a party to a divorce obtained overseas who seeks to apply for financial relief in this jurisdiction, must first obtain the leave of the court. The court, ‘shall not grant leave unless it considers that there is substantial ground for the making of an application for such an order.’

An application for permission may only be made if at least one of the conditions set out in section 15 of the Act is met concerning the parties’ domicile in this country and their ownership of property in this country. There is no issue that the necessary conditions are met.

Section 16 sets out the factors to consider when determining whether there is substantial ground for making an application in England and Wales. Again, the parties are agreed that having regard to the checklist set out at section 16, the Court would be bound to find that the England and Wales is the appropriate venue for the wife’s application for financial remedies.

So the only issue that remains for me decide is whether or not the Court should refuse to recognise the decree of divorce obtained by the wife in Pakistan on 15 July 2024, made final on 13 October 2024.

The relevant provisions concerning recognition of the validity of overseas divorces are found at section 46 and section 51 of the Family Law Act 1986.

Section 46 provides:

Section 51 provides:

The parties are agreed that for the purposes of section 46, the divorce obtained in Pakistan is a valid document and effective within that jurisdiction. While the husband continues to seek to challenge the basis upon which it was made, he accepts that it is an order which remains in force unless and until it has been set aside.

Mr Dipré relies upon the case of MM v VHM [2023] EWHC 2988 (Fam), a judgment of Mr James Ewins KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, in which the husband had obtained final orders in divorce proceedings in Indonesia. The judge found that the husband had failed to take steps for giving notice as should reasonably have been taken. He found that the husband had deliberately prevented notice being given by hiding from the court the wife’s whereabouts and the means of communicating with her. He concluded that justice required that the Court in this jurisdiction should refuse to recognise it.

Mr Ahmed relies upon the case of TI v LI [2024] EWFC 163 (B) a judgment of Mr Recorder Allen KC. In that case the judge held that a divorce (talaq) obtained by the husband in Pakistan was valid and effective under Pakistani law, and should be recognised in this jurisdiction. The court found that although the wife was not personally served with the divorce documents at her current address, she had actual knowledge of the proceedings and had the opportunity to participate, thereby satisfying the requirements for recognition under the Family Law Act 1986.

In both MM v VHM and TI v LI, the judges cited the case of Duhur-Johnson v Duhur-Johnson (Attorney-General Intervening) [2005] 2 FLR 1042, in which Jeremy Richardson QC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) considered the court’s approach in applications for refusal to recognise an overseas divorce, and put forward the following six propositions:

Recorder Allen then went on to cite two further cases, helpfully summarising the approach of the Court in similar applications:

See also, paragraphs 35 and 36 of Olafisoye v Olafisoye (No. 2) (Recognition):

So my task is first to consider whether the divorce was obtained by the wife in this case either (i) without such steps as should reasonably have been taken for giving notice of the proceedings to the husband as should reasonably have been taken (section 51(a)(i)); and/or (ii) without the husband having been given such opportunity to take part in proceedings as he should reasonably have been given (section 51(a)(ii)).

If I conclude that the wife should reasonably have taken further steps to notify the husband before the divorce was obtained, and/or that the husband was not given sufficient opportunity to participate in the proceedings, then that opens the gateway to the next stage. I must then go on to decide whether, in those circumstances, ‘recognition of the divorce …. would be manifestly contrary to public policy.’

In her first statement dated 31 January 2025, the wife’s focus is on the facts that go to her application for permission to bring her application for financial remedies in this jurisdiction. The statement describes how the parties have lived and worked in the UK, own property here, and educated their son here. She deals only briefly with the divorce, saying that she commenced divorce proceedings on 15 July 2024, and that the respondent ‘had notice and received the divorce application and the divorce was duly pronounced and effective on 13 October 2024.’

As noted above, in his statement in response the husband said he did not agree with the way the Khula had been obtained, but was not seeking to defend the application for permission to bring proceedings based on recognition of the divorce.

In her second statement, which was filed in response to the husband’s application for the court to refuse to recognise the divorce, the wife gave a more detailed account of the dates.

Her account of initiating divorce proceedings in the UK in December 2023 is not challenged by the husband. She says that the husband had all relevant documentation and subsequently destroyed the original marriage certificate, which prevented her from proceeding with the application. She subsequently instructed solicitors in Pakistan to obtain a new marriage certificate and then instructed them to lodge the divorce application on her behalf on 23 May 2024.

She travelled to Pakistan on 29 June 2024 and attended court on 9 July 2024, to provide evidence in support of her petition. She says that she gave evidence to the judge, ‘explaining the circumstances of the breakdown of the marriage.’ She says, although the husband was aware that she was in Pakistan, ‘I am unsure whether he was specifically aware that I was attending court.’

On 9 July 2024 the court permitted the Khula divorce application. On 15July 2024 the court issued the decree sheet, which was an official court order related to the divorce proceedings. This was not the final decree; the final decree was issued in October.

The wife returned to the UK on 22 July 2024.

The wife then sets out in her statement the steps that she took to notify the husband that the decree had been issued. She says she spoke to the police to ask for guidance on how to serve the husband, given that there were bail conditions in place. She says this is what led to her sending a screenshot of the decree by WhatsApp on 31 July 2024. She has exhibited to her statement a screenshot showing the double blue ticks suggesting the message was both delivered and read.

The wife says that on 9 August 2024 the husband’s assistant [name redacted] visited her at home to pick up some documents, and in the course of their conversation, he confirmed to the wife that the husband had received the WhatsApp message.

In her statement, the wife goes on to say that under section 8 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961, the husband has thirty days from the date of receiving knowledge of the divorce proceedings to file any objections or raise a challenge to the divorce proceedings. She calculates therefore that the husband had until 30 August 2024 to raise objections to the divorce. She says the husband had every opportunity to engage with the proceedings, but chose not to do so.

In his second witness statement, the husband says that the wife submitted false documentation to the family court in Lahore, firstly by giving the husband’s address for service as the family home, notwithstanding that by 24 May 2024, she knew that he was not living there and was bailed not to attend the property.

He says that she attended court and gave false evidence claiming that the husband had been notified of hearings on 9 June and 9 July 2024, by being served at the family home, when, as well she knew, he had continued to live at [property at location B] since 12 May 2024.

The husband says that as a consequence of the wife’s failure to notify him, he was unaware of the Khula proceedings until after the decree was issued on 9 July 2024. He says he had no opportunity to present his case or oppose the application, nor was he informed of any attempts at reconciliation, which are mandatory in the period following issue of the initial decree in Pakistan.

The purpose of notifying the husband of the petition was to enable him to have the opportunity to say whether or not he accepted the grounds for divorce, and to be able to participate in the proceedings.

The wife knew that from 12 May 2024 onwards the husband was not living at the family home. It was her responsibility to tell her solicitors of the change of address, and to make sure that documents submitted on her behalf were true and accurate. She had many weeks after the proceedings were issued and before the first hearing to notify the husband of the proceedings and to notify the court that he was not living at the address she had given for him. I find that these are steps she could and should reasonably have taken, and would have resulted in the husband being notified of the proceedings.

There was a court hearing on 9 June 2024 which I understand was attended by the wife’s solicitors. On 10 June 2024 the wife signed an affidavit in which she acknowledged that the court had directed her to give the defendant’s new address, but ‘the plaintiff tried to get new address of the defendant but no avail’, that the husband was presently residing at the FMH, and ‘there are no other addresses in knowledge of the plaintiff except the mentioned above address.’

The wife’s solicitors in Pakistan arranged for notice of the petition to be published in the local newspaper, but plainly, as the husband was resident in England at the time, this was unlikely to be an effective means of notifying him.

The consequence of this was that the husband was prevented in responding to the petition, did not instruct solicitors to represent him, and did not have the opportunity to attend either the hearing on 9 June 2024, nor the subsequent hearing that the wife attended in July 2024, nor file evidence to challenge the wife’s account given at that hearing.

The wife travelled to Pakistan to attend the court hearing, but did not tell the husband the purpose of her visit.

The wife has not given a good explanation to the Court as to why she failed to notify the husband of the proceedings. The only reasonable inference that can be drawn is that she took deliberate steps over a period of months to prevent him receiving notice because she did not wish him to know, and she intended to obtain a divorce without giving him a right to reply to her petition.

I was not persuaded by the wife’s account in her witness statement that she was prevented from formally serving the husband with the documents as a result of the bail conditions. She had solicitors in Pakistan and had the ability to instruct solicitors in this jurisdiction or otherwise to employ a process server to serve the husband.

This set of facts establishes that for the purposes of section 51(3), the wife did not take such steps as were reasonable to ensure the husband was notified of the proceedings.

I am satisfied to the standard of a balance of probabilities that just over two weeks after the decree was issued, on 31 July 2024, the husband did receive notice of the proceedings by the WhatsApp message. He does not challenge the wife’s account in his witness statement, either that he received the WhatsApp message, or that his assistant confirmed to the wife that by at least 9 August 2024 he did then know the provisional decree of divorce had been issued.

Turning to the question of whether the husband was given sufficient opportunity to participate in the proceedings. For the reasons given above, he was not given sufficient opportunity to take part in the proceedings up to 31 July 2024.

I am satisfied that the husband had sight of the provisional decree. At that time, the husband took no steps either to challenge the validity of the decree or to participate in the proceedings. I accept the wife’s submission that he did have that opportunity before the final decree was made in October. Once the final decree was issued, the husband waited over three months before filing his application to the Court in Lahore for it to be set aside.

Having reached the conclusion that the wife did not take reasonable steps to give notice of the proceedings and the husband did not have sufficient opportunity to participate in the proceedings before the provisional decree was issued, I must proceed to consider the question posed at section 51(3)(c)(ii). Given the procedural deficiencies, would recognition of the divorce be manifestly contrary to public policy?

On behalf of the husband Mr Dipré submits that the decree was obtained not just without proper notice being given, but on the basis of misrepresented facts put forward in the petition. The phrase ‘a pack of lies’ was used repeatedly in his submissions, and it was asserted that the husband was offended by the defamatory quality of the remarks in the petition.

There is evidence that the wife deliberately misled the Court about where the husband was living, with a view to preventing him from finding out about the proceedings. As a matter of public policy should this conduct be overlooked by this Court?

The grounds set out in the petition can be summarised as follows:

On behalf of the wife, it is submitted that the Court in Pakistan was rightly satisfied that the procedural and evidential requirements necessary for obtaining a divorce were found to have been met, and the Court should be slow to refuse to recognise it.

I have weighed all the factors in the balance.

I do not condone the wife’s actions in obtaining the divorce in Pakistan behind the husband’s back and in actively misleading the Court so as to prevent him from being notified. The husband is justified in complaining that this was deceitful and unfair to him, and rightly this conduct opens the gateway to consideration as to whether the divorce should be recognised in this jurisdiction.

However, having had regard to all the circumstances of the particular case, I have come to the conclusion that notwithstanding the wife’s failure to notify the husband of the petition in advance of the hearing in July 2024 and the granting of the decree, the factors in favour of recognising the divorce in this jurisdiction outweigh those in favour of refusing to recognise it.

I have concluded that on balance the public policy considerations weigh against exercising my discretion to refuse to recognise the divorce pursuant to section 51(3).

My reasons for coming to that conclusion are as follows.

I am satisfied that the wife had been frustrated in her attempts to proceed with the divorce in England by the husband destroying both the original and the copy of the marriage certificate. I am satisfied that she proceeded with the divorce in Pakistan, as she says, because she had already instructed solicitors in Pakistan to obtain a further copy of the divorce certificate. I find that she did so because she wished to be divorced. However, I am satisfied that she intended for the financial remedies proceedings to take place in this jurisdiction.

This case can be distinguished from cases like Olafisoye v Olafisoye, or Mahtani v Mahtani where the party obtaining the divorce overseas did so deceitfully and with a view to depriving the other party of their entitlement to a financial remedy on divorce, indeed to obtain an outcome that was disadvantageous to the other without them having any opportunity to participate in the proceedings.

In this case the wife obtained a decree for the purpose of formalising the separation, but thereafter she made her application for permission to bring financial remedies proceedings in this jurisdiction on notice to the husband.

The husband accepts that the marriage has irretrievably broken down. He accepts that there will need to be a legal process by which the division of the assets of the marriage on divorce will need to be determined. He accepts that process should take place in this jurisdiction.

The husband now asserts that he objects to the way in which the decree for divorce was obtained as a matter of principle:, The husband’s fundamental submission to the Court is that it offends public policy to recognise a decree of divorce that was obtained by falsehood. I have not been persuaded by that submission, for the following reasons:

The husband has not acted promptly. He had the opportunity to become involved with the proceedings once notified on 31 July 2024 but chose not to do so. Even after the khula was issued on 13 October 2024, he waited a further three months before issuing his application to set it aside.

The process of that application was apparently delayed by the husband, firstly his lawyers had to file further information about their right to act, and the hearing on 22 April 2025 was then adjourned at their request in order for them to formulate the arguments on his behalf.

The husband initially took no issue with the wife’s application for permission, but then changed his mind. This has caused delay and additional hearings. At the final hearing he asked for a stay for an indefinite period. He then made an application for expert evidence, which would have caused further delay. This is against a context where the wife alleges that the husband has dissipated assets of the marriage.

The husband’s proposal in the event that the decree is not recognised is simply to start the process over again in this jurisdiction, with one or the other parties filing for a no-fault divorce. Ultimately that would bring the parties to the position that they could be in now were the Court to recognise the decree of divorce, but would have involved the further passage of time and expenditure of costs.

The case law highlights the reasons that a ‘limping divorce’ is undesirable. In this case by refusing to recognise the divorce, the Court would place the parties in a state of limbo, it being acknowledge that the marriage broke down back in May 2024, but the parties being prevented from having their separation formalised by the divorce process. It prevents them working together to resolve issues of division of assets on divorce, all the more important because they are parents to their son whose future also hangs in the balance while his parents’ issues remain unresolved.

Returning to the point made in the authorities, that the court should be slow to overturn a decision of an overseas court that has followed a process, and having regard to all the circumstances, I have concluded that the arguments in favour of recognising it outweigh those in favour of refusing to acknowledge it.

I accept that there remains the possibility that the husband may be successful in his application to the court in Lahore to set aside the decree of divorce. However, for essentially the same reasons that I refused the stay, I do not consider this constitutes a reason not to recognise the decree at this time.

If the husband is ultimately successful, then it is right that the foundation for the financial remedies proceedings in this jurisdiction will fall away. The parties are agreed that the steps that would then need to be taken would be that one of the parties will need to apply for a divorce in this jurisdiction.

That of course has the potential for causing confusion and could upset all the work that has been done within financial remedies proceedings. However, I must determine cases on the basis of the facts as they are, not on the basis of a possibility that those facts may change. The decree is a valid document obtained after an effective process (section 46). Unless and until it is set aside it should be treated as such.

Any work the parties have done in exchanging information about their finances and entering into meaningful negotiations will not be wasted. That work will be needed, even if a fresh divorce is required. The work needs to take place as soon as reasonably practicable, in order to enable the parties to put themselves on a new footing financially and emotionally after the divorce, and to support their son.

If at the time the financial remedies proceedings are nearing their conclusion, the husband’s applications in Pakistan are still outstanding, the Court can make protection orders providing that any final order in financial remedies proceedings may not be enforced without permission of the Court.

For all these reasons I have determined that the public policy arguments fall in favour of recognising the khula. The court should recognise the validity of the decree.

I will make an order recognising the overseas divorce pursuant to section 51 of the Family Law Act 1986.

I grant permission for the wife to bring a claim for financial remedies in this jurisdiction, pursuant to section 13 of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984.