Sheffield Designated Family Court
48 West Bar,
SHEFFIELD
S3 8PH
Before :
H.H. Judge Marson
Between :
SHEFFIELD CITY COUNCIL | Applicant |
- and - | |
(1) THE MOTHER (2) THE FATHER (3) THE CHILDREN (4) CHILD ‘A’ | Respondents |
Ms J. Cole (instructed by Sheffield City Council) for the Applicant
Ms M. Harbin (instructed by Taylor & Emmet Solicitors) for the First Respondent Mother
Mrs P. Stanistreet-Keen (instructed by Howells Solicitors) for the Second Respondent Father
Mrs K. Broughton (instructed by the children’s guardian Kiri Smith), for the children
Ms H. Bramley (instructed by Howard & Co.) for the child, A.
Hearing dates: 24th, 25th , 26th, 27th and 31st March 2025 and 1st 2nd 3rd 4th April 2025
Judgment handed down on the 1st May 2025
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10am on the 1st May 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by subsequent release to the National Archives
IMPORTANT NOTICE This judgment was given in private. The court permits publication of this judgment on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of this judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including the parents, their legal representatives, legal bloggers and representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court. |
H.H. Judge Marson:
The original version of this judgment included the names of the children, parents, other friends and family members and all professionals involved with the family, and specific dates were identified. This published version has been altered to preserve the privacy and anonymity of the family concerned.
The court is concerned with the welfare of five children; Child ‘A’, a boy born in 2011 who is 14 years old; Child ‘B’, a girl born in 2013 aged 12 years; Child ‘C’, a boy born in 2017 aged 7 years; Child ‘D’, a boy born in 2020 aged 4 years, and Child E, a girl born in 2022 aged 3 years. The children, with the exception of Child A, have been represented at this hearing by counsel, Ms Broughton who in turn takes her instructions from the Children’s Guardian, Mrs Kiri Smith. Child A, by virtue of his age and understanding, has the capacity to provide his own instructions to his legal representatives and he is separately represented by Ms Bramley.
The children’s parents are [the mother] who is represented by counsel, Ms Harbin, and any references to ‘the mother’ in this judgment refer to [her]. The children’s father is [Mr X] who is represented by counsel, Mrs Stanistreet-Keen and similarly, any references in this judgment to ‘the father’ refer to Mr X.
The local authority in this case is Sheffield City Council and it is represented in these proceedings by counsel, Ms Cole. I may refer to it hereafter as ‘the local authority’.
At this composite final hearing the local authority seeks final care orders in respect of all five children with care plans of long-term foster care for children A, B and C, and care plans of adoption outside of their birth family for D and E. For this reason, the court also has placement order applications before it for those two children.
If care orders are made in respect of the eldest three children, the local authority proposes to place ‘A’ and ‘B’ together in a long term foster placement. It is proposed both children will have supervised family time with their parents at a frequency of at least two hours per month with additional opportunities to spend time together during religious and cultural festivals. It is proposed A and B will also have family time with D and E at a frequency of once per month until the local authority establishes a plan of adoption with a family match for the younger two children. The local authority intends to explore introducing supervised family time between A, B and C, but as A and B consider C holds some responsibility for the situation the family finds itself in, there is a need for preparatory work to be undertaken with all three children separately to ensure it is the best interests of each individual child.
The local authority proposes to place Child C separately in long term foster care. Child C has expressed a clear preference not to have contact with his parents and he has not seen them since he was placed in foster care 11 months ago. Further work needs to be undertaken with C to reassure and support him to have contact with his parents in the hope, in the longer term, their relationship may be repaired and he may join in the time his older siblings spend with their parents. It is not known when or if that stage will be reached. His proposed contact with A and B, if it can be achieved, is to have face to face contact starting at three times a year and increasing the frequency if it is going well and that is what the children wish to happen. It is proposed Child C will continue to spend family time with D and E at a frequency of once per month unless and until the younger two children are matched and placed for adoption when it will reduce.
In respect of Child D and Child E, it is proposed they will be placed together in an adoptive placement. If placement orders are made, their contact with their parents will gradually reduce from its existing weekly frequency to once a month until such time as they are placed into an adoptive placement. Post-placement and in the longer term it is proposed D and E will maintain a direct relationship with their birth parents via the exchange of letters/cards and a video call, approximately three months following each Letter Box contact. Should this indirect form of contact be consistent and positive, the local authority intends to promote face to face contact between the children and their adoptive parents post-adoption, at a neutral venue.
Similarly, the local authority intends to promote direct contact between D and E with their siblings both directly and indirectly following the children being placed for adoption at a frequency of once per year face to face, with video calls around birthdays and significant cultural and religious festivals. It is proposed the adoptive parents will meet with the foster carers for the respective older children and group family time sessions for all five siblings together should be arranged once per year to maintain a sense of family connection and identity.
If care and placement orders are made for D and E, the search for an adoptive family will be undertaken for 12 months and if a family is not found within that period the children will be placed together in a long-term foster placement. The search for an adoptive placement will be twin-tracked with a search for a suitable long term foster placement from around 6 months to avoid what Ms Rowe described in her evidence as the search falling ‘off a cliff edge’ at the 12 month point.
At this final hearing the parents do not agree with the local authority’s applications. They seek the immediate return of all five children to their care but with some recognition this is an unlikely outcome for Child C. If the children cannot be returned immediately, the parents seek an adjournment of this final hearing for further assessment. Child A opposes the care plan for himself and seeks to return to the care of his parents.
The Children’s Guardian supports the local authority’s applications and the proposed plan for permanency for D and E by way of adoption. Mrs Smith also supports the proposed contact arrangements and invites the court to make orders pursuant to section 26 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 to underscore the importance of the ongoing family relationships. The local authority does not consider such orders to be necessary as it asserts it is committed to implementing the care plans as set out above.
I have heard oral evidence from 15 witnesses in the following chronological order to accommodate their availability. All of the oral evidence has been translated into the parents first language of [an African dialect] to enable them to understand it fully:
HT (Child C’s Headteacher at the time of the index incident);
CT (Child C’s class teacher at the time of the index incident);
Ms Maria D’Amico (Social Worker who attended school after the index incident);
OIC Cox (Investigating Police Officer who conducted the section 18 PACE Act 1984 search and attended Child C’s ABE Interview);
Ms Katie Monaghan (Social Worker who attended school after the index incident);
DC Radford (Police Officer who conducted Child C’s ABE Interview);
Ms Claire Badger (the previously allocated Social Worker in 2018);
Dr Mohammed Rahman (court appointed Consultant Paediatrician);
Mr Daniel Roberts (Social Worker and author of the parenting assessments);
Mr Brian Marsden (the previously allocated Social Worker);
Ms Liz Rowe ( Senior Fieldwork Manager for ‘Family Finding’);
Ms Toni Claridge (social work Team Manager and author of the amended final care plans);
The mother;
The father;
Mrs Kiri Smith (the children’s guardian).
No party sought to challenge any of the other evidence filed although not all of it is agreed. I have read, watched and considered all of the written evidence, reports, exhibits, photographs, video interviews and Police disclosure filed in these proceedings. I have received and read written submissions from all parties for which I am grateful. Although this judgment is being written in sections, consideration of the evidence and the realistic options for all five children has been undertaken holistically for each individual child.
It should also be noted that where reported speech is given in italics in this judgment it is taken from the written and/or oral evidence and in the latter case it is taken from my own contemporary notes of the oral evidence. This means whilst it is materially and factually accurate it is possible some quotations may not be verbatim due to the speed at which the note was written during live evidence. In accordance with guidance from the Court of Appeal, I have addressed only those issues which I consider are relevant, proportionate and necessary to determine the applications before the court.
Where care and placement orders are applied for together, the task for the court is to conduct a holistic evaluation of the relevant child’s welfare throughout their life, and to determine whether their welfare requires them to be made the subject of a final care order and placement order which would have the effect of removing them permanently from their birth family, or whether there is a more proportionate and realistic option namely, in this case, placing Child D and/or E in the care of their parents either immediately or within a timescale which is meaningful for their welfare.
THE LAW
I have been helpfully assisted by the advocates as to the law I must apply in their written submissions and I have directed myself in accordance with it and with the principles in the following cases.
In describing the background and in the narrative parts of this judgment, I may address matters upon which the parties do not agree. I may give my findings on these disputed matters as they arise and when doing so it is in the context of having considered the evidence as a whole even though the judgment is being written in sections. When making findings I have applied the following principles derived from the judgment of Baker J (as he then was) in the case of A Local Authority v (1) A Mother (2) A Father (3) L & M (Children by their Children’s Guardian) [2013] EWHC 1569 (Fam):-
The burden of proving an allegation lies with the party who is making it, in this case that is the local authority;
The standard to which it must prove it is the usual civil standard namely the balance of probabilities.
Findings must be based on evidence and on inferences which can be properly drawn from the evidence but cannot be based on mere suspicion or speculation.
Evidence cannot be evaluated and assessed in separate compartments. A Judge in these cases must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to a conclusion whether the case put forward by the local authority has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof.
Whilst appropriate attention must be paid to the opinion of medical experts, those opinions need to be considered in the context of all the other evidence. It is important to remember that the roles of the court and the expert are distinct and it is the court that is in the position to weigh up the expert evidence against its findings on the other evidence. It is the judge who makes the final decision.
In assessing the expert evidence……. the court must be careful to ensure that each expert keeps within the bounds of their own expertise and defers, where appropriate, to the expertise of others.
The evidence of the parents and any other carers is of the utmost importance. It is essential that the court forms a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability.
It is common for witnesses in these cases to tell lies in the course of the investigation and the hearing. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for many reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear and distress, and the fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything (see R v Lucas [1981] QB 720)
As observed by Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P in an earlier case:
The judge in care proceedings must never forget that today’s medical certainty may be discarded by the next generation of experts or that scientific research would throw a light into corners that are at present dark”.
And the importance of the court taking into account, to the extent that it is appropriate in any case, the possibility of the unknown cause.
In order to make a care or supervision order the local authority must prove that the situation justifies the intervention of the State. It achieves this by establishing the statutory threshold set out in section 31 of the Children Act 1989 is crossed. It also means the Article 6 and 8 rights of the children and the parents are engaged.
In this case the issue of whether the section 31 threshold criteria are satisfied was fully disputed by the parents at the outset of this hearing. In their closing written submissions each parent concedes the threshold is crossed but not for the reasons the local authority has pleaded. Accordingly, there is a schedule of facts and findings submitted by the local authority which still requires determination by the court, and the following additional cases and guidance is relevant to that exercise.
Lies and credibility. As the President, McFarlane LJ observed in Re H-C (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 136 at paragraph 97:
A family court, in common with a criminal court, can rely upon a finding that a witness has lied as evidence in support of a primary positive allegation. The well-known authority is the case of R v Lucas (R) [1981] QB 720 in which the Court of Appeal Criminal Division, after stressing that people sometimes tell lies for reasons other than a belief that the lie is necessary to conceal guilt, held that four conditions must be satisfied before a defendant’s lie could be seen as supporting the prosecution case as explained in the judgment of the court given by Lord Lane CJ:
“To be capable of amounting to corroboration the lie told out of court must first of all be deliberate. Secondly it must relate to a material issue. Thirdly the motive for the lie must be a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth. The jury should in appropriate cases be reminded that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour from their family. Fourthly the statement must be clearly shown to be a lie by evidence other than that of the accomplice who is to be corroborated, that is to say by admission or by evidence from an independent witness.”
The decision in R v Lucas has been the subject of a number of further decisions of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division over the years, however the core conditions set out by Lord Lane remain authoritative. The approach in R v Lucas is not confined, as it was on the facts of Lucas itself, to a statement made out of court and can apply to a “lie” made in the course of the court proceedings and the approach is not limited solely to evidence concerning accomplices.
In the Family Court in an appropriate case a judge will not infrequently directly refer to the authority of R v Lucas in giving a judicial self-direction as to the approach to be taken to an apparent lie. Where the “lie” has a prominent or central relevance to the case such a self-direction is plainly sensible and good practice.
One highly important aspect of the Lucas decision, and indeed the approach to lies generally in the criminal jurisdiction, needs to be borne fully in mind by family judges. It is this: in the criminal jurisdiction the “lie” is never taken, of itself, as direct proof of guilt. As is plain from the passage quoted from Lord Lane’s judgment in Lucas, where the relevant conditions are satisfied the lie is “capable of amounting to a corroboration”. In recent times the point has been most clearly made in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division in the case of R v Middleton [2001] Crim.L.R. 251. In my view there should be no distinction between the approach taken by the criminal court on the issue of lies to that adopted in the family court. Judges should therefore take care to ensure that they do not rely upon a conclusion that an individual has lied on a material issue as direct proof of guilt.
In Lancashire County Council v The Children and Others [2014] EWHC 3 (Fam) at paragraph 9 of his judgment and having directed himself on the relevant law, Jackson J (as he then was) said:-
‘…where repeated accounts are given the court must think carefully about the significance or otherwise of any reported discrepancies. They may arise for a number of reasons. One possibility is of course that they are lies designed to hide culpability. Another is that they are lies told for other reasons. Further possibilities include faulty recollection or confusion at the time of stress or where the importance of accuracy is not fully appreciated, or there may be inaccuracy or mistake in the record-keeping or recollection of the person hearing and relaying the account. The possible effect of delay and repeated questioning upon memory should also be considered, as should the effect of one person on hearing accounts given by another. As memory fades, a desire to iron out wrinkles may not be unnatural; a process that might inelegantly be described as “story-creep” may occur without any necessary inferences of bad faith.’
The importance of following these principles was reinforced in the decision made by the Court of Appeal in Re A, B and C (Children) [2021] EWCA Civ 451 and the judgment of Macur LJ. In paragraph 52 the learned judge states:
“It is quite possible that the tribunal may conclude that, in the particular circumstances of the case, the integrity and substance of the uncorroborated evidence of the child complainant is sufficiently compelling to lead them to determine that the alleged perpetrator’s denials must be a lie. In others the tribunal may reasonably determine that it is incumbent to look for other evidence in support”.
And at paragraph 54:
“That a witness’s dishonesty may be irrelevant in determining an issue of fact is commonly acknowledged in judgments, and with respect to the Recorder as we see in her judgment at [40], in formulaic terms…But this formulation leaves open the question: how and when is a witness’s lack of credibility to be factored into the equation of determining an issue of fact? In my view, the answer is provided by the terms of the entire ‘Lucas’ direction as given, when necessary, in criminal trials.
Chapter 16-3, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the December 2020 Crown Court Compendium, provides a useful legal summary:
A defendant’s lie, whether made before the trial or in the course of evidence or both, may be probative of guilt. A lie is only capable of supporting other evidence against D if the jury are sure that (1) it is shown by other evidence in the case, to be a deliberate untruth; i.e. it did not arise from confusion or mistake; (2) it relates to a significant issue, (3) it was not told for a reason advanced by or on behalf of D, or for some other reason arising from the evidence, which does not point to D’s guilt.
The direction should be tailored to the circumstances of the case, but the jury must be directed that only if they are sure these criteria are satisfied can D’s lie be used as some support fotr the prosecution case, but that the lie itself cannot prove guilt…”
The application of the above guidance was further clarified by Peter Jackson LJ in the case of Re H (Children: Uncertain Perpetrator: Lies)[2024] EWCA Civ 1261.
Para 21: “The court’s view of a witness’s overall credibility and reliability will naturally contribute to its evaluation of whether it can accept their evidence on the critical issues. If it concludes that lies have been told, it will consider what weight, if any, should be given to that aspect of the matter, after due consideration of any explanations have been offered. That is part of the normal process of sifting and weighing the evidence, and explaining the result. The family courts encounter many forms of bad behaviour and they are used to assessing their true significance for the issue in hand. There is no special rule of evidence for lies.”
Para 22; “I would therefore make one observation about the description of good practice in Re A, B and C. At [58(iii)] it is said that the court should seek to identify the basis on which it can be determined that the only explanation for the lie(s) is guilt. That draws on the slightly different jury direction in the Crown Court Compendium… which requires that a lie is only capable of supporting other evidence against a defendant if the jury are sure that it was not told for a reason advanced by or on behalf of the defendant, or for some other reason arising from the evidence, which does not point to the defendant’s guilt.” Para 22
Para 23: “Relying on a literal reading of Re A, B and C, Mr Barnes further argues that the court is required to exclude a lie from consideration altogether in any case where it cannot be satisfied (to whatever standard) that the only explanation for it is to conceal guilt. I do not accept that submission. There will be some cases where the ultimate finding is so critically dependent on the assessment of the particular lie – that the court may out of caution wish to direct itself in accordance with Re A, B and C. ….. It will be sufficient for the judge to recall that the true significance of a lie must be carefully assessed, for all the well-known reasons noted by the judge in the present case. A general exclusionary rule, exclusively directed at lies, would be inconsistent with the duty on the court to consider all the evidence. Once it has done that, its conclusion in an individual case may be that the lie was told to conceal guilt, but that is a conclusion, not a test…Any other approach would hamper the court in carrying out its important assessment of credibility and its evaluation of particular issues of fact.
I have had regard to the dicta of Peter Jackson J (as he then was) in Re BR (Proof of Facts) [2015] EWFC 41. In particular paragraphs 4-7:
The court acts on evidence, not speculation or assumption. It acts on facts, not worries or concerns.
Evidence comes in many forms. It can be live, written, direct, hearsay, electronic, photographic, circumstantial, factual, or by way of expert opinion. It can concern major topics and small details, things that are important and things that are trivial.
The burden of proving a fact rests on the person who asserts it.
The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities: Is it more likely than not that the event occurred? Neither the seriousness of the allegation, nor the seriousness of the consequences, nor the inherent probabilities alters this.
Where an allegation is a serious one, there is no requirement that the evidence must be of a special quality. The court will consider grave allegations with proper care, but evidence is evidence and the approach to analysing it remains the same in every case. In my view, statements of principle (some relied on in this case) that suggest that an enhanced level of evidential cogency or clarity is required in order to prove a very serious allegation do not assist and may lead a fact-finder into error. Despite all disclaimers, reference to qualitative concepts such as cogency and clarity may wrongly be taken to imply that some elevated standard of proof is called for.
Nor does the seriousness of the consequences of a finding of fact affect the standard to which it must be proved. Whether a man was in a London street at a particular time might be of no great consequence if the issue is whether he was rightly issued with a parking ticket, but it might be of huge consequence if he has been charged with a murder that occurred that day in Paris. The evidential standard to which his presence in the street must be proved is nonetheless the same.
The court takes account of any inherent probability or improbability of an event having occurred as part of a natural process of reasoning. But the fact that an event is a very common one does not lower the standard of probability to which it must be proved. Nor does the fact that an event is very uncommon raise the standard of proof that must be satisfied before it can be said to have occurred.
Similarly, the frequency or infrequency with which an event generally occurs cannot divert attention from the question of whether it actually occurred …
The court must guard against the danger of reversing the burden of proof. The burden remains at all times upon the local authority to prove the facts alleged to the requisite standard, and it is not for a parent or carer to disprove facts or present an alternative explanation for events. Re M (Fact-finding: Burden of Proof) [2013] 2 FLR 874 at 881:
‘The burden of proof lies on the local authority to prove the case against the parents. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities, and that means the same in this kind of case as in every other, a simple balance of probability. Suspicion is not proof, and the burden must always remain on the local authority and should not be reversed…’
and
‘That, too, was the effect of the judge's view of the case: that absent a parental explanation, there was no satisfactory benign explanation, ergo there must be a malevolent explanation. And it is that leap which troubles me. It does not seem to me that the conclusion necessarily follows unless, wrongly, the burden of proof has been reversed, and the parents were required to satisfy the court that this is not a non-accidental injury.’
I have reminded myself of the specific guidance on the law and authoritative guidance pertaining to ABE Interviews given by MacDonald J in the case of AS v TH (False Allegations of Abuse)[2016] EWHC 532 Fam. In addition, a second judgment of Mr Justice MacDonald in the case of Re P (Sexual Abuse – Finding of Fact Hearing) [2019] EWFC 27. I have carefully considered the valuable points made about children’s suggestibility and ‘confirmation bias’, and the need for professionals to keep an open mind, together with the 12 point memorandum in paragraph 577:
“That said, and considering the authorities set out above, the Report of the Inquiry into child abuse in Cleveland 1987 Cm 412 and Report of the Inquiry into the Removal of Children from Orkney in February 1991 among others and the contents of the current ABE Guidance, I am satisfied that this court can take judicial notice of the following matters:
i) Children, and especially young children, are suggestible.
ii) Memory is prone to error and easily influenced by the environment in which recall is invited.
iii) Memories can be confabulated from imagined experiences, it is possible to induce false memories and children can speak sincerely and emotionally about events that did not in fact occur.
iv) Allegations made by children may emerge in a piecemeal fashion, with children often not reporting events in a linear history, reporting them in a partial way and revisiting topics.
v) The wider circumstances of the child’s life may influence, explain or colour what the child is saying.
vi) Factors affecting when a child says something will include their capacity to understand their world and their role within it, requiring caution when interpreting children’s references to behaviour or parts of the body through the prism of adult learning or reading.
vii) Accounts given by children are susceptible to influence by leading or otherwise suggestive questions, repetition, pressure, threats, negative stereotyping and encouragement, reward or praise.
viii) Accounts given by children are susceptible to influence as the result of bias or preconceived ideas on the part of the interlocutor.
ix) Accounts given by children are susceptible to contamination by the statements of others, which contamination may influence a child’s responses.
x) Children may embellish or overlay a general theme with apparently convincing detail which can appear highly credible and be very difficult to detect, even for those who are experienced in dealing with children.
xi) Delay between an event recounted and the allegation made with respect to that event may influence the accuracy of the account given.
Within this context, the way, and the stage at which a child is asked questions/interviewed will have a profound effect on the accuracy of the child’s testimony.
I have read and reminded myself of the revised guidance for ABE Interviews published subsequent to the above cases and contained in the January 2022 edition.
In the context of this case it is necessary to remind myself of Ryder LJ’s judgment in Re S [2014] EWCA Civ 25 and in particular, paragraphs 19 – 21 of that judgment wherein he states:
§19. The term 'non-accidental injury' may be a term of art used by clinicians as a shorthand and I make no criticism of its use but it is a 'catch-all' for everything that is not an accident. It is also a tautology: the true distinction is between an accident which is unexpected and unintentional and an injury which involves an element of wrong. That element of wrong may involve a lack of care and/or intent of a greater or lesser degree that may amount to negligence, recklessness or deliberate infliction. While an analysis of that kind may be helpful to distinguish deliberate infliction from, say, negligence, it is unnecessary in any consideration of whether the threshold criteria are satisfied because what the statute requires is something different namely, findings of fact that at least satisfy the significant harm, attributability and objective standard of care elements of section 31(2).
§ 20. The court's function is to make the findings of fact that it is able on the evidence and then analyse those findings against the statutory formulation. The gloss imported by the use of unexplained legal, clinical or colloquial terms is not helpful to that exercise nor is it necessary for the purposes of section 31(2) to characterise the fact of what happened as negligence, recklessness or in any other way. Just as non-accidental injury is a tautology, 'accidental injury' is an oxymoron that is unhelpful as a description. If the term was used during the discussion after the judgment had been given as a description of one of the possibilities of how the harm had been caused, then it should not have been; it being a contradiction in terms. If, as is often the case when a clinical expert describes harm as being a 'non accidental injury', there is a range of factual possibilities, those possibilities should be explored with the expert and the witnesses so that the court can understand which, if any, described mechanism is compatible with the presentation of harm.
§ 21. The threshold is not concerned with intent or blame; it is concerned with whether the objective standard of care which it would be reasonable to expect for the child in question has not been provided so that the harm suffered is attributable to the care actually provided. The judge is not limited to the way the case is put by the local authority but if options are not adequately explored a judge may find a vital piece of the jigsaw missing when s/he comes to look at all the evidence in the round.
In relation to the issue of similar fact evidence and propensity, I have reminded myself of the judgement of Peter Jackson LJ in Re S (Children: Findings of Fact) [2023] EWCA Civ 1113 para [30]:
“I also consider that the judge was in error in relation to the issues of propensity and hindsight bias. The question of propensity or similar fact evidence arises where an individual's behaviour in other circumstances makes it more likely that he will have behaved in the manner now alleged: see R v P (Children: Similar Fact Evidence) [2020] EWCA Civ 1088, [2020] 4 WLR 132 at [23]. In that case, the question was whether a man's behaviour towards one partner was admissible in relation to allegations made by another partner. Here, the court was concerned with a sequence of events within the same family. Self-evidently, one finding about a parent's behaviour towards a child might be relevant to another similar allegation and there was no need to resort to the concept of propensity or to erect artificial barriers around the assessment of evidence. Similarly, the well-known concept of hindsight bias cannot deflect the court from making a common-sense assessment of the evidence as a whole, and I do not understand the judge’s apprehension that the local authority was asking him to do something unusual or impermissible”.
THE BACKGROUND
The following facts are agreed, unopposed, or found by the court, except where stated otherwise.
The parents originate from [a country in Africa], the father arrived in the UK as a refugee in around 2014/15 and was placed in accommodation for asylum seekers for around 6 months before being granted asylum. The mother joined him in the UK in 2016 and brought children A and B with her. They now have indefinite leave to remain in the UK, and the parents speak [an African dialect] as their first language. The father is able to speak and read some English but the mother cannot, and they both need support to read and understand more complex text/correspondence. The three youngest children were born in the UK and speak English and [the African dialect], whereas A and B who were born in [Africa] can speak and understand both. I have met with and spoken to A and B at their request with the agreement of all parties, and they have an excellent ability to converse in the English language.
The precipitating incident which caused the issuing of these proceedings began on the 1st May 2024 when Child C was disciplined at school for using threatening comments towards peers in his class. A class teacher and the school’s designated safeguarding lead person (DSL), spoke to the father about C’s behaviour, presumably at the end of the school day although her statement is non-specific about the timing, and the father denied C says such things at home.
The next day, 2nd May 2024 C did not attend school. The explanation for his absence given by the father at the time is that he had a headache. In the parents’ oral evidence they gave a different version and both asserted it was because C did not wish to go and they did not wish to force him to go.
On Friday 3rd May 2024 C did attend school but he was again involved in an incident, this time fighting and swearing in school. His class teacher explained to C she would need to speak to his father about his behaviour which led C to say “No, he will hit me again. He will hit me” over and over again and he burst into tears. The DSL spoke to C about this and he is alleged to have told her had been hit before by his father and proceeded to show the DSL where he had been hit revealing multiple marks and bruises on his right thigh and upper and lower back, some of which were linear, and some circular consistent with having been hit with implements.
This led to Police and social care involvement, and later the same day two social workers, Katie Monaghan and Maria D’Amico spoke to C and B in school. C alleged to them it was both of his parents who had hit him with a wooden object which the mother uses for cooking, B made no allegations. The parents were arrested and the Police exercised their powers of protection prior to the local authority issuing this application.
On the 8 May 2024 interim care orders were made by DJ Corkhill at an urgent hearing following the expiry of the police powers of protection.
On the 10 May 2024, C underwent a child protection medical (CPM) which was conducted by Dr G., a consultant paediatrician. It had been delayed by the parents’ refusal to consent to the same. The evidence in Dr G.’s written CPM report lists the bruises and marks which were visible to her on C’s skin, and she viewed the extensive bruising in the photographs taken of C’s back on the 3 May 2024 by Maria D’Amico on her mobile phone, which were no longer present upon her clinical examination. In her oral evidence, Ms D’Amico confirmed the photographs she took on the 3 May are those which appear in the electronic court bundle at F1 – F3 which I have seen. It is common ground the bruising to C is very extensive and distressing to look at.
In her unchallenged evidence, Dr G. opines: “the bruises to C’s back are red/purple in appearance, they have a tramline/linear appearance. The bruises are mainly in the right upper quadrant and mid-central area of his back…In addition the photographs show a large purple bruise to the right buttock/upper thigh which was not evident today. The other bruising seen in the photographs taken on Friday 3rd May was evident on examination today but is more pronounced in the photographs”.
In her opinion, Dr G. concludes; “The appearance of these bruises is concerning for an implement being used. I haven’t seen the implements alleged to have been used but have been told that they are a wooden spoon and a broom handle. The shape of the bruising would fit with a circular implement, such as a large wooden spoon and a linear implement, such as a broom handle”. … “The bruising observed today, a week after it was first seen by social workers, is still extensive. C would have been hit with significant force to produce this extent of bruising. The bruising pattern is consistent with inflicted injury. Of significance, C had a safeguarding medical assessment back in 2018 when there were concerns about physical abuse of an older sibling (Child A). It is also significant that C has extensive dental decay and reports having toothache, this suggests dental neglect”.
Having taken this evidence into account, on the 15 May 2024 the interim care orders were extended for the duration of these proceedings. Child A is placed with kinship carers, ‘Aunt’ F and her husband; the four younger children are currently placed in foster care. B and C are in two separate placements; Dand E are placed together. The children have continued to be placed separately as outlined above throughout these proceedings.
On the 30th July 2024 child C participated in an Achieving Best Evidence video interview facilitated by the South Yorkshire Police which was recorded, it may be referred to as the ‘ABE’ interview hereafter for ease of reference. The parties and the court have that pre-recorded interview available to them and a transcript of it. In the interview C makes allegations of physical and emotional abuse perpetrated upon him by his parents. The local authority relies upon C’s ABE interview as evidence of what has happened to him in the care of his parents, and to satisfy the section 31 statutory threshold for intervention.
Throughout these proceedings and up until Day 6 of this final hearing, both parents denied ever having physically or emotionally abused any of their children. They denied having seen any marks or bruises on C as described by Dr G. At the outset of this final hearing they did not accept the photographs taken by Ms D’Amico are of C because the photographs do not show the child’s face, only the extensive bruising. On Day 6 the father made an admission he had hit C with a stick/branch he had picked up on the way home from school on the 1st May 2024. The mother maintains her denial of any wrongdoing.
The local authority alleges at paragraph 10 of its schedule that both parents failed to protect the other children in the family home from witnessing the assault upon C which took place on the 1 May 2024 and this was emotionally abusive to all of the children.
The local authority also pleads an earlier assault by the mother against Child A in 2018, when it asserts she hit ‘A’ with a coat hanger. It being connected and linked to the statutory threshold by way of similar fact evidence and the finding at paragraph 12 sought against both parents namely, they choose to use excessive physical chastisement as a means of routinely punishing their children and, notwithstanding social care intervention in 2018, it has not led to any sustained change in the parents’ behaviour demonstrated by their subsequent assault upon child C. The mother denies any assault upon ‘A’ in 2018 and denies any recollection of social care involvement at that time, the father also asserts he has no recollection of any social care involvement and asserts he was always at work, and at the outset of this final hearing both parents were denying ever using excessive physical chastisement as a means of punishing their children.
The evidence relied upon by the local authority in support of the assault upon ‘A’ in 2018 is derived from historic social care records which include a child protection medical performed upon ‘A’ by Dr R., a Consultant Paediatrician, in January 2018. The notes record both parents were present and the father gave his consent to the medical assessment taking place, his signed written consent form is in the court bundle and in his oral evidence he confirmed that was his signature on the consent form. In January 2018 the father refused to give his consent for any photographic recording of ‘A’s bruises asserting it was ‘against their religion’. He now asserts he has no recollection of saying or doing any of this.
The history given to Dr R. by the social worker who was then involved with the family, Claire Badger is that ‘A’ had been to school that morning and showed his teacher several scratches to his left arm and said that “his mum had hurt him and was very, very angry. ‘A’ told his teacher that his mum had hit him with a ‘costume peg with a question mark at the top’. His teacher showed him a coat hanger and he said ‘yes’ that was what had been used”. ‘A’ was reported to have scratches with unbroken skin on both left and right forearms and his left thigh.
At the hospital, Dr R. used the interpretation service, ‘Language Line’, to communicate with the parents. From that conversation Dr R. has recorded the following:
“I asked the parents if they knew that ‘A’ had marks on his arms and legs and if they knew how he had got them. ‘A’s mother said ‘he did not hit the wall or anything’. She told me that she had hit ‘A’ to cause the marks. ‘A’’s mother said that ‘A’ had misbehaved. He had urinated; wet himself whilst wearing his clothes. He did this whilst watching television. At the time mum was busy preparing breakfast for him and his siblings. His siblings had sat on the wet bed and his mum was very cross. ‘A’s mother admitted that she had lost her temper and after removing ‘A’s dirty clothes she said she had hit him with a ‘piece of clothes’. It was difficult to ascertain through the translation of the interpreter what exactly mum meant but the interpreter clarified that mum had said she had hit him with clothes. [The mother] said that she had hit ‘A’ that morning before he went to school. I asked if that had happened before and she said no. Mum repeated many times over that she liked her children and did not hit them. She then said though that she had been very cross with ‘A’ and thought he needed to be punished for his bad behaviour”.
During the clinical examination of ‘A’, he told Dr R. directly, “that his mum had ‘fighted’ him. He mimed how she had hit him on his arms and legs. ‘A’ said that his mum used a ‘clothes peg’ but I asked him to describe what this was for and he said ‘you hang shirt on it to put them in the big cupboard with the mirror on it’. From this description I ascertained that what he was talking about is a clothes hanger and this would fit with what he said to the teacher at school”. ‘A’ told Dr R. that his mother had hit him many times and not simply on this one occasion.
When Dr R. examined ‘A’ she found a significant number of bruises. These were multiple, linear red bruises, parallel to each other in groups of 2 or 3 on both lower arms and his left outer thigh. Dr R.’s opinion is that the bruising she saw is consistent with the history given by ‘A’ of being struck with a solid linear object. She states that considerable force was used to cause the bruising and that ‘A’ has been hit multiple times. Dr R.’s opinion is that reasonable chastisement is not an appropriate explanation or effective behaviour management for wetting accidents.
The outcome of Dr R.’s CPM led to a section 47 child protection investigation being conducted by social care and the Police. Social workers visited the family in January 2018 and spoke to the mother. Ms Claire Badger told the court in her oral evidence, and it was not challenged, that she informed the mother of the law in the UK regarding physical chastisement and the mother agreed she would not use physical chastisement again. The child protection investigation concluded in March 2018 with some concerns ‘A’ had not been registered with a dentist and the children having outstanding immunisations, but as the parents were otherwise cooperating with social care the case was closed in April 2018.
In June 2024 each of the children underwent health assessments which concluded B, C and D’s dental health had been neglected, and B’s medical needs had been neglected by the parents’ failure to ensure her attendance at ophthalmic appointments despite being repeatedly advised by school staff to do so. B was assessed as having reduced vision in both eyes but the parents neglected to take her to follow up appointments leading to B being discharged from necessary health services. The parents deny any neglect of the children’s health needs. The local authority no longer relies on the evidence of this neglect to satisfy the statutory threshold but does assert it is relevant to the children’s welfare and consideration of the welfare checklist within section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989.
THE EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO THE FINDINGS SOUGHT TO SATISFY THE SECTION 31 STATUTORY THRESHOLD
MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND ASSESSMENTS
In addition to the above child protection medicals of ‘A’ by Dr R. in 2018, and of C by Dr G. in May 2024, the court directed an independent paediatric assessment to be undertaken of the marks/bruises seen on C on the 3 May 2024, and Dr Mohammed Rahman, Consultant Paediatrican was appointed by the court. Dr Rahman has provided an initial report dated 25 June 2024 and two addendum reports dated 1 August and 11 November 2024 following a clinical examination of C in person on the 31 October 2024. He was required to give oral evidence and was cross examined by the parents. His opinion remained unchanged throughout.
It is Dr Rahman’s opinion is that C’s blood test results are normal and he does not have any susceptibility to bruise more easily than any other child. In his oral evidence, Dr Rahman stated, “When we look at children with underlying problems with their blood clotting we see marks which are not patterned. By doing a full blood count we have excluded the conditions which would produce small bruises. They (the health care professionals at the CPM) have excluded the majority of the blood clotting conditions by doing a full blood count. However, we have not excluded all conditions which may lead to bruising. If we consider rarer conditions, it is extremely unlikely C has one of these conditions. They are in-born conditions and come to light much earlier either due to cuts which don’t stop bleeding or gums which bleed or other problems which start from when the child is born. So I am satisfied it is highly unlikely C has any underlying conditions”.
Dr Rahman considered the photographs taken by Ms D’Amico on the 3 May 2024; the photographs taken at the CPM on the 10 May; and the descriptions recorded by Dr G. from her clinical examination on the 10 May 2024. In respect of the latter, he agreed it would have been best practice to create a body map identifying where the bruises appeared on the child’s body and this does not exist, and that some of the marks C has, such as a port wine birth mark on his [body], are not included in the list of marks Dr G. must have seen, but nevertheless he considered the descriptions given by Dr G. which are included are sufficient and those descriptions need to be taken in context: “In safeguarding and CPM situations, we examine a large number of children and we don’t take photographs every time so descriptions are important…The injuries have been listed quite well – the examining doctor has focused on the injuries so I agree it is an omission but I don’t agree it makes a huge difference”.
In his written report Dr Rahman noted the following marks itemised by Dr G. in the CPM on the 10 May 2024:
10cm x 5cm red/purple bruise to upper right ventral (rear) surface of thigh;
1.5cm x 5cm red circular bruise to right shin with central pale area;
4cm x 3.5cm red/purple bruise to mid right thigh inside aspect;
3 x linear brown bruises to upper outer left arm, sizes 5cm x 1cm, 1cm x 2cm, 3.5cm x 1cm;
Dark brown linear bruise to mid-thigh dorsal surface left side;
Blister to back of left heel;
4cm x 1.5cm red bruise with central pale area right upper arm outer aspect with 2.5cm in diameter purple bruise below;
Pigmented mark, possible birth mark overlaying right mid-scapula;
Multiple chicken pox scars to the back;
Café au lait patch to inside aspect of left mid-calf;
A 1.5cm in diameter circular bruise right outer lower thigh, just above the knee;
Multiple overlapping circular red bruises with central pale area, one bruise more linear in appearance, right outer thigh. Bruise sizes 5cm x 1.5cm, 4.5cm x 4.5cm, 4cm x 2.5cm.
2 x linear dark purple bruise right outer leg, just above the knee.
In his written and oral evidence he maintained his opinion that marks itemised above at 1; 2; 3; 11; 12 and 13 are patterned bruises showing a pattern suggestive of a spoon with a circular part and a linear part because accidental injuries do not leave such specific patterns. There is no photograph of #2 but Dr Rahman relies upon Dr G.’s description of it. Marks #4, #5 and #7 are described as linear marks and although there are no photographs provided of these marks, they are in keeping with an inflicted injury with a linear object such as a spoon handle. The mark at #6 is non-specific and the marks at #8, #9 and #10 are not inflicted injuries.
Dr Rahman then requested and received the photographs taken by the Police of the wooden spoon and broom which the Police allege they took from the family home in a Section 18, Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act 1984 search of the property on the 4th May 2024. The parents dispute these items were taken from their home and I shall address this point further below. Having viewed these photographs Dr Rahman provided his updated opinion on the 2 August and he states; “the wooden spoon shown on the photos matches the injuries noted on ‘C’…The bruises noted match the wooden spoon very closely…My original opinions remain unchanged”.
When preparing this updated report, Dr Rahman was provided with some further photographs of C taken on the 15 July 2024 which noted some pigmentary changes to his right thigh, he was asked to clarify what these were and whether they were new injuries. This led to the request for Dr Rahman to assess C face to face which he did in October 2024.
In his third and final report, Dr Rahman opines the remaining marks seen on C’s body are either pigment related or birthmarks. In his oral evidence he clarified this and explained: “When children who have pigment in their skin, depending on their racial origin, injuries may not heal in the sense they leave a mark behind. These marks are not scars necessarily, they are movement of pigment so you can see persisting marks due to the darkening of the skin which may last quite a long time.”
In cross examination, Dr Rahman was asked to consider alternative explanations for the marks/bruises such as C falling over or them being caused by another child in the fight at school which had taken place on the 3 May 2024. Dr Rahman rejected these alternative explanations either because the extensive marks C had were patterned, and because they were on soft areas of his skin which are not usually injured in accidental falls, or because another similarly aged child would be unlikely to produce sufficient force through another child’s clothes to cause such bruising: “When children fall they are either falling forwards or backwards. If a child falls sideways they put their hands or arms out to protect themselves therefore you only see falls causing injuries to the front of the legs or due to falls on the head when we see them to the front of the forehead, older children do not typically fall flat backwards”.
On the photograph of C’s right thigh at F3 in the bundle there are a number of distinct, circular bruises to C’s leg, Dr Rahman’s opinion is that “it is difficult if not impossible to imagine a single fall could cause at least four circular marks on his leg”, and he agreed C’s description of being hit with a wooden spoon matches these circular marks almost exactly. He also agreed it is difficult to imagine how any fall could have created the patterned marks to C’s back and agreed they are “wholly consistent with what C says about being hit with a stick, a handle of a broom, or a handle of a wooden spoon’”.
In respect of the likelihood of the marks being caused by another child, Dr Rahman told the court: “If C was involved in some form of altercation with other children I would either expect to see no bruises or bruises and scratches which would not look like the bruises we have seen because when looking at the marks they show patterns. Marks in small fights generally have a mark with no pattern. We may see marks 1cm – 2cm – 3cm whatever, but they will be uniform without gaps in between and without any shape or pattern unless the fight involved implements”. In his initial report, Dr Rahman noted the linear marks “also have the appearance of being slapped leaving finger marks behind” and he was asked whether another child could have caused those marks. He considered this was not impossible but it was unlikely another child of this age could produce a mark like that. He also rejected the suggestion of falling over in a shopping centre as being “very unlikely”.
Dr Rahman conceded that marks and bruises to an active child’s shins are not unusual and agreed this area is a typical area for accidental injuries. However, he rejected this as an explanation for injury #2 because of the description given of it by Dr G., he said: “If we look at the description it says ‘bruise right shin with central pale area’. I cannot think of an accidental bruise which would cause a pale central area which is why I didn’t say it is a possible accidental injury…what is said is a good description. I can visualise what the doctor is describing but I agree it would be good to have had a photograph”. “Typically when I come across descriptions of bruises to shins, photos or no photos, I tend to say they are accidental but in this case if, for example, it had been described as a 1.5cm x 5cm bruise I would accept it is more likely to be an accident but we have a further description where the doctor says a ‘central pale area’. It is very difficult to imagine an accident which would cause a bruise like that”.
Dr Rahman considered the totality of the evidence available to him, including the history given by C, and his firm opinion is that these marks and bruises are not likely to have occurred accidentally and are more likely to be inflicted injuries in keeping with the history provided by C. Dr Rahman states that C is likely to have felt pain when he sustained the bruises and may have cried or spoken out to say it was hurting. Furthermore, any carer assisting C with his personal hygiene is likely to have noticed the bruises, and the person or persons who inflicted them are very likely to have been aware that their actions had led to an injury.
THE EVIDENCE FROM THE SCHOOL STAFF
Two members of staff from C’s primary school were required to give oral evidence; HT, the Headteacher of [School], and CT, C’s class teacher in May 2024.
HT confirmed she saw the marks and bruises to C’s body at school on the 3 May 2024 as shown in the photographs in the court bundle, and as the parents were, at that stage of the proceedings, disputing these were photographs of C, she also confirmed these were photographs of his body and what she saw that day although she had not been present when the actual photographs were taken. HT went on to explain C is wearing a distinctive red top visible on one of the photographs which is not school uniform because it should have been white. I am persuaded this is likely to have been known to the parents.
HT agreed C’s behaviour had been deteriorating in the lead up to the 3 May 2024 whereas prior to Easter he had been making good progress. She confirmed there is a recording on the Child Protection Online Monitoring System (CPOMS) kept by the school which included a reference to C’s involvement in a fight on the 3 May 2024 as part of the wider safeguarding entry relating to his bruises, but there was no specific entry relating to the fight itself. When asked why not, HT’s explanation is “if we felt it was a serious incident it would have been recorded on the CPOMS” and if the fight had involved implements, this would ‘definitely’ have been recorded on the CPOMS at the time. HT didn’t have any recollection of being told about the fight but said, if “it had involved any implements it would have been reported to me and I would have considered exclusion of a child who used implements”.
HT had been working at the school in 2018 when child A had made allegations against the mother. She denied ‘A’ had limited command of the English language at that time and stated her recollection is that “His English was good for someone whose English is not their first language”…. “78% of the children in my school speak English as an additional language so what I consider as the norm for our school, he was part of that norm. He certainly didn’t stand out as a child who needed extra support over and above what we were already doing. Verbally he could communicate and read well. He was in the higher group of that class for reading.”
She also expressed her concern about child B not wearing spectacles and rejected the suggestion this was not unusual. HT told the court; “We do see it as unusual when we have spoken to parents and asked them, and reminded them and they still continue not to wear them. We do see that as a concern.” The unchallenged written evidence outlines the difficulties B was having with reading the whiteboard at the front of the class, getting out of her seat to go to the board because she couldn’t see it clearly, and holding her book close to her face and squinting.
CT is the teacher to whom C made his first complaint about his father hitting him. CT told the court this occurred on the 3 May 2024 when she told C she would have to speak to his father at the end of the school day about his behaviour in school. CT’s clear and unchallenged recollection is that C said, “No, he will hit me again. He will hit me, hit me, hit me” and burst into tears. When she asked C whether it had happened before, he replied ‘yes’. CT stated in cross examination, “from the conversation he seemed very, very strong in himself about what he was saying”. She then reported what had happened to HT.
THE EVIDENCE FROM SOCIAL CARE
Ms Maria D’Amico and her colleague Katie Monaghan both confirmed they attended C’s school after 5pm on the 3 May 2024 as part of the section 47 investigation into C’s injuries. Ms D’Amico confirmed the child they spoke to was C because he was brought into the room and introduced to them by name by the teacher, DSL. He was also the same child who was returned to the family home by the social workers with child B later the same evening, and who was recognised and seen by child A at the time, the parents having been arrested by that point in the chronology.
Ms D’Amico and Ms Monaghan explained to C why they were there and he did not appear to be in any distress. He voluntarily said “do you want to see my leg” and took his trousers down to show the social workers the bruises on it. Ms D’Amico confirmed she was the person who took the photographs of C’s injuries on the 3 May which appear in the court bundle. C said to her, “he was hit with a wooden spoon and a stick by both of his parents, his mum and his dad. We tried to explore how it made him feel and he said he had cried when it happened”. As part of the safeguarding investigation the social workers also spoke to B who “didn’t say her parents had done anything to C, she said her parents are good parents. She did say C had fallen – but face down and not backwards”.
Ms D’Amico agreed the initial allegation made by C to CT before the social workers arrived had only been against the father but she denied asking C any direct questions and was firm in her recollection of events, she said, “I can remember what happened and I am confident of what happened and what I saw and what I experienced.” Ms D’Amico was clear C had volunteered the information that it was both his mum and dad who had been hitting him. Ms D’Amico denied asking C to repeat what he had said earlier to the teaching staff and denied acting in a way which was contrary to her professional training or the ABE guidance other than not keeping a contemporaneous note. She did not keep a written note because this task was being undertaken by Ms Monaghan, and the parties and the court have her written notes. Ms D’Amico told the court “ I don’t feel I have (acted contrary to the guidance) and when you see a child with that much bruising you would be very concerned. In my career as a social worker this is some of the worst bruising I have ever seen”.
Ms D’Amico was sure the word ‘spoon’ was used by C as the implement he was hit with and agreed he did not present as distressed when sharing the information. This of itself was of concern to Ms D’Amico who said, “The fact he was not in distress is even more worrying because it would suggest he has normalised that in his life, it worries me even more. No child should normalise that happening. I would expect a child to be in distress and he wasn’t.”
Ms Monaghan produced the contemporaneous note she took at the school on the 3 May 2024. In it, it is clearly recorded, “Mum and dad hit me, 2 spoons to hit me, marks on legs/back, when it stopped, he calmed down, mum kept going, no kiss after, I kept crying, wouldn’t let me see a G.P.” Ms Monaghan accepted there was a discrepancy between her contemporaneous note above, and her Police statement dated 11 September 2024 where she states “Child ‘C’ was happy to speak with us about the abuse. C told Maria and I that both of his parents had been abusing him at the same time and that they had used something which they cooked with to cause the injuries”. Ms Monaghan explained this discrepancy is because she had, at that point, mislaid her notes and was preparing her Police statement from memory. I find the two versions to be broadly consistent and one does not undermine the other.
On Day 3 of this final hearing, the South Yorkshire Police belatedly disclosed the body worn camera footage from the 3 May 2024 when two Police Officers attended C’s school. In the video footage, the Officers go into the room where C is waiting and he is asked if he will show the officer, PC Manole the bruises on his back, which he does, and he also shows them the bruises to his legs. When asked how it happened, he tells the police officers both of his parents have caused the bruising and indicates some have been caused by a stick and some by a spoon. He suggests his father has caused the bruises to his back with a stick and his mother caused those to his legs with a wooden spoon but it is unclear from the video exactly where he is pointing as the camera only captures C’s head at this juncture. However, the unchallenged statement of PC Manole dated 4 May 2024 who was wearing the bodycam confirms this to have been the case and where C was pointing to. C states it happened on Wednesday which would have been the 1st May 2024. It was only after this video footage became available which includes C’s face, did the parents accept the child in the photographs taken by Ms D’Amico was in fact C despite the confirmatory Police statements having been provided well in advance of the hearing.
Miss Claire Badger is currently employed by CAFCASS but in 2018 she was employed as a social worker by this local authority.
Miss Badger confirmed her involvement with the family as follows: In January 2018 she became the allocated social worker for ‘A’ after he made a complaint to school staff he had been hurt and injured by the mother when she hit him with a coat hanger. Ms Badger conducted the section 47 investigation which followed and was present at the CPM’s for ‘A’, B, and C which took place on the [date] January 2018. Ms Badger confirmed both parents were also present and attended each of those medical assessments. Thereafter, Ms Badger also attended Child in Need (CIN) Meetings with the parents which were convened for the children in January 2018, March 2018 and April 2018 and had therefore, met the parents on several occasions throughout the ‘child in need’ period.
Miss Badger confirmed the mother made an admission to Dr R. as set out in the CPM report submitted by the paediatrician that she had hit ‘A’, and her recollection is that the mother also admitted it to the police officers who were involved at the time. Miss Badger could not recollect the mother making a separate or direct admission to herself, only to Dr R. and the Police, and she had worked with the mother on the basis that what the mother told those professionals was the truth.
Miss Badger confirmed her communication with the mother had been through an interpreter and she had used ‘Language Line’ to assist. Miss Badger had no concerns about the mother’s understanding when an interpreter was used. Miss Badger confirmed to the court she had conversations with both parents about the law in the UK regarding the use of physical chastisement: “It would have been a conversation about it is not considered acceptable to use that to manage a child’s behaviour, and making it clear to the parents what was expected and not expected from them in that respect…Yes they cooperated and that’s one of the main reasons we were able to manage the case at the level we did (Child in Need) without any escalation. We closed the case because we were satisfied it was a ‘one-off’ incident with no other concerns of that nature for the children which led to the decision the case could be closed”.
Miss Badger told the court a safety plan was put in place, and it included the parents’ agreement not to use physical chastisement again. She explained the inclusion of that condition was unique to the circumstances of this particular family and was not included in every case. She also confirmed that if ‘A’ did not know a particular word he found a way to describe it e.g. he use the words ‘costume peg’ to describe a coat hanger.
THE POLICE EVIDENCE
OIC Cox is the investigating officer in the police investigation into how C sustained his injuries, she was also the person who observed C’s ABE interview. OIC Cox carried out the search of the family home pursuant to section 18 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 on the 4 May 2024, and in her oral evidence she confirmed she seized a wooden spoon from the draining board in the kitchen, and a broom with a wooden handle from behind the television in the living area, both of which are now exhibits in the criminal investigation. The photographs of these items appear in the court bundle.
The parents deny ownership of both of these items and deny they were found in their home. On Day 3 of this final hearing they asked the local authority to make enquiries with the family support worker who visited the home on the 3 May 2024 to check on the children, whether she had brought these items into their home. The answer to this enquiry is, no and there is no evidence to suggest otherwise.
DC Radford is the Police Officer who conducted C’s ABE interview, she has played no other role in the police investigation. DC Radford referred to C’s allegations as ‘disclosures’ but refuted the suggestion she had approached the interview with pre-conceived ideas about the veracity of C’s account. The delay in conducting the ABE interview between the 3 May and the 30 July 2024 was attributable to the availability of the intermediary and she agreed, this delay was regrettable and not best practice. DC Radford agreed C presented as ‘chatty’ and ‘seemed quite comfortable in the setting’. DC Radford denied there was any risk she had invited C to tell her or repeat what he had told the teachers or social workers at school.
C’s ALLEGATIONS AND HIS ‘ABE’ INTERVIEW
In his ABE interview on the 30th July 2024, C had the assistance of an intermediary and he repeats the allegations he made to CT, Ms D’Amico, Ms Monaghan and PC Manole on the 3 May 2024.
C makes allegations that both of his parents were hitting him in the living room of the house in the presence of his four siblings, he refers to ‘A’ and B being scared and they left the room to go into their bedroom.
C recalls he had said “bad words at school and after the teacher told them, my dad and mum then after they got angry that’s when they started hurting me (sic)”… “When they got angry after school, after school when my dad picked me up and my sister when we gone back home my mum said why did you do anything after she started hitting me with a stick and a wooden spoon”. When asked where did his mum hit him, he replies, “It was only my legs (he taps his right leg) I mean, I don’t know why/where (Footnote: 1) she hit me but she hit me like here, on my back and after that when my dad come he hit me like, he hit me every time on the legs here (pointing to his leg and back), everywhere”.
C alleges his parents used a stick first and then they used a wooden spoon “First my mum used a stick now she used a spoon” and suggests his father used the spoon after his mother. He also alleges, “One day my dad actually hit me with his belt.. but that really hurt”. C alleges the belt left marks on him and it happened on a different day to the occasion he has described being hit with a stick and a spoon.
THE PARENTS’ and CHILD A’s EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE FACTS PLEADED TO SATISFY THE STATUTORY THRESHOLD
The mother has consistently denied perpetrating any physical assault or any harm to any of her children. She is entitled to rely upon those denials unless the local authority can prove otherwise.
Throughout these proceedings and up until Day 6 of the final hearing, the mother denied any recollection of any assault upon ‘A’ in 2018 or any recollection of social care being involved with her family. On the 2 April 2025, the mother filed a third statement in which she shifted slightly and said at paragraph 9, “I have struggled to recall what happened in 2018. I know that there were people involved with my family but I was not sure who they were. I still do not remember having said that I hit ‘A’”.
In her oral evidence, the mother said, “I have never touched my children or beat them or done anything to them”. She was able to recollect people coming to her home in 2018 to visit her children but stated she could not recall going to the hospital with ‘A’, B or C, or any of those three children having medical examinations by a doctor. When pressed in cross examination about the likelihood of it being a memorable event, the mother said, “I don’t remember a lot of things, I don’t remember what happened yesterday, I have a lot of problems with my memory”. Despite asserting she had no recollection, the mother was clear she had not said the things to Dr R. which Dr R. has recorded and maintained she had no memory of hitting ‘A’.
In contrast, the mother was able to recollect events from 2017 when C was born; that she had attended medical appointments during her pregnancy accompanied by her husband, as well as attending antenatal scans and that C had been born in a hospital. She was able to recollect her husband had been at school when she went into labour and someone else from the hospital took her there. She was able to recollect having an interpreter present and there were medical professionals who helped her but she did not know whether they were doctors or nurses.
The mother’s case is that ‘A’ did not understand the English language very well in 2018 which meant it was unlikely ‘A’ and Dr R. had been able to understand each other for ‘A’ to make the allegations he is said to have made.
The mother denied having met Claire Badger in 2018 at the CPMs or at any of the ‘child in need’ meetings which followed.
In her statement dated 2 April 2025, the mother also accepts she has been dishonest with the court and all of the professionals involved in this case when she previously stated she did not know anything about how C suffered his injuries in May 2024. She now accepts she was aware on the 1 May 2024 that the father used ‘physical chastisement’ towards C on that day, and that C had told her, “daddy had ‘beat him up’ after school”, and she had seen C’s thigh which was red but she has no recollection of seeing any circular marks. The mother suggests she previously lied because she feared for her safety with the Police and not to conceal any wrongdoing.
The mother told the court she asked C why his father had beaten him and C said, “because I did something wrong at school” and he showed her a bruise by picking up the leg of his shorts. The mother could not recall which leg C showed to her and stated she had replied to C: “you did wrong because you were not performing well at school and then he (child C) became angry”. She agreed ‘A’ and B had been in the bedroom at this point in the chronology as C has described in his ABE interview. The mother initially denied discussing the incident with the father afterwards but did agree the father had become ‘upset’ because of C’s behaviour in school. Later in her evidence, the mother told the court that the father had told her the following:
“He spoke to me about what he heard from the teacher, that C is going to kill everyone in school and what is going to happen to your son in the future, and because of this [the father] was upset. Then he beat C due to the information from the teacher that unless this boy is punished now, C is going to attack everyone in the community and [the father] was upset by this so he beat him up. That’s what [the father] told me”.
The mother accepted she agreed with and supported what the father had done and the reasons for it, she accepted she did not ask C anything further about his injuries or look at them herself to see if he needed medical attention. The mother said she did not check on C because this was the first time this had happened in the family and the father had given her an acceptable reason for why he had done it. The mother initially asserted the first time she became aware of the father assaulting C with a stick had been ‘yesterday’ i.e. 1 April 2025 which was the date the father made his admission to the court. The mother’s evidence then changed and she said “I remember after a long time I asked him what happened and after that I didn’t want him to mention it as I was busy thinking about my children.”
The mother maintained her denial of ever having hit C with a wooden spoon and suggested that whilst C may be telling the truth about what the father had done to him, he was lying about what he alleged she had done; “As I said, I verbally told him what wrong he did at school and I have never hit his body or hurt him. I compared him with ‘A’ and ‘B’, I said they were behaving very well at school and working hard and maybe he was unhappy with me because of this” .
The mother accepted she had known all along the photographs in the court bundle were of C and had previously denied this to be the case, requiring the local authority to prove the child’s identity in them, “because I was in fear”. She maintained she did not know whether C had been beaten by the father with a stick or a wooden spoon and that she “didn’t remember” whether she owned a wooden spoon or whether the broom seized by OIC Cox was hers or not. The mother suggested she could only be sure these items belonged to her if there had been bodycam footage of the search undertaken by OIC Cox which there is not. The mother continued to suggest there were a lot of support workers visiting the house as well as ‘Aunt’ F’ and it was possible one of them had brought the items into her home instead.
The mother asserted it was her culture and family background which caused her to agree with C being beaten by his father and asserted she did not know this was wrong; “Yes, according to my culture, a family does this to show them a better future. I’m sorry I didn’t know this is illegal in this country”. The mother asserted in her evidence: “everything only became clear last Monday (31st March 2025) …I didn’t know beating up kids is not legal in this country before then”. In cross examination by Ms Broughton, the mother stated: “Had he been a good student at school, this wouldn’t have happened.”. When asked in cross examination why she had lied to the Police if she did not know beating a child was illegal in the UK, the mother stated; “I didn’t know it was a crime here…I lied because the Police interfered in this matter”. Overnight, the version given by the mother changed, and on the 3 April she told the court she became aware it was a crime when the Police arrested her.
The mother denied any knowledge of the children having any problems with their teeth or dental hygiene and stated she had taken them to the dentist in 2019. She explained, after that visit there was the lockdown due to coronavirus and she wasn’t able to take them. She told the court: “When lockdown finished I think I took them to the dentist. I realise now I took them from school to the dentist and then our children were taken out of our hands.” The mother asserted child B was taken for appointments in respect of her eyesight by the father. The mother’s evidence is that they had been told B didn’t need spectacles and her eyesight was ‘alright’. The mother’s opinion is that “child B can read and write very well, she said she doesn’t need any glasses and didn’t want to go (to the appointment), and so she did not wish ‘to force’ her to go.
Up until Day 6 of this final hearing the father had consistently and repeatedly denied hitting or hurting any of the children or ever threatening them they would be hurt. The father filed four witness statements and two responses to the schedule of facts pleaded by the local authority, all of which contained statements of truth, which he now concedes were not true and contained lies. In one of his written responses to the statutory threshold dated 3 December 2024 (Footnote: 2), he confirms that “my response is the same as my first statement at A15-A6. I am Muslim and the Quran does not allow me to lie. I am telling the truth” whereas he now accepts he was dishonest and lying to the court in that document.
The evidence which he now submits to the court is the truth is that contained in his final witness statement dated 1 April 2025. In it, he admits using a stick, a branch he found on the ground, on the way home from school on the 1 May 2024 and used it to hit C on his back.
In his oral evidence the father told the court he did not hit C in order to hurt him but to secure “a better future for the child” that was the purpose of the punishment, and it was something which had been done to him as a child as he was growing up in [Africa]. The father said he hit C in response to what the teacher had told him about his behaviour in school and because he was worried about C’s future. He expressed his regret and remorse about what he had done and asserted this was the first and only time he had ever hit any of his children.
In contrast to the mother’s evidence, the father denied discussing with her what he had done to C. When asked in cross examination whether, in the past 11 months, he had any conversation with the mother about beating C, his answer is: “We didn’t discuss what happened about C, all we speak about is the future and how we bring up the children in the future.”
When asked in cross examination about the detail of what he had done to C, the father said he had been holding C by the hand whilst hitting him with the stick on his back, he denied C was crying and said C was “overwhelmed with anger, he didn’t utter a word” and was covering his face with his other, free hand. The father couldn’t recall how many times he had hit C and admitted to feeling he “was really sad and angry” whilst doing it. He agreed he had lost control of his temper. The father said he let go of C’s hand and C crossed the street and went home whilst the father turned to B and D to hold their hand whilst crossing the street.
In his oral evidence, the father denied hitting C with a wooden spoon as C has alleged in his ABE interview. The father refused to accept the wooden spoon and broom had been removed by the Police from the family home, he asserted that “issues inside the home are to do with their mum. I do not know what is there or not there, I really don’t know”. This is in contrast to his earlier admission in his initial response to threshold dated 23 May 2024 where he states: “I have never hit C with a wooden spoon or broom handle or any object. We have these items in the house. The wooden spoon is in the kitchen. The broom is in the corner behind the TV to stop the younger children getting to it”. Which, I pause to note, is exactly where OIC Cox said these items had been found when she searched the property.
The father also accepted he had known he had hit C and yet denied the photographs illustrating C’s injuries were of C up until the bodycam footage taken by PC Manole became available during the hearing. His explanation in his oral evidence for misleading the court and professionals in this way is: “That was an error of judgment. I didn’t see his face and when I saw the bodycam footage I accepted it” and attributed this to a fear of the police which had led him to lie.
Both parents deny not sending C to school on the 2 May 2024 in an attempt to conceal the injuries. They both assert C did not wish to go to school and they did not want to force him to go.
The father accepted he had made an application for C to attend court to give evidence and be cross examined about his allegations. His instructions at the time were that the allegations were not true and could only be properly challenged by being tested in cross-examination. The application was withdrawn on the day it was due to be determined by the court in the face of opposition from the local authority and children’s guardian. The mother was ‘neutral’ about the application but ‘vehemently disputed the allegations made by C and if the court had sanctioned C giving evidence, intended to pose questions to him’. When asked about the emotional impact this may have had upon C if he had been required to give evidence when the father knew what he had done, the father said: “I’m not denying now I hit C and I want to say sorry but what happened has already happened” which deflected answering the question.
The father admitted he had lied to Daniel Roberts during the parenting assessment when he had denied hitting C and denied having any reason to hit him.
In respect of the allegation relating to ‘A’ in 2018, the father denied any recollection of social care involvement at the time, he denied any recollection of ‘A’ having made a complaint to his teacher at school, and he denied any recollection of attending the hospital when the CPMs were carried out by Dr R.. When pressed in cross examination about the likelihood of it being a memorable event, the father said: “I didn’t go to the hospital in 2018, I was working” and was able to recollect he was working five days a week, 6am – 6pm in Rotherham.
The father denied any recollection of refusing to give consent for photographs to be taken of the bruises seen on ‘A’ at the CPM and had no recollection of giving any written consent for the CPM to take place. He stated: “I don’t remember that at all. Maybe if I had signed this I would remember that”. When he was shown his signed written consent in the court bundle, he agreed that was his signature and said: “The problem is I don’t know what I signed because I am making a lot of signatures…I only know that is my signature, I don’t know what I signed.”
In contrast, when speaking to Mr Roberts during the parenting assessment the father told him “with records, I don’t know, but at this time I was working, ‘A’ was young, ask him to confirm. He didn’t know the language, we took him to the doctor, and it was made up against us” which indicates he could recollect ‘A’ was seen by a doctor. In addition, when asked about the neglect of ‘B’s eyesight and vision, the father was able to recollect taking B to a hospital appointment about her eyes in June 2018 and denied ever missing any appointments for her. The father also asserted he didn’t consider ‘A’s English language skills had been good enough in 2018 to communicate with Dr R. and said: “I don’t think he could explain himself at that time.”
Child A has filed a witness statement dated 10 February 2025 setting out his recollection of what happened in 2018. He should know that I have read it very carefully. In it, he denies the incident in 2018 and states his parents have never hit him, and if he has done anything wrong, they “have told me off but that is all”. In respect of events on 1 May 2024, ‘A’ states the evening was “perfectly normal and there were no other issues or incidents…At no point were any of my brothers or sisters upset and at no point did I see or hear either or both of my parents hitting C”.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE SECTION 31 STATUTORY CRITERIA
I consider an appropriate place to start is with an evaluation of the reliability and credibility of the parents’ and Child A’ s evidence.
Both parents now accept they have lied repeatedly and consistently in the written evidence they have submitted to the court and in their interactions with professionals, and they both assert their latest version of events, which includes an admission by the father of hitting C as a method of ‘physical chastisement’, is the whole truth of the matter.
Not only have they each separately lied to and misled the court and all professionals including the Police in this case by their own admission, I find the accounts they now give continue to be internally inconsistent with each other’s in many material respects, including when or if they discussed what the father asserts he did to C; when or if they knew such ‘physical chastisement’ was a criminal offence; and whether or not they owned the wooden spoon or broom which OIC Cox seized from their home.
Their mutual dishonesty on many material facts persuades me that their evidence and denial of C’s allegations cannot be relied upon unless it is supported by some other, independent piece of evidence. Where their evidence conflicts with any evidence given by any other witness in this case, I prefer the evidence of that other witness as being the more credible and reliable due to its consistency and/or contemporaneous recording.
I have considered the fact that any parent may tell lies for many reasons including out of shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear or distress and the fact these two parents have lied about some matters does not mean they have lied about everything. But in this case, the reasons advanced by the parents for why they have lied so extensively is, in essence, to conceal guilt. In the mother’s evidence she advanced an explanation that she did not know ‘physical chastisement’ was a criminal offence, and they have both given the reason they were fearful of the Police being involved, but I am persuaded they are still not telling the court the whole truth and their ongoing lies are fundamentally capable of corroborating C’s account and are supportive of both parents having behaved as C has described.
I have evaluated the parents’ account that they told their lies because they were fearful of the Police and it was not to conceal any wrongdoing. They allege that as asylum seekers coming from [Africa] their treatment at the hands of the State in their country of birth was different to the Police in the UK and they feared for their safety here, but I note that whilst this may be superficially plausible there is only their word to support that assertion in this case. However, I do not attach much weight to this explanation for two reasons.
Firstly, because the Police in the UK were involved with this family in 2018 and there is written evidence which establishes PC Appleby had at least one conversation with the father. They knew through this experience that the simple fact of Police involvement in their family in the UK did not lead to any risk to the safety of themselves or to their family, on the contrary, no criminal charges were brought against either of them and the children remained in their care.
Secondly, the mother was interviewed by the Police on the 23 August 2024 and had the services of her own solicitor and an interpreter prior to and during that interview taking place. Rather than using this opportunity to tell the truth, she submitted a pre-prepared statement to the Police in which she states: “I’ve not caused C’s injuries, I don’t know how he got these injuries as I didn’t know about them before I was arrested. I’ve never seen or been aware of my husband hitting C or any of my children” (Footnote: 3). In contrast, her oral evidence to the court is that she knew on the 1 May 2024 that the father had assaulted C, and that C had sustained an injury because he showed her part of it to his leg and accordingly, she had little option but to admit to the court she had lied, concealed and covered up for the father in that pre-prepared statement if the truth is as she now alleges. I consider, if she is innocent of any wrongdoing herself, she could have sought the advice of her solicitor about her personal safety with the Police and told the honest version of events in her pre-prepared statement or Police interview.
I am persuaded that if the parents were at all fearful of the Police, it was driven by a fear of the consequences to themselves of admitting they had assaulted their son, and they chose to prioritise themselves and their relationship above telling the truth.
I was not impressed with either parents’ evidence and formed the view the longer they gave it to the court the less plausible and credible it became for the following reasons.
Firstly, I find the parents continue to lie about their ownership of the wooden spoon and broom seized by OIC Cox during her s18 search of their home. OIC Cox gave a detailed account of the ‘chain of custody’ for these two exhibits, where they were found, and how they were securely labelled and stored by the Police. I cannot identify any reason for why OIC Cox would lie about such matters and her evidence is corroborated by the father’s admission in December 2024 that these items were owned by the family and found exactly where OIC said she found them in the family home even though he later resiled from this admission.
I find the mother’s denial and the father’s inconsistent account about this material issue to be lies which have been deliberately told by the parents; it is relevant to the material issue of whether they own the items C asserts he was assaulted with; the motive for telling it is the realisation by them of that fact; and it is demonstrated to be a lie by OIC Cox’s and C’s evidence. C could not have possibly known the items he states he was assaulted with would be found in his family home by the Police unless he was telling the truth.
Secondly, C’s account has remained consistent since 3 May 2024. It is correct that his initial complaint made to CT only referred to his father hitting him but by the time Ms D’Amico and Ms Monaghan arrived at the school between 5 -5.30pm he was very clear he had been hit with a wooden spoon and a stick by both of his parents. It is an account contemporaneously recorded in the bodycam footage taken by PC Manole and the time recorded on the bodycam at the point the officer speaks to C is 18.41 hours.
I have considered the likelihood of a teacher, a social worker or a Police officer suggesting to C, even inadvertently, that he has been assaulted by both of his parents in the short period between C complaining to CT shortly before playtime in the afternoon of the 3 May and the other professionals arriving, and whether he is likely to have embellished or adopted such suggestion into a lived experience. I find this to be highly unlikely. The advocates extensively explored with the witnesses whether C’s evidence may have been tainted by conversations but no evidence emerged in support of it beyond speculation. Furthermore, the bodycam footage clearly show Ms D’Amico explaining to PC Manole that they had been considering a safety plan of the father leaving the house and the children being left in the care of the mother but following C making allegations against both of his parents, this plan could not be implemented. I consider it is unlikely either social worker would have formulated such a plan if they were simultaneously suggesting to C his mother had assaulted him.
Thirdly, I have carefully evaluated C’s ABE interview and the reliability of his evidence which in turn involves consideration of the events which led up to its creation, and whether the conduct of any professional who spoke to him in the immediate aftermath of the 3 May or between then and the 30 July 2024 may have impaired its reliability in any way. I am persuaded that whilst criticisms may be made of the process due to not every question and reply being contemporaneously recorded, the interview itself reflects what C told PC Manole on the 3 May which is contemporaneously recorded and this persuades me of its accuracy and reliability. C informs and demonstrates to PC Manole that his father has caused the bruises to his back with a stick and his mother caused those to his legs with a wooden spoon. C’s authentic and spontaneously recorded bodycam allegation is beyond any criticism and is accurately and consistently repeated in his ABE interview some two months later.
C’s evidence has remained consistent and he has repeated the same account to multiple professionals on many occasions. They include to the DSL; CT; HT; Maria D’Amico; Katie Monaghan; Dr G.; and the children’s guardian. I pause to note that simple repetition does not of itself create any corroboration for his account but the consistency of it does add credence to its reliability. He has never resiled from it despite the tremendous impact it has had upon him and his family.
Finally, I have considered ‘A’s evidence about events in the family home on the 1 May 2024 but I cannot accept it because A’s statement contradicts the admission the parents now make of the father assaulting C. The parents accept C was assaulted on that date whereas ‘A’ asserts the 1 May 2024 was a ‘perfectly normal evening with no issues or incidents’. Even in the context of the parents’ partial admission I consider this to be highly unlikely and ‘A’s evidence, whilst likely to be untrue, is being advanced by him due to his loyalty to his parents and his desire to return home to their care rather than any wish to deliberately deceive the court.
When I turn to consider the facts pleaded against the parents in respect of the mother’s alleged assault of ‘A’ in 2018, I find the parents’ evidence about this incident also to be unimpressive and unreliable.
To be clear, I do not attach much weight to any party’s or witness’s inability to recall particular dates or times given the age of some of the detail they were being asked to recollect. The fact of an incident occurring is likely to be more memorable than the date of it unless it coincided with another significant occasion which would cause it to fix in a person’s memory. I have also taken into account that the passage of time and a person’s participation in family proceedings are factors which are likely to caused elevated levels of anxiety and depression, and that chronic levels of anxiety can affect an individual’s ability to process and recall information (Footnote: 4) as the mother suggested in her evidence.
However, I found the collective amnesia of both parents when it came to recalling anything about the allegation of an assault against ‘A’ in 2018 is likely to be fabricated and another example of their dishonesty.
I find it to be dishonest because they each had no difficulty at all in recalling the details of other events which preceded and occurred at a similar time, such as the pregnancy and birth of C or B’s attendance for hospital appointments to address her eyesight. The father appeared to forget he had told Mr Roberts he could recall ‘A’ seeing a doctor in 2018 even though he believed ‘it had been made up’ against himself and his wife.
I am persuaded their many assertions ‘they could not remember’ were selective and they had no difficulty at all in remembering evidence which supported their version of events, such as ‘A’ having poor English language skills in support of their assertion he is likely to have been incapable of making any alleged complaint to school staff or Dr R. at the time.
I find both parents are continuing to be dishonest with the court and deliberately telling lies when they assert they cannot recollect what happened in 2018 because it is relevant to the material issue of whether they knew it was illegal to use physical chastisement in the UK after this date as they were so informed at that time by Ms Badger; their motive to lie is to conceal they knew this to be the case in order to explain away the father’s use of ‘physical chastisement’ of C in 2024 which they both assert they did not know to be a criminal offence; and it is demonstrated to be a lie by their selective recollections and the sheer weight of the contemporaneous evidence from 2018 derived from multiple sources namely, health, education, social care and the Police.
When I contrast the parents’ evidence about events in 2018 with the measured, consistent recollection of Ms Badger, whose evidence is contemporaneously supported by written documents from 2018, I prefer the evidence of Ms Badger.
I have noted ‘A’s denial of any assault having occurred in 2018 and I have not ignored it but I place greater weight and reliability upon the contemporaneously recorded evidence from multiple different disciplines including the evidence of Ms Badger.
CONCLUSIONS IN RESPECT OF THRESHOLD
I am persuaded and so find that C is a truthful witness and his account of being assaulted by each of his parents is a reliable one. I find the local authority is entitled to the findings it has pleaded with some amendments, and I identify both parents as being a perpetrator of assaulting C as he has alleged and as set out in the schedule at the end of this judgment. I also find the mother used excessive physical chastisement in 2018 when she assaulted ‘A’ with a coat hanger. My additional reasons for doing so are set out below.
Firstly, I find C’s consistent account to be corroborated by the medical evidence of Dr G. and Dr Rahman, as well as by the lies told by the parents.
The court appointed Dr Rahman to assist the court in an area where the court does not have the necessary expertise. To ignore his professional opinion or for the court to reach a different conclusion to the one expressed by him must be explained with clear reasons, to do otherwise would be a denial of that expert role. In this case I am persuaded there is no evidential basis upon which the court could safely reach a conclusion which differs from the one expressed by Dr Rahman and I accept it in its entirety. Dr Rahman gave his opinion before the father made any admission, partial or otherwise, of assaulting C with a tree branch, and this serves to underscore the correctness of his opinion as a whole.
Dr Rahman’s opinion and the photographs taken by Ms D’Amico of C’s injuries persuade me, not simply on the balance of probabilities but beyond all reasonable doubt, that C has been hit repeatedly with a circular object, such as a wooden spoon as he has alleged. He has also been repeatedly assaulted with a linear object as the patterned bruises demonstrate, there is no other sensible or reasonable conclusion this court could reach when evaluating the evidence as a whole.
I have considered whether the father’s belated admission of assaulting C with a tree branch outside of the family home, unknown to the mother, is an acceptable explanation for the injuries C sustained and I am persuaded it is not. I reject this version because it contradicts C’s evidence the assault occurred inside the family home and was inflicted by both of his parents and I consider C to be the more reliable witness. The father’s version does not fit at all with C’s account of being repeatedly assaulted with the wooden spoon which is entirely consistent with the injuries seen.
I am persuaded the father’s account of assaulting C in a public place as he described is an unlikely explanation due to the risk of the assault being witnessed by other members of the public or other parents leaving school at the same time, and because the description of it simply does not fit with the location of C’s injuries on multiple areas of his body not just on his back. The father’s description does not fit with the level of pain and distress Dr Rahman opined C is likely to have experienced and which C himself described to Ms Monaghan when he told her “I cried it hurt so much” Having regard to the extensive bruising visible in the photographs I find it extremely likely that C, as a 6 year old child, would have cried out in a great deal of pain when those injuries were inflicted upon him.
I have reminded myself that the burden of proof remains at all times upon the local authority and there is no burden at all upon either parent to explain away why C should make these allegations against either of them. I have carefully considered but rejected the alternative suggestions put forward by the parents that some or all of the injuries may have been inflicted upon C during a fight at school or in a fall as described by B. These explanations required careful consideration because the evidence of these two things happening do not rely entirely on an account put forward by the parents. However, I reject them as likely explanations and prefer the evidence of Dr Rahman and HT regarding the improbability of either event providing a likely explanation for any of C’s injuries. There is no evidence the fight between C and another child was of the intensity or force required to produce such bruising nor is there any evidence of any implements being used by either child. It is also inconsistent with C’s account about how he sustained his injuries.
I am persuaded the more likely explanation for the father belatedly putting forward his admission of wrongdoing is an attempt to take responsibility for C’s injuries in order to exculpate the mother. I reject the likelihood of the parents not discussing this between themselves and consider it to be more likely that they did, and it was only in the face of overwhelming evidence towards the end of the local authority’s case that they were prepared to make any admission of culpability at all.
I do not accept the parents’ joint account for why C did not attend school on the 2 May 2024, which is the day after he was assaulted by them. Both parents repeatedly stressed the importance of education in their evidence because they had been denied the opportunity of a good education themselves, and they both advanced C’s poor behaviour and underachievement at school as being the reason to justify the father’s ‘physical chastisement’ and the mother’s support for it. In this context, their suggestion C did not go to school because he simply did not wish to and they did not wish to force him to attend is untenable.
From all that I have read and listened to about this family I am persuaded C and indeed all of the children, would have found it exceptionally difficult if not impossible to go against their parents’ wishes. One example was given by Mr Marsden in respect of B who expressed her wish not to attend mosque every evening whilst in foster care but was fearful of her father’s response should he become aware of this. Mr Marsden told the court: “Those images of the harm caused to C – the bruising, and his words to me about how scared he was of his parents, along with the fear of ‘B’ when she spoke to me about challenging her dad’s insistence of what she should do whilst she was in foster care, really do etch in my mind how frightened these children can be and how unwilling the parents are to work with the local authority and other services to make changes. Those images and responses will be etched in my mind forever”.
In cross examination Mr Marsden said: “I’m of the view the children present as very polite and respectful children. If that politeness and respectfulness and good behaviour comes from wholesome good parenting, then of course it is to be absolutely welcomed. But my worry is the information I have seen and the discussions I have had with others is that much of their presentation is based on fear, one example is ‘B’ who spoke to me at length and wanted to speak to me directly because she was worried about something. She told me she did not want to go Mosque every evening and when she raised this with her foster carer she said, would her dad find out about this? She was very worried her dad would be angry if she missed one evening. When the foster carer told her she would have to inform her father of this, in the foster carers own words ‘B’ was terrified for it to be raised’. When I spoke to ‘B’ I made it clear to her, whilst her parents would want her to attend from the information I had available to me, arrangements could be made for her not to attend if she did not want to. She still remained very fearful this would get back to her father in particular.”
It is in this context I am persuaded the more likely reason C did not go to school on the 2 May 2024 is because the parents wished to conceal the visible consequences of the assault they had perpetrated upon him. It is likely they both knew, because they were both present, that the force they had used in their ‘physical chastisement’ of C was excessive and went far beyond that which any reasonable parent would have used and constituted an assault. Neither parent sought any medical attention for him or took any steps to protect him from being harmed by the other. On C’s own evidence and from the parents’ belated admissions, both parents were fully aware C had been assaulted, the mother stated she agreed with what the father had done, and both showed an alarming lack of curiosity about the injuries they had inflicted preferring to attribute responsibility for not investigating this with C because he appeared ‘angry’ with each of them.
In respect of paragraph 10 in the schedule of findings, I am persuaded the other four children were in the family home when C was assaulted and are likely to have been aware of it taking place. I reach this conclusion because it is consistent with C’s evidence in his ABE interview and with parts of the mother’s evidence when she agreed ‘A’ and ‘B’ had been in the house in their bedroom at this point in the chronology. It is likely C shouted out in pain and distress and this was heard by his siblings in such a small 2 bedroomed flat. I am persuaded it is unlikely this was the first time this had happened to C, as the parents allege, because of the degree of the beating inflicted and because C states in his interview it was not. I am persuaded this was abusive for all five of the children to experience and likely to cause significant emotional and psychological harm to their development. Seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another person also constitutes significant harm by virtue of section 31(9) of the Children Act 1989.
When I turn to consider the likelihood of the mother assaulting ‘A’ with a coat hanger in 2018, it is in the context of this family normalising the use of physical chastisement which they admitted in evidence was carried out as part of their background, culture and ignorance of the law in the UK. I find there are striking similarities in the parents’ use of ordinary household utensils such as a coat hanger, wooden spoon and broom between the two incidents which persuades me of the greater likelihood ‘A’ was also assaulted in 2018 in an act of ‘physical chastisement’ which caused him physical injury as described by Dr R. in her CPM report.
I am persuaded by the evidence of Claire Badger and the contemporaneous records from the health service; the school and HT; social care and the Police that ‘A’ did make an allegation of being assaulted by his mother with a ‘costume peg’ and at that time the mother admitted to it despite what the parents now suggest. I am persuaded it is likely the mother did make her admission at the time as she had not been in the UK very long at that point in the chronology, and it is plausible she did not know the level of physical chastisement she had used in 2018 was unlawful which increases the likelihood of her admitting to it. That does not excuse the assault or the significant harm she inflicted upon ‘A’ but it does create the context for it.
I have considered the challenges faced by parents and professionals who rely on services such as ‘Language Line’ and the risk of miscommunication but I make this finding in the context of all of the evidence from 2018 not simply what was said at the hospital in January 2018. The parents went on to participate in several ‘child in need’ meetings with Ms Badger who stated in her evidence that she did not have any concerns about the mother’s understanding when an interpreter was used, and she was ‘certain’ an interpreter had been present at the ‘child in need’ meetings ‘otherwise the meeting would have been ineffective’. As the parents state they have no recollection of events in 2018 there is no evidence to contradict Ms Badger’s evidence and I accept it.
Furthermore, the mother’s admission was the basis on which social care formulated its safety plan and managed the risks to the children living at home on ‘child in need’ plans without the need for any escalation to child protection plans or court proceedings. Had there been no admission or honesty about this issue it is likely there would have been records about the mother’s lack of engagement or dishonesty during this period and there are none.
For all of these reasons, I find the statutory threshold for intervention to be crossed and turn below to the welfare considerations.
The local authority chose not to pursue findings numbered 13 and 14 as part of the facts to satisfy the threshold criteria but does pursue them as part of the welfare considerations in this case. I agree with that approach, both Mr Roberts and Mr Marsden conceded but for the index incident in May 2024, it is unlikely this local authority would have sought to intervene in this family’s life.
I find the facts pleaded in these two paragraphs to be, on the balance of probabilities, factually accurate as they are well founded on the evidence the court has heard and read. The significance of them in this case however, lies more in the parents’ unwillingness to follow and adhere to professional advice, which is a welfare issue, rather than any harm they caused to the children.
THE WELFARE EVALUATION
The Law
Once the statutory threshold for intervention is crossed, the court must go on to apply well-established legal principles and decide what order, if any, the court should make in order to safeguard each child’s welfare. In doing so, I must bear in mind any Article 8 rights they have with their birth family for the right to respect for family life. Any interference with the rights of parents and a child under Article 8 must be necessary and proportionate. I also bear in mind that adoption is an option of last resort requiring a high degree of justification, it should be made only in exceptional circumstances where nothing else will do to meet the welfare of the child in question.
The court must undertake a global, holistic evaluation and analysis of each child’s welfare and keep in mind their welfare is my paramount consideration. Under section 1(2) of the Children Act 1989 any delay in making decisions concerning any child’s future is likely to prejudice their welfare. Section 1(3) provides a checklist of factors to be taken into account when determining where their welfare lies and what order should be made. In addition, section 1(3)(g) of the 1989 Act requires this court to have regard to the range of orders available.
On the applications for Placement Orders, the court applies section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (ACA 2002). On such an application, my paramount consideration is D and E’s welfare throughout their life. Once again, I take into account the fact that delay in coming to a decision is likely to prejudice their welfare, and there is a checklist of factors to be taken into account in assessing their welfare set out in section 1(4) of the 2002 Act.
Under section 21(3) ACA 2002 a court may not make a placement order unless satisfied either that each parent with parental responsibility has consented to their child being placed for adoption or that his or her consent should be dispensed with. In this case both parents share parental responsibility for children D and E and they have not consented to the making of a placement order. Under section 52(1)(b) the court may dispense with the parents’ consent if the welfare of the children requires their consent to be dispensed with.
I have reminded myself of the ‘first principles’ of adoption as enunciated by the former President, Sir James Munby in Re B-S [2013] EWCA Civ 1146 :
Just how stringent and demanding has been spelt out very recently by the Supreme Court in in re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] UKSC 33, [2013] 1 WLR 1911. The significance of Re B was rightly emphasised in two judgments of this court handed down on 30 July 2013: Re P (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 963, para 102 (Black LJ), and Re G (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 965, paras 29-31 (McFarlane LJ). As Black LJ put it in Re P, Re B is a forceful reminder of just what is required.
22. The language used in Re B is striking. Different words and phrases are used, but the message is clear. Orders contemplating non-consensual adoption – care orders with a plan for adoption, placement orders and adoption orders – are "a very extreme thing, a last resort", only to be made where "nothing else will do", where "no other course [is] possible in [the child's] interests", they are "the most extreme option", a "last resort – when all else fails", to be made "only in exceptional circumstances and where motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child's welfare, in short, where nothing else will do": see Re B paras 74, 76, 77, 82, 104, 130, 135, 145, 198, 215.
23. Behind all this there lies the well-established principle, derived from s 1(5) of the 1989 Act, read in conjunction with s 1(3)(g), and now similarly embodied in s 1(6) of the 2002 Act, that the court should adopt the 'least interventionist' approach. As Hale J, as she then was, said in Re O (Care or Supervision Order) [1996] 2 FLR 755, 760:
"the court should begin with a preference for the less interventionist rather than the more interventionist approach. This should be considered to be in the better interests of the children … unless there are cogent reasons to the contrary."
Linked with this is the vitally important point made by Wall LJ in Re P (Placement Orders: Parental Consent) [2008] EWCA Civ 535, [2008] 2 FLR 625, para 126:
"Section 52(1) is concerned with adoption – the making of either a placement order or an adoption order – and what therefore has to be shown is that the child's welfare 'requires' adoption as opposed to something short of adoption. A child's circumstances may 'require' statutory intervention, perhaps may even 'require' the indefinite or long-term removal of the child from the family and his or her placement with strangers, but that is not to say that the same circumstances will necessarily 'require' that the child be adopted. They may or they may not. The question, at the end of the day, is whether what is 'required' is adoption."
In Re F (A Child) (Placement Order: Proportionality) [2018] EWCA Civ 2761 Jackson LJ set outs the following matters to which I must have regard when considering the type of harm which might arise to the children and to D and E in particular, and the likelihood of it arising in particular:
the consequences: what would be the likely severity of the harm to the child if it did come to pass;
Risk reduction/mitigation: would the chances of harm happening be reduced or mitigated by the support services that are or could be made available? My assessment of any parent’s ability to discharge their responsibilities towards their child/ren must take into account the assistance and support which the authorities would or could offer.
The comparative evaluation: in light of the above, how do the welfare advantages and disadvantages of the child growing up with their parents compare with those of adoption?
Proportionality: ultimately, is adoption necessary and proportionate in this case?
I have also been guided by the judgment of Jackson LJ in the case of Re T (Children: Risk Assessment)[2025] EWCA Civ 93 which refers to the above case of re F and says at paragraph [31] “The risk of harm, important as it is, is one of a number of factors in the welfare checklist and it has to be carefully assessed, particularly where it may be decisive”. The judgment helpfully sets out at paragraph [33] the questions which the court needs to address:
What type of harm has arisen and might arise?
How likely is it to arise?
What would be the consequences for the child if it did?
To what extent might the risks be reduced or managed?
What other welfare considerations have to be taken into account?
In consequence, which of the realistic plans best promotes the child’s welfare?
If the preferred plan involves interference with the Article 8 rights of the child or of others, is that necessary and proportionate?
With respect to the issues of adjournment and any need for further assessment I have had regard to the cases of Re S (A Child)[2014] EWCC B44 (Fam) Munby P; Re P (A Child) [2018] EWCA Civ 1483 and the judgment of Lady Justice King in which she cites the case of Re S Child [2014] EWHC 2 FLR 575, and S-L (Children: Adjournment)[2019] EWCA Civ 1571 and the judgment of Peter Jackson LJ.]
In Re S the former President gives guidance on the test of necessity which must be satisfied before proceedings may be extended, and guidance as to evaluating the capacity to change. In its essence it requires:
Is there some solid evidence-based reason to believe the parent is committed to making the necessary change?
Is there some solid evidence-based reason to believe the parent will be able to maintain commitment?
Is there some solid evidence-based reason to believe that the parent will be able to make the necessary changes within the child’s timetable?
In paragraph 18 of his judgment in Re S Munby P. cites the case of Re J (Residential Assessment: Rights of Audience)[2009] EWCA Civ 1210, [2010] 1 FLR 1290, para 10, Wall LJ, as he then was said:
“I think it important to remember when one is looking either at the independent assessments by social workers or at applications under section 38(6) of the Act that one needs to be child focused. It is not a question of the mother’s right to have further assessment, it is: would the assessment assist the judge in reaching a conclusion or the right conclusion in relation to the child in question?”
Referring to this in Re T (Residential Assessment) [2011] EWCA Civ 812 2 FLR 308, para [93], Black LJ rejected the proposition that ‘a parent facing the permanent removal of their child has a right in all cases to an assessment of their choice rather than one carried out or commissioned by the local authority’. She continued:
Still less is there a principle such as that for which [counsel] contends, namely that parents must be given then chance to put forward a positive case to the judge determining the issue of whether a care order should be made’
Sir Nicholas Wall, P, para 53, identified the “critical questions” as being:
does this child’s welfare warrant an assessment under section 38(6) of the Act? And (2) in looking at the timetable for the child, is there evidence that this mother will be able to care adequately for the child within the child’s timetable?”
In the case of Re P the mother, who was a longstanding alcoholic and who had told significant lies in previous proceedings, persuaded the court to grant an adjournment for a period of 6 months. At para 38 of her judgment, King LJ cites the following paragraph from Re S above:
“There must be a robust and realistic appraisal at the outset of what is possible within the child’s timescales and an equally robust and realistic ongoing appraisal throughout of whether what is needed is, indeed, being achieved or not within the child’s timescale. These appraisals must be evidence based, with solid foundation, not driven by sentiment or a hope that ‘something may turn up’.
In the case of S-L Peter Jackson LJ gives guidance on the ‘trade-off between the need for information and the presumptive prejudice to the child of delay, enshrined in section 1(2) Children Act 1989. Judges in the family court are well used to finding where the balance lies in the particular case before them and are acutely aware that for babies and young children the passage of weeks and months is a matter of real significance”. “Adjourning a decision should never be seen as pressing the pause button: it is a positive purposeful choice that requires a proper weighing-up of the advantages and disadvantages and a lively awareness that the passage of time has consequences.”
THE PARENTING ASSESSMENTS
The court directed a parenting assessment of both parents and of any friends or family members who wished to be assessed to care for any of the children. The parents’ assessment was conducted by Daniel Roberts, and social worker, Susie Doak has filed a statement dated 27 February 2025 which sets out a chronology of all the other persons who have been put forward and assessed by the local authority and the outcome of those assessments. These persons include:
‘Aunt’ F and her husband (current carers for child ‘A’);
AH & his wife;
HK;
AY;
Mr G and his wife.
Mr Roberts’ assessment of the parents dated 4 October 2024 does not support the return of any of the children to the care of the parents. There were several delays in completing it due to the national shortage of interpreters who speak [their African dialect] either face to face or online which necessitated the initial filing date in August 2024 to be extended.
In his conclusions, Mr Roberts states the most significant concern in this family is the likelihood of physical chastisement should the children return to the care of the parents based upon the allegations made by C, and the similar allegations made by child ‘A’ in the past which also led to a period of social care intervention. Mr Roberts repeatedly explored the parents’ views about both of these concerns throughout the assessment process, but they maintained their denial of hitting any of their children and put forward explanations which he found to be implausible. One explanation they repeatedly gave to him was that C had ‘fallen over’, and another was: “they said C was very easily influenced, specifically [the father] said C would do anything for a small piece of chocolate. I find it very hard to accept a child would make allegations of this nature for an insignificant reward”.
As the parents denied any physical abuse had occurred, Mr Roberts could not identify any evidence of reassurance there would be no repetition if the children were returned. Despite what the parents now allege, the parents described a positive upbringing in [Africa] to Mr Roberts and did not mention any level of trauma or difficult experiences in their own childhoods. Mr Roberts also relies upon his concern the parents neglected the children’s health needs and he has doubts they would engage with any support to address this when they do not accept it has happened. Mr Roberts considers there is unlikely to be any change from the parents in terms of accepting any concerns until the police investigation has concluded and the outcome is known.
In his oral evidence, Mr Roberts confirmed he had considered what support could be put in place to remove or reduce the risk of harm to the children and said: “to address a problem you need, as a starting point, the concerns being accepted by the parents in the first place. Another concern, based on conversations I had with the children is that if they went home, even with support, I don’t think the children would be open to making disclosures in the future.”
Mr Roberts explained his knowledge of working with families from ethnic minority backgrounds, and in addition to his social work training he had previously been employed for many years in secondary schools in London. In that role he worked with many children and families in diverse areas including African families although not specifically from the [specific African] community.
Mr Roberts was criticised in cross examination by the parents for not utilising the support or resources from an agency known as ‘AFRUCA’ to see what they could offer the family, but he explained, “In my opinion, any starting point for addressing concerns – there has to be an acceptance of the initial concerns”. He said he found it difficult to talk to the parents about changing their parenting strategies and implementing boundaries because “the parents would not talk beyond the timeline of events – the children being removed and them denying hitting any of the children”.
Mr Roberts amplified this in his oral evidence and told the court: “It’s not just about the (physical abuse) allegations e.g. if I asked them if it was difficult having all those children of different ages living under one roof, they said they had absolutely no issues at all which I do find difficult to believe. It must be difficult for any family with that number of children living in a relatively small space – a two bedroom flat.”
Mr Roberts highlighted the parents’ lack of support from family and the local community, and the support they did appear to have did not reassure him because those members of the community who the parents introduced him to namely, AY and the Imam from the local Mosque, both “repeatedly asked me why we prioritised the welfare of the children above their parents. The sense I got was that they were more concerned about the reputation of the parents in the wider community than the welfare of the children.” He said, “they seemed to struggle with the idea why anyone would believe a child over an adult which was concerning for me.”
In respect of the parents’ capacity to make changes, Mr Roberts told the court: “Unfortunately, to move on and to make improvements and adjustments to their parenting, the first step has to be acceptance of the concerns. There is a large gap between the concerns raised and the evidence in support of them, and the parents’ explanations. In addition, the previous period of social care involvement relating to very similar concerns. Those are key factors which led me to have significant doubts about the parents’ capacity to change their parenting. I have been asked repeatedly about a package of support but I have doubts it would be effective”. In support of this contention, Mr Roberts highlighted the parents lack of engagement with the multi-agency support service (MAST) in 2017, and the parents’ lack of engagement with dentists and opticians as well as with professionals in this case.
Mr Roberts noted the parents’ failure to address the problems with B’s eyesight and their neglect of the children’s dental health but taken overall, whilst these matters were concerning to him they would not, of themselves in isolation, have justified the children’s permanent removal from the care of their parents. He rejected the suggestion the parents had, overall, ‘done a good job’ of parenting the children and said “I could not say that given my conclusions around physical chastisement.”
Mr Roberts agreed, if the court were to reach the conclusion that C’s injuries were caused accidentally there would need to be further assessment of the parents because that was not his appraisal of the totality of the evidence before him. I pause to note, as this court has found the injuries to have been the consequence of C being assaulted by the parents, his parenting assessment was conducted on the correct factual premise.
Mr Brian Marsden is an advanced practitioner and author of the local authority’s final evidence and care plans. Mr Marsden told the court he tried repeatedly to work with the parents and those persons who they put forward for assessment but “at almost every interaction I have tried to have with the parents I have been met with either no answer, the parents have turned up late, or just no cooperation at all”. At the point at which Mr Marsden was cross examined on Day 5 of the final hearing, the parents were denying this to have been the case and he had to explain at great length his experience, expertise and methods of engaging with them. He explained, in addition to the parents turning up 20 minutes late on the 24 December to meet with him, there had been at least 8 other attempts to engage with them without success. Given the challenge of booking interpreters for these meetings it wasn’t always possible to conduct them if the parents turned up late and the interpreter was no longer available. I pause to note, the distance between where the parents live and the place where the meetings were to be held is a three minute walk, and no adequate explanation for their failure to attend on time has been provided.
On Day 6 the father filed his sixth statement dated 1 April in which he states, “I accept that I did not work as I should have done with Daniel Roberts and Brian Marsden”, and this was the first occasion the father conceded Mr Marsden’s evidence was correct. But the mother, in her statement dated 2 April, does not make the same concession. I am persuaded and do find that both Mr Roberts and Mr Marsden went to great lengths to assess both parents in ways which were culturally appropriate and if there is any identifiable failure this is attributable to the parents’ choice not to engage openly and honestly with them, with Mr Marsden in particular who was persistent and flexible, and no criticism could validly be made of either social worker in this respect.
Mr Marsden’s opinion about the final care plan for each child remains unchanged and his evidence is incorporated further below in the welfare analysis. He was asked to provide his opinion about what is likely to happen if the children did return home as the parents’ wished, and he told the court; “My worry is, if the children are returned home, there will be considerable pressure put upon [children A and B] to maintain their position of supporting the parents and that in light of what they have seen and heard from us and their own lived experiences, coupled with C returning home, who I would be terrified for his safety, would cause a very fractious dynamic.”
When asked to explain why he would be terrified for C, he said: “Those injuries I see on C are some of the more horrific I see in my practice. The limited interactions I have had with the parents is that even the level of concern they have shown has been indifference. I am extremely worried that any child who doesn’t obey the rules in the home, as B has told me, as has ‘A’, the parents continued, after our first interactions with them, frequently punished the children and this included locking them in their bedrooms. Those images of that young boy will be permanently etched on my mind and the parents’ inability to provide any explanation or show any concern really does cause me concern. My knowledge and experience of the Islamic faith and community is that whilst respect and adherence to rules from parents is extremely important, causing harm to your children is something which should not be done and I have heard it referred to as ‘haram’ meaning it is sinful. It greatly worries me, these are the most significant injuries I have seen to a child from the [specific African] community and those responses from the older two children would indicate to me this has more likely happened non-accidentally but they were not willing to give an explanation”.
The local authority has explored potential alternative kinship carers but no other persons who were put forward by the parents were positively assessed. Those assessments have not been challenged by the subjects of them. As no other suitable carers have been identified, the local authority considers the only realistic, proportionate and safe care plan it can devise for each child are those it has placed before the court.
The Parents’ Evidence
The mother seeks the immediate return of children A, B, D and E to her care. She wishes for C to return home as well but now recognises their relationship will need to be rebuilt before this could be achieved. If the court does not agree to any of the children returning home at the conclusion of these proceedings she invites the court to adjourn the proceedings for further assessment and work to be completed to enable rehabilitation to be achieved. The mother opposes any plan of adoption, and if the children are to remain in foster care she would seek a higher level of contact than that proposed by the local authority, she asks for a minimum of fortnightly.
The mother stated in her oral evidence she had made mistakes and that she wished to cooperate with professionals and to learn how to do thing differently. She asks for a ‘second chance’ and asserts the children will not be physically chastised if they are in her care.
Contrary to what she told Mr Roberts in her parenting assessment, the mother agreed she had been hit as a child and said “Yes, in my culture anyone who did wrong, my family they beat us up, it was mainly my dad. If a child was growing up rude they could be a problem to the community so the child was punished by their dad. According to my culture, elders should be respected by their children. It is not because they hate them that they hit them, it’s because they want them to show respect to the community”.
The mother initially denied not attending all of the meetings with Mr Marsden and maintained her view she had cooperated with professionals. When it was pointed out to her in cross examination that the father had made a concession in his sixth statement that they had not cooperated with him, her evidence changed and she told the court: “I accept I was not cooperating. I didn’t understand what was going on and I didn’t get the full information about why I was wanted so now I will cooperate”.
The mother insisted she was telling the truth in her evidence and would work honestly with professionals in the future if the children came home.
The father also seeks the return of the children and acknowledges C will need support to understand he has admitted to hitting him. The father expresses he is sorry and asserts it will not happen again. If the children cannot return home immediately the father also seeks further assessment and he invites the court to adjourn the proceedings for there to be an updated risk assessment of himself following his admission.
The father also opposes any plan of adoption and if the children are not to be returned home immediately he invites the court to approve final care plans of long term foster care for all five children so they may continue to have relationships with each other and with their parents.
In his oral evidence the father expressed his willingness to work openly and honestly with professionals in the future and said he will accept any support which may be offered to him. The father continued to deny the mother had hit or harmed C and when asked in cross examination about how C could return home when they were not accepting what C has said, and how that would make C feel, the father stated: “ I don’t think his mother hit him, he (C) was cross at his mum – maybe this is why he said [the mother] hit him” but he deflected from answering any question about C’s feelings or the incident from C’s perspective.
The father submits in his written closing submissions that “the court must be alive to the possibility that the professionals in this case have assessed the parents from the perspective of ‘white professionals’ which has impeded their ability to understand the proceedings from the perspective of a father who fled oppression and a very real threat in [the specific part of Africa]”. I have considered this submission and reject it in its entirety. The professionals in this case have, in my judgment, gone to great lengths to understand, support, respect and assess this family taking full account of their ethnicity, their religion, their culture and their particular background. This court does not act on possibilities but on the evidence and there is nothing in the evidence of Mr Roberts, Mr Marsden or the children’s guardian which could justify this conclusion being reached.
The Evidence of the Children’s Guardian
Mrs Smith supports the local authority’s final care plans and confirmed she had heard nothing in the oral evidence to cause her to change her views or recommendations. Her opinion is based not only on the assault upon C on the 1 May 2024 but upon what C has said to her directly when she has spoken to him; the assault on child ‘A’ in 2018; and the information in the school CPOMS which include reports from ‘A’ and ‘B’ of other incidents of physical chastisement by their father. Ms Smith expressed her concern “that I haven’t seen from [the mother] or [the father] any indication of understanding why the physical chastisement of their children might be a concern other than it being illegal. What I know is, for change to happen and to be effective, there has to be understanding at a deep level and it is difficult. What I also know is that the relationship between ‘A’, ‘B’, C, D and E with their parents is absolutely precious and must be nurtured but that has to be in a context of safety and my analysis remains, mum and dad cannot provide that safety at this time.”
Mrs Smith was ‘heartened’ to hear the evidence from Ms Rowe, the adoption fieldwork manager, about the child centered approach which would be taken to search for a family for E and D, and the local authority’s commitment to maintaining the relationships each of the children have with their parents and with each other. Nevertheless, Mrs Smith maintained her recommendation for orders for contact to be made pursuant to section 26 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 in respect of the youngest two children to mark the importance of those relationships. She said: “it signifies if adopters aren’t willing to support the children in their relationships, then they are not the right adopters for these children”.
Mrs Smith was opposed to any period of adjournment to allow for further work and/or assessment to be undertaken with the parents. Her objections to this included: “I have thought about this a great deal, particularly in respect of the very harsh potential outcome of adoption for D and E, but it remains my view this work cannot be undertaken now because I still feel there are things the parents are not telling us. I haven’t seen a recognition of the impact on the children of their lack of openness and honesty and that full openness and honesty is an absolute bottom line before any change work can start….I have seen very little capacity for reflection from these parents”.
Mrs Smith rejected the suggestion there is no evidence that D and E have been hit or smacked and told the court: “C reported to me that ‘when we were little we were not hit, we are all hit, my baby sister isn’t. I don’t know what changed’, So I would disagree because C has reported to me that ‘D’ has been physically chastised by his parents. … [the father] has acknowledged hitting C with a stick on one occasion whereas C has reported all of the children, except E, being hit is a common experience within the family home. So I find the father’s acknowledgment of hitting C on 1 May welcome but insufficient to explain what has happened within the family.” …. “Yes, there needs to be an absolute commitment not to repeat it but also a full acknowledgement of all that has happened for the profound change to work, and that needs to be supported by the local authority in order to rebuild these relationships and to provide knowledge and understanding of safe parenting”. Mrs Smith’s opinion is that all of this needs to happen and be achieved before any of the children could return home and that’s not within the children’s timescales.
Mrs Smith was asked to amplify her opinion about what the children’s timescales are and she told the court: “The children need to have a firm and secure base with relationships they are able to rely upon in order to thrive. These children have already had 11 months of not knowing, 11 months of instability, they need to know and be able to feel a sense of home and established life now. The scale of change required by the parents and the scale of relationship building that is now required will take months and months and years. Months if not years because the depth of level of change required is so profound. The children’s need for stability and permanence cannot wait for this change to be established and therefore it is my conclusion it is not achievable within the children’s timescales.”
In respect of a return home being the best way of meeting the children’s cultural and identity needs, Mrs Smith’s opinion is that: “I think the children’s need for safety has to be prioritised above the best way of meeting their need for culture and identity. Primarily the children need to be safe from physical harm and the commitment everybody is expressing about maintaining a relationship with the parents should ensure far as possible, the children’s cultural and identity needs will be met.”
THE WELFARE CHECKLIST
The Children’s Wishes and Feelings
Child ‘A’ has filed a statement and repeatedly expressed his wish to return home to the care of his parents, he does not wish to spend any time in foster care. Given ‘A’’s age and capacity to provide his own instructions, these wishes and feelings must be afforded some considerable weight and may only be displaced for very good reasons which require his wishes and feelings not to be given priority. ‘A’ has told Mr Marsden that “C has brought shame upon the family” and was firmly of the view that what C alleged had happened at home did not happen. Even though he has expressed this view, ‘A’ also has a clear wish to spend more time with his brothers and sisters.
Child ‘B’ was very guarded when Mr Roberts tried to ascertain her wishes and feelings last year and said little about her home life. She has said that her father ‘has slapped her’ to another child living in the same foster placement but the foster carer did not hear this. She can be argumentative but also quiet, respectful and well-mannered. In direct work with the children’s guardian, ‘B’ wrote a letter to the judge in which she states she wishes to go back home to her family and that she misses everyone. She wants to see more of her brothers and sister, including C.
Child ‘C’ does not wish to return home or indeed to spend any time with his parents at present. He told Mr Marsden he was ‘still frightened’ of them although C did wish to have a relationship with his brothers and sisters and to spend time with them.
Children ‘D’ and ‘E’ are too young to comprehend the enormity of the decision about adoption which the court is being asked to make, but I infer from their positive behaviour and interactions with each other in foster care that they would wish to be cared for together and not separated. They enjoy spending time with their older brothers and sister in contact, and there is no dispute the parents love their children even if there is evidence of a lack of ‘connection’ between them. I consider, in general terms, any child would choose to live with and be cared for by their parents and it is likely D and E would feel the same way. Mrs Smith described family time for these two the children with the parents as follows: “When I observed family time with E and D, when they caught sight of their parents they sparkled, they lit up, and when I met with ‘A’ and ‘B’ they have both been very willing to engage with me and very clear with me about their love for their parents”, which is supportive of these two children wanting to live at home with their birth family if it was safe for them to do so.
The Children’s Physical, Emotional and Educational Needs, and Their Age, Sex, Background and Any Other Characteristic Which is Relevant
All five of the children need a safe, nurturing, loving home in which to grow up in and to fulfil their emotional, physical, psychological and educational potential. They need to be protected from experiencing or witnessing harm and to be able to rely unquestioningly on their parents or carers for their physical and emotional safety. The children have particular identity and cultural needs being part of the Black UK/[specific African] community and the Islamic faith, as well as being part of a large sibling group. Where one or more of these identified needs conflicts with another, this court will have to determine which need takes priority and decide how each need may be met to best meet the welfare needs of each individual child.
Child ‘A’ is a 14 year old boy who has remained close to his local community having always lived with his parents and then with family friends during these proceedings, but at the same time he is a young person with an awareness and understanding there is a world in the UK which is very different to his [specific African] heritage. The evidence is that ‘A’ respects his sister, ‘B’ who he is close to and who understands their shared situation, and he is more likely to listen to her views.
‘A’ has experienced emotional conflict caused by his parents’ actions which have led him to experience torn loyalties between family members. He has allied himself with his parents and against C, preferring to believe the parents’ previous narrative they have not harmed C even when informed the father has admitted to hitting C during the course of this hearing. This is likely to have created a sense of mistrust in him towards all adults not knowing who to believe or to trust, it has sown division in his relationship with C who he blames for the fracturing of his family, and it is going to take a considerable amount of therapeutic work for ‘A’ to understand and accept none of this is C’s fault or responsibility. ‘A’ currently does not wish to engage in such work or intervention but he needs to when he is ready. The persons who have let him down are his parents not his brother and it is the parents who have the sole responsibility for the situation this family finds itself in.
Educationally, ‘A’s performance at school has improved of late, when Mrs Smith spoke to his Assistant Headteacher, [name redacted] in January 2025, [the Assistant Headteacher] told her, “how delightful ‘A’ is in school, there are no behavioural difficulties and he is achieving as well as can be expected and better given that English is not his first language and he has had to catch up from a delayed start to his education”. ‘A’ will begin his two year GCSE course in September 2025 and he needs to be settled in his care arrangements and his school to maximise his engagement with the activity of learning in order to fulfil his potential. He told me he would like to be a pilot and he should be given every encouragement to fulfil his ambition.
Child ‘B’ is 12 year old girl who is approaching adolescence and has a strong relationship with ‘A’, they understand each other, not least due to their proximity in age and because they both have a greater recollection and understanding of what it has meant to move and live from one country to another. I accept the evidence of Mr Marsden that these are two children who “are in the process of understanding their identity which is [a specific African community] with a very strong connection to the Islamic faith but they are also two Sheffield children who demonstrate a mixture of culture and identity that is very similar to each other”. I am persuaded by Mr Marsden and Mrs Smith’s evidence that these two children should live together wherever they are to be cared for and by doing so are “likely to achieve a better outcome where they may support each other through what will be a difficult and challenging time for any child to go through”.
‘B’ has also been emotionally affected by her parents’ actions and experienced torn loyalties between her parents and C. There is lot of work to be done to repair her relationship with C and for B to understand none of what has happened has been his fault. This is likely to be a lengthy process. B has experienced the trauma of separation and disrupted relationships within her family and needs consistent care to give her a secure base from which to recover. She is committed to her faith and shows a keen interest in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, she is a young person who can understand what is going on around her and demonstrate right from wrong. For the time being there will be no changes to her education setting or provision where she is settled and performing well. If any transition to another school is required, the local authority and school intend to ensure this will be sensitively managed.
B’s problems with her eyesight have now been addressed, she has reduced bilateral vision and needs to wear spectacles. This was identified at an appointment in 2018 and she was prescribed glasses at that time but her parents filed to take her to the follow-up appointment and she was discharged from the service. Another referral was made in 2022 but B was again not taken to the appointment and in July 2022 she was discharged from the service.
Child C has an urgent need for stability. The foster placement in which he was thriving and had provided a secure home for him since his separation from his family unexpectedly came to an end in February 2025 when one of his foster carers passed away. This is likely to have caused C an additional sense of loss and confusion as he awaits the outcome of these proceedings and/or a long term foster placement. In addition to this loss, over the past year he has experienced the loss of all that is familiar to him, from a reduction in the time he spends with his siblings, to the lack of a relationship with his parents who he is fearful of and has chosen not to see for 11 months. When Mr Marsden raised the issue of returning home or having contact with his parents with C, his views were unequivocal: “He was scared and there was no hesitation - a very clear no, I do not want to go. Often there is some hesitation, often there is still that attachment there, but he was very clear to me”. When speaking to Mr Roberts, C’s views appeared to soften and he indicated he missed his parents and ‘maybe’ would like to see them.
He is a young boy who is rising 8 years old who has lost a great deal by speaking up and telling the truth and he is in need of significant reassurance, comfort, love and attuned, nurturing care. Mr Marsden described C as “the most vibrant, beautiful and cheerful boy I have met in many years. He has made a lot of progress since the local authority made its initial interventions. His foster carer who is no longer with us, sadly, did some excellent work with C and the local Imam, and he is very clearly a child who is making a good recovery and starting to integrate with the local community where he has been placed”. Whilst this is heartwarming to know, C’s resilience cannot be taken for granted and he needs therapeutic support and interventions to address the impact of his trauma and disrupted family relationships. He needs a decision about his permanent care arrangements to be made as soon as possible to give this therapy the maximum chance of success.
Children D and E are now 4 and 3 years old respectively and they are described by Mr Marsden as ‘two lovely young children’ who have made a great deal of progress in foster care. When they were placed in care both children were presenting with challenging behaviour; D would often scream, shout and try to push E into doing what he wanted to do. Mr Marsden said “his outbursts would be very loud and very animated, he would use his arms and legs pointing, stretching and aggressively posturing towards his sister. E had a rigid fear of dolls at that time and would literally freeze on the spot she was stood in and not move either when she was with the dolls or when her brother shouted very loud”. D’s Child Permanence Report (CPR) states these outbursts have mirrored those of his father observed on occasions during contact sessions and as described by C. D’s behaviour has now reduced and he is learning to express his feelings through words or seeking comfort from his carers rather than resorting to aggressive behaviour.
E had speech and language delay and was pre-verbal at the age of 2 years 1 month. Both D and E lacked an understanding of ‘stranger danger’ often approaching unfamiliar adults without hesitation which would suggest a lack of boundaries or clear attachment to specific adults or, as their CPRs suggests, is an adaptive response to experiencing early neglect by seeking attention indiscriminately when parental attention has been inconsistent or absent.
The foster carers worked very closely with the fostering support team and local multi-agency psychological services (MAPS) to support D and E. Within 10 weeks, progress was seen to take place, these behaviours reduced as well as improvements in the children’s speech, dexterity, handling cutlery and toilet training which had been seen to be delayed.
Physically, both D and E enjoy good health and have no additional needs over and above any other child of their age. I am persuaded D experienced neglect of aspects of his health and development such as poor dental hygiene, delayed toilet training, and a lack of boundaries at home which led to his challenging behaviour, but these issues have now resolved with the attuned care provided by his foster carers.
Emotionally and psychologically, both D and E need consistency of care with permanent carers to whom they may form secure attachments which will promote their ability to have long lasting relationships throughout their lives. Their CPRs state their foster carers have noted both children to have made significant progress in their ability to form secure attachments and trusting others. It would not be consistent with promoting their welfare to have their emotional and psychological attachments repeatedly disrupted which is more likely to cause them anxiety and to have feelings of distress and insecurity. If the children are returned to the care of their parents before the parents have made sufficient changes in their parenting, there is a high likelihood the children will be removed a second time and placed once again into foster care precipitating the very disruption which must be avoided.
The CPRs for D and E do not identify any significant physical, educational, social or health needs which would prevent an adoptive family being found for them. The parents are able to meet the basic care needs for these two children in contact and whilst concerns have been raised about the father’s behaviour and the food which has been brought for them during family time, these concerns are not, in isolation, sufficient to justify the children’s continued removal.
Mr Marsden’s recommendation is for a permanent family to be found for D and E through an adoptive family who support direct contact as this would be more likely to provide them with the security and stability which the children need and is less likely to be provided by a long term foster placement. I am persuaded they need a permanent care arrangement as soon as possible not least because E refers to her current carers as ‘mummy’ and ‘daddy’ and does this with other adults, including with Mr Roberts at one point during his assessment when he was observing contact. It indicates the level of confusion about who her primary carers are and who is fulfilling the parental role.
The Likely Effect on each Child of any Change in their Circumstances and the Impact on D and E Throughout their Lives of becoming An Adopted Person
Child ‘A’ has remained with kinship carers during these proceedings who are not in a position to care for him long term. The realistic options for his future care are between his return to the care of his parents or long term foster care. He has expressed his unwillingness to consider foster care as an option and told the children’s guardian if he cannot return home then “wherever in the country he is sent, he will return to his parents”. His opinion appeared to soften by March 2025 when the newly allocated social worker, Ms Najma Kauser visited him on the 10 March 2025 and he was upset but stated “he would have to go where the local authority ask him to go – but wanted to wait for the judge to make the final decision as he was hopeful that the whole thing could change. ‘A’ stated that he would want to be with his siblings if he could not be with his parents”.
It is likely that any move for ‘A’ to go into foster care may be met with some degree of opposition which will need to be overcome as it is against his wishes and feelings, but I am persuaded the impact of it could be ameliorated by being placed with ‘B’ who he is close to.
The realistic options for Child ‘B’ are to go home or to remain in foster care. B’s clear preference is to go home and to have her family reunited and her main issue with foster care is that “it doesn’t feel like home because my siblings aren’t there”. ‘B’ is likely to welcome being placed with ‘A’ but this would only partially ameliorate the impact of not reuniting her whole family.
Child ‘C’ does not wish to go home and his parents concede this should not happen immediately. He is placed with short term foster carers and will need to move to long term foster carers which will be another disruption to his emotional and psychological attachments.
Children ‘D’ and ‘E’ have established good emotional attachments to their foster carers and to other members of the foster family but this is not an early permanence placement and they cannot remain where they are, therefore there is going to be a need for these two children to change their care arrangements again at some point whatever this court’s decision is.
D and E are likely to want to continue their relationships with their parents and older siblings no matter what their care arrangements are. These relationships are important and valuable to them because they support and promote the cultural and identity needs of them both. If a change in their circumstances led to these relationships not being promoted it would be a significant loss to them and impact adversely upon their connection to their [specific African community] identity as well as their connection to their large sibling group. If D and E are placed for adoption the saliency of these relationships will inevitably be reduced compared to living at home with their parents and this is a disadvantage of adoption or long term foster care.
If D or E become an adopted person they will lose the potential to be rehabilitated to the care of their parents if they go on to make any changes in the long term future, and they will lose part of their identity as they will no longer be members of their birth family but will join their own ‘forever family’. D and E both have an emotional bond with their parents and siblings and enjoy spending time in contact with them as Mrs Smith described. It is likely this will be a loss to them if it is reduced in frequency. The disruption to D and E’s emotional and psychological attachments to their birth family and to their foster carers is going to be a challenge and is likely to cause short-term confusion and anxiety for them both. It serves to emphasise the prejudice being caused to their welfare by further delay.
I also take into account that adoption outside of a child’s birth family is not always successful and can break down in later years and cause further harm to a child. Fortunately, D and E have been capable of forming positive attachments to their foster carers which bodes well for them being able to be transfer such attachments to adoptive carers to make it a successful adoption. It may take longer to find an adoptive placement for these two children together due to their cultural identity and older ages plus the need for ongoing contact with their birth family, and there is no guarantee how short that time-frame may be completed within which delays any permanency plan being achieved, but I am persuaded by the evidence of Ms Rowe it will be achievable. Any adoptive placement which is found will only be progressed after a robust and comprehensive assessment of the prospective adopter/s ability to meet the needs of both D and E together, and this will minimise the likelihood of any adoptive family placement breaking down. An adoptive placement will keep the children safe, it will meet their needs, it will provide them with life-long security and be free of the risks they are likely to face in the care of their parents.
In her oral evidence, Ms Rowe did not shy away from the challenge of finding an adoptive family which is a cultural match for D and E, and explained the difficulty in predicting how easy or long this search may take. This local authority has encouraged a change in culture away from closed adoption to more contemporary, modern adoptive placements which support direct contact and if this were to be achieved for D and E it would lessen the impact of any change in the children’s circumstances if they cannot go home. It will also provide them with relationships with their older full siblings which will benefit their understanding of their identity.
Any Harm which the Child has Suffered or is Likely to Suffer and How Capable Each of the Parents, and any other Person is of Meeting the needs of the Children
I consider this composite heading is an appropriate point to consider part of the required Re F and Re T analysis.
The type of harm which the parents have caused to their children and are likely to cause to them is that set out in the facts approved to satisfy the statutory threshold for intervention.
In my judgment, the severity of that harm is immense and likely to impact adversely not only their physical welfare but the children’s emotional and psychological development. No child may have a close, confiding, trusting relationship with a parent who repeatedly assaults them. It denies the child their right to feel safe at home which is the place where they deserve and need to feel safest of all. It is likely to affect their emotional and psychological development not just in the short term but as adults, and it increases the likelihood of them behaving in a similar way having normalised violence as a method of resolving conflict and disagreements, and using it to control the behaviour of others. Examples of this was evident in D’s behaviour towards his sister when he was placed into foster care.
The current likelihood of the harm occurring is, in my judgment, a high one because of the parents’ lack of real change since the children were removed from their care. The parents submit there has been change which justifies further adjournment and assessment because the father has admitted to assaulting C, but I have rejected his explanation for the reasons set out above and consider the parents still continue to deny or accept what they have both done to their children. There has been no change in this regard.
In my judgment, the parents continue to minimise their behaviour and intermittently and repeatedly refer to it as ‘physical chastisement’ which it is not, it is an assault, and there is no aspect of any child’s behaviour which could possibly justify the extent of the beating they inflicted upon C. Having regard to the photographs of C’s injuries, they are likely to constitute actual bodily harm which crosses the custody threshold. It is not possible for this court to say whether any conviction would result in an immediate sentence of imprisonment or not and I am not conducting a sentencing exercise, but I cannot sensibly ignore the possibility that one or both parents may not be in a position to care for any of their children in the future if they were to receive a custodial sentence at the end of the concurrent criminal investigation.
I am further persuaded to reach my conclusion about a lack of change because the mother assaulted ‘A’ in 2018 and despite a great deal of support and intervention by social care at the time, including reassurances by the parents they would not use physical chastisement again, they did so when they assaulted C. The degree of the assault upon C is greater than the description of the one inflicted upon ‘A’ and this persuades me the risk to the children in the intervening years is increasing not diminishing, and whether that is due to there being more children in the household which has placed greater stress upon the family is not known as the parents have struggled to accept they have done anything wrong or have any problems with parenting any of their children.
When I turn to consider whether the likelihood of repetition may be reduced or mitigated by support services which could be made available, I am persuaded this is not the case immediately nor likely to be in any timescales which is meaningful for the children because it is unlikely the parents would engage consistently, openly and honestly with it for the following reasons;
Firstly, there is a long history of the parents being obstructive and not working with professionals: They refused to give their consent for any child protection medicals to be carried out upon any of the children in May 2024 and these were delayed until the local authority shared parental responsibility to give their consent; this is echoed by the father’s refusal in 2018 to give consent for any photographs of the bruising to ‘A’ at his CPM conducted by Dr R. The reason given by the father in 2018 is that it was ‘against his religion’ and yet he accepted in his evidence it was not against his religion to take photographs of his children.
The parents have lied to the Police and still don’t accept the evidence about where the wooden spoon and broom were found despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
The mother has given an inconsistent account about whether she did or did not cooperate with Mr Marsden. Both parents did not tell the truth to Mr Roberts in their parenting assessment. Both parents gave instructions during this final hearing to suggest these two professionals were not doing their job competently or fairly before the father conceded Mr Marsden was telling the truth about his own lack of engagement. All of this does not bode well for collaborative working in the future.
The parents failed to take ‘B’ to health appointments for her eyesight or the children to the dentist at the required intervals leading to dental decay, demonstrating a lack of engagement with health professionals and school staff who repeatedly asked them to take ‘B’ to her appointments to address this. The parents continue to deny this has been the case.
Secondly, I agree with the evidence in the Parenting Assessments, and of Mr Roberts, Mr Marsden and Mrs Smith, that neither parent has been ‘open or reflective about comparing their own childhood experiences to those of their children or in their responses to the Parenting Assessment generally’. The parents’ position during these proceedings has prevented meaningful discussions about this from taking place. Mrs Smith told the court: “In my conversations with the parents I asked lots of open questions to give them the opportunity to tell me about their experiences which were not taken…I haven’t seen any deep reflection yet and I hope that work will continue but it takes a long time for us all to process the parenting we have received, so this is very much a start, and the added complication in this case is the Police investigation”. This persuades me the parents are likely to have normalised the use of ‘physical chastisement’ from their own childhoods into their own parenting strategies and it will take a very long time to ‘unlearn’ this reflex action.
Finally, neither parent accepts C is telling the truth about what they did to him, and I am persuaded by the evidence of Mr Roberts, Mr Marsden and Mrs Smith that there is a lack of openness and honesty about what has really happened in this family. There is very little reflection by the parents about what they have done or any understanding why their ‘physical chastisement’ might be a concern other than it is illegal. Having listened to the parents’ evidence I formed the view the parents, whilst apologetic, showed very little insight or accountability for the true impact of what they have done which has torn their family apart, and until there is, there is no basis on which one parent could mitigate the risks posed by the other. Until such time as there is, I agree with Mr Marsden and Mrs Smith, it is not possible to identify any support services which may mitigate the risks they pose to their children.
The assessments conducted in these proceedings and the evidence before the court demonstrate insufficient change, and when I turn to consider the necessity of adjourning these proceedings for further change to be achieved, I am persuaded there is little cause for optimism the nature and degree of profound change Mrs Smith said is required, is likely to happen in a meaningful timescale for any of the children. This is for the following reasons.
The father has, extremely belatedly, begun to make a partial admission of wrongdoing but the mother has made none and the father supports her denial of wrongdoing. The father’s partial admission is all very positive and he is to be commended for making it, it will be very important for C to know, but it is not the whole truth. Accepting full responsibility for the abuse is only the first step on the road to making changes. Thereafter there is a need to show genuine commitment to fundamental change by engaging in parenting classes and any other interventions to acquire alternative parenting strategies and insight into why they repeatedly default to using violence against their children, who they love. Mrs Smith states, and I agree, “In my observations of family time I have seen [the mother] very focused on meeting the physical and practical care needs of all the children, there has been a great deal of warmth but not a great deal of connection, very little conversational connection between them and the children and very little play between them. They have very few resources or methods of managing the children’s behaviour in the family dynamic.” It persuades me that whatever currently drives the parents’ overwhelming urge to use violence and the use of household implements upon their children is not fully understood but it is so great, it cannot be controlled by either parent by strength of will, instead, it overrides all rational thought.
In answer to a question from the court, Mrs Smith said: “As the parents have explained, it is their experience of parenting from their own childhood and cultural background. It is very difficult to change entrenched habits and behaviour and for that reason the work needs to be done first. The risk remains very high despite a knowledge of the consequences because we know from 2018, the consequences were explained and the expectations were made clear but change did not happen. Sometimes, knowing something is not accepted is not enough to bring about immediate change and the risk remains high”.
Having achieved genuine change, there is likely to be further time needed to see if the parents may put it into practice, and the only reliable indicator of this is likely to be by lengthy observation and assessment of their actions. Simple assertions they will ‘not do it again’ is not going to be enough in this case when they gave those assurances in 2018 and could not maintain them.
When I turn to consider whether there are some solid evidence based reasons to believe the parents will be able to make all of these changes and to maintain and sustain them within a time frame which is meaningful for any of the five children, and D and E in particular, my robust and realistic appraisal of the evidence is that they will not.
I reach this conclusion because they are still not being open and honest about what has happened at home which means they are yet to reach the very first base of accepting responsibility. I have been persuaded these are not parents who have achieved the necessary change and now require further time to demonstrate they can sustain it, they are parents who are at the very beginning of making the changes which are essential to their parenting of any child. I sincerely hope they continue to make those changes because it will benefit the children when they see them to accept and apologise for what they have done, but I very much doubt they will make those of the nature and degree required in the short to medium term foreseeable future and accordingly, I cannot conclude they have the capability to care for their children or to keep them safe from harm.
The Ability of any Other Person to Care for the Children
There has been no dispute there are no other family members or friends who have come forward and been positively assessed. The local authority has assessed other persons as set out above but their assessments have been negative in their outcome and no party has suggested the court should conclude otherwise.
CONCLUSIONS
I am persuaded that without successful change having occurred followed by a lengthy period of assessment and observation of the parents in the community to assess their ability to sustain any changes, it is unlikely they will be able to keep any of their children safe from harm. Given the events of the past 11 months, none of the children are likely to make any further disclosures or volunteer information about what happens at home if it is likely to lead to them being removed a second time, which would leave all of the children vulnerable and unprotected.
Child ‘A’, as a male older child, has more physical resources to protect himself from physical harm from his mother but in my judgment, not if his father should choose to use violence against him, nor should he be placed in a situation where he is expected to protect himself or his younger siblings. ‘A’ cannot protect himself from the emotional harm of witnessing the physical abuse of his siblings nor can he protect himself from the impact of his parents lying to him and denying they have hurt C and then belatedly admitting they have done so causing him confusion and most likely, anger and distress. Given the parental concealment of wrongdoing in this case, it is more than likely ‘A’ will find himself in the increasingly invidious position of covering up for his parents and losing all respect for authority. The parents do not appear to have given any thought to how that may affect ‘A’s welfare or his position in the community in the future.
A plan of long term foster care for ‘A’ is opposed by him and there is a risk he may not accept such an outcome which would give rise to different risks. I have carefully considered what those risks may be and the evidence identifies them to be his behaviour becoming more challenging in school and potentially, in the community, with an associated risk of criminal offending or exploitation. It may impact upon his education in a way which leads him not to achieve his potential. There is a balance of harm to consider for all of the children which I have done, and I am persuaded by the evidence of Mrs Smith that whilst these risks to ‘A’ may exist, the probability of them manifesting themselves is low. This is because, as she said; “because not every child in foster care is criminally exploited and my experience of ‘A’s behaviour is that even when he is unsettled he does not take risks, and he is reported at school to have a very positive set of friendships which makes me more confident he has the stability and good foundation that is protective for him”. I note he has been placed outside of the care of his parents for the whole of these proceedings with kinship carers, which he preferred to foster care but was still against his wishes, and none of these risks have materialised. In addition, if he was placed with ‘B’ as the local authority intends, he would have the positive influence of his sister alongside him.
In respect of ‘B’, if she were to return home as she wishes, she is highly unlikely to express any concerns outside of the home if the parents repeat their behaviour, especially when she is fearful of even exercising her own autonomy over whether she attends the Mosque or not. I consider the need to prioritise the safety of her welfare in the global sense is more important than following her wishes and feelings.
If ‘A’ and ‘B’ are placed together in foster care their contact with other members of their birth family will change and reduce and this is likely to be unwelcome to them both. They love their parents and their siblings and have an undeniable need to maintain a relationship with them all. The local authority will need to respond flexibly and sensitively to each child’s need for contact, utilising different formats for it creatively, as they move through their teenage years.
I have considered the welfare of ‘A’ and ‘B’ holistically, attaching appropriate weight to all of these things, and I have been persuaded it is both necessary and proportionate for both children to be made the subject of final care orders and to be placed together in foster care, and for their relationships with their birth family to be promoted through direct and indirect forms of contact. I am sorry I cannot give ‘A’ or ‘B’ what they want and ask them to trust my decision as being the correct one for them both.
In respect of C, the welfare decision for him is not a finely balanced one and I cannot identify any basis on which it would promote his welfare to place him in the care of his parents when he is yet to accept it would be safe to spend any time with them. If C was returned to the care of parents currently, he is likely to lose all trust in adults to keep him safe, he would not feel listened to and he is highly unlikely to report anything in the future if he was assaulted again. Further direct work needs to be undertaken with C to repair his relationship with his parents and older siblings, and only when that is successfully completed will it be possible to consider C’s rehabilitation to his birth parents. There is no likelihood of this being in the short to medium term future and the only realistic care plan this court could endorse is one of long term foster care for him.
In respect of D and E, the permanent removal of any child from the care of a birth parent is an option only to be taken when no other realistic option will do. I have considered long term foster care for these two children and this option has the advantage it will give a guarantee of family relationships being maintained and the prospect of rehabilitation to their parents if they do eventually make the changes they need to make in the long term. But I have rejected it as an option to meet their welfare needs because of the inherently greater likelihood of instability and insecurity in such placements as has been seen for C during these proceedings. Even the most committed foster carer may not be in a position to continue to care for children for reasons which are beyond their control, and each change in placement would disrupt their emotional and psychological attachments and cause further harm to their welfare. It is an option which should only be taken after a search for an adoptive placement has been tried and failed.
When considering the impact of the delay upon any of the children caused by any further assessment and adjournment of these proceedings, I accept the evidence of the children’s guardian and the ways in which any further delay is going to prejudice their welfare. The children have been living with 11 months of ‘not knowing’ where they will be living or who will be caring for them, and even at the most basic level of understanding, ‘D’ and ‘E’ do not know who to call ‘mummy or daddy’ because of this. They need and deserve to have a permanent family life as soon as possible and my holistic appraisal of the evidence is that the parents are going to need much more time than D and E can afford to give them to ‘unlearn’ long established patterns of behaviour and acquire new, healthy ones.
Accordingly, for the same reasons I have given above I am persuaded it is not necessary to extend these proceedings further and it is not necessary for there to be any further assessment of the parents as the court has all the information it needs to make a decision now. Any further assessment may produce further information but it is not going to produce any more optimism that what needs to change is likely to change in any meaningful timescale.
Having conducted the holistic balancing exercise and having considered everything I have read and listened to, I have been persuaded that making the care orders and placement orders sought by the local authority is necessary to protect and safeguard the welfare of these five children and is a proportionate response to each of their situations, it is what D and E’s welfare requires. Accordingly, I make final care orders and I approve the respective care plan for each child.
In doing so, I can confirm I have considered the arrangements for contact as I am obliged to do pursuant to section 34(11) of the Children Act 1989. I endorse the proposals for contact put forward as a starting point, and fully expect such proposals to be flexible as Ms Claridge described and to be discussed with ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ as part of the ‘Looked After Child’ (LAC) process. Contact will need to be reduced from its current level because it is no longer going to provide a springboard for rehabilitation of the children to the parents’ care, and for the older children it needs to be at a level which encourages them to settle into long term foster care. However, it is not possible for me to be prescriptive about the speed of the reduction or too precise about what the eventual level should be set at. If the children settle quickly into foster care and the parents support their respective placements, the eventual level may be set at a higher level than monthly in accordance with the children’s wishes and feelings. This is the purpose of the ‘LAC’ review process.
I am well aware this is going to be a very distressing decision for these parents and probably for ‘A’ and ‘B’ as well, and for that I am sorry, but my duty is to have each child’s welfare as my paramount consideration and to make decisions based upon the evidence not upon where my sympathy lies. I have to set out my reasons, however difficult they may be to read, because this is an important decision for ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’ and ‘E’, and those reasons have to be recorded.
The Placement Order and s26 Contact Applications
I can confirm that in making the Placement Orders I have read and considered the relevant documents in respect of those applications. I am satisfied that adoption is in the best interests of D and E and is achievable for them. Before making a placement order I must also consider the arrangements for contact pursuant to section 27(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (ACA 2002) and I will return to this further below. The parents have not given their unconditional consent and I must formally consider dispensing with their consent on the basis the welfare of these two children requires it. Having reached the conclusion that adoption is in their best interests in the care proceedings, it follows I must dispense with the parents’ agreement to D and E being placed for adoption in accordance with section 52 of the ACA 2002 in order to implement that plan. Accordingly, I dispense with the parents’ consent to placing both children for adoption and authorise the local authority to place them with prospective adopters of its choice.
I turn now to the request of the children’s guardian, supported by both parents if this staged were reached, to make orders for contact pursuant to Section 26 of the ACA 2002 in respect of D and E. It is a request which is opposed by the local authority as not being necessary because they are already committed to contact being promoted, and I have considered the judgment of Bennett J in the case of Re C (Contact)[2008] 1 FLR 1151 FD in this respect.
Upon the making of the placement orders, the local authority’s duty to promote contact under section 34 of the Children Act 1989 (re parental contact with children) comes to an end, and whilst those placement orders remain in force, no application may be made for an order under section 34 by the parents, or by the older children without the court’s permission under section 34(3)(b). Section 26(4) ACA 2002 permits this court of its own initiative to make an order for contact pursuant to section 26(2)(b) which would place a legal framework around the local authority’s duty to promote contact even whilst the placement orders are in existence . When considering whether to make such an order I must afford paramount consideration to each child’s welfare in accordance with section 1 of the ACA 2002.
I have been persuaded by the evidence of the importance of the relationships D and E have with their parents and with ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’. Those relationships are very valuable to these two children even though the parents cannot care safely for them, they are not babies but young children who are likely to carry live memories of their birth family with them wherever they grow up, more so by the time they are placed in an adoptive family.
These relationships meet their cultural and identity needs both from an ethnic and religious viewpoint as well as by being part of a large sibling group. It is unlikely the local authority will find prospective adopters from the [specific African] community and their ongoing relationships with their birth family will maintain this important link with their identity and heritage. I do not consider it will hinder the search for the right adoptive family being found for the children because I agree with Mrs Smith’s evidence that if any prospective adoptive family is not willing to promote such contact, then they are not the right adopters for these two children, and the principle and details of the contact is endorsed by the local authority itself which will become the adoption agency with the responsibility for finding the adoptive placement.
I do not doubt the willingness of the Independent Reviewing Officer or the current social worker to follow the details of the final care plans, but I also recognise that professionals change employment, resources become reallocated, and slippage may occur. For each of these reasons I am persuaded orders for contact should be made in accordance with the local authority’s proposals to set the minimum level of contact to take place which will signal to all involved with these children the importance this court has attached to contact taking place. If no adoptive placement is found and the placement orders are revoked, then the duty to promote contact pursuant to section 34 will be resurrected whilst the children are in long term foster care.
I direct the advocates to draft the various orders arising from this judgment and to incorporate the final threshold within it.
In the event any party requires any further clarification or reasons in respect of any issue I reserve the right to provide the same once it has been brought to my attention. I remind the parties that any application for leave to appeal must be made within 21 days of the date of this judgment. In accordance with the judgment of McFarlane LJ in Re H (Children) [2015] EWCA Civ 583, the care and placement orders drawn by the court will have this reminder recorded on the face of the order.
In accordance with FPR Part 12 Chapter 7 and Practice Direction 12G, the local authority shall provide a copy of this judgment to the South Yorkshire Police for the purpose of any criminal investigation and/or the Crown Prosecution Service to enable it to discharge its functions under any enactment
Pursuant to Rule 25.19 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010, the party who instructed Dr Rahman is to provide a copy of this judgment to that court appointed expert.
H.H. JUDGE MARSON
Dated: 1st May 2025
SCHEDULE OF FINDINGS APPROVED BY THE COURT IN SATISFACTION OF THE SECTION 31 STATUTORY CRITERIA
The children have suffered significant harm and are likely to suffer significant harm in the future attributable to the care given to them and likely to be given to them by their parents, [the mother] and [the father] which is not reasonable. The significant harm suffered by the children and likely to be suffered is in the form of physical and emotional harm and ill-treatment and impairment of their health and development from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another.
On Wednesday 1 May 2024, the child ‘C’ aged 6 years, was beaten by both his mother, and his father, by hitting C with a wooden spoon and a stick and/or a broom handle, leading to C sustaining significant bruising and injuries.
On the 3 May 2024, C presented at school with extensive red/purple bruising to his back with tramline, linear appearances, mainly to the upper right quadrant and mid-central area of his back, with further bruising to C’s right buttock and upper right thigh which are circular and visible on photographs F1 to F3 of the case lines bundle.
On the 10 May 2024, C underwent a Child Protection Medical (CPM) completed by Dr G. Consultant Paediatrician. The bruising, a week after first being photographed on the 3 May 2024, was still evident as noted by Dr G. and was extensive with the shape of the bruising mirroring the shape of a wooden spoon and a broom handle/stick. These injuries were, on the balance of probabilities, inflicted upon C by being assaulted by the mother and by the father with a wooden spoon and a wooden stick and/or a broom handle with excessive force which was not reasonable to use.
The court finds the following injuries were inflicted (following the numbering in Dr G.’s and Dr Rahman’s reports for consistency):
10cm x 5cm red/purple bruise to upper right ventral (rear) surface of thigh;
1.5cm x 5cm red circular bruise to right shin with central pale area;
4 cm x 3.5cm red/purple bruise to mid right thigh inside aspect;
3 x linear brown bruises to upper outer left arm, sizes 5cm x 1cm, 1cm x 2cm, 3.5cm x 1cm;
Dark brown linear bruise mid-thigh dorsal surface left side;
Not an injury;
4cm x 1.5cm red bruise with central pale area right upper arm outer aspect with 2.5 cm in diameter purple bruise below;
Not an injury;
Not an injury;
Not an injury;
1.5cm in diameter circular bruise right outer lower thigh, just above knee;
Multiple overlapping circular red bruises with central pale area, one bruise more linear in appearance, right outer thigh. Bruise sizes 5cm x 1.5cm, 4.5 cm x 4.5 cm, 4 cm x 2.5cm;
2x Linear dark purple bruise right outer leg, just above knee.
The independent medical evidence produced by Dr Rahman, Consultant Paediatrician confirms from the photographs provided by Social Care and the South Yorkshire Police, and the descriptions from the medical notes and Child Protection Medical report submitted by Dr G., that the injuries referred to above in paragraph 3 are likely to have been inflicted upon C by being hit with a wooden spoon on his back, arms and legs, which matches much of the bruising pattern very closely, and a broom handle on his back, arms and legs.
The Court find the perpetrators of the assault are the mother and the father. The assault was carried out by the mother and the father using a wooden stick and/or a broom handle, and a wooden spoon, causing significant injury in the form of extensive bruising.
The assault caused significant pain and physical injury to C at the time it was inflicted and significant emotional harm to his welfare.
Any parent acting reasonably who was present at the time of assault would be aware that the force used by the perpetrator was excessive and would cause the child significant pain and injury.
Any reasonable parent who was not present at the time of the assault but who was made aware of it and/or subsequently assisted the child with dressing/undressing and/or bathing following the assault would be aware of the extent of the child’s injuries.
The court finds each parent was aware that the other parent had assaulted C and failed to protect C from significant physical harm perpetrated by the other parent. Both parents were aware an assault had taken place upon C and both parents failed to seek medical attention for him.
The court finds each parent failed to protect the other children in the family from seeing or hearing their ill-treatment of C which is likely to have caused them emotional harm by being present in the family home during the assault of C.
The mother used excessive physical chastisement in 2018 after child ‘A’, then aged 6 years, wet himself. The mother hit ‘A’ across his arms and legs with a coat hanger causing multiple linear red bruises, parallel to each other, in groups of 2 or 3 on both of ‘A’s lower arms and left outer thigh as listed within the medical report produced by Dr R. on the 12.01.18 following her clinical examination of ‘A’.
Both parents have assaulted at least one of their children by using excessive physical chastisement as a means of punishing their children, and all five children are likely to suffer similar punishment in the future. Any child exposed to such severe and punitive parenting will suffer and is likely to suffer significant physical and emotional harm.
Not a finding made in respect of threshold.
Not a finding made in respect of threshold.
Approved and adopted as the final threshold.
H.H. Judge Marson
Dated: 1 May 2025