T v K

I am concerned today with the welfare of B, who is the son of Mr T and Ms K. The father is represented today by Ms Gaunt, the mother by Ms Ecob and B through his Guardian by Ms Stamford of counsel. In considering this case and delivering this judgment, I am grateful to all of counsel for their carefully thought-through submissions. B is currently 11 years old but was only five years old when these proceedings started in 2019. He was born in Norway and moved with his mother to the UK in 2017. His mother is originally from West Africa but moved to Norway as a child. His father is originally also from West Africa but moved to Sweden as a refugee.

Given the duration of these proceedings and the issues raised, it is necessary to set out the background in some detail. B’s mother and father met over the internet. B was rapidly conceived when they met in person. His mother and father have never lived together, and B has always lived with his mother. During B’s life, B’s father has always lived in Sweden.

The parents disagree about how much involvement the father had in B’s life before B and his mother moved to the UK. It is agreed, however, that there are at least two occasions where they had direct contact. One of these was in 2014 when the mother and B visited Sweden. An incident occurred during this visit where B was separated from his mother by the father for a short period of time. The police were involved, and B was returned to his mother, and no charges were brought against B’s father. This led to the end of the mother and father’s relationship. The incident left a strong impression on the mother.

Following this incident, the mother denied that the father was the biological father of B. DNA testing was carried out in Norway in September 2014, which concluded that the father is, indeed, B’s biological father. B’s Norwegian birth certificate was amended as an administrative procedure in Norway to record the father’s details. It is also agreed that the father visited Norway to see B around the time of B’s second birthday. He stayed with the mother’s sister and, in the company of other family members, he got to spend time with B.

In terms of other contact between the father and B prior to these proceedings, it is recorded in documents from Norwegian Social Services that in 2016, the father had had two to three Skype calls with B and spoke to the mother about three to four times a week. It is agreed that the father and B had no face-to-face contact since Mother and B left Norway, at least until these proceedings started. There are, however, exhibited to the father’s statements a range of emails and text contacts with Mother dating back to 2017.

It is a matter of record that during 2016, Social Services in Norway were involved with the family during the course of which the mother left Norway in October 2016, initially telling Norwegian Social Services that she was in the USA (page D162 of the bundle) with police tracking indicating that they were actually in Germany (page D163). It is agreed that by 2017, Mother and B had arrived and taken up residence in the UK, where they have remained ever since. In July 2019, the father launched proceedings in the High Court in the UK for an order for contact and to ascertain where the mother and son were living. That was the start of these very lengthy proceedings.

I will endeavour not to recite the history of these proceedings in detail. However, the salient highlights are that in August 2019, following location of the mother, Hayden J directed that the mother and B’s passports be held by the mother’s solicitors and that indirect contact take place with the father. In October 2019, the father issued an application for parental responsibility which was joined with his application for contact. A section 7 Cafcass report was directed by District Judge Cronshaw in November 2019, and the first Cafcass section 7 report was prepared by February 2020.

The father then applied for Swedish citizenship in 2020. This resulted in a delay to the resolution of these proceedings until originally after December 2021, when his application for citizenship had been rejected. The father was then granted a passport by his birth country in June 2022 and sought a UK visa. The intended final hearing of these proceedings in September 2022 understandably had to be adjourned for an updated section 7 report, given the time that had passed since the completion of the original report. Following that, an ICFA referral was pursued in 2023, which took time to agree, and further planned final hearings in May 2023 and February 2024 were ineffective.

By the time we got to February 2024, a Guardian was appointed for B and a final hearing was set for 11 to 13 December 2024. Even the viability of this date seemed in jeopardy in October 2024 when it transpired that B had been placed on a child protection plan. Fortunately for all involved, the final hearing has been able to proceed as scheduled, and we are now at the position where I am delivering a judgment today. At this stage, I note that whilst proceedings in the Family Court often take far longer than anyone involved would wish, this is still an exceptional case where proceedings have now been going on for five and a half years. On a purely practical level, the effect of these lengthy proceedings has been that B has been subject to court proceedings for nearly half his life. It is inconceivable that this will not have had an impact on his childhood.

Turning to the issues and the parties’ positions, the issues have narrowed significantly in this case. Although the father originally sought a child arrangements order for spending time with B, he has, to his immense credit, been very focused on B’s needs and wishes, and following careful consideration of the Guardian’s most recent updating report of 6 December, changed his position at this final hearing to seek a direction for a global psychological assessment of the family, no order on his application for contact at present but still an order granting him parental responsibility of B.

The issues I have to decide today are:

The father’s position is that a global psychological assessment is required despite the fact that he is not currently seeking an order for contact. He says that the reasons for B’s current reluctance to have any contact with him need to be explored. The father notes that the contact had, during these proceedings, especially at the ICFA, been good, and raises concerns that B has been influenced to reject him.

The father points to the positive duty on the Court as expressed in Re C (A Child) [2011] EWCA Civ 521 to promote contact and grapple with all options before abandoning hope. In any event, the father seeks a positive declaration that he has parental responsibility for B. He contends this is crucial in light of the background where he has not been kept updated on important events such as a move to homeschooling and the child protection plan. He says that he has shown commitment to B and had good interaction when they had interaction. He vehemently disputes the mother’s assertions regarding his motives for seeking parental responsibility. He states that is reasons are solely connected to his desire to be a father to B and to play a full part in his life. The father does not object to the return of the mother and B’s passports provided he is notified of any trips abroad at least 28 days in advance, but he does seek details of the mother’s address as part of the natural consequences of parental responsibility.

The mother’s position is that a global psychological assessment is not required. It would unduly delay proceedings that are already of lengthy duration and would require B to engage with more professionals. This would be overwhelming for him as he is already undergoing assessments with the Local Authority. There is a real risk he would refuse to engage with this assessment and potentially then with any of the other necessary assessments conducted by the Local Authority.

The mother also opposes the grant of parental responsibility. She says that the father does not know B sufficiently to be able to exercise such a right, and he has never spent any proper time with B. Further, she questions his motives and asserts that he is seeking responsibility for the purposes of supporting his immigration applications and potentially coming to the UK. She says she is happy to keep him informed of the decisions she makes and that this is sufficient, and he does not require parental responsibility. She is happy to give an undertaking regarding her trips abroad, but says that her address should not be disclosed because of her fear of Father and that she would not feel safe if Father knew this. She says that Father has a criminal record and cannot be trusted.

The Guardian supports the grant of parental responsibility. In light of the inconsistent approach of Mother in providing information, the Guardian believes that this will provide the necessary framework for Father to reinforce his role and to ensure that he is informed and consulted about decisions affecting B going forward. The Guardian observes that the Local Authority have indicated that the outcome of these proceedings would need to be taken into account in determining whether the father is invited to any meetings as part of the child protection plan. Further, parental responsibility will ensure that the father continues to be kept informed from other agencies, such as school, if B were to return to school, and the GP. The Guardian also considers that such an order will enable B to know that his father was as involved as he could be in B’s life. Any risks of harmful behaviour can be managed appropriately in how B is told of the order.

As might be expected in a case that has been enduring for five and a half years, I have a wealth of documentary evidence to consider. I have read the contents of the bundle, which include extensive witness statements, Cafcass section 7 reports and updates and information both from Norway and Sweden and from the Local Authority regarding the child protection plan. I have also heard oral evidence from the father, mother and Guardian. An oral update was provided by Ms Hood, the Local Authority assigned social worker, in respect of the child protection plan. This was not given as sworn evidence but simply as an update to assist the Court, and I am grateful to Ms Hood for attending the first day and being able to provide this.

The father, who attended via video link from Sweden, said that he has been involved with B as much as he has been able to. He has sent money to help with B’s care, even without knowing where B is. He wants to play a role as B’s father, to know about his daily life and be involved in decisions about B, such as where he goes to school. He felt that contact with B had been good when it had occurred.

The father accepted that he had not sent letters and cards to B over the last year as directed by the court orders. His explanation was that he had not received the monthly updates, so did not know what B likes and dislikes. He had sent video messages as directed but these had not been viewed. He also wants to respect B’s wishes around contact. The father also accepted that he had been convicted of a money laundering offence in Sweden. He said that this did not impact on his ability to work with children; he had been working with children with autism, nor, as far as he was aware, did it impact on his visa to come to the UK. He firmly rejected any suggestion from the mother that he had used false ID at any point or that he was seeking parental responsibility for immigration purposes, noting that he was married to a Swedish citizen and has a child in Sweden.

The mother’s evidence was that it would be challenging for Father to be involved in B’s life. B had become upset at the thought of his father being involved in decisions. The mother asserted her continuing belief that the application was made solely to support the father’s immigration status. In relation to updates on B, the mother said that she had provided these, but they may not have been on the same day each month or necessarily included education and health and all updates, but they were sent. She accepted and apologised for not sending updates about homeschooling and the child protection plan, stating that this was because everything that had been going on was difficult for her as a mother and that she was not in the right state to deal with it. She had prioritised engaging with the professionals on B’s behalf.

Mother expressed concerns that Father was aggressive to her in the Skype calls with B and had not sought to understand B’s need for her or for calls to proceed at his pace. She noted that B has a relationship with other male figures at their church who are in the UK and able to take him for activities. Mother said that she was prepared to work with Father for B’s interests, but the father did not know B. There is space, in the mother’s view, if B wants to know his father. She disagreed that she had tried to shut B’s father out of B’s life and said that she had told the father of her move to the UK.

She said that she had never tried to tell B directly about incidents in her relationship with the father, or that it occurred when B was a baby. However, she accepted that B may have overheard adult conversations since he is free to roam around the house, although she would always go to another room to have such conversations. Mother confirmed in her evidence that she will be happy to give an undertaking regarding notifying of travel arrangements and that she would commit to retaining letters and cards sent to B and to providing monthly updates.

Kirsten Connor, B’s Guardian, gave oral evidence in which she confirmed that her view is that parental responsibility should be given to the father. Father’s counsel questioned her about comments made by B and whether these indicated that Mother was influencing B. Ms Connor remained firm in her professional opinion that B had not presented as a child who is being manipulated. He is, in her opinion, attuned to his mother and his mother’s feelings, and her professional opinion is that he is endeavouring to explain the situation in a way that he can process and understand.

Ms Connor noted that B has expressed very clear wishes and feelings. She has concerns that B is displaying risky behaviours in running away from home at points of distress to him. This needs to be managed to avoid even more serious risks of harm to B arising. Ms Connor praised Father for his child-centred approach in not coming to the UK and insisting on contact with B in light of B’s wishes and feelings.

In response to questions from Mother’s counsel, Ms Connor indicated that parental responsibility for Father will give him the right to be informed and consulted on matters concerning B and to obtain information from other authorities. Father has not, in Ms Connor’s opinion, sought to disrupt Mother’s decisions to date, and she did not feel this is a risk. Ms Connor urged Mother to keep Father updated and Father to send letters and cards to B, as both of these are in B’s best interests.

I turn now to the issues I have to determine today, and although this does go in a reverse order to the submissions made to me, I will start with the application for a global psychological assessment. This is a renewed application, the application originally being made on day one of this final hearing for the very practical reason that if I were to accede to it at that time, there would be no need for the rest of the hearing. I gave a short ex tempore judgment on the application at the time, in which I indicated that I did not consider appointment of such an expert to be necessary to resolve the main issue of parental responsibility that was remaining at present for determination or that it was necessary more generally. I took into account, in particular, B’s welfare and the delay that would be occasioned by ordering such a report. I noted that Father may wish to renew the application after evidence and, indeed, he has duly done so.

Having heard the evidence, my view remains the same that a global psychological assessment is not necessary and that it is appropriate for these proceedings to conclude today. The Court’s power to give permission for such an expert and the factors I must consider are set out in section 13 of the Children and Families Act 2014. I have had due regard to the factors listed in subsection 7 and also to the guidance of the Family Justice Council regarding cases alleging parental alienation, which was published on 11 December 2024.

First and foremost, I note that the main substantive issue I am being asked to determine today is whether Father should have parental responsibility for B. Ms Gaunt, for the father has confirmed that the father is not seeking any order for contact today. She invites me not to conclude proceedings today and to order an assessment as necessary to determine contact arrangements at a final hearing to dispose of the proceedings. She submits the Court needs to understand the reasons why B is refusing contact with his father and what treatment may then be required so that proceedings can be disposed of.

Mother and Guardian oppose the application for the same reasons as they opposed it when made at the start of these proceedings. They claim it would occasion significant delay, and B is already exposed to a large number of professionals, so there is a significant risk that he will not engage and potentially also not engage with professionals looking to support him with his other vulnerabilities.

The test is one of necessity. Father does not pursue a contact order today, and I am invited to order an assessment on the basis that contact may be pursued in the future, depending on what the assessment comes back with. If the underlying concern is potential alienation, then Ms Gaunt does not seek specific findings on this today.

Considering the evidence I have heard and taking into account the guidance already mentioned, I do not consider this report to be necessary. To the extent that any parental alienation concerns exist, I remind myself that it is for the Court to find on the facts whether such behaviours exist and then to consider the need for an expert to assist in resolving welfare issues arising from this. There are three necessary elements to establishing what I will, for convenience, refer to as “alienation”. These are:

The case law indicates that what is being looked for is a pattern of parental manipulation. Resistance or reluctance on its own does not amount to alienation, as there can be a range of reasons for this.

I have heard the oral evidence in this case and I have seen the references to what B has said to both his social worker and Ms Connor. Whilst I agree that it seems unlikely that B would reference “kidnapping” and “poison” if he were completely unaware that his mother held these concerns about what has happened in the past, the balance of evidence, in my view, does not indicate sufficiently at present, that there are real concerns of parental manipulation.

Set against the comments reported in the social worker reports and Ms Connor’s reports is the attendance at the three ICFA sessions, where the report is that B enjoyed the engagement with his father, and four years of Skype calls, which Father considered overall to be good contact. This does not present as a child who has been manipulated into a position of hostility to his father, that would require further investigation.

The impression I have been left with is that it is highly regrettable that in the course of these proceedings, the parties have not been able to work together more effectively to build contact with B. Cross-allegations have been made around Mother being present during Skype calls and calls being insisted to be at times that interfered with B’s time with friends. This speaks of a lack of effective communication to build a workable timetable that would work with B, as opposed to parental manipulation. I also note that at the time these proceedings started, B was only five years old and naturally would have felt the impacts of arrangements between his parents on how he got to spend his time at home.

Overall, I accept the professional opinion of Ms Connor that B shows attachment to his mother and is attuned to her emotions. Whilst I accept that the comments B has made are of concern to his father, the evidence before me does not substantiate findings of alienating behaviours. I cannot see, as a result, that it is necessary, having regard to the Family Justice Council guidance, for an expert to be appointed to explore these matters with B and his family with a view to recommending steps to address it.

I reiterate the points I made when rejecting this application when first made, that with regard in particular to the factors listed in section 13(7), I consider that appointing an expert would not be in accordance with B’s welfare. I accept in full the points made by Ms Stamford for the Guardian and Ms Ecob for the mother regarding the level of assessment B is already under. It is also against B’s interests for these proceedings to continue further without final resolution, especially given his clear wishes and feelings that the proceedings come to an end. Finally, there is no question but that this course of action, if adopted, would involve a substantial delay to the proceedings concluding. Since an expert report would have to be prepared, there would no doubt have to be further reporting by the Guardian in light of that report and potentially further statements before the final hearing on contact could be listed. In proceedings which have been ongoing for five and a half years, and in which contact is not pursued today, this is utterly unacceptable.

I turn now to the question of parental responsibility. Father was never married to Mother, so this case falls within section 4 of the Children Act 1989. It is accepted that although Father is demonstrably the biological father of B and is registered on the Norwegian birth certificate as such, that this does not give rise to parental responsibility in the UK by operation of law because Norwegian birth certificates do not amount to registration of Father under the Births, Deaths and Registration Act 1953 and its pertinent regulations.

Since Mother and Father do not agree on parental responsibility, the question falls to the Court to decide whether or not to order it. It is accepted that, as with any order under the Children Act, I must have regard to the Welfare Checklist. When considering parental responsibility, all the circumstances of the case must be considered.

The case law establishes that there are three factors likely to be particularly relevant, namely, the father’s commitment to the child, the degree of attachment and the reasons for making the application.

Father points to his efforts to bring this case, including having to discover where the mother was and his ongoing engagement in the proceedings as evidence of his commitment. He further points to his approach to not insisting on contact in the face of B’s opposition, as to the child-centred nature of the commitment to B.

Mother urges that court proceedings cannot be sufficiently persuasive evidence of commitment. It is said on her behalf that commitment needs to be demonstrated in practical ways. My attention is drawn to the stated failure of Father to demonstrate such commitment by failing to send letters and cards to B in February 2024 when able to do so under the court orders. This has included failing to send B a card on his birthday.

In my judgment, Mother places the threshold of commitment too high. This is a counsel of perfection under which Father is seeking parental responsibility, but has to demonstrate specific actions to justify the conferral of the status on them. In this particular case, the parties were living in separate countries. There is evidence before me in the exhibits to the witness statements that Father was sending Mother money regularly and has previously sought to send money for B’s birthday. Whilst the mother disputes some of the reasons for this, I accept that the father was sending money to mother and that this was at least partly for B.

Further, I note that B has been subject to proceedings for half of his life and for two years prior to that, Father and Mother were not having direct contact. If proceedings are not to be taken as sufficient commitment to B, this leaves very little time for the father to demonstrate commitment within B’s lifespan to the standard suggested by Mother. Having said that, it is entirely regrettable that the father did not send letters and cards from February 2024. I refer to the view of the Guardian on this, and I repeat it. However, this is not, in my view, sufficient to suggest that he has not shown commitment to B.

On the degree of attachment, Mother argues that there is no significant attachment as there has been minimal contact and mainly indirect only. Again, with respect to the mother, I find that there is a realistic level of attachment between B and his father in this case. In the first Cafcass section 7 report, B is recorded as being aware of the concept of his father and said he was happy about his father. He has had regular Skype calls during the course of these proceedings, and he has had three ICFA face-to-face sessions with his father, in which the reports indicate that the sessions went well and a good relationship was forming. I appreciate that his views on contact have hardened over these proceedings, but in my judgment, views on contact are different to whether an attachment has been formed between father and son.

In relation to reasons for the application, I have heard the oral evidence from both Mother and Father on this, as well as submissions on their behalf. I find that the father’s motives for making the parental responsibility application are nothing more and nothing less than primarily his desire to be a father to B and to be involved in B’s life. For the avoidance of doubt, although questions have been raised about the veracity of the father’s papers, there is no substantive evidence before me to suggest that the father is anything other than who he says is. Further, although I accept the mother is anxious about this application, I do not consider, without concrete evidence on the point, any significant weight can be placed on her beliefs that there are immigration reasons behind the application.

I turn to the Welfare Checklist. I remind myself that B’s welfare is paramount, and his welfare has been at the forefront of my mind throughout this hearing. I also have full regard to the principle of proportionality. The Court should not sanction or make any orders unless it is satisfied that it is both necessary and proportionate and that no other less radical form of order will achieve the central aims of promoting B’s welfare. I also have full regard to the presumption that the involvement of both parents in B’s life will further his interests.

Considering the points in the checklist in turn and, firstly, the ascertainable wishes and feelings of B, I am urged by Ms Ecob to place considerable weight on B’s express desire for no involvement with his father and to import this into parental responsibility such that his father shall not be granted parental responsibility. However, as Ms Stamford for the Guardian submits, parental responsibility is a considerably more complex and nuanced concept than contact. Bearing in mind B’s age of 11 and his potential other vulnerabilities which are being explored under the care protection plan, whilst I am happy to accept that he does not wish contact with his father, I am not prepared to accept that this extends to cutting his father off from parental responsibility, even if he understands what this involves.

Looking at his physical, emotional and educational needs, the grant of parental responsibility to his father would, in my view, further B’s physical, emotional and educational needs through the provision of additional input from the father. This is, of course, on the basis that the father is properly informed of information relating to B. At present, B is homeschooled and is under a child protection plan. The grant of parental responsibility will allow Father to be involved in Local Authority meetings and to be kept informed of B’s health and educational needs, and to have input in these. There is no evidence before me to suggest that this would be exercised in any way improperly, and I note that it is B’s right to have an identified father with parental responsibility and that granting parental responsibility to his father will give B that emotional security and knowledge that he has a father who was interested and wanted to be involved with him, again, which can only further his welfare through meeting his emotional needs.

I take the factors of the likely effect on B of any change in his circumstances and the harm that he might be at risk of suffering together. It is urged on me by Mother that B will need to be told of the grant of parental responsibility, and it is said that this would have a significant detrimental impact on him. I am told that he will most likely become very distressed and that he is highly likely to react badly. Ms Connor, in her evidence, considered that such risks could be managed effectively through the careful telling to B of the Court’s decision. Ms Ecob has told me today that this is an overly optimistic assessment of how this could be managed.

I do appreciate that this will be a change for B, but, on balance, I accept the view of Ms Connor, who has worked with B for several years now, given the duration of the proceedings, that there are ways in which B’s potential poor reaction can be managed. I note that with no order for contact being sought today, there is no question at the end of these proceedings, B would be required to participate in any contact which might cause him undue distress.

I do not find that there is anything particular to add to what I have already said under the heading of “Age, Sex, Background and any other Characteristics”.

I turn then to the capability of his parents in meeting his needs. I am urged to consider the ability of the parents to manage co-parenting effectively for B and to be able to exercise parental responsibility between them. Ms Ecob states that historically, the parties have had a very poor relationship and have a deep mistrust of each other, continuing to this day. I agree with her that, certainly, during their oral evidence, it does appear that they do not have full trust in each other and that there may well be trust issues that they will need to work on. She notes that they have not had any experience of co-parenting and suggests that the Court cannot seriously accept that they will be able to work together over essential decision-making. This is despite both Mother and Father saying in their oral evidence that they would be willing to work with each other in B’s best interests.

As I observed to Ms Ecob, it is far from unusual that parents in the Family Court are in a state of conflict, often considerable conflict and that this is not on its own a reason not to grant parental responsibility. It is an unfortunate fact that relationships do break down, and the parties in them need to find a way to work together for their children, often despite significant conflict and even, on occasion, despite significant safeguarding issues. It is a peculiar feature of this particular case that there are no safeguarding issues identified by Cafcass in relation to Mother and Father. If the Family Court were to take parental conflict into account in this way, it is likely that far fewer awards of parental responsibility would be made, and, indeed, the cases for removing it would increase markedly.

Ms Ecob tells me that whilst she accepts that it is not the case that the presence of conflict should equate to no parental responsibility, the specifics of this case and of B mean that this conclusion should follow here. She submits that the parents are so conflicted in this case, and the risks to B are such that there should be no parental responsibility granted to the father. I am afraid I cannot accept this. This case is not particularly unusual or unique in the levels of conflict, and B is already under a child protection plan supported by his Guardian. There is no evidence before me to demonstrate that these parents will be unable to ever reach agreement, and to reject this before they have even had a chance to try would, in my view, be even more damaging to B and his right to understand where he comes from and his right to have a father with parental responsibility in his life. Parental responsibility flows in cases with even more conflict present between the parties, as the case of Re W (Children) [2013] 2 FLR 337 to which I have been referred shows.

I have also been told that parental responsibility for the father is not needed, as Mother can keep him updated and has promised to do so. Indeed, she promised to do so in her oral evidence. Ms Gaunt for the father notes that there have been several instances in these proceedings where the mother has not kept the father updated and submits that the father can have no confidence he would be kept informed and, as a result, parental responsibility gives him that right to be informed without needing to rely on the mother. The Guardian has also noted this and, in particular, the failure to inform anyone involved in the proceedings of the child protection plan.

I agree that the mother’s ability to keep the father properly informed is a significant concern. I accept her apologies provided to the Court regarding her failure to inform the father and the Court of the home education and child protection plan. However, the fact remains that this important information was not told to the father at the time. I have noted the history of the proceedings, and I have taken into account the mother’s oral evidence that her updates have not necessarily been on the same date each month and have not necessarily included all the matters they need to. I agree with the Guardian and the submissions on behalf of the father that parental responsibility for the father and the right to access information that this will bring will assist him in meeting B’s needs and will do so over and above any reliance purely on the mother keeping Father informed.

It follows from the above that I will be making an order that the father has parental responsibility for B.

In the event that, as I am in fact doing, I make this order, I am asked by the mother to consider making either a prohibited steps order or specific issue order as appropriate to govern the exercise of the father’s parental responsibility. I accept that this is in my power to make. Indeed, with regard to the Welfare Checklist, this will be something I consider under paragraph (g). Ms Ecob submits that such an order is appropriate given the high level of conflict between the parents. She proposes that I should make an order that, after consultation between the parents on a fully-informed basis on any issue involving the exercise of parental responsibility, if there is still no agreement, the mother’s decision should prevail; that is, the mother’s parental responsibility should trump that of the father.

She notes that in cases of special guardianship, the Special Guardian will have such powers and submits that such an order will minimise the amount of time the parties need to come back to court. Ms Stamford says this simply is not a case where such an order is needed. Ms Gaunt echoes this and notes that this proposal would effectively amount to the mother continuing to make all decisions in a situation where the mother is already demonstrably unreliable at keeping Father informed.

I note, first of all, that this is very different from a special guardianship situation, and whilst a Special Guardian will have such powers, I do not consider that significant parallels can be drawn between that and this situation. I have been referred to several cases regarding the use by the Court of its section 8 powers to control parental responsibility, including, amongst others, Re A (Parental Responsibility) [2023] EWCA Civ 689 which in turn, cites other case where such orders were made and the very recent case of Re T & Another [2024] EWCA Civ 793.

I find Re T particularly helpful. It concerns a situation with an order similar to that which Ms Ecob proposes I make here, though Ms Ecob’s proposed order is, as I understand it, in even broader terms. The facts, however, of that case were very different to the ones I am faced with today. In Re T, there had been verbal and physical aggression between the parties. The children were under a child protection plan on the category of “Emotional Abuse” from their mother, and there had been significant difficulties with the mother’s behaviour in engaging with the authorities. None of those factors are present here. Indeed, the facts in this case are very, very far away from that sort of situation.

The Court of Appeal is very clear in its judgment that the use of orders under section 8 to control the exercise of parental responsibility is an interference with parents’ freedom to make decisions and that they must be used in a way that is no more than necessary to achieve a desired aim.

Orders of the nature sought in this case, I accept, would effectively remove the father’s parental responsibility for practical purposes, and these are only made in extreme cases. Should disputes arise between Father and Mother, there is already a way to deal with this through the application for specific issue orders. If Father and Mother end up issuing multiple applications in this regard, then there are also ways to deal with that through, potentially, section 91(14) orders as appropriate.

I have no evidence before me today as to whether the parents really will be unable to reach agreement on any issue whatsoever. I also have absolutely no evidence to suggest that the father will seek to abuse or misuse his parental responsibility in any way. In light of this total lack of evidence, in my view, it would be wholly improper and without any foundation for me to make either a specific issue or prohibited steps of nature sought by Ms Ecob.

A few final matters arise. It is agreed with these proceedings being determined today that there should be no order on the father’s application for contact. I confirm this. For the avoidance of doubt, and this should be included in the recital, this leaves the father free to send letters and cards to B. The Court has heard the mother’s commitment to keep these safe for B, along with any messages on the parenting App. The Court will note its expectation that this happens, and this should also be included in recitals.

Then, next, the parties are agreed that I should make a lives with order to reflect the reality of B’s life. I have had regard to no order principle but in my view, the lives with order will give B additional security that his current position remains the position going forward, and so I do think it is right and appropriate to make this order.

In relation to passports, Mother has offered an undertaking which Father is willing to accept, that Mother will inform Father 28 days before travel of travel plans, flight details and hotel booking or city or town if she is staying with relatives. Travel may be sooner in the case of emergency, but again, Mother would inform Father of this. In light of the history of this case, and I note that Mother has had explained to her the serious nature of giving an undertaking to the Court, I am happy to accept this undertaking from her.

Mother has requested that her address be kept confidential from Father, as she remains anxious about what Father may do if he has the address. I do appreciate that the long history of these proceedings and the prior history before proceedings started have left Mother anxious. However, equally, there is no evidence to suggest that the father would, indeed, take any steps that the mother fears. There are procedures, again, to address this if such a thing were to transpire in the future. Father has offered an undertaking not to attend the address unless specifically invited to do so by the mother. I accept this and direct that the mother’s address should be released to the father and that letters and cards to B can be sent directly to this address.

Accordingly, I will order a lives with order for Mother, parental responsibility for Father, Mother’s address to be disclosed and Mother and B’s passports to be released and the Court’s acceptance of the mother’s undertaking.

Finally, and here, I am very much speaking to Mother and Father, I conclude by saying that I really have no doubt at all that both Mother and Father love B very much. Indeed, it is due to their love for B and their concern for his best interests that these proceedings have been brought and have continued for so long. I urge them both to consider and realise that, ultimately, B’s best interests are not served by litigation. He has made his feelings and wishes about litigation concerning him very clear. He is over halfway through his childhood. He deserves his parents being able to come together to discuss and agree issues concerning them between themselves.

It is critical that both of the parents have all the relevant information to do this, which means Mother keeping Father updated of B’s progress and development, his health, his interests, his likes and dislikes. It is also critical that both of them engage constructively in good time when important decisions need to be made. Litigation should always be the last resort if they cannot reach agreement, and I would urge them both to consider mediation before any litigation. I also stress that the approach of no order on the contact application means no more and no less than contact is not currently subject to regulation by court order.

Mr T has demonstrated his concern and respect for B in these proceedings through not insisting on contact in the face of B’s resistance. He, of course, remains free at any time to seek contact with B if he wishes to do so, but it is very much dependent on B’s wishes. If B were to express any wishes to have contact, the Court would expect Ms K to support and facilitate this.

In respect of Mr T, as the Guardian has stressed, it is important for maintaining a connection with B and ensuring that B understands how important he is to his father, that father does take advantage of the opportunity to send him letters and small gifts, especially on important occasions such as his birthdays. I urge him to stick to this even if there were to be any issues of monthly updates in the future.

Finally, and as it will be clear, I very much hope that there is no need for further litigation over B in the future. I do comment that if any litigation were to arise, a future Court will be interested to know how these arrangements have been adhered to and the extent to which mediation has taken place. I have not been addressed on it and I am certainly not proposing to consider anything in relation to a section 91(14) order today, even though the proceedings have been going on for five and a half years, but Ms K and Mr T should remain aware that the Court does have the power to add a filter to making any further applications if litigation were to continue again in the future, especially if it were to become a first resort rather than a last resort for resolving issues.