The Crown Prosecution Service v A London Local Authority & Ors (Disclosure Application)

This is an application made by the CPS for disclosure of information and documentation from these care proceedings, which concluded in January 2022. The respondents to the application are the local authority which brought the proceedings, the parents, and the four subject children through their guardian.

The application was made five months ago on 3.4.23. A first hearing took place on 25.5.23. At that hearing the CPS, the local authority, the mother and the children were represented, and the representatives had filed skeleton arguments. The father was a litigant in person. After hearing argument, I gave permission for the index of papers in the family proceedings to be disclosed to the CPS. I then adjourned the hearing, at the father’s request, to enable him to seek legal advice on the application. I directed the CPS to refine its disclosure request following receipt of the index and directed the represented parties to put in written submissions in response, with a view to hearing directly from the father at the hearing in the event that he remained unrepresented.

Following that hearing the father secured not only legal advice but pro bono representation by the solicitor who had acted for him in the care proceedings. She attended the adjourned hearing on 17.7.23 and sought a further adjournment, on the basis that she had experienced difficulties in obtaining her client’s instructions. The mother sought an adjournment on the same basis. Time was allowed during the hearing for the parents’ representatives to take instructions but this proved insufficient, and the adjournment sought was granted.

Both parents’ representatives pressed for the next hearing to take place at a court where the parents could be produced in person. In the hope that that would make the process of taking instructions easier I arranged to sit at Stratford Magistrates’ Court. A hearing was listed on 29.8.23 with a time estimate of one day. That was well in excess of the time that would usually be allocated for a case management decision of this nature but I was anxious to do everything possible to ensure that the hearing was effective.

The mother was produced for the hearing on 29.8.23 but the father was not. The prison informed my clerk that he had refused to attend on the basis that he was unwell. After hearing submissions from the parties I refused the father’s application for a further adjournment of the hearing, giving reasons for doing so, but said that if, following the hearing, there were any further points on which his solicitor needed to take instructions I would allow time for her to do so, and would give my decision thereafter in writing. The father’s further submissions were filed, after the time for filing had been extended on two occasions, on 7.9.23. This decision is being handed down on 8.9.23.

I record at this stage that the police, but not the CPS, were provided on 26.1.23 with a full and unredacted set of all papers filed within these and previous care proceedings. The purpose of that order, which was made within separate proceedings concerning the parents’ newborn baby, was to assist the police in locating the parents, who at that point were missing with their child. There was at the time a clear and urgent need to share all information held by the court which might assist the police in locating the family, and the disclosure was provided solely on that basis and for that purpose. Due to an error that restriction was omitted from the order of 26.1.23 and so it was included in a subsequent order dated 9.3.23. It has been confirmed to me by both the police and the CPS, at all hearings which they have attended, that the limited basis of that disclosure has always been fully understood. That means that there has been no further access to, or use of, those documents by the police since the search was concluded, and the CPS have had no access to any of the material disclosed under that order.

I have set this out in some detail because it appeared at the hearing on 29.8.23 that the father, and perhaps also the mother, erroneously believed that the disclosure sought by the CPS had already been granted. The father’s position statement for that hearing described the CPS application as “purely academic”. I assume that since the hearing his solicitor has had the opportunity to explain to him the limited basis on which disclosure was granted on 26.1.23, and the misunderstanding has been corrected.

The only documents which have been disclosed to the CPS to date are the judgments given within these care proceedings and previous care proceedings in Wales in 2017 which related to the parents’ oldest child. These were provided to the CPS by the local authority pursuant to FPR 2010, r.12.73 and PD12G, which permit any party to provide the CPS with “the text or summary of the whole or part of a judgment given in the proceedings…. to enable the CPS to discharge its functions under any enactment.” Again, the parents have expressed concern that this disclosure was authorised by the court without their having had an opportunity to make representations. That is not correct: as I explained to both parents at the hearing on 25.5.23, the only disclosure that has taken place to date is that which is already permitted under the rules, and for which court authorisation is not required.

By agreement between the local authority and the CPS, the local authority has redacted the children’s identifying details (names and dates of birth) from each judgment that has been disclosed to the CPS, so that the risk of their identities leaking into the public domain is minimised. At this hearing the CPS agreed that any further documents disclosed should be subject to the same redactions, and also that the children’s genders should be redacted.

In some, perhaps most, applications for disclosure made by the police or the CPS there is a substantial overlap between the subject-matter of the family proceedings and the parallel criminal investigation/ proceedings. That is not the case here. The care proceedings concerned the parents’ four older children. They concluded in January 2022 when final care and placement orders were made. The criminal proceedings relate to the parents’ actions towards a fifth child who was not yet born when the care proceedings concluded. The parents are charged with gross negligence manslaughter, child cruelty, concealing the birth of a child, preventing a lawful burial, and perverting the course of justice. I understand that a further charge of causing or allowing the death of a child is under consideration. All these charges relate to the death of the parents’ fifth child, who, the CPS allege, died because her parents led an “off-grid” existence and did not access standard medical or social care support.

The CPS case on the disclosure application is that evidence heard in the family proceedings is relevant because (a) it is likely to go to issues of propensity, and (b) it is also of particular and direct relevance to the foreseeability limb of the gross negligence manslaughter charge. The CPS is aware, from the judgments already disclosed, that in the family proceedings a finding was made that in failing to seek appropriate antenatal and postnatal care in previous pregnancies the parents had repeatedly prioritised their own need for privacy and secrecy above their children’s health. Within the criminal proceedings the Crown will seek to rely on that finding to prove its case that what happened to the parents’ fifth child was foreseeable, at least in part because the parents had been explicitly warned about what conduct of this nature might lead to.

Paragraph 17 of the CPS’s skeleton argument dated 22.5.23 sets out the categories of material which the CPS says are relevant to the criminal proceedings. They are:

The local authority and the guardian have no objection to the disclosure sought by the CPS, provided that appropriate measures are in place to ensure that the children’s identities remain confidential. Both are content with the redaction protocol agreed by the CPS. The local authority has offered to undertake the redactions, accepting that it is best placed to do so in circumstances where there are potential risks of “jigsaw identification”.

The mother’s case, as set out in the skeleton argument originally filed on her behalf on 23.5.23, was that the documents from these proceedings were wholly irrelevant to the criminal trial and that the CPS application was simply a fishing expedition. Since then she has modified her position and has agreed that some limited documents, being witness statements and other documents which she herself produced within the care proceedings, should be disclosed.

The mother objects strongly, however, to the disclosure of any further information. In particular she says that there should be no disclosure from the first set of care proceedings relating to the parents’ oldest child, on the basis that this material is now “stale” and irrelevant; and she objects also to disclosure of her own medical records, which are contained within the family proceedings bundle, on the grounds that an enhanced confidentiality attaches to material of this nature.

The father’s position statement prepared for the hearing on 29.8.23 suggested that he might be prepared to agree to some limited disclosure. At the hearing and in subsequent submissions it was confirmed that in fact his position is that the disclosure application should be refused in its entirety. As I understand his case he puts forward two main grounds for his objection to disclosure: first, that the material from the care proceedings is irrelevant to the criminal proceedings and, secondly, that it would be unfair to the parents to disclose information obtained at a time when there was no contemplation of a criminal investigation.

The law which applies to this application is set out comprehensively, and in my view accurately, in the skeleton argument filed by the CPS. The leading case is Re EC (Disclosure of Material) [1996] 2 FLR 725. At p733 in his leading judgment in that case Swinton Thomas LJ set out the following list of factors, often referred to as the “Re EC checklist”, to which the court should have regard in dealing with applications of this nature:

Re EC, and specifically the Re EC checklist, was confirmed as the leading authority, and still fit for purpose, in Re M [2019] EWCA Civ 1364. Its application was further considered by the Court of Appeal in Re A [2020] EWCA Civ 448.

It was suggested by leading counsel for the mother, in an addendum skeleton argument filed on 24.8.23, that the children’s interests are the court’s paramount consideration in this application. I do not agree that this is an accurate statement of the law. The interests of the child are very important, but they are not paramount. That is made clear by Swinton Thomas LJ at p733 of Re EC, in the following paragraph which immediately precedes the checklist:

An earlier skeleton argument filed on behalf of the mother on 23.5.23 set out the following passage from the decision of Munby J (as he then was) in Re X (Children) [2007] EWHC 1719:

Often relevant in applications of this nature is CA 1989, s98 which reads:

In oral submissions at the hearing on 29.8.23 the father’s solicitor suggested that s98 should operate in this case to weigh against any disclosure.

There is a detailed passage in the judgment of McFarlane LJ (as he then was) in Re M which sets out both the historical background of this statutory provision and the way in which it has been interpreted by the Family Court. As I will come to explain, and for similar reasons to those set out by Keehan J in the decision which was upheld by the Court of Appeal in Re M, I have concluded that this is not a case where s98 is a relevant factor in the disclosure decision.

I have also had regard to the 2013 Protocol and Good Practice Model on Disclosure of information in cases of alleged child abuse and linked criminal and care directions hearings. It is clear from the definition in the protocol that the criminal proceedings in this case fall within the definition of “linked” criminal proceedings, notwithstanding that they relate to a different child.

Finally it is important to make clear that I am not concerned with any issues of admissibility within the criminal proceedings, or any arguments that the parents may wish to make there about potential prejudice to them within those proceedings. Those issues will be entirely a matter for the Crown Court judge. The mother’s objection to disclosure is based in part on the fact that some of the material sought is “negative”. To the extent that that is correct, it seems to me that it is not a factor which I can take into account. The same goes for the father’s generalised complaints of unfairness.

It is not feasible to set out in this judgment a full consideration of each of the Re EC factors as they apply to each individual item of dislcosure sought. As the principle of disclosure is opposed, or largely opposed, by both parents I intend to make some general observations about each of the Re EC factors first, and then to deal briefly with the disputed items of disclosure, by category where possible but individually if necessary.

There is no dispute between the parties that this is a factor which should carry significant weight in this case. It is not suggested that it would be in the public interest for the children’s identities to be publicly known, and indeed there are compelling reasons for maintaining the confidentiality of their identities so that this information does not leak into the public domain. That is the position in most public law Children Act proceedings but especially so in this case. After the care proceedings concluded, the parents went missing with the children’s younger sibling in circumstances which attracted huge publicity. There are real and obvious risks to the children’s physical and emotional safety and wellbeing if information in the public domain were to lead to the confidentiality of their placements being breached.

I have no reason to suppose that the criminal court would take a different approach to this issue, and counsel for the CPS has assured me that is unlikely to be the case, but I am conscious that any disclosure of information involves some risk, however small, that sensitive and confidential details may accidentally leak. For that reason I am grateful to the CPS for its agreement that the redactions applied to any disclosed material will include not only the children’s names and dates of birth but their genders. That will minimise the risks of jigsaw identification.

If that is done, the potential impact of disclosure on the children’s welfare is much more limited. I accept that even if they are not publicly identified the children may be caused distress, if not now then at some time in the future, if information about their parents’ actions in the period up to and during the care proceedings is put into the public domain. This is something that will need to be carefully managed by their carers, with the support of the local authority, as part of their life story work. However this factor needs to be set in context. The information from the care proceedings, sensitive as it is, will I am afraid be eclipsed in terms of its capacity to cause the children distress by the subsequent developments in their parents’ lives, which have already been, and no doubt will continue to be, the subject of intense press and public scrutiny. Sadly, there is nothing that I can do to prevent or lessen the impact this will have on them.

This is not a factor that is relevant in this case, save that in very broad terms it is in the interests of children generally for those agencies with child protection responsibilities to be enabled to carry out their functions without unnecessary hindrance.

As the Court of Appeal held in Re A, confidentiality in this context is a broad concept and goes beyond the children’s interests in having their identities protected. It extends to the interests of the children more generally in not having sensitive information about their history in the public domain, even if they themselves are anonymised (a factor I have dealt with above), and to the interests of litigants and third party witnesses who have given evidence in proceedings held in private.

I accept that when the care proceedings took place the parents can have had no expectation that the information held within those proceedings would be considered in public in a later criminal trial. However, as counsel for the CPS pointed out, and as was the case in Re A, in relation to most of the disclosure sought in this application the issue of confidentiality is more apparent than real. The reality is that it is inevitable that there will be scrutiny within the criminal proceedings of the parents’ actions in relation to their older children: not only does the Crown rely on this aspect of the background as part of its case, but the mother herself gave an account in interview in which she sought to explain the parents’ actions towards their fifth child by reference to their previous experiences with the child protection authorities.

The importance of maintaining confidentiality where possible may, however, be a significant factor to weigh into the balance when considering particular categories of information, in particular the mother’s medical records.

This was described in Re EC as a “very important” factor and one which is likely to be of particular importance in a case to which section 98(2) applies. This is not in my view a case where s98(2) is a significant factor in the disclosure exercise. The family proceedings have concluded and there is no longer any obligation on the parents to give evidence. The proceedings pre-dated the events with which this criminal trial is concerned. In any event, when the parents did make statements within these proceedings they did not, on my analysis, make any statement or admission that could be described as tending to incriminate them. In fact, as I explained in both my fact-finding judgment of February 2021 and my final judgment in January 2022, the parents’ engagement with those proceedings was minimal.

In Re M the Court of Appeal held that Keehan J had been right to attach “particular weight” to the fact that in that case the parents’ witness statements and position statement did not contain any material that might incriminate either of them in any criminal activity. In my judgement the same argument applies in the present case. Furthermore, in Re M the disclosure application was made at an early stage in the proceedings, when the parents had provided witness statements but had not yet given oral evidence; in those circumstances one might suppose that there was still some purpose in encouraging frankness on the part of the parents in any future account they might give during the course of the proceedings. So if in that case Keehan J was right to have only limited regard to the privilege against self-incrimination, it seems to me that where proceedings have concluded with the parents having made no admissions, I can safely discount this factor.

In Re EC Swinton Thomas LJ observed that “barriers should not be erected between one branch of the judicature and another because this may be inimical to the overall interests of justice.” The withholding of relevant information from the CPS would amount to erecting a barrier. While there is no presumption in favour of disclosure, this suggests that some justification is required if information is to be withheld.

This factor was described in Re EC as “likely to be very important.” There is a strong and obvious public interest in making available to the police/ CPS which is relevant to a criminal trial.

The offences with which the parents are charged are at the higher end of the spectrum in terms of their gravity and seriousness.

The parents argue that because there was no suggestion during the family proceedings that there might be a criminal investigation into their conduct, and because the criminal proceedings relate to a different child, much (or, in the father’s case, all) of the disclosure sought is irrelevant to the criminal proceedings.

I disagree. It seems to me that the material that falls within the scope of paragraph 17 of the CPS’s skeleton argument (as set out above at paragraph 12) is indeed relevant to the issues within the criminal proceedings, for the reasons set out by the CPS. I would add that it seems to me that the evidence relating to the finding that the mother had removed the children to Ireland to evade the local authority’s safeguarding investigation is also of potential relevance to the charge of perverting the course of justice.

The CPS points out also that material within these proceedings which portrays the parents as loving and concerned parents may well be relevant within the criminal proceedings, and indeed may fall to be disclosed to the defence as information with the potential to undermine the prosecution case.

Finally, if issues as to either parent’s credibility arise (as seems likely: I understand that the mother gave an account in interview, and so it may well be that she at least gives oral evidence), the CPS says that any evidence bearing on the credibility of either parent within the family proceedings is of potential relevance in the criminal trial.

The parents have not explained why the CPS is wrong to draw the connections it does between the evidence held within these proceedings and the issues before the criminal court, or why the CPS analysis of relevance is flawed. In principle, I agree with the approach taken by the CPS. The only caveat I would add is that the ultimate decision as to relevance is, of course, not mine but that of the Judge who will be presiding over the criminal trial. That is an important safeguard for the parents: if in my analysis of relevance I cast the net too wide (and of course I have not seen any of the material from the criminal proceedings, so my analysis can only be a broad one), then the material in question will be inadmissible within the criminal proceedings.

It is appropriate to deal at this point with the mother’s argument that some of the evidence, in particular the evidence from the first set of care proceedings in Wales, is “stale”. By that her counsel means that the events in question took place some time ago. But that does not in itself mean that the relevance of this information diminishes. On the contrary, where a person has behaved in a similar manner on several previous occasions and over a lengthy time period, this may well be a significant factor in establishing propensity. Indeed that was the approach I took in the care proceedings before me to similar arguments made on behalf of the parents (see paragraph 205 of my judgment dated 23.2.21).

There is a strong public interest in information-sharing between agencies with child protection responsibilities; experience has shown that when this does not take place children are not effectively safeguarded. In general terms this factor points in favour of disclosure.

For the reasons I have given, I do not consider this to be a case where s98(2) applies.

The CPS has already received, in accordance with r.12.73, the judgment of DJ Taylor in the first set of proceedings in Wales which related to the parents’ oldest child; my fact-finding judgment in these proceedings dated 23.2.21; my final judgment dated 28.1.22; and (although it is not of particular relevance to the criminal proceedings) a short judgment I gave in an interim care order application relating to the parents’ fifth child on 20.1.23.

It could be argued that the findings I made in February 2021, to which the CPS already has access, are likely to go a long way towards assisting it to prove its case on the foreseeability element of the gross negligence manslaughter charge. That does not mean, in my view, that it is unnecessary or inappropriate to provide the CPS with the material on which those findings were based. In Re A the fact that significant disclosure had already taken place (including of a judgment) was a factor pointing towards, rather than away from, disclosure of the remaining disputed material. There is nothing in Re EC or the later authorities to suggest that the court should limit disclosure of material to the minimum which is necessary. Presumably FPR r.12.73 and PD12G were drafted in such a way as to permit, as a default position, the disclosure of a judgment because for many straightforward criminal investigations and trials this will be sufficient. But this is a serious and complex trial with a time estimate that is proportionate to the nature and gravity of the charges which the parents face, and it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which the police or the CPS will need to make use not only of the judgments in their possession but of the underlying evidence on which those judgments were based.

I am confident that the agreed redactions set out above will be sufficient to prevent the children’s identities being disclosed into the public domain and/ or a breach of the confidentiality of their current placements.

Provided that those measures are applied to any disclosure which takes place, I consider that the arguments in favour of further disclosure to the CPS substantially outweigh the arguments against. While there is no direct overlap between the evidence in the care proceedings and the issues with which the criminal court is concerned, there is a strong and obvious connection between the behaviours exhibited by the parents and documented in those proceedings and the behaviours which are alleged to have led to the death of their fifth child. It is inevitable that information about the existence of these children and the proceedings relating to them will form part of the material before the court in the criminal proceedings; indeed, it seems likely that this information will form part of the mother’s defence. It is very much in the public interest that any such information is as specific, accurate and reliable as possible.

The factors weighing against disclosure are much more limited. Disclosure may, in the longer term, have some impact on the children’s welfare, but the reality of this case is that the decision I make on this application is likely to be of relatively limited significance in the context of the information about their family which is already in the public domain. This is not a case where the privilege against self-incrimination had any impact on the evidence given by the parents within the care proceedings. Largely because of the parents’ lack of engagement with those proceedings, for the most part the documentation within the care proceedings (I deal separately below with the issue of medical records) is not so sensitive as to attract, in and of itself, a particularly high degree of confidentiality.

In those circumstances, to refuse the application entirely, or to allow only the limited disclosure which the mother is prepared to agree, would create barriers for the prosecution which cannot be justified by any of the factors set out in Re EC.

The CPS has set out the disclosure it seeks in a schedule dated 21.7.23. It is apparent that after receipt of the index the CPS has taken a careful and responsible approach to its disclosure application and has limited the material sought to that which it considers likely to be relevant. Of course the CPS is hampered by the fact that it has not seen the documents in question, and so I have taken care to review each of the documents of which disclosure is sought in order to satisfy myself as to relevance.

The CPS does not seek disclosure of all documents in this section, only the various iterations of the local authority’s schedule of findings and the parents’ responses, and the position statements filed by the parents.

I consider that all of this material falls to be disclosed, with the exception of the guardian’s position statement at A181. Having reviewed that document, I am of the view that it contains nothing of relevance to the criminal investigation. From the notes in column 4 of the table, I suspect it may have been requested in error.

The mother agrees to the disclosure of documents she herself has produced. It follows that she concedes their relevance, which in my judgement is obvious. The majority of these statements set out in detail the parents’ interactions with child protection authorities, which is an issue of direct relevance in the criminal proceedings.

The mother’s main objection to the disclosure of statements produced by social workers and other professionals is that they contain “negative” material. I have already explained why I do not consider this to be a valid objection.

Having reviewed each of the statements, I consider that they should be disclosed, with the exception of the “family finding” statement at C285. This statement deals exclusively with the local authority’s approach to finding adoptive placements for the children and the availability of placements, and there is no material in there which could be considered relevant to the criminal proceedings.

I have given careful consideration to the “Together and Apart” assessment. This primarily deals with the sibling relationships, but there is material in there which also concerns the children’s relationships with their parents and the parents’ attitude to the children and to contact. These are issues which are likely to be of relevance in the criminal proceedings and I am of the view that this document should be disclosed.

The items sought by the CPS are all relevant and should be disclosed. I note that the reports described as “assessments” of the parents contain little if any sensitive or confidential information, because the parents did not cooperate with the assessments. The reports therefore set out the attempts made by the various experts to communicate with and engage the parents. This information is relevant to the criminal proceedings.

In my judgment, the CPS has correctly identified the documents from this section which are relevant to the issues in the criminal proceedings. These are all documents which form the evidential basis of the findings I made in February 2021. They should all be disclosed.

The CPS already has access to the document at G1 (the judgment of DJ Taylor).

I am of the view that, although not requested, the composite threshold document at G33 should also be disclosed to the CPS. This sets out the findings sought at the conclusion of the Welsh proceedings relating to the parents’ first child, and, importantly, identifies what at that stage the parents were and were not prepared to accept in terms of their parenting.

The document at G634 appears in this section in error. This is a heavily-redacted version of my fact-finding judgment, prepared for the limited and specific purpose of providing wider family members with some information about the proceedings so that they could decide whether they wished to be considered as carers. There is no reason in principle why it should not be disclosed, but it seems to me undesirable that there should be two differently-redacted versions of the same judgment made available to the CPS, and that this is highly likely to cause confusion. For that reason alone I refuse permission to disclose the document at G634.

I have explained earlier in this judgment why I disagree with the mother’s overarching submission that I should refuse disclosure of any material from the Welsh proceedings on the basis that it is “stale”. With the exception of the medical records, which require separate consideration, the remaining material in section G is highly relevant and should be disclosed.

The mother’s medical records appear in different places in the bundle. The documents in section H relate to the mother’s admission to hospital in November 2019 after a violent incident between the parents about which I made findings in February 2021. They form part of the evidence on which that finding was based and should in principle be disclosed.

The documents at G303 – G528 are the mother’s medical records from birth until 2016, which appear to have been produced in the Welsh proceedings. I made some observations about these documents at paragraph 130 of my February 2021 judgment. I considered them to be relevant because they demonstrated a significant change in the mother’s attitude to health care after 2016 when her relationship with the father commenced. The parents’ attitude to health care is also an issue of relevance in the criminal proceedings and either the CPS or the defence may seek to rely on evidence of a different approach having been adopted by either parent in the past.

Particular issues of confidentiality arise in connection with both sets of records. All of the medical records contain material which is both sensitive (in that it was provided by the mother in confidence to a medical professional) and likely to be irrelevant to the issues before the criminal court. There may also be material which is relevant but sensitive, and in respect of which there is a need to balance its evidential value against the mother’s right to have her privacy respected.

It is relevant in my view that if this material is disclosed to the CPS it will be classed as sensitive and held subject to the safeguards in the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (s23(1)) Code of Practice. Any release of this information will therefore be strictly controlled, and subject ultimately to the decision of the criminal court.

I have considered whether I should direct a process of redaction prior to disclosure of the information to CPS, so that any material which is not relevant to the issues before the criminal court is withheld. However, that would involve a complex and detailed balancing exercise to be carried out, in the case of each piece of evidence, between the mother’s privacy rights and the value of the evidence to the criminal court. It seems to me that it is better that that exercise is conducted within the criminal proceedings by those who, unlike the parties and the court in these proceedings, have a full understanding of the issues in those proceedings.

In those circumstances I am satisfied that sufficient safeguards exist within the criminal proceedings for the balance to fall down in favour of disclosing in full what is, in my view, relevant material.

There is considerable material within these documents that is relevant to the parents’ relationships with each other and their children and their attitude towards professionals; all issues of relevance in the criminal proceedings. As the CPS has observed, my judgments make clear that there is considerable evidence in the contact notes that sheds a positive light on the parents’ parenting and may fall to be disclosed to the defence on that basis. These documents should all be disclosed.

The disclosure sought by the CPS is granted, subject to the agreed measures in respect of the redaction of information which might identify the children or breach the confidentiality of their placements, and with the following exceptions:

In addition, the composite threshold document at G33 should be disclosed to the CPS.