BY v GC : (No. 3: Costs)

On 21^st November 2025 I handed down judgment following the final hearing in financial remedy proceedings brought by BY against GC. This judgment was published as BY v GC (No. 2) [2025] EWFC 397. My earlier judgment in relation to GC’s Daniels v Walker application (which I refused) was published asBY v GC [2025] EWFC 226. This judgment now deals with costs of these proceedings.

As previously I shall refer to the parties as ‘W’ and ‘H’ respectively. I shall also adopt the same anonymisations that I used in my previous judgments.

I stated in my main judgment that:

The position as to costs was not agreed. I therefore heard an application on W’s behalf in respect of costs on 27^th January 2026 as well as determining on that date a number of other issues (including the timing of the lump sum payment(s) to be made by H to W, security for these payments, the terms of undertakings sought by H from W, the nature and scope of various tax indemnities to be given by H, and tax covenants in relation to which both parties have had input from specialist corporate lawyers) that related to the order consequent upon my main judgment.

W was again represented by Ms. Sally Harrison KC leading Ms. Abigail Bennett, instructed by JMW LLP. H was represented by Mr. James Roberts KC leading Ms. Jennifer Palmer, now instructed by McAlister Family Law (H having moved his instructions from Hall Brown LLP subsequent to the final hearing).

I have not referred to all the arguments made in writing and orally in this judgment. However, I have borne in mind all that I read and was said to me.

There was no dispute between the parties as to the applicable legal framework.

Pursuant to FPR 2010 r28.1 the court “may … make such order as to costs as it thinks just”.

As these are financial remedy proceedings to which r28.3 applies:

These rules are supplemented by Practice Direction 28A - Costs which states (as amended with effect from 27^th May 2019) inter alia as follows:

In Azarmi-Movafagh v Bassiri-Dezfouli [2022] 1 FLR 157 King LJ set out the above rules and paragraph 4.4 of the PD at [47]-[50] inclusive. She emphasised the “importance” of paragraph 4.4 at [49]. These paragraphs have been cited most recently in LP v MP [2026] EWFC 36 by Cusworth J at [9].

H’s Daniels v Walker application, being an interim application, is governed by r28.2. This means I must apply CPR 1998 r44.2 save that r44.2(2), the general rule that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party (i.e. that costs ‘follow the event’), is disapplied. In deciding what order (if any) to make about costs the court will apply r44.2(4) and the factors to be taken into account in deciding the amount of costs are as set out in r44.4. The court may summarily assess the costs under r44.6(1)(a).

As there is no presumption either that there is no order for costs or that costs ‘follow the event’, cases governed by such rules have become known as ‘clean sheet’ cases. However as was made clear in Gojkovic v Gojkovic (No. 2) [1991] 2 FLR 233 per Butler-Sloss LJ (as she then was) at p236 (a decision of course that predates the FPR 2010) although the rule that costs ‘follow the event’ did not apply in family proceedings “there still remains the necessity for some starting-point. That starting point in my judgment, is that costs prima facie follow the event … but may be displaced much more easily than, and in circumstances which would not apply, in other Divisions of the High Court”.

Similar comments as to there being a starting point that costs ‘follow the event’ in a ‘clean sheet’ case were made in Judge v Judge [2009] 1 FLR 1287 per Wilson LJ (as he then was) at [53], Baker v Rowe [2010] 1 FLR 761 per Wilson LJ at [25], KS v ND (Schedule 1: Appeal: Costs) [2013] 2 FLR 698 per Mostyn J at [21], Solomon v Solomon and Others [2013] EWCA Civ 1095 per Ryder LJ at [22], and LM v DM (Costs Ruling) [2022] 1 FLR 293 per Mostyn J at [1]. Such a starting point is often known as a ‘soft’ presumption to this effect.

By a letter dated 13^th November 2025 H indicated his position that there should be no order as to costs save that the costs associated with any hearing in order to determine the issue of costs should remain at large.

On 17^th November 2025 (and in detail in a schedule dated 26^th November 2025) W gave notice that she sought recovery of the following costs which total £621,932.61 (inclusive of VAT):

I shall consider these in turn. In so doing I should record that Ms. Harrison in particular structured her written submissions in a slightly different way with her arguments made under two broads heads of (i) the Daniels v Walker application; and (ii) costs pursuant to r28.3. Therefore, although I may have set out a submission under a particular sub-heading below I have also considered it and taken it into account under the other sub-headings where appropriate.

W’s N260 for this hearing was prepared on the basis that five hours of the eight-hour pre-trial review (i.e. 62.5%) was used to deal with this application. This proportion of her solicitors’ attendance at the hearing and Ms. Harrison’s fee was claimed accordingly. On W’s behalf it was said that quite simply that costs should ‘follow the event’.

On H’s behalf it was said that his costs of W’s failed ‘conduct’ case (of £26,884) broadly offset W’s Daniels v Walker costs (of £23,371) and so ought to result in no order overall. Therefore although H recognised his liability for the costs of this application in principle, he adopted (it was said) a pragmatic approach to net them off against costs that W would otherwise owe him on an issue-based basis.

It was then said on H’s behalf that if I did not agree with this approach then the quantum claimed by W was in dispute given that (i) there would have been a one-day pre-trial review in any event before a seven day final hearing (and the pre-trial review was listed many months prior to H’s application) and to attribute 62.5% of costs to H’s application was wholly arbitrary and obviously overstated when the attendance costs of solicitors and counsel’s brief fee for a day would have been incurred in any event; (ii) at the pre-trial review I dealt not only with general case management matters and the Daniels v Walker application but also an (unsuccessful) application by W in relation to updating the valuation of SP in relation to which W had filed a D11 application notice and which consumed court time and therefore the costs of this unsuccessful application (also one governed by the ‘clean sheet’) ought to be reflected/netted of against the costs of the Daniels v Walker application; and (iii) it was only during the hearing that W conceded her agreement as to the value of one of H’s business assets.

I have little difficulty in concluding that H should pay W’s costs in respect of his unsuccessful Daniels v Walker application. Although a ‘clean sheet’ application, to adopt the words in Judge v Judge per Wilson LJ at [53], as H is responsible for the generation of the costs of a failed application I record upon it that I start from the position that W is entitled to her costs. It is likewise (to adopt the same judge’s words in Baker v Rowe at [25]) the fact that H was unsuccessful counts as the decisive factor in the exercise of my discretion.

I do not consider that these costs are then netted off/offset by costs that W would otherwise owe to H on an issue-based basis given her unsuccessful ‘conduct’ arguments given that (i) such an application for costs has not been made; (ii) if it had been there is no certainty that I would have acceded to it (both because this would come within the r28.3 presumption of no order for costs and because the sub-factor at r28.3(7)(c) is not whether a party raised, pursued or contested a particular allegation or issue - or indeed whether they raised it successfully - but whether it was “reasonable” for them to do so); and (iii) H cannot seek the benefit of this argument as a ‘shield’ twice (i.e. to both W’s Daniels v Walker application and to her application for one half of her remaining costs which he does as I shall set out below).

I therefore consider that these costs are payable in principle.

As to quantum, it is all but impossible for me to ascribe specific proportions of costs to the matters listed at paragraph 20 above. Any percentage claimed in respect of the one-day hearing is almost inevitably arbitrary - certainly in relation to counsel’s fees. With this caveat I agree, however, that to attribute 62.5% of costs of the solicitors’ attendance and counsel’s brief fee to H’s application is overstated. I shall therefore reduce this to 50% which reduces the figures by £450 (plus VAT) and £2,500 (plus VAT) respectively – i.e. a total of £3,540 (inclusive of VAT) and therefore reduces the N260 figure from £23,371 to £19,831.

As reduced the total sum claimed does not appear to have been unreasonably incurred or be unreasonable in amount (r44.3(1) and r44.4(1)(a)).

However where (as here) the costs are to be assessed on the standard basis, the rules state I am only to allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue, I may disallow or reduce costs which are disproportionate in amount even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred, and I must resolve any doubt which I may have in relation thereto in favour of the paying party (r44.3(2)). I am satisfied that the costs claimed bear a broadly reasonable relationship to the factors set out in r44.3(5) which are the factors to be taken into account when deciding whether costs incurred are proportionate. However, there are no doubt some reductions (if only very modest ones) that would be made were the costs to have been subject to a detailed assessment and I shall make a small reduction to reflect this. I therefore summarily assess W’s costs in respect of this application at £19,000 (inclusive of VAT). I prefer in this case to approach the issue in this way than simply to adopt a percentage of the costs claimed (being the approach adopted (for example) in JM v CZ (Costs: Ex Parte Order) [2015] 1 FLR 559 per Mostyn J at [51]).

It was submitted on W’s behalf that these costs also fall within the ‘clean sheet’ rules as being referable to the Daniels v Walker application. I am not sure that they do. However, irrespective of whether there is a presumption that there be no order in respect of these costs or a ‘soft’ presumption that they should follow the event I do not consider that a costs order in relation thereto can be justified. These were reports that I directed at the pre-trial review on 15^th July 2025 having refused H’s applications to instruct his own expert to value his business interests (see paragraph [51] of my Daniels v Walker judgment where I concluded that the proportionate approach was to adopt Ms. Harrison’s secondary position and that the additional information that had been sent to FRP Advisory should be sent to Ms. Middleton at PwC) and CC (where I directed Survey Spain to update their report as to the valuation of CC as their first one was now considerably out of date). They were therefore reports that I considered “necessary” and which were of relevance at the final hearing. There is no basis for the costs of these additional reports to be borne by H alone.

On W’s behalf it was submitted that the reality is that both of PwC and Survey Spain were required at the behest of H in light of his serious challenge to both SJE valuations. It is said that W did not challenge either valuation, did not require Survey Spain, and would not have required the attendance of PwC if H had declined to call them. It was further said that as it is, Ms. Harrison asked very few questions by way of clarification only. Therefore these costs must fall to H.

On H’s behalf it was said that in relation to Survey Spain, W cannot have it both ways. Their attendance to give evidence at the final hearing added a further c. €1 million of equity to the asset schedule (in that it led to their preparation of a third report which increased their value of CC from €15.956 million to €16.919 million), of which W now has the benefit. She relied on this figure for the value of CC in closing and it was adopted by me for the purpose of computation and calculating the lump sum payable to W.

It was therefore submitted that W cannot therefore argue that it was unnecessary and/or a waste of court time to hear evidence from Survey Spain. Either the valuers should not have given evidence (and so the court should have used the figure in their second written report of €15.956 million) or they should have given evidence (and the court should adopt the figure arising as a consequence of them doing so). W elected the latter position and must accept that this, naturally, also carries costs alongside it. It was said that this submission pertains to both the ‘cost’ of the valuers giving evidence and the cost of their third report submitted after they had given their oral evidence.

I prefer the submissions made by Mr. Roberts in relation to this issue. W has had the benefit of the uplift in Survey Spain’s valuation as a consequence of their giving evidence and in such circumstances it would be unfair for H alone to bear the costs of their attendance.

Further, and to repeat what I have said above, the sub-factor at r28.3(7)(c) is not whether a party raised, pursued or contested a particular allegation or issue but whether it was “reasonable” for them to do so and pursuant to r28.3(7)(d) I must also take into account the “manner” in which a party has pursued or responded to a particular issue. I do not consider that as a matter of general principle the mere fact that a party chooses to call an SJE to give oral evidence at a final hearing in order to test their opinion by way of cross-examination can be said not to be “reasonable” or that to do so was to act in an inappropriate “manner”. Of course every case will turn on its own facts and whether or not to depart from such a general principle is likely to depend on the nature of that expert evidence and its centrality (or otherwise) in the particular case (which will engage consideration inter alia as to whether a party has acted proportionately). However there is no basis for me to conclude that H’s decision was not a “reasonable” one or that he pursued or responded to this issue other than in an appropriate “manner”.

I am fortified in this conclusion by the following statement of general application in OG v AG (Financial Remedies: Conduct) [2021] 1 FLR 1105 per Mostyn J:

In relation to W’s claimed day of evidence attributable to PwC it was submitted by Mr. Roberts on H’s behalf that:

I agree with Mr. Roberts that a party is entitled to cross-examine an expert where they are putting a reasonable and arguable case. This is clear from r28.3(7)(c) and (d) and their respective references to “reasonable” and “manner”. I also agree that it is more likely to be considered reasonable to ask questions of an expert on a matter of opinion evidence where that opinion relates to the valuation of a private company where the exercise has been described as “as art rather than science” and that such valuations have been described variously as “fragile”, “uncertain”, and “a matter of no little difficulty”. However, again this is question to be determined on a case-by-case basis. There may be times where objectively it is unreasonable to challenge the evidence of an SJE even one valuing a private company. I have in mind (for example) the observations made in HO v TL [2024] 2 FLR 175 per Peel J at [23] when he stated that the reliability of a valuation will depend on a number of factors including (i) “whether the business is to be valued on a net asset basis (for example a property company) or one of the recognised income approaches (such as EBITDA or DCF)”; and (ii) “whether the assumptions underpinning the valuation are seriously in dispute”. In a case where (say) a property company has been valued on a net asset basis and the assumptions underpinning that valuation cannot be said to be seriously in dispute it might be ‘litigation conduct’ to call that expert to be cross-examined as this would be an unreasonable approach for a party to have adopted - but this is not that case.

H had a reasonable and arguable case to put to the SJE in relation to the valuation of Company A which he said ought to be valued at £11.493 million rather than £24.833 million (which I did not accept) and in addition (albeit materially less significant in financial terms) there were modest adjustments in H’s favour as a result of her oral evidence. On the facts of this case there is no basis for this to sound in costs.

More widely I see no basis for such an issue-based costs order whether based on H’s litigation conduct or otherwise. As I understand it is common ground that the instruction of an SJE to value H’s business interests was proposed by W’s solicitors before they (and W) had received and then considered his Form E. I was told by Mr. Roberts on 27^th January 2026 that H’s then solicitors had agreed the need for such an instruction by 12^th January 2024 which was just 10 days after exchange of Forms E (although his position statement referred to it being agreed in early April 2024). That this was agreed does not surprise me given the asset base in this case and the centrality thereto of H’s business interests. The suggestion of such a valuation was clearly a proportionate one and I agreed to the “necessity” of such an instruction at the First Appointment on 8^th July 2024 (there having been cross-applications for such an order made on W’s behalf dated 1^st July 2024 and on H’s behalf dated 2^nd July 2024).

I therefore cannot see that H’s ‘litigation conduct’ directly caused the instruction of the SJE. It cannot be said that the SJE instruction was required because of H’s Form E values.I therefore do not consider that Ms. Harrison’s submission that “the instruction of an enormously costly SJE was required in the face of H’s deliberately misleading valuation on Form E” (my emphasis)is a sustainable one. Indeed my note of Ms. Harrison’s oral submission on this point (which I don’t claim is verbatim) is “[w]ould always be W’s case that needed SJE”.

It is also a fair submission, as made on H’s behalf, that W’s Form E said that “[t]o the best my understanding” the Bidco 1-4 loan notes consisted of values of just under £160 million (although W did not ascribe a particular value to them in her Form E) whereas the SJE’s figure in her report was £81.3 million. It might be taking the point slightly too far to then say (as Mr. Roberts did) that “on that basis alone an SJE was required” but I agree that it demonstrates at least in part why the instruction of an SJE was a necessary one and why it cannot be said that it was required solely for the reasons Ms. Harrison gives.

I should record for completeness that Mr. Roberts sought to emphasise that the enormous expense of instructing PwC specifically was always an issue for H and was first raised on his behalf in correspondence dated 30^th September 2024 and why he ultimately proposed an alternative expert be instructed who could report in a faster time frame and at a lower cost (they had agreed to cap their costs at £425,000 plus VAT). W resisted this application and insisted on the instruction of PwC. Again I consider there is force in this submission and having sought to persuade me (successfully) to maintain the instruction of a more expensive SJE she must bear the cost consequences of doing so.

In Loggie v Loggie [2022] EWFC 2 Mostyn J at [35] encouraged the court, when giving a direction for an SJE to be instructed, to exercise its powers under r25.12(5) and limit the amount to be paid by way of fees and expenses to the expert. On 6^th December 2024 I exercised this power and limited PwC’s fees in the first instance for what was known as ‘Phase 2’ of their report to £517,000 plus VAT. This was the bottom of the estimated range that had been given on 16^th September 2024. On 14^th March 2025 PwC wrote directly to me (as I had also provided for in my order of 6^th December 2024) seeking my permission to increase the limit by £105,000 plus VAT to £622,000 plus VAT which was at the top of the estimated range that had previously been given. This was originally a contested request but on 6^th May 2025 I made an order by consent increasing the cap to this figure.

W seeks an order that H pays in effect her entire share of the ‘uplift’ on PwC’s fees (as he will be paying his 50% uplift in any event) plus (as dealt with below) 50% of W’s total costs. As Mr. Roberts observed this would mean he would bear the majority of the costs of instruction of the SJE.

On W’s behalf I am invited to consider a detailed chronology which is said to show “an evasive and dilatory approach to the instruction of the expert which resulted in an unnecessary escalation of the expert’s fees and W’s litigation costs”.

Mr. Roberts submits there is no specific complaint from PwC or coherent explanation as to how any alleged delay increased their fees. They made a bare assertion in their letter of 14^th March 2025 of “inefficiencies in completing the work” but this was neither explained nor evidenced by PwC and it is unclear what this means or how it impacted their costs.

It is fair to say that PwC’s letter of 14^th March 2025 is more detailed than Mr. Roberts describes. It details delays in information provision, raises concerns about the quality and constancy of some of the information provided, describes additional complexities, and highlights tax considerations – all of which was said to have made the scope and process more complex than expected.

However, I cannot conclude from this letter or otherwise that H was responsible for the various matters referred to in the letter. Further, although I have considered what is set out in W’s chronology with care I accept as was submitted on H’s behalf that:

I therefore see no reasonable or justifiable basis for holding H solely responsible for the increase in PwC’s costs above my initial cap.

Ms. Harrison sought these costs based on a Form H1 which totalled £1.687 million (a slight increase from the figure of £1.678 million referred to in my main judgment due to additional disbursements having been incurred in respect of SJE costs). 50% of the solicitors’ costs and counsel’s fees - less those required to avoid double-counting - were £308,430 and £156,191 respectively.

Ms. Harrison submitted that it was well-established that non-disclosure and other litigation misconduct is a powerful reason to make an order for costsreferring to OG v AG (Financial Remedies: Conduct) (above) per Mostyn J at [38] (“Where [litigation misconduct is] proved, this should be severely penalised in costs”). Later in the same judgment he stated at [89] that “[t]he message should go out that if you are guilty of deliberate non-disclosure, even if it is relatively minor, you will pay a penalty in costs”. She submitted that OG v AG (Financial Remedies: Conduct)serves to highlight that deceit by reason of non-disclosure early in the proceedings has an enduring and profound impact upon the trajectory of the case and the resulting costs of the litigation. I was also referred to Cummings v Fawn [2024] 1 FLR 117 per Mostyn J and its emphasis on the central importance of full and frank financial disclosure and (as Ms. Harrison put it) the “zero tolerance” approach to non-disclosure (which was characterised as fraudulent and therefore justified an assessment on the indemnity basis) reflected in the costs decision in Helliwell v Entwistle (Costs) [2026] 1 FLR 138.

Mr. Roberts queried on 27^th January 2026 the reference to these authorities (and also Ms. Harrison’s reference during the hearing to Sharland v Sharland [2015] 2 FLR 1367 and Gohil v Gohil [2015] 2 FLR 1289) arguing that this was not a case of non-disclosure. Whilst strictly accurate, I agree with Ms. Harrison’s response that at least in the context of costs, a knowing undervalue of an asset is a specie of non-disclosure.

It was submitted by Ms. Harrison that this non-disclosure “sits in the most serious category” and that only a costs order of the magnitude sought would justly reflect the seriousness of H’s conduct and fairly reflect the position in which it has placed W. She (i) referred to my finding at [43] that H ascribing a value to Company A in his Form E of nil (H stating at 2.11 that “I estimate the company value and business interest to be £nil”) was a “knowingly inaccurate” assessment of its value (and was a misstatement of c. £24.8 million given the SJE’s opinion which I accepted (and H of course subsequently contended for a value of c. £11.8 million at the final hearing)); (ii) referred to H’s case that his knowledge of the company’s value was more credible than the opinion of the SJE (and it was submitted that H could therefore not argue that he was a litigant who did not possess the knowledge or expertise to give a correct and realistic value of the company on his Form E whilst advancing the case that he had greater knowledge and expertise than the SJE); and (iii) submitted that H’s initial representation had a very significant impact on the litigation and a number of consequences including (a) W could not rely on anything that followed H’s Form E as it irrevocably and justifiably eroded any trust that she had in H’s disclosure from the outset (including H’s assertions as to an alleged debt to Mr. Z which I found to be genuine); and (b) H’s position on the “magnetic issue” of the valuation of Company A made a contested final hearing inevitable from the outset.

On H’s behalf it said that in relation to his averred ‘litigation conduct’, the only real criticism of H in the judgment related to:

I consider it can fairly be added to this the fact that whereas I adopted a valuation for CC £14,712,174 as per the updated Survey Spain valuation, H contended for a figure of £10,869,565 and (as I recorded at paragraph [72] of my main judgment) I found H’s evidence as to comparable properties likely to be flawed and entirely self-selecting. I agree with Ms. Harrison that there is some importance to this in the context of H’s open offer as he sought to retain CC at what would have been a c. £3.9 million undervalue.

I consider that my finding that H gave a “knowingly inaccurate” assessment of the value of Company A in his Form E is sufficient to come within r28.3(7)(e) namely “any other aspect of a party's conduct in relation to proceedings which the court considers relevant” and that this ought to sound in costs. In financial remedy proceedings there does not necessarily need to be a causative link to the actual quantum of those costs then being incurred. This is clear from many of the cases that deal with non-disclosure to which I refer at paragraph 49 above. Therefore, I consider it is of limited relevance as to what the direct financial consequences of the ‘conduct’ may be: it is the principle that is more important.

I am fortified in my conclusion that it is appropriate for a costs order to be made in relation to this issue given W v W (Financial Provision: Form E) [2004] 1 FLR 494 per Nicholas Mostyn QC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)- and to which I referred at [42] of my main judgment - where he stated:

However I do consider that the fact that W had already proposed the instruction of an SJE prior to receipt of H’s Form E to be relevant.

I am also not satisfied, however, that H’s initial representation can necessarily be said to have had the consequences suggested by Ms. Harrison namely that W could not rely on anything that followed H’s Form E (including H’s assertions as to alleged debt to Mr. Z which I found to be genuine) and that H’s presentation of dishonest figures in his Form E as to the valuation of Company A “infected” the proceedings and made a contested final hearing inevitable from the outset (as was argued). W’s position in relation to Mr. Z was more based on her evidence (which I did not accept) that he had told her that he would lie on oath for H and it can be said (as Mr. Roberts submitted) that W’s ‘conduct’ case (which did not succeed) may have been just as likely to be the reason why the case required a contested final hearing.

I therefore do not consider this to be a case similar (for example) to HD v WB [2023] 2 FLR 395 per Peel J who described as “[m]ost significant” H’s attempts throughout the proceedings to persuade the court that the parties’ prenuptial agreement should be completely disregarded and continued as follows:

I shall determine the appropriate figure to reflect H’s ‘litigation conduct’ in respect of his Form E – but one that also takes into account these further matters - once I have considered the other factors that guide my discretion.

Both Ms. Harrison and Mr. Roberts also referred me to the well-known authorities that build on PD28A paragraph 4.4 and which emphasise the need to negotiate openly and reasonably (which include OG v AG (Financial Remedies: Conduct (above) per Mostyn J, WC v HC [2022] EWFC 40 per Peel J, VV v VV(No. 2) [2023] 1 FLR 194 per Peel J at [6] and HO v TL (Costs) [2024] 2 FLR 200 per Peel J).

It is of note that both VV v VV (No. 2) and HO v TL (Costs) were described as ‘needs’ cases and that therefore but for the costs orders that were made against the receiving party in both cases, the paying party (who sought a costs order) was paying both parties’ costs (see paragraphs [2] and [4] respectively). This differs from the present case where both parties’ paid and unpaid costs have been ‘top sliced’ before a sharing of the net assets. Therefore this is not a case where the net effect of my judgment is that W (who seeks costs) is responsible for payment of all of H’s costs unless any costs order is made to disturb that outcome.

In A v M [2021] EWFC 89 Mostyn J explained at [100] the meaning of the obligation to negotiate “openly, reasonably, and responsibly” in the following way:

In WC v HC having referred at [4]-[6] to rr28.3(5) – (7) and PD28A paragraph 4.4 Peel J continued as follows:

In HO v TL (Costs) Peel J stated:

In relation to the parties’ open negotiations there was some dispute on 27^th January 2026 as to how close (or otherwise) the parties’ respective open offers had been given my findings as to computation which totalled £89,394,413 (excluding pensions). I therefore directed that the parties were to seek to agree this issue after the hearing which they subsequently did as follows:

As is clear from the above table, on 10^th June 2025 (four days after the pFDR Appointment before Nigel Dyer KC) H proposed a lump sum payment to W of £20 million (payable over a three-year period) plus the transfer of DS and OE. In light of the overall outcome at the final hearing where I ordered a lump sum payment of £24.75 million this was a reasonable open negotiating offer (even though W exceeded this by c. £4.75 million) and this is a factor that weighs in H’s favour when considering whether and if so to what extent to make an order for costs in this case. As Mr. Roberts observed, this offer was made before H’sDaniels v Walkerapplication of 1^st July 2025 and before the costs of the pre-trial review, the costs of evidence for the final hearing, and the costs of the final hearing itself were incurred (the difference between the parties’ Forms H at the pFDR appointment on 6^th June 2025 (W’s of £1,164,836 and H’s of £961,715) and Forms H1 at the final hearing (W’s of £1,687,115 and H’s of £1,503,628) show combined legal fees spending of c. £1 million after the pFDR appointment (i.e. an increase from £2,126,551 to £3,190,743) and this spending will have been in the main after H’s open offer of 10^th June 2025). It was, however, an offer that was only open for acceptance for seven days. In any event W was under a duty to negotiate reasonably in response but in reply on 27^th June 2025 she sought a lump sum of over £34.2 million plus half the proceeds of CC (i.e. a total of c. £37 million) and which exceeded my final order by c. £10.2 million. I agree that in light of the overall outcome (and bearing in mind that the PwC reports were dated 9^th/16^th April 2025 and 9^th May 2025 with all written questions answered by 28^th May 2025), this was an unreasonable open negotiating response. This must also weigh in the balance.

It is also of note that in no open offer before the final hearing did W concede that there should be any discount for liquidity/class of asset. I agree with Mr. Roberts that this was also unreasonable. This would not have prevented W from arguing that there should not be such a discount at the final hearing. As was observed in MAP v MFP (Financial Remedies: Add Back) [2016] 1 FLR 70 per Moor J:

Similarly, in LMZ v AMZ [2024] 2 FLR 735 Moor J stated:

I therefore consider that there is some force in H’s submission that W did not negotiate openly and reasonably once the financial landscape was clear.

On H’s behalf it is also said that that the outcome cannot be characterised as a ‘loss’ for H versus a ‘win’ for W.

I consider this likewise to be a fair submission. As I observed at [189] of my main judgment my figure for computation of the parties’ assets of c. £89.5 million compared to c. £105 million contended for by W and c. £72 million contended for by H. As I stated at [34] W had sought before me an equal division based on her computation – so each would receive c. £52.5 million - and H sought a division as to 60% to himself and 40% to W based on his computation - so c. £43 million to him and c. £29 million to W. Having determined that the appropriate distribution was for the parties’ assets to divided as to 55/45 in H’s favour this was therefore a division of c. £49.23 million to H and c. £40.28 million to W. This was not a ‘loss’ or a ‘win’ for either party but an outcome that might be said to be broadly halfway between the two open positions.

This was a reflection of the fact that both parties succeeded on some issues (both major and minor) and both lost on some issues. By way of the more major issues H failed on the value of Company A and the value of CC. W failed on her conduct/addback case on both the amount paid to Mr. Z (save in relation to interest paid of £500,000 (which must be seen in the context of an addback sought of £6.7 million) and interest to be paid of £400,000 and that pursued in relation to the sale of the AA shares of £6.804 million. As to the latter I have some sympathy with Mr. Roberts’ submission that this limb of the ‘addback’ claim in relation to an historic value for the AA shares was a somewhat fanciful one. W was on notice that H would pursue an issue-based costs application in relation to this failed case (H’s N260 totalling £26,884 served ahead of the final hearing).

It is a coincidence (albeit a striking one) that the difference between the parties’ positions in respect of the value of Company A (where I preferred W’s case) was c. £13.040 million and in respect of ‘addback’ of the payment to Mr. Z and the loss crystallised on H’s sale of the AA shares (where I preferred H’s case save in respect of £900,000 in paid and unpaid interest) was the similar figure of £13.504 million.

There are also a number of other issues on which W did not succeed including (i) who should bear liability for H’s owed costs to a third party (a £1.18 million difference in computation); and (ii) the costs of sale on CC (a difference of c. £863,000).

I am therefore in a situation where it is relevant to the exercise of my discretion on costs that (i) H’s valuation of Company A in his Form E was knowingly inaccurate (but W had sought an independent SJE valuation in advance of its service and H agreed soon thereafter); (ii) H’s grounds of challenge to the Survey Spain valuation were in part based on flawed and self-selected evidence and he sought to retain this property at what I found to be a significant undervalue; (iii) H sought to negotiate reasonably and openly in June 2025 before the hearing of his Daniels v Walker application at the pre-trial review and before a further c. £1 million of legal fees were incurred and W failed to do so in response (but H’s offer was only open for seven days); (iv) both parties then adopted positions in relation to computation (the value of Company A on H’s part (on which he did not succeed) and the conduct ‘addback’ on W’s part (on which she largely did not succeed)) that rendered a final hearing very likely if not inevitable; and (v) the outcome was broadly half way between the parties’ final open positions (with both parties succeeding on some issues and not others both major and more minor).

It is also the case that there are many occasions where I made ‘no order for costs’ in respect of part or all of my orders (including 20^th March 2024, 6^th December 2024, 22^nd January 2025, 10^th April 2025, and 6^th May 2025). Ms. Harrison readily accepted in her oral submissions that she could not go behind these orders and that I had to “add that to my consideration”.

Standing back (as I must) these factors taken both individually and collectively justify an order for costs in W’s favour but one far lower than sought on her behalf.

In the overall exercise of my discretion and looking at matters in the round I conclude that a contribution by H of £60,000 to W’s costs is justified. Such a figure reflects in the main my finding that H knowingly completed his Form E falsely in respect of Company A. The Form E states on its face that it must be completed “fully and accurately” and that a party has “a duty to the court to give a full, frank and clear disclosure of all your financial and otherrelevant circumstances”. This is why - perW v W(Financial Provision: Form E) - a party who fails to do so must expect judicial censure and penalties in costs. This is therefore a penalty that reflects this principle. This duty is not abrogated if a party expects (or even if it has already been agreed) that an SJE will subsequently be instructed. The figure also reflects (to a far lesser degree) H’s approach to the valuation of CC.

But for these two points I would have considered this to be a case for no order for costs (save in respect of the Daniels v Walker application) given the other factors I set out at paragraph [74] above. Taking all the other factors into account there would have been no reason to depart from the starting presumption. The fact that I am making such an order on a different factual basis that pertained in both VV v VV (No. 2) and HO v TL (Costs) is also of note. Therefore although I acknowledge the costs order is a relatively modest one in the context of W’s overall costs it is an important one.

I therefore order that H shall pay £79,000 - i.e. £19,000 plus £60,000 - (inclusive of VAT and disbursements) towards W’s costs. There shall otherwise be no order as to costs.

I should record for completeness that during the hearing on 27^th January 2026 Mr. Roberts sought to persuade me that any issue-based costs order I might make in W’s favour should be subject to a detailed assessment. I am aware that CPR PD44 paragraph 9.2(b) refers to a “general rule” that the court should make a summary assessment of the costs at the conclusion of a hearing which has lasted not more than one day. I am, however, satisfied that it is appropriate to depart from the general rule given that (i) I have a full and detailed knowledge of this case; and (ii) there is no justification to put both parties to the cost and delay of a detailed assessment.

A one-day hearing had initially been sought by W’s solicitors on 5^th November 2025 “to deal with all outstanding matters to include any outstanding drafting, computation, clarification issues, costs submissions etc”. I was still to receive requests for clarification on my main judgment at that time (which I did on 19^th November 2025). I was then sent a composite draft order on 21^st January 2026.

On H’s behalf it was said that W had failed to take any steps to try and mitigate the costs of the hearing on 27^th January 2026. It was said that her solicitors sent a first draft of the consent order on 13^th January 2026, meaning very little time to narrow issues. Her response on costs (in which H proposed ‘drop hands’ but did accept the principle of payment of the Daniels v Walker application) was said to be wholly unreasonable. It was said submissions would be made once the above issues are determined.

In my determination of the substantive issues relating to the drafting of the order I resolved some in favour of W and some in favour of H. In relation to the issue of costs, I have made an order in W’s favour albeit at a significantly lower level than the c. £622,000 that was sought on her behalf.

I cannot prevent submissions being made in relation to the costs of the hearing on 27^th January 2026. However I strongly discourage such a course of action. It is certainly unfortunate that further significant costs have had to be spent on both sides in dealing with the issue of costs. However, I will need some considerable persuasion to conclude other than the hearing was necessary because of the need for me to determine issues arising from my main judgment that both parties wished to pursue and that both should therefore bear their respective costs relating to it. As I have highlighted above the rules in respect of raising and pursuing issues emphasise the reasonableness of doing so rather than success. I also remind both parties that pursuant to r1.3 they are required to help the court to further the overriding objective – which is to enable the court to deal with a case justly - and that this includes at r1.1(2)(d) “saving expense” and at (e) “allotting to it an appropriate share of the court’s resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases”.

On 19^th November 2025 Ms. Harrison and Ms. Bennett asked me to confirm that permission to appeal would be dealt with at the next hearing once all matters had been determined and that appeal time limits would not therefore run until the conclusion of that hearing. I agreed to this. It was then said in Ms. Harrison and Ms. Bennett’s position statement for the hearing on 27^th January 2026 that W would seek permission to appeal and that submissions on this issue would be made orally at the conclusion of the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing Ms. Harrison stated that W would await my decision on costs.

I therefore directed at the hearing on 27^th January 2026 that any application for permission to appeal by either party to be made in writing within five working days of receipt of my costs judgment.

That is my judgment.