Alvina Collardeau v Michael Fuchs (Contempt of Court: Sentencing)

The Defendant to these contempt of court proceedings is Michael Fuchs who is present in court. The application for committal for contempt of court was brought by his ex-wife, Alvina Collardeau. They have been engaged in long running hostile financial remedy proceedings which have been the subject of a number of published judgments. My judgment finding Mr Fuchs in contempt of court is Collardeau v Fuchs (Contempt of Court) [2025] EWFC 413.

The parties were married in 2012 and separated in 2020. There are two children of the marriage. The family lived a lavish international lifestyle. The parties had entered a pre-nuptial agreement in March 2012, as amended by agreement in March 2014. In his final financial remedy order Mostyn J gave effect to that agreement. By his order Mr Fuchs was to pay the mortgage on the former family home in London until the youngest child turned 21 and to pay a lump sum to the wife of just under £19m within 14 days.

Mr Fuchs ceased paying the mortgage and did not pay the lump sum as ordered. Ms Collardeau made a series of applications seeking to enforce the final order. In early 2025 she made a variation and enforcement order that resulted in a comprehensive variation and enforcement order made by me following my judgment handed down on 24 September 2025 – Collardeau v Fuchs [2025] EWFC 307.

Earlier, in order to preserve properties so as not to prejudice the variation and enforcement application, I made an order on 28 March 2025 which, amongst other things, at paragraph 9, prohibited the Defendant from selling a property in the US known as ML1. A penal notice was attached to that particular order.

On 25 June 2025, Mr Fuchs sold ML1 for US$26m with net proceeds of over US$10m which he gave to his friend and associate Mr Rosen, not to the Claimant.

In July 2025, Ms Collardeau applied for the committal of Mr Fuchs for contempt of court by reason of his sale of ML1 and in three other respects which, in the event, have not been found against him. As set out in my published judgment handed down on 28 November 2025, after a hearing on 7 November 2025, I found Mr Fuchs to have been in contempt of court by breach of paragraph 9 of my order of 28 March 2025 by selling ML1.

Mr Fuchs attended the sentencing hearing today, as required. He did not attend the first two hearings in the contempt application in person but he has been represented throughout. At the first hearing of the committal application he made no admissions as to the alleged breaches. At the hearing on 7 November, through Counsel, Mr Fuchs admitted breaching the order by selling ML1. He raised an issue regarding service as a defence to the contempt proceedings but I ruled against him on that issue. I have agreed that time will not run in relation to an appeal against that decision until the conclusion of the contempt proceedings which will be today. As to the other three alleged breaches, they were either withdrawn or found not to be proved.

Having found Mr Fuchs to have been in contempt of court by breaching paragraph 9 the order of 28 March 2025 I adjourned sentence until today, 11 February 2026.

Just prior to the hearing on 7 November 2025 Mr Fuchs made a large lump sum payment to Ms Collardeau of US$31. He made a further payment of US$10m but Ms Collardeau complained that the second sum may well be encumbered because Mr Fuchs had used monies to pay it which he had been prohibited from using by a court order in the US. That is no longer her position and she accepts that the US$10m payment was unencumbered. Following a further payment of under £20,000 in January 2026 it is now agreed that Mr Fuchs has paid all the amounts due and owing to date under the varied final order and the enforcement orders, save that there are some costs order the amounts of which have not yet been formally assessed. He has ongoing child maintenance obligations and there are outstanding applications in relation to securing those future payments. As well as the US$41m he has paid other not insubstantial amounts to Ms Collardeau since the final order.

Mr Fuchs was open about his sale of ML1, writing to Ms Collardeau’s solicitors on 10 July 2025 to explain what he had done. He has not hidden the fact of the sale nor, ultimately, that it was a breach of the order of 28 March 2025. He says that he needed a quick sale in order to raise money to unlock liquidity to enable him ultimately to pay the monies owing to Ms Collardeau under the variation and enforcement order. He did not know exactly what he owed her, he says, until I handed down my judgment on her enforcement and variation application on 24 September 2025. The opportunity for a quick, cash sale arose and he decided it would make financial sense to seize that opportunity. Upon slae and transfer of the net proceeds to Mr Rosen, he made arrangements with the help of Mr Rosen to raise the monies owed to the Claimant. He paid them. He has now apologised to the court and to Ms Collardeau for breaching the order recognising that he could and should have sought a variation of the order before selling ML1, albeit he seeks to justify his actions because they led to compliance with the final financial remedy order and thus benefited the Claimant.

In considering the appropriate sentence for this single contempt of court, I adopt paragraphs 21 to 23 of Cobb J’s judgment in Re Greg Hazeltine [2024] EWHC 2982 Fam where he said:

21.

In respect of penalty for these proven contempts I have a range of powers under section 14 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 and the Family Court(Contempt of Court)(Powers) Regulations 2014, supported by rule 37.9 FPR 2010. I can of course impose no penalty at all.

22.

Any penalty for these contempts is entirely in my discretion. In exercising that discretion, I have had in mind the Court of Appeal's comments about sentence in contempt cases in Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Khan [2019] EWCA (Civ) 392 at paragraphs 57 to 71. I have also had regard to the more recent Supreme Court decision in HM Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15 where Lord Lloyd Jones, Lord Hamblen and Lord Stephens in a joint judgment directed judges

in these circumstances to adopt the following approach (see [44]):

"1.

The court should adopt an approach analogous to that in criminal cases where the Sentencing Council's Guidelines require the court to assess the seriousness of the conduct by reference to the offender's culpability and the harm caused, intended or likely to be caused.

2.

In light of its determination of seriousness, the court must first consider whether a fine would be a sufficient penalty.

3.

If the contempt is so serious that only a custodial penalty will suffice, the court must impose the shortest period of imprisonment which properly reflects the seriousness of the contempt.

4.

Due weight should be given to matters of mitigation, such as genuine remorse, previous positive character and similar matters.

5.

Due weight should also be given to the impact of committal on persons other than the contemnor, such as children of vulnerable adults in their care.

6.

There should be a reduction for an early admission of the contempt to be calculated consistently with the approach set out in the Sentencing Council's Guidelines on Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea.

7.

Once the appropriate term has been arrived at, consideration should be given to suspending the term of imprisonment. Usually, the court will already have taken into account mitigating factors when setting the appropriate term such that there is no powerful factor making suspension appropriate, but a serious effect on others, such as children or vulnerable adults in the contemnor's care, may justify suspension.”

23.

I bear in mind that the sanction which I impose, if any, has a primary function of marking the disapproval of the court and deterring others from engaging in conduct comprising contempt (see Patel v Patel & O'rs [2017] EWHC 3229 (Ch) at [22] and [23]). I have also had regard to the comments of Hale LJ (as she then was) in Hale v Tanner [2000] EWCA Civ 5570; she listed ten points relevant to committals in family cases, including (and those which follow are those which are potentially relevant to the instant case):

"i)

It is a common practice, and usually appropriate in view of the sensitivity of the circumstances of these cases, to take some other course [than imprisonment] on the first occasion" [26];

ii)

"If imprisonment is appropriate, the length of the committal should be decided without reference to whether or not it is to be suspended. A longer period of committal is not justified because its sting is removed by virtue of its suspension" [28];

….

iv)

"The length of the committal has to bear some reasonable relationship to the maximum of two years which is available" [30];

v)

"The court has to bear in mind the context. This may be aggravating or mitigating" [33].”

I am not sentencing Mr Fuchs for failing to abide by Mostyn J’s final order. His breaches of that order have been dealt with by enforcement and variation orders, imposition of interest, and costs orders. A penalty for a contempt of court is for that contempt alone, found to the criminal standard of proof to have been committed, not for more general conduct in the litigation, however obstructive and contumelious. Nevertheless, the context of the contempt of court has to be taken into account. Numerous judgments have now recorded Mr Fuchs non-compliance with the final order and obstruction of the enforcement of it.

Mr Fuchs was a litigant in person at the time of the breach and at the time when the order of 28 March 2025 was made. However, there is no doubt that he knew of the prohibition on the sale of ML1. He maintains that he had a time-limited offer by a cash buyer for ML1 and acted under financial pressure and to secure that sale. I accept that he was under financial pressures at the time although any pressure arising from his non-compliance with the final order were of his own making.

Mr Fuchs has not previously been found to have been in contempt of court and there are no other previous matters for me to take into account. In that respect, I treat him as of previous good character for the purpose of sentence.

Mr Fuchs has complex business interests and he has an ongoing need to attend to them. He has two sons in England whom he wishes to see and who depend on future periodical payments and the payment of school fees by Mr Fuchs. It is the court’s hope that the family, in particular the children, may enjoy a time free from litigation and the hostility that that has generated. There are remaining financial issues between the parties but there is also opportunity to resolve those and to cease litigation in the interests of the children and the parties themselves.

The breach was serious because it involved the prohibited sale of a significant asset at a time when Ms Collardeau was intensely engaged in seeking to enforce the final financial remedy order, Mr Fuchs had avoided compliance for a prolonged period, the order prohibiting sale had been made at a hearing he had attended, and the order was made only some three months before the sale took place.

The impact of the breach on Ms Collardeau has ultimately not been serious. I do not diminish the overall effect on her of Mr Fuchs conduct in the litigation, but I am focusing here on the effect of the breach found to have been in contempt of court. She has now received all the monies owing to her to date. Mr Fuchs maintains that this has been achieved in part because of the sale. I do not have the means to trace all his financial dealings in order to verify that assertion, but the fact is that he has raised the money to make the payments to Ms Collardeau and he has done so after selling ML1 and giving net proceeds to his friend and associate Mr Rosen. I therefore proceed on the basis that the sale of ML1 has facilitated the payments due and owing to Ms Collardeau. I am satisfied that Ms Collardeau has ultimately benefited from the sale although the benefit was only to make good the loss she had previously suffered due to Mr Fuchs’s earlier defaults. Whilst the sale may have facilitated the payments in November, I do not accept that the breach in contempt of court was thereby justified.

Albeit I should consider sanctions from the lowest to the highest in terms of severity, I make it clear now that, in all the circumstances, this is not a case in which only a sentence of imprisonment will suffice to meet the seriousness of the contempt of court. I shall impose neither an immediate nor a suspended sentence of imprisonment. Such sentences would be disproportionate.

The non-custodial options for me to consider are a fine, sequestration of assets, or no order. There is no maximum level of fine which I may impose.

The imposition of a penalty is complicated by the costs claimed by Ms Collardeau in respect of the contempt application. In line with the costs incurred in the litigation arising out of the final financial remedy order both by her and, when represented, by Mr Fuchs, the costs are eye-watering. She has submitted schedules of costs totalling over £200,000 inclusive of VAT just in relation to the contempt application in which this is only the third hearing.

Sequestration of assets would not be appropriate in the circumstance of this case. There have been many orders concerning his and Ms Collardeau’s assets which appear now to have led almost to a full resolution of disputes. However, there are outstanding applications regarding the securing of future periodical payments for the benefit of the children. Those applications concern the transfer and/or securing of assets. There is no merit in complicating matters further with sequestration of Mr Fuchs assets within the contempt proceedings. There is a danger that any sequestration in the contempt proceedings will become entangled with, or affect, applications in relation to assets in the substantive proceedings. The particular asset, ML1 has been sold and the proceeds now, in effect, forwarded to the Claimant.

In considering a fine as a sentence, I should take into account the costs which Ms Collardeau seeks in relation to the contempt proceedings. I remind myself that whilst she brings the contempt application and had the burden of proving allegations, only one of the initial four alleged contempts of court has been both pursued and found proved. Also, following the finding of contempt the matter of sentence is very much one for the court not for the Claimant. Nevertheless, the contempt application in relation to the sale of ML1 was fully justified. A costs order against Mr Fuchs is appropriate and the amount of costs will be substantial.

In the inferior courts the maximum fine for contempt of court is £2500. There is no maximum in the higher courts.

Mr Fuchs, as he has done many times before, complains about the lack of access he has to funds, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the final order the court proceeded on the basis that he had assets worth over £1 billion. I am sure that he has the means to raise funds but I accept that he would struggle to raise cash to pay a very substantial fine in addition to substantial costs. As it happens, he remains under an obligation to pay costs in the substantive proceedings which have yet to be subject to detailed assessment and so will have to find liquid funds for that purpose. He also has considerable ongoing liabilities in respect of school fees and periodical payments for the benefit of the children.

Having regard to the costs award, which is explained below, I have decided that there should be no separate penalty imposed for the contempt of court.

Unless the fine were set at a level wholly disproportionate to the contempt and the consequences of the contempt, any fine imposed on Mr Fuchs would be nominal compared with the payment by Mr Fuchs of US$41m to Ms Collardeau after the breach. The orders of the court and, perhaps, these contempt proceedings have achieved the desired goal and Mr Fuchs has paid the amounts due and owing to Ms Collardeau. A fine would not serve to ensure present or future compliance and it would not serve as a punishment unless it were set at a disproportionately high level. Mr Fuchs remains under an onerous obligation to pay substantial payments for the benefit for the children. A substantial fine would deplete funds which could otherwise be used for that purpose just at a time when Ms Collardeau seeks to pursue applications to secure funds for that purpose. I have considered whether to impose a small or nominal fine to, at least, mark the fact of his contempt of court, but I am satisfied that it would be a futile exercise in all the circumstances of this case. Mr Fuchs has made good the adverse consequences of the breach, he will have a considerable costs award against him. A nominal fine would serve no useful additional purpose. It has been a burden for the Defendant to have to go through the contempt proceedings. He has a finding of contempt against him and that was recorded in a public judgment. He will have to pay the costs of the contempt proceedings – his own and the Claimant’s costs, as assessed by the court. He has brought all that on himself but in my judgement no separate penalty is required or appropriate by way of sentence. I therefore make no order save as to costs.

I warn Mr Fuchs that his conduct in contempt of court was unjustified and that any future breaches of court orders which are found to be in contempt of court are likely to result in the imposition of penalties, including possibly imprisonment.

As to the Claimant’s costs, the contempt proceedings have lasted more than one day, there having been three hearings. I am nevertheless satisfied that it is appropriate for me summarily to assess costs today. I note the fact that the Defendant raised matters of service very late in the day on 7 November 2025 but, because of the pragmatism of Ms Collardeau’s Counsel, that did not delay the proceedings. He did not formally admit the breach at the earliest opportunity in the proceedings even though he was candid about the sale of ML1. But the Claimant brought four different allegations of breach amounting to contempt and only one has ultimately been proved. I have to consider the basis of costs. Whilst any successful contempt of court claim by definition involves contemptuous conduct by the Defendant, it does not necessarily result in indemnity costs. I am mindful of the late arguments as to service but they were dealt with on the day and the Defendant was entitled to raise them. Although I did not accept the submissions on his behalf they were properly raised. I do not find any unreasonable conduct by Mr Fuchs in these contempt proceedings. In my judgement costs should be assessed on the standard basis. I have to be satisfied that the costs claimed are reasonable in amount and proportionate to the issues. I take a broad brush approach on a summary assessment. The costs are very high for three hearings, each of which lasted no more than a day. Today’s hearing concerns sentence alone but the Claimant claims over £40,000 in costs just for this hearing. Other than the failed arguments concerning service, the issues were not particularly complex. The parties have each instructed the most experienced and skilled lawyers and each has recognised that the costs of doing so will be considerable and that they risk paying for the other party’s costs at that level. Nevertheless, the costs should be reasonably incurred and proportionate to the issues. Costs should not serve as a disincentive to bring contempt proceedings when such proceedings are justified, nor as a weapon. Some of the Claimant’s costs will have related to the allegations not found proved. Taking into account all the matters set out above, I am satisfied that an appropriate, reasonable and proportionate level of costs which the Defendant should be ordered to pay is £100,000 inclusive of VAT which shall be payable in full within 21 days of today.

I therefore order that the Defendant shall pay the Claimant’s costs summarily assessed in the sum of £100,000 inclusive of VAT, payable within 21 days of today. I impose no separate penalty for his contempt of court.

A copy of the judgment on the finding of contempt was published on the judiciary website. This judgment shall be published there also.