BC v BC (No 2) (Matrimonialisation; Division of shareholding; Provision for debt)

This is my judgment at the conclusion of the final hearing of W’s application for a financial order issued in form A on 1 May 2024.

H (60) and W (54) met in2005 and married in 2008. There is one child of their relationship who is aged 17. They separated in early 2024 and following W’s application for divorce in this jurisdiction, a conditional order was made on 3 July 2025. Unfortunately, a private FDR hearing before Sir Philip Moor was unsuccessful on 14 July 2025. The parties have now spent a total of £2,820,445 in legal fees and disbursements within these proceedings.

I have received and had regard to a significant quantity of documentary evidence (the primary bundle alone containing 1260 pages), the oral evidence of each party and GG (chief executive of BB), and the written and oral submissions of leading and junior counsel. After the hearing concluded, I received further evidence from the parties by email. I do not propose to recite the witnesses’ evidence at any length; the parties have a transcript, as do I, to which I have had frequent recourse when coming to my judgment, and I will identify the evidence that I have found relevant at appropriate points below.

The parties were not able to agree on the computation of their net wealth, but I have determined it to be £51.5 million (rounded) for the reasons given below. Approximately half of this sum is represented by a shareholding in a listed company, BB, of which H is the executive chairman. The bulk of the balance is held in real property that the parties would like to retain or in pension assets, thereby severely limiting the amount of ready funds available for distribution. This cash-flow limitation has been exacerbated by the late realisation that H is liable for a debt to His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs that I have assessed as likely to be £X million (rounded) including interest and penalties, and which is increasing by the addition of £Y in interest each day.

Given the resources available to the parties, they have not troubled me with assessing their respective needs, each of them conceding that their needs will be met by the operation of the sharing principle. Therefore, after the computation issues were ventilated, the hearing was dominated by arguments about the proportions in which the parties will share their wealth (W seeking equality - H seeking a 55/45 split in his favour) and the mechanism by which sharing will take place.

W’s case for an equal division is that the parties’ net wealth is made up entirely of matrimonial property. She asserts that there was a seamless period of cohabitation from the end of 2005 until their marriage in2008. She says this is important because it was in late 2007 that a company called CC was floated and H’s shareholding in it was valued at approximately £10 million, it previously having been valued by him in 2005 at approximately £30,000. In any event, she says, it is common ground that the value of the CC shares was only realised in 2014 when £6.5 million was borrowed against them, and virtually the entire sum was spent as if joint funds, including in the purchase of jointly held real property. In the current jargon, the CC shares had been ‘matrimonialised’.

In response, H’s case is that although the parties met in 2005, they were still living independently in their own houses until early 2007 when they were engaged to be married and opened a joint bank account in February, and then completed the purchase of the Hampshire property in April, which became the matrimonial home. He asserts that his 11 million shares in CC did not change in value during 2007, so there was no increase in value when the parties were cohabiting. As for matrimonialisation, even if I conclude that has taken place, he says that there remains scope for the court to depart from equality to reflect the source of this unmatched contribution. He says in this case it would be fair so to do because it represents a significant proportion of their current net wealth and it was the financial bedrock for the parties’ subsequent matrimonial endeavours. An overall departure from equality by 5% has no arithmetical justification but is, he says, a fair recognition of the source of that £10 million.

Turning to the way in which an equal division should be facilitated, in addition to those transfers of real property that are agreed, W objects to a transfer of the French property, the parties’ holiday home, to H and seeks its sale, with the net proceeds being made available for division between the parties. She does so primarily because she thinks that the single joint expert has undervalued the property and she objects to H benefiting from what may be as much as an additional EUR 10 million on her case. She raises a secondary argument that the mortgagee of the property has custody of H’s shares in BB, which she wishes to be transferred to her in part, and therefore the mortgage may need to be redeemed in any event. Finally, she relies on the parties’ agreement to sell the house that is recorded on the face of an earlier order.

As for the BB shares, W seeks an outright transfer into her name of half of the shares held by H personally and a pension sharing order for half of the remaining BB shares held in a SSAS. She accepts that this latter order will require a separation within the SSAS of the non-BB assets but it is uncontroversial as between the parties that this can be done. In return, she is willing to give whatever ‘drag and tag’ undertakings are reasonably necessary to minimise the risk of an adverse effect on the share price of the diminution of H’s personal shareholding and give the directors and shareholders of BB a sufficient level of comfort. Only by such a transfer, she says, will she acquire a degree of autonomy in respect of the shareholding and the parties achieve what approximates to a clean break.

W does not want to share in H’s SIPP. Although it contains the three care homes that were once her business, she asserts that she has had no involvement with them since 2020, and blames H for permitting EE, who operates the homes, to build up more than £500,000 debt to the SIPP. She points to the uncertainty of the outcome of a pension sharing order because it is common ground that a sharing of the SIPP will require a likely foregoing of the debt, the forfeiting of the lease granted to EE, and a sale of the care home business.

Once the various transfers have been accounted for, W seeks whatever balancing lump sum payment results arithmetically in an equal division of the parties’ net assets. In addition, she accepts that she is liable to account to H for half of his HMRC debt and will undertake to pay her share as and when it falls due. In the meantime, she supports his proposal that he pays the necessary interim sum by the 31 January 2026 and will also defer part of any lump sum payment due to her now in lieu of her future obligations.

H agrees that W should have transferred to her the properties that she wants, including the Caribbean property, but in return says that he should be able to retain the French property. He says that the court should not go behind the valuation ascribed by the single joint expert, particularly in circumstances where W has not even sought to file alternative expert evidence. Further, he says the mortgagee’s custody of the BB shares is a red herring because they are not held by the bank as security, and in any event he can and will make alternative arrangements if necessary. Finally, the agreement to sell was made at a very early stage of proceedings and he should not be held to it now.

H asserts that a transfer of any proportion of the BB shares would be damaging to the share price, undermining the confidence that the market has in the company that in large part flows from his personal control of a significant proportion of the shares as part of a total holding by the board of c.20%. Although a transfer of 50% of his holding to W, together with the undertakings that she offers, may be understood by institutional investors, the reaction of retail investors who hold a total of 40% of the shares, is unpredictable. It is a risk that he says is not worth taking, particularly in circumstances where he can hold W’s beneficial interest in accordance with undertakings that he is willing to give so that she receives the full benefit of the shares in due course when he does, with appropriate protections against potentially disadvantageous events. He asserts that the autonomy that W suggests she will achieve by a transfer is largely illusory because of the ‘drag and tag’ undertakings that she is willing to give, and his proposal gives her the equivalent benefit without the corresponding risk to the share price.

In my search for a fair outcome as between the parties, I must and do have regard to section 25 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973:

My first task is to compute the matrimonial wealth available to the parties for division between them. When considering next the well-established strands of award being needs, compensation and sharing, I must start with an equal division of the matrimonial assets before considering whether that is required to be adjusted, either to meet needs or for some other principled reason. Compensation and needs do not feature in this case but as I have already indicated, a departure from equality is sought based on the source of some of the parties’ wealth.

In considering that proposed departure from equality, I have regard to the following authorities that were brought to my attention.

On the issue of pre-marital cohabitation, in VV v VV [2023] 1 FLR 170 Peel J said this:

The issue of what constitutes matrimonial property and the concept of ‘matrimonialisation’ as it applies to sharing were considered and put beyond doubt by the Supreme Court in Standish v Standish [2025] 2 FLR 489 in this way that binds me:

On the issue of the mechanism for the sharing of H’s holding in BB, I am invited on his behalf to have regard to the decision of Peel J in BR v BR [2025] EWFC 88. In that case, Peel J was presented with a choice between two of the three options identified by the Court of Appeal in Martin v Martin [2018] EWCA Civ 2866 at [93] for the division of shares in a private company. Faced with either dividing the shares in specie or the option of a buy out of the wife’s entitlement to part of the husband’s shareholding, Peel J chose the latter primarily because “[96] (i) … a clean break is desirable, achievable and in accordance with the statutory steer at s25A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.”

However, that is not the choice presented to me, which is either to divide these publicly quoted shares in specie, albeit with ‘drag and tag’ provisions, or leave them in the ownership of the husband for an indeterminate period of time of his choosing before the wife may benefit. I am therefore not really assisted by the ratio of Peel J’s decision with which respectfully I agree (namely, if a clean break is achievable, that is to be preferred) or his distinguishable fact specific outcome. Quite simply what I must and will do, in circumstances where a buy out and therefore an immediate clean break is not available in this case, is alight upon which of the other two Martin options does justice to these parties and achieves overall fairness.

Finally, when considering how the debt to HMRC is to be paid, and whether one or more properties should be sold to meet it, I am invited on W’s behalf to have regard to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Fisher-Aziz v Aziz [2010] EWCA Civ 673 per Thorpe LJ at [6],

“As a matter of general principle, it seems to me that if the wife in occupation of the final matrimonial home (having primary regard to the interests of the children) seeks the transfer of the property, in preference to the proceeds of sale of the property, she should ordinarily succeed, providing of course that she can secure the release of the co-owner from the mortgage or charges attached to the property.”

Unfortunately, the ratio of that decision will not help me. Even if such a ‘general principle’ is still properly described as such, it is clear that the Court of Appeal intended it to apply to the matrimonial home that was deemed necessary or at least desirable to provide the primary (and only) accommodation for the wife and children. That will not be the situation in this case if some properties are to be sold.

Line 67 is a debt owed to the French property contractors. H says it is EUR115,552 but W says EUR38,157. W’s form E deposes to a liability of “c.£100,000”. In her replies to questionnaire, she requests documentary evidence of whether the sums are owed personally or by the SCI holding the French property. H has provided documentary evidence to substantiate the sum owed and was not challenged about it. The documents that evidence demands for payment amount to EUR 38,157. That is, therefore, the amount at which I assess this debt.

Line 96 is a credit account with the Caribbean property management company which is agreed to be a joint liability. H says the debt stands XCD 631,964 as at the statement dated 30 September 2025 included with the updating disclosure provided by W in accordance with my order. She asserts that the debt now stands at XCD 660,692 and relies on an email from the management company dated 27 October 2025. Accepting that the statement of account will constantly vary, for consistency across the schedule, I prefer to use the figure provided with the updating disclosure.

Lines 98 & 99 refer to a claim for a contribution to hurricane damage at the Caribbean property and a contribution to the Caribbean account. W claims USD142,934 and XCD100,000, being the figures agreed in correspondence between the parties subject to no further payment for so-called hurricane damage. At line 172, W claims a further USD160,552 for that hurricane damage. During the oral evidence I was referred to the documentary evidence in support. In my judgment, much of the work referenced in the documents is of the nature of general updating rather than as a result of damage from the hurricane. In any event, the property value was agreed by the parties at the first appointment, which post-dates the hurricane and must therefore have had regard to the property’s then condition. I shall therefore delete the amount at line 172 but hold the parties to their agreement in respect of lines 98 and 99, in circumstances where W will be taking responsibility for the entirety of this joint liability.

At lines 134 and 177 H seeks reimbursement from W for half of the cost of security paid from the joint account when she was in residence at the French property. He says security was not necessary. She says historically security was provided at the French property, but he cancelled it and she therefore reinstated it for the period of her occupation. In my judgment, her doing so was reasonable as a joint expense referrable to her occupation of a joint property. I shall therefore delete these items from the schedule.

Lines 138 and 171 refer to the parties’ most recent AMEX expenditure. H seeks to exclude the most recent bills on the basis that they are post-separation and W has spent three times as much as him. She includes their most recent bills in the same way as all other post-separation credit card expenditure has been included, having been paid from their respective current accounts. W justifies greater credit card expenditure on the basis that unlike him, she has no earned income. I accept that justification, and given that all other post-separation credit card expenditure has been taken into account on the schedule, these most recent bills shall also be included.

At line 147, neither party includes a figure for penalties in respect of the unpaid CGT. Doing the best they can, the single joint expert places the likely penalty in the range 10-20%, but it could be zero or as high as 70%. I have concluded that it is appropriate to include a figure for a penalty, and given that there is a chance that it might be very substantial indeed, it is reasonable to assess it at the top of the likely range, i.e. 20%, and include that on the schedule.

Lines 215, 217 and 219 are referable to FF Capital Limited. H asserts that his figures are taken from his updating disclosure. W did not assert a contrary case in closing. I shall therefore adopt his figures in the schedule. There is also a contra-entry for line 219 at line 129.

Those disputed items having been resolved, at the date of this judgment the net assets available for distribution between the parties amount to £51,526,013.

I remind myself and respectfully adopt, as did Peel J in V v V (above), Williams J’s description of cohabitation as being where “prior to the formal commencement of marriage, the parties had entered into the sort of partnership involving the mutual support, working together, rights and obligations which may be indistinguishable from those which arise when parties begin to live together only after marriage … The mere fact that parties begin to spend time in each other’s homes does not of itself, it seems to me, equate to marriage. In situations such as this, the court must look to an accumulation of markers of marriage which eventually will take the relationship over the threshold into a quasi-marital relationship”.

In my judgment, for H and W that is likely to have been at the beginning of 2007. By that time, H had been formally introduced in2006 to W’s children and they were in the process of jointly purchasing what became the matrimonial home, which had been secured by the payment of a holding deposit shortly followed the exchange of contracts at the end of 2006. Their developing joint emotional and financial status was then cemented by their engagement and the establishment of a joint bank account in early 2007 followed shortly by the completion of the purchase of their matrimonial home.

Factors against an earlier cohabitation include W’s sole purchase of a property for her and her family in May 2006. Even if H was to spend increasing amounts of time at that house, the children then only just being aware of his relationship with their mother, it was clearly thought by each party to be too early in their relationship to enter into a joint financial commitment when that property was purchased. Nor is the purchase of that house by W as a home for her and her children consistent with a suggestion that she was then, and had been since November 2005, living with H at his house. She may well have stayed with him from time to time, but that does not equate to cohabitation akin to marriage. I note that W gave her address, not H’s, to Companies House in 2006.

In my judgment, W’s case on cohabitation is further undermined by her wholly confusing presentation of her financial circumstances and living arrangements as they were in 2005 and 2006, which was laid bare when she was cross-examined. For example, it became clear that, despite her protestations and contrary to the assertion in her July statement, she was not earning £250,000 per year at the outset of the relationship. Further, W confused the date of sale of her house in Lymington, which in fact came after the purchase of the Hampshire Property in April 2007, not a year before as asserted in her statement. In my judgment, W has not shown herself to be a particularly reliable historian about this period of the parties’ relationship.

That the parties described themselves in 2011 in a letter to a solicitor as having commenced cohabitation at the end of 2005 does not detract from my evidence-based conclusion, given the uncertainty that surrounds the authorship of that letter, its particular purpose and the passage of time that had already elapsed when it was written. Equally, I recognise that my analysis possibly rejects H’s own initial presentation in his form E when he said “W and I met in or around 2004/5 and moved in together not long after that”.

At the beginning of 2007, when I have found that the parties commenced their cohabitation akin to marriage, there is no dispute that H already held his shares in CC. It is clear, therefore, that those shares were non-matrimonial. Their value at that time is less clear.

In the summer of 2005, when H settled the financial claims of a previous wife, he ascribed a value of £30,000 to his shares, although the D81 filed with the consent order in March 2006 ascribed no value to them. Having entered into a joint venture with DD in December 2005, CC grew considerably during 2006, ending the year with a turnover of £596,000 compared to £2,000 in 2005. Further growth continued through 2007 so that by the end of 2007, CC was floated by a reverse takeover of another quoted company, valuing H’s shareholding at just over £10 million. Was that growth during 2007 a result of joint matrimonial endeavour, or simply the result of what proved to be a good deal with DD 12 months earlier? The answer to that question may well be of little importance now, because of what happened next.

H did not realise any money in the flotation. In fact, no money was realised from those shares until 2014 by which time H had spent seven years of the marriage working with his wife’s support. In 2014 he pledged his shares to borrow £6.5 million, which was paid into the joint bank account and spent on acquiring a London flat (£1 million), the Caribbean property and its renovation (£3.7 million), renovations to the matrimonial home and other expenses of the family. The balance of the unpledged shares was sold over time after H left CC in 2015, realising a further c. £1.5 million. So much is uncontroversial.

In this way, what started as a non-matrimonial shareholding at the outset of the cohabitation/marriage in 2007 had become, in my judgment, well and truly ‘matrimonialised’ by 2014 in eventually acquiring and being spent on jointly owned property and in deferring marital expenses from their joint bank account. Categories (b) and (c) identified by Wilson LJ in K v L as endorsed by the Supreme Court in Standish (above) apply here. Those categories are not, in any event, exhaustive. “[M]atrimonialisation rests on the parties, over time, treating the asset as shared” and “it is the parties’ treatment of what was initially non-matrimonial property, over time, as shared between them, that is central in deciding the fairness of that property being viewed as matrimonialised” (per Lord Burrows and Lord Stephens). In my judgment, H and W treated the realisation of the CC shares as a shared resource when using the resulting monies on joint expenditure.

The value of these shares having been matrimonialised by 2014 in the ways I have described, should their original non-matrimonial character nevertheless still be recognised by a departure from equality when I make a financial order in 2026? In my judgment, the answer to that question must be ‘no’.

In my judgment, either an asset is non-matrimonial, in which case it is excluded from equal sharing, or it is matrimonialised, in which case it is included in equal sharing along with all other matrimonial property (unless there is another, additional justification for departure from equality). I take from paragraph 50 of Standish that there is no room for a hybrid treatment of assets that have been matrimonialised: they are subject to the same normal rule of equal sharing as other matrimonial assets, and the same limited justifications for departure, for example and perhaps most commonly, to meet needs, which are not relevant in this case. After 18 years of marriage there is no room for an unprincipled, randomly alighted upon, 5% (why not 4% or 6%?) departure from the equal sharing of what I find to be now entirely matrimonial wealth.

Each party needs to be accommodated in this jurisdiction. It is agreed between the parties that this need will be met by H receiving the former matrimonial home (the Hampshire property, net £3.15 million) and W receiving a London property (, net £3.7 million). It is further agreed that other real property will be divided with roughly equal value: two flats in London for H, net £2.1 million; the Swiss chalet and land in India for W, net £1.85 million. I shall make the necessary orders to give effect to this agreed distribution.

What then should happen to the French property (, net £3.93 million) and the Caribbean property (net £7.34 million)? H wants the former; W wants the latter. Whilst it is understandable, perhaps, that each of them seeks to retain a holiday home in their preferred destination, there is an alternative use to which these properties should, in my judgment, be put. I acknowledge the emotional pull for W of the Caribbean property, but that factor is insufficient to deny the reality of what will be needed to meet the anticipated debt.

The agreed potential liability to HMRC in respect of unpaid CGT (as included in the schedule) plus the likely penalty as I have assessed it to be, amounts to just under £X million. Of that, H intended to pay an initial payment on account from his realisable resources by 31 January 2026. That leaves £Z million. I realise that the precise sum has yet to crystallise but this is the most reliable figure that emerges from the expert evidence that the parties accept.

Although an alternative proposal was advanced in closing on behalf of W in the hope of avoiding a sale of the Caribbean property, in reality there is simply no other source of funds to meet this debt other than by selling both the French property and the Caribbean property. This is a course of action that I raised with both parties in evidence and which was fully addressed in closing submissions.

Failing to make provision now risks embroiling the parties in a fresh dispute about how it is to be paid when it eventually falls due, perhaps with litigation to enforce an indemnity against W, and perhaps when the parties’ respective financial positions may be worse than they are now. If these properties were the parties’ main or only source of accommodation, as in Fisher-Aziz v Aziz (above), the situation may be different. But they are incidental luxuries that H and W can ill afford to keep whilst this liability looms over them.

I shall therefore order the sale forthwith of the French property and the Caribbean property, with the net proceeds of sale up to £Z million to be held for the payment of the HMRC liability as and when it falls due, thereafter the balance is to be divided equally between the parties. If the net proceeds of sale exceed £Z million, any excess shall be divided equally between the parties. The Porsche motorcar currently held by the SCI holding the French property but being used by W shall be transferred to her before the sale, as agreed between the parties.

As I have already remarked (above), the lack of liquidity in this family’s finances removes the preferable option of an immediate clean break through H buying out W’s interest in his shareholding. Further, the parties are agreed, and I accept, that a forced public sale now of H’s shares, or some of them, to meet W’s claim may result in a significant reduction in the share value and therefore the amount to be realised. This is because of H’s central importance to the company and the considerable size of his shareholding.

I am left, therefore, with either dividing the shares between the parties in specie, with the protection for H of ‘drag and tag’ provisions, or leaving them in H’s ownership subject to his undertakings and eventually sharing the proceeds of sale at a time of his choosing.

H has argued strenuously in favour of the latter approach, on the basis that an outright transfer to W, to quote him, “will have a detrimental effect on the share price” and undermine his influence within the company. In my judgment, a proper analysis of the evidence that he has presented is really no more than reflective of an understandable concern that a change to the status quo may adversely impact the share price and his standing in the company. His reliance on the impact of a share sale by the CEO of Cerillion, who placed a large number of shares on the market at a value lower than the prevailing share price, in my judgment is misplaced given that the proposed transfer to W is clearly not akin to a large share sale at an undervalue.

I accept that a transfer presents a risk that he and the other directors of BB would rather not take, however small it may be. Change, of whatever type, is always uncomfortable and potentially destabilising. The evidence of GG, which I prefer to that of H because of its greater objectivity (despite the irregular way in which it was produced), was nuanced. He told me that “clearly from [the board’s] perspective, we would rather not have to do anything … it is the status quo … that is very much what we are trying to propose as the ultimate.” However, he also stated that “as long as it is very easily explainable that ultimately there is no ability for W to do anything except what H does, then fundamentally the board would have less of an issue.”

Fortunately, there are recognised protective measures that will be easily explainable, even to retail investors, and that will minimise the risk of transfer. It would be unrealistic to expect there to be no risk, but effective ‘drag and tag’ provisions provide considerable and conventional protection. In coming to a fair outcome for H and W, I must balance whatever risk remains against the advantages for W of receiving the shares in specie now. Further, I will be striking that balance in the knowledge that W has no interest at all in doing anything to destabilise the company or undermine H’s position in it, because to do so would put her at a considerable financial disadvantage that she can ill afford.

I do not accept H’s case that the advantage to W of her proposal is largely illusory because of the drag and tag provisions. Outright ownership brings with it a level of certainty and autonomy, even when curtailed by the drag and tag provisions, that his proposal cannot provide. For example, with outright ownership, although she may not sell shares earlier than he decides to sell, she can sell at a later time of her choosing, an option not available to her if he retains the legal ownership of the shares. This may be significant given that she is seven years younger than him, so he reaches retirement age sooner.

Furthermore, although the drag and tag provisions are not without complexity, H’s proposal is based upon an even more complex and uncertain combination of deferred lump sums, an indefinite adjournment of W’s claim for pension sharing, maintenance of claims under the Inheritance Act 1975, undertakings regarding his testamentary intentions/estate planning, undertakings regarding his future domicile/re-marriage, undertakings in relation to receiving non-cash consideration for his shares, undertakings regarding future taxation, the possible requirement for insurance that may not be available, regular, ongoing disclosure, etc. This approach maintains an inextricable link between the parties, with every prospect of future tension, dispute and more litigation.

It follows, therefore, that I prefer W’s solution to the division of the BB shareholding so that I shall order a transfer to her of 50% of the shares held personally by H, and a pension sharing order for her of 50% of the BB shares in the SSAS.

The necessary drag and tag provisions in the form of undertakings from W have been going to and fro between the parties, the latest version of which was provided to me after the hearing following input from BB. If that version is not agreed, I shall receive short submissions on the items in dispute that I will resolve when approving the draft order in due course.

As for the other assets in the SSAS, if I were to endorse the parties’ agreement for them to remain with H, the balancing lump sum that would be required to reflect the equal division that I have determined is fair would leave H with insufficient liquid assets. Therefore, the remainder of the SSAS shall also be subject to a pension sharing order of 50% for W, in the knowledge that a mechanism for achieving this has been set out in the email from H’s junior counsel on 13 November 2025.

In my judgment, fairness dictates not only an equal division overall of the parties’ wealth but as far as possible, an equal division of each class of asset that makes up that wealth. That is broadly the approach that I have taken in this case and in my judgment, there is no good reason for abandoning it when it comes to the SIPP.

The care homes held within the SIPP came from W when she no longer wished to manage them. EE assumed their management and her company took leases of the properties. Unfortunately, rental payments have been missed so that debt has accumulated in the SIPP in the sum of approximately £500,000. To a certain extent, each party has sought to blame the other for the accumulation of debt. I am not assisted by resolving that dispute. It seems to me that once the care homes were placed in the SIPP and an arrangement was entered into with EE to maintain the business, neither party took very much interest in them or the subsequent accumulation of debt, despite being aware of it to a greater or lesser extent.

In these circumstances, there is no good reason for leaving the SIPP entirely in H’s name so that W would receive a cash lump sum in exchange for her share. I shall therefore make a pension sharing order for W to receive 50% of the SIPP, in the knowledge that the expert evidence is that the likely mechanism for this to be achieved is by forfeiting the leases, writing-off the debt, and selling the properties/business.

W shall take responsibility for the joint Caribbean credit account and the liabilities there, as set out on the net effect schedule. The remaining joint assets, namely the joint bank accounts, and membership of a private members club in London, shall be divided equally between the parties as agreed.

Once the above orders have been made and the parties’ assets held in their sole names are taken into account, an equal division is enabled by H paying a lump sum to W, calculated at £2,715,992. He has the liquid resources to enable him to do this, and I so order.

Following the circulation of this judgment in draft, it was advanced on H’s behalf that further adjustment would need to be made to this figure to reflect expenditure by each party from their interim distribution, as agreed at paragraph 19 of the order dated 16 April 2025. Although the issue was advertised in the opening note of Ms Bangay KC and Ms Howitt, it was not then pursued during the hearing or in closing, nor has any such proposed adjustment been quantified by them. In my judgment, it is now too late to attempt to chip away at the award by seeking to resurrect this issue at this stage in the proceedings.

Although this did not loom particularly large in the parties’ evidence or submissions, nevertheless there is a live dispute between the parties as to the quantum of child periodical payments for the parties’ 17-year-old daughter to be paid by H. W contends for £50,000 per year; H responds with £25,000 per year.

There is no doubt that the parties’ daughter will have become used to her parents’ generous lifestyle, particularly over the last 10 years or so. She attends an expensive international boarding school where she will have become used to mixing with children from families of great wealth. Nevertheless, a budget for her of over £100,000 per year, net of school fees, is plainly excessive. As an example, I think W’s original schedule suggested £51,000 per year for food for the parties' daughter, whether eating out or at home.

Doing the best I can in the round, in my judgment a budget of £65,000 per year is more realistic and still generous, to which the parties shall contribute equally. The quantum of child periodical payments to be paid by H shall therefore be £32,500 per year.

Following circulation of this judgment in draft, Mr Webster KC and Mr Wooldridge adverted to further items relating to the parties’ daughter about which I had not heard argument during the final hearing. If disagreement prevails when in due course the draft order is submitted for my approval, I shall consider then how they should be addressed.

For the reasons given above, in my judgment this combination of orders strikes the right balance between the parties so as to achieve a fair and just outcome at the end of their marital partnership. I now invite those representing the parties to submit a draft order giving effect to this judgment. I am content that they should do so on or before 9 March 2026 as they have requested.