SB (A Child) (Alienating Behaviour: Application to Reopen Findings), Re

By a judgment dated 14 December 2020 (“the December 2020 judgment”), HHJ Mitchell (“the judge”) sitting in the Family Court at Middlesbrough found that the mother of SB, a girl then still at primary school, had alienated her against her father, in the course of long-running private law proceedings in which the father was the applicant. The judge made an order transferring SB to the father’s care with immediate effect. Until that point, SB had resisted contact with her father and did not want to see him.

The mother now applies under Part 18 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 for the findings reached by the judge to be set aside. The application is brought pursuant to Re Y (Experts and Alienating Behaviour: The Modern Approach) [2026] EWFC 38, in which Sir Andrew McFarlane considered the approach that should be taken to allegations of “parental alienation” in light of what is now accepted to be the correct approach to determining such issues. That includes situations where, as here, findings had been reached prior to the legal principles being settled. The “modern approach” to alienating behaviour is based on the Family Justice Council’s guidance entitled Family Justice Council Guidance on responding to a child's unexplained reluctance, resistance or refusal to spend time with a parent and allegations of alienating behaviour (“the FJC Guidance”).

SB, now in her teenage years, remains living with her father, and has only indirect contact with the mother. She is, I am told, thriving in his care. Life has moved on for SB considerably since the previous proceedings. From being in primary school when the earlier proceedings commenced, she has reached a milestone point in her education, has a boyfriend, and is looking forward to the next stage of her life. These proceedings have, unfortunately but not surprisingly, been a somewhat unsettling development for her.

The principal controversial issues in this judgment are:

The judge’s final order required all future applications relating to SB to be brought in the Family Court at Newcastle upon Tyne. That, combined with the fact that the judge has since retired, led to me hearing this application sitting in Newcastle. Pursuant to Re Y, I do so sitting at High Court level.

The interests of SB are now represented by a different guardian to the earlier proceedings. The current guardian is Sophie Pollard.

I heard the Part 18 application at a hearing on 8 July 2026. Ms Wiseman, Ms Ismail and those instructing them on behalf of the mother appeared pro bono. I record my gratitude to them for doing so, and thank all advocates in the case for their considerable assistance and the quality of their submissions.

Ms Wiseman submits that, at its heart, this application is about SB. It is about correcting the narrative that she was wrongly given by professionals working with her at the time, and (through no fault of the judge’s own) endorsed by the judge in applying the then-applicable, now discredited methodology.

Accordingly, the mother makes this application on the basis that the approach taken by the judge was inconsistent with what is now accepted to be the established approach to determining allegations of parental alienation. It is the mother’s case that, since it is now accepted that “parental alienation” is not a symptom that is capable of being diagnosed, but rather a process of manipulation of a child perpetrated by one parent against the other through alienating behaviour, the approach taken by the judge cannot now be sustained.

Ms Wiseman invites me to re-determine the admissibility of two reports (or sets of reports) admitted and relied upon by the judge in the earlier proceedings.

The first set of reports were those submitted by the Children’s Guardian at the time, Ms J. Dean. Ms Dean opined in her report dated 13 June 2020 that SB’s behaviour “aligned with a child who has been exposed to alienating behaviours”. In her analysis dated 4 November 2020, Ms Dean again referred to the “alienating behaviours” displayed by the mother.

The second set of reports were authored by Dr J. Matthews, a HCPC Registered and BPS Chartered Forensic Psychologist. Dr Matthews was appointed by the judge as a Part 25 expert to conduct full psychological assessments of each parent and of SB, and to address other matters including any psychological factors that may have affected each parent’s ability to parent the child, and to support her to spend time with the other parent. Dr Matthews was also instructed to address “barriers or other factors” surrounding the mother’s ability to support SB spending time or living with the father.

In her first report dated 18 August 2020, Dr Matthews expressed concerns that the mother may have been alienating SB from the father. In an addendum report dated 20 September 2020, Dr Matthews maintained that there was evidence of parental alienation (see para 4.1), and that she had (para. 7.2) considered “research” which addressed a number of characteristics related to the behaviour of alienating parents and the alienating child. I will return to that discussion in due course.

I will address the detail of Ms Wiseman’s submissions in the course of my substantive analysis, below. Simply put, she contends that the findings reached by the judge should be set aside on the basis that they do not conform with the approach that Re Y contends should now be taken. That will enable direct work to take place with SB which can begin to correct the flawed understanding she has of her mother’s prior conduct, and in turn may go some way to enabling SB’s relationship with her mother to be restored.

The father’s primary position is that he is concerned for the impact on SB of these proceedings. He is sceptical of the purpose of this exercise, although understands why the mother may wish to “clear her name”. He adopted a neutral position in relation to whether the court should grant the Part 18 application to set the judge’s findings aside.

The father stressed the difficult time that it had been for both parents when the previous litigation was conducted. Findings were made against each of them, he observed, but the overall conclusions were ultimately a matter for the previous judge. He questions the utility of reopening these issues nearly 6 years after they were first determined.

The Guardian, Ms Pollard, essentially adopts a neutral position in relation to this application. She considers that the approach of Ms Dean, Dr Matthews and the judge, may “require scrutiny” in light of the modern approach to determining the presence of alienating behaviour, and instead focuses on SB’s welfare needs, in light of the passage of time and the contemporary child arrangements for her care.

The earlier proceedings were complex. The summary that follows is necessarily brief, and restricted to the essential features of the chronology necessary to determine and give reasons for my decision on this application.

The parents’ relationship ended in 2015. An application was made by the mother for a child arrangements order, and a shared care arrangement was made by a District Judge in September 2015 (“the 2015 order”).

In August 2019, the father applied to vary the 2015 order, following a decision by the mother, in June 2019, to restrict the father’s access to SB. SB had reported that the father had pushed her head into a pillow, and driven fast with her in the car when she was not wearing a seatbelt. The mother made a referral to the police and the relevant local authority, which recommended that further assessment was required under the auspices of a Child in Need Plan. SB indicated some reluctance to spend time with the father during one of the assessments. The mother subsequently reported the father to the police for harassment, and declined to engage in direct contact with him. The mother later made allegations of domestic abuse against the father, and continued to oppose direct contact with SB.

The application in the earlier proceedings was brought in Newcastle but was transferred to the Family Court sitting at Middlesbrough for reasons I need not go into. A fact-finding hearing took place before HHJ Mitchell on 17 and 18 June 2020 to address the pillow and the seatbelt allegations referred to above.

The judge delivered the fact-finding judgment on 24 June 2020 (“the June 2020 judgment”). The version I have been provided with does not feature paragraph numbers.

As to the pillow incident, the father had accepted pushing SB’s head into the pillow, but maintained that he did so “just to say, ‘get to sleep’ in a meaningful way”. The judge did not find the father’s explanation “wholly convincing”. She found that the father had pushed SB’s head into the pillow when she was being naughty during a sleepover despite having no need to do so, and in so doing therefore using excessive force. The judge found that the father had not caused SB to bang her head on a chest of drawers, as the mother had alleged SB had told her.

In relation to the seatbelt incident, the judge found that the father had pulled away in his car before SB had fastened her seatbelt. He did not know that she did not have her seatbelt on, but should have checked before setting off. He pulled over as soon as he realised. This was careless but not intentional. The incident scared SB and she needed time to calm down afterwards.

The judge explained that the father and SB had spent some time holidaying out of the UK shortly after the pillow incident. There were pictures of what appeared to be a fun and enjoyable holiday, and SB had made no complaint to anyone about that holiday, the judge said. SB continued to spend approximately half of her time with her father until she spoke about these two incidents on 2 June. As to that, the judge said:

“That indicates to me that the two incidents were not major events or problems as far as SB was concerned.”

The judge concluded that these findings were not reasons why SB should not spend time with her father, especially since he had indicated his willingness to undertake a parenting course. Since the incidents had occurred in the context of SB misbehaving, the father could benefit from objective professional advice on dealing with such situations, the judge said.

In the course of the June 2020 judgment, the judge made a number of observations about the conduct of the parents. The mother appears to have interviewed SB about those allegations, making a video of the “interview”. The judge said that she was troubled greatly by the mother having done so, partly due to the intonation and emphases she adopted when putting questions to SB which (on the judge’s findings) implied that the father had done something wrong. The manner in which the questions were put to SB introduced to SB the concept of being scared, and had set the tone for the conversation, the judge found. That led SB to express fear of the father. The judge observed that the answers given by SB did not “sound like a little girl who herself does not want to see [her father] any more”. By mid-June 2020, the judge observed, SB was still reporting that she wanted to see the father. SB disclosed to the local authority that she wanted to see the father, and said nothing about being scared of him.

While the father was careless in the seatbelt incident, and should not have pushed SB’s head into the pillow when she was being naughty during a sleepover, SB herself had not displayed any signs of not wanting to spend time with her father as a result. Indeed, shortly after the sleepover/pillow incident, SB had accompanied the father on a family holiday, which was reportedly a happy time. The judge found that the pillow incident was not a basis to restrict the father’s contact with SB.

One aspect of the pillow allegation had been that SB banged her head on a nearby chest of drawers as a result; the judge found that had not happened, and in so doing observed that that amounted to a finding that it had not taken place, pursuant to Re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35. That is significant because the allegation came indirectly from SB in the form of an account that she is said to have given to her mother.

The judge observed that, at the time of the fact-finding hearing, the mother was “already very pre-disposed to find aspects of F’s parenting and care of SB problematic and seek to change them.” The judge went on to explain that:

“I find that there is a real risk that SB has been led into saying things which are not entirely accurate and/or that M’s account is not entirely accurate because of the approach that she had to what she was hearing.

SB and M have both spoken to professionals about these matters subsequently. There are consistent aspects to what has been said, but also differences. I find there is also a real risk that SB has, over time, been influenced in what she says by her mother and the mother’s version of this original conversation.”

Following the June 2020 judgment, a number of clarifications were sought from the judge, including a clarification of a subsequent case management decision not to conduct a finding of fact hearing into allegations made by the mother against the father.

Ms Dean’s first report is dated 23 February 2020. It is described as a “Child Contact Intervention” and was directed by the court on 8 January 2020. By this time, SB was having supervised contact with the father at a contact centre. It records significantly contrasting views of each parent about the ability and attitude of the other, and summarised direct work undertaken with SB. It concluded that SB had been exposed to considerable parental conflict. At para. 40, the report said:

“As explored with both parents, there is evidence to suggest SB has been exposed to some alienating behaviours by her mother, in contrast, if the mother’s allegations are true, SB could be displaying a justified reaction to her father's behaviours towards her.”

Ms Dean reported again on 8 April 2020. This report could not be completed fully due to Covid-19 restrictions coming into force. It was compiled on the basis of Ms Dean’s notes of her prior observations of SB and her parents while attending supervised contact sessions, and through speaking to the contact supervisors. Ms Dean noted that at one contact session, SB appeared to become dysregulated at the prospect of spending time with her father. The mother, Ms Dean noted, was “ineffective” in her response to SB’s behaviour. Ms Dean offered contrasting definitions of an “abused child” and an “alienated child” (page 6), and went on to address some of the characteristics of each. SB appeared to have extreme views of the parents, Ms Dean noted; with very positive views about the mother, and very negative views about the father (page 7). Ms Dean noted that directions had been given for an expert witness and observed that “any expert is most definitely going to be assisted by a factual matrix…”

The next report of Ms Dean that I have been provided with is dated 13 June 2020. The Child Contact Intervention had been suspended by Cafcass the day before, as a result of the mother’s attitude and conduct at the contact sessions. Ms Dean had participated in several virtual contact sessions. She described some of SB’s negative attitude and demeanour in relation to the father when anticipating contact, and how it would change, for example when the father was admitted into the virtual waiting room with her (para. 18). Ms Dean concluded that the mother had not fully supported the intervention. The mother had taken detailed notes of the sessions, despite recordings (of any type) not being permitted. SB had also mentioned the particulars of the then forthcoming fact-finding hearing prior to contact taking place; the implication being that the mother had been the one to share this information with her, inappropriately. At para. 4 of the analysis section of the report, Ms Dean said:

“I remain concerned that SB’s rejection of her father and paternal family members are not congruent with what the mother would describe as a response to the father’s abusive behaviour towards SB and more aligned with a child who has been exposed to alienating behaviours whilst in the care of her mother: As previously stated, ‘Parental Alienation is known to be abusive towards children and causes emotional harm to children and a real threat to the well-being of a child and is attributed to human action’.”

Ms Dean filed a further report on 27 July 2020, summarising her direct work with SB to share the outcome of the June 2020 judgment. By this time, Ms Dean opined, SB’s negative attitude to her father appeared to be becoming more entrenched, and she had a distinct lack of empathy towards him.

On 23 October 2020, Ms Dean filed a further report, which had been directed as her final analysis. The report drew heavily on Dr Matthews’ reports (summarised below). At para. 29, Ms Dean said that Dr Matthews “offers a psychological perspective to the reason of SB’s rejection of her father and paternal family members.” At para. 41 Ms Dean observed that SB was a child who “may have been subjected to alienation…” She concluded that, in living with her mother, SB was in an emotionally harmful environment (para. 42). Ms Dean deployed an assessment methodology entitled, “Typical Behaviour When Alienation is a Feature”, and said that a “number of professionals” have concluded that “there are no cogent reasons why SB should not have a relationship with her father and how the mother’s behaviours are undermining that relationship…”

Dr Matthews’ first report is 55 pages long. It recites the history to the proceedings, the evolving chronology of contact between SB and the father and her attitude to him, and summarises the position of each parent and the reports of Ms Dean, in considerable detail. Dr Matthews met with each parent, and with SB, in the course of preparing the report. In the section summarising the history of the proceedings and the welfare dispute, there is a sub-heading “Parental Alienation”, which summarises some of the reasons given by SB for not wanting to see her father: this related to issues around her clothes, her hair, ear piercings, “mean things” the father and his family allegedly said, and having little to do at the father’s house. Dr Matthews summarised the following features of Ms Dean’s reports (at paras 1.48 and 1.49):

“1.48

I note that SB had engaged in direct work with Ms Dean; this included the paternal family making videos for SB, which she watched with Ms Dean. It is reported that SB responded emotionally, with positive emotions, upon seeing her grandmothers: she ‘immediately smiled broadly’, and after seeing a video of her grandfather applying make-up to her grandmother, ‘SB laughed out loud and could not contain her laugh’. However, Ms Dean noted that, upon expressing positive emotions about her paternal family, SB asked her to turn the video off and said that her grandparents were ‘horrible to me’. SB put her hand over her face after watching the video with her grandfather and looked away. She tried to hide her face from Ms Dean and said, ‘I’m not in the middle Joanna, I just want to live with my mam and not see him anymore.’ During this session, SB said that her mother had told her, ‘Mum says it’s up to me and she is much better than him … they [the paternal family] are all horrible and I am not seeing any of them.’

1.49

Ms Dean has explained her concerns regarding parental alienation; this is based on SB’s incongruent presentation when watching the videos described, which is not the expected reaction of a child who has witnessed domestic abuse. Ms Dean is also concerned because it is acknowledged that an alienated child often comes to reject the family of the alienated parent. Ms Dean has noted SB’s lack of capacity to change her views, which is consistent with the presentation of an alienated child, and SB’s extreme views of her parents, seeing her mother as all good and her father as all bad; this opinion has extended to his family members.”

At para. 6.16 of the report, having reviewed the judge’s findings in the June 2020 judgment, Dr Matthews said, with emphasis added:

“In my opinion, the mother has subsequently influenced SB in regards to the ‘pillow’ and ‘car seat’ incidents, and her wider views and feelings about him [the father] as a result.”

The mother is then recorded as having said that “she could not be alienating SB from her father as SB is responding to having been abused.” As to that, Dr Matthews said:

“…this is not the view of the court, nor the other professionals who have provided professional opinions in regards to this case. All professionals have recommended that SB spent time with her father. On this basis I have concerns that the mother is alienating SB from her father. Parental alienation causes emotional harm to a child therefore there are concerns about the mother’s ability to parent SB and to enable her to spend time with her father.” (Emphasis added)

At para. 6.17, Dr Matthews defined the term “parental alienation” as follows:

“6.17

Parental alienation is the unwarranted or illogical rejection of a parent by a child, where there was previously a normal, warm, loving relationship. It most often occurs in highly conflicted relationship break-ups and is the result of intentional or unintentional actions, most usually by a parent. The rejection of one parent is often the only ostensible solution for a distressed child who is unable to deal with the hostility and conflict between parents. When one parent influences the child against the other the child is faced with the cognitive dissonance arising from the imbalance between their own experience of their parent and external messages given by the other (influencing) parent. A child feels compelled to choose between one parent and the other in order to minimise their distress and maintain stability and a sense of some security by having an 'alliance' with the 'alienating' parent. This manifests itself in 'splitting', whereby the child views one parent as all good, and the other as all bad.”

At para. 6.45, Dr Matthews addressed the ability of each parent to meet SB’s needs. She said:

“I have provided my opinion that SB has been alienated from her father by her mother. However, this is a matter for the court to take a view on.” (Emphasis added)

At para. 6.46 the report continued:

“If the court’s view is that SB has been alienated by her mother against her father, review of the literature in regards to the alienation of a parent shows that action is required as waiting for ‘spontaneous resolution’ or leaving the child with the alienating parent was found to exacerbate the alienation…”

Dr Matthews went on to summarise various propositions about alienated children derived from a number of academic sources, and addressed the steps that should be taken in order to provide the treatment that would be necessary to achieve a degree of resolution. The propositions relied on by Dr Matthews included the need for custody arrangements to change such that the child should move to live with the “alienated” parent, and separating the child from the “alienating” parent “was not found to be harmful to the child though some transient distress may be experienced.” The report concluded (para. 6.47) that the father had been rejected by SB due to the influence of the mother, and that SB should move to living with the father full-time, accompanied by a short period no contact between SB and the mother.

For present purposes, the operative conclusion of the report is at para. 6.64:

“I have provided my opinion that SB has been influenced by her mother against her father and I have provided recommendations to the court if this is the court’s view.” (Emphasis added)

In her addendum report dated 20 September 2020, Dr Matthews was asked to address the possibility of causes other than parental alienation for SB’s attitude to the father. Dr Matthews said that she had considered the incidents that SB had referred to previously, mismatched parenting styles, whether SB preferred the mother’s style to the father, or whether she was lonely or misunderstood in the father’s care. In response (para. 4.1), Dr Matthews said that her conclusion was “based on the assessment as a whole… there is evidence of parental alienation which provides an explanation for the issues being considered.”

At para. 7.2 - 3 of her addendum report, Dr Matthews stated:

“7.2

As described in the assessment report Parental Alienation is the term given to a psychological process which occurs when a child is influenced by one parent (or care giver) against the other where previously a warm, ‘normal’ parental relationship existed. Research has identified a number of characteristics which relate to the behaviour of alienating parents and the alienated child. There has been discussion as to whether this psychological process should be considered a ‘mental disorder’ of the child, which would lead to a diagnostic criteria. There have been discussions about incorporating Parental Alienation in to the International Classification of Diseases – Version 11 (ICD-11, World Health organisation), and how it would fit in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual – 5 (DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association, 2013). However, there are strong views (which I agree with) that the psychological process which is identified and acknowledged is not indicative of a mental disorder within a child, but of a process of adjustment of the child’s views, attitudes and feelings about the rejected parent which is necessary to align themselves with the alienating parent in order to maintain stability and security within the child’s life and functioning.

7.3

Parental Alienation is best understood as a psychological process which can be assessed by a qualified and experienced clinician who is familiar with the research in regards to Parental Alienation. The views and behaviours of the child and the parents must all be considered in coming to a conclusion. In order for Parental Alienation to be confirmed assessment must (a) Identify that the psychological process of splitting has occurred within the child, (b) the reasons for this process occurring.”

These reports were available to the judge at a welfare hearing which took place in November 2020, pursuant to which the judge delivered her reserved judgment on 14 December that year.

This is the judgment which lies at the heart of this Part 18 application.

The judge heard evidence from both parents, Dr Matthews, Ms Dean, and considered the reports of Dr Matthews. Written closing submissions were directed.

Early in the judgment (para. 12) the judge summarised the view of Dr Matthews as being that “SB has been alienated from her father by her mother…” and went on to quote Dr Matthews’ definition of parental alienation which I have quoted at para. 40, above. She directed herself as to the law, citing Re S (Parental Alienation: Cult) [2020] EWCA Civ 568 as providing the approach that she should take to determining issues of parental alienation. As to the impact of Re S, the judge directed herself that, it “makes clear that the court must establish the facts first.”

The judge identified the following issues to be determined, at para. 22:

“The issues in this case, it seems to me, boil down to: does the father present such risk to SB that it should impact on whether, or how, he can see her? Has the mother alienated SB against the father? Are the mother's allegations against the father valid, or are they a false defence she raises against the alienation allegation made against her? Or, is it all the other way around, with the father raising a false defence against the mother's allegations against him? Or possibly does the truth lie somewhere in between? Having established the facts, I must consider SB’s welfare in the light of my findings.”

There was a schedule of allegations the judge was invited to determine. She accepted some of the allegations but not others. She made findings against the father about an argument between the parents in 2018, after they had split up, while the father was staying in her home for a temporary period. She found that the father used some harsh words when speaking to SB about a dog. These were minor incidents, she said.

The judge found that the father swore at the mother when she visited his home on an occasion in 2018, and that he swore at her via text message. SB would have known about these harsh words. The judge also found that it was unlikely that the pillow and seatbelt incidents were the only times that the father had shouted at SB, and that he had been irritable and abrupt with her on another occasion. The judge declined to find that the father had been aggressive at a GP appointment in 2019, and declined to find that the father had told SB that she had spoiled his birthday following an argument about a toy. The judge found that certain messages exchanged between the father and the mother, which had used sexually derogatory language, had not caused offence, and that the mother had replied in kind. There were other remarks that the father had made to the mother which the mother had contended was transphobic, particularly in relation to guests to her home in the presence of SB, but in relation to which the judge was not satisfied they were so. The judge made other findings which it is not necessary to set out here.

The issue of alienation was covered at paras 53 and following. The approach of the judge was to consider specific factual allegations relied upon by the father against the mother. These included the mother refusing to accompany SB to spend time with her father, failing to address SB’s reluctance to engage with her father at a supervised contact session and taking minimal steps to reassure her. The judge found (para. 55) that the mother had sent a clear message to SB by not taking her to see her father in early March 2020, consciously failed to pass on gifts provided by the father, or failed to encourage SB to look favourably on gifts provided by the father. This conduct, the judge found, demonstrated that the mother thought that the father’s gifts for SB were not important: see para. 59. The judge accepted Dr Matthews’ characterisation of this conduct as “a rejection” and “a negative message”. At para. 60, the judge found that the mother abdicated her role to encourage SB to engage positively with the father, and accepted, and even wanted, SB’s behaviour to deteriorate in or in anticipation of the Father’s presence. At para. 61, the judge found that the mother had permitted SB to write rude and curt letters to the father, and in so doing demonstrated to SB that it was acceptable to speak to the father in those terms. The judge adopted Dr Matthews’ characterisation of the situation, and found that it changed the dynamic between SB and the father, leading to SB seeing herself as being in authority over him. There were other steps the mother had failed to take in order to encourage SB to relate positively to her father, such as by allowing SB not to thank the father for sending her photographs of dogs, one of her favourite animals.

At para. 64 the judge continued:

“I find that the mother has behaved as described by the contact workers, and the children's guardian in the above examples and evidence – largely, in fact, not disputed by the mother. The issue is the interpretation to be put on that behaviour.”

At para. 65, the judge found that the mother’s view of the father was “extremely negative.” She had made allegations against the father in relation to his mental health and drug use, “and has kept going back to those matters despite my earlier decisions. In my view, she has raised those matters in an effort to portray him in a negative light.” As to the way the mother had described the father to Dr Matthews:

“Dr Matthews felt she [the mother] was describing someone with significant personality difficulties, which is not what Dr Matthews found in her own examination of the father. This is the picture the mother has presented to the court, and the picture she asks the court to find about the father.”

At para. 65, the judge said that it was “highly unlikely” that the mother was able to hide her views and feelings about the father from SB. In turn, that would influence SB’s own view of her father. The mother would have spoken to SB in negative terms, portraying him as being unreliable.

In relation to the seatbelt and pillow incidents which were the subject of the June 2020 judgment, the judge noted that the mother was unable to help SB move on from those issues. The mother continued to refer to SB’s perception of those incidents as being more serious than the judge had found them to be in that judgment. She added:

“it appears [the mother] is not willing to take on the adult parental role, and tell SB not to worry about this, and to help SB move on.”

Against the background of those findings of fact, the judge said, at para. 68:

“Having considered the factual matrix in terms of the behaviour of each of the parents, I must now consider how this behaviour factors into the current situation of SB refusing to see her father, so I am going to consider Dr Matthew's evidence.”

The judge then went on to summarise the evidence of Dr Matthews, as contained in her reports and given orally. She summarised the evidence of Dr Matthews in the following terms, at para. 74:

“Dr Matthews' opinion and advice to the court is that severe parental alienation has occurred in this case, and SB has experienced the process of splitting, that is being compelled to choose one parent against the other in order to minimise her distress and maintain stability and security by having an alliance with the alienating parent…

She recommends that SB moves to live with the father, and that after that move there should be a short period of no contact to the mother, and that there should be systemic family therapy for this family.”

At para. 75 the judge said, “Having considered the expert evidence in this case, I ask myself: what is the cause of SB’s rejection of her father?” The judge found that SB’s rejection of the father went beyond a mere preference for one parent over the other. SB had obliterated the many good memories she had of happy times with her father for no reason, and her position had become “completely one sided” and was emotionally unhealthy.

At para. 81, the judge held:

“On the balance of probabilities I find that this behaviour by the mother, for example letting SB write the curt letters to the father, has influenced SB against her father, as Dr Matthews has advised is the case, and as the children’s guardian outlined above. I accept the evidence of Dr Matthews, and I accept her assessment of the mother’s behaviour as outlined above… The negative attitude and influence at home has continued. The mother is unable to contain her negative feelings about the father, the strength of them was clear during this hearing.”

The judge’s global finding on the issue of alienation was at para. 82:

“My finding is that SB’s rejection of the father has been caused by the mother, or to use the CAFCASS definition, as used in the case Re S (Parental Alienation: Cult) [2020] EWCA Civ 568, SB’s resistance, or hostility towards her father, is not justified, and is the result of psychological manipulation by the mother. This behaviour is abusive and protective action must be considered.”

The judge conducted a welfare evaluation which concluded with an order for an immediate change of residence for SB from the mother to the father, with a period of two weeks of no contact between SB and the mother.

These are the findings that the mother now seeks to set aside.

I will summarise the parties’ submissions briefly. I have considered the entirety of all submissions.

On behalf of the mother, Ms Wiseman’s submissions are twofold. First, she submits that I should retrospectively deem the reports of Ms Dean and Dr Matthews to be inadmissible. This submission is made by reference to the established principles concerning the admissibility of expert evidence, pursuant to Kennedy v Cordia Services Ltd [2016] UKSC 6 and Re H (Children: Expertise of Witness) [2026] EWCA Civ 249. The ‘modern approach’ to parental alienation is inconsistent with the judge’s decisions to admit, and rely upon, this evidence, and should be revisited by this court, Ms Wiseman submits.

Ms Wiseman also submitted that Dr Matthews does not fall under the guidance given in Re Y because, in notable contrast to the expert in those proceedings, Dr Matthews is a registered and regulated psychologist. This, submitted Ms Wiseman, “permits professionals with her profile to continue to provide expert views based on de-bunked unreliable pseudo-scientific literature to not only continue to identify ‘parental alienation’ but also unevidenced remedies in terms of interventions” (see para. 20 of Ms Wiseman’s first skeleton argument).

The thrust of Ms Wiseman’s criticism of Dr Matthews’ reports and evidence is that they pre-dated full judicial findings of fact being reached. Dr Matthews’ appointment should only have been made once the factual matrix had been determined, Ms Wiseman submits. Similar criticisms are made of Ms Dean.

Ms Wiseman submitted that this court may not be able properly to determine whether the opinion evidence previously admitted in these proceedings is admissible without fresh expert opinion “based on a reliable body of knowledge”. I refused an application for a Part 25 expert at an earlier hearing.

The second limb of Ms Wiseman’s submissions contends that I should set aside the findings reached by the judge pursuant to the ‘modern approach’ in Re Y. Ms Wiseman scrutinised many aspects of Dr Matthews’ evidence, contending that her reasoning and methodology cannot stand in light of the Re Y approach. In her submission, a recurring theme of Dr Matthews’ analysis was purported findings of fact on disputed issues that only the court was competent to determine. In turn, the approach of the judge was flawed. Although the judge purported to preface her analysis with a self-direction that it was the role of the court to reach findings of fact first, in reality the judge relied upon flawed expert evidence to determine disputed factual matters that should have been the sole preserve of the court.

For the father and the guardian, their submissions were essentially as summarised at paragraphs 15 to 17, above.

It is well established that the Family Court enjoys the ability to reopen previous findings of fact. In Re CTD (A Child: Rehearing), Peter Jackson LJ held that the court is to proceed in three stages:

“(1)

It asks whether the applicant has shown that there are solid grounds for believing that the previous findings require revisiting.

(2)

If that hurdle is overcome, it decides how the rehearing is to be conducted.

(3)

It rehears the matter and determines the issues.”

As to the first stage, further guidance may be found in Re E (Children: Reopening Findings of Fact) at paras 28 to 34, endorsing the decision of Hale J (as she then was) in Re B (Children Act Proceedings: Issue Estoppel) [1997] Fam 117. At para 128, Hale J held:

“(1)

The court will wish to balance the underlying considerations of public policy, (a) that there is a public interest in an end to litigation – the resources of the court and everyone involved in these proceedings are already severely stretched and should not be employed in deciding the same matter twice unless there is good reason to do so; (b) that any delay in determining the outcome of the case is likely to be prejudicial to the welfare of the individual child; but (c) that the welfare of any child is unlikely to be served by relying upon determinations of fact which turn out to have been erroneous; and (d) the court's discretion, like the rules of issue estoppel, as pointed out by Lord Upjohn in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No.2) [1967] 1 AC 853, 947, "must be applied so as to work justice and not injustice."

(2)

The court may well wish to consider the importance of the previous findings in the context of the current proceedings. If they are so important that they are bound to affect the outcome one way or another, the court may be more willing to consider a rehearing than if they are of lesser or peripheral significant.

(3)

Above all, the court is bound to want to consider whether there is any reason to think that a rehearing of the issue will result in any different finding from that in the earlier trial. By this I mean something more than the mere fact that different judges might on occasions reach different conclusion upon the same evidence. No doubt we would all be reluctant to allow a matter to be relitigated on that basis alone. The court will want to know (a) whether the previous findings were the result of a full hearing in which the person concerned took part and the evidence was tested in the usual way; (b) if so, whether there is any ground upon which the accuracy of the previous finding could have been attacked at the time, and why therefore there was no appeal at the time; and (c) whether there is any new evidence or information casting doubt upon the accuracy of the original findings.”

Where the court is determining an application to reopen findings of fact, it is not sitting as an appeal court. The purpose of the exercise is to determine whether there are “solid grounds” to revisit a finding of fact previously reached. This doctrine is a facet of the ability recognised in many areas of law to revisit findings of fact where there is fresh evidence, or a sound basis to revisit an earlier finding, absent an error of law infecting the original decision.

Paragraph 10 of the FJC Guidance provides:

“A court would therefore need to be satisfied that three elements are established before it could conclude that Alienating Behaviours had occurred:

i)

the child is reluctant, resisting or refusing to engage in, a relationship with a parent or carer; and

ii)

the reluctance, resistance or refusal is not consequent on the actions of that parent towards the child or the other parent, which may therefore be an appropriate justified rejection by the child ('AJR'), or is not caused by any other factor such as the child's alignment, affinity or attachment ('AAA'); and

iii)

the other parent has engaged in behaviours that have directly or indirectly impacted on the child, leading to the child's reluctance, resistance or refusal to engage in a relationship with that parent.”

As to the child’s “alignment, affinity or attachment”, the Glossary to the guidance provides:

“Attachment, affinity and alignment ('AAA') - reasons why children may favour one parent over another, or reject a parent, which are typical emotional responses to parenting experiences and not the result of psychological manipulation by a parent.”

Para. 18 states:

“Given the relative impact of domestic abuse, the harms that flow from it and the importance of protecting children, Alienating Behaviours will not be found in cases where findings of domestic abuse are made which have resulted in a child's appropriate justified rejection (AJR), or in protective behaviours (PB) or a traumatic response on the part of the victim parent.”

And finally, para. 44 states:

“Children who show reluctance, resistance or refusal to maintain or build a relationship with a parent who has been abusive towards them or towards the other parent, may be found to have a justified response to that parent. The allegation of Alienating Behaviour will thus fail.”

Re Y summarises the “modern approach” in the following seven steps:

“i)

As the full title to the FJC guidance makes plain, the reason for the court's investigation should be 'a child's unexplained reluctance, resistance or refusal to spend time with a parent', rather than the allegations that one or other parent may be making against the other;

ii)

Where a child is reluctant, resisting or refusing to engage in a relationship with a parent or carer (element (i) of the three elements in paragraph 10 of the guidance), then the court's focus will move to element (ii) to consider whether that reluctance, resistance or refusal is a consequence of the action of the estranged parent, where it is alleged that that parent has been abusive to the child and/or caring parent;

iii)

If it is found that the estranged parent has not behaved in a way in which the child's reaction can be seen as an 'appropriate justified reaction' [AJR] to such behaviour, or, for other reasons, it is found that the child's reaction is not caused by any factor such as a child's ordinary alignment, affinity or attachment [AAA] to the parent with care, then the court will move on to element (iii);

iv)

It is only at the stage of element (iii) that the court will focus on whether the caring parent has engaged in alienating behaviours that have directly or indirectly impacted on the child, leading to the child's reluctance, resistance or refusal to engage with the estranged parent.

v)

Thus, where domestic abuse is alleged, and there is a cross-allegation of alienating behaviour, if a fact-finding process is required, the focus of the fact-finding must be to first determine the issues of domestic abuse and secondly to consider whether the child's refusal to engage with the estranged parent is an 'appropriate justified reaction' to any abusive behaviour, or that what has occurred is the result of protective behaviour or a traumatic response on the part of the victim parent.

vi)

Courts should not follow the route adopted by the judges in O v C and the present case in determining the issue of alienating behaviour on its own and without determining the underlying facts and, where it is alleged, the primary issue of domestic abuse;

vii)

Courts should not appoint an expert to advise in cases where a child is reluctant, resistant or refusing to engage with a parent unless and until there is clarity and, if necessary, facts that have been found, as to the parents' past behaviour towards each other and the child and, if domestic abuse is proved, whether the child's reaction to that behaviour is an appropriate one.

At the outset, it is important to recall what this application is, and what it is not. It is not an appeal. The task before me is to determine, in the first instance, whether there are “solid grounds for believing that the previous findings require revisiting…” (Re CTD, at para. 2, per Peter Jackson LJ). The focus of this application therefore lies principally in the findings reached by the judge, rather than revisiting case management or admissibility decisions taken by the judge in the course of reaching those findings. The focus on findings does not mean that this court’s focus is entirely driven by focusing on the outcomes of the previous proceedings; the evidential basis and the judge’s methodology when reaching those findings are relevant to this assessment. But it does mean that that this court should be careful not to purport to assume an appellate role in relation to what are, from an appellate perspective, unchallenged findings of fact. At its heart, a decision to set aside findings of fact reached in existing proceedings is a question of whether the court should permit the previously reached findings to be relitigated absent an error of law in the earlier decision. In Re E (Children: Reopening Findings of Fact), Peter Jackson LJ identified the enduring role of the Ladd v Marshall approach to reopening findings of fact. It is a doctrine that is based on taking proper account of post-hearing developments which may give rise to solid grounds for reopening the earlier findings, rather than a form of appeal by the back door.

As will be seen, many of Ms Wiseman’s submissions fail to engage with this distinction, and seek to invite this court to assume an appellate role that it is not constituted to assume.

Pursuant to the above observations, I consider that Ms Wiseman’s submissions inviting me to revisit the judge’s case management decisions to appoint Dr Matthews and admit her evidence to the proceedings are misplaced. As set out above, the focus of a Part 18 application to set aside findings of fact lies with the substantive findings reached by the court. Even if I were to accede to Ms Wiseman’s substantive submissions to set aside the challenged findings reached by the judge, it would be wholly improper to purport retrospectively to revisit earlier decisions taken by the judge in relation to the expert and other evidence that she relied upon.

Similar observations apply in relation to the reports of Ms Dean. More fundamentally, a guardian’s evidence is not expert evidence. See para. 2.1 of PD25B of the Family Procedure Rules 2010. As such, a guardian is not subject to the same admissibility gateways as a Part 25 expert is otherwise subject to. Accordingly, not only is a Part 18 application an inappropriate vehicle to revisit earlier expert evidence admissibility decisions taken by a judge, evidence given by a guardian is not expert evidence, but is evidence given by a party to the proceedings.

If any further clarity is needed in relation to the distinction between findings (which may be set aside pursuant to a Part 18 application), on the one hand, and admissibility decisions, on the other, I note the approach of Judd J in O v C [2025] EWFC 334. This approach was expressly endorsed by the President in Re Y: see paras 66, 75(vi). O v C was a Part 18 application to set aside findings reached consequential to a district judge’s reliance on a report by Ms Gill, the same unregulated psychologist whose evidence lay at the heart of Re Y. Judd J found that the district judge’s reliance on the evidence of Ms Gill’s purported “findings” (see para. 27) led to the judge reaching a finding that “cannot be regarded as a finding that has proper status today” (para. 29). Judd J concluded that Ms Gill’s reports did not contain findings of fact about how the parent in question had behaved, and that, consequently there were no findings to be set aside. Judd J cautioned the parties in robust terms about the need not to rely on Ms Gill’s report in the future, at para. 32:

“Accordingly that report should be left out of account by anyone going on to carry out a further assessment of the children, which includes any observation the judge made about it.”

Significantly, however, nowhere in the judgment of Judd J was there any suggestion that it would be appropriate retrospectively to redetermine the district judge’s decision to admit Ms Gill’s report. That was hardly surprising, within the confines of a Part 18 set-aside application.

As set out above, this application is not an appeal, and this court cannot and should not purport to conduct the analysis, nor exercise powers, that are the preserve of the appeal court. The first limb of the mother’s application in these proceedings is without merit; the application to redetermine the admissibility of Dr Matthews’ reports and evidence, and the evidence of Ms Dean, is refused.

In my judgment, properly understood, the judge’s approach was, in substance, sufficiently consistent with the modern approach to determining findings of alienating behaviour such that there are no solid grounds for believing that her findings require revisiting.

I accept that aspects of the approaches of Ms Dean and Dr Matthews (and indeed the judge) may indeed “require scrutiny”, to adopt Ms Pollard’s terminology, in light of the modern approach to alienating behaviour. The sequencing and structure of the judge’s analysis was not conducted pursuant to the three-stage approach required by para. 10 of the FJC guidance. Nor did the judge structure her analysis in a manner that was on all fours with the modern approach required by para. 75 of Re Y. That is hardly surprising given the judgment pre-dated the modern approach by several years.

While Dr Matthews was instructed after the judge reached her findings in the June 2020 judgment, the final welfare hearing leading to the December 2020 judgment took place as a composite hearing in which further allegations of abuse were determined. On the materials before me, it is not clear why, having directed on 2 July 2020 that there would not be any further fact-finding exercises, the December 2020 judgment reached a range of additional findings of fact on the basis of a schedule of allegations. That chronology meant that, by the time Dr Matthews was instructed, and Ms Dean had been directed to provide her final analysis, there were still relevant allegations that were yet to be the subject of judicial determination. I accept that that was at odds with the sequencing now required by the modern approach pursuant to Re Y at para. 75(iv).

The question is whether that methodology, combined with the judge’s substantive analysis, provides a sound basis to revisit her findings. I accept the submission advanced on behalf of Ms Pollard, the current guardian, that it does not follow that the contemporary guidance automatically invalidates earlier judgments and findings reached. The substantive issue for my consideration must necessarily go beyond a consideration of whether the case would now be managed and approached differently, but rather address whether the underlying reasoning and the findings reached by the judge provide the required solid grounds for those findings to be revisited. This submission reflects the requirement that there must be solid grounds to revisit existing findings of fact.

I consider that the mischief with which the modern approach required by Re Y is concerned primarily lies in ensuring that the concept of alienating behaviour is properly understood, and that any findings are founded on findings of fact reached by the court. Accordingly, the modern approach is intended to ensure that judicial findings of fact in relation to alienating behaviour are (1) reached on a proper understanding of what alienating behaviour is (namely not a psychological symptom but a process of manipulation), and (2) are reached with a proper evidential foundation.

On a fair reading of the June and December 2020 judgments, and the reports and evidence of Ms Dean and Dr Matthews, the judge’s overall conclusion was reached on the basis of findings of fact reached in circumstances which do not merit those findings being set aside. The December 2020 judgment is consistent with the factors set out in the preceding paragraph. This is for the reasons set out below.

First, the June 2020 judgment provided the foundations for the findings of fact reached by the judge in the December 2020 judgment, and for the analysis of Ms Dean and Dr Matthews conducted in the meantime. In the June 2020 judgment, the judge reached findings against the father in relation to the pillow and seatbelt incidents. In doing so, she did not simply reach binary findings about whether or not the father engaged in the conduct alleged, but also reached findings about their severity and their impact on SB. The judge found that the gravity of the incidents was not as severe as alleged by the mother, and that they formed no barrier to the father’s ongoing contact with SB: see paras 25 and 26, above.

The judge also made broader findings in the June 2020 judgment which were relevant to the later finding of parental alienation. These findings included the observations about the mother’s video-recorded ‘interview’ of SB, in which her tone of voice and intonation implied to SB that she had done something wrong, and introduced to SB the concept of being afraid of her father. That was relevant since the seatbelt and pillow incidents “were not major events or problems as far as SB was concerned…”

These findings must be read alongside the judge’s observations in the June 2020 judgment that there was a “real risk” that SB had been led into saying things that were not entirely accurate, or that the mother’s account of what SB had reported to her about the father’s conduct was itself not accurate. These were findings that the father’s conduct was not as bad as claimed by the mother, and that the mother had either led SB into making inaccurate reports against the father, or had herself inaccurately reported what SB had told her about the father.

In the December 2020 judgment itself, the judge made extensive findings of fact concerning the issue of alienation by reference to the conduct of the mother: see para. 54, above, for my summary of those findings.

Secondly, viewed through the lens of the FJC Guidance and Re Y, thesewere findings that SB’s reaction to her father did not appear to be an ‘appropriate justified reaction’ to his conduct, and that aspects of the mother’s conduct represented a real risk that SB was being manipulated against her father. While the judge may have made those observations pursuant to a lower standard of proof (real risk, rather than the balance of probabilities), nothing turns on that for present purposes. I doubt that the judge was attempting to introduce a lesser standard of proof into family proceedings. It is far more likely that she was giving an indication of her likely approach to those issues at the welfare stage, without conclusively determining them at that stage.

I also note that, although Ms Dean’s initial analysis pre-dates the June 2020 findings, its references to parental alienation were not adopted by the judge in the June 2020 judgment. This is significant because it demonstrates that, although Ms Dean had raised the prospect of SB being an “alienated child”, that was not, at this stage, a categorisation adopted by the judge – despite the judge’s findings that there was a real risk that the mother was influencing SB’s reaction to the father adversely.

Moreover, Ms Dean’s analysis did not conclude that SB was an alienated child. Rather her 8 April 2020 report posited alternative categorisations, contrasting the “abused child” with the “alienated child” (page 6). In doing so, Ms Dean reflected (at least in broad terms) the distinction the FJC Guidance would later come to adopt, whereby it is necessary to look to whether the conduct and attitude of a child is an appropriate justified reaction to an abusive parent (c.f. “the abused child”), or whether a parent has engaged in alienating behaviours (c.f. “the alienated child”).

Thirdly, on her findings of fact in the December 2020 judgment, the judge found that there had been a process of manipulation of SB by the mother, and that SB’s reaction to her father was not merited by the father’s conduct. In the modern parlance, SB’s reluctance and resistance to engage in a relationship with the father was not what is now termed “an appropriate justified rejection”, or AJR. The judge also found that complete rejection of one parent, of the sort then demonstrated by SB towards her father, “is way beyond a child having a preference for one parent over the other” (para. 80). In the contemporary terminology, this was a finding that SB’s attitude to her father was not “caused by any other factor such as the child’s alignment, affinity or attachment” (para. 10(ii), FJC Guidance). Those findings are entirely consistent with the methodology now required by the modern approach.

I also consider that the working definition of “parental alienation” offered by Dr Matthews, quoted at para. 41, above, anchors the concept of alienating behaviour to the conduct of a parent (stating it is “the result of intentional or unintentional actions most usually by a parent…”). There are, of course, significant differences between this definition and the modern approach, but I consider that the Re S definition was the operative definition applied by the judge, pursuant to her self-direction at para. 20. She said:

“The Court of Appeal in that case found it not helpful to debate labels, but makes clear that where behaviour is found to be abusive then protective action must be considered.”

It is clear from that self-direction that the judge was not concerned with labels or purportedly categorising parental alienation as a symptom. Rather she was, correctly as it now turns out, concerned with the underlying behaviour of a parent and its impact on the child.

Fourthly, I am not persuaded that the judge impermissibly substituted the views of Ms Dean or Dr Matthews for her own findings of fact. As set out above at para. 50, above, the judge expressly directed herself in the December 2020 judgment that “the court must establish the facts first…”

The analysis of Ms Dean and Dr Matthews makes clear that the ultimate arbiter of fact was the court, rather than their professional expertise. Ms Dean’s report of 8 April 2020 noted that any expert to be instructed would require the factual matrix to be determined (see para. 33, above). Para. 6.45 of Dr Matthews’ first report concluded that SB had been alienated from her father by her mother, but added, “However, this is a matter for the court to take a view on.” At para. 6.46, Dr Matthews addressed the consequences of alienating behaviour from a welfare perspective “if the court’s view is that SB has been alienated by her mother against her father…”. Dr Matthews based her own analysis primarily on her understanding and construction of the facts, without purporting to reach findings that were to bind the court without evidential foundation. Dr Matthews, as Ms Wiseman accepts, is a HCPC Registered and BPS Chartered Forensic Psychologist. This is in stark contrast to the unregistered self-declared psychologist whose analysis lay beneath the findings that were set aside in Re Y, and other published Part 18 decisions, where purported judicial findings of fact were reached on the basis of analysis conducted on an entirely incorrect footing.

To the extent the judge drew on the analysis of Ms Dean and Dr Matthews, I consider that she did so in a manner that was consistent with the findings of fact she had already reached, either in the June 2020 judgment, or in the sequencing of her analysis in the December 2020 judgment which is clearly structured on the basis of findings of fact, followed by an analysis of the matters arising from those findings. The judge did not rely on the analysis of either Ms Dean or Dr Matthews in order to reach her primary findings of fact. While the judge summarised their evidence at some length in the December 2020 judgment, her operative conclusions at paras 75 to 82 were based primarily on her findings relating to the nature and quality of the parents’ relationship with each other, and their relationships with SB.

Drawing this analysis together, when read as a whole, in light of the materials that were before the judge, I do not consider that the findings reached by the judge are such that they should now be set aside. They were, in broad terms, consistent with the modern approach that is now required in relation to determining allegations of alienating behaviour. While the threshold for granting a Part 18 application is lower than an application for permission to appeal (see O v C at para. 23, quoting Cobb J (as he then was) in Re AD & AM (Fact Finding Hearing: Application for Rehearing) [2016] EWHC 326 (Fam) at para. 14), I do not consider that even that comparatively modest threshold is met. While the mother’s application has a superficial persuasiveness to it based on a bald comparison between the judge’s approach and the Re Y methodology, when examined in further depth, the required strong grounds, or the “real reason for believing that the earlier findings require reconsideration” (per O v C at para. 14), are not present.

This conclusion is reinforced when the above analysis is considered through the prism of the factors listed by Hale J in Re B (Children Act Proceedings: Issue Estoppel) [1997] Fam 117. Bearing in mind the congruence between the operative analysis of the judge, on the one hand, and the modern approach, on the other, I consider the public interest in the finality of litigation to be significant in the circumstances of these proceedings. It is difficult to see how it could properly be said that there are “solid grounds” for revisiting the earlier findings in the circumstances of these proceedings.

For these reasons, I dismiss the mother’s Part 18 application to reopen the findings reached by the judge.

Upon circulating this judgment in draft, I sought the views of the parties about whether this judgment should be published. All parties agreed that, in principle, it should be. The mother invited me to postpone publication by a month to enable her to consider her position in relation to any onward appeal, and for my decision to be shared with SB before being published.

I decided that there was no need to delay publication on account of the prospect of an onward appeal, but accepted that SB should be told the result in age-appropriate terms before the full judgment becomes available online. To that end, I wrote to SB to explain my decision shortly after handing this judgment down, and informed the parties that I would postpone publication for seven days.

I was also invited by the mother to give directions for some form of further welfare analysis to be conducted by the guardian, and in turn the court, in relation to SB’s contact with her mother. That was resisted by the father and by Mr Dodds on behalf of the guardian.

I declined to give further directions in relation to SB’s welfare. Her welfare did not require further directions in this respect. SB has commenced remote direct contact with the mother, and both she and the father are committed, in principle, to that relationship continuing, developing and being restored. Given her age, SB’s wishes and feelings are a key factor in the onward development of her relationship with her mother, and determining questions relating to her welfare. This is a process that is being guided by her, and it is difficult to see the merit in the court seeking to direct or oversee that process, in the circumstances of this case.

In any event, in due course there will come a point when the court will not be able to make a child arrangements order absent exceptional circumstances due to SB turning sixteen (see section 9(6) of the Children Act 1989). The spectre of further proceedings hanging over SB, and the delay that that would entail, would be likely to prejudice her welfare, with little by way of any welfare ‘gains’. The no order principle contained in section 1(5) of the 1989 Act requires the court not to make an order unless it considers that doing so would be better for the child than making no order at all.

This is a case where, in light of all that has happened, it would be better for SB for the court to make no (further) order pertaining to her child arrangements, other than an order to amend the previous child arrangements orders to reflect SB’s current circumstances. That order will recite the factors set out above and will provide that contact between SB and her mother is to be determined in accordance with SB’s wishes and feelings.

That is the judgment of the court.