TH v AR & Anor (No. 2: Financial Remedies)

I am concerned with the final hearing of financial remedy proceedings brought by TH against AR. KK is AR’s father.

In this judgment I shall refer to the parties as ‘H’, ‘W’, and ‘W’s father’ respectively. This is just a convenient shorthand and no disrespect is intended.

I have previously given a judgment in relation to H’s application for an interim anti-suit injunction – published as TH v AR and KK(No. 1: Financial Remedies: Antisuit Injunction) [2026] EWFC 220. I shall adopt the same anonymisations of the parties’ assets in this judgment.

I heard the final hearing over five days from 27^th July 2026 – 31^st July 2026 (with the fifth day being used the hear the application for the interim anti-suit injunction). H was represented by Mr. Brent Molyneux KC leading Mr. Nicholas Chapman, instructed by Hall Brown LLP. H attended remotely. Neither W nor W’s father attended the final hearing.

I thank both leading and junior counsel for their assistance. I also thank their solicitors for the preparation of the case.

In advance of the final hearing I was provided with an e-bundle of 602 pages. I was subsequently provided with an e-bundle of W’s recent emails to the court of 89 pages, and a supplemental e-bundle of 245 pages. I also received a position statement and an ES2 on H’s behalf and written closing submissions likewise.

I remind myself that the burden of proof is on the party who makes a particular allegation/seeks a particular finding and the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities; no more and no less.

In this judgment I have not referred to every issue or argument raised in the written and oral evidence or in submissions. I have however borne all that I read and was said to me in mind.

W’s divorce order application was issued on 28^th March 2025. At that stage she instructed Branch Austin McCormick LLP. She instructed this firm and thereafter Sears Tooth up to and including a combined First Appointment and return date of a freezing order which I heard on 22^nd October 2025. At that hearing W was represented by Tim Amos KC.

Shortly thereafter W transferred her instructions to Irwin Mitchell. On 24^th November 2025 I received correspondence from the solicitor with conduct that raised concerns about W’s litigation capacity. This was then the subject of correspondence with H’s solicitors but on 1^st December 2025 W filed a Notice of Acting in Person.

There has been minimal engagement from W with the proceedings since that date. She has sent the occasional email to H’s solicitors - such as on 6^th February 2026 (in which she alleged her severe depression and PTSD was as result of H’s prolonged abuse and sexual violence and also alleged she had been raped by H on 2^nd January 2022 – allegations which H wholly denies), one on 10^th February 2026 (in which she set out why she was unable to engage in a pFDR Appointment), and others criticising the selection of SJE valuers of the parties’ assets and thereafter the valuations themselves. But these communications have been few and far between.

W did not attend a hearing on 30^th January 2026 when I finalised the First Appointment order and listed the case for pre-trial review and final hearing.

On 13^th April 2026 W applied to adjourn the pre-trial review on 1^st May 2026 or, in the alternative, to excuse her attendance on the basis she would be travelling to Russia to provide care and support to her mother who she said was due to undergo spinal surgery in the coming weeks. I refused the application but gave permission to W to attend remotely of which she was informed on 27^th April 2026.

W did not attend the pre-trial review. After the hearing had concluded I received an email from her which stated inter alia as follows:

W’s email also referred to the evidence she had filed in October 2025 in advance of the First Appointment.

On 14^th June 2026 I received a further email from W. She said her mother suffered from Alzheimer’s disease, that unfortunately her condition had not improved, and as her only daughter she remained responsible for her ongoing care and this continued to require her presence in Russia. W therefore sought permission “to attend the hearing remotely via video or telephone link from the Moscow Region (village of [D]) or the Vologda Region (village of [F]), depending on my location at the time of the hearing”. On 15^th June 2026 I sought H’s solicitors’ views in relation thereto. They replied (i) referring to paragraph 12(d) of my order of 1^st May 2026 which directed that if either partywished to vary the directions for personal attendance they were to issue an application in accordance with FPR 2010 Part 18; (ii) stating that W had not issued such an application and should do so; and (iii) stating that “upon an appropriate application having been made … and on the basis that the relevant permissions are obtained from the overseas authorities, [H] does not object in principle to [W] being granted the same permission to give evidence remotely from overseas that he is seeking, provided this does not disrupt the court timetable”.

On 16^th June 2026 W emailed me stating she “cannot file a claim in accordance with your requirements, as I do not have the appropriate skills and, unlike the other side and his huge team of lawyers, I represent myself and cannot file a claim in the form required”. On 17^th June 2026 I replied stating (i) a party who represents themselveswas still obliged to file the appropriate application; (ii) if such application was madeit would then be sent to me for determination; and (iii) any application made must set out what enquires/attempts had been made to obtain permission to give evidence from overseas (if needed).

On 26^th June 2026 W made a Part 18 application asking for permission to attend the final hearing remotely in the same terms as her email of 14^th June 2026. Contrary to what I had said to her in my email of 17^th June 2026, the application notice was not referred to me for determination (and the first time that I was therefore aware of it was during my reading day on 27^th July 2026). I understand the application was not sent on to me as the fee of £195 had not been paid nor fee remission obtained (as the court office confirmed in its email in response to W dated 16^th July 2026).

On 25^th July 2026 (i.e. the Saturday before the start of the final hearing) W emailed the court office setting out her reasons for non-participation in the hearing. She referred to her state of health, the situation of the children, and her position on the merits of the case. That email (and the numerous attachments thereto) was forwarded to me by the court office on 27^th July 2026 (my reading day). W and the parties’ adult children also sent further communications me on 27^th July 2026. W’s email stated inter alia that “I am unable to appear in court in person due tomy state of health; I am completely defenceless against the entire army of lawyers and barristers of [H].”

I raised with Mr. Molyneux and Mr. Chapman in advance of the hearing on 28^th July 2026, and again at the start of the hearing itself, that I had never determined W’s application of 26^th June 2026. I said that in light of H’s solicitors’ comments in their letter of 15^th June 2026 it was likely I would have given the permission sought subject to the obtaining of relevant permissions (which is now far less of an issue given Potanina v Potanin (No. 3) (Video Evidence from Abroad) [2026] EWHC 1738 (Fam) per MacDonald J). I therefore did not know whether W would have attended the hearing via either telephone or video link if I had done so.

I therefore adjourned the hearing until the following day. I made an order that included the following:

I directed a copy of the order was to be served unsealed forthwith on W (and W’s father) by email accompanied by a copy of (i) FPR 2010 Part 3A and PDs 3AA and 3AB; and (ii) Form EX740.

In approaching matters in this way I was satisfied I was being procedurally fair to W and giving her every opportunity to participate in the final hearing if she wished including the making of such participation directions as may be required.

This order was duly served unsealed by H’s solicitors and then sealed by the court office.

There was no response prior to the start of the court day on 29^th July 2026.

Out of an abundance of caution I then decided to treat W’s emails of 25^th July 2026 and 27^th July 2026 (and those received from the parties’ children) as a deemed application to adjourn the final hearing.

I gave an extempore judgment in which I refused the same. I shall not extend this judgment unnecessarily by setting out in full my reasons for so doing but they included (i) W’s email of 1^st May 2026 had referenced the asserted impact on her (and the children’s) health of H’s behaviour but had not suggested she could not participate remotely; (ii) her email of 14^th June 2026 and her application notice of 26^th June 2026 requested permission to attend remotely; (iii) the medical evidence which she had filed – a one page letter from a neurologist translated from Russian following an appointment on 23^rd July 2026 - gave a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder and recommended further examinations and treatment but did not suggest W could not attend remotely; (iv) W had not engaged substantively in the proceedings for many months and was in wholesale breach of my orders; (v) I therefore considered this to be part of a policy of non-engagement and non-cooperation; (vi) her criticisms of the SJE evidence had been made clear and the acceptance (or otherwise) of this evidence was a matter for me; and (vii) fairness required consideration of both parties and H (who was not in the best of health) had expended significant time and effort to travel from Moscow to the edge of the Caspian Sea in order to attend the hearing remotely to give evidence.

In refusing the deemed application I applied (i) in relation to medical evidence, Levy (Trustee in Bankruptcy of Ellis-Carr) v Ellis-Carr and Another [2012] EWHC 63 (Ch) per Norris J (and in particular [36]) and Foresters Ketley v Brent and Another [2012] EWCA Civ 324 and Simou v Salliss [2017] EWCA Civ 312 (and in particular [26] and [63] respectively where this aspect of Levy was cited with approval); (ii) in a financial remedy context, Velupillai v Velupillai [2016] 2 FLR 681 per Mostyn J; and (iii) in relation to expert evidence, TUI (UK) Limited v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48.

Later in the court day on 29^th July 2026 I received a further email from W which stated inter alia she was “currently unwell and, due to my state of health, am unable to attend or participate in the hearing”. I received further emails from her to like effect on each subsequent day. Mr. Molyneux declined to address me on these further emails and none made me reconsider my decision to refuse the (deemed) adjournment application.

W’s father, who was joined to the financial remedy proceedings as second respondent by order of Peel J dated 9^th October 2025, has never taken any part in either the injunctive or financial remedy proceedings. He has been served at his personal email address pursuant to the order of Deputy District Judge Handa dated 8^th August 2025 and Peel J’s order dated 9^th October 2005 and at the address of Company CD by any method of service permissible under Cypriot law pursuant to my order of 30^th January 2026.

I was not addressed by Mr. Molyneux on FPR 2010 r27.4(2) which empowers the court to continue with a hearing at which one or more respondents have failed to attend, provided the court is satisfied that the absent respondent had “reasonable notice” and the circumstances of the case justify proceeding in his absence (r27.4(3)). However, for completeness, I record that for the reasons I have set out above I was so satisfied by evidence that both respondents had reasonable notice of the final hearing, and that the circumstances of the case justified proceeding in their absence.

H is aged 85. He is a dual British and Russian citizen. He was a businessman prior to retirement. He presently lives at Property O, the parties’ family home in Odintsovo, near Moscow.

W is aged 52. She is also a dual British and Russian citizen. She is a homemaker. She has lived in England since August 2014. Her present address is not entirely clear but (as referred to above) she may be living in Russia at her parents’ address to provide post-operative care to her mother.

The parties married in Moscow on 4^th August 2000 and separated in December 2024/January 2025. It was therefore a marriage of 24 years to separation.

There are two adult children of the marriage – X (aged 25) and Y (aged 23). Both parties also have children (H a son and daughter and W a son) from previous relationships.

W’s application for a divorce order was issued on 28^th March 2025 (dated 21^st March 2025). The application stated W wished to apply for a financial order. The Conditional Order was made on 7^th October 2025 and the Final Order on 20^th November 2025.

H’s Form A was issued on 12^th June 2025 (dated 23^rd May 2025). On 16^th July 2025 he filed a Notice to Show Cause seeking an order in the terms of the “Memorandum of Understanding on the Division of Joint Marital Property” which had been signed by both parties on 1^st March 2025 and from which W was seeking to resile (for reasons detailed in her statement of 28^th August 2025 and her Form E). However, it was subsequently said H no longer pursued the same for reasons I shall set out later in this judgment.

On 5^th August 2025 H applied for a freezing order against W and her father. The application was made after he discovered that on 20^th June 2025 (i.e. six months after the parties’ separation) W’s father sold Flat 12 BL for 530 million Roubles (c. £4.9 million at the then fx rate) and its associated parking spaces on the same date for 20,600,000 Roubles (c. £189,000).

This application was refused by Deputy District Judge Handa (sitting at the Family Court at East London) on 8^th August 2025 on the basis that such an order was not required where only short informal notice had been given to W and her father. A further hearing was directed to be heard at High Court level on the first open date between 1^st September 2025 and 17^th October 2025.

In the meantime, on 1^st October 2025, W’s father sold Flat 15 BL for 570 million Roubles (c. £5.14 million at the then fx rate) and its associated parking spaces on the same date for 30 million Roubles (c. £270,000).

On 7^th October 2025 H renewed his application for a freezing order having discovered the further sale. On 9^th October 2025 Peel J made such an order against W and her father which I continued until further order at the First Appointment on 22^nd October 2025.

On 5^th August 2025 H also applied for an order under MCA 1973 s37 to set aside W’s transfer of her shares in Company CD to her father in July 2024. This application was before me for determination at the final hearing.

Shortly after the First Appointment on 22^nd October 2025 W disinstructed Sears Tooth and, having instructed Irwin Mitchell for a brief period, she has since acted in person. As a consequence a hearing was required on 30^th January 2026 to finalise the First Appointment order and where I gave further directions.

It subsequently transpired that W’s father had blocked all emails sent from H’s solicitor’s email domain (a mode of service permitted by the orders of Deputy District Judge Handa dated 8^th August 2025 and Peel J dated 9^th October 2025). As a consequence neither the freezing order of 9^th October 2025 nor the order made on the return date on 22^nd October 2025 had been served on him. H therefore applied on paper on 24^th October 2025 for an orderrequiring W to provide all of her father’s email and telephone numbers known to her. I made this order on 27^th October 2025.

When W failed to comply (just as she had failed to disclose her father’s home address in response to Deputy District Judge Handa’s “best endeavours” order that she do so),H applied on 18^th December 2025 for an order giving permission to serve W’s father via the Cypriot address of Company CD(a jurisdiction in whose litigation he was participating, as he sought to avoid a Cypriot freezing order in mirror terms to the English order). I made this order on 30^th January 2026. That same order required W again to disclose her father’s home address (as well as all known email and telephone contact details). Again she failed to do so.

On 7^th April 2026 I made debarring orders on paper (to which I refer further below) and reduced the time-estimate for the final hearing from ten days to five days.

I gave further directions on 30^th April 2026, the pre-trial review was held on 1^st May 2026, and the final hearing was heard between 27^th – 31^st July 2026.

W’s indifference to these proceedings, mirrored by W’s father, has not been true of the Cypriot proceedings in which H has sought and obtained orders intended to prevent dealings with Company CD. There they have been represented and have actively participated in proceedings.

In her email to me of 27^th July 2026 W stated inter alia that the allegation she had taken an active part in proceedings in Cyprus while not participating in the English proceedings was untrue. She stated that “I was in a horrifying state when I was notified by my father's lawyer that a claim had been filed against me in court, and that I needed to sign two documents so that they could file a response on my behalf. This is what I did. I took no other action, as I don’t have any legal rights to do so and also was not in a state to do so even if I was. I was not informed about [my father’s] work with the lawyers”.

I reject this explanation. The Cypriot order of 8^th May 2026 records that W was represented, that on 23^rd December 2025 a Notice of Appearance had been filed in which it was said W “intends to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court”, and that on 15^th January 2026 an application had been filed challenging jurisdiction supported by affidavit evidence. This is not consistent with W taking “no other action, as I don’t have any legal rights to do so” and I do not believe that W’s lawyers would have acted in this way without instructions from her to do so.

I should record for completeness that (i) W also issued an application under FLA 1996 Part IV (ZC 25 F 00315). I understand she obtained both a non-molestation order and an occupation order on an ex parte basis which were discharged by consent by way of an order made on 15^th August 2025 which included the giving of mutual undertakings; and (ii) on 21^st October 2025 (i.e. the day before the First Appointment and the return date of the freezing order) W applied for a legal services payment order. This was listed for hearing on 4^th November 2025. However, her then solicitors (Sears Tooth) confirmed on 29^th October 2025 that W had secured alternative financial support from her children and asked for her application be adjourned with liberty to restore. I made an order in the terms sought on 31^st October 2025.

I should also record for completeness that on 28^th July 2026 H filed an application against W for committal as a consequence of the alleged breaches of the freezing order made on 22^nd October 2025. However this application was not pursued at that stage given the need to consider issues of (personal) service further.

I have recorded above that W failed to comply with my order of 27^th October 2025 and provide all known email and telephone contact details for her father by 29^th October 2025. However H’s solicitors did not receive notice at the time via the online portal that this order had been made and hence did not serve the same on W and her father.

Neither W nor her father complied with any of the orders made by me on 30^th January 2026 and 7^th April 2026. In respect of my order of 30^th January 2026 W’s failures can be summarised as follows:

In her email to me of 27^th July 2026 W stated inter alia that (i) owing to the sanctions on Russian nationals, her father was not entitled to instruct lawyers in England; and (ii) she was not able not able to disclose personal information about her father, as she had no legal right to do so.

There is no evidence in support of either of these assertions and I reject the same.

The consequence of W’s failures was (per my order of 7^th April 2026) that she was debarred from (i) filing a defence (and evidence in support) to H’s statement of case regarding the beneficial ownership of assets and properties; (ii) running a conduct case; (iii) filing a response to H’s contribution statement; and (iv) filing a s25 statement.

W’s father’s failures (that I shall not list separately but they are likewise many) meant he was debarred from filing a defence and adducing evidence in relation to the dispute about beneficial ownership of assets and properties.

No application for relief from sanction (as expressly referenced in my order of 7^th April 2026 and to which the test in Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906 would apply) was made by either W or W’s father.

Mr. Molyneux and Mr. Chapman addressed me at length in both their opening and closing notes about the interrelationship of debarment and the s25 exercise. I agree with their summary of the applicable principles as follows:

It was however accepted on H’s behalf that:

On contributions, where disputed facts are quintessentially matters for positive assertion and proof by the party relying on them, it was said that the practical effect of debarment was that H’s account, if credible and internally consistent, would likely be accepted – subject only to testing in cross-examination (which did not occur).

In relation to the s25 exercise, and acknowledging its quasi-inquisitorial nature, it was said (and I agree) that the duty upon me was to reach a fair outcome having regard to all the circumstances on the material available, to do the best I can on the evidence before me, and that the consequences of an evidential vacuum fall on the party who created it. This is the consistent theme of the non-disclosure jurisprudence culminating in Moher v Moher [2020] 1 FLR 225: the court is entitled to draw adverse inferences, to make findings on a broad and robust basis, and to resolve uncertainty against the defaulting party.

In summary it was said (and I agree) that the court fulfils its statutory s25 duty through consideration of H’s evidence, such evidence as W has adduced in accordance with the rules and orders of the court, expert evidence, inference, and judicial common sense – but not by reconstructing the case W had forfeited the right to put.

It was submitted the position in relation to debarment and the property dispute was different and the effect of debarment more significant. I was referred to the following from TL v MLand Others (Ancillary Relief: Claim Against Assets Of Extended Family) [2006] 1 FLR 1263 per Nicholas Mostyn QC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge):

This passage has been subsequently cited with approval many times including in A v A and St. George Trustees Limited and Others [2007] 2 FLR 467per Munby J (as he then was) at [22] and most recently in MF v NF and Others [2026] EWFC 243 per MacDonald J at [38].

I was addressed in writing at length in relation to the nuanced distinction between a party (or parties) having been debarred from filing a defence (as here) and being debarred from defending H’s claim (which was not the case). It was said the court still had to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the claim was made out,must be so by evidence and not by a statement of case alone, and that W and her father would still be permitted to participate in relation to the beneficial ownership dispute, to put H to proof, cross-examine him, make submissions on the law and facts – but not advance any rival factual narrative. Again, I accept this analysis as being correct.

My overarching objective is of course to achieve a fair outcome having regard to the MCA 1973 s25 factors, in pursuit of which the court takes (as I have said) a ‘quasi-inquisitorial’ role. This means the court is not “… confined within the tramlines of adversarial pleadings” (Re H-W (Care Proceedings: Further Fact-finding Hearing) [2023] 2 FLR 171 per Baker LJ at [37] albeit a comment made in the context of care proceedings), but the judge has a duty independently “to investigate issues which he considers relevant to outcome even if not advanced by either party” (Parra v Parra [2003] 1 FLR 942 per Thorpe LJ at [22]).

In Re Z (Prohibition on Cross-examination: No Qualified Legal Representative) [2024] 2 FLR 306 Sir Andrew McFarlane P stated:

After Mr. Molyneux had invited H to confirm the truth of his Form E, Replies to Questionnaire and his various statements, I therefore asked a number of questions of H. I drew these in part from W’s long email to me of 27^th July 2026.

Similarly therefore to the approach adopted by His Honour Judge Hyde KC in OO v QQ [2025] EWFC 310 (B) at [17] (albeit with the parties reversed) “I asked the wife questions on areas that I needed more clarification or which I considered the husband would have explored had he been present.” In so doing I was very careful to tread the “narrow path” which the then President described.

H’s open proposals dated 27^th June 2026 sought an order in the following terms:

On 15^th June 2026 the Russian assets of Company CD, i.e. Company B and which owns the A shopping centre in Moscow, were redomiciled in Russia. However H only discovered this much later. The effect of this was to denude the shares in Company CD of their entire value as it has been shorn of the company it owned.

As a consequence H revised his open proposals. He now sought an adjournment of his lump sum claims (calculated to be worth the SJE value of Company CD of £21.75 million less tax of £3.263 million, i.e. £18.49 million) whilst he attempted to reconnect the company with its Russian assets (which, if successful would lead to the ultimate dismissal of the lump sum claims).

W did not file a formal open proposal. In her email of 30^th June 2026 she described H’s proposal as “shameless” and said a proposal under which one party retained two homes while the other was deprived of their only home “bears no resemblance to a genuine attempt to reach a fair and equitable settlement.”

As I said to Mr. Molyneux, so far as it was possible to glean an open proposal from W’s emails it was that she should retain Property L (the parties’ London property), H should retain Property O (the parties’ Moscow property), the parties’ other assets should be divided equally in a way that meant an overall equal division of the assets in their names, and the assets transferred to W’s father were not to be taken into account.

I must apply the factors set out in MCA 1973 s25 (as amended) in deciding what orders to make pursuant to ss23 and 24. I have borne all aspects of this section in mind. The overall requirement in applying s25 is to achieve fairness (as made clear in White v White [2000] 2 FLR 981) with the three principles that should guide the court in trying to achieve fairness (needs, sharing, and compensation) identified in Miller/McFarlane [2006] 1 FLR 1186.

The last of these principles is not engaged in this case. Given the asset base it is clearly a sharing case.

A synopsis of the relevant jurisprudence applicable in financial remedy cases was provided in WC v HC(Financial Remedies Agreements) (Rev 1) [2022] 2 FLR 1110 per Peel J at [21] as augmented in Clarke v Clarke [2023] 2 FLR 1 per Mostyn J at [36]. I have borne all of this jurisprudence in mind.

As was observed in Charman v Charman (No. 4) [2007] 1 FLR 1246 per Sir Mark Potter P at [67] the inquiry is always in two stages, namely computation and distribution. Logically the former precedes the latter with the court first considering, with whatever degree of detail is apt to the case, the matters set out in MCA 1973 s25(2)(a), namely the property, income (including earning capacity) and other financial resources which the parties have and are likely to have in the foreseeable future.

The ES2 (which was completed solely on H’s side without any input from W) shows resources totalling £47.5 million net. It is populated with the product of the SJE evidence. W did not co-operate with the preparation of this evidence. I have no reason not to accept this expert evidence and I do so.

H does not believe that the ES2 represents the totality of the resources available to W. In particular he stated that prior to the parties’ separation W had obtained an Austrian residency permit, the terms of which required her to own or rent property in Austria. He stated that this, in conjunction with her exploration of a more permanent relocation to Austria and her frequent presence in that country, had led him to query whether she had acquired property in that country.

This question was raised in H’s Questionnaire which W had not answered and was an issue upon which I asked questions of H.

I referred above to the fact that H initially issued a Notice to Show Cause why W should not be held to the terms of an agreement signed between the parties on 1^st March 2025. That agreement divided between the parties’ assets in London and Russia including:

H therefore no longer sought an order in the terms of the parties’ agreement because several of the assets he was to retain thereunder had been sold.

H’s case as to beneficial ownership of the various assets was pleaded in his statement of case and supported by his sixth witness statement dated 4^th February 2026. The relief sought by him was principally a declaration that W’s father holds the beneficial ownership of the asset or if applicable the proceeds of sale thereof for the benefit of H or H and W (as appropriate) and, in relation to the shares in Company CD, the set aside.

It was H’s case that for geopolitical, regulatory and tax reasons the parties, from time to time, transferred many of their Russian assets to selected third party nominees and principally to W’s father. However at all times the assets remained in the beneficial ownership of the parties.

It was W’s case that any assets so transferred were for full value, they were not owned or controlled by H (or by her), and her father was entitled to do what he liked with them. She therefore saw this as a dispute between H and her father.

In breach of my orders W has declined both to plead her case in her defence or adduce evidence in support of it.

I shall consider the relevant assets in turn.

Company CD is the single most valuable asset in this case (valued by the SJE, Alfa, in March 2026 at £23.6 million). As set out above, Company CD is a Cypriot company which owns a Russian company, Company B, which in turns owns the A shopping centre in Moscow, the development of which was funded (H states and W disputes) by H principally using pre-marital wealth.

The shares in Company CD, which was incorporated in 2008, were originally owned by H. He transferred some of the shares to W in 2009 and the remainder to her in 2011. W transferred the shares to her father in August 2014, they were transferred back to her in 2018, and transferred back to W’s father on 9^th July 2024.

The beneficial ownership of Company CD is disputed between the parties. H says it is owned by the parties; W says it is owned by her father.

H seeks an order pursuant to MCA 1973 s37(2)(b) for the setting aside of the transfer of the shares in Company CD to W’s father.

Jurisdictionally there is no issue in making the MCA 1973 s37 order sought (see for example AAZ v BBZ and Others (Financial Remedies: Sharing Principle: Special Contribution) [2018] 1 FLR 153 where Haddon-Cave J set aside a disposition under which the husband transferred the entire share capital in three offshore holding companies into a Cypriot trust).

W did not file a defence to H’s case that the beneficial ownership of Company CD was at all times vested in the parties. She was therefore debarred from denying it. However in her filed evidence she accepted the transfer to her father was gratuitous and that the shares were gifted. Therefore no issue as to valuable consideration arises. The transfer took place on 9^th July 2024, months before the parties’ separation and less than three years prior to H’s application for a financial remedy. In those circumstances the statutory presumption in MCA 1973s 37(5) - that the disposition was done with the intention of defeating his claim - applies.

It was pending determination of this issue that Peel J made a freezing order on 9^th October 2025 and which was extended by me at the return date on 22^nd October 2025. By those orders, W and her father were each subject to an in personam prohibition on disposing of, dealing with, or diminishing the value of Company CD. H subsequently obtained a mirror order in Cyprus (the most recent order then available dated 8^th May 2026).

On 15^th June 2026(although H discovered much later) the assets of Company CD (being Company B and hence the A shopping centre which it owns), were redomiciled in Russia as International LLC Company CD – leaving the Cypriot company diminished in value.

It is H’s case that (i) the transfer of shares by W to her father on 9^th August 2014 was a sham; (ii) the transfer back to W in 2018 was on H’s instructions and took place at a time when W was based in England and W’s father was ageing, and the risk of “corporate raiding” seemed greater if the legal owner of the shares was based in Russia; and (iii) the transfer of the shares back to W’s father on 9^th July 2024 was without H’s consent and with the intention to defeat his claims for a financial remedy.

As H has the benefit of the statutory presumption it is for W to satisfy the court that the transfer of the shares was not made with the intention of defeating his claim.

It is of course well-settled (see for example Kemmis v Kemmis (Welland and Others Intervening); Lazard Brothers and Co (Jersey) Ltd v Norah Holdings Ltd and Others [1988] 2 FLR 223 per Nourse LJ and Le Foe v Le Foe & Woolwich Plc [2001] 2 FLR 970 per Nicholas Mostyn QC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)) that where there is more than one intention for a disposition, the intention to defeat does not have to be the sole or even the dominant intention; it is enough if it played a substantial part in the intention as a whole.

W’s evidence in her statement of 28^th August 2025 was that H “gifted” the shares to her in 2014 (paragraph 61) and that she had always viewed her father “as the rightful owner” because “he worked at the shopping centre every day. He bore full legal and financial responsibility for running it. I had never managed the shopping centre” (paragraph 65), the shares were gifted back to her “not because he was instructed to do so … but because of his own health” (paragraph 67) and that in 2024 the parties “came to the conclusion that the right thing would be to gift the shares back to [W’s father]” (paragraph 69).

W’s case as to the redomiciliation was set out in her email to me of 27^th July 2026 in which she stated inter alia as follows:

The law on sham was set out in Kremen v Agrest and Fishman [2011] 2 FLR 478 at [12] and [13] which in turn cited at length from paragraphs [32] and following of A v Aand St. George Trustees Limited and Others per Munby J (as he then was). I bear in mind all of what is said in both authorities including that (i) an allegation of sham is a serious matter; (ii) there is a very strong presumption that parties intend to be bound by the provisions of agreements into which they enter, and, even more, intend the agreements they enter into to take effect; (iii) a degree of dishonesty is involved in a sham; (iv) it follows there is a strong and natural presumption against holding a provision or a document a sham; and (v) the latter point does not elevate the standard of proof which remains the simple balance of probabilities but the more serious the allegation the greater the need for evidential clarity.

I am satisfised that the transfer of the shares in August 2014 was a sham with no monies changing hands and the shares therefore remained in the beneficial ownership of the parties. I reach this conclusion for a number of reasons including:

The parties’ agreement of 1^st March 2025 also retains substantial evidential importance in this regard. The assets which the parties sought to divide between them numbered amongst them the shares which W now said were beneficially owned by her father. As Mr. Molyneux and Mr. Chapman submitted, the point is an obvious one. If they belonged to W’s father, why was she including them amongst the divisible pool of the matrimonial resources and agreeing to transfer them to H?

In saying this I am conscious that W has claimed duress (denied both by H and by the lawyer, Mr. K, who assisted the parties in negotiation and in drafting their agreement) as a justification both for agreeing to divide that which she knew the parties did not own and thereafter resiling from the agreement.

Had W filed a defence to H’s beneficial interest claim this argument would have required forensic scrutiny of inter alia:

I am therefore satisfied that the transfer of the shares in 2014 was part of a strategy to address changes in the Russian regulatory environment and the expected change in residency status of both W and H and that the beneficial ownership of the shares in Company CD remained at all times with H and/or W. The transfer of the shares back to W in 2018 therefore just recognised the correct legal position.

Further, W has not satisfied the evidential burden upon her. I therefore conclude that she transferred the shares back to her father on 9^th July 2024 with the intention to defeat H’s claim for financial remedies. I shall therefore set aside the same.

I also reject W’s explanation as given in her email of 27^th July 2026. I find that W and her father acted in concert in this regard. I therefore consider that injunctive orders in two jurisdictions have been knowingly ignored and broken by both W and her father leading (as things stand) to the most valuable asset in the case having been denuded of its value.

I therefore agree that (as was submitted) there was “bleak prescience” in H’s statement of 16^th July 2025 when he stated at paragraph 14 that “I am very fearful of what next steps she will take in her determination to undermine my claim” and in his statement of 8^th August 2025 when he stated at paragraph 32 that “I am very concerned that [W’s father] has demonstrated that he is willing to take action in relation to the assets which belong beneficially to [W] and me, without my consent (although presumably upon [W’s] instructions). … [W’s father], following [W’s] instruction, is now taking steps to put [Company CD] out of reach.”

I am satisfied that both of these properties and their associated parking spaces were transferred to W’s father pursuant to sham sale agreements with no monies changing hands and that both properties remained in the beneficial ownership of the parties.

I reach this conclusion for a number of reasons including:

Given that the flats and their parking spaces were sold on 20^th June 2025 for (at the then fx rates) £5.020 million and £189,000 and 1^st October 2025 for £5.142 million and £270,000 respectively, the – very significant - proceeds of these sales are therefore held by W’s father for the benefit of the parties.

This land was purchased in W’s sole name on 30^th August 2006. W transferred the land to her father on 31^st March 2014. I am satisfied this transfer was pursuant to a sham agreement and that it was done for geopolitical, regulatory and/or tax reasons.

This land has been valued by way of SJE evidence at c. £2.140 million net of tax.

This property was purchased in W’s sole name on 29^th December 2010. W transferred the property to her father on 15^th August 2018. Again I am satisfied this transfer was pursuant to a sham agreement and was done for the same reasons as aforesaid.

The retention of the beneficial ownership by the parties is evidenced for example by H’s communications with a third party in which they negotiate over the grant of a lease over the property.

This property has been valued by way of SJE evidence at c. £858,000 net of tax.

This property was purchased by H on 24^th April 2017. H transferred the property to W’s father on 1^st November 2018. Again I am satisfied that this was pursuant to a sham agreement and was done for the same reasons as aforesaid.

The retention of the beneficial ownership by the parties is evidenced for example by W’s father deferring to H in relation to a prospective rental of the property (“I cannot decide by myself, I am accountable here ... At the end, you say not to give it, I will refuse them. I promised to give them a call tomorrow and send them a letter”).

This property has been valued by SJE evidence at c. £1.397 million net of tax.

H has provided extensive evidence which demonstrates the parties agreed the beneficial interest in these assets would at all times be retained by H and/or W and that W’s father acted as their nominee or alternatively held the assets on some form of a trust arrangement. I accept H exercised day-to-day control of these assets and that W’s father acted in accordance with his instructions.

I have set out some of the specific evidence relied upon by H (and which I accept) when dealing with each asset in turn. More generally there is H’s evidence of WhatsApp communication from W dated 25^th February 2025 in which she references the tax consequences of assets being owned by H whereas “before they were protected by the grandfather”. This is a reference to W’s father and I accept this is a transparent indication that beneficial ownership had at all times remained with the parties.

Likewise, and as I have set out above, these assets were central to the parties’ signed agreement. That agreement saw the parties deal with, and effect transfers of, the various assets notwithstanding W’s father’s legal ownership of them. W’s treatment of these resources in communications with H at this time is impossible to reconcile with a denial of ownership and control.

I therefore accept the presentation of the assets as set out in the ES2.

However this is not the end of the story. W has failed to provide her Replies to Questionnaire in which H sought to address W’s alleged non-disclosure. He has repeated the same in various of his witness statements. W has never responded to the same. She has also failed to provide any updating disclosure or permitted the valuation of her valuable collection of jewellery.

I have reminded myself of the “broad conclusions” as to the approach the court should take when dealing with non-disclosure as set out in Moher v Moher by Moylan LJ at [86]-[91]. I consider this to be a case within paragraph [89 (iii)] namely one where it is not possible to make a specific determination either as to a figure or a bracket because of the manner in which W has failed to comply with her disclosure obligations. I am therefore unable to quantify the extent of her undisclosed resources.

I accept as submitted that the way H advances his case means precise computation of those non-disclosed resources is unnecessary in any event as the parties’ claims can be fairly satisfied by reference to the visible resources.

I do conclude, however, that there is a (high) probability that W has further resources hidden from the court’s gaze.

I will consider the consequences of this as part of the distribution exercise.

H’s case is that prior to the parties’ marriage, he had amassed significant wealth from a business established by him. H’s case is that the fortune he acquired through these business dealings prior to meeting W funded the acquisition of the assets which now populate the ES2 (including the A shopping centre, the two properties at 5BL, and the O Property). In summary he contends by way of contributioncase:

W’s filed evidence (principally her statement dated 28^th August 2025) was that at the time of the parties’ marriage H did not have significant assets, he was a heavy drinker living in a modest house with his former mother-in-law, had just divorced his previous wife and had transferred to her a house in Spain, a house in the US and an apartment in Moscow. She also stated H had insufficient funds to develop and build the A shopping centre and that it was financed by significant commercial loans that were serviced/repaid by monies earned during the marriage. She further stated the properties purchased during the marriage were purchased using monies earnt during the marriage and also alleged significant depletion of family funds by H to his mistress and to his adult children from his previous marriages.

W did not produce a contributions statement and was therefore debarred from filing evidence in reply. However she addressed the issue of wealth accumulated before the marriage in her email to me of 27^th July 2026 (and gave similar detail to her statement of 28^th August 2025).

This was one of the factual issues that I focussed on in my own questions of H.

I readily accept that the parties’ contributions during their marriage were equal. As Lord Nicholls recognised in White v White at p605 - under the heading of “Equality”:

However this does not mean it may not appropriate to recognise a party’s pre-marital contribution by way of non-matrimonial property. This is of course subject to the question as to whether or not:

The second of these questions engages paragraph [50] of the Supreme Court judgment and in particular the phrases “sharing … should normally be on an equal basis”, “equal sharing is the appropriate and principled starting position”, and “once non-matrimonial property is excluded, much of the justification for not applying equality in sharing fades away”.

In relation to this question it is arguable that differing views were expressed in LP v MP [2026] 1 FLR 1089 per Cusworth J at [30]-[32] and BC v BC (No. 2) (Matrimonialisation; Division of Shareholding; Provision for Debt) [2026] EWFC 37 per Garrido J at [40]-[41]. Cusworth J seemingly agreed with the view expressed by Moylan LJ at [166] of the Court of Appeal decision in Standish v Standish (reported at [2024] 2 FLR 966) that once an asset is matrimonialised and treated as matrimonial property it may still be shared unequally. He said the submission to the contrary, that once an asset is matrimonialised and treated as matrimonial property, it must be shared equally“is unsupported by any authority and would be contrary to the objective of a fair outcome” and that “itwould be perverse if the court could not decide that the non-matrimonial source, in whole or in part, of an asset treated as matrimonial property could not justify an other than equal division”. Cusworth J said the Supreme Court had disagreed with Moylan LJ’s formulation that the concept of matrimonialisation should only be applied “narrowly” but “there was no suggestion of any correction to other parts of his reasoning.” Garrido J expressed the view that an asset is either non-matrimonial, in which case it is excluded from equal sharing, or it is matrimonialised, in which case it is subject to equal sharing (unless there is another additional justification for departure from equality) and there is no room for a hybrid treatment of assets that have been matrimonialised.

When considering this question it important to recall that in Hart v Hart [2018] 1 FLR 1283 Moylan LJ stated (i) at [85] that “the concept of property being either matrimonial or non-matrimonial property is a legal construct.Moreover, it is a construct which is not always capable of clear identification” and that an asset can comprise of both “in the sense that it can be partly the product, or reflective, of marital endeavour and partly the product, or reflective, of a source external to the marriage”; and (ii) at [97] that “fairness has a broad horizon” and that “the need for clear guidance and principles … should not lead to the imposition of constraints which are not needed to achieve, and which deprive the court of the flexibility required to achieve, a fair outcome.”

It is of course perfectly possible to achieve the same result arithmetically in any event either by finding the asset in question is hybrid with the non-matrimonial element excluded from sharing and the matrimonial element shared equally or, alternatively, by an unequal sharing of the entire matrimonial asset.

I accept H’s case as to pre-marital contribution by way of non-matrimonial property. In my view assets including as Flats 12BL and 15BL (and their parking spaces) that were subsequently purchased with these funds were not later matrimonialised on application of Standish principles (or at least not in full). These two properties (and their parking spaces) alone have a combined value in excess of £11.05 million (at current fx rates) which is c. 23.2% of assets of c. £47.5 million as shown on the ES2. Therefore whatever the correct answer to the second question above may be in law a fair outcome in this case is one that, to adopt the phrase used in N v F (Financial Orders: Pre-Acquired Wealth) [2011] 2 FLR 533 per Mostyn J at [44], recognises that H’s pre-marital wealth “was the bedrock on which this marriage was founded.”

As part of the award he seeks, H seeks a transfer of Property L into his name. He wishes to return to live in London for medical and familial reasons. In his oral evidence H explained the importance to him of living in London in order to receive effective treatment for his health conditions. He suffers from coronary artery disease, hypertension, paroxysmal atrial fibrillation, heart failure, bronchiectasis, monoclonal gammopathy of undetermined significance, asthma, acid reflux, diabetes mellitus, and chronic kidney disease. Although not in a Part 25-compliant form, the existence of many of these conditions was corroborated by a letter from one his treating physicians dated 2^nd October 2025 and W also referred to some of H’s health issues at paragraph 4.3 of her Form E. I accept that this is a reasonable aspiration.

But there is another reason why this is important – Property L (a property valued by the SJE at £9.2 million and owned in W’s sole name), is the parties’ only real property outside Russia. I accept that, given W’s machinations, this property may be the only asset which H will actually receive at the end of these proceedings.

I am conscious that in her emails to me W said it would be unfair for H to receive both the parties’ properties in London and Moscow. In her email of 27^th July 2026 she stated that were I to leave her “to live in my parents' flat and depriving the children of their sole support in England, then I will be forced to leave the United Kingdom, and my children, forever”. I do not accept this. W will be able to meet her housing needs (whether in England or elsewhere) from the assets she will retain in this case.

The ‘net effect’ of H’s open position that I have summarised at [72] above – and assuming that H receives value for the shareholding in Company CD - would be to divide the parties’ visible assets of c. £47.5 million so that H exits the marriage with just over £32 million and W with just over £15.5 million. This would be a 67/33 percentage split in H’s favour.

If I considered this to be too great a departure from equality then, assuming that H retains the O Property in Moscow and the L Property in London, the only asset it would make sense to adjust from H’s open offer is the division of the shares in Company CD – i.e. sharing these between the parties rather than by a transfer of them in their entirety to H.

Such a potential outcome engages consideration of Wells sharing (named after Wells v Wells [2002] 2 FLR 97). In Versteegh v Versteegh [2018] 2 FLR 1417 King LJ stated:

In his concurring judgment Lewison LJ stated:

The applicable principles were subsequently considered in ES v SS [2023] EWFC 177 per Sir Jonathan Cohen, BR v BR [2025] EWFC 88 per Peel J , ED v AP [2025] EWFC 399 per His Honour Judge Hess and Rosemin-Culligan v Culligan [2025] EWFC 1 per MacDonald J.

The last of these cases was appealed to the Court of Appeal. In Culligan v Rosemin-Culligan [2026] EWCA Civ 948 Moylan LJ observed at [63] that the judge’s approach “was clearly significantly based on his analysis of, what he considered to be, the “view of the Court of Appeal” in Versteegh”. Thereafter having quoted from the judgments of King and Lewison LJJs he stated:

This led Moylan LJ to conclude as follows:

It has therefore now been made clear that the Court of Appeal did not in Versteegh decide as a matter of principle that Wells sharing is a “last resort” and/or should only comprise “a minority element” of any award. There is also no principle that it should be “standard fare” or “commonplace” (as Mostyn J had also described them in BJ v MJ (Financial Order: Overseas Trust) [2012] 1 FLR 667 at [85]). The only principle is to approach Wells sharing with “caution” given the statutory duty to consider whether it would be appropriate to achieve a clean break.

I have given careful thought as to whether it would be appropriate to share the shareholding in Company CD in this way and therefore adjust the overall asset division from that proposed on H’s behalf. I have concluded that this would not be appropriate in this case for the following two reasons:

I am also asked to adjourn H’s lump sum claim. H is said to be considering his options in light of his discovery of the theft from Company CD of the underlying Russian business. H continues to investigate what Cypriot remedy he has in respect of what he is told is an entirely illegitimate interference with the rights and resources of the company. He is concerned that the shareholding which I shall transfer to him is worth nothing.

The classic line of authorities (which includes Davies v Davies [1986] 1 FLR 497, Roberts v Roberts [1986] 2 FLR 152, and MT v MT (Financial Provision: Lump Sum) [1992] 1 FLR 362) confirms the court has a discretionary jurisdiction to order an adjournment of a lump sum claim in exception to the normal practice to make a once and for all division of capital if there was a real possibility of capital from a specific source becoming available “in the foreseeable future” and this was also the only means when justice could be done to the parties. More recent authorities (Joy v Joy-Morancho & Ors (No. 3) [2016] 1 FLR 815, Quan v Bray & Others [2019] 1 FLR 1114, AW v AH and Others [2020] 2 FLR 519, and X v Y [2022] EWFC 95 (B) in which His Honour Judge Hess succinctly summarised the jurisprudence at [19]) have slightly expanded the grounds for adjournment to include situations where a party’s conduct (which may include full or partial non-disclosure) means an immediate one-off division of capital risks an unfair result, and where fairness and justice must prevail over the normal desirability of the finality of litigation.

In this case, H seeks the adjournment not so as to wait for capital to materialise but on the basis of W’s conduct so that it may act as an insurance against implementation failure. There is no previous authority (so far as I am aware) in which a lump sum order has been adjourned for such a purpose. There is (perhaps) some analogy with cases in which a nominal spousal maintenance order has been made by way of a ‘safety net’ (one example being DE v FE [2022] EWFC 71 per Sir Jonathan Cohen where H was ordered to pay W a lump sum of £9.3m with £1m to be paid in each of the next four years and the balance at the end of the fifth year and where a nominal order was made until the final lump sum order was paid but in the anticipation that it was to be activated only in the event of W becoming unable to work and to be dismissed upon payment of the lump sum in full).

However, notwithstanding the absence of direct comparative authorities I agree that, as was submitted, the more recent authorities lend weight to the conclusion that the test for adjournment is satisfied in this case. In Quan v Bray& Others at [51] Mostyn J adopted Sir Peter Singer's analysis in Joy v Joy-Morancho & Ors (No. 3) and at [39] referred to H’s “brazen nondisclosure, coupled with his arrogant and contemptuous attitude”. In part based on W’s non-disclosure (as I have found there to be) and in part based on W’s conduct I conclude that this is one of those hard cases where fairness and justice must prevail over the normal desirability of finality. If I dismissed H’s lump sum claims and he is unable to reconnect the shares in Company CD with their underlying assets, then I might well be doing him a considerable injustice.

Once the court has decided to adjourn capital claims, the court must then determine whether to adjourn the claims until a particular date or event, for a fixed number of years, or indefinitely. In AW v AHand Others Roberts J adjourned capital claims for seven years (when the husband was to reach the age of 70). In Quan v Brayand Others Mostyn J adjourned the capital claims indefinitely.

I propose to adjourn H’s lump sum claim generally with liberty to restore, provided that any application to restore must be issued on or before 11^th September 2027 (i.e. one year from the date of this judgment), failing which it shall stand dismissed. I prefer this approach to the one proposed on H’s behalf namely that if not restored earlier, there shall be a hearing before me on the date convenient to me closest to 31^st July 2027 at which (i) the dismissal of H’s lump sum claims; (ii) their disposal by way of a substantive award; or (iii) the terms on which they should continue to be adjourned, shall be considered.

I agree, however, that no later than 28 days in advance of any such restored hearing, all parties shall file and serve a narrative statement explaining the steps which they have taken to give effect to the restoration and any other circumstances material to the order which they seek at that hearing.

I should record for completeness that although in many of the adjournment cases the entirety of the applicant’s capital claims – i.e. both lump sum and property adjournment order – have been adjourned – I am satisfied I can adjourn the lump sum claim even though I have made property adjustment orders. By way of analogy in AW v AHRoberts J adjourned both lump sum and property adjustment claims for seven years, but made a pension sharing order in the wife's favour. I am therefore satisfied the s23 claim for a lump sum order can survive regardless of what s24 orders are made at the same hearing.

Further, as I have set out above, I am satisfied from W’s litigation conduct and failure to engage that this may well mean W has not given full disclosure of her financial position. As Mr. Molyneux and Mr. Chapman submitted, this gives me greater comfort that the proposed division of the parties’ visible assets is a fair one.

I am also satisfied that the proposed departure from an equal division of such assets reflects H’s very significant pre-marital contributions and hence the non-matrimonial origins of much of the parties’ assets.

I am further satisfied that the proposals (and in particular the transfer to him of Property L) meet H’s needs.

W will be left with the Russian assets (which I declare are held by W’s father for her benefit and are therefore a resource available to her). W will therefore have (more than) sufficient assets to purchase a suitable property (whilst satisfying her smaller sharing claim). She will also be able to meet her income needs, put by her on her Form E at c. £321,000 pa.

For all the above reasons I am therefore satisfied that H’s open proposals reflect the fair outcome to this case.

I am not asked to make (and do not make) orders directly against Russian property (where the efficacy of such orders would be in doubt given the unlikelihood that a Russian court would enforce an English property adjustment order). As was made clear in Goyal v Goyal (No. 2) [2017] 2 FLR 236 per Mostyn J at [34]-[36], property adjustment orders (or in that case pension sharing orders) are unlikely to be made absent clear evidence that such an order would be implemented in the overseas jurisdiction as the absence of such evidence the order would represent an exorbitant act of extra-territoriality and would also be futile.

Hence I do not make orders in relation to the Russian properties other than to make the declarations as to beneficial ownership sought which is unobjectionable because this is an in personam remedy and treats those property assets as a resource available to W. It also guards against making orders which will be ignored overseas.

In relation to enforceability in Cyprus, H, in order to meet the point made by Mostyn J in Gohal v Gohal (No. 2) as set out above, has obtained expert evidence from Mr. Pantelis Vorkas, a Cypriot-qualified advocate, dated 24^th June 2026. It evidences that there is a likelihood of an English order in respect of Company CD being enforced.

For completeness I should record that no evidence was adduced as to whether Russian law acknowledges the separation or legal and beneficial ownership nor whether the lex situs ought to mean that the applicable law to the property dispute was Russian law. I agree with Mr. Molyneux and Mr. Chapman that had W and/or or her father raised either or both of these points it would not have caused difficulties.

In relation to the first point, as Lord Mance stated in Akers and Others v Samba Financial Group [2017] UKSC 6:

As for the second point, in Hamed v Stevens [2013] EWCA Civ 911 Lloyd Jones LJ (as he then was) made the position clear:

I therefore make orders in the terms set out at paragraphs [72] and [74] above with the adjournment of the lump sum claim to be as I have described.

In determining this case I have been conscious of the parallels with Velupillaiv Velupillai – a husband whose litigation misconduct effectively removed him from meaningful participation still received a determination of his claims in accordance with MCA 1973 s25; just one made almost entirely on the wife’s evidence and the documents.

This case is not on ‘all fours’ with Velupillai v Velupillai – no two cases are ever exactly on ‘all fours’ with each other – but I have likewise striven to determine W’s claims in accordance with the relevant statutory criteria. In doing so I have taken account of all her filed evidence and also everything that she has said in her subsequent emails to which I have referred always bearing in mind the debarring orders which have proscribed the extent to which she may adduce evidence to rebut H’s case.

The parties’ costs of this litigation are unsurprisingly significant. W’s costs to the First Appointment were c. £177,000. H’s costs are c. £700,000 excluding the costs expended in Cyprus. It is likely that the parties’ aggregate costs therefore exceed £1 million.

H seeks an order that W and W’s father jointly and severally pay his costs of these proceedings to the extent they have not already been determined by way of existing costs orders (i.e. £27,000 (inclusive of VAT) per my order of 30^th January 2026 and £2,000 (inclusive of VAT) per my order of 7^th April 2026).

It is said on H’s behalf that W (and her father) have been wilfully uncooperative and prodigiously dishonest. It is said that this case has been played out against the backdrop of egregious litigation misconduct comprising not only numerous breaches of court orders but a rank determination to defeat H’s claims by any means necessary.

W and W’s father are to be asked as to their position on costs when this judgment is provided to them in draft. I shall then determine the issue when I finalise the same.

I am conscious that W and/or her father may seek to apply to set aside my order given their failure to attend and I have given judgment and made an order against them. There is the ability to make such an application under FPR r27.5(1) although I note that the editorial notes in the Family Court Practice 2026 state the rule “does not apply to financial remedy applications that have their own set aside regime under FPR 2010, r 9.9A”. Whether the applicable rule is r9.9A or r27.5(1) – or indeed both – my general powers of case management as set out in r4.1(3) include that I may (except where the rules provide otherwise) at sub-rule (a) “extend or shorten the time for compliance with any rule” and at sub-rule (o) “take any other steps or make any other order for the purpose of managing the case and furthering the overriding objective.”

I consider this is a case where it is appropriate to exercise these case management powers. I shall therefore direct that any application to set aside my order is to be made by no later than the date by which any Notice of Appeal is to be filed. Pursuant to r30.4(2)(b) this is 21 days after the date of my decision.

I circulated this judgment in draft to H’s counsel on 4^th September 2026 and asked that it be forwarded to W and W’s father. I requested to receive editorial corrections and requests for clarification (if any) by 10^th September 2026.

I received a small number of suggested corrections from H’s solicitors on that date and have amended the judgment accordingly. There was no request for clarification.

There has been no response from either W or her father.

H renewed his application for costs and sought the same on an indemnity basis. I have been provided with concise written submissions in support.

Pursuant to FPR 2010 r28.1 the court “may … make such order as to costs as it thinks just”.

As these are financial remedy proceedings to which r28.3 applies:

These rules are supplemented by PD28A - Costs which states inter alia as follows:

The freezing order applications (in relation to which costs were reserved) are interim applications and their costs are therefore governed by FPR r28.2. As a consequence CPR Part 44 (as amended) applies. There is therefore no presumption either that there be no order for costs or that costs follow the event. Applying Solomon v Solomon[2013] EWCA Civ 1095 and Gojkovic v Gojkovic (No. 2)[1991] 2 FLR 233 this so-called ‘clean sheet’ costs regime is sometimes referred to as having a ‘soft presumption’ in favour of costs following the event.

I am wholly satisfied it is appropriate for a costs order to be made given the conduct of W and her father in relation to the financial remedy proceedings. Examples of this conduct (and the sub-rules which are thereby engaged) include the following:

In OG v AG (Financial Remedies: Conduct) [2021] 1 FLR 1105 per Mostyn J observed:

In relation to the freezing order applications there is no reason for me to depart from the ‘soft presumption’ in favour of costs following the event albeit I have also considered all the factors set out in CPR 1998 r44.2(4).

The two alternative bases for the assessment of such a costs order (standard or indemnity) are set out in CPR 1998 r44.3 and r44.4(1).

An appellate expression of the test whether costs should be awarded on the indemnity basis can be found in Excelsior Commercial & Industrial Holdings Ltd v Salisbury Hammer Aspden & Johnson [2002] EWCA Civ 879 per Waller LJ at [39] when he said:

The applicable principes were summarised inThree Rivers District Council & Others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England [2006] EWHC 816 (Comm)per Tomlinson J (as he then was) at [25].At sub-paragraph (2) it was said that“[t]he critical requirement before an indemnity order can be made in the successful defendant's favour is that there must be some conduct or some circumstance which takes the case out of the norm”. At sub-paragraph (8) the judge listed seven “circumstances” which take a case out of the norm and justify an order for indemnity costs “particularly when taken in combination with the fact that a Defendant has discontinued only at a very late stage in proceedings”.

A similar observation was made in the family law context by Mostyn J in JM v CZ (Costs: Ex Parte Order) [2015] 1 FLR 559 at [23]:

Excelsior also makes it clear (per Waller LJ at [36] and [37]) that the pre-CPR authorities which often suggested that indemnity costs were only warranted as a punishment or where there was a need for conduct deserving moral condemnation were to be put aside.

The circumstances listed in Three Rivers District Council & Others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England do not apply easily to this case. However this is clearly not an exhaustive list. It is also one focused on commercial litigation rather than financial remedy proceedings.

Notwithstanding this, there is more than sufficient in W’s conduct and that of W’s father in relation to their approach the litigation as I have set out above for this case to be one taken out of the norm and which justifies the making of an indemnity order. With specific reference to the freezing order application, W’s father’s sale of 15BL took place at a time not only after financial remedy proceedings had been issued but whilst there was an extant application against W and W’s father and served on each of them for a freezing order against this very property (amongst others) and a hearing date was awaited. Again this is conduct outside of the norm.

Pursuant to CPR 1998 r44.6(1) where the court orders a party to pay costs to another party it may either (i) make a summary assessment of the costs; or (ii) order detailed assessment by a costs officer.

I am invited to make such a summary assessment. Both an N260 and Form H1 have been filed for this purpose.

H seeks a costs order of £592,708.61 to be made jointly and severally against both respondents. This figure has been discounted from W’s full costs by (i) £35,908, being the sum of costs sought in H’s N260 dated 26^th January 2026 (and which resulted in a costs order of £27,000 in his favour at the hearing on 30^th January 2026); and (ii) £2,188, being the sum of costs sought in H’s N260 dated 24^th March 2026 (and which resulted in a costs order of £2,000 in his favour in the order dated 7^th April 2026).

The figure of £592,708.61 (i) does not include H’s costs incurred in pursuing the anti-suit injunction, which were addressed in a separate N260 dated 31^st July 2026 in the sum of £3,014 and which I am invited to deal with separately; (ii) does include £134,016.90 referable to the freezing order applications; and (iii) does not include the c. £50,000 costs in respect of implementation which were included in H’s Form H1 filed in advance of the final hearing, and upon which the figure of £700,000 I refer to above was based.

CPR PD 44 paragraph 9.2 provides a “general rule” that the court should make a summary assessment of the costs of a hearing which has lasted not more than one day. However the court retains a discretion to assess costs summarily even if a hearing exceeds one day. This is clear from authorities including Q v Q (Costs: Summary Assessment) [2002] 2 FLR 668 per Wilson J (as he then was), Timokhina v Timokhin [2019] EWCA Civ 1284, and OG v AG (Financial Remedies: Conduct) per Mostyn J.

It was observed, however, in Q v Q (Costs: Summary Assessment) per Wilson J:

I initially so hesitated in this case. The costs sought are of a level that it is more difficult to form a clear view as to the reasonableness thereof. This is compounded by the fact that although W and her father have had an opportunity to comments on the schedules filed, they have not done so. I therefore do not have the benefit of such a response.

However, given W and W’s father’s respective disengagement and non-engagement in the proceedings there seems little merit in requiring H to incur the delay and costs of a detailed assessment. I shall therefore summarily assess the costs.

The court will not allow costs which have been unreasonably incurred or are unreasonable in amount whether those costs are being assessed on the standard basis or indemnity basis. However where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the indemnity basis (i) the court will resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably incurred or were reasonable in amount in favour of the receiving party; and (ii) the requirement only to allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue does not apply. It is for this reason that as Mostyn J observed in OG v AG (Financial Remedies: Conduct) at [90] on an indemnity assessment one would normally expect about 90% of the actual costs to be awarded.

I have considered the factors to be taken into account in deciding the amount of costs as set out in CPR r44.4. Having done do I consider the appropriate amount to order to be £525,000 which is just a little less than 90% of the full amount claimed.

These costs shall be payable by W and/or her father on a joint and several basis and shall be payable within 14 days.

As I stated in TH v AR and Another at [14], H initially sought an interim injunction and, if I ordered that the parties’ Russian property be retained by him, that the injunction be made final. I later stated as follows:

I have now ordered that H is to retain the Odintsovo property.

I accept the submissions recorded above and for those reasons will now make a final injunction in the terms sought.

As I have set out above, H’s costs in respect of this application were in the sum of £3,014. I summarily assess these costs on the standard basis in the sum of £2,600.

Having carried out the “balancing exercise” espoused in Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2005] 1 AC 593 which has regard to the interests of the parties and the public as protected by ECHR Articles 6, 8 and 10, as considered in the particular circumstances of the individual case, I consider that it appropriate for this judgment to be published on a fully anonymised basis.

I would be grateful if H’s counsel could please prepare a draft order for my consideration and approval.

That is my judgment.