A (A Minor: Domestic Abuse: Welfare) (No 4), Re

The focus of this hearing is on a young child whom I will identify as A. These protracted proceedings concern a dispute between A’s parents about the time she spends with her father. In the course of a fact finding hearing, I made a number of serious findings of domestic abuse against the father. The NYAS caseworker has undertaken extensive enquiries and recommends that A should continue to have indirect contact with the father through correspondence and occasional gifts. A is highly resistant to any video or direct contact with the father; this being a reflection of A’s anxieties and not her views of the father. The parties broadly agree with the caseworker’s recommendations and make a number of ancillary applications giving rise to the following issues:

The fact-finding hearing was procedurally complex as the father did not attend the first part of the hearing, and subsequently applied to set aside the earlier decision to proceed in his absence and to reopen the hearing. These have been the subject of two judgment Re A (A Minor: Preliminary Issue: Proceeding in the absence of a party)[2025] EWFC 346and Re A (A Minor: Proceeding in the absence of a party: Application to set aside) (No. 2)[2025] EWFC 347 that inform the relevant procedural background to this hearing. I have also handed down a third judgment in which I made a number of findings of domestic abuseRe A (A Minor: Domestic Abuse: Fact Finding) (No. 3) [2025] EWFC 351. The present judgment must be read together with the previous judgments.

The parents began their relationship in 2017. They have never been married or cohabited. The mother has three older children, and the father has a young child from a more recent relationship. Earlier in the parents’ relationship, the mother fell pregnant but suffered a miscarriage. Their three-year relationship ended shortly after A was born. The father remained involved in A’s life, but the parents were unable to agree the longer-term arrangements leading to the father initiating these proceedings in the family court on 1 October 2021.

Pursuant to the persisting arrangements at the time, the father collected A from the mother’s address in the morning of 17 December 2021. Thereafter the mother was alone at her address. On returning downstairs, she was confronted by two masked men in her property, with one standing by the front door that was habitually left unlocked and the other facing the mother. The latter of the two men attacked the mother by beating her, throwing a toxic substance in her face, lacerating her face and throat. The mother managed to escape through her living room window facing the front and public side of her property. The two men escaped. There were no signs of forced entry, and nothing was taken from the property.

The police have diligently investigated this horrific attack but have been unable to press charges against any individuals. The scenes of crime photographs of the mother’s property in the aftermath of this attack speak to the ferocity with which the attack was undertaken and what she has had to endure during and since this gruesome event.

The father’s conduct after this event has been the subject of much scrutiny and I will refer to some of the detail later in this judgment. The mother and the police are of the firm view that this attack was orchestrated by the father who through his significant history of criminality has the capacity, the means, and the motive to facilitate this attack upon the mother.

The court proceedings continued. Notwithstanding the assistance of Cafcass, a local authority, an experienced independent social worker and the mother’s support, it has not been possible to establish contact between A and her father. In the most recent reports of the independent social worker, concerns have been raised about A’s serious anxiety on being separated from her mother and the father’s lack of acknowledgement or insight into these concerns.

The mother’s allegations against the father have loomed throughout most of these proceedings but had not been pursued by the mother until more recently. In August 2024, the court determined that a fact-finding hearing was necessary. The parties required a significant period to obtain the necessary disclosure and the fact finding commenced in March 2025. The father applied to adjourn the hearing but failed to attend to pursue his application. For reasons that I have set out in my first of the two earlier judgments, I refused his application for an adjournment and having given him an opportunity to attend, proceeded in his absence. The father subsequently became involved in the continuing hearing in the circumstances that I have detailed in the second of the two aforementioned judgments.

I am grateful to counsel for their helpful submissions which I have carefully considered together with the evidence adduced before me. Importantly, I have had the benefit of hearing the oral evidence of the NYAS caseworker, whose recommendations where further crystallised without changing her central set of recommendations that in he views best meet A’s welfare.

Pursuant to s.1 of the Children Act (1989), A’s welfare is my paramount consideration and that I must make my decision by reference to the ‘welfare checklist’ as set out in s1(3) of the said Act. Unless the contrary is shown, s1(2A) of the Act presumes that the involvement of a parent in a child’s life will further the child’s welfare. Furthermore, the court should only make orders when it is better for the child to make an order than not making one, otherwise referred to as the ‘no order principle’ as set out in s1(5) of the Act.

A is much too young to have an informed view about her circumstances and to express the same. She is a settled and happy child who is well cared for by her mother. In her early years, she experienced the difficulties in the parents’ relationship, was exposed to police intervention to return to her mother’s care, witnessed the scars to her mother’s face left in the aftermath of the attack upon her and experience the cessation in her contact with her father and the paternal family. On any view there can be little doubt that her experiences have contributed to her sustained anxiety at separating from her mother and steadfast refusal to see her father.

Notwithstanding the mother’s profoundly disturbing experiences and views of the father, she has placed A’s interest as the forefront of her concerns and demonstrated her capabilities as mother by supporting A’s ongoing relationship with the father. This is all the more impressive when considered in the context of these unconscionably prolonged proceedings and the father’s conduct and attitude during the proceedings including the after the fact-finding exercise.

The father’s journey in these proceedings has not been a smooth one, with many challenges that have finally seen him arrive at a point where he commendably now accepts that prospects of A living with him or having face to face contact with him are unrealistic and not in A’s best interest. Having said that, it is also clear to me that his journey must continue outside of these proceedings and I am pleased to note his wish to attend a suitable course to address issues of domestic abuse.

There are no significant issues about the range of orders that are available to the court. For reasons that I will detail below, the orders sought are necessary in the context of this case. I will also address the terms of the orders in more detail in the forgoing paragraphs.

Whilst the issues between the parties in this regard is narrow, the frequency of the time that a spends with her father is an important one. The caseworker’s recommendation is that the current monthly frequency of indirect correspondence should continue and as it was put to her, it appears to be established, predictable and manageable by the parents. Importantly, A is used to it and there is no reason to change it. In cross-examination, the caseworker could see no reasons why there should not be two additional annual correspondence centred around A’s birthday and Christmas. She also accepted that a reduction in frequency to fit the school holidays may also provide an appropriate foundation to build on as A becomes older. The caseworker opined that it would be inappropriate to reduce the frequency to six time per annum as this would be an unnecessary and significant reduction to what is already in place and working well.

In my judgment the caseworker’s first recommendation of keeping the arrangement unchanged is the option that will best meet A’s welfare interest. Not only is A used to the arrangements that are tried and tested, but the parents are also accustomed to them. The parents’ ability to maintain the arrangements without support is yet to be tested. I am grateful to the mother’s solicitors who have offered to assist with this for a limited period. Any breakdown of these arrangements will be another change that A would have to cope with and may drive the parties to further protracted litigation. Any reduction in the frequency would be an unnecessary change and an increase may become an intolerable intrusion into the mother’s life that may threaten the solid foundations of the current arrangements and their ultimate breakdown. Therefore, the current child arrangements shall continue indefinitely.

Save in the most exceptional circumstances such orders are by their nature not intended to be long term orders and are guided by the child’s welfare interest being the court’s paramount consideration. Furthermore, the nature of the order must be focused, proportionate and time limited with indefinite orders being only made in the most exceptional circumstances (see AS (the child’s Mother) v Waltham Forest London Borough Council [2024] EWHC 2808).

Given the concerning and tragic history of this case and having heard from the mother in evidence at an earlier hearing, I have no doubt that the mother’s fears and anxieties are genuinely held. I am confident that each day she has to battle the horrors of the past events and what may lie ahead. The father’s conduct in the aftermath of the attack as I have found to be, has given the mother cause to live in fear of A being removed from her care.

In my judgment, it is entirely necessary and proportionate to make a prohibited steps order that prevents the father whether by himself or through the agency of another removing A from the mother’s care. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the length of these proceedings and what the mother has endured, A’s age and her ability to provide any protection for herself, the possible ongoing impact on the mother as A’s primary carer and the mother’s ongoing commitment to supporting A’s relationship with the father, it is necessary and proportionate that such an order should continue for five years.

The above section of the Act empowers the court to “… order that no application for an order under this Act of any specified kind may be made with respect to the child concerned by any person named in the order without leave of the court”. By virtue of s.91(A)(2) the circumstances in which such orders are made include but not limited to the risk of harm to the child or a “relevant individual”, in this case the mother, if future applications are made to the court without such a bar being in place.

Mr Griffiths responds to the application for such an order by the mother through two avenues. Firstly, he submits that there is no requirement for making such an order and secondly any such order should not be for more than two years. Connected to the second issue is the mother’s request that any future applications must be supported by independent evidence that the father has completed a RESPECT accredited DAPP.

Turning to the need for such an order, it is clear to me that given my findings about the father’s conduct prior and during these proceedings, mother’s experiences and A’s significantly anxieties that any future applications by the father are likely to put the mother and A at a risk of harm. A has been involved in proceedings for most of her life and her welfare demands that there is a cessation to proceedings and time for her to enjoy her childhood. This is a clear opinion that is expressed by her caseworker. Such a restriction on the father’s ability to make future application to the court is an encroachment on his rights to a family life and fair trial. However, in my judgment when balanced against the same protected rights of the other parties, such an order is entirely necessary, proportionate and in pursuance of a legitimate aim.

The term of five years that is requested by the mother is in my view disproportionately long. A term of three years is proportionate in the circumstances of the case at the conclusion of which A should have a greater understanding of her circumstances and be better placed to express her views. I sincerely hope that this period will also offer her an opportunity to become less anxious about separating from her mother. I further hope that this will provide a breathing space for some reflection on the father’s part.

Finally, responding to the mother’s request that any future applications must meet preset conditions, Mr Griffiths correctly relies on Stringer v Stringer [2006] EWCA Civ 1617 and Re S (Children); Re E (A child) [2006] EWCA Civ 1190 in which cases the Court of Appeal very clearly stated that the statutory framework does not permit any conditions to be attached to a s.91(14) order. As such, although I understand the reason for the mother wishing to have such conditions in place, I must decline her invitation. At her request I will however order that any future applications during the term of the s.91(14) order shall proceed without notice to her in the first instance.

The above point is developed further by Miss Thornton by reference to Re S (Children): Re E (A child) (above), submitting that there is a clear distinction between conditions that apply to the furtherance of orders under s.8 of the Act and those that relate to future applications which are permissible as they fetter the discretion of any future judge.

The point in issue has become significant in circumstances where the father has made an application for the court to direct him to attend a DAPP which is RESPECT compliant and not RESPECT accredited. I have already observed that such a direction does not fall within the ambit of a Part 25 of the Family procedure Rules (2010) but may be ordered under s11 of the Act.

Mr Metzer KC and Ms Traugott raise serious concerns about any attempt to circumvent structure of the RESPECT approach which requires a twelve-month period of reflection before an individual can commence the course. This, they state to be absent in courses that the father wishes to undertake. They point to the history of this matter and further submit that this is yet another attempt by the father trying to control the court process and to bring the mother back to court as soon as it is possible, especially in circumstances when he continues to deny the court’s serious and important findings.

I have no doubt that the courses that father wish to attend are suitable for a certain cohort of individuals. Whatever course the father attends must not only bring about the much-needed positive changes for the matter to progress, but it must also bring with it a degree of confidence on the part of the mother so that she can better invest and promote A’s relationship with her father. Given that the mother has already expressed clear and certain reservations about the proposed courses, it is unlikely that the completion of any such course would progress matters in the way that the father wishes. Furthermore, for reasons that I have already identified concerning the courts findings and the father’s denial of the same, the father and importantly A will be far better served by attending a suitably RESPECT accredited course that may provide the court with the appropriate necessary evidence.

Therefore, as it is suggested by Miss Thornton, I order the father to attend a RESPECT accredited DAPP and if he wishes to make any future applications he is to provide a copy of all of my judgment in this matter and a report from the DAPP provider with his future applications so that any judge considering the application can proceed on a properly informed basis. I further order that future applications should be reserved to me in the first instance but may be heard by another judge if I should release the case or otherwise be unavailable.