SITTING AT READING
Before:
HHJ MORADIFAR
Sitting as a judge of the High Court
Suzanne Martin
Freelance journalist
Applicant
-and-
The Father
1st Respondent
-and-
The mother
2nd Respondent
-and-
A child
By her guardian
3rd Respondent
Ms Suzanne Martin appeared in person
Mr Dafydd Griffiths (instructed on a direct access basis) for the father.
Mr Anthony Metzer KC and Ms Elisabeth Traugott (instructed by THP Solicitors) for the mother.
Miss Alice Thornton (instructed by NYAS) for the for A by her Guardian pursuant to r.16.4.
Hearing dates: 15 April 2026
JUDGMENT
This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.
HHJ Moradifar
Introduction
At the centre of these protracted proceedings is a five-year-old girl (‘A’) who has for most of her life been the subject of a dispute between her parents. I have handed down four previous judgments in this matter that have concerned the father’s participation in a fact-finding hearing, my conclusions in the fact-finding hearing which concerned the mother’s very serious allegations of abuse by the father and a more recent judgment in which I have set out how the father may spend some indirect time with his daughter.
Ms Martin has attended most hearings since the matter was reallocated to me in the summer of 2024 and applies for the easing of the reporting restrictions so that she can identify and name the father. This she argues is in the interest of the public given the father’s criminal history and the findings of domestic abuse in these proceedings. The application was supported by the mother but opposed by the father and the guardian through whom the child is represented. The mother changed her position after receiving advice from police and is now neutral.
In the foregoing paragraphs I will set out a brief summary of the relevant background, the applicable legal principles, and a summary of the parties’ respective submissions before turning to my analysis and conclusions.
Background
The parents were in a three-year relationship which ceased shortly before A was born. Although, there was some measure of agreement between the parents about the time A could spend with the father, they could not agree the longer-term arrangements leading to the father’s applying to the court for child arrangement orders in October 2021. The proceedings have continued, concluding with my recent judgment in which I have made orders regulating the indirect time that A spends with the father and address any future applications.
During the morning of a day in December 2021, pursuant to the persisting arrangements at the time, the father collected A from the mother’s address. Later that morning, alone at her address, the mother was confronted by two masked men in her property. One of the intruders attacked the mother by beating her, throwing a toxic substance in her face as well as lacerating her face and throat. The mother managed to escape through her living room window out onto the public side of her property. The two men escaped. There were no signs of forced entry, and nothing was taken from the property. The police continue to investigate this terrible event but have been unable to charge any individuals.
The police included the father in their investigations, and the mother continues to believe that the father orchestrated the attack on her. In the meantime, arrangements between the parents for A were becoming increasingly difficult and have continued such that she has not seen her father for more than two years. Despite significant professional support and intervention, A has continued to display high levels of anxiety around seeing her father and separating from her mother. As I have recently observed, notwithstanding the exceedingly difficult circumstances of the family, the mother has been incredibly supportive of A’s relationship with the father and has done all that she can to progress it.
The nature of the dispute and allegations between the parents necessitated a fact-finding hearing to determine the allegations levied against the father. I made a number of significant findings that included the father’s domestic abuse of the mother, his dishonest and evasive conduct during the police instigations together with his lack of honesty in these proceedings. I also found the evidence to be lacking in support of an allegation that the father had any involvement in the attack on the mother and did not make any findings in this regard.
Legal framework
There are no material differences between the parties about the relevant legal principles. The difference in their approach to the application of these principles is detailed in the later of sections of this judgment. Ms Martin, Mr Metzer and Ms Traugott make particular reference to Summers & Anor v White & Ors [2024] EWFC 182where I set out a summary of the legal principles as detailed by Lieven J and approved by the Court Appeal. Counsel, particularly Mr Griffiths and Miss Thornton each refer to other authorities that I have considered. As expected, the more recent decision of Theis J in A Local Authority v X and others [2025] EWFC 126 is particularly helpful where she sets out the application of the Supreme Court decision inAbbasi v Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2025] UKSC 15 adding invaluable observations to the existing guiding principles that may be summarised as follows:
section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act (1960) places 'considerable restrictions' on the publication of information from family proceedings, and
section 97 of the Children Act (1989) places a prohibition on the identification of a child who is the subject of proceedings, but the court may 'relax' such prohibition,
unlike the provisions of the 1960 Act, the provisions of section 97 of the 1989 Act cease at the conclusion of the proceedings, and
any easing of the restrictions under section 97 must be in circumstances that is compliant with convention rights and not just demanded by welfare requirements of a child (Norfolk County Council v Webster[2007] 1 FLR 1146 per Munby J).
In this context, the interest of the child is not paramount but the primary consideration which requires the court to assess the impact of the proposed reporting with an 'intense focus' on the elements of the claimed rights in each particular case. (Re J (A Child) [2013] EWHC 2694 (fam) per Sir James Munby P referring to ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home department [2011] UKSC 4 and Re S (A child) [2004] UKHL 47).
In doing so, the court is tasked with undertaking a ‘structured’ approach to Convention rights beyond a balancing exercise. The balancing exercise is undertaken after the court has addressed whether:
there has been an interference with the protected rights as prescribed by law,
this is in pursuance of a legitimate aim,
was such an interference necessary in a democratic society.
(per Lord Reed and Lord Brigg [128] Abassi).
When Articles 8 and 10 (ECHR 1950) are engaged:
neither takes precedent over the other,
a conflict between the two necessitates an 'intense focus on the comparative rights' under each article, and
must be proportionate.
(Re S above quoting from Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers [2004] 2 WLR 1232), and
the court is tasked with scrutinising the cogency of the relevant evidence relied upon in support of the competing arguments (see Abbassi [155], [159] and [181] per Theis J [66] A Local Authority).
there is no presumption in favour of open justice or a ‘weighted balance’ (per Theis J in a Local Authority at [65] referring to Abbassi [51], [120]-121] and [128]).
The hierarchy of different Article 10 rights include political speech as the top item that it essential to democracy, then 'intellectual and educational speeches' that are important to democracy and finally artistic speech, with the latter two being important to the development 'of individual's potential to play a full part in society'. (per Lady Hale at 148 in Campbell above)
Rights to privacy go beyond issues of publication and include access to information by third parties. Furthermore, repetition of information or repetition of disclosure of information as well as repeated publication may constitute further and 'unjustified' interference of an individuals' right to privacy and extends to those with whom he/she is involved. This requires the court to give 'due weight to the qualitive differences' in the intrusion and any causal distress. (King LJ in Newman v Southampton City Council [2021] 1 WLR 2900).
Harm from publication to the subject child must not be assumed, especially where there has already been some publicity and the court must take an objective view about 'the reasonable expectation of privacy.' (Clayton v Clayton [2006] 3 WLR 599 and Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1176).
Submissions
The applicant
Ms Martin makes her submissions by reference to the broader and general public interest before applying those to the specific considerations in this case. She readily recognises that both Article 10 and Article 8 (ECHR) are engaged and in competition, referring to section 12(4) of the Human Rights Act (1998) which mandates the court to have particular regard to the right to freedom of expression and the public interest argument when the material is journalistic. She further points to the cultural shift in transparency in family proceedings and the 2021 guidance from the President of the Family Division titled Confidence and Confidentiality: Transparency in the Family Courts. she relies on the case of White (ibid) as illustrative of three general propositions:
The public interest is naming an individual engaged in serious abuse and/or criminal activity that extend beyond private domestic context is especially strong.
The child’s anonymity or Article 8 rights cannot serve as a shield for the abuser where principles of open justice and protection of others point the other way.
The child may continue to be protected by anonymity even if a parent is publicly identified.
Ms Martin further submits that the findings of the court are serious against a background of the father’s established criminality and the court’s findings about his conduct in the aftermath of the attack upon the mother as well as continuing litigation conduct throughout these protracted proceedings. The nature and facts of this case fall outside ‘private family dysfunction’ and raise serious public interest beyond the confines of the present case. By continuing to draw parallels with White (Ibid), she observes that in the present case the findings are profoundly serious that include findings of dishonesty within the proceedings and beyond that must be considered in the context of the father’s known criminal history. Furthermore, there is a significant amount of information already in the public domain. A’s anonymity will be observed in any event with prohibition on identifying her or any personal information about her that may lead to her identification. Ms Martin concludes that accurate reporting that includes no findings be made about the father’s involvement in the attack on the mother adds further weight to the public interest and identification of the father.
The mother
At first the mother strongly supported Ms Martin’s application. Mr Metzer KC and Ms Traugott rely on Ms Martin’s careful submissions and add that the evidence about the mother’s parenting and her capacity to provide optimal care of A is beyond dispute and her commitment to supporting an ongoing relationship between A and the father in the circumstances of this case and her personal feelings exemplifies the mother’s capacity as a parent and demonstrates her ability to appropriately and sensitively address any issues for A that may be caused by publicity. It would be unrealistic to assume that A can be protected from learning about her father given the significant amount of information that is already in the public domain. A will inevitably have to confront her parents’ circumstances as she grows up and the mother is best placed to deal with the issues as they arise in an age appropriate a sensitive fashion.
They advance the public interest argument further by submitting that the renewed publicity may assist the police in their investigations which remain open, particularly given the court’s determination about the father’s alleged involvement with the attack on the mother. Approached from a different angle, it is important to the mother to set out her side and she initially offered to waive her rights to anonymity. Mr Metzer KC and Ms Traugott readily accept that such a waiver is without effect to the current standard restrictions that are in place and continue to invite me to grant Ms Martin’s application.
This position has since softened after considering the concerns raised by the police about the safety of the mother and child and that their view that there is a need for a risk assessment so that the police can put in place appropriate safeguards if any party is to be named. The mother now takes a neutral position on the application and no longer wishes to be publicly identified.
The father
The father strongly resists the application. Mr Griffiths submits that whilst the court’s findings are serious, they are not of a nature that raise public interest to a degree or nature that would justify interfering with the normal rules of confidentiality. The court must proceed on a ‘binary’ basis by recognising the lack of any findings that connect the father to the attack on the mother. The continued interest and the assertions in this regard elevate the concerns about the publication of an unfounded and wrong assertion which can bring with it serious reputational damage to the father. Such concerns also apply to publicly identifying him as having conducted himself in the manner that the court has found which would be disproportionate and unnecessary. Once publication is permitted, there will be little control over how the information is published with any accuracy.
Mr Griffiths further submits that the father’s primary concern is the impact on A and the prospects of identification. The information that is already in the public domain is dated and any new publication is likely to result in renewed interest in the existing material as well as the fresh material from these proceedings, thus exposing A to an unnecessary risk of identification and distress if she becomes aware of the information in an unplanned and uncontrolled manner. The ensuing risks to A are probable with possible lifelong consequences for her. The guardian’s views in this respect are crucial, and the father relies on the views expressed by the guardian in her opposition to the application.
The guardian
Opposing the application Miss Thornton adds to Mr Griffiths’ submissions by raising serious concerns about the prospect of A being identified or that information may be imparted to her in an uncontrolled and potentially damaging way. This may come from older children at school, or older siblings of A’s peer group. Whilst she has not made any further submissions following the receipt of the views of the police, I have no doubt that she would rely on those as supporting the guardian’s opposition to publications.
Analysis and conclusions
In Re B (Care proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35 Lord Justice Hoffman observed that;
“...if a legal rule requires the facts to be proved a judge must decide whether or not it happened. There is no room for a finding that it might have happened; the law operates a binary system in which the only values are nought and one.”
Thus, as already noted, Mr Griffiths submits that there is nothing unusual in the court’s findings that would distinguish it from the majority of family cases in which such findings are made and the rules of confidentiality continue to apply. Such a submission, which is entirely properly made, also serves to dilute the concerns raised against publication in the ‘balance’ where the value of ‘0’ is allocated to the allegations of the father’s involvement in the attack upon the mother.
The task of the court to undertake a risk assessment (see for example PD12J) and the task facing the Police are different subspecies of risk evaluation. When protecting the public, the police are required to take account of different classes of information some of which are not established as fact that include a subcategory of information that may be categorised as ‘intelligence.’ Furthermore, as is suggested in this case, based on its own risk evaluation. The police may have to deploy additional resources to protect mother and child. This will come at a cost to the public purse which is an important factor that must be considered.
The perpetrators of the attack upon the mother are still at large and whilst I accept the submissions by Mr Metzer KC and Ms Traugott that publication of the father’s identity and greater publicity may lead to an increased likelihood of identifying the perpetrators, this must be considered in light of the risk of the mother and A being identified elevating the prospects of exposure to the very men who attacked her or their associates.
There is already a great deal of information about the father in the public domain that include some of his criminal activities and convictions. There is also publicly available information about the attack upon the mother identifying her as the victim. The information about each of the parents is now dated with no evidence suggesting that at present it holds any general public attention. Any identification of the father is likely to lead to a greater public attention and resurrection of the already available information that will in turn add further concern to the identification of the mother or A, thus, creating a greater intrusion into the parties’ lives. Such an intrusion by its nature may be repetitive and compound its impact within undefinable temporal limits.
The resurrected attention on the father and any consequential identification of A, may cause A to be confronted with inaccurate information about her family, create tensions within her peer group or older children such as siblings of her peers, intrude into her school life, and cause her harm. However, this must be considered in the light of the mother’s capacity to address these issues with A and to protect her which is most likely to moderate and alleviate the resultant harm.
In this matter there is a significant tension between the protected rights under Art.10 and those of the parties’ respective protected rights under Art.8 with neither taking priority over the other. These rights may only be interfered with if such an interference is necessary, proportionate in accordance with the law and in pursuance of a legitimate aim. It may seem paradoxical that an individual whose conduct and behaviour may raise concerns for the public should have his identity protected by operation of rules of confidentiality within the family court. However, in the instant case, the safety and protection of A and her mother must be given priority. Accordingly, I dismiss Ms Martin’s application for permission to publicly identify the father.
___________________________________________________________________________