Bartok v Brunner

I will now give a short ex tempore judgment following the hearing today. I am sitting as a High Court judge in England and Wales, sitting in the Family Court, hearing two distinct matters. One is a contested divorce application between the applicant and respondent; and the second and very much related to that, is the disputed application for financial remedies following the end of the marriage between the applicant and the respondent.

This is the fourth occasion on which I have heard these proceedings. The background can be very briefly summarised. The applicant is Ms Dorrottya Bartok. She is a Hungarian national who was born in April 1992. She became a British national in April 2026 against a background of having resided in London, in England and Wales for some considerable period of time. The respondent to the application is Angelique Brunner. She was born in California, in the United States of America, in January 1972. The parties met in 2019 and became engaged to be married later that year. They were married on 30 July 2020 in the United States of America. They have no children. The marriage ran into difficulties, and the parties separated in September 2025. On 6 October 2025, the applicant applied for divorce in the jurisdiction of England and Wales. On 14 October 2025, Deputy District Judge Stuart made an order for substituted service of the divorce application out of the jurisdiction to the respondent in the United States of America. On 7 November 2025, the respondent applied to set aside the order of Deputy District Judge Stuart.

I need not say much more about the factual background for the purposes of today. I then heard this matter on 16 February 2026. On that occasion, the applicant was represented by Vardags Solicitors and Mr Richard Todd KC. The respondent was represented by Winckworth Sherwood LLP and by leading counsel Ms Alexis Campbell KC. I heard legal argument over the course of one day. The applicant attended in person and London, and the respondent was given permission to attend via video link and did so throughout the hearing.

Following the 16 February hearing, I handed down a judgment, formally, on 18 March 2026. In that judgment, amongst other matters, I set aside the order of the deputy district judge permitting alternative service out of the jurisdiction. I then re-made that decision, and I was not satisfied in respect of service. However, it was my clear understanding of the position of both parties represented that there was no dispute that this Court could make interim orders pursuant to section 22 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to provide for maintenance pending suit, and the applicant’s application was for a substantial sum of interim maintenance from the respondent. The respondent’s position on that was to accept, notwithstanding the difficulties with service, an order for maintenance pending suit could be made from the date of issue of the proceedings and, therefore, the dispute for me was not about the Court’s jurisdiction or authority or power to make the maintenance pending suit order; the issue was the quantum of the order.

I was also asked to determine a contested legal services payment order pursuant to section 22ZA of the 1973 Act and, again, the issue before me was not whether the Court had jurisdictional power to make those interim orders, it being accepted by the respondent that the Court had jurisdiction to make the order from the date of issue of the proceedings; the contest, again, was on quantum. I made orders for maintenance pending suit and a legal services payment orders.

In addition, leading counsel for the respondent asked me to make directions for a hearing to determine forum conveniens. “Forum conveniens” is a straightforward and well-known concept where parties cannot agree which of more than one jurisdictions is the most appropriate and convenient jurisdiction to litigate. The issue put in issue by the respondent was that Florida State in the United States of America was a more convenient jurisdiction than the jurisdiction of England and Wales. I therefore acceded to the respondent counsel’s submissions and made directions for evidence, the instruction of an expert in Florida law, and I set the matter down for a contested forum conveniens hearing in July. Just to repeat, for the avoidance of doubt, it was plainly my understanding and the understanding of the applicant’s legal team that the respondent, by asking the Court to determine forum conveniens, was accepting there was jurisdiction in England and Wales and jurisdiction in Florida. The issue for the Court to determine at the forthcoming hearing in July 2026 is which of those two jurisdictions that have jurisdiction would be the more convenient place to litigate the divorce and financial remedies issues. I went on to make other directions.

The perfection of the order following the hand down of the judgment on 18 March took place at a hearing on 27 March 2026. At that hearing, the applicant, again, attended in person and was represented by Vardags and leading counsel, Mr Richard Todd KC, who appeared remotely. The respondent was represented at that hearing by Winckworth Sherwood LLP and by Mr Tim Amos KC. The respondent did not attend, and that is because I gave permission for the parties not to attend because it was a short hearing to deal with the terms of the order. At that hearing, I largely acceded to Mr Amos’ submissions regarding the timing of payments for the backdated maintenance and legal services payment order, and the timings for payments going forward up to the hearing of the forum dispute in July.

It is important I say in this judgment, at no stage during that hearing, did Mr Amos KC, on behalf of the respondent, seek permission to appeal. It was open to him to do so, and I would have heard any application. He did not do so, and, in my understanding, he has not sought any application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the orders I made in the three areas of maintenance pending suit, legal services and the direction for the forum conveniens hearing.

I had a third hearing in this matter at the end of April. That was an application by the applicant for a third-party debt order. I made an interim third-party debt order without notice on the papers and listed the matter for an early return date. The respondents to the third-party debt order were the respondent to this application, and a second respondent, which was Winckworth Sherwood LLP. At that hearing, Winckworth Sherwood attended, through a partner, and they instructed counsel, Mr Samuel Cuthbert, to appear on their behalf. It became apparent at that hearing that the respondent did not appear, and, it is my understanding, was not represented, because Winckworth Sherwood were there in their own stead, given they were a respondent to the application. No explanation was provided as to why the respondent did not attend. I refused to make a third-party debt order and dealt with ancillary issues.

The purpose of the hearing today is to deal with three D11 applications. D11 is the application form for a freestanding application within proceedings in either divorce or financial remedy proceedings. There is one dated 15 April 2026, one dated 21 April 2026, and one dated 6 May 2026. It is fair to say, the first two of those applications deal with the wholesale non-compliance with the orders I made at the end of March. They further deal with service, what is called a “Hadkinson order”, a request for an unless order and also, there is also an application for expedition of the divorce, the dismissal of the directions up to, and the, forum conveniens hearing, a Hemain injunction to prevent the respondent continuing to litigate towards issues in Florida and/or Colorado and certain declarations and findings in respect of judgment debts owed following the orders made.

The 6 May 2026 application asked for me to sit in public today, it being noted that in the hearings in February, March and April 2026, it being the agreed position that those three hearings I had sat in private. I should note in that regard that I have published two judgments in this jurisdiction. Those judgments fully anonymise the parties’ names and avoid the risk of jigsaw identification through the careful deployment of description of parties.

At the hearing today to consider, therefore, those three D11 applications, once again, the applicant is present in court and is represented again by Vardags and Mr Richard Todd KC. Ms Brunner is not present in court 35 at the Royal Courts of Justice. She is not on the remote link that has been provided and sent to her. The link has been kept open before the outset of the commencement of the hearing at 10.30am and remains open just now at 2.45pm. Ms Brunner has not joined at any stage. She is neither represented by solicitors nor counsel at this hearing.

I made enquiries at the outset of the hearing of Mr Todd KC to find out what information has been provided to her, and it is clear to me she is aware of the three applications. They have all been emailed to her and, indeed, were emailed to Winckworth Sherwood, who were acting for her until very recently. I should note to say Winckworth Sherwood have now come off the record, and that happened recently, so the respondent is, therefore, a litigant in person, although I should note the Court is very used to dealing with litigants in person, but I am satisfied that it was not appropriate to adjourn this hearing. I am satisfied that the respondent knows about it, and I am satisfied that it is fair to continue to hear the applications in the absence of the respondent.

Summarising matters generally, the purpose of the legal services payment order was to permit the applicant to fairly litigate the financial remedy proceedings against the respondent, but since that order was made at the end of March, it has not been complied with, which places the applicant in a very difficult situation, because she continues to instruct solicitors and counsel, but has had neither the historic costs nor the £100,000 per month from April provided to her that I ordered, which makes it very difficult for her to fairly continue to litigate these important issues. It would, in those circumstances, and against that backdrop, have been unfair to her to have adjourned this hearing to provide the respondent a further opportunity to attend to set out her position.

Accordingly, it is entirely fair to proceed with this hearing today in the absence of the respondent. The second issue to which I should turn is the question of whether I do or do not sit in public. That was the third of the D11 applications, and is dated 6 May. I made directions on the papers that that application was to be served on the respondent by email. I am told that it has been served by email, and I am satisfied that the respondent has received it. It is a significant step in some ways, because the previous three hearings have been in private. Those hearings have been in private because that was the agreed position of the parties at those hearings, and I did not have to grapple with the need or otherwise to sit in public.

However, I remind myself there are two sets of proceedings before me: the divorce proceedings, because I still have to deal with the issue of service. In addition, there are the financial remedies proceedings. It is clear from Rule 7.30 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 that the general rule is that hearings in respect of divorce proceedings are heard in public because they go to questions of status. Rule 7.30(3) provides that a hearing or any part of it may be in private. Therefore, the Court has a discretion to sit in private. A number of reasons are set out at Rule 7.30(3). None of them seem to be particularly apposite for the purposes of today’s hearing. Publicity would not defeat the object of this hearing. It does not concern matters of national security. There are no protected parties or children. It is not a without-notice application, and nobody has advanced any reason why it is necessary in the interests of justice to sit in private.

The only issue that causes me some concern is 7.30(3)(c), “It involves confidential information (including information relating to personal financial matters), and publicity would damage that confidentiality”. It is because of that reason that many financial remedy cases are heard in private. However, I am principally concerned at this hearing with questions of service, the non-compliance with orders that I have made and steps to provide for further enforcement of the orders made in late March 2026. Whilst at the February hearing, I was concerned with some level of private information regarding the parties, that is not the case today. Questions of divorce being heard in public are longstanding. Open justice principles are very important. Of course, I remind myself in respect of financial remedy proceedings that the Court is always having to grapple with the Article 8 right to respect to private life of the parties and balancing that, as it must, with the Article 10 rights of freedom of expression of the press, sometimes the parties and possibly others.

It is not lost on me that the reason for this hearing and possibly the reason, in part, for the application to sit in public is driven by what Mr Todd KC describes as “the litigation misconduct” of the respondent. In his helpful written argument for today’s proceedings, he reminds me of the case of Lykiardopulo v Lykiardopulo [2010] EWCA Civ 1315. That is a decision of the Court of Appeal, in which judgments were given by Thorpe LJ, Stanley Burnton LJ and Tomlinson LJ. I remind myself about what is said by Thorpe LJ at paragraph 72:

“Should public judgment or the threat of public judgment be used as an aid to enforcement? I think not. There are statutory and other remedies both for enforcement within the jurisdiction, enforcement within Europe and enforcement worldwide. For European enforcement, I recognise a distinction is drawn between maintenance orders and orders encompassing the property consequences of divorce. Nevertheless, the question of publication should, in my judgment, be kept quite separate from questions of enforcement”.

That is an important dictum which I apply to the application before me today. The background to Lykiardopulo was that the information that was provided by the husband in those proceedings was false. The Court concluded that, having provided false information to the Court, there was no proper confidentiality in play and, therefore, publicity was forfeit. Dealing with matters in private was inappropriate. I also bear in mind Mr Todd KC’s reference to Re S (A Child) [2004] UKHL 47, and I have firmly in mind the necessary balancing act between Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention.

This is not one of those cases where I need to engage with any of the purported two strands between different thinking of judges of the Division about whether these types of cases, that is to say, financial remedy cases, should be in private or public. I adhere with the views of the lead judge for financial remedies, Peel J, in the case of Tsvetkov v Khayrova [2023] EWFC 130. However, this is really not one of those cases because a large part of this case is divorce, which should be heard in public, and it is very difficult to divorce the divorce proceedings from the financial remedy proceedings at this hearing.

I am, in any event, in respect of the financial remedies, materially assisted by Mr Todd KC’s reference to the decision of Recorder Cusworth QC, as he then was, in the case of Bloom v Bloom [2018] EWFC B10, where three key principles are set out in Mr Todd’s document. The first is that a party who fails to comply with orders has broken a pact of the Court, and by the implied undertaking, the Court ensures confidentiality in exchange for full participation in the proceedings. Secondly, whilst publication is not a punishment, there is a public policy reason weighing against anonymity in non-disclosure cases. He then quotes from a case called W v W [2004] 1 FLR 494 with the following:

“…the prospect of public condemnation in the event that the default is exposed will act as a deterrent, and so reduce the incidence of such misconduct”.

I note that, but that does not undermine my reference to Thorpe LJ that publication cannot be used as any form of enforcement, but I note what is said. Possibly, more importantly, Mr Todd KC’s third point is in reliance on what Mostyn J said in Veluppillai v Veluppillai [2016] 2 FLR 681, which is the following:

“…the right to privacy in the hearing of an ancillary relief application would be forfeited on proof of iniquity…The public should be aware of the scale of problems that courts administering justice and implementing the rule of law have to face at the hands of unrepresented and malevolent litigants determined to do everything they can to destroy the process”.

That is the jurisprudential background. I am satisfied, because I am primarily dealing with divorce and the service of the divorce proceedings, that it is appropriate to sit in public. Inasmuch as it is necessary to traverse aspects of financial remedies at this hearing, at which both matters are being dealt with, it is extremely difficult to disentangle the divorce and the financial remedies proceedings. I could sit in public for one and private for another, but one then gets into acute difficulties about what is in the public domain and what is not in the public domain. Ultimately, open justice is a fundamental principle of the common law, which applies to family justice as to anywhere else, with the obvious safeguards as set out in the Family Procedure Rules.

Above all else, I note that every opportunity has been given to the respondent to attend court today to advance submissions contrary to my sitting in open court today. She is aware of that, and she has not provided any submissions in writing or otherwise. She has provided no evidence. I am satisfied on the balance of the issues that it is appropriate to sit in public. I have raised with Mr Todd KC that whilst I am sitting in public, there are no members of the public present, and there are no members of the press present. However, it may well be that Vardags will seek a transcript of this rather rough and ready ex tempore judgment. Should they seek a transcript, and as and when it is approved by me, should they ask me to publish it, there will be an opportunity given to the respondent to consider the judgment and provide any written submissions as to publication or otherwise, seven days after it is provided to her by my clerk. That is the first issue. I am, therefore, sitting in public today.

Having determined that I am sitting in public, it is necessary to go back to my order of 27 March 2026. That order has a number of definitions that are set out at sections one to seven. The order notes that:

“The respondent has stated she does not submit to the jurisdiction of England and Wales other than to contest the applicant’s divorce application from proceeding in England. The applicant has made no admission of whether the respondent has submitted or not”.

That recital was agreed by the parties. However, it must be understood in the context of what I have already said that in asking for a hearing to determine forum conveniens, the applicant was accepting there is a dispute about whether the jurisdiction of England and Wales or the jurisdiction of the courts in Florida was the most convenient one. Recital eight can only be interpreted in that way. That is made further clear by recital 10 of that order because, as it says:

“And upon the respondent serving her Part 25 application for expert evidence on Florida and Colorado family law on the eve of 16 February 2026 hearing”.

That is plainly a reference to her seeking expert evidence to make good her forum conveniens argument that Florida or Colorado was the more convenient jurisdiction than England and Wales. It can be seen at paragraph 11 of that order that it was for the respondent to apply to set aside the order of the deputy district judge for alternative service. I then, at paragraph 12, set aside the order of the deputy district judge. I did so, paying comity to the jurisdiction of the United States of America, and paying comity to the citizens of the United States of America and the judicial authorities in the United States of America, and I set out my reasons for applying that approach in an earlier judgment published in these proceedings.

The application for the divorce and the financial remedy proceedings were therefore stayed to permit determination of the respondent’s own forum non conveniens application dispute. Both parties agreed to there being a stay in any other jurisdiction, and the parties agreed the following:

“Neither the applicant nor the respondent shall take any further steps in any other jurisdiction other than for a stay for either dissolution of marriage or nullity, pending the outcome of the forum non conveniens dispute”.

There was then provision for the instruction of a single joint expert in Florida family law, a requirement that the respondent file a narrative statement, importantly, setting out where she had spent time over the previous three years, because that was highly relevant to her case in respect of Florida. I then ordered that there should be payments of maintenance pending suit, as follows:

“The respondent shall, on or before 6 April 2026, pay to the applicant backdated maintenance pending suit from the 5 November 2025 to the 18 March 2026 in an amount of £36,573.08 (This on the basis that the applicant will continue to have the use of her current car).

The respondent shall use her best endeavours to ensure that the applicant’s current tenancy is extended to the end of July 2026 and if she is unable to do so through no fault of her own, then she shall pay £8,450 per calendar month on the 6th of each month in advance, from the date when the applicant has to vacate her current tenancy until the determination of the forum non conveniens dispute.

The respondent shall pay the applicant maintenance pending suit from 18 March 2026 in the sum of £13,849 per month. Sums shall be payable monthly in advance or until determination of the Respondent’s stay application and forum non conveniens. The first payment shall be made on 1 April 2026 and shall include the amount due for the period 18 March 2026 to 30 April 2026. The first payment shall be £19,657.27.”

I then dealt with the legal services provision order, as follows:

“On or before 3 April 2026, the respondent shall pay or cause to be paid to the applicant’s solicitors, a lump sum to cover the historic costs and costs to the end of the forum non conveniens hearing in the sum of £175,000 including VAT.

On or before 10 April 2026, the respondent shall pay or cause to be paid to the applicant’s solicitors, a lump sum to cover the LSPO costs in the sum of £125,000 including VAT.

The respondent shall pay to the applicant’s solicitors a monthly sum of £100,000 including VAT on the 6^th of the month, commencing on 6^th April 2026 and concluding on 6 July 2026, until the total sum of £700,000 including VAT (and the payments in paragraphs 27 and 28 above) have been paid.

I set the matter down for a pre-trial review and a final hearing of the forum conveniens matter in July. Costs of the proceedings were reserved to the forum non conveniens hearing. No application was made to appeal that order by the respondent.

The applicant has since filed written evidence for the purposes of the application today, and I can see in her fifth witness statement her evidence that the maintenance pending suit and legal services payment orders have not been complied with. What the respondent has chosen to do instead is make a payment in April and May 2026 for the sum of approximately £5,500. That is the sum she unilaterally determined was the appropriate sum following the breakdown of the marriage. It is the sum that she thinks is reasonable. It is not the sum that the Court considered was appropriate for the applicant. Apart from those two payments of £5,500, the evidence of the applicant is that no other payments have been made to her, and it is the position of Vardags and Mr Todd KC that the payments have not been made, and that is evidenced.

There is also further evidence provided today in respect of the question of service. , I note the evidence in the proceedings, which is that there was an attempt to personally serve the respondent at her address in Miami, Florida in the United States on 10 February 2026, and I have seen the process server’s evidence in respect of that. It was attempted but failed. The respondent was then served with the originating applications in the divorce and financial remedies proceedings on 16 February, but there were then further efforts at service, and some of these took place through the official channels.

There is a reference in the evidence today to a letter from His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunal Service, which provides for evidence delivered to the Senior Master of the Senior Courts of England and Wales for the attention of the Foreign Process Section, which shows that service was attempted on the respondent at her address in Miami. That relates to certificates of attestation showing an attempt on 10 February, but significantly more efforts were made on 14 April, 15 April, 16 April, 17 April, 18 April, including the evidence of the process server, who believes there was somebody in the apartment, looking through a peephole, but not providing access. There were further attempts on 19 April and on 20 April. Those are the attempts at service.

In respect of the application before me today, the applicant has provided the opinion of an experienced attorney in the law of Florida, Mr David Hazouri. He sets out, over a number of pages, his professional opinion on the question of service in the State of Florida in the United States of America. It is signed and dated 13 April 2026. It does not need to be set out in detail in this judgment, but, having surveyed both the statutory and case law material from the courts in Florida, he says this:

“I conclude from the above that:

(a)

An English Court may correctly assume that service by email is permitted in Florida on an international defendant;

(b)

This is subject to the conditions that (a) an order is made by a competent Court; (b) the email service is intended to achieve actual notice; and (c) that service was not prohibited by international agreement”.

He sets out that service by email is not prohibited under the law of Florida. He also makes clear, having reference to case law, that there is no need for due diligence to be provided in terms of efforts at service. Therefore, the application before me by the applicant is to consider again the question of service. A number of options have been put forward by how that may be achieved, by Mr Todd KC. I am satisfied the appropriate method is for me today to make an order approving alternative service by email on the respondent. I have previously set out in my judgment the need for comity between jurisdictions and the fact that service is an exercise of sovereignty, but that exercise of sovereignty cannot defeat proper process and fairness. The applicant in these proceedings has diligently tried to serve the respondent now over many months, and for whatever reason, the respondent is putting herself in a position where she will not accept service. I am entirely satisfied, therefore, that the laws of England and Wales permit me to provide and grant permission for service by email, and that is not prohibited by the laws of Florida on the evidence before me.

Again, I note that the respondent set out certain views on the law of Florida in February, but she has not provided any evidence in respect of the updated position provided by the applicant. She has had plenty of opportunity to do so and has not done so. Therefore, I approve service out of the jurisdiction of England and Wales on the applicant by email. I also make clear that all further documents that are required in these proceedings, either to be provided by the Court or served upon the respondent by the applicant, may be provided by email.

The other issue in the 15 April 2026 application was a request for an unless order to be made in respect of the non-payment of the maintenance pending suit and the legal services payment order. I am not satisfied at this stage that it is appropriate to strike out various matters on the basis of an unless order. The alternative or, indeed, possibly parallel application is an application for what is called a “Hadkinson order”, and to that issue I now turn. A “Hadkinson order” is a reference to the very well-known case of Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] P 285, a well-known decision of Lord Denning. That was a case where the Court of Appeal refused to hear a mother’s appeal while she remained in contempt by failing to return the child to England. The principle, effectively, is not one of punishment for contempt but rather a case management tool to prevent a party from using the Court while they are in reliance on their own disobedience, which, of course, obstructs justice.

Mr Todd KC relies on the case of De Gafforj v De Gafforj [2018] EWCA Civ 2070 and the case of Mubarak v Mubarik [2004] EWHC 1158 (Fam). That, effectively, set out that the court should consider five questions:

I have considered all of that case law and am materially assisted by the recent decision of Ahmad & Anor v Faraj [2025] EWCA Civ 468, a decision of King LJ. She sets out reference to Hadkinson orders at paragraphs 30 to 40 of her judgment, and it is those principles which I am expressly applying in this application.

Turning against that background and the evidence which I have briefly summarised, it does seem to me it is plain that apart from the two payments of £5,500, the respondent has failed to comply with my orders in respect of making payments to the applicant as set out in my 27 March 2026 order under the headings “Maintenance Pending Suit” and “Legal Services Payment Order”, which I have already quoted in this judgment. She has failed to comply with those orders. She has not made those payments. I am satisfied that she is in contempt for failing to do so.

I am also secondly satisfied that that failure to comply with my orders is both deliberate and continuing. I, of course, when I made the orders on 27 March, had heard from her leading counsel over the course of a day’s legal argument about her assets. On her own case, her assets were around $60,000,000, and she had $ 500,000 liquid. Having considered that and the submissions of her counsel, I was entirely satisfied that she was able to make the payments, and the structure of the payments that was set out in my order largely followed her own leading counsel’s submissions as to how those payments should be made. Therefore, I have no doubt that her contempt in failing to comply with those orders is her deliberate choice, and it is continuing. It seems clear to me she simply flouts the jurisdiction of this Court. She does not consider herself bound by my orders, and she continues to make unilateral decisions about what she considers is the appropriate amount of maintenance to be provided to the applicant.

Does that contempt create an impediment to the course of justice? It is plainly obvious that it does. Dealing first and most importantly, from my perspective, the legal services payment order, as I explained in my judgment, is to provide for an equality of arms and the fairness between spouses to permit one, who may be financially disadvantaged to fairly and properly litigate with equality of arms, which is protected by the English common law and, of course, by Article 6 of the European Convention. That is the specific purpose of section 22Z of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The non-compliance with my orders hugely disadvantages the applicant in fairly litigating these issues.

Is there any other realistic and effective remedy? I have experienced matrimonial finance lawyers in front of me. I do not think they have been able to come up with other avenues or routes. They did try a third-party debt order, which was, I think, relatively imaginative, and I described as “high risk” in an earlier judgment. There are no other remedies other than the matters I am also dealing with today, with the exception of the question of sitting in public.

Lastly, I look at all of the matters in the round and consider whether making a Hadkinson order is proportionate and necessary. It is, of course, a case management order, but it is a draconian one, because the Hadkinson order will prevent the respondent participating in these proceedings until such time as she purges her contempt or makes good the payments that she is compelled to make by the terms of my order. I recognise the gravity of making that order, but I am entirely satisfied it is proportionate because it is required compliance with terms of an order in respect of which the respondent has had every opportunity to participate, engage, file evidence and make submissions and, indeed, did so, until some stage after 27 March, when she took the view that she was not bound by what was said. It is also necessary to provide for fairness to the applicant, but, seen overall, it is also necessary to uphold the rule of law and ensure, from a matter of public policy, that when this Court devotes considerable time and care to making orders to achieve justice for the right outcome between parties, that those orders are complied with. Where would we be if that were not the case? Therefore, I will make a Hadkinson order against the respondent in, effectively, the standard terms, until such time as the orders are complied with.

I was also asked, by way of the applicant’s D11s to dismiss the forum conveniens hearing and directions and provide for some form of expedition of the divorce. I am satisfied that that is not the right thing to do, and whilst there has been non-compliance through April and May to date by the respondent, I am hopeful that the orders made today to ensure compliance will cause her to change her mind and engage in these proceedings. Therefore, my orders for a forum conveniens dispute will remain in place. Given her non-payment of the legal services payment order, I will vary the orders in respect of the instruction of the expert in Florida law so that the respondent is required to pay for the entirety of that report.

I will extend time for the filing of her witness statement in respect of her whereabouts, resources and her case on forum conveniens, but I will add a clear rider to that order that if, once again, she fails to comply with my direction to file evidence, the Court will be at liberty to make reasonable adverse negative inferences from her failure to file evidence. If she fails to do so in the light of that warning in the order, she will find herself in some difficulties, complaining about the outcome of forum conveniens in circumstances where she has been given every opportunity to file evidence but has not done so. I encourage her to engage and file evidence, and deal with the forum conveniens matters that she, herself, asked me to do in February. I will also extend time for the applicant to file her evidence on forum, and I will reduce that to a short statement of three pages, given the difficulties she has continuing to fund her own representation in these proceedings because of the non-payment of the legal services payment order.

I am also asked to make a Hemain injunction, that is, an injunction restraining the respondent from pursuing litigation in Florida and Colorado. I have not been addressed in any detail on the principles and case law behind that. It is not necessary for me to deal with that today; I am familiar with the background of a Hemain injunction. I take on board it is a significant step and the Court must always pause and carefully consider the circumstances, but I have little difficulty in granting the applicant a Hemain injunction, for the very obvious reason that when the respondent attended this hearing and was represented by leading counsel in February, and when she was represented by leading counsel at the hearing in March, it was agreed that there should be a stay in pursuing proceedings overseas.

She has acted in breach of the agreement and, therefore, I have no hesitation in concluding that it is appropriate to grant the applicant the relief by way of the Hemain injunction, so she can try to preserve the status quo, reduce the cost of proceedings in Florida and Colorado, to which she has again been disadvantaged by the non-payment of the legal services payment order. In addition, it is the case that it is correct to hold the ring until this Court can determine whether the appropriate jurisdiction is England and Wales or Florida for these contested proceedings, which was the agreed position before me in February 2026. Non-compliance by the respondent since March does not alter that.

Latterly, I am asked to record in this order that there is a judgment debt owing as of yesterday’s date from the respondent to the applicant of £562,811.77. That figure is arrived at because the respondent, by her non-compliance with my order, owes the applicant £36,873.94 and backdated maintenance pending suit plus interest, £22,644.35 of outstanding maintenance pending suit plus interest, £176,496.04 for historic legal fees plus interest, and £125,876.80 for the costs associated with the LSPO application plus interest. Also outstanding is £200,920.64 in respect of the first two instalments of the LSPO orders plus interest. It should be immediately obvious to anyone reading this judgment of the grave impact on the fairness of the applicant in fairly participating in these proceedings and pursuing her divorce and financial remedy applications.

I have heard brief submissions by Mr Todd KC as to whether that is properly a judgment debt. I am satisfied that I have made the order, and even if it is an order for maintenance pending suit and legal services payment, which are interim orders, it is still a judgment order which is binding on the respondent and, therefore, it is a judgment debt which is capable of being enforced. That is apparent from the terms of Part 33 of the Family Procedure Rules, and I am satisfied it is right for me to characterise that as a judgment debt.

Those are my reasons for making substantive orders today to deal with non-compliance since early April. The matter will remain listed for a contested forum conveniens hearing before me in July, and the directions for evidence are varied to deal with that. I will still hear a pre-trial review at the end of June. This judgment will, no doubt, be sent to the respondent, and as she reads it carefully, I ask her to please consider proper engagement in these proceedings for the reasons set out in this judgment.

Lastly, I am asked to make a costs order against the respondent for the trouble they have been put to in dealing with these various applications today. I conclude without any difficulty that, in the exercise of my discretion, it is entirely appropriate for the applicant to receive her costs of the 15 April 2026 D11 matters and 21 April 2026 D11 matters. Both of those deal with the non-compliance. The aspects of those orders that are occasioned by the respondent’s non-compliance can be provided for on the indemnity basis. The aspects occasioned by alternative service will be on the standard basis, and I will hear Mr Todd KC’s submissions about the appropriate quantum for that and, I will need to hear submissions on the question of costs arising from the 6 May 2026 application notice. Those are my reasons further to make costs orders against the respondent in those terms.

That concludes this ex tempore judgment.