Milton Keynes County Court and Family Court
351 Silbury Blvd
Milton Keynes
MK9 2DT
Before :
MS JUSTICE HENKE
Re: X (A Child) (Fact-Finding & Welfare)
Alex Perry (instructed by Milton Keynes City Council) for the Applicant
Jane Page (instructed by Duncan Lewis Solicitors) for the First Respondent Mother
Matthew Brookes-Baker (instructed byBLM Solicitors) for the Second Respondent Father
Matthew Stott (instructed by Blaser Mills Solicitors) for the child
Hearing dates: 10-14 March 2025
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on 4 April 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail. Following anonymisation and subsequent hearings on disclosure, it is released to the National Archives at 2pm on 13 October 2025.
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MS JUSTICE HENKE
This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.
Ms Justice Henke :
Introduction
I am concerned for the child X now 5 years old. X is the child of Ms A and Mr B. Ms A is now 32 years old. Mr B is now 42 years old. They met in or around November 2017 and married the following year. Ms A and Mr B separated in or around December 2019. X has been known to Children’s Services since about January 2020.
The Chronology and the Private Law Proceedings
In January 2020 Ms A made an ex parte application for a non-molestation order against Mr B which was granted. At the same time Ms A applied for a Child Arrangements Order and a Prohibited Steps order. Within the private law proceedings, Mr B engaged in hair strand testing which covered the period August 2020 to November 2020. He tested positive for Codeine and Dihydrocodeine, an opioid derivative.
On 22 and 23 February 2021 District Judge Dodds heard a fact-find within the private law proceedings. At the conclusion of that hearing on 2 March 2021 he found that:
Allegation one was proved – namely Feb 2018 - On one occasion the mother had asked the Respondent to take me to my parents’ house but he refused to do so and he refused to let me out of the car and began driving erratically and continued to shout at me. The Respondent then parked the car near a lake, took me for a walk and told me that whilst I was pretty, I was too fat for him and therefore I needed to get into shape. During the same conversation he told me that I should attend sex parties with him and perform a threesome. He stated that if I did not lose weight, he would be physically unable to have sex with me. It was an uncomfortable and upsetting conversation and as much as I wanted out of this, he forced me to walk with him for an hour whilst putting me down. I did not realise at the time, but in hindsight, I now see that this was emotional abuse.
Allegation 2 was found to be proven – namely June 2018 - Whilst at work, […], I had made friends with a lady named C. We decided to have a girl’s night in in June 2018. I had informed the Respondent of my plans for that evening and despite of this, whilst I was with C, the Respondent began to barrage me with text messages. In these messages he stated that ‘no one makes friends selling pets’ ‘that is a stupid excuse’ ‘I know you’re cheating on me’. To put his suspicions to bed, I texted the Respondent a photo myself and C in her home. He became enraged because C was wearing a bath robe over her T-shirt and he felt I was cheating on him. He launched yet another invective called me on my phone and began shouting at me and called me ‘SLAG’ and ‘fat lazy bastard’ and continued to accuse me of being unfaithful to him. I was left with no choice but to cut my evening with my friend short and return home. When I returned home, the Respondent was enraged. He began smashing items within the home and put a hole in the door in the bedroom. I became entirely frightened by his behaviour and in order to get away from him and to attempt to seek help I went into the bathroom. We did not have a lock on the bathroom door and so opened a cupboard to hold the door shut form the inside. The Respondent however made his way in and grabbed my phone off of me and forced me to get into bed with him. I had no other choice but to comply as I feared that the Respondent would physically assault me otherwise.
Allegation 3 was found to be partly true in that there were arguments which led to verbal abuse by the father towards the mother which amounted to domestic abuse. The District Judge however did not find the allegation of physical violence proved.
Allegation 4 was proved in its entirety namely, May 2019 When it came to X’s birth, I had to be induced into labour. During my labour, the Respondent attended the hospital some two hours after coming to learn that I had gone into labour. It was a stressful and difficult labour and my health and the health of the baby continued to deteriorate. When the Respondent came to the delivery room and the midwife left the room to seek more help and guidance as to how to handle my labour, the Respondent began to use my gas and air. I asked him for it back and said that I needed it but he would not give it to me. I told him that he would not be treating me like this if he loved me at all. He said that he was very stressed and that he needed it more than I did. I punched the Respondent and took the gas and air off from him. I felt helpless and was scared whilst going through the birth. The midwife then came back into the room and the Respondent said ‘this bitch just punched me’. I explained that I needed the gas and air. The Respondent then stated that it was all my fault that I was unwell, and I had chosen to get induced and now our baby was going to die. The midwife interjected at this point to explain that I had not in fact chosen to be induced but had to be induced for the welfare of our child. The Respondent continued to be verbally abusive towards both myself and the hospital staff to the point that I had to telephone my friend C to be with me during X’s delivery for safety. Whilst the Respondent was arguing with the nurse, I was rushed into theatre but the Respondent did not care and continued arguing
Allegation 5 was found to be proved, namely - 19 July 2019 - The Respondent stated that we should go on a family holiday and that it would be good to make amends in our relationship, it was apparent that he would not take no for an answer. On 17th July 2019, we went to South End. On 19th July 2019, when we were scheduled to leave, I packed our belongings, readied X and moved all our items to the car. The Respondent was at this point preparing his drugs, he uses Codeine, by mixing it with over the counter Cocodamol and mixing it with boiling water then consumes the liquid which gives him a high. He was occupied making this that we had surpassed the checkout time. When I asked him to leave, he refused and said that I was stupid because no one leaves at the exact time of check out. I eventually managed to get the Respondent to leave. He was carrying X in her car seat in one hand and in his other hand was the cup of codeine he had mixed. He went down the stairs fast and bumped the car seat and spilt his concoction mixture. The Respondent became irritated as a result and shouted ‘look what you made me do’ ‘it’s all mixed, I can’t take it now’. We got into the car and he continued to shout at me, he said that it was my fault that I have made him spill his drugs and spat in my face. The Respondent drove off in the car with X after he insisted I get out the car and go for a walk. He stopped the car at the road about 20 feet away after I ran after him screaming “that’s my baby”. Then he allowed me back in the car and spat in my face then. I had a panic attack as a result. I needed to use my inhaler but he would not let me out of the car. I therefore began banging on the car windows crying out for help. The Respondent eventually let me out to get my inhaler and told me to stop making a scene
Allegation 6- was proven in part. The District Judge did not find that the father had hit the mother rendering her unconscious as alleged but did find that on the evening of 19 July 2019 when the mother, father and X returned home the father was abusive and angry towards the mother and threw food over her.
Allegation 7 was found to be made out in part namely that on 18 December 2019 the father was aggressive and unreasonable in his phone calls to the mother.
Allegation 8 was not found to be true, it being found that it was more likely than not in January 2020 the father was desperate to get in touch with Ms A.
The District Judge rejected the allegations made by the father against the mother
Looking at the totality of the evidence District Judge Dodds concluded as follows:
I do not find that F perpetrated serious physical violence on M as M alleged. I do find that F was guilty of persistent domestic abuse in the form of threats and obsessive, unreasonable and prolonged behaviour as set out in the above findings. I find that M and F had a toxic relationship and that F was unable to respond to his differences with M in a reasonable manner. F was unable to control his emotions when disagreeing with M. F was unable to respond appropriately to a vulnerable M and caused her unnecessary and unreasonable distress. I find it more likely than not that due to past experiences F was unable to form a healthy relationship with M and unable to deal with the stresses of a partner who was not well and then the stresses of a difficult birth and then the breakdown of their relationship. I find that though M had her faults and made exaggerated claims of physical violence M was far more the victim than F. Does this mean that [X] cannot have an enduring relationship with [her father]? I note the following protective factors: 1. M and F have separated so the risks of F perpetrating domestic abuse are considerably reduced 2. There were moments when F looked after X without reported problems e.g. when D described F as stepping up to look after X when M was ill in December 2019 – though relations between M and F then deteriorated.
Mr B does not accept the findings made by District Judge Dodds but acknowledges that his relationship with Ms A was toxic.
On 7 September 2021 District Judge Dodds made an order that X should live with her mother and a prohibited steps order prohibiting the father from removing X from her mother’s care. The final Child Arrangement’s order was eventually finalised by District Judge Lynch on 7 December 2021. He confirmed the lives with order and Prohibited Steps Order made by District Judeg Dodds and provided for Mr B to have contact and set out specific stepped arrangements which were to progress through contact at the Family Centre to unsupervised contact in the community. There was to be an addendum S7 report filed by CAFCASS on 25 November 2021.
The private law proceedings next came before the court on 7 December 2021 when they were heard by District Judge Lynch. A further contact order was made to enable X to have contact with her father. Again, the contact was required to start with supervised contact in the Family centre.
By February 2022, X was living with her mother and maternal grandmother, who was unwell. DX Adult Social Care, who were the paternal grandmother’s carers, reported that X would answer the door to them, they had seen Ms A lying on floor intoxicated and unresponsive, and reported other occasions when Ms A had questioned if they had moved her vodka.
On 10 May 2022, the nursery X attended, made a referral to social services because X was not attending nursery and because they were concerned that Ms A was stressed and confined to her house as she was the main carer for the maternal grandmother.
On 13 June 2022 the local authority received a referral from Milton Keynes Hospital after the mother attended A&E following an assault by her then partner, not Mr B.
On 28 October 2022 the local authority received a referral from the ambulance service. It was reported that Ms A had taken an overdose of medication.
On 15 January 2023 Ms A stopped all contact between X and her father.
On 27 January 2023 Ms A alleged that Mr B had sexually abused X. The local authority conducted a s.47 investigation. There was a parallel police investigation.
On 31 January 2023 X had a medical examination at the Sexual Assault Referral Centre (SARC). The medical examination was inconclusive.
A Strategy meeting was held on 3 February 2023. A safety plan was put in place. Ms A agreed that she would work with drug and alcohol services and that she would take X to pre-school, and work with her health visitor and midwife as she was pregnant with her second child.
On 19 February 2023 the police confirmed that they would be taking no further action against Mr B.
A social worker working for the local authority, conducted a Child and Family Assessment in response to a referral on 26 January 2023. At its conclusion in March 2023, X and Ms A’s unborn baby were placed on Child in Need Plans. There was concern amongst the professionals about Ms A's housing situation due to her not being named on her parents’ tenancy and the home being cluttered with Ms A's parents' belongings.
On 10 March 2023 a referral was made to Family Assessment and Support Team (FAST) to support Ms A with improving home conditions. FAST did not start the work as it was stated that the home conditions had improved so the support was not needed. However, on 23 March 2023 an update was received from Ms A’s midwife; Ms A had not attended multiple antenatal appointments.
On 12 April 2023 Mr B issued a C100 application to vary the existing Child Arrangements order. He sought shared care. On his C1A the father raised the issue of the mother’s drug abuse and stated that the mother had made false allegations against him of child sexual abuse. There had, at the time of the father’s application, been no contact since late January 2023 between father and daughter. Mr B’s application was timetabled to a hearing date in early October 2023.
On 15 May 2023 X’s half- sister Y was born. Mr E is named as the father however he is not placed on the birth certificate. Ms A's labour was induced due to poor growth. Y only weighed 2.3kg. Following her birth, Y was observed in hospital. There was concern regarding possible withdrawal from the medications her mother was taking. Ms A was on Gabapentin (for pain), Citalopram (antidepressant), Amitriptyline (antidepressant, but also used for the pain of fibromyalgia), Naproxen (pain relief, although this would have no effect on the baby) and Lansoprazole (antacid). Y's observations were uneventful, and she was therefore discharged after three - four days.
On 1 September 2023 Ms A followed telephone advice from a Social Worker and family time between Mr B and X. The father’s contact with X recommenced between 11am – 5pm.
On 11 September 2023 X started at [] School. X's school attendance was positive, however, there were four occasions of slight lateness within the first seven days of school whilst X was in her mother's care. School reported no concerns.
On 20 September 2023 a local authority social worker began completing a Section 7 report in the Private law proceedings.
On 22 September 2023 the school asked Mr B to collect X from school. The mother had failed to pick her up. It was later established that Ms A was unconscious and her then partner had been unable to wake her. Ms A accepts that on this occasion she had passed out. Mr B was advised to keep X with him due to the safeguarding concerns identified by social worker.
On 29 September 2023 a social worker, provided a S7 report to the court.
The same day, Ms A made an application to vary the previous Child Arrangements Order and enforce the Prohibited Steps order. The mother alleges that the father had wrongfully removed X from her care. Within the application she relied on the findings of District Judge Dodds. Further she states that the father has not cared for the child for significant periods of time and alleges that the father had issues with substance misuse in the previous proceedings.
A Strategy Meeting was held on 3 October 2023 after police reported an allegation against Mr B. There was also a meeting to discuss whether the children should progress to an Initial Child Protection Conference. The recent concerns primarily related to X but the impact on Y was also discussed. In relation to the relationship between Ms A and Mr B, both were found to make allegations against each other, and it was noted that appointments had been missed for X by her mother. There were concerns in respect of the medication that Ms A was taking. The police shared information regarding a previously Looked After Child, (who was now 18), and had stayed with Mr B's parents because they were her Foster Carers. This young person, known as LE in these proceedings reported that Mr B took her out, bought her presents and their relationship progressed to a sexual relationship. The young person reported feeling that she had to have sex with Mr B because he bought her favourable gifts. As such there was a grooming/ rape allegation pertaining to this matter and on 5 October 2023 the police logged it as statutory rape.
On 4 October 2023 the father made an application to discharge existing orders and applied for an interim living with order pending further enquiries/assessment, a Prohibited Steps order to prevent the mother removing child from his care and a Specific Issue order in relation to schooling.
There was a Dispute Resolution Appointment before District Judge Lynch on 9 October 2023. He discharged the existing orders and made an interim order for X to live with her father and spend time with her mother on a regular basis. Contact was to be a mixture of visiting contact and video calls. There was no provision for overnight contact. The order was made upon the court having read the section 7 report dated 29th September 2023 from the Milton Keynes Council and been informed by the Local Authority that they were shortly to have a Child Protection Conference in relation to the children, and that the Public Law Outline process is being considered in respect of both children. The relevant report was provided by a social worker. It recommended shared care where X spent equal time with her parents. Ms A had raised concerns about X being in Mr B’s care, however those concerns were considered by the local authority not to have been substantiated. The report records that it appears that the relationship between Ms A and Mr B ended in an acrimonious state and that has influenced Ms A’s decision making on X’s family time with her father. X has missed a significant amount of quality time with her father due to this. However, despite this Mr B and X have managed to re-start their relationship with no hesitation. Considering X’s views and observations of her being in Mr B’s care, the Social Worker had no concerns for X’s welfare whilst in Mr B’s care. However, Milton Keynes Children’s Services would be making section 47 enquiries under Children Act 1989 in respect of X and her sibling, due to concerns about home conditions, neglect, and emotional abuse whilst the children are in Ms A’s sole care. This is an ongoing matter, thus the social worker recommended that there should be an addendum report to support this section 7 report.
On 10 October 2023 the local authority served Public Law Outline paperwork in relation to Ms A's two children.
On 23 October 2023 the Health Visitor completed a home visit and Ms A disclosed she was buying marijuana oil from Sapphire Clinics. She was spending approximately £400 a month on it as, she said, it was the only thing that was helping with her physical pain.
On 24 October 2023 X was placed on a Child Protection plan.
On 14 November 2023 the local authority received an e mail from Mr B reporting that Ms A’s neighbour had concerns about the care being provided to the children in Ms A’s care.
On 28 November 2023 the private law applications were re-timetabled by consent towards a hearing listed on 25 January 2024.
On 8 December 2023 the local authority made a telephone call to Ms A’s neighbour who shared concerns following an incident in August 2023 which had not been reported to the police or shared with children’s social care at the time.
On 9 December 2023 there was a FAST weekend visit to the mother’s home. No concerns were raised. Y was seen dressed appropriately and in her mother arms. Home conditions were a bit messy, and the kitchen needed to be cleaned and there was no carpet in the living room.
There were Public Law Outline Gateway Meetings with Ms A and Mr B which were held separately on 12 December 2023.
On 18 December 2023 the local authority telephoned Ms A to explain the purpose of the parenting assessment they proposed and the plan for the first session. Ms A agreed to the observation for the following day. The first parenting assessment observation with Ms A, X, and Y at the home address was on 20 December 2023. After twenty minutes Ms A asked the assessor to leave and became aggressive.
On 2 January 2024 the local authority made a telephone call to Mr B because he had sent photographs to the allocated social worker on Christmas day of a bruise on X's face, which were reviewed when worker returned to work. The social worker reported Mr B was aggressive and abusive during the call and told them that he was seeking legal action against them. The social worker ended the call.
The local authority made a telephone call to X's GP Surgery. X was taken to the doctors on 28 December 2023 as she had a cough and cold, and the bruise on her face that was stated to have occurred on the 25 December 2023 at her mother's house.
There was an Initial Strategy Meeting with police about the bruise to X’s face. They considered that no further action was required. The police stated that they are not concerned about a bruise on X's head, as it was consistent with X's story.
On 3 January 2024 a further parenting assessment session took place with Ms A. Ms A asked social worker to leave the house after twenty minutes. Ms A was aggressive in her tone of voice. Y was in her arms and did not respond to her mother shouting. The social worker left due to the children being present at the home address. The social worker spoke to Ms A and asked her to explain the bruise on X's face. Ms A confirmed that story that X had given. The social worker stated that if this were to happen again that Ms A would need to inform social care of any incident. Ms A agreed to do this. Ms A explained that she had placed a cold compress on X's face and that when she left her house she was not complaining about it hurting and that it was a small bruise.
On 9 January 2024 a letter was received from Ms A's GP. The letter stated many of Ms A's experiences may be related to ADHD rather than to any psychiatric condition. The letter requested an early ADHD assessment date, as she and her children would benefit greatly from having a diagnosis and further treatment plan.
On 10 January 2024 there was a Second Parenting assessment session with Ms A. After twenty minutes Ms A started to scream and shout so the social worker left the family home.
On 15 January 2024 the social worker made a telephone call to Mr B to explain the parenting assessment and that the first session would be an observation of himself and X. Mr B agreed but stated that he did not know why he had to do all these things as he was fine, and he had done nothing wrong, and it was all Ms A's fault. Mr B became aggressive on the phone demanding that the social worker tell him what the issues were.
The first Parenting Assessment session of Mr B with X took place on 16 January 2024. The social worker observed Mr B and X, this was conducted for thirty minutes before Mr B wanted to talk about the process and then started to shout at the social worker, causing her to leave the address. The social worker reports being unable to continue with the following assessment dates as Mr B continued to be aggressive and had refused to work with the social worker.
On 18 January 2024 a home visit to Ms A was completed by Perinatal mental health team. The Perinatal team deemed that Ms A did not have any mental health issues, so they closed their involvement.
On 20 January 2024 Ms A's mother died. Ms A remained living in her parents' home and therefore faced homelessness.
On 22 January 2024 the local authority made a telephone call to Mr B as he did not attend the Child Protection Conference. Mr B told the Child Protection Chair that he and X were both staying at his mother's home during the week as that allowed him to go to work. He further stated that he does not know why he has to be involved in these processes and that he does not want to waste his time with all these meetings. A telephone call was also made to Ms A as she too did not attend the Child Protection Conference. Ms A said that her mother had just passed away and explained that she did not feel well enough to attend. Ms A was offered another date.
The Review Child Protection Conference concluded that X and her sister were to remain subject to Child Protection Plan under the category of neglect.
On 23 January 2024 the Local authority requested an extension of time to file the Addendum Section 7 report in private law proceeding.
There was a Dispute Resolution Hearing on 2 February 2024. It was for decided that X would remain living with Mr B. Family time for X with Ms A was to take place on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays after school till 7 and every other weekend. There was to be no overnight stays with Ms A.
On 5 February 2024 the social worker made a home visit to Ms A's house. Mr E was at the home address which was surprising given that Ms A had said that he has no contact with her and Y. Ms A later verbally agreed that he would not be at the home address.
Thereafter a PLO Meeting with Ms A and Mr B was adjourned because the local authority had received information regarding allegations made against Mr B of a sexual nature by LE. There had been a delay in the local authority sharing this information with Mr B as the police had not permitted this information to be shared. The local authority adjourned the review PLO meeting while enquiries were made with the police about sharing this information.
On 7 February 2024 information was obtained from the Police regarding Mr E – father of Y. Police advised that Mr E was charged with a domestic violence offence in November 2022. Mr E was a suspect in a rape case, but there was no further action.
The local authority made an unannounced home visit to Ms A on 8 February 2024. Ms A agreed that Mr E would not be at the family home with her. Mr E was awaiting sentencing at Aylesbury for intentional strangulation of his previous wife. The pre-sentence report stated that he was a high risk to his previous wife and Ms A, any future partners and any of their children.
During February 2024, Y died unexpectedly. South Central Ambulance Service (SCAS) attended Ms A’s home and called the police at 04:41hrs to advise that they were giving Y CPR and taking her to MKUH. Y was declared dead at 05:36hrs. Police reported finding empty bottles of vodka. At the time of Y’s death, X was staying with her paternal grandmother. Ms A consented to blood samples for toxicology purposes. Ms A smelt of alcohol when she attended Hospital with Y. Mr B was spoken to by Children's Social Care. Mr B advised the local authority that he knew that Y had died and that there was a Police investigation. Mr B was advised not to talk about the incident in front of X and that her mother would like to tell her herself. Mr B was asked where he was living and sleeping and said that he and X were living with his mother Mr B was reported to be aggressive to the social worker.
A Strategy Discussion following the death of Y took place on 13 February 2024. Ms A consented to being referred to adult social care.
On 14 February 2024 Ms A declined a referral to mental health services.
On 15 February 2024 the paternal grandmother put herself forward to be assessed to care for X if the parents could not care for her. The paternal grandmother stated Mr B is not living with her and she is caring for X from Monday to Friday as he is working. However, at the weekend he would look after her. A referral was made for an Initial Viability Assessment.
Chronology and the Public Law Proceedings
The local authority, Milton Keynes City Council, commenced public law proceedings on 27 February 2024. On the face of the Part 4 application the risk of harm was past and future emotional harm, and past and future neglect. The factors effecting parenting were stated to be parental substance misuse, parental conflict including domestic abuse, poor mental health and the death of Y, X's younger sister which was the subject of a police investigation.
There was an interim care order hearing before Mr Justice Willaims on 6 and 7 March 2024. The recital to that order states
The Local Authority, supported by the Guardian, sought an interim care order with a care plan that X be removed from her parents’ care and placed into foster care.
The Court refused to endorse a care plan of removal from the father’s care and determined that X should remain in the care of her father within a framework of paternal family support as annexed to this order.
The local authority confirmed, having considered the decision of the court and the framework put forward by the father and paternal family, that they could not regulate the placement under Regulation 24, the paternal grandmother being the subject of an outstanding LADO investigation and the father being subject to an outstanding PiPOT investigation.
Having considered the framework put forward by the father on the 7th March, and having heard from the paternal aunt, the court considered that an Interim Care Order was necessary and proportionate. In the light of the local authority refusal to accept an Interim Care order under the father’s proposed framework of care it made the child subject to an interim care order and ordered, pursuant to s.38(6) Children Act 1989, that the child be placed with the father and paternal grandmother, as outlined within the framework of care, for the purpose of assessment.
The Local Authority confirming that it will not seek to remove X from the care of the father or the paternal grandmother without first returning the matter to court and the court noting that any emergency removal can only take place by Police exercising their Powers of Protection.
The court finds threshold for the purpose of an order pursuant to Section 38 met.
The court approved the care plan for contact between X and her mother at a frequency of twice per week and for a duration of 1.5 hours. The contact was to be professionally supervised.
On 27 March 2024 local authority applied to urgently restore their application to court. The application details were as follows:
Application Details: At the hearing on 08.03.2024 the Court granted an interim care order in respect of the child and approved the child being placed in the care of paternal grandmother and Father under a s38(6) assessment. The Local Authority circulated a safety plan following the hearing on 08.03.2024 and the safety plan is annexed to the court order. The Local Authority confirmed to the parties that it intended to undertake 2-3 visits to see the child each week and that these visits would be a combination of announced and unannounced visits by the allocated social worker, duty work and FAST team. The Local Authority confirmed that the frequency of these visits would be kept under review. The reasons for these visits is to enable the Local Authority to monitor the child in her father and paternal grandmother’s care and ensure that appropriate support is being provided. The father, paternal grandmother and paternal aunt have agreed that Father’s contact with the child shall be supervised by paternal family. A family plan was drafted at the hearing on 08.03.2024 which sets the arrangements for this supervision. There is an outstanding LADO investigation of the paternal grandmother which is expected to be completed by 04.04.2024. An initial viability assessment is being undertaken of the paternal grandmother and this is due to be filed by 19.04.2024. The Local Authority have made a number of attempts to visit the child in Father and paternal grandmother’s care. To date, she has only been seen once in their care since the hearing on 08.03.2024. Father and paternal grandmother have not responded to telephone calls made to them by the social worker. The Father and paternal grandmother and paternal aunt have complained about visits being made to see X. The Easter school holiday break is due to commence very shortly and X will not be seen by any other professionals over that period. The Local Authority are unable to conduct the monitoring and supervision it believes is necessary to meet its parental responsibilities under the ICO. The Local Authority seek interim separation of the child into foster care
The local authority’s application for interim removal was listed before Mr Justice Williams on 3 and 4 April 2024. Mr Justice Williams refused the application and X remained in the care of her father and paternal grandmother.
The case returned before Recorder Archer on 8 April 2024 because the local authority had had difficulty getting the Child Safety Plan signed by the paternal family. The paternal grandmother and paternal aunt were required to attend the hearing. At that hearing the aunt and the father and the team manager duly signed the Child Safety Plan.
On 18 April 2024, the local authority made an application for the psychological assessment of both parents.
The public law proceedings came before Mr Justice Williams on 23 April 2024. The application for psychological assessment was adjourned for consideration of the appropriate discipline of the expert. Drug and alcohol testing in relation to both parents was approved. Further case management directions were given.
The local authority sought a further urgent removal hearing by application dated 3 June 2024. The application was heard by Mr Justice Williams on 6 June 2024. That order contains the following recitals
The court having considered the Part 25 application for psychological assessment on behalf the local authority and the Part 25 application for the psychiatric assessment on behalf of the father and determining that the appropriate discipline is psychiatric and that Dr Oyebode would be the appointed expert, subject to a further review of the CV’s by the court post hearing.
The local authority having made an application for the removal of X from paternal family care.
The local authority seeking protective measures as a holding position in the event the court cannot hear the application this week, supported by the guardian.
The court listing the matter for determination on 11th June 2024 and making an exclusion order preventing the father from attending at the paternal grandmother’s home, if consented to by the paternal grandmother, under the Children Act 1989 and if not, under the Court’s Inherent Jurisdiction and an order providing that X shall only have supervised contact with the father until the next hearing.
The solicitor for the father confirming by email after the hearing that having spoken with the paternal grandmother, she consents to the making of an exclusion order in respect of the father.
The court approving as a holding position a plan for the local authority to arrange for father to have family time with X in a contact centre professionally supervised between now and the hearing on 11 June 2024 where the orders will be reviewed.
The Local Authority informing the court that it sought to delegate its function to assess the Mother, Father and Paternal Grandmother to an Independent social worker, and that the instruction of Rebecca Jackson was now proposed, supported by the mother and guardian but opposed by the father. The court determining that the local authority were assessing the parents and therefore the identity of the assessor that they delegated this responsibly to was a matter for them therefore approving the instructions of Rebecca Jackson as she can undertake assessment of the mother father and paternal grandmother.
There was not time to hear the contested removal case on 3 June 2024, and it was adjourned for hearing. It was eventually heard by Mr Justice Williams on 13 June 2024. The court heard oral evidence from the paternal grandmother and submissions on behalf of all parties. The court approved a plan to remove X from her paternal grandmother’s care.
Thereafter Mr Justice Williams case managed the hearing. Pertinently, in the context of the applications now before me, on 17 September 2024 Mr Justice Williams ordered that the paternal uncle Mr F and the paternal aunt Dr G shall by no later than 4pm on 24th September 2024 confirm in writing to the local authority whether or not they wish to be assessed to care for X. If they failed to do so or if they state that they do not wish to proceed at this time with such an assessment, no such assessment shall be undertaken, and no further time shall be granted for any assessment to be undertaken.
Mr Justice Williams next heard the case on 15 October 2024. On the face of that order, it is recited that:
AND UPON the local authority informing the court and parties that the outcome of the initial viability assessments of the paternal aunt and the paternal uncle is negative.
AND UPON the court determining that in the event that either the paternal aunt or uncle seek to challenge their negative assessment they must notify the local authority within 14 days. They should be informed of this timescale within the letter being sent by the local authority to each of them, along with a copy of their assessment and information on how to challenge the negative outcome of the assessment. If they seek to challenge the negative assessment, they should be invited to indicate on what basis they would seek to care for X in the future
On 22 November 2024 the father made a Part 25 application for an Independent Social Worker to assess the paternal uncle Mr F and the paternal aunt, Dr H, as alternative carers. That application came before me on 29 November 2024. At that hearing Ms A and Mr B agreed that the S31 threshold criteria was met in this case, but Mr B did not accept the allegations made by the local authority against him. I adjourned the Part 25 application for independent social work assessment of the paternal family members to be heard at the final hearing.
The final IRH was heard by me on 20 February 2025. The local authority’s application for a final care order was timetabled to be heard over 5 days beginning on 10 March 2025.
The Final Hearing Before Me
At the hearing before me the parties were represented as follows:
The local authority were represented by Mr Perry of Counsel.
The mother, Ms A, by Ms Page of Counsel
The father, Mr B by Mr Brookes-Baker of Counsel
The Guardian by Mr Stott of Counsel.
I am grateful to them all for their assistance and efficient advocacy.
In order to determine the issues before me I was provided with a bundle containing 1904 pages and documents handed to me during the course of the hearing.
In addition, I heard oral evidence from the below witnesses.
Ms Rebecca Jackson
The first witness I heard was MsRebecca Jackson. Ms Jackson is an Independent Social Worker who provided a parenting assessment in relation to Ms A and Mr B and a Special Guardianship Assessment in relation to the paternal grandmother. She was an impressive witness. She gave her evidence calmly and professionally. Ms Jackson has over 20 years of experience in the field of Child Protection, Care Proceedings, Looked-after children and the fostering arena. She has been an independent social worker since 2016. Her evidence was measured and authoritative.
Ms Jackson very fairly told the court that she had not experienced Mr B’s behaviour directly but that she had witnessed him becoming extremely heightened and agitated and angry about other professionals. In her opinion, which I accept, that impaired his ability to focus on the discussion in hand and resulted in her having to placate him at times, with any perceived challenge resulting in his anger increasing.
I accept Ms Jackson’s report and evidence on Mr B subject to one caveat. In her report at paragraph 6.40 Ms Jackson states in relation to allegations that Mr B has sexually abused X:
I fully accept that no concerns have been substantiated, but also remain mindful that an account being unsubstantiated does not mean that abuse has not taken place for factors owing to medical evidence (i.e., the medical could not prove or disprove sexual abuse), X has not wish to elaborate/speak of matters with other. This combined with other factors such as Mr B’s complete lack of honesty on the matter relating to the foster child, his persistent deflection of blame onto others, his limited insight and acceptance of his actions, his pursual of the relationship, despite showing regard that it was wrong to have a sexual relationship with her and his utter defiance that he has done nothing wrong, all of which leads me to conclude that there remains an unquantifiable risk that X needs to be safeguarded from. Furthermore, as suggested in the findings, “that Mr B was prepared to manipulate both vulnerable individuals but also family members in a way which is highly risky”, I fully concur with this consideration, believing that Mr B is not deterred by others and that he exerts dominance and manipulation over others which increases the risks posed to X
I consider that the above passage wrongfully reverses the burden of proof in relation to the allegations that Mr B has directly sexually abused his daughter. Unless a matter is proven, as far as this court is concerned, it did not happen. I therefore take out of the assessment of risk by Ms Jackson, the allegations that Mr B has sexually abused X. Having done so, I have asked myself whether that error taints Ms Jackson’s assessment of Mr B as a whole. In my judgment it does not. Further I find that the other risk factors as identified by her are independent of any assessment based on what X is alleged to have said about her father. Those other risk factors individually and collectively justify her recommendations to this court in relation to Mr B, namely that he is not able to care for X safely. In relation to those areas where change is indicated, Ms Jackson has told this court that Mr B is at the pre-contemplative stage and that he is unlikely to achieve the changes necessary in a timescale which would meet X’s needs. I accept that evidence.
Ms Jackson was also the author of Special Guardian Assessment of Mrs H and is dated 12 December 2024. I have read it with care. It is evidence based and balanced. It was not in any manner undermined in cross-examination. I accept it in its entirety. Similarly, I accept the unchallenged parenting assessment of Ms A dated 18 December 2024.
Ms J
Ms J is X's allocated social worker. She was allocated to her on 30 November 2023 and has a good relationship with X. Mr B considers her to be a dangerous woman and wants her arrested. That is not my assessment of her. I consider her to be an honest witness who has found herself under attack. In the witness box she was straight forward in her evidence. Unfortunately ,and unknown to her lawyers she took notes into the witness box. On behalf of Mr B it is submitted that this was an unprofessional attempt to take evidence into the witness box, however I find it was a document she intended to use as an aide memoir. The notes came to light when she asked if she could refer to them during her evidence. I am confident that up until that point that she had not been referring to them. In any event her notes were then duly disclosed to all parties and no party, including those representing Mr B, chose to cross-examine her upon them. I consider that she took the notes into the witness box because of the anxiety and nerves surrounding facing questions on behalf of Mr B. She is anxious because of the sustained attack on her. In the witness box she faced on behalf of Mr B questions to the effect that her assessment of Mr B was motivated by racist views . She was also accused of manufacturing evidence. I find that her evidence to this court in writing and orally has been focused on doing right by X. When she made a mistake, as she did about LE’s age in her first SWET , she has accepted it. I accept her evidence. She is not part of a conspiracy against Mr B. She has not manufactured evidence against him. She has become the focus of Mr B’s ire and has nevertheless continued as X’s social worker because it is in the child’s best interest to have continuity of social worker. Despite all Mr B has thrown at her, she has remained willing to work with him for the benefit of X. I accept her evidence in all regards except in relation to the risk which she considers arises from the unproven allegations that Mr B has directly sexually abused X. I acknowledge that unproven allegations should not form the basis of any assessment of risk.
A Former Social Worker
On the first day of the hearing, I allowed an application on behalf of Mr B to cross-examine the social work. She duly attended court. She was the social worker who took the role of Team Manager supporting the key worker from March – July 2024. She was a straightforward witness who denied allegations that her actions towards Mr B were racially motivated. I accept her denials.
Ms A
Ms A did not give evidence before me. On the first morning of the final hearing, I heard an application on behalf of Mr B to cross-examine her. Given her vulnerabilities and given she did not actively advance a case against Mr B before me, I initially declined the application but was persuaded by Mr Brooks-Baker to adjourn consideration of it until after the conclusion of the local authority’s case. At the conclusion of the local authority’s case the application to cross examine the mother was not renewed on behalf of Mr B. Ms A observed the hearing remotely throughout. The only times I saw her occurred when she turned on her camera. Those occasions were rare. On one such occasion, she interjected. Her interjection was visceral. She was clearly unwell and vulnerable.
Mr B
Mr B was an unimpressive witness. He was neither reliable nor credible. His evidence was self-centred and self-serving. He has sought to mislead this court for his own purposes. In his initial statement to this court he stated the following:
The SW’s statement says that in October 2023 a young person who was a foster child in my mother’s care made an allegation that when she was 16 years old I made her have sex with me and she didn’t want to. She also said that I would visit the address whist she was there and took her out on some days out and brought her gifts and she willingly engaged in sexual activity with me. I vehemently deny these allegations. I have never had sex with this girl or taken her on days out. I have been out with her to go to restaurants when we have all gone out as a family for a meal. I have also bought presents for her as we all buy presents for each other at Christmas and for each other’s birthdays. I didn’t especially by presents for her, but we all bought presents for her on her birthday and for Christmas. I have given her lifts when she needed to visit her boyfriend or if she wants to go and see a friend etc. 16. I was never interviewed or spoken to by the police or any other person in relation to these allegations. At the hearing I confirmed that this young person was born on[2004]. I accept that I sent her a messages on the 13 June 2023 and the message was "I was wondering if you are developing an interest in me, or perhaps I am simply misreading the signals, it is hard to tell sometimes. I just thought that I would ask".
That statement is simply untrue. He did have sexual intercourse with the young person on his own admission on three occasions. She was a foster child in his mother’s care. She was 16 years old when she had that sexual relationship with him and he was 38 years old. He did buy her presents and take her out. Mr B’s justification for misleading the court as stated to Ms Jackson in assessment was “because they said I was in a position trust and she was a 14 yr old, why would I admit it”. His responses to similar questions in cross-examination before me elicited similar answers. I find that Mr B has tried to deflect the blame of his dishonesty onto the Local Authority for having falsely reported the foster child’s age. When Ms Jackson suggested to him, whilst the age had been an error, the premise of the report was true, and he could have advised the Court that the age was incorrect, but he had had a sexual relationship with this child. Mr B stated, “had they been honest and said not 14 and not in position of trust I would have admitted to that being true, but if I admit that it would go to straight to [a regulatory body to which Father belongs], if they had been honest first, I would have been honest”. I find Mr B’s explanation self-serving. He deflects blame and tries to justify his actions rather than him accepting responsibility for his own conduct and actions. I find that Mr B should have been upfront and truthful with the court. He chose not to be for his own purposes.
I find that the above is not the only example of Mr B’s dishonesty within these proceedings. On 23 April 2024 this court considered the instruction of experts for psychological or psychiatric assessment of the parents. I accept the Guardian’s evidence that the Court asked whether Mr B had any history of mental illness. In that cross-examination it was put to Mr B that the very clear response from the father through his legal team was that there had never been any previous mental health conditions nor worries about his mental health. However, the Guardian had access to the linked cases on the Cafcass system and had read them for due diligence. In the private law proceedings, there was a letter written on 5 August 2020, setting out a diagnosis for Mr B of mixed anxiety and depressive disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Mr B was discharged from secondary mental health services and a psychiatrist had been involved. Whilst Mr B denied he had acted dishonestly; I prefer the evidence of the Guardian on this point. I also accept the Guardian’s evidence about Mr B’s reaction to his dishonesty being uncovered. He complained he had been upset and violated by the Guardian raising the issues in court. I find that this is another example of him deflecting blame. I find that he has not to date provided a satisfactory explanation for why he had again misled the court. In the witness box, Mr B also tried to justify why he had still not disclosed his medical records into these proceedings to enable the court appointed psychiatrist to comment upon them . He told me that he did not consider their disclosure necessary because he had received treatment some years ago, was able to hold down a full-time job and had no current metal health difficulties. I find that contrary to what he told me. He did not want to disclose his records because they were unlikely to support his assertions and might damage his case to care for X.
Mrs H, the Paternal Grandmother
Mrs H was a hesitant witness. I listened to what she had to say with care. Mrs H made it very clear to this court that she was not now putting herself forward to care for X but would play an active role in her care if this court allowed X to be with her father. As an experienced foster carer, Mrs H told the court that she would if necessary, protect X from her father. However, I find that Mrs H is blinkered to Mr B’s faults and failings. In evidence she told me that X’s father would never harm X. In relation to LE, she simply said of Mr B - he made wrong choices. I found that she was indulgent of her son and willing to explain away his actions which she knew were wrong. I find Mrs H is unlikely to change her views or gain insight. She has not done so since the findings of District Judge Dodds and she is unlikely to do so in the future. Without insight, on the ground, Mrs H is unlikely to be able to be a protective factor in X’s life.
My assessment of Mrs H is consistent with that of District Judge Dodds. He found Mrs H , the paternal grandmother an unconvincing witness and of limited value. He considered her evidence to be one-sided as a result of her understandable wish to support her son, District Judge Dodds considered that she failed to be even-handed in the context of compelling evidence to the contrary. On 13 June 2024 Mr Justice Williams heard evidence from the paternal grandmother. He considered, at an interim stage, that she could not protect X from her father because she did not accept that he posed an risk to his daughter. I have made my own assessment of Mrs H as a witness. My independent assessment of her resonates with that of Mr Justice Williams . I find that her blinkered approach to her son has been evident since at least 2021 and is unlikely to change in X’s timescales.
Mr F
He was a poor witness. He was fully aligned with his brother’s case and arguments both in writing and orally. He had no reasonable independent perspective. He appeared to me to take what Mr B told him at face value without challenge. I consider his evidence to be of little value to this court. He is unlikely to protect X from her father.
Dr G
Dr G gave evidence on the third day of the hearing. She told me that it was not until the question was posed in evidence before me that she knew that LE had been 16 when she had sex with Mr B. She told me that had she known that she would have acted differently when assessed for her IVA. She was clear that she cannot condone her brother’s actions. She was straight forward in asserting before me that she would follow the direction of the court in relation to X’s welfare. She asserted that that would include any direction that X was not to see her father. In cross-examination Dr G told me that her brother’s admitted sexual relationship was legal but not right. She did not see a risk to X from Mr B. She had known of the findings of District Judge Dodds since they were made. Dr G said, in answer to questions on behalf of the Guardian, that she had not seen X since June 2024. It was put to her that at the time of the IVA, she had said if Mr B was not seeing X it was not appropriate for her to see X. In terms of working with the local authority she said that -she would have to work with a clean slate.
The Children’s Guardian
The Guardian has provided two reports to this court. The first is an interim analysis dated 16 April 2024 and the second her final analysis. I found her to be a straightforward and honest witness who did her best to assist the court. She had not been able to engage with Mr B. Mr B did not respond to her email communication and in her telephone call with him on 20 March 2024 asked her how she could recommend the removal of X from his care when the social worker’s statement was untrue. I accept her account that within this telephone call, he talked over her and did not let her answer his numerous questions. Thereafter he has failed to respond to her emails. I accept that the manner in which Mr B spoke to her impacted upon The Guardian because of its intimidating tone and confrontational manner. Although he did not shout at the Guardian, he presented as agitated and angry.
The Guardian’s final report is dated 14 February 2025. It details that Mr B has continued to decline to engage with the Children’s Guardian. Within her final analysis , The Guardian has weighed up evidence of Mr B’s dishonesty with the Court, his sexual conduct with a sixteen-year-old child and lack of transparency around the same, along with his unwillingness to engage meaningfully with professionals involved with X’s life. Furthermore, she considers the paternal family’s responses to reported harm and the evidence of Mr B having sex with a vulnerable child in his mother’s care. I accept her analysis of those risk factors. Unfortunately, like the other professionals in this case, she also placed in the balance X’s allegations of sexual abuse against her father. I have already dealt with the manner in which this court treats unproven allegations. In a binary system, they are either proved or not. Here they have not been proved and accordingly I take them out of the equation.
The Guardian told me that having heard Dr G give evidence her view of her had not changed. There is a risk of emotional harm. The paternal family are a closed unit. There is a deep distrust of the local authority and CAFCASS within the family. In 54 weeks of proceedings , she has not been proactive in speaking to the social worker . To simply have no contact since June 2024 is harmful to the child. It was evident from Dr G’s evidence that she still did not consider Mr B posed a risk to X. In that context the Guardian posed the question- if you don’t see risk , how can you protect from it ? Without change, X would , in her opinion, be at grave risk of harm. Mr B has no or blurred sexual boundaries. Her father and his family not having contact with X since June 2024 has caused X significant emotional harm. There is no empathy for X and the impact of the paternal families’ actions on her. Ms A is the most important adult in the child’s life. She has been her constant despite her own failings. The relationship between mother and child is beautiful. When cross-examined by Mr Brookes-Baker, the Guardian was asked to acknowledge that the findings of District Judge Dodds were set in time and place. In response she told me she considered that there was a pattern to Mr B’s behaviours . He has done no work to address the risk of future domestic violence and has been aggressive and threatening to professionals when challenged. Mr B’s engagement with Ms Jackson is evidence that he can engage with professionals but it is noteworthy that she had to placate him. The Guardian in evidence would not accept in cross-examination that the relationship between the father and LE was organic and natural. She told me the age gap, the power imbalance and the child’s vulnerability made it inappropriate. She did not accept that he did not know he was doing anything wrong.
The Parties’ Positions in Closing
The local authority in closing maintained their opening position. In relation to Dr G and the application that she be fully assessed to care for X, it was submitted that
Whether Dr G believed LE was 18 years old or 16 years old when Mr B had sex with her is irrelevant. She was still a teenager, still vulnerable, still had a troubled background and her brother was still more than twice her age.
Dr G is aligned with her brother.
The fact that Dr G is unaware of the real reason for X's removal is because Mr B controls the narrative within the members of the paternal family before this court.
Dr G could see no reason to supervise contact between Mr B and X.
Whilst Dr G’s prepared to work with the professionals on a clean slate that is but an assertion and the evidence points the other way. There has been alignment with her brother since District Judge Dodds’ decision and there is family resentment of local authority intervention which is part of the family narrative. She has an ongoing and acrimonious relationship with professionals.
The strengths of a placement with Dr G have been taken into account in the IVA but they have been outweighed by the negatives.
The paternal grandmother features heavily in the life of Dr G and her child.
These proceedings are now in week 54 and X needs finality.
It is submitted that assessing Dr G would build in even further delay. X needs a break from litigation. In reality she has been the subject of court proceedings since about December 2019. It is likely that even if any further assessment were positive further work would be required before X could be placed in Dr G’s care. To date no family member before the court has challenged Mr B . He is controlling of the narrative and manipulative and unless Dr G’s can see the risk he poses X is unlikely to be protected. This court must take into account that Mr F, Dr G and Mrs H all suspected that Mr B was having sex with LE but they did nothing.
Turning to Mr B, the local authority submitted that he is not a safe carer . The paternal grandmother is neither a safe carer nor a protective factor. It is a highly toxic dynamic with no capacity for challenge of the father . Mr F simply bought into the father’s narrative. Any care package involving the paternal grand mother would not be safe . This court should dismiss the father’s Part 25 for Independent social Work assessments of Mr F and Dr G.
The threshold is crossed in this case. The issue is whether the allegations against the father are proved to the requisite standard. X on the local authority's case is at direct risk of sexual harm and whilst the risk is unquantifiable the consequences would be grave if it was to come to fruition. The local authority contend that the father has been found to be domestically abusive to Ms A and there would be a similar risk in any future relationship
Ms Page on behalf of Ms A submitted that the mother fully supported the care plan and adopted the local authority’s submissions. The paternal family is a close knit, secretive family. If you look at the family as whole, you will see that if X is placed with any paternal family member who has appeared before this court, X will be drawn into family which has a false narrative and is unlikely to promote contact between X and her mother given their negative view of her. This court should not allow an assessment of Dr G or Mr F. They both rely on Mrs H who is not a safe carer. Placement with Dr G will result in X being left with the paternal grandmother and having regular contact with her. She turns a blind eye to Mr B’s faults. She never says no to him. She did not protect LE. Dr G has a similar blind spot.
Mr Brookes- Baker on behalf of the father filed a position statement in advance of the final hearing. In closing, he took me back to that document and supplemented it orally. In closing he continued to challenge the findings the local authority seek against Mr B. Mr B vehemently denies he poses a sexual risk to is daughter. He criticises the local authority, Ms Jackson and the Guardian for factoring the risk of sexual abuse which is said to arise from X's allegations which are not proven, There is no place for a finding he might sexually abuse his daughter The professionals have wrongly lumped the issue of what X has said , allegations which have not been proved, with Mr B’s relationship with LE. LE’s evidence before this court is hearsay evidence and I must treat it with caution. Where it conflicts with the father’s I am invited to accept Mr B’s account. He has no burden upon his shoulders to prove his innocence. Mr B denies he poses any risk to his daughter and seeks the return of X to his full-time care. Mr B does not have an issue with all professionals, just Ms J and his view of her is justified. There is evidence before the court that Mr B can work with professionals- Ms Jackson and the two S7 reporters. Whilst Mr B seeks the return of X to his care, if he cannot care for her he pursues his applications for full assessment of his family members- Dr G and Mr F. There are a number of positives to assessing Dr G which cannot be ignored.
On behalf of the Guardian, Mr Stott highlighted Ms Jackson’s report and the steps she took to engage Mr B which included placating him. It is the view of the local authority, the Guardian and Ms A that X would be at significant risk in her father’s care. In the first contact Ms Jackson observed, X had to seek comfort from a stranger not her father. Mr B poses a risk of significant harm to X and his family, other than Uncle K, they have no insight into the risks he poses or his manipulation and the controlling of the narrative and of them.
The Law
I am very grateful to Mr Brookes-Baker for his distillation of the basic pertinent law. I have read it and accept the law as set out within it. I record that it is fundamental to the decisions that I have to make that (i) the burden of proof rests on the shoulders of he who asserts and (ii) that the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. A fact is either proved to the requisite standard or it is not.
In addition, I have raised with counsel during oral closing submissions that given the quasi-inquisitorial nature of public law proceedings, the factual basis on which the threshold is satisfied is a matter for the Judge and not the parties. The Court is not confined to those matters which the local authority seeks to prove. Where the judge wishes to make findings of fact not contained within the schedule or sought by the authority, she must ensure that those findings are securely founded in evidence and that the fairness of the fact-finding process is not compromised - Re G and B (Fact-Finding Hearing) [2009] 1 FLR 1145 and Re J-L (Findings of Fact: Schedule of Allegations) [2013] 1 FLR 1240.
When considering whether or not an allegation is made out, I must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for many reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, and distress. The fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything -R v Lucas [1982] QB 720. Within the context of family proceedings, the Court of Appeal has made it clear that the application of the principle articulated in Lucas in family cases should go beyond the court merely reminding itself of the broad principle. In Re H-C (Children) [2016] 4 WLR 85McFarlane LJ (as he then was) stated as follows:
“[100] One highly important aspect of the Lucas decision, and indeed the approach to lies generally in the criminal jurisdiction, needs to be borne fully in mind by family judges. It is this: in the criminal jurisdiction the ‘lie’ is never taken, of itself, as direct proof of guilt. As is plain from the passage quoted from Lord Lane's judgment in Lucas, where the relevant conditions are satisfied the lie is "capable of amounting to a corroboration". In recent times the point has been most clearly made in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division in the case of R v Middleton [2001] Crim.L.R. 251. In my view there should be no distinction between the approach taken by the criminal court on the issue of lies to that adopted in the family court. Judges should therefore take care to ensure that they do not rely upon a conclusion that an individual has lied on a material issue as direct proof of guilt.”
In Re H (Children: Uncertain Perpetrator: Lies) [2024] EWCA 1261 Peter Jackson LJ stated:
Lies, where they are admitted or alleged, will form just one part of the overall evidence in family proceedings. The underlying purpose of the Lucas direction is to ensure that proven lies are assessed with a sense of proportion. In relation to welfare, it has been said that they should not be allowed to hijack the case (Re Y [2013] EWCA Civ 1337 per Macur LJ at [7(4)]) and, as I put it in Re K (Children: Placement Orders) [2020] EWCA (Civ) 1503, [2021] 2 FLR 275, [2022] 4 WLR at [29], that the link between lies and welfare must be spelled out.
The same discipline applies to fact-finding. The court’s view of a witness’s overall credibility and reliability will naturally contribute to its evaluation of whether it can accept their evidence on the critical issues. If it concludes that lies have been told, it will consider what weight, if any, should be given to that aspect of the matter, after due consideration of any explanations that have been offered. That is part of the normal process of sifting and weighing the evidence, and explaining the result. The family courts encounter many forms of bad behaviour and they are used to assessing their true significance for the issue in hand. There is no special rule of evidence for lies.
I would therefore make one observation about the description of good practice in Re A, B and C [[2021] EWCA 21]. At [58(iii)] it is said that the court should seek to identify the basis on which it can be determined that the only explanation for the lie(s) is guilt. That draws on the slightly different jury direction in the Crown Court Compendium at 16-3, which requires that a lie is only capable of supporting other evidence against a defendant if the jury are sure that it was not told for a reason advanced by or on behalf of the defendant, or for some other reason arising from the evidence, which does not point to the defendant’s guilt.
Relying on a literal reading of Re A, B and C, Mr Barnes further argues that the court is required to exclude a lie from consideration altogether in any case where it cannot be satisfied (to whatever standard) that the only explanation for it is to conceal guilt. I do not accept that submission. There will be some cases where the ultimate finding is so critically dependent on the assessment of a particular lie – cf. H-C at [99] – that the court may out of caution wish to direct itself in accordance with Re A, B and C. However, in the normal run of cases, a direction of that austerity is neither necessary nor appropriate. It will be sufficient for the judge to recall that the true significance of a lie must be carefully assessed, for all the well-known reasons noted by the judge in the present case. A general exclusionary rule, exclusively directed at lies, would be inconsistent with the duty on the court to consider all the evidence. Once it has done that, its conclusion in an individual case may be that the lie was told to conceal guilt, but that is a conclusion, not a test. Wherever a lie is found to be relevant to the fact-finding exercise for some other good reason, that element of the evidence should be factored in. Any other approach would hamper the court in carrying out its important assessment of credibility and its evaluation of particular issues of fact. There is no indication that judges are in fact approaching matters in a restrictive way, but the issue has arisen on this appeal and we have therefore addressed it.
In relation to the importing of criminal principles into Family Proceedings, I have borne in mind Re J, P and Q (Care Proceedings) [2024] EWCA Civ 22 in which Baker LJ stated:
The third general matter concerns the application of directions and principles applied in the criminal jurisdiction to family cases.
In Re R (Children) (Import of Criminal Principles in Family Proceedings [2018] EWCA Civ 198, this Court considered an appeal against findings made in care proceedings following an incident in which the mother had sustained fatal injuries from a knife in the course of an altercation with the father. At first instance, the father presented his case by direct reference to the criminal law relating to self-defence. All parties couched their arguments in terms derived to some extent from the criminal law of homicide. The judge concluded that the local authority had established “that it was more likely than not that the father did not act in self-defence” and found that the father “had used unreasonable force and unlawfully killed the mother”. This Court allowed an appeal against the findings and ordered a re-hearing, in part because in the words of McFarlane LJ giving the lead judgment, a “serious error occurred in the trial in relation to the relevance of the criminal law”.
At paragraph 82 of his judgment, McFarlane LJ summarised the distinction between family and criminal procedures in these terms:
The focus and purpose of a fact-finding investigation in the context of a case concerning the future welfare of children in the Family Court are wholly different to those applicable to the prosecution by the State of an individual before a Criminal Court….
The primary purpose of the family process is to determine what has gone on in the past, so that those findings may inform the ultimate welfare evaluation as to the child’s future with the court’s eyes open to such risks as the factual determination may have established ….
Criminal law concepts, such as the elements needed to establish guilt of a particular crime or a defence, have neither relevance nor function within a process of fact-finding in the Family Court ….
As a matter of principle, it is fundamentally wrong for the Family Court to be drawn into an analysis of factual evidence in proceedings relating to the welfare of children based upon criminal law principles and concepts ….”
In his judgment, Hickinbottom LJ observed (at paragraph 104):
Of course, the same incident may give rise to proceedings in a number of different fora – the Criminal Courts, the Civil Courts, the Family Court, disciplinary tribunals. Those may each require findings of fact to be made, but restricted to the facts necessary for the determination of the issue before the particular tribunal, and then they will be subject to the particular substantial, procedural and evidential rules that apply to the determination of those particular issues in that jurisdiction, including, in Criminal Courts, technical defences. Those rules will be tailored to ensure that the issues are determined fairly and properly in the context of the particular tribunal.
Further, I have reminded myself that Knowles J’s decision inA and D v. B, C and E [2022] EWHC 3089 has been endorsed by the Court of Appeal. Within that case she said:
I reject the need for the family court to apply consistent definitions of rape, sexual assault, and consent. I also hold that the definitions of rape, sexual assault, and consent used in the criminal justice system should have no place in the family court
In relation to ‘rape myths’ Knowles J stated:
On the basis that I have found what follows of assistance in my own practice as the lead judge for domestic abuse, I draw the attention of family judges to Chapter 6 of the Equal Treatment Bench Book (July 2022) entitled “Gender”. Under a subheading entitled “Sexual Offences: Who is Affected?”, there is information about sexual offences which includes several paragraphs addressing rape myths which may feature in criminal proceedings (see [74]-[91]). Though written to assist those sitting in the criminal courts, there is much in that section which family judges may find useful. The Equal Treatment Bench Book is publicly available on the judiciary.uk website at Equal Treatment Bench Book July 2022 revision (2) (judiciary.uk). Likewise, the CPS Guidance on Rape and Sexual Offences at Annex A provides a comprehensive guide to the unhelpful stereotypes which may cloud judicial thinking in cases involving sexual assault. It too is publicly available on the cps.gov.uk website and was last revised in May 2021: Rape and Sexual Offences - Annex A: Tackling Rape Myths and Stereotypes | The Crown Prosecution Service (cps.gov.uk).
I have also come to the view that I should not produce a list of common rape myths or stereotypes or attempt to craft a standard self-direction about sexual assault stereotypes which a family judge might give her/himself. No list would be comprehensive. Further, it would run the risk of creating a rigid framework to which adherence would be given. That would deprive a family judge of the flexibility to think about what is apposite in the particular case, having been appropriately trained to recognise unhelpful stereotypes, and should they consider it necessary to do so, for a family judge to draw attention in her/his judgment to the manner in which they have guarded against applying any relevant stereotypes. Secondly, any self-direction I might devise would be equally inflexible because it cannot encompass the great variety of stereotypical thinking outlined, for example, in the two sources to which I have referred.
In this case I have to consider the future risk to X. In that context I have consideredRe L-G (Children: Risk Assessment) [2025] EWCA 60 wherein Peter Jackson LJ stated:
The judge referred to Re F (A Child: Placement Order: Proportionality) [2018] EWCA Civ 2761, [2018] All ER (D) 94 (Dec), in which I proposed that in assessing a risk of future harm, the court should ask itself a series of questions:
What is the type of harm that may arise?
What is the likelihood of it arising?
What would be the severity of the consequences for the child if it arose?
Can the chances of harm happening be reduced or the consequences be mitigated?
These broad questions need to be tailored to the facts of the individual case. Here, it is indisputable that Mr F is capable of causing serious harm to any child in his care. If he was in a position to live with or spend significant time with O or Y, the likelihood of harm would be high. But further questions also needed to be asked:
What are the settings and circumstances in which Mr F would have a realistic opportunity of harming these children?
What is the likelihood of those settings and circumstances arising and remaining undetected?
If the mother is incapable of being instinctively protective, can the likelihood or consequences of harm be reduced by protective measures such as:
• obligations imposed on the mother by the court
• the vigilance of O’s father
• the vigilance of the children’s grandfather
• the statutory powers of the local authority acting under a supervision order?
Although the judge referred to the grandfather as potentially protective at paragraphs 82 and 86, she did so on the unstated premise that only one-to-one supervision would be adequate to counteract the risk from Mr F. This doubtless reflected her assessment of him in the case about his older children. But the harm suffered by those children arose in a different factual scenario from the situation in which O and Y were living. It occurred in a long-standing home setting, dominated by Mr F. That was not O and Y’s situation and, as indicated above, the judge made no clear findings about whether the mother had complied with her obligations over the last year to keep them away from unauthorised contact with Mr F. In argument, Ms Baker described Mr F as posing a slow and creeping risk to O and Y. That may or may not be right, but it was a central matter for the court to consider.
The finding that the mother would not be protective on her own could not be (and has not been) challenged on appeal, but the assessment of risk did not turn on her oral evidence alone. The court needed to go on to consider the likely real-world consequences of her lack of insight. The mother and the local authority had provided lists of protective measures that could be put in place. The judge did not address these or explain why they would be ineffective [bold added by me for emphasis]. The absence of a supervision order also appears incongruous with her overall approach.
It is of course possible that the further questions I have posed, and any others considered to be relevant, might have been answered in a way that justified the removal of the children from their mother, though further thought would then have to be given to making the resulting arrangements coherent. But the questions had to be asked, and until they were answered it could not reliably be known where the children’s welfare interests lay. I would therefore allow the appeal and remit the local authority’s application for a supervision order for rehearing by a judge to be nominated by the Family Presiding Judge.
The assessment of risk has been considered again in Re T (Children: Risk Assessment) [2025] EWCA 93 wherein Peter Jackson LJ stated:
The separation of a child from a family can only be approved after a process of rigorous reasoning. That is essential where there is a plan for adoption, but it is also necessary for any significant decision where the outcome is not obvious. A structured process is of real benefit for these important and often difficult decisions, as without it there is a greater chance of error, leading to children living unsafely at home or being kept unnecessarily in care. The fact that the underlying principles are well-known to specialist judges does not relieve the court of its duty to the child, to the family and to society, to explain and justify its decision.
This court’s recent decision in Re L-G (Children: Risk Assessment) [2025] EWCA Civ 60, reiterates the guidance given in Re F (A Child: Placement Order: Proportionality) [2018] EWCA Civ 2761, [2018] All ER (D) 94 (Dec). The risk of harm, important as it is, is one of a number of factors in the welfare checklist and it has to be carefully assessed, particularly where it may be decisive.
The Children Act 1989 provides a framework within which the court assesses whether a child has suffered or is likely to suffer ‘significant harm’ for the purposes of the threshold for intervention, and ‘harm’ for the purposes of the welfare assessment. Section 31(9) defines harm in this way:
“harm” means ill-treatment or the impairment of health or development including, for example, impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another; “development” means physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development;
“health” means physical or mental health; and “ill-treatment” includes sexual abuse and forms of ill-treatment which are not physical.
Accordingly, the court had to address these questions in relation to each of these children:
What type of harm has arisen and might arise?
How likely is it to arise?
What would be the consequences for the child if it did?
To what extent might the risks be reduced or managed?
What other welfare considerations have to be taken into account?
In consequence, which of the realistic plans best promotes the child’s welfare?
If the preferred plan involves interference with the Article 8 rights of the child or of others, is that necessary and proportionate?
A structured analysis of this kind, adapted to the facts of the individual case, is of benefit to those who make decisions and to those who are affected by them. The analysis need not be lengthy, but it ensures that undue weight is not given to one factor, however notable, and that other important factors are not overlooked. It must be remembered that risk assessment is about the realistic assessment of risk, not about the elimination of all risks. Likewise, the assessment of actual or likely harm is not the same thing as an all-round welfare assessment.
In addition, I have reminded myself that pursuant to S32(1)(a) CA 1989, public law applications must be disposed of without delay and in any event within 26 weeks of the day on which the application is issued. That legislative mandate is subject to one caveat, namely S32(5) A 1989 under which a court may extend that period if it is necessary to do so to enable the court to resolve the proceedings justly. As Pauffley J stated in Re NL (Appeal: Interim Care Order: Facts and Reasons) [2014] 1 FLR 1384, justice must never be sacrificed upon the altar of speed. However, it is only the imperative demands of justice, namely fair process, or the child’s welfare which will justify an extension as necessary – Re M-F (children) [2014] EWCA Civ 991.
Where the court is satisfied the threshold condition in S31(2) CA 1989 is met, the court has the jurisdiction to make a care or a supervision order if it is satisfied it is in the best interests of the subject child to do so. The child’s welfare is paramount and must be evaluated in accordance with the checklist under S1(3) CA 1989.
S1(3)(g) CA 1989 requires the court to have regard to the range of powers available to it under the Act in the proceedings in question. When considering whether or not to make an order under the Children Act the court shall not make the order or any of the orders unless it considers that doing so would be better for the child than making no order at all – S1(5) CA 1989.
A care order rather than a supervision should only be made if the stronger order is necessary for the protection of the child. The protection of the child is the decisive factor- Re B (care or Supervision Order) [1996] 2 FLR 693 26. The key in each case is to decide whether a supervision order is necessary and proportionate response to the risk presented. Proportionality is key.
The Article 6 and 8 rights of X and her family are engaged. Where there is a tension between the article 8 rights of an adult and that of a child, the right of the child prevails- Yousef v Netherlands [2003] 1 FLR 210. Any interference with Article 8 rights must be (i) lawful, (ii) necessary and (iii) proportionate - Re O (A Child) (Supervision order: Future Harm) [2001] at paragraph 27.
The Issues
I now turn to consider the issue before me. They are:
The factual matrix underpinning the Threshold Criteria.
The future welfare of X.
Threshold
Before me it is accepted by both parents that the threshold is crossed and that at the relevant time X was suffering and was likely to suffer significant harm attributable to the care given and likely to be given by her parents not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give. It is accepted that threshold is crossed on the following basis:
Ms A’s mental health difficulties. It is accepted and I so find that the mother has a history of self-harm, namely attempted suicides on the following dates:
At the end of October 2022, she was admitted to hospital following an impulsive overdose of 32 x 300mg Gabapentin tablets, 17 x 30mg Duloxetine tablets and 600mg Oramorph ingested with a bottle of wine.
On the 1 April 2022 she was taken to hospital following a significant overdose of several medications including Oramorph.
On 19th February 2024 she was found by police at home with a white plastic bag over her head, unconscious and shallow breathing. There was a strong smell of alcohol and two empty vodka bottles next to her bed. The mother had also left a note which appeared to indicate she was going to commit suicide.
On 23 July 2024 the police attended and found her with a ligature around her neck and heavily intoxicated.
On the 24 July 2024 Ms A was noted to have a healing cut to her wrist which the mother explained she had done a couple weeks before and had been stopped by a friend from making a further attempt on her life.
When experiencing the symptom of anxiety, and with her parasuicidal behaviour, which has been impulsive, the mother is not able to safely care for a child.
The mother’s mental health difficulties adversely impact on her functioning, including interpersonal relationships.
Ms A has misused alcohol, namely:
On the 6 October 2023, the Perinatal Team reported that there was a strong smell of cannabis in her home on their last visit.
On the evening of Y’s death and whilst caring for Y, the mother had consumed at least half a 70cl bottle of vodka, drinking some neat and straight from the bottle.
On the evening of Y’s death, having consumed a significant amount of alcohol the mother also took her prescribed medication, knowing that it should not be mixed with alcohol and that it can ‘react’. The following morning the police observed a half empty 70cl vodka bottle on the bedside table, with multiple other empty bottles under the bed and around the room.
Ms A has consumed excessive alcohol as demonstrated by test results which show such consumption from the start of November 2023 to the start of May 2024.
Throughout the proceedings, Ms A has continued to consume excess alcohol as demonstrated by test results for the period middle of February to middle of August 2024.
Ms A has neglected X. When police entered the mother’s home on the morning following Y’s death, it was unclean, untidy and unhygienic.
X has suffered and is at risk of suffering emotional harm as evidenced by:
Exposure to her mother’s aggression and volatility towards professionals
Exposure to the mother’s mental health functioning and alcohol misuse.
Mr B does not accept any of the allegations against him. He does not accept that his aggression and volatility to professionals has caused X harm or placed her at a risk of harm. He does not accept that X is at risk of suffering sexual harm and exposure to inappropriate sexual activity as evidenced by:
At the age of 38 the father sending inappropriate communications to a foster child who was placed in his mother’s care, who was aged 16 at the time the communications commenced. Mr B does not accept this. He says that the messages being shown are taken out of context and were part of a wider conversation which demonstrate aa relationship that was being fully reciprocated at the time. The father feels that the LA have only taken a selection of messages to assist their case. The LA should have received all the messages from the girl and they have selected the messages to make the father look as bad as they could. The police never arrested the father and only went for a voluntary interview. The police have informed the father that they are not taking any further action. It should be noted that the police never charged the father with malicious communication and the police had access to all the messages.
Whilst the foster child was aged 16 the father engaging in sexual activity with her including sexual intercourse on a number of occasions, for which the police are investigating in respect of an allegation of rape. In resonse the father accepts that he had consensual sexual relationship with a 16-year-old and that any communication via text messaging was fully reciprocated during the relationship. He can see that the age gap can be viewed negatively by certain people. The police investigation has concluded in no further action. However, the father was never investigated in relation to an alleged rape. After the police interview the father was told that the investigating officer was not happy with the way the SW had obtained and coerced the girl into making a statement based on an old disclosure. The father was notified that the investigating officer would be speaking to the SW’s manager about her conduct. Also, sadly this false allegation of rape was recently highlighted to father’s employer by the LA. The LA wrote to …….. safeguarding ……….. where father was working and within 8 weeks of starting the father lost his job. The father finds this wholly inappropriate because he has not committed a crime.
The father buying the foster child gifts and give her money. In response Mr B states that he doesn’t accept that he bought her gifts. He does accept that he used to pay for dates that they went on during the relationship. He accepts that he gave her money, but this was at her requests and usually for taxis to get home. This is clear from the text messages between both parties
The father, as stated in his police interview, did not think there was anything wrong with this relationship and that he “got turned” by her when she “…was dressing in very, very short clothes.” and was “provocatively dressed.” This is accepted by the father. However, Mr B does not accept that this is a threshold point, or he poses a risk of sexual harm to his daughter.
As the adult son of the foster carer and 22 years older than the child placed in his mother’s care, the father was in a position of trust. Mr B does not accept this allegation. He states that the police have confirmed that the father was not in a position of trust and thus broke no laws during the relationship. There has been no investigation by any agency that has concluded that the father was in a position of trust and that he broke that position of trust.
The local authority assert that subparagraphs a-e above demonstrate the father’s inappropriate sexual interest in a young vulnerable female in his mother’s care. This is not accepted by the father nor is it accepted that in any way he poses a sexual risk to his daughter. g. (a-e) above demonstrates the father’s engagement in an inappropriate sexual relationship with a young vulnerable female living within his family and therefore places X at risk of exposure to such an inappropriate relationship, and, as a young female within the household, directly at risk of sexual harm perpetrated by the father. Mr B does not accept this assertion.
The father has a diagnosis of anxiety and depression, which, if there were to be a relapse or failure to be compliant with medication, would affect his ability to safely and adequately parent. In response the father accepts that he has a diagnosis of anxiety and depression. However, he says that this does not affect his ability to care for his child or to work fulltime in a demanding and a pressurised job. The father has sought appropriate help and guidance and continues to take prescribed medication to assist his underlying diagnosis of depression.
The father has failed to work with professionals. The local authority allege that Mr B has lied to professionals and the court in respect of his relationship with the foster child in his mother’s care. In response Mr B accepts he lied but his counsel states this: thefather agrees that he did not accept having the relationship with the 16-year-old at the beginning of these proceedings, which he regrets. The LA sought to assert at the beginning of these proceedings that she was in fact 14 years old and that the father had committed statutory rape which the LA subsequently withdrew.
X has suffered and is at risk of suffering emotional harm as evidenced by exposure to the father’s treatment of the mother as found by District Judge Dodds. The mother accepts this. Mr B accepts that the court made these findings, but states they were many years ago. He says that the relationship between the parents was extremely toxic, but there was never any physical abuse from the father towards the mother. The father’s case is that he ended the relationship, taking protective and child focused steps due to the toxicity of the relationship.
Exposure to her parents’ aggression and volatility towards professionals. The mother denies this and states that the hostility and volatility is from the father only. The mother has shown no hostility or resistance to professional help. The mother states she has a good relationship with her social worker. This is not accepted by Mr B. The father says he had a very good working relationship with the previous social worker over many months, she fully supported the father in getting X away from her mother’s care. The social worker also supported the father to resume contact with X after the first false sexual abuse allegations made by the mother. Then the other social worker also had a good relationship with the father and fully supported the court in October 2023 when the father was granted the live with order that kept X safe and living with her paternal family. It has only ever been the current social worker Ms J who has claimed the father cannot work with her. The father did not shout at her in his mother’s house and was working with her up until Y’s death when he put in a complaint about her and the neglect Y had suffered. The father told her after the baby’s death that she had ignored his warnings and as such had also endangered his own daughter’s life by sending her to the mother’s house. The father asked social services to remove the social worker as he felt that due to her failings the professional relationship had completely broken down. The father has always said that he would fully work with the social services but will not work with Ms J.
Since X was placed into foster care on the 21st June 2024, the father has refused to have any contact with X citing the reason for this as his own self-protection and therefore prioritising his own needs over and above those of X. Mr B accepts that sadly he has been placed in a situation where he cannot have direct contact with his daughter at a contact centre. This is to stop more false allegations being made against him by the local authority. He doesn’t accept that he has prioritized his own needs over and above those of X because in the long term it means that he is more likely to secure the return of his daughter.
The Disputed Threshold Findings – My Decisions with My Reasons
I begin by considering Mr B’s relationship with LE. I find that in June 2021 LE received a text from Mr B stating that he had feelings for her and asking if she felt the same. At the time she was 16 and his mother’s foster child. Mr B was then 38 years old. In September 2021 / October 2021 the relationship became sexual. These are now admitted facts.
I find that LE was a vulnerable child when Mr B had sexual intercourse with her. I accept his mother’s evidence that at that time LE was under her roof and in her care. LE, according to the paternal grandmother, was vulnerable by reason of her age, the number of previous placements she had had and the neglect she had suffered as a child. LE had had a boyfriend from her previous placement of similar age to her who was abusive. Mrs H accepted in cross-examination that her son, Mr B should not have had sex with LE whilst LE was in her care. I agree
I find that LE reported the allegations initially on 31 August/1 September 2023. She had not told anyone that it has happened and was embarrassed about it, but it was the reason she wanted to move out of the foster carer’s home. At the time LE did not want to proceed with the police investigation. When the paternal grandmother was told of the allegation on 2 November 2023, she stated that she was warned when she took LE into her home that LE can make allegations and that she was aware of her doing so against a boyfriend during her time with her. I find that response was pure deflection and victim blaming. I find, as Mrs H told Mr Justice Williams, that she had known since at least October 2022 that Mr B had had sex with LE.
I find that in or about June 2024, LE spoke to her PA about these court proceedings. I find that it is likely that LE’s PA did encourage LE to give an interview. I find that is not an example of professional wrongdoing. I find that whatever caused LE to give her interview to the police that does not detract from the bald facts that he did have sex with a vulnerable 16-year-old in his mother’s care. I reject the assertion made by Mr B that LE was coerced to speak to the police by Ms J. Firstly it was LE’s PA who spoke to her not Ms J. Secondly LE told the police “Well, when I’d heard about him being in court for my PA and I heard that he had had denied it. That’s what made me really angry because I’ve got all that evidence here and it’s kind of been - it’s definitely been something that’s been at the back of my mind and I’ve been feeling terrible about like - I think within all of last year, I think there was even five times that I’d been in hospital for suicide attempts or feeling like I was going to hurt myself and that was actually related to this incident”. In cross-examination, Mr B was taken to that passage of LE’s interview. He stated that I feel bad for her. However, he told me that his relationship had been legal by reason of age and that he had not been in a position of trust in relation to her. He told me that he accepted that a lot of people would consider what happened morally reprehensible. However, he told me it was a relationship between two consenting adults and returned to the facts that she was 16 and it was legal. As the cross-examination proceeded Mr B sought to put responsibility for what had happened with LE on to her shoulders- she instigated matters. He has stated in relation to LE that she was constantly attaching herself to me, but as a human being I have a human urge. He has made comments about her provocative clothing. I find that throughout the police investigation and within these proceedings, Mr B has sought to deflect responsibility away from himself. He told me that he never took advantage of her and in that phrase demonstrated that he failed to understand the power imbalance between himself and LE. I find Mr B continues to assert that LE only returned to the police in June 2024 and gave an interview because she was coerced into doing so by Ms J, is another example of obfuscation and deflection by Mr B. I feel his preoccupation with the actions of others, and his dishonesty and challenging of events is an attempt to deflect responsibility for his own actions.
I have read the messages passing between Mr B and LE. He has asserted that they are partial and have been selected to paint him in a poor light. However, the police have confirmed that they have disclosed all the screenshots that they have of messages passing between Mr B and LE . Further within this hearing I gave Mr B the opportunity to disclose a full run of his written telephone communication with LE. In the event he did provide a run of text messages but could not in relation to other forms of communication. What he did disclose had already been disclosed by the police. I find the messaging between LE and Mr B shows that he was insistent- wanting the relationship to carry on even when she was seeing someone else. He tells her within the 2021 messages that she looks smoking hot and refers to her as jailbait. The messages are flirtatious. Mr B says he was simply chatting her up. In that assertion he fails to factor in the power imbalance between him and LE and her vulnerability. I find that he was grooming and manipulating her. I find that the messages disclosed in 2021 acknowledge that a lot of people including his mother would be disgusted if they knew of the relationship and would strongly disapprove. Within those messages he writes: Although I have done nothing wrong they would still label me as a pervert and you as a naive girl. I am no better than the monsters I fear. His messaging captures that his mother kept telling him he should not be talking to her, and he should keep his distance due to her age. He refers to himself as paedo bob and not being up to date on the paedo handbook. He asserts that this was a humorous exchange between him and LE. There is another exchange in the messages in which LE is clearly a schoolgirl getting ready for school and he is responding in a sexual manner. I find that Mr B knew that his actions were inappropriate and yet he still went ahead and did what he wanted. As he has said, she was constantly attaching herself to me, but as a human being I have a human urge. Based on all the evidence I find that Mr B knew having sex with LE was inappropriate and crossed a boundary. His assertions that he did not groom her but bought her gifts and took her places because they were dating is, I find, self-serving and self-justifying. The responsible adult in the situation was Mr B. He had choices to make. He chose to cross a boundary, and he did so knowing, as the messages evidence, that what he was doing was wrong. He did groom her. He sent her messages, he gave her gifts and took her places because he wanted sex with her. He knew she was a schoolgirl and he a grown man. He, by his own admission, followed his urges and in doing so put his own needs above those of LE. I find that Mr B’s sexual activity with LE is evidence of him knowing where appropriate boundaries lie but choosing to cross them for his own needs regardless of the impact on the victim. I am asked by the local authority to find that Mr B’s sexual relationship with LE is evidence that he poses a direct risk of sexual abuse to X. I have stood back and considered the evidence within the framework of S31 of the Children Act 1989. In my judgment Mr B’s sexual relationship with LE proves that he knows where appropriate sexual boundaries lie; that he has the ability to understand that they should not be crossed for risk of harm to others but that nevertheless to satisfy his own needs he will cross that boundary and seek to blame his victim. I find that if he wants to pursue a course of action, he will justify it to himself and seek to justify it to others. I find that it is likely that if his needs and wants conflicted with those of X he will prioritise his needs above hers. He has shown that he will do so by refusing to have contact with her on a supervised basis. That is but an example of his behaviour which I find is likely to manifest itself in all aspects of his life. I find that as a consequence X is likely to be at risk of significant harm from her father. The harm in question is sexual, emotional and psychological. The harm is likely to be significant. Mr B has shown by his sexual relationship with LE that he is not inhibited by social norms although he knows what they are and that he will proceed to meet his own needs either without regard to the impact of his behaviour on others or knowing of the likely impact he will proceed anyway. Mr B had the ability to reasonably foresee the consequences of having sex with LE and the impact upon her, nevertheless and despite her evident vulnerability he proceeded to have sex with her. I find that the risk of significant harm to X is attributable to the care likely to be given to her by Mr B not being what it would be reasonable for a parent to give to her.
In relation to the findings made by District Judge Dodds, I take the point that Mr B and Ms A separated a significant while ago and that there have been no allegations of domestically abusive behaviour towards Ms A or another since those findings. I also accept that his behaviours towards professionals (as found later in this judgment to be proved) post-date the relevant date for threshold. I have therefore considered what, if any relevance the allegations have to threshold. I find that each is an example of Mr B’s behaviour when challenged and when he does not get his own way. In those circumstances, he is emotionally and psychologically abusive. His obsessive behaviours, his over-talking, his determination to get his way are at such a level that they expose the recipient to a risk of emotional and psychological harm and that harm is significant. I find that as X grows, she like any child, will be likely to challenge her father by her actions and her opinion. I find that it is likely that if she does Mr B will subject her to the same types of treatment as found by District Judge Dodds and as I find in relation to the professionals who have challenged him in this case The alternative is that X avoids challenging her father by adapting to avoid conflict. That is maladaptive and harmful. It too is likely to place X at risk of significant harm , that harm again being emotional and psychological harm. I find that the risk of significant and emotional harm arises from the pattern of Mr B’s behaviours when he does not get his own way. I find that the risk of harm is attributable to the care being given to X not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to her.
Future Welfare - the Balance
I now turn to consider X's future welfare.
I begin with X herself. X is nearly 6. She is bright, articulate and healthy. I accept Ms Jackson’s assessment of X. She is a perceptive little girl who will need a stable and consistent figure in her life. She is watchful of those around her and capable of reading their cues. She needs stability of response and needs to know who she can turn to and who will meet her needs. To date she has suffered significant trauma in that she has had various transitions of her main care givers and has ultimately suffered the consequences for her parents’ poor choices and behaviour. X has suffered an immense amount of loss in her life, loss of her father’s presence on numerous occasions, loss of her mother’s care, loss of her grandmother and tragically the loss of her baby sister. I accept Ms Jackson’s evidence that Y very much lives on in the heart of her sister. X will speak of her during contact and speaks to her sister, as she is “a star in the sky”. X clearly enjoys remembering her sister through discussions with her mother during contact. X has suffered trauma beyond her years and whilst she appears to show a degree of resilience on the outside, there is concern, which I accept, that this is simply her coping mechanism, as the adults around her have not been consistent in meeting her needs and she has been exposed to adult feelings and behaviour. It is likely that the full impact upon X of her adverse life experiences to date will not manifest in full until she feels stable, secure and safe.
The local authority’s plan for X is long term foster care. That brings with it significant disadvantages. She will be placed outside her natural family. In long term foster care, she is likely to experience a number of moves from foster home to foster home. She cannot remain with her current foster carers who she has come to regard as grandparent-like figures. When she leaves their care, she will experience yet another loss. Foster care has many downsides not least that it is unlikely to provide her with stability and security of placement throughout her childhood. However, there are significant advantages to long term foster care for X. Her carers will be regulated, and her placement should be safe. Another advantage of long-term foster care is that she will be able to maintain regular contact with her mother. Despite her mother’s poor life choices and failings which have impacted on X, Ms A remains the most important person in X’s life. I accept the description of the relationship between mother and child as given by Ms J. It is beautiful. Within contact Ms A meets her daughter’s needs including her emotional needs. She is attuned to her daughter. Ms A supports X’s placement in foster care. She does not do anything in contact to undermine the placement. Ms A has, despite all her problems and failings, been the consistent person to whom X has turned throughout her life. Any future placement for X must, in my judgment, provide for that consistent thread to continue by maintaining a meaningful relationship with her mother through contact.
Ms A loves X very much. She accepts that she cannot meet X at the moment and supports the local authority’s care plan. From all the evidence I have read whilst Ms A hopes to be able to resume care in the future, at present she lacks the insight to bring about the meaningful and sustained change that will be necessary to become a full-time carer for X. That said, within contact, she meets her daughter’s needs well. Contact for X is important for her. The current care plan provides for a high level of regular contact given the context of long term foster care. The direct contact set out in the plan will be supplemented by video call contact and the care plan, if endorsed, will need to be amended to reflect that.
I accept that Mr B loves X very much. I accept Ms Jackson’s assessment that Mr B is capable of meeting X’s physical needs. That encompasses the ability to ensure she has appropriate medical and dental care, she is fed and hydrated, she has warmth shelter and clean clothing and appropriate hygiene. Whilst his own accommodation does not now lend itself to caring for a child, I remind myself that many parents by dint of circumstances raise a child in a one-bedroom property, and I have no reason to consider that Mr B could not adapt his accommodation to care for X if that were needed. Further he has given evidence that he and X would stay with his mother whilst he placed himself in a position to provide suitable accommodation for his daughter. Many working parents do rely heavily on grandparents to care for their children whilst they are at work and in essence that is what Mr B proposes. It is what happened before when X went to live with him in September 2023. I also factor into my analysis that he can meet X’s educational needs and can, if he chooses, provide her with the stimulation to meet her needs. However, I find, as the first session of contact observed by Ms Jackson demonstrated that he does not read his daughter’s cues and is unable therefore to meet all her emotional needs. In that contact session, X was reaching out for a unfamiliar adult to provide her with reassurance and assuage her apprehension. She did not get that from her father and had to turn to a professional she had just met. Further I find that Mr B is likely to be unable to meet X emotional and psychological needs because he is rigid and determined to ensure his own needs are met and his point is accepted even when that is to the detriment of X. He has wilfully and determinedly refused to see X, other than the two sessions observed by Ms Jackson, because he will not agree to having supervised contact with his daughter. That means that X has not had any meaningful contact with him since June 2024. Between September 2023 until her removal into foster care in June 2024, Mr B was an important figure in his daughter’s life. Since then, through her eyes, he has vanished and she, I find, is likely to feel abandoned, confused and yet again let down by someone who she looked to meet her needs. His actions in failing to maintain in contact with his daughter are, in my judgment, likely to have caused and to be causing X significant harm. I do not accept, as Mr B asserts, that X will just slot back into his life if I were to order her return to his care. I find Mr B’s expectation that she would do so naïve and lacking in empathy. I find that his argument that if she is returned to him, the end will have justified his absence from his daughter’s life to be based on distorted logic. It is a purely self-serving justification and is illogical because his failure to maintain his relationship must as a matter of logic diminish the prospects of her being placed in his care. I have found earlier in this judgment that X was suffering and was at risk of suffering significant harm as a result of the care likely to be given to her by her father not being what a reasonable carer would give to a child. I find that risk of harm has not diminished since the relevant date. There remains a risk of significant harm to X if placed in her father’s care. The risks are continuous and continuing. Mr B sees no need to change. Mr B, as I have already found knows where appropriate boundaries lie but choses to cross them to meet his own needs which he will prioritise above the needs of others, including, I find, the needs of his own daughter eg his attitude to maintaining contact with her. I find that he is unlikely to boundary his own behaviours or to regulate his emotions. Mr B is articulate, educated and has the ability to take on complex information and consider wider perspectives. However, he does not do so. He is heavily preoccupied with the injustices he considers he has faced from the local authority and the children’s guardian. He has not been able to set aside his own exceptionally strong views about the professionals in this case for the benefit of his daughter. His preoccupation is, in my judgment, extreme. They are, in my judgment examples of his own needs and feelings taking precedence. He puts them before X’s needs. He is unlikely to be able to work with professionals who challenge him. Ms Jackson felt a need to placate him and said in evidence: I had to placate it from happening - result of my actions […] When challenged his behaviour comes out. Despite taking steps to placate Mr B, he still regards M Jackson as the local authority’s puppet and has little if no professional respect for her- Mr B told this court that she did not do her job properly. I reject Mr B’s arguments that it is only Ms J he cannot work with. I find that the social workers he did work with, one social worker and the other did not challenge him and the outcome they settled on aligned with his own. I find that Mr B has shown an inability to work with Ms J and her manager, he has acted unfavourably to the FAST workers, he has refused to work with contact supervisors as he has reported that based on past experience he does not trust them and he has refused to work with the Children’s Guardian. I take into account the impact Mr B’s behaviours towards her have had on the Guardian. I find that it is likely that as X grows up, she will challenge her father and provoke his ire if she does not do as he considers she ought. The impact of his likely severe reaction upon X is likely to harm her emotionally and psychologically. Further it is likely that if not protected from her father’s lack of emotional regulation and inappropriate boundaries, she will begin to model behaviours which will be contrary to her emotional and psychological wellbeing. Having heard Mr B give evidence I find that he is unlikely to promote contact between X and Ms A. I find that would be a significant detriment to X. Given the importance of her relationship with her mother, I find that if it were not promoted in the future, it would cause X significant further emotional and psychological harm.
Mrs H, the Paternal grandmother, does not seek to care for X given her age but she would help Mr B care for X. On the basis of the evidence before me I find that she is blind to the risks her son poses and would not be a protective factor. She has bought into his narrative and minimises or excuses her son. I find Mrs H’s perceptions and positions are influenced by her son and her need to protect him. Mrs H does not believe that her son or anyone influences her, stating: I am the head of family and live my life the way I want to live. I do not accept that self-analysis. It is evident that Mrs H did not disclose to professionals her knowledge of her son’s actions, and by her own account in Court that she had known for some 20 months. She failed to disclose this to her independent fostering agency and indeed, Children’s Services when X was living in her care. I believe that Mrs H, having been a foster carer and being aware of procedures and reporting disclosures, failed to act in the best interests of the foster child when she suspected a relationship between her son and LE. Mrs H has refused contact with X since June 2024. She told Ms Jackson that it would be too painful for her. Mrs H does not accept that Ms A is vulnerable and does not accept the findings of District Judge Dodds. Mrs H told Ms Jackson that her intention at that time was to care for X until she can return to her father’s care, and should there be any restrictions i.e., he cannot visit the home, contact is to be professionally supervised Mrs H stated: it wouldn’t work it’s not even a possibility, if he has been found guilty that’s a separate manner. Mrs H continued: I can’t abandon him and as much as I want to care for X that’s not what she would want, she wouldn’t choose to live with me, in my eyes he was just an adorable dad, if anything he spoilt her. They have a beautiful relationship. Because he’s not guilty I don’t think that would be fair, in my head if I ever felt there would be any harm to X, I’d be the first person [to protect her]. I wouldn’t want to abandon B for her, that wouldn’t be what X would want. In the circumstances and on the evidence, I stand back and conclude that Mrs H has no insight into the risks her son poses to X and is unlikely to be able to protect her in the future.
Mr F’s evidence before me was strongly aligned with the father’s evidence. He had had a negative viability assessment and his stance before this court underscored that he is enmeshed with his brother; sees no risks emanating from his brother and is hostile to the professionals in the case. There is no basis for further assessment of him as an alternative carer and in closing the issue of an independent assessment of him was rightly, not pressed on behalf of Mr B.
.
Dr G was present when her mother was visited by a social worker for an Initial Viability Assessment. The unchallenged evidence before me from that assessment is that:
Dr G felt that her brother and her family were being bullied and accused of harming X which they would never do. She said that unannounced visits were taking place which are unlawful. She had attended court with her brother and the Judge said that these should not happen. As part of the unannounced visits, a worker had telephoned Dr G on one occasion to ask where X was but she did not provide the information to the worker as she felt the visits were wrong and not authorised. She was disgusted that a worker had shared with her that they were visiting the home because they wanted to check whether Mr B was bathing X, which is information her brother had shared with her following his conversation with a worker on the telephone. She was appalled that anyone could think her brother would be sexually inappropriate towards his daughter. Mr B had shared information from his solicitor, that Ms J, X's social worker, had said her mother should turn off her ring doorbell. She had no faith or trust in Children's Social Care due to Ms J's behaviour and attitude towards her family. Mrs H supported Dr G's angry torrent of information by not challenging any of the information Dr G shared. Mrs H shared that she was very upset by the unannounced visits. She did not understand their purpose as Mr B was allowed to be in her home and see X as long as she supervised the time he spent with her. She believes the visits were upsetting for X who was confused and unsettled by different people coming to the home for unscheduled visits.
There is also an Initial Viability Assessment of Dr G dated 9 October 2024. There is no doubt she is able to physically care for X. Dr G advised that she has been frustrated by the lack of communication by the local authority and does not trust the allocated social worker as she considers that lies have been told and that the social worker's goal was to place X in foster care. Dr G advised that her mother was not told that unannounced visits would take place and then people had been trying to visit without the family understanding that this would happen. Dr G referenced that at one point a plan was put in place that hadn't been shared with her mother and there has been a theme of plans and reports being shared at the '11th hour'. Dr G advised that she is aware that she has been described as angry and hostile when she attended her mother's initial viability assessment. Dr G told her assessor that she had joined her mother as her mother hadn't been aware of what the visit was for, so she went to help her mother understand the purpose of the visit. Dr G advised that on reflection this wasn't the appropriate person to share her concerns with and described that she was upset and frustrated but does not agree with the portrayal of herself as being hostile. Dr G considered that it would be challenging to trust X's social worker, but they would have to if needed as they want X to remain with family. Dr G queried whether for her own assessment it would be more appropriate for an independent social worker to complete their assessment as they would want an assessment to be fair and unbiased. During the assessment visit and prior phone calls with Dr G she shared worries about engaging with the assessment and how the information she shared would be recorded. Dr G also said that she does disagree with the view of the local authority and is concerned about how this will be reflected within the assessment.
Dr G and her husband work. Their main support would be Mrs H. Dr G and Mr G advised that if Mrs H cannot care for X unsupervised, they would not be able to care for her as she is their main support. They did not consider that there were any concerns in respect of Mrs H.
I have considered the chronology of the private and then the public law proceedings. It is evident from that chronology that Dr G has been a supporter of her brother Mr B throughout. She was a witness in the 2021 proceedings before District Judge Dodds. She, like her brother, does not accept the facts as found by that judge. Dr G has been aware of Mr B’s sexual relationship with LE for some time, although she thought her 18 not 16 until she heard the contrary in the witness box. I accept the argument that it does not matter whether LE was 16 or 18 years old when Mr B had sex with her. What matters is that it was an inappropriate relationship given the age gap, LE’s vulnerabilities and that LE was a foster child in his mother’s care. Dr G, I find, has the intellectual and emotional ability to understand why that relationship was inappropriate but has nevertheless adopted the father’s narrative to date and bought into and been part of the paternal family’s hostile relationship with the professionals in this case. Dr G has not had contact with X since June 2024 when she was removed from the paternal grandmother’s care. She says it was not offered to her and that she did not know how to secure it. That may be right, but I also take into consideration that she took no steps to find out how to get contact with her niece. I factor in that at present Dr G does not accept her brother is a risk to X or the risks that emanate from her mother not protecting X and allowing her into contact with Mr B.
I also factor in that Dr G and her husband provide a stable and nurturing home to their own child and have the ability to meet all of X's needs. I factor in that Dr G will be able to nurture and reflect to X her heritage. I factor in that if directed by the court Dr G will facilitate and promote contact between X and her mother. They will enable contact with the paternal family and the father. I also factor in that if X were placed with her aunt and husband, it is likely that they would provide a stable home for X throughout her childhood. All that however presupposes that the placement would not be disrupted and undermined by Mr B; that Dr G and her husband could work transparently and without hostility with professionals for X's benefit and could and would protect X from the risk of significant harm that Mr B poses to X.
I have stood back and looked at the analysis of the various options for X as a whole. Although this judgment is written in a linear fashion, I have considered her future welfare holistically. In my judgment there are two realistic options for X- long term foster care or a placement under a court order (public or private) with Dr G and her husband. I have considered whether having looked at all the evidence I have sufficient evidence before me to enable me to make a decision between the two competing options. I have decided that I do not. I consider that issues such as whether the placement would be disrupted and undermined by Mr B; whether Dr G and her husband could work transparently and without hostility with professionals for X's benefit and could and would protect X from the risk of significant harm that Mr B poses to X all need to be assessed as part of an independent assessment of Dr G and her husband in these proceedings. However, I also have to factor in that assessment will cause further delay. X has been the subject of proceedings since late 2019. I accept that what she needs is finality. Dr G has been supportive of her brother throughout these proceedings and has adopted the paternal family narrative. It is therefore argued on behalf of the local authority, the Guardian and the mother that I should dismiss the application for a full independent parenting assessment. Set against that, is that it is not until this judgment that findings of fact have been made that there is a risk of significant harm to X in her father’s care which is continuing. In my judgment, what this court needs is evidence of whether or not Dr G and her husband can accept those finding and the consequences that flow from them. It is that upon which I need evidence. As matters stand this court does not have all the evidence it needs to be able to rule Dr G out as a realistic option for X. In my judgment Dr G has the intellectual and emotional ability in theory to change to meet X's need to be protected her from her father and the risk of significant harm he poses to her. I consider that an independent assessment of Dr G and her husband is necessary to assist the court to resolve the proceedings justly. I set out in more detail what the assessment will consider. In particular it will need to consider whether in the light of my findings in this judgment, Dr G and her husband can:
Accept and understand the risks of significant harm I have found Mr B poses to X.
Protect X from the risk of significant harm posed to her by her father and those, including Mrs H, who have no insight into the risks and are likely to let Mr B have unsupervised contact with X.
Provide and commit to providing for X a stable home throughout her childhood.
Exercising parental responsibility and making decisions for X which are in her best interests and which her father may not agree with.
The ability to understand the need for X to have regular contact with her mother and their ability to promote that contact throughout X's childhood
The ability to work with professionals to further X's best interests.
I have regard to and take into account the statutory time limits for public law proceedings and note that they have already been considerably exceeded. However, the delay the assessment will cause will be purposeful. If the assessment is positive, it may mean X can have a home throughout her childhood in her wider family. The alternative is long term foster care and she is only 6 years old. Whilst the assessment is progressing, X will remain under an interim care order in foster care and continue to see her mother in accordance with the care plan before this court and supplemented by video contact. On the ground, matters will remain as they are currently for X and that will minimise the harm of further delay.
My decision to adjourn for further assessment is to ensure I have all the evidence necessary before me to make a final welfare decision for X and determine whether long term foster care or a placement with her paternal aunt is in the best interests of X. What that ultimate decision will be will depend on the evidential landscape once the assessment has been completed. To enable the assessment to be meaningful, I direct that a copy of this judgment should be disclosed to Dr G within 48 hours of the approved judgment being handed down. The identity of the ISW to be used is to be agreed between the parties and if not will be determined by me on the papers. I will determine any dispute on the papers. Any application by the assessor to see X in the presence of her aunt and husband will be determined by me. That is my judgment.
Postscript
Requests for Clarification
This judgment was sent out in the usual way for corrections of a typographical nature etc and subject to the usual embargo. In response to the draft judgment, the court also received the following request for clarification:
Can the court clarify if there is a finding that Mr B poses a direct risk of sexual abuse to his own daughter? If so, can the court confirm if it is relying on the adverse findings that Mr B engaged in an inappropriate sexual relationship with LE to support the finding that he poses a direct risk of sexually abusing his own daughter?
If the court has not found that Mr B poses a direct risk of sexual abuse to his own daughter can the court clarify its finding of the nature and extent of the indirect sexual risk he poses to his own daughter?
The request for clarification has been carefully considered in line with the authorities stretching back from Re YM (Care Proceedings) (Clarification of Reasons) [2024] EWCA Civ 71 and it is sought because it is vital that Dr G and her husband understand the precise nature and scope of the sexual risk that Mr B has been found to pose to X which will then inform the decisions to be taken in proceedings.
It is fully appreciated that the court will decline to respond to this request if it considers that it would not be material to the decisions that have to be taken in the proceedings.
Response
Given that this judgment is to be handed down formally to the parties at 2pm today, 4 April 2025, I have given my response as a postscript to the judgment.
In paragraph 124 of my judgment above I have found that as a consequence of his sexual relationship with LE, X is likely to be at risk of significant harm from her father. The harm in question is sexual, emotional, and psychological. In coming to that conclusion, I have considered and applied s.31 CA 1989 and O (Description of Sexual Abuse), Re, [2024] 4 W.L.R. 29. The harm arises from the father knowing where appropriate sexual boundaries lie but choosing to cross them to meet his own needs. Appropriate in this context is used to denote what a reasonable person in the shoes of the father would or would not do. The risk that arises to X from the father choosing to cross appropriate sexual boundaries is the risk of significant harm. The harm is sexual, emotional, and psychological. The risk of sexual harm in this case includes the risk of direct sexual contact and the risk that arises from contact with her father’s inappropriate sexual boundaries. The latter includes the risk of maladapted sexual boundaries for the child herself.