Middlesbrough Borough Council v Mother & Ors

This is an ex-tempore judgment given orally at the conclusion of these care proceedings number MB25C50285. I have indicated that this Judgment will be published on the National Archive in anonymised form, such that it is in the public domain. This judgment must not be published such as to identify the parties or children involved or to disseminate information within it, and to do so would be a contempt of court.

These proceedings concern four children, Z A, Y A, X C and W C. The mother of all of the children is Mother, aged 37 years old. The father of Z and Y is Mr A, aged 43 years old. The father of X and W is Mr C, aged 41 years old. Mother has an older child, who is cared for by his father under a Child Arrangements Order that was made in 2025 as part of separate private law proceedings.

Mr A has had a daughter after the end of his relationship with Mother. His youngest daughter is aged 7 years old. Mr A’s wife, Mrs A, has two children from her own previous relationship, born in 2008 and 2010. The children's guardian has provided her final analysis on 27/11/25. This is the final hearing in relation to these care proceedings. I have heard evidence at this final hearing from 1/12/25 to 5/12/25. I received written submissions from all the parties and further oral submissions today on 10/12/25 before delivering my judgment. This has therefore been a six-day final hearing.

At this final hearing Mr McDonald has represented the local authority, Mother and Mr C have appeared as Litigants in Person, Mr Percy-Raine has appeared for Mr A and Ms Mangenie has appeared for the children’s guardian.

The concerns of the local authority include substance misuse by Mother and Mr C, based on hair strand testing and Mother’s behaviours and failures to address her mental health. Mother has diagnoses for Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder ‘EUPD’, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and ADHD as well as having past anxiety and depressive episodes and past episodes of extreme crisis when she has received acute psychiatric treatment and threatened harm to herself or to take her own life.

The local authority also alleges exposure of the children to domestic abuse in the relationship between Mother and Mr C, a risk of emotional and physical harm, emotional neglect from neglectful parenting, chaotic or unsafe home conditions and a lack of insight into these difficulties and risk to the children from Mother and Mr C.

Latterly when the local authority has sought to address these problems they aver as to breaches of safety planning, a failure to follow recommended treatment as to substance misuse or mental health difficulties and as to a failure to work with professionals.

I put on record my thanks to all of the advocates in this matter. Mother and Mr C both engaged fully with the Final Hearing as Litigants in Person. Mother has demonstrated significant preparedness for the Final Hearing. Mr C has addressed the matters that he has wished to do and taken more of a ‘back seat’ in supporting Mother through his representations and evidence during most of the Final Hearing. Given past issues of domestic abuse between the different parents they have not conducted cross-examination in person of one another but have, where questions were wished, submitted questions to be put on their behalf. Any comments I make subsequently in respect of the effects of the parents representing themselves or what it might speak to in their capabilities or relationships is not intended to detract from the basic competency they have shown in seeking to put over their own perceived interests in the case and representing themselves before me.

This final hearing has been particularly vast in respect of the areas of dispute. Mother has sought to challenge the whole basis for the evidence presented by the local authority. She has argued doggedly that the local authority has deliberately manipulated the court process, including by withholding evidence at past hearings and causing delay such as to cause previous judges to make decisions without evidence. Mother is alleged to have manipulated Mr C, and accepts that she has done so in the past. Mother and Mr C at the final hearing have denied the entirety of the threshold and welfare findings sought by the local authority and sought the immediate reinstatement of their separate care, Mother and Mr C now having separated.

I have previously given judgment in complicated cases involving applications for placement or care orders and findings of fact involving detailed and contentious expert evidence. I would though comment that the extent of dispute and material in this case has been most notable. This has mostly been driven by Mother in her position as Litigant in Person in seeking to contest and challenge all steps taken by the local authority, at this time and historically.

Given the vastness of the dispute, and the materials, with over 1,600 pages that I have considered within the final hearing bundle plus additional documents and materials, I do not make reference to every dispute raised between the parties within this judgment. If I have not referred to certain matters, it does not mean that I have not considered them. I have sought to focus on key aspects of the evidence that enable me to give reasons and set out the most relevant considerations in determining the statutory threshold findings sought by the local authority and addressing the welfare of Z, Y, X and W.

The proceedings have been particularly fractious. Proceedings were issued by the local authority on 10/6/25. An Interim Care Order was initially made by Deputy District Judge Nix on 10/6/25 for X and W. In respect of Z and Y an Interim Supervision Order, Child Arrangements Order for them to live with Mr A and Prohibited Steps Order for Mother not to remove Z and Y from Mr A’s care were made.

Z and Y have remained living with their father, Mr A. Regrettably, X and W have moved several times, and this has included a family placement with the U family in the summer. Mother and Mr C state they have been separated since about May 2025. There have been attempts at placing the youngest children with their father, Mr C and also with Mother, including with support of maternal grandmother and also with 24-hour care support, present except when X and W were at school, paid for by the local authority in Mother’s home.

For the various reasons which now form part of the local authority’s concerns those family placements with Mother and Mr C were not continued under the ICO. This included the local authority responding to the results of the drug hair stand testing once received.

Unfortunately without an available foster placement together X and W have most recently moved to a residential home placement, when this was sanctioned by the Court. It is patently undesirable for the children to be in a residential placement at their young age, albeit the evidence does indicate that X and W have coped well and been well cared for at the residential care home. The local authority plan is for long term foster care and it has been indicated in evidence that a foster carers match is available, dependent on the outcome of proceedings.

The proceedings have been heavily contested by Mother. Mother became dissatisfied with her legal representation. She made her own choice to become a Litigant in Person from the time of a contested removal hearing heard before District Judge Richards on 20/8/25. District Judge Richards did counsel mother, in a way I find to be prescient as to how these proceedings have developed, as to the disadvantages and difficulties of being a litigant in person in Care proceedings such as the emotional involvement, but Mother was determined to be a Litigant in Person from that time.

The procedural background to this matter is complex, and there have been a number of appeals made by Mother to the Court of Appeal. There have been over 30 different orders made during the course of these proceedings. From hearing Mother's evidence at the final hearing, my sense is that Mother was unhappy with concessions made by her own legal representation earlier in the proceedings. In particular she wished to represent herself in order to fully challenge the statutory threshold criteria and the welfare decisions that had been made and seek immediate return of the children to her.

Amongst the many notable hearings that have occurred is the hearing before Recorder Pallo on 16/9/25, at which there was a full contest in respect of interim arrangements. Recorder Pallo found at that time that on an interim basis it was not feasible or realistic for the children to return to Mother as she wished.

From my reading of the detailed recitals and Orders that have been made in these proceedings, Recorder Pallo’s well-reasoned judgment sets out many of the recurrent themes and issues from the contested hearings that have occurred.

Recorder Pallo stated in his judgment that there had been a number of judges and advocates who had encouraged Mother to re-engage different solicitors, but that she had expressed a wish to remain unrepresented.

At the end of his judgment Recorder Pallo also added comments in relation to warning Mother over posting on social media. Recorder Pallo warned against her communicating her daily thoughts and struggles in that way.

Whilst endorsing the interim care plan of the local authority, Recorder Pallo stated that the local authority should ensure that the steps expected of Mother were made clear to her. He also stated as his own message to Mother that she, "as I said yesterday, [Mother] needs to properly channel her anger, her frustrations, and her upset into fighting in a properly focussed way for these children. The way that she has approached this case to date seems to me to be distracting her energies into ways that are entirely counterproductive. Constantly fighting against the local authority is not working for her."

As well as the various contested hearings that have taken place, Mother posting on social media resulted in the local authority bringing committal proceedings against her.

In possible retaliation or response to her own committal proceedings, Mother, as a Litigant in Person, has brought committal proceedings against the social work team involved with the children. Mother has instituted ongoing committal proceedings against the three witnesses, social work professionals, from the local authority that also gave evidence at the Final Hearing.

At the hearing before Her Honour Judge Cains on 14/11/25, the local authority was granted permission to withdraw its application for committal. Mother's application for permission to apply for the committal of the three social work professionals from the local authority was adjourned to the conclusion of these care proceedings, with liberty to restore following judgment.

I wish to make clear that the final hearing before me was concerned solely in relation to the care proceedings in relation to these children and was not intended to form any part of the evidence heard for the committal proceedings, if they are restored.

A penal notice was issued against Mother by Her Honour Judge Cains on 28/8/25. It was reported to her that since the warnings over posting on social media had been given by His Honour Judge Brown at a hearing on 15/8/25, Mother had continued to post on social media about this case. HHJ Brown on that earlier date had removed the children from the care of Mother, directed a statement from Mother in relation to her social media posts and issued a further warning that Mother must cease from posting on social media and recording the social worker covertly or overtly.

The penal notice issued by HHJ Cains on 28/8/25 is in terms that the Mother, if she disobeys the Court's Order that she must comply with the confidentiality warning contained in the order, will be held in contempt of court and may be imprisoned, fined, or have her assets seized. This penal notice has been in full force and effect since that date and during these proceedings.

The local authority at this final hearing have provided detailed care plans and seek for Z and Y to remain in the care of Mr A with a Child Arrangements Order and Prohibited Steps Order continuing in similar terms in relation to Mother, and for X and W to be made subject to Care Orders and with placement in foster care. Whilst X and W are presently in a residential placement, all parties agree that this is not ideal, particularly given their age. The local authority have stated at final hearing that a foster care placement is available for matching and that a move for X and W would be transitioned if a Care Order is made.

The local authority and Guardian support that there should be a minimum of monthly contact for Mother with Z and Y to be supervised and organised by Mr A. The contact between the Mother, X and W is to be facilitated by the local authority. This is based upon the plan that the intended foster care placement proceeds to transition to fortnightly contact for each parent and to be subject to regular review.

The care plan also includes that Mr A will liaise with the local authority to ensure further additional time, outside of the other parents’ contact, for inter-sibling contact.

The local authority have indicated that they will support funding being provided if Mother does approach them to seek the recommended DBT treatment. The Guardian strongly supports this and the identified therapist should be agreed with Dr Swart and with Dr Swart’s reporting being made available to the treating therapist.

I urge in the strongest terms that I would support any such funding being provided by the local authority in circumstances where the care plan is to be implemented.

In respect of the plans of the local authority, it is important that the contract of expectations is provided to Mother and Mr C. The eventual hope is for reunification, as explained by the social workers in their evidence. That would be their intent in engaging with the family subject to their primary duty to safeguard the children. It is important to bear in mind that in making a final Care Order it is made for any children’s minority.

The position of Mother is that she seeks the return of all four children to her care immediately. In respect of Z and Y, this would be under a shared care arrangement, as had functioned for around eight to nine years before the intervention of the local authority and these present proceedings. Mother would also support X and W spending time with Mr C.

Mr A’s position is that he agrees with the final care plan for Z and Y, subject to seeking a longer duration for a Prohibited Steps Order and to match the period of 12 months for a Supervision Order which is recommended by the guardian. Mr A considers that Z and Y should have weekly contact with their Mother, despite his concerns over Mother and her behaviour, including that towards him and past alleged domestic abuse. He feels satisfied that he could appropriately facilitate this contact.

Mr C seeks for the return of X and W to his care or to that of Mother. Mr C states that he is arranging a deposit for a house in which he and the children could live. He states that the relationship with Mother is over, but that he now considers that Mother has made positive changes since their break-up and is in a position to also care for the children. Mr C has also set out within his evidence that his cousin runs a large estate agency, and he would not have difficulty in acquiring any property that would be required for the care of the children.

Mr C says that he would comply with any requirements placed on him by the local authority or others in order for X and W to be in his care.

The position of the children's guardian is that she supports the local authority in relation to the care plan. She has recommended that there be a section 91(14) Order made in order to seek to ensure stability for the children, which she states should be for a period of at least 12 months.

In relation to Z and Y, the children's guardian considers that there should be a Supervision Order for a period of 12 months, as well as the Child Arrangements Order for the children to live with Mr A. She supports the Prohibited Steps Order and the Supervision Order lasting for a further 12 months and considers that the section 91(14) Order should be for the same duration.

The issues to be decided are wide and detailed in relation to the parents’ full contest in relation to the threshold and welfare findings sought by the local authority.

My paramount consideration within these proceedings is the children’s welfare. This is the ‘welfare principle’ that I apply throughout this judgment.

As the local authority plan is for a Care Order for X and W and a Supervision Order and Child Arrangements Order for Z and Y to live with Mr A. I apply and have regard to ‘the welfare checklist’ contained within s1(3) of the Children Act 1989, which I will refer to as ‘the Act’ within this judgment.

I must at all times bear in mind that, in general, any delay in coming to a decision within these proceedings is likely to prejudice the children’s welfare, as at s1(2) of the Act.

The Act also makes clear at s1(2A) that unless the contrary is shown that involvement of a parent in a child’s life will further the child’s welfare, and there is accordingly a presumption in favour of parental involvement.

The meeting of the ‘threshold’ in respect of the harm caused or that might be caused to the children, under s31(2) of the Act is disputed by Mother and Mr C. I am also concerned at this time with welfare decisions, and with the future plans that should be made for the children. In the circumstances I must make findings on these issues based on the evidence.

I bear in mind proportionality and the rights that the children, and their parents and other family members, have under the European Convention of Human Rights under Article 6 as to a right to a fair trial and Article 8 as to respect for family life.

Under s1(5) of the Act, the Court is not to make orders unless it considers that doing so would be better for the child or children than making no order at all, the ‘No Order Principle.’

Furthermore, in respect of proportionality I must not take more draconian steps than are needed to meet the children’s needs in this situation, and any interference with the exercise of the right to respect for family life should be proportionate to its legitimate aim.

The final order made must be proportionate, Re B-S [2013] EWCA Civ 1146. The Court must adopt a holistic welfare analysis, considering the statutory checklist and all realistic options, as in Re G [2014] 1 FLR 670 and there is no hierarchy within the welfare checklist: Re D [2014] EWCA Civ 315. The Court must undertake a structured balance-sheet analysis, evaluating each realistic option’s strengths and deficits, as also stated in Re B-S [2013].

In Re B (A Child) 2013 UKSC 33 Lord Wilson set out that the Court must continually consider what the evidence shows about future parenting capacity and consider the long term implications for the children.

A Court which is considering an application for public law orders such as for these children must first be satisfied that the statutory threshold criteria are met pursuant to s.31(2) of the Act, before then applying the welfare principle and welfare checklist to determine whether an Order should be granted and, if so, what type of Order.

The Act, at s31(2), provides that:

“A Court may only make a care order or a supervision order if it is satisfied –

The relevant date for determining whether a child is suffering significant harm is at the time when the local authority initiated protective measures, (Re M (A Minor) (Care Order: Threshold Conditions) [1994] 2 AC 424). In this instance the relevant date is 10/6/25.

Harm is defined at s.31(9) of the Act as meaning “ill-treatment or the impairment of health or development including, for example, impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another”. Development is defined as, “physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development” and health means “physical or mental health.”

In Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33, Lady Hale explained that significant harm must be “considerable, noteworthy or important”. In Re MA (Children (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2009] EWCA Civ 853, Ward LJ expressed a meaning of “significant harm” as being such that it must “be significant enough to justify the intervention of the State and disturb the autonomy of the parents to bring up their children by themselves in the way they choose. It must be significant enough to enable the court to make a care order or a supervision order if the welfare of the child demands it”.

Also in Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33 Lord Wilson took the view that “significant” is not a word that needs explaining or an additional gloss, and at paragraph 27 of Re B cited the formulation of Hedley J in Re L (Care: Threshold Criteria) [2007] 1 FLR 2050 that, “society must be willing to tolerate very diverse standards of parenting, including the eccentric, the barely adequate and the inconsistent”, and, that “[significant] harm is fact-specific and must retain the breadth of meaning that human fallibility may require of it” but that “it is clear that it must be something unusual; at least something more than the commonplace human failure or inadequacy.”

The Court of Appeal explored the meaning of “likely” in Re R (A Minor) [2009] EWCA Civ 942. Wilson LJ, as he then was, stated that “likely” is defined as meaning a “real possibility that could not sensibly be ignored” having regard to the nature and gravity of the feared harm in the particular case and that this did not mean that the risk of significant harm had to be “probable” in the sense of being “more probable than not”.

In this matter I have dealt with Mother and Mr C as Litigants in Person. This is unusual within care proceedings when legal aid for representation is readily available.

The circumstances of Mother and Mr C becoming litigants in person is different. Mother wanted to more fully contest matters than her legal team were doing. She was dissatisfied and felt she could better represent herself. She has been warned repeatedly that representing herself risks distracting her from the required focus on the children and can be less than ideal with the emotive subject matter of care proceedings.

Mother does have legal knowledge. She has studied though not yet completed a law degree. She was obviously able to conduct the proceedings competently herself in terms of preparing a case and making argument before the Court.

Mother’s status as a litigant in person, I find, has meant that she has lacked emotional or professional distance as an advocate in determining the best approach and overall strategy within proceedings. In addition, in her position as a parent in care proceedings she has become distracted and fixed on past legal issues and lost the required focus on the children. I agree with the Guardian who has stated that acting as a Litigant in Person has “distracted” mother away from the children.

Mr C acting as a Litigant in Person is more accidental. He was legally represented but, in short summary, Mother raised with him her dissatisfaction over the positions that were being adopted by him during some of the interim hearings and his non-attendance when he was legally represented. Mother obtained, from Mr C, an email from Mr C’s solicitor that she felt reflected badly on that solicitor and Mother distributed it electronically to all the other parties. I took from Mr C’s evidence that he had agreed with Mother that she could distribute this email to the other parties. After this took place Mr C’s solicitor withdrew from acting on his behalf. Mr C has not obtained other legal representation and has represented himself as a Litigant in Person and taken part in the Final Hearing on that basis.

Both Mother and Mr C are intelligent adults who can express their wishes and feelings in Court and are able to make submissions and ask questions as part of the Final Hearing. However, I do feel both would have benefited from experienced solicitors that could have counselled them as to formulating their position for the Final Hearing and passed on available expertise.

Ultimately, in this jurisdiction the best interests of the children are paramount. I have strived to make this process fair and appropriate for the Mother and Mr C as litigants in person.

As a Judge, I must also be alive to issues and points that should, and would, have been put forward on behalf of the parents had they been legally represented. This includes if there were other realistic options for the long-term care of the children.

Similarly, the applicant local authority has an absolute obligation to ensure that the court considers all matters relevant to the child’s welfare even if, in doing so, it might be seen to be undermining its own case, as is set out in Re Y (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 1091. I am satisfied that this has taken place.

I am familiar in dealing with Litigants in Person from other family cases. It is though less common at a complicated and difficult Final Hearing such as this one. I am though satisfied that the process has been fair. The Litigants in Person have been active within the Hearing and have been able to express at any time as to what their wishes were as to the process or anything that they have wanted to do or to have addressed. As stated, the overarching consideration for these proceedings and this Final Hearing is the welfare of these children.

The making of a Care Order as set out at s33(3) of the Act would include that the local authority has parental responsibility for a child and that it would have the power, subject to the Act, to determine the extent to which a parent may meet their parental responsibility to the child.

Under s35 of the Act whilst a supervision order is in force the duties of the supervising local authority include:

to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to give effect to the order; and

where –

the order is not wholly complied with; or

the supervisor considers that the order may no longer be necessary,

In considering the possibility of making no order, instead of a supervision or care order it is important to remember the local authority’s statutory duties to children in need and at s17 of the Act that:

As found in Re K (supervision orders); [1999] 1 FCR 337 once the threshold criteria are satisfied, in considering whether to make a supervision order or no order in accordance with s 1(5) of the 1989 Act, there has to be something in the making or operation of a supervision order which makes it better for the children for it to be made. It would be wrong to make a supervision order where the duties imposed on the local authority under Pt III of the 1989 Act to provide services for children and their families would be sufficient to meet the children’s needs and the court should start with a preference for the less interventionist approach rather than the more interventionist approach.

Also to be remembered in considering the future for these children is that after the conclusion of these proceedings if there is the making of a Care Order that there would be no continuing role for the Guardian.

It is also sought in relation to Z and Y that the Court make Section 8 orders, child arrangements order for them to live with Mr A, their father and a Prohibited Steps Order, to continue in similar terms in respect of Mother. The welfare principle, welfare checklist and no-order principle apply to these orders under s8 of the Act. A PSO must be necessary and proportionate to protect the child’s welfare. The duration of any orders must also be proportionate and courts should avoid orders extending beyond what is required.

In this case, the Mother and Mr C do not accept any of the threshold or welfare findings sought. I must therefore make findings on the totality of the local’s authority’s threshold and welfare findings document.

Findings of fact must be based on evidence (including inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence) but not on the basis of suspicion or speculation; Re H and R (Child Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] 1 FLR 80; Re A (A Child) (Fact-finding hearing: Speculation) [2011] EWCA Civ 12.

The burden of proof lies with the local authority and the Court must be careful not to reverse the burden of proof. The standard of proof on the disputed factual issues is the balance of probabilities; Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35. A fact must be proved applying this legal standard. It is not appropriate to find that something might have happened. As Lord Hoffmann observed in Re B:

The opinions given by expert medical professionals need to be considered in the context of all the other evidence. It is important to remember that the roles of the court and the experts are distinct, and it is the courtthat is in the best position to weigh up the expert evidence against its findings on the other evidence. The judge is the person who makes the final decision.

The process of evaluating the whole of the evidence is often likened to a jigsaw puzzle. There is a need to piece together all of the evidence in coming to a conclusion on disputed facts. As Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss observed in Re T [2004] 2 FLR 838:

Evidence may be live, written, hearsay, expert or circumstantial. The Court acts on evidence, not assumption: Re BR (Proof of Facts) [2015] EWFC 41. ‘The court acts on evidence, not speculation or assumption.  It acts on facts, not worries or concerns. Evidence comes in many forms.  It can be live, written, direct, hearsay, electronic, photographic, circumstantial, factual, or by way of expert opinion.  It can concern major topics and small details, things that are important and things that are trivial. The burden of proving a fact rests on the person who asserts it. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities: Is it more likely than not that the event occurred?  Neither the seriousness of the allegation, nor the seriousness of the consequences, nor the inherent probabilities alters this.’

Hearsay evidence is admissible under CA s.96(3) of the Act and the Civil Evidence Act 1995, with the weight assessed in accordance with s.4: as stated in Re W (Fact-Finding: Hearsay) [2014] 2 FLR 703.

The Court must follow the established legal approach where a party or witness is found to have lied. In cases where it is alleged that a parent has deliberately lied the court should give careful consideration to the reasons for the lie. These principles derive from the case of R v Lucas [1981] 1QB 720, decided in the criminal jurisdiction but of equal application to the fact-finding process in the family court.

I remind myself of the revised Lucas direction elaborated on by Macur LJ in Re A, B and C [2021] EWCA Civ 451:

“That a witness’s dishonesty may be relevant in determining an issue of fact is commonly acknowledged in judgments … in formulaic terms:

‘That people lie for all sorts of reasons, including shame, humiliation, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, distress, confusion, and [other] emotional pressure, and the fact that somebody lies about one thing does not mean it actually did or did not happen, or that they have lied about everything.’

But this formulation leaves open the question how and when is a witness’s lack of credibility to be factored into the question of determining an issue of fact. In my view, the answer is provided by the terms of the entire Lucas direction as given when necessary in criminal trials.”

Within the context of family proceedings, the Court of Appeal has made clear that the application of the principle articulated in R v Lucas in family cases should go beyond the court merely reminding itself of the broad principle.  In Re H-C (Children) [2016] 4 WLR 85 McFarlane LJ (as he then was) stated as follows:

There have been a series of case in the family courts emphasising the importance of the correct application of the Lucas principles, such as in A, B and C (Children) (2021) EWCA Civ 451 and caution must be taken over any specific adverse inference to be drawn. A lie may only support an adverse inference if the witness lied, it was a deliberate lie, about a material matter and without an innocent explanation.

More generally, the purpose of finding facts in family hearing is to establish what has happened and if findings are made to inform the assessment of risk for the purpose of the welfare decision. The court is to make findings to the extent that they further these purposes.

In Re A (No. 2) (Children: Findings of Fact) [2019] EWCA Civ 1947 Peter Jackson LJ set out that the questions for every fact-finder, in no set order, are What, When, Where, Who, How and Why? Some answers, he said, will be obvious, while other questions may be extremely hard or even unanswerable. Sometimes a question may not need answering at all. The answers to the questions will be provisional until they have been checked against each other to provide a coherent outcome.

As a matter of common sense, the court can take into account inherent improbabilities in deciding whether the standard of proof has been met: Re B [2008] UKHL 35. Findings of fact must be based on evidence, not on speculation: see Re A (A Child) (Fact-finding hearing: Speculation) [2011] EWCA Civ 12. The court must take into account all the evidence, considering each piece of evidence in the context of the other evidence, surveying a wide landscape, and must avoid compartmentalising: see Re U, Re B (Serious Injury: Standard of Proof) [2004] EWCA Civ 567. The evidence of parents and other carers is of the utmost importance and the court must make a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability: Re W and another (Non-accidental injury) [2003] 2 FCR 346.

There is a different but related question of witness fallibility, which is a matter of reliability rather than credibility. The court should bear in mind that recall of events by a witness is a process of fallible reconstruction which may be affected by external influences and supervening events, moulded by the process of litigation and the drafting of lawyers, with past beliefs being reconstructed to make them more consistent with present beliefs and motivated by a desire to give a good impression, as set out in Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd & Anor [2013] EWHC (Comm), by Leggatt J.

In his President’s Memorandum on Witness Statements, McFarlane LJ said on 10 November 2021:

“Parties should understand that the Court’s approach to witness evidence based on human memory will be in accordance with the CPR PD57 AC appendix paragraph 1.3. This states human memory:

a)

Is not a simple mental record of a witnessed event that is fixed at the time of the experience, and fades over time, but

b)

Is a fluid and malleable state of perception concerning an individual’s past experiences, and therefore

c)

Is vulnerable to being altered by a range of influence such that the individual may or may not be conscious of the alteration.”

I also direct myself to the persuasive judgment of Peter Jackson J, as he then was, in Lancashire County Council v C, M and F (Children: Fact-Finding) [2014] EWFC 3:

“To these matters, I would only add that in cases where repeated accounts are given of events surrounding [in that case] injury and death, a Court must think carefully about the significance or otherwise of any reported discrepancies. They may arise for a number of reasons. One possibility is of course that they are lies designed to hide culpability. Another is that they are lies told for other reasons. Further possibilities include faulty recollection or confusion at times of stress or when the importance of accuracy is not fully appreciated, or there may be inaccuracy or mistake in the record keeping or recollection of the person hearing and relying on the account.

The possible effects of delay and questioning upon memory should also be considered, as should the effect on one person of hearing accounts given by others. As memory fades, a desire to iron out wrinkles may not be unnatural, but a process which might inelegantly be described as story creep may occur without any inference or bad faith.”

That guidance should be borne in mind when considering perceived differences between accounts over time and generally when considering a witness’ recall.

As regards witness demeanour, I also have regard to Peter Jackson LJ’s analysis in B-M (Children: Findings of Fact) [2021] EWCA Civ 1371:

“No judge would consider it proper to reach a conclusion about a witness’s credibility solely based on the way that he or she gives evidence, at least in any normal circumstances. The ordinary process of reasoning will draw the judge to consider a number of other matters, such as the consistency of the account with known facts, with previous accounts given by witnesses, with other evidence, and with the overall probabilities.

However, in a case where the facts are not likely to be primarily found in contemporaneous documents, the assessment of credibility can quite properly include the impression made upon the Court by the witness, with due allowance being made of the pressure that may arise from the process of giving evidence.

In relation to electronic messages, I remind myself of the observations in Stocker v Stocker [2019] UKSC 17, in which Lord Kerr cautioned against elaborate analysis of a tweet.

“It is likewise unwise to pass a Facebook posting or its theoretically or logically deductible meaning. The imperative is to ascertain how a typical, i.e. an ordinary, reasonable reader would interpret the message. That search should reflect the circumstances that this is a casual medium. It is the nature of conversation rather than carefully chosen expression, and that it is pre-eminently one in which the reader reads and passes on.”

In relation to hair strand testing authorities such as Re H (A Child: Hair Strand Testing) [2017] EWFC 64, properly indicate that to be of use in the care proceedings the expert must describe the process, results and their significance in a clear and understandable way. The findings of the hair strand testing require explanation from the expert to fairly and clearly identify appropriate conclusions.

Section 91 of the Act sets out important matters as to the duration and effects of orders. It contains the power under s91(14) as follows:

Section 91A was inserted into the Act by the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, s 67(1), (3). It provides that under Section 91A(2) that :

The circumstances in which the court may make a section 91(14) order include, among others,

the child concerned, or

another individual (“the relevant individual”), at risk of harm.

It is also stated at s91A of the Act

“(4)

Where a person who is named in a section 91(14) order applies for leave to make an application of a specified kind, the court must, in determining whether to grant leave, consider whether there has been a material change of circumstances since the order was made.

A section 91(14) order may be made by the court—

on an application made—

by the relevant individual;

by or on behalf of the child concerned;

by any other person who is a party to the application being disposed of by the court;

of its own motion.”

Practice Direction 12Q also contains important guidance on the consideration of s91(14) Orders.

Hayden J has described in F v M [2023] EWFC 5 the additional provisions at s91A of the Act as ‘transformative’ and added “[t]he section provides a powerful tool with which judges can protect both children and the parent with whom they live, from corrosive, demoralising and controlling applications which have an insidious impact on their general welfare and wellbeing and can cause real emotional harm.” His comments have been endorsed in Re A (Parental Responsibility) [2023] EWCA Civ 689, [2024] 1 FLR.

Section 91(14) orders are a protective filter to prevent a person from making specified future applications under the Act without first obtaining the leave of the court. They impose a hurdle, not a bar.

Butler-Sloss LJ in Re P (s 91(14) Guidelines) [1999] 2 FLR 573, CA set out that the power at s91(14) is discretionary. It must be used with care, sparingly and proportionately. The court must weigh all the circumstances, including that the restriction is a statutory intrusion into the right of a party to bring proceedings before the court. The children’s welfare is to be paramount.

Mr McDonald is correct to point out that following the insertion of s91(14) and the subsequent case law that the Court no longer requires “exceptional” circumstances or a history of multiple applications. The order acts as a protective filter to stop repeated, vexatious, or harmful litigation where further applications would risk harm to the child or another individual, or where the family requires a period of respite from proceedings. Rather than exceptionality, an overriding consideration can be the risk of harm to the children with their welfare being paramount.

In respect of litigants in person, the Court of Appeal has also handed down guidance on the approach to be taken when considering making an order under section 91(14). It is of utmost importance that the party affected by the order, particularly if they are in person, understand that such an application is being made or that consideration is being given to making a section 91(14) order and that its effect and meaning are understood and that there is proper opportunity to make submissions to the court, Re C (Litigant in Person: s 91(14) Order) [2009] 2 FLR. The parties must have full knowledge of the evidential basis on which such an order is sought and have had a proper opportunity to make representations in relation to the making of such an order; Re T (A Child) (Suspension of Contact: section 91(14)) [2016].

In this instance the proposal of making a s91(14) Order was raised by the Guardian in her final analysis and it has been the subject of evidence, argument and submissions before the Court. The Guardian in her evidence proposed that the s91(14) Order be made for 12 months, and the local authority have supported this position. The Guardian’s reasoning is based on the need for stability for the children and that it would be harmful to have further court hearings shortly after the conclusion of this final hearing.

Finally, in summary Re C-D (A Child) [2020] EWCA Civ 501 has set out that the power to make a s 91(14) order is to be used with ‘great care’, and that the circumstances in which a child’s welfare will justify the making of such an order are many and varied. These circumstances are not confined to cases of repeated or unreasonable applications.

At this Final Hearing I have had the opportunity to consider a large amount of evidence. The final trial bundle is at over 1,600 pages. In addition, outside the trial bundle there has been important evidence such as the Guardian’s final analysis, from the IRO dated 21/11/25 and Mr C’s final statement.

At the Final Hearing I have heard from Mr Mark Davies, a senior reporting scientist, who has authored expert evidence in this case from the hair strand testing company FTS, the instructed Clinical Psychologist Dr Swart, Ms T and Ms S, the previously allocated social workers and their team manager, Ms R. I subsequently heard from Mother, Mr C and Mr A and the Children’s Guardian

Before addressing in more detail as to analysis of different matters within the case it is important to provide short assessments in relation to the witnesses.

Mr Davies was very thorough and fair in his evidence. Mother cross-examined at length but she did not persuade me from following the conclusions reached in the hair strand test which showed substance misuse over a large number of months by Mother and Mr C and that cocaine was present in the urine testing of X and W.

On two key areas of cross-examination, Mr Davies did not accept Mother’s questioning to the effect that passive exposure, potentially by intimacy between Mother and Mr C could explain the levels of metabolites found in Mother’s testing. He also did not accept that Mother’s alleged slow growing of her hair would alter the conclusions reached. He explained that he had not seen evidence that he could accept of slower growth of Mother’s hair and that in any event this would not affect the concentrations found which were key in his conclusions.

Mr Davies did accept that the levels found for Mother in June and July 2025 would not be above the cut-off with some other drug testing agencies. I accept what he said that cut-off levels are only guidelines. He did point out that Mother’s only admitted use of cocaine was during this later period. He also explained that he had to consider the pattern of the results which showed consistent use over the period. He also explained that this did not fit with Mother’s explanation over her greater earlier periods of alleged exposure that she could have had to Mr C’s misuse.

Mr Davies rejected Mother’s arguments that FTS are not an appropriate agency to be engaged for hair strand testing in this case. I agree with this albeit the decision to instruct FTS is a determination made and considered at earlier hearings.

Mr Davies did set out in his evidence that Mr C’s use of cocaine was amongst the highest levels that had ever been found throughout the whole of FTS’ national database of results.

Overall, Mr Davies was an obviously fair and reliable witness that sought to properly explain his conclusions to the Court.

I heard Dr Swart give evidence and be cross-examined. Dr Swart was at pains to make clear to Mother under cross-examination that he would not take against parents merely due to mental health difficulties. He explained that his drive in making assessments was to try and support parents and find ways that their mental health could be addressed to support parenting. He was undeniably empathetic towards Mother during her cross-examination of him.

I perceived Dr Swart as a very well reasoned and experienced expert who was thorough in his analysis of the case. Despite his sympathetic approach Dr Swart raised difficulties and concerns he had over matters raised in cross examination of him by Mother at the Final Hearing. He maintained the recommendations and opinions set out within his report.

Ms T, Ms S and Ms R were all impressive and fair witnesses. It was obvious that they had found difficulties in working with Mother. Despite the issues raised against them, including professional complaints by Mother and the contempt proceedings, I found there to be no bias or vendetta against Mother.

Ms S stated that there have been times that she has found working with Mother to be “impossible.” There was also a description that Mother had used a meeting to “cross-examine” rather than focus on the children and future plans.

The local authority witnesses were professional, grounded and had obviously worked hard to seek to support the family. Ms R set out that this was one of the most intensive and time consuming cases the local authority had encountered. One example being the very large number of text messages that Mother would send on a daily basis.

It is important to make considerations as to Mother as a witness on the basis of her evidence to the Court rather than her sometimes confrontational approach to cross examination of the witnesses. Mother’s evidence though was difficult. She is intelligent but she continually failed to show insight. She was completely oppositional to those that she perceived to be against her interests, such as the local authority.

Mother was resolutely unwilling in her witness evidence to properly recognise the harm, particularly the emotional harm that her actions could cause. I find that any reasoning that she gave that she had not been able due to practical constraints to undertake recommended DBT treatment to be specious. The local authority have raised that they might fund this treatment if Mother will undertake it.

I find it likely that Mother does not consider that she can change her mental health symptoms and that, at the moment, she does not want to actively seek change. I do hope that Mother can progress in her wishes and actions by engaging with the local authority and the recommended treatment.

Mother’s evidence was inconsistent but I do consider that the key features were lack of insight, unwillingness to recognise past or potential harms and her own considerations against her undertaking the DBT recommended by Dr Swart.

Overall, despite her qualities of intellect and sociability, Mother’s witness evidence was deeply flawed, particularly in the obvious matters of harm caused to the children that Mother would not accept under questioning.

I would add to that that the cross examination conducted by Mr McDonald on behalf of the local authority was very non-aggressive and in a friendly tone. It did though clearly establish the inconsistencies and lack of reliability in Mother’s evidence.

Mr C sometimes presented as being honest and open, such as in recognising that he had a problem with his cocaine misuse at the Final Hearing and that he had not done enough to address it. He described that if he drinks in his local pub he will invariably be offered cocaine and will likely accept it. He needs to avoid alcohol to seek to avoid his problematic cocaine misuse.

As with Mother, Mr C showed an obvious love for their children.

There were times when Mother and Mr C gave different accounts of the same events. It was often hard to consider either account feasible and there was sometimes little sense that their evidence could be considered in any way reliable.

There were descriptions of extreme drug taking by Mr C himself and by Mother in relation to Mr C. He admitted spending up to £1,400 on the taking of cocaine over consecutive days as part of what was referred to as a “bender”. This had resulted in Mr C suffering bouts of drug induced psychosis. Mother stated that much of Mr C’s drug taking was hidden from her. She did though say firmly that she could always tell when he had taken drugs.

Mother stated that she was surprised that Mr C was still alive given the amount of drugs he had taken. She stated she had sent him away from the home when he was on one of his bouts of drug taking that would extend over multiple days and he was unfit due to the influence of drugs. Mr C had even rented an alternative property in order that he had somewhere to go when taking drugs over an extended period and when sent away from the house by Mother.

There was insufficient recognition from Mother and Mr C that sending Mr C away from the home for days on end would be damaging for the four children that they had in their care prior to June 2025. Mother tried to indicate that it would not trouble the children, as she would tell them that Mr C had been sent away for farting. This, however, does not address the loss of Mr C to the household or how the children might come to question this explanation.

Whilst each individual instance requires careful consideration as to whether any lies have been told under the Lucas formulation, what can plainly be stated is that there was an obvious lack of consistency and logic across the evidence given individually and collectively by Mother and Mr C. Mr C's position and approach to the litigation has changed, from one of engagement and making appropriate concessions whilst represented, to a position at the final hearing where he was reliant on mother for filing of documents and trying to match up to her wishes. I find Mr C was acting partly due to the control exerted on him by Mother in respect of his proposals at the final hearing. Mr C adopted unreasonable or unsustainable positions.

An example of Mother’s control is that Mr C told the Guardian that he fell asleep and that Mother had then submitted his final statement to the Court on his behalf, without him having seen what final draft had been entered. The final draft puts forward an unsupportable position in relation to contesting all of the threshold findings sought, matching Mother's case.

Mr C's own explanation at trial was that he did not accept what had been said by the Guardian and that he was accepting the statement submitted on his behalf by Mother and adopting this statement fully. The body language and approach of Mr C was plainly indicative of him seeking to please and appease mother during the Final Hearing, almost with no exception.

The evidence was given by the Guardian that she has observed Mother at Court hearings to be shouting at Mr C and telling him what to do. The control that Mother has over Mr C is indicated by her steps in forwarding the email sent by his solicitor, which she perceived to be against her own interests, and which then resulted in Mr C's loss of his legal representation.

The broader lack of consistency and coherence throughout the evidence of Mr C and the Mother, and the lack of insight shown, particularly by Mother, was an overwhelming feature of their evidence to the Court.

Mr A was a compelling witness. He was patently child-focussed in his approach and answers to the Court.

Mr A was at pains to indicate that he had not realised the extent of problems that existed in the relationship between mother and Mr C until recently. He expressed deep concern as to what he had now found out from the evidence during the proceedings. He was also worried, and repeated within his evidence, that the behaviours displayed by Mother mirrored the very troubling period that he had experienced during the breakdown of his own relationship with Mother.

Mr A was, I find, being honest when he explained that he has found it difficult to stand up to Mother and that this does remain the case. He plainly wishes to make child-focussed decisions, but he does find that given mother's disproportionate reaction to matters that he does make concessions to her. The example he provided in evidence was that if there is a dispute and an inconvenience to him as to a handover time as between 5.30 pm and 6.30 pm, that he would agree the time wanted by Mother because he is aware that Mother would act in an extreme manner if he did not concede.

Mr A also worryingly described that during these proceedings, if he has been perceived by Mother to share information with the local authority that is detrimental to the Mother that he has received abusive messages and Mother has sought to exert pressure upon him. This has included a message which has been threatening in respect of Mother stating to Mr A that those in the local community would not like someone who was a "grass".

In contrast to the Mother and Mr C, Mr A showed a considerable amount of insight within his evidence. He was very interested and considerate in relation to the children's needs and their emotional welfare. He was obviously concerned about the actions of Mother and their potential for harm in relation to Z and Y, who have lived with him for the past six months along with his wife, Mrs A.

The children's Guardian gave very considered and perceptive evidence by way of her final analysis completed on 27/11/25 and in her evidence to the Court at the final hearing. The Guardian indicated that she was unimpressed and concerned at the evidence given by the mother and Mr C at the final hearing. The positions presented by mother and Mr C have left the guardian confused given their contradictory evidence. Her opinion is that the mother and Mr C showed an almost complete lack of insight into the concerns of the local authority and the professionals. Her view is that the evidence of Mr C was simply given with a view of minimising any "fallout" from going against the mother and that he had changed his account to suit mother's narrative.

The Guardian provided detailed evidence and recommendations to the Court, which were to support the local authority's case and to recommend that there should be a Section 91(14) order made. The Guardian also gave detailed factual evidence about the views expressed and her interactions with the children and as to her engagement with the Mother and the state of the Mother's home conditions.

I found the Guardian's evidence to be entirely appropriate as to her analysis, factually compelling and detailed.

As well as considering individual findings of fact in relation to threshold and welfare sought by the local authority, I address and make findings in relation to the key issues that have been apparent from my overall analysis of this case. I have sought to order these while recognising that the issue are often co-dependent and inextricably linked. For example, I do consider and accept that Mr C's grossly excessive extent of his cocaine misuse has been used as a form of "release valve" in response to mother's mental health presentations and behaviours within the household and towards him.

Similarly, Mother having to cope with Mr C's extreme behaviour from his cocaine misuse, which has included behaviours of addiction and drug-induced psychosis, has had an impact upon her and will have caused her difficulties in the management of her mental health and in respect of the children.

What is most stark in this case is that those behaviours obviously played out within the family dynamic and family household, but this has not been properly recognised by Mother and Mr C as emotionally harmful and neglectful as towards X and W.

I will consider each of the key issues in turn whilst also making threshold and welfare findings during each section. The sections I shall address are background and precipitating events, mental health, substance misuse, behaviours and insight, domestic abuse and the toxic relationship between Mother and Mr C, neglectful parenting, home conditions, mother’s social media posts and messages, and engagement and working with professionals.

In my analysis, Mother has been wrong to disregard or to deny the local authority’s characterisation of the background that brought about these proceedings on 10/6/25 as a long, cumulative process.

There is a long history of local authority involvement. In 2012 whilst pregnant with Z, Mother had a mental health crisis period. She admitted overdosing on alcohol and prescribed medication. A referral was received by the local authority from a mental health hospital, where Mother had been voluntarily admitted.

From 2011 to 2019 local authorities had concerns in respect of Mother’s mental health, domestic abuse between Mother and Mr A and concerns of neglect whilst the children were in the care of Mother and an incident of non-accidental injury to Z.

From approximately January 2011 there was a child protection plan in place for the family, with Z born in 2013 and Y born in 2015.

In 2016, the father of Mother’s older child brought court proceedings and was granted a Child Arrangements Order for the child to stay in his care. Mother had thrice weekly contact with the child until August 2023 when she was granted shared care.

On 8/3/17 Stockton on Tees Borough Council brought care proceedings in relation to Z and Y. The statutory threshold for intervention was conceded by Mother and Mr A. Z and Y had gone into foster care. The threshold findings recorded in the final Order made by Recorder Walker on 31/8/17 included the non-accidental injury found to have been suffered by Z was inflicted at a time when one or the other parents were responsible for her care, Mr A having tested positive for cocaine and “longstanding concerns regarding the welfare and safety of the children due to reported domestic abuse within the parental relationship and mental health problems suffered by [Mother].”

The recital to Recorder Walker’s final order on 31/8/17 also notes that Mother and Mr A had failed to comply with the order of Recorder McCallum dated 5/7/17 to provide a sample of hair for analysis in respect of the use of drugs. It was noted that Mother had subsequently provided a mouth swab sample on 29/8/17 that was outstanding and that she had asserted that alopecia prevented her providing a hair sample, although the recital stated that Mother had not provided medical evidence to support this. The Court following the Guardian’s recommendation for a Supervision Order for 12 months and shared care between Mother and Mr A, due to perceived improvements made by the parents since the children were in foster care.

There was a further period of intervention which took place for X via a child in need plan due to concerns around her health needs being neglected in 2019-2020.

The first threshold finding sought is as to local authority involvement. This is entirely factual and fully made out. It cannot be realistically challenged by Mother or Mr C and they have not provided evidence to do so. This finding highlights a lack of any sustained change or improvement for the parenting provided to the children, and represents a concerning pattern, representing a substantial risk of emotional harm, physical harm and neglect.

The local authority’s chronology indicates that in 2024 a police referral was received due to concerns of domestic abuse in relation to Mother and Mr C. A business partner of Mother had called the police because Mr C had entered Mother’s home and was going through her belongings as he believed she was unfaithful to him. Mother had returned home and there had been an argument. Mother had said Mr C was paranoid due to drug fuelled psychosis.

During this time Mother reassured the local authority that the relationship had ended and she would not allow the children contact whilst Mr C was under the influence. These entries are contrary to Mother and Mr C’s characterisation of their relationship going well until the more recent local authority intervention. They have though recognised that Mr C had serious drug problems in mid-2024 that needed addressing.

On 2/8/24 a Child and Family Assessment identified that the family would benefit from early help, to support their mental health, for engagement with substance recovery services and educative work on domestic violence and its possible impact on the children.

On 16/8/24 a safety plan was put in place when Mother reported ongoing issues with Mr C harassing her, domestic violence and substance abuse.

On 26/8/24 Mr C was arrested for threatening texts sent to Mother whilst under the influence. Bail conditions were ordered as to no contact with Mother and for any contact to be supervised by the Paternal Grandmother.

Mother was reported to be unhappy with the bail conditions, as this would affect the wedding events business operated by Mother and Mr C. Mother had an appointment with the Police and had the relevant bail conditions removed.

On 2/9/24 Mr C contacted the social worker to assert that Mother had had a mental breakdown and could not manage any longer, a matter which was denied by Mother.

Subsequent Child Protection Conferences placed X and W on child protection plans under the category of emotional abuse until the case was closed on 5/3/25.

In March 2025 a referral was made by a local hospital as Mr C had attended stating that Mother had drugged him with her medication and been physically abusing him, including by putting two sets of contact lenses in his eyes whilst he was sleeping. The allegations were denied by Mother who stated that Mr C had been suffering a drug fuelled psychosis. At the Final Hearing, Mother stated that Mr C was also saying that ‘J’ was the father of the children, an example of his extreme behaviours at that time. However the local authority records show the ‘J’ reference was also alleged to have been made on 22/5/25 during a different incident.

Section 47 enquiries were commenced. Mr C withdrew his allegations against Mother on the basis that he had been under the influence of drugs. Safety plans were in place and it was stated that Mr C would go to his alternative property when needed. A property he had rented for the purpose of being away from the family whilst under the influence of drugs.

It is to be noted that Ms T in her first statement to the Court stated that Mr C had told her that he did believe he was drugged by Mother. However, he said that Mother had advised him to say that he had been lying due to drug misuse in order to avoid social care involvement.

I do find it likely that something seriously untoward was taking place for Mr C to have attended JCUH and for him to have made these allegations. Given Mr C’s own extremely high usage of cocaine at that time it is not possible to find it likely that Mother had drugged him or abused him with the contact lenses. It is more likely that Mr C was reporting events due to drug-induced psychosis.

In May 2025 a serious incident took place at a children’s dance event in which Z was taking part. The accounts of this event were very different from Mother and Mr C. The incident did involve an argument between Mother and Mr C, Mr C taking cocaine either at the event or later and Mother sending a grossly offensive message describing W, then aged 4 years old, as a “horrible cunt” and Mother stating that she hated W.

On 21/5/25 Mr C contacted the police and stated that Mother had attended his new property shouting and banging on the door whilst the children were there.

On 22/5/25 Mother called the Police stating that Mr C was in charge of the children and psychotic due to his drug use. Mother said that Mr C had told the children Mother’s new boyfriend was ‘J.’ J is the name of a deceased celebrity. As the evidence developed it became unclear if the reference to J was as to the celebrity, as would have been absurd but could exemplify Mr C’s drug-induced psychosis, or was reference to a local person of that name. Police attended Mr C’s address and he ran away.

On 23/5/25 Mr C’s brother contacted social services as he was worried about the children. He had seen mother’s messages about W. He reported Mr C was a drug user that kept relapsing. He said he was worried for either parent to have care of the children.

Mr C’s brother also stated that Mr C had taken W back to Mother’s house and become uncontactable. He was worried that he thought Mr C was on a “drug bender.” He said that Mother had previously taken the children to the Paternal Grandparents and said, “if you can raise them better you can have them” and that Mother had also previously said, “go ahead and contact social services.”

From all of the evidence in the case, I find the reporting of Mr C’s brother to be likely accurate and that he was referring matters to the local authority due to serious concerns for the children.

Paternal Grandmother contacted the local authority as Mother had written on Facebook that she was not collecting the children from their after-school club as planned. All attempts to contact Mother were unsuccessful and a safety plan was implemented for Mr C to collect the children.

On about 24/5/25 Mother expressed that she was unhappy for Mr C and his step-father to care for the children and she made allegations about the step-father. The children were moved to Mr C’s brother and sister-in-law.

On 26/5/25 X and W were moved to live with Mr C with support from his mother, and they remained there until 9/6/25.

On 5/6/25 Mother acknowledged sending the messages about W at a Public Law Outline meeting. Mother stated the messages were sent in an attempt to manipulate and control Mr C. Mother did not accept the messages could be emotionally harmful to W. She said she sent the messages to try and force Mr C to care for W and stop him going on a drug binge. She stated she thought Mr C had already used cocaine that day at Z’s dance event.

On 5/6/25 Mr C told the PLO meeting he ran away from Police in May 2025 as he had heard sirens and saw Mother who had continually threatened to have him “locked up” if he did not do what she wanted. He said he had been worried Mother would tell lies to have his suspended sentence in relation to texts he sent in 2024 activated. He said he was not psychotic and that he asked Mother if she was in a relationship, as W had talked about a daddy M and said that he gets them toys and is not fat. Part of the background to this is that Mr C is said to have been nicknamed “fat daddy” by Mother or the children.

On 5/6/25 Mr C and Mr A expressed that they did not support unsupervised contact for Mother whilst assessments were ongoing. Mother expressed that she was unhappy with this and would be collecting the children from school despite the local authority warning her not to do this.

The local authority advised Mother not to collect the children and that her doing so would force them to issue court proceedings.

Despite being warned not to, Mother attended at school to try and collect the children. Mother was not able to collect the children as the school supported Mr C by providing the children at an alternative exit.

The local authority planned to issue but desisted on Friday 6/6/25 when the Mother’s solicitor indicated that Mother would agree to the children staying with Mr C under the agreed arrangements.

On Monday 9/6/25, Mother collected the children from school in breach of what she had agreed with the local authority. Her reasoning was that the local authority had not been to Court. Despite requests, Mother refused to allow X and W to return to Mr C as she had previously agreed.

In contrast to Mother’s arguments that there were no precipitating events representing significant harm or significant risk of harm to X and W, it is obvious that the issuing of proceedings was the culmination of a deeply worrying period. X and W were consistently exposed to the fractious relationship between mother and Mr C and domestic disputes and caused significant harm. Mother showed a lack of insight, or any ability to be child focussed. Mother abjectly failed to co-operate with the local authority as she should have done during this period, leading to the bringing of proceedings.

I had the benefit of hearing Dr Swart giving evidence as well as considering his written expert reporting and response to questions. He was a thoroughly impressive witness with a careful considered view of this case. He showed considerable engagement and knowledge of the case whilst cross examined and in the detail of his reporting.

I find that the welfare findings sought by the local authority at §5, §6 and §7 of the final threshold document to be entirely appropriate as a summary of Dr Swart’s opinions. I accept them as found as follows:

Mother has accepted that she has long-standing mental health problems. Dr Swart has provided expert analysis to the Court including by way of responding to questions put by Mother. Mother does not now accept that Dr Swart is an appropriate expert. She states that a psychiatrist should have been instructed instead of a psychologist. Dr Swart is a consultant clinical psychologist in independent practice. I find he has considerable experience in relation to the assessment and treatment of children and families with a wide range of psychological difficulties. He is an eminent expert with suitable experience in conducting assessments for public law proceedings.

The Court during these proceedings has properly determined that Dr Swart is an appropriate expert and had him provide extensive reporting and expert evidence at trial. I do not deviate from considering Dr Swart an appropriately instructed and useful expert, and I have no cogent reason to do so.

Dr Swart’s recommendation were intended by him to help and assist the Court and help Mother and Mr C towards the reunification of the family.

Mother's submissions to the Court and her conducting of the final hearing, rather than engaging with Dr Swart’s recommendations, have seen her unreasonably oppose his standing as an expert.

Mother avers that Dr Swart conducted a psychiatric-level report and that he lacks authority or expertise to interpret mother's medication or to diagnose complex psychiatric conditions. She cross-examined Dr Swart on this basis and that he was opining outside of his area of expertise in diagnosing mother's mental health condition and providing assessment and recommendations to the Court.

Whilst Mother's treatment for her mental health may be psychiatrist-led and subject to psychiatric medication, I fully accept Dr Swart as an appropriate and important expert in this case.

Mother within her final submissions is seeking to relitigate a matter as to the instruction of the expert, Dr Swart, that has already been decided. There is no application for alternative psychological assessment. I have fully considered Dr Swart's evidence in multiple reports and in his oral evidence at the final hearing, and found it to be compelling.

Indeed, the diagnoses reached by Dr Swart match those that have been found by mother's treating clinicians. It is not appropriate for treating clinicians to be the experts appointed in proceedings. I do not find Dr Swart's diagnoses or recommendations in that respect to be in any way controversial.

Sadly, Mother’s complete failure to accept or recognise Dr Swart's expertise or his recommendations is typical of her approach within these proceedings and her failure to engage with professionals and seek to make child-focussed decisions that could help to move towards her reunification with the children.

Unfortunately, Mother is a very long way at the present time from being able to accept Dr Swart's recommendation or to engage properly with them. As the Guardian's position sets out there is real concern that if mother, with this frame of mind, were to undertake recommended treatment Mother would only be paying “lip service” to what is required and Mother does not truly consider that she wishes to undertake this treatment.

It was extremely telling that Mother in her own evidence to the Court was at times representing that she did not need any treatment or, alternatively, at other times that she had already completed DBT and was unable to complete certain of the modules. Dr Swart found this to be a specific mistruth by Mother in that he has considered her medical records and he does not agree with her characterisation as to having partially completed DBT. He was also concerned that Mother now states that she has completed online courses for psychological treatment that were ongoing at the time of his assessment but that these were not disclosed to him. These raise obvious and well-founded concerns to Dr Swart as to Mother's engagement and honesty.

After receipt of Dr Swart's report, Ms S and Ms R attended at mother's property to discuss the outcome and recommendations. The reported response of mother at that time matches my own analysis as to her true feelings and approach.

The local authority's position has been throughout that it will support seeking funding for the recommended DBT treatment for mother.

Ms S explained in her evidence to the Court that she had sought to set out to mother the benefits that there could be if she followed Dr Swart's recommendation as to engaging in DBT. Ms S described the responses of Mother as being that she said to the effect "Absolutely not, I like who I am."

Ms S described that mother stated as to her ability to disassociate. This is a process that Mother also described in her own witness evidence. If she feels that she is becoming dysregulated or might be in crisis that she takes herself away from situations. She will go for a five-mile walk and listen to music. I took this to also be reflected in the arrangements for care whilst Mother and Mr C were living together at home with the children. Once Mr C was at home at approximately 6pm or thereabouts, Mother would usually retire to her bedroom. She would relax by being on her phone and also do duties on her phone or in replying to emails as part of their business.

I find that Mother would take herself out of the stressful childcare responsibility on most evenings and father, Mr C, would engage with the children and make their dinner and perform evening chores. Mother's evidence to the Court was that this ability to disassociate meant that she had learned how to address her EUPD. Sadly, what mother completely refused or failed to recognise was that this disassociating was affecting her time with the children. As she is no longer in a relationship with Mr C, Mother would not be able to apportion household chores or time in this way and take herself out of situations where she had to care for the children for considerable lengths of time.

Miss S also described in her evidence that during this conversation, when the local authority was trying to encourage mother to undertake the recommended therapy, that mother stated that she would not do so and said that she was "neuro spicey". Mother also stated that she, "did not want to change her personality as she likes who she is". Unfortunately, this is a rejection of the professional advice and encouragement not only from the social worker and team manager but also in respect to the psychological assessment performed by Dr Swart as part of these proceedings.

I find Mother's arguments in seeking to reject the status of Dr Swart as completely inappropriate and counterproductive. Moreover, her arguments that she might have partly completed DBT are not supported by the expert evidence given by Dr Swart are another example of mother not being accurate in her evidence to the Court.

Mother has explained that her psychiatric conditions are lifelong. I do not disagree with this and neither does Dr Swart. Dr Swart was very careful, fair and considered in his evidence. He also made clear that he views it as his role to try to help parents in making recommendations.

The plan of the local authority could be for reunification if the parents’ evidence sustained progress and improvements in parenting ability. This is the position supported by the Guardian and aligned with Dr Swart's recommendations. The route is there for mother to make child-focussed decisions and undertake the recommended treatment in order to spend more time with, and thereafter with the possibility for reunification with, the children. Mother has shown a complete lack of insight that this would be the child-focussed approach to be taken in her circumstances.

Whilst I have sympathy with Mother and accept that her EUPD condition is lifelong, that does not mean that Dr Swart is wrong to recommend DBT treatment. This treatment is the NICE-recommended treatment for EUPD. This is not a controversial recommendation. Having the recommended treatment would enable mother to address and manage her symptoms and behaviours. It could improve her parenting ability and her own degree and management of symptoms and behaviours related to her mental health conditions.

In the absence of the recommended treatment mother has failed to recognise that many of the incidents that have taken place previously and during these proceedings are related to her mental health and could be subject to being avoided in future if she were to engage.

Mother seeks to argue that she was assessed as being stable upon her presentation with Dr Swart when she was assessed on 9/9/25 and had a video call with him on 17/9/25. Dr Swart, however, set out in his evidence that on the following day of 18/9/25 that Mother had actually presented as being in crisis and he sets this out as being an example of the variability of Mother's presentation.

During these proceedings on 3/10/25, Ms R as team manager and Ms S attended at mother's home as an emergency as they were contacted and told that Mother was in crisis and threatening to take her own life. Out of professional and personal concern for Mother, Ms S and Ms R attended at her home. Mother initially presented as being in despair and was sat on her stairs crying into one of the children's coats. After two hours of reassurance and those professionals engaging with Mother, they felt satisfied to leave her that evening, with follow-up planned for the Monday and suitable safeguards in place.

Mother's reaction to this incident and her presentation in relation to it at the final hearing is worrying. Her approach was to attack the professionals for not having escalated the matters and involved the police. In actual fact, Ms R had contacted the Police and been advised by the Police as to when they would need to be engaged. It was appropriate for Ms R and Ms S to attend upon Mother in those particular circumstances. Mother completely failed to recognise the seriousness of this incident. I do find that she had made a threat to end her own life and required the counselling of Ms S and Ms R.

Mother's approach was confused in that she appeared to be veering towards arguing that the incident was not serious but then seeking to criticise the professionals for having left her after spending two hours with her. Mother's lack of insight and understanding of her condition is a worry. She refuses to recognise her own time in crisis such as on 18/9/25 when she states that her attendance at a mental health hospital was not as a result of a time of crisis, when she has attended there during an episode and had undergone psychiatric assessment.

Mother accepts that she has serious and complex psychiatric conditions. I find that Dr Swart is entirely correct and accurate when he assesses that mother should undergo treatment for this and that these conditions cannot be ignored in determining welfare arrangements for the children.

The threshold finding sought by the local authority at §1 as to ‘Mental Health’ I find to be factually accurate and involves matters that Mother has accepted within her previous statements to the Court. I find accordingly that the threshold and welfare findings sought by the local authority to be fully made out:

“Mother suffers with poor mental health and suffers with ADHD, post traumatic stress disorder, EUPD and depressive disorder. The children would be at significant risk of emotional harm and neglect should they be exposed to mother’s deteriorating mental health.

(i)

Mother attempted to take her own life when pregnant with Z.

(ii)

Mother voiced to Mr C she was going to take her own life and took a video of herself taking tablets, sent it to Mr C in May 2025. She claims she said this to try to ground him when he was in a drug-induced psychosis.

(iii)

During a PLO meeting on 5 June 2025 Mother, mother, informed that she uses her mental health to control and manipulate Mr C.”

I understand that Mother and Mr C met and began their relationship whilst they were both cocaine users. Recently there has been heightened use of cocaine by Mr C that has resulted in extreme levels of cocaine use and this has affected his behaviour and everyday life. Mr C in his evidence to the Court accepted that he had not done enough as he should do to address his cocaine addiction. He has attended at agencies and attends Narcotics Anonymous meetings, but he accepts he has not done this as much as he should.

The local authority seek threshold finding §4 on ‘substance misuse’ based on factual admissions already made by Mother and Mr C, contemporary reporting from the Police and by Mother as to the incident on 23/5/25 and hair strand testing conducted and ordered by the Court from FTS, and upon which Mr Davies provided evidence. Based on these reliable sources of information the local authority seeking findings that:

After events of mid-2024 Mr C and Mother describe that Mr C did have a period of abstinence. He was subject to regular drug tests and in order to support this he abstained from alcohol. Mother said she conducted urine testing of Mr C to ensure this period before relapse.

Unfortunately, during a trip to Amsterdam with Mother's father, Mr C started drinking alcohol again. This was at around the end of January or the beginning of February 2025. There was not clear evidence as to the precise date from Mother and Mr C. From shortly after the trip to Amsterdam Mr C says that he started using cocaine again.

Mother's evidence as to her knowledge of Mr C restarting his use of cocaine was confused. She was aware that he had the alternative property where he would go during prolonged periods of cocaine use or binges which would extend over multiple days. She was though seeking to deny that this was a problem until about March 2024. Mother also though represented to the Court that she would be aware of whenever Mr C had used cocaine as she said that she could tell when this was. She said that there would be facial features that would indicate this such as a raised eyebrow.

Mother cross-examined Mr Davies on the basis that there would be used cocaine bags around the house. Mr C's own evidence was that he would use bags of cocaine worth £50 which were ‘half a gram’. He accepted that these could have been found around the family home. He described that the amount he would take as a baseline which he would “sneak in” at the end of each day would be the £50 bag.

Mr C described that he would usually take cocaine when he took the dog for a walk and went to the local pub and had a beer. He described that at other times when he went through periods of taking cocaine heavily on consecutive days, described variously as drug benders or binges, he would be spending up to £1,200 to £1,400 on cocaine.

The FTS results demonstrate that Mr C was using extremely high levels of cocaine throughout the period from February to July 2025. Mr Davies said this was one of the highest sets of readings encountered in the national database. I do find that Mother was likely aware of the extent of Mr C’s cocaine use. She stated this within her own evidence, that she could tell when he was misusing cocaine. I do not think that in living together that she would not have known when Mr C was using cocaine. She would obviously have known when she herself had sent him from the home or when he was living at the alternative address in order to partake in his days-long cocaine binges.

The drug test results for Mr C are startlingly high. Mother said in evidence that she was surprised that Mr C is still alive with the amount of cocaine he has taken.

The hair strand test segments for Mr C are high throughout the 6 months period from 4/1/25 to 3/7/25. The section for approximate period 4/1/25 to 3/2/25 records for cocaine a concentration greater than 9600 pg/mg. The cut off is at 500 pg/mg and, therefore, Mr C is at over approximately 19 times the cut off level.

At a child protection meeting in late February 2025 Mother and Mr C told those present that Mr C was no longer taking cocaine. This is inconsistent with the test results and I find that this is an example of dishonesty.

I find that Mother has been dishonest in relation to her own cocaine misuse. I entirely reject her challenges in relation to the FTS evidence. Mr Davies dealt appropriately with the cross-examination by Mother and explained persuasively the result findings and conclusions.

Again, I found Mother to be contradictory in her position at the final hearing. In cross-examination of Mr Davies she was cross-examining on the basis that she had been in an intimate relationship with father very regularly up to May 2025 and that they had continued to sleep together less frequently after that time. The mother's own evidence in the witness box was that that the intimate relationship had ended in May 2025.

In any event Mr Davies completely rejected that the possible intimate relationship with Mr C would provide an explanation or support that it was passive exposure rather than Mother's own use that led to her hair strand testing results. Mother had dyed her hair but even with that having taken place the results were such as to indicate continued cocaine use on a few days a month over the period from February 2025 to July 2025.

I do note that in the second hair strand test from August to September 2025 that Mother is only showing passive exposure to cocaine. It is not apparent as to the source of this passive exposure given that she says she was no longer in a relationship with Mr C during that period.

Mother sought to cross-examine Mr Davies on the basis that there had been difficulty in obtaining the second hair strand testing because her hair grew at a slower rate than is usual. Mr Davies was very clear in his responses that this would not affect the concentration of results, the recording level at which the relevant metabolites were found. He did say that this might mean that the periods were not as precise but stated that he had not seen any evidence that would cause him to consider that Mother did have a slower rate of hair growth than usual.

I reject Mother’s theory of her having slower hair growth and that this was the reason a sample was more difficult. Moreover, Mother in her final submission provides a possibly different reason for this difficulty in stating that she has stress-related alopecia. I have also read the documents from the care proceedings in 2017, in which Mother said she could not give a hair sample due to alopecia. This alopecia would seem to be a more relevant possible explanation as to why there were difficulties in taking hair strands for the second set of testing.

Fundamentally, in respect of the findings made, I agree entirely with the conclusions and explanations provided by Mr Davies and his results and recordings.

As set out earlier, Mother did also challenge the FTS results on the basis that the June and July 2025 results might not have met a cut-off with other drug testing agencies. Mr Davies explained this such that I am satisfied that those periods do show cocaine use by Mother. I also note, as Mr Davies did in evidence, that Mother does admit that she took cocaine in July 2025.

Mr Davies was detailed within his evidence in explaining that the pattern of results was indicative of cocaine use by Mother across the period from February to July 2025, at a frequency of approximately a few days per month.

From the findings of the hair strand testing, I do find that Mother was misusing cocaine during the approximate period from February to July 2025. Mother and Mr C have at times been dishonest with professionals and have sought to mislead in relation to their cocaine misuse.

In any event, the issues around Mother’s drug taking are not integral to my overall assessment in respect of Mother, which is anchored in her unaddressed behaviours in respect of her mental health, her lack of insight and the impact upon the children.

Mr C has not undertaken further hair strand testing but admits that he has continued to relapse in his misuse of cocaine. This is of deep concern given his difficulties and previous extreme levels of cocaine use, and the multiple risks that this represents to him and the children.

Mr C has recognised previously that he has a long way to go with his recovery journey. He told the Court today that he has not taken cocaine for 4 weeks. Everyone would support and agree with Mr C that he has to try and sustain his abstinence.

I find that the threshold finding §4 and welfare findings §9, §12, §15, §16, §18 are fully made out on the evidence.

The local authority seek a finding at §8 in relation to welfare that:

I find that Mother and Mr C have failed throughout their evidence to recognise the impact that their own reported behaviours and the situation in the home would have caused for the children.

Before the intervention of the local authority, there were up to four children within the household. Z and Y were subject to the shared care arrangements with Mr A and X and W were living full time with Mother and Mr C.

Their own evidence is that Mr C would be spending consecutive days away staying at his other rented property during drug binges. During this time he would not be available for childcare. I do find that Mr C would perform a lot of the childcare and household chores within the home. Both of these parents did describe that Mother would absent herself to go upstairs early in the evening for approximately an hour or more whilst Mr C dealt with the children. From all the evidence I do find that this was a means of Mother coping with the stress of looking after the children and seeking to protect her own mental health.

Mother described how she had CCTV throughout the property. She would be sending Mr C away when she considered that he was under the influence of cocaine. There was no adequate recognition from either of the parents as to how this routine was potentially harmful for the children.

The circumstances of the dance event encapsulate a number of the themes and problems present within this case and it is also the subject of threshold finding §2 in relation to inappropriate language.

In May 2025 Mother was present at a charity dance event with Z that was attended by a large number of children and parents. The mother does engage with Z and support her in what are stated to be successful child dance activities. Mother's account is that whilst she was watching the dance event that W was there. W was showing exuberance and playing up, whilst Mother was seeking to help with the event and watch Z. She says that Mr C attended and he went to the toilets and that when he returned she could tell that he had taken cocaine at this event. She states that there was an argument between her and Mr C, and Mr C left.

Mother described in her evidence to the Court that her intention thereafter was to have Mr C return to the dance event and for him to drive W to his mother's house in order for Mr C to look after W.

There are a number of strange and concerning features to Mother's account. She states that Mr C was under the influence of cocaine at a dance event attended by a number of parents and children. She was encouraging Mr C to drive back to the event and to drive with, and to care for, W whilst under the influence of cocaine. I do also find that Mother's apparent desperation in those circumstances to have W cared for by someone else does show that she herself was struggling to look after W whilst also attending to watching Z as part of the dance event.

Mother sent Mr C the following text messages in reference to W on the day of the dance event:-

These messages are indefensible. Mother accepts sending these messages to Mr C.

Mother however, refused to accept that her messages would cause significant harm if seen or considered by W. She also apparently failed to recognise properly the negative impact that they could have upon Mr C, the family dynamic and the care for the children. Mother's reasoning is that these were designed to force Mr C to return and to stop him taking drugs. However, the subject matter of the texts reflects Mother not coping with W and wanting Mr C to care for W, despite her saying that Mr C was under the influence of cocaine at that time.

I do find that this is an obvious example of a circumstance when Mother was unable to cope and has expressed herself inappropriately as a result. She has also shown a lack of insight throughout her evidence as to the damaging nature of these messages.

Mr C's account of the dance event was different to that of Mother. He stated that he had attended at the event and subsequently gone outside to smoke a vape in his car. He said he had returned to the dance event but there had been an argument with Mother and he had left. He said that he had gone to his other property and had what he described as some "cold beers." He said he had then received the text messages from Mother, and this had caused him to relapse and take cocaine.

I do not find Mr C's description of what happened around the dance event to be credible or truthful. The narrative he presents does not make sense. It is not clear why an argument would take place after he had only been in the car and he had not taken cocaine. It is not clear why he would leave a dance event early to go to the other property and start drinking beer. After he had received the text messages from Mother, which indicate significant mental turmoil on her part and a clear request for him to collect W, it is hard to understand why he would then decide to take cocaine. I do recognise that within his evidence Mr C did state that mother's behaviours towards him caused him to increase his cocaine misuse and caused him to feel pressure. However, I still do not accept his account as plausible.

In the exchange of messages, Mr C is responding to Mother to try and take practical steps to address the situation with W. In response to Mother, Mr C is saying that he needs bedcovers and clothes and asking her to sort pyjamas and bedding for W. He states that he is on his way to Mother and would be there in five minutes. The messages, therefore, do not support that Mr C had relapsed into cocaine misuse. The messages show that he was immediately trying to get to Mother to address her concerns and look after W.

I find it likely that there was cocaine taken by Mr C at the dance event despite the presence of other parents and children, and that this had caused an argument between Mother and Mr C. I find that Mother was struggling to cope and unhappy with W at that time. On all the evidence that is the logical and most likely explanation for the context of these text messages.

In addition, I do accept that the text messages were also an attempt to manipulate Mr C, as Mother has admitted she will do and described to Dr Swart as to her “mentally torturing” her ex-partners. I also find that this behaviour was inappropriate as Mother was encouraging Mr C to drive whilst under the influence of cocaine as well as to have him look after W whilst he was in that condition.

It is not clear if Mother was actually dysregulated at this time or in any form of crisis with her mental health. She does describe that she will send messages and experience regret afterwards. However, during her evidence to the Court at Final Hearing, Mother sought to minimise her actions. She rejected the notion that these messages could cause significant emotional harm to W or to her other children.

I do find threshold finding §2 and welfare finding §8 made out by the local authority.

The local authority seek the following finding at §3 of the Threshold and Welfare document:

I have already made specific findings in relation to the attendance at a local hospital in March 2025. I agree with the findings sought by the local authority as these findings are a plain narrative as to what has been reported, and I find that those events are likely on the balance of probabilities.

Mother and Mr C have been both perpetrators and victims in relation to the domestic abuse between them. Mr C has been convicted in relation to the threats to kill he made by text in 2024. His conviction was in relation to harassment, a serious offence that carries a maximum sentence of 10 years, albeit his sentence was on suspended terms.

Mother admitted to manipulating and mentally torturing her ex-partners to Dr Swart, particularly during circumstances of relationship breakdown. I have witnessed myself during the Final Hearing that Mother has exerted control over Mr C. In his submissions and presentation to the Court I find that he has been influenced by mother. I note the evidence of the Guardian that she has witnessed mother exerting control over Mr C. She witnessed Mother shouting at Mr C whilst they have been outside Court as part of these proceedings. In public view, Mother will seek to manipulate Mr C.

Mr A was an impressive and insightful witness. He described that he is very concerned that the behaviours that Mother exhibits towards Mr C mirror those that he suffered during his relationship with mother.

There is a police video which has been provided which shows Mr C complaining to the Police Officer about the behaviours of Mother. Mother has asserted that the domestic abuse within the relationship did not have any impact upon the children. However, in the police video, X and W are present and can be heard on the body-worn footage whilst Mr C complains about Mother.

The events in May 2025 played out whilst the children were in the care of Mother or Mr C. Mr C had care of the children when Mother attended at his property with the Police. He said in evidence he did not know what mother might have told the Police and, therefore, he ran away. I do not accept that he ran away simply because Mother was present with the Police. It is likely that there was something that caused him concern that he could properly be subject to arrest.

Mother's assertion was that Mr C had taken cocaine and was under the influence of cocaine at that time. I find it likely that this was one of the reasons why Mr C ran away, and that he was under the influence of cocaine whilst he was looking after the children. I also accept it likely Mother had used Mr C’s suspended sentence to seek to control him and threaten he would be locked up again if she did not do what she wanted. The children were present at this time as they were when mother and her work assistant attended at father's property and caused disruption.

Mother accepts that at times of relationship breakdown, she will threaten harm upon herself in order to seek to manipulate her partner. This type of behaviour is insidious and harmful. I reject the suggestions of the parents that the children would not be affected by the domestic abuse which, I find, was ongoing from at least 2024. The continued control of Mother of Mr C is likely abusive in nature and a continuation of the problems of their toxic relationship.

There were times of high stress with the failure of the business that was operated by Mr C and Mother. I had the sense that Mr C when he described how he had had to cancel a work booking and make other arrangements because they were not able to deliver on the service promised was obviously scared of Mother and her reactions to adversity.

Mr C was frank in his evidence in stating that he felt under pressure and was struggling due to Mother's behaviours. This added to a vicious cycle whereby he increased his cocaine use, which was at grossly excessive levels from January to July 2025.

I do find that it is likely that all four children have been exposed to, and at times been aware of, the domestic abuse which has been a feature of the relationship between Mother and Mr C. Mother's manipulative behaviours towards others are also an obvious cause for concern and present a risk of significant harm.

I find §3 of the threshold document to be found and that the toxic relationship between Mother and Mr C places the children at significant risk of emotional and physical harm.

In their evidence to the Court, Mother and Mr C did eventually recognise the toxic nature of the relationship between them. In addition, as I have already indicated, Mr C would be away for days on end from the family home whilst excessively using cocaine. Mother in seeking to use her strategies of disassociation for her own mental health would also not be absenting herself at times and not meeting the children's needs.

Fundamentally, the evidence that has been given at Final Hearing by Mother and Mr C has been adult-focussed and completely failed to recognise the impacts of their behaviour or the concerns that they should have in relation to the children.

Mother within these proceedings has pursued in a very dogged fashion past issues, such as within her final submission where she is seeking to relitigate and challenge the decision of Deputy District Judge Nix on 10/6/25 in making the initial ICO.

Recorder Pallo, as other Judges have done, warned Mother that her strategies whilst pursuing these proceedings as a litigant in person were counterproductive. The Guardian has commented that the proceedings have distracted mother from engaging with the children. The local authority witnesses described that it has been noted that mother has not paid as much attention to her care for the children as a result of her focusing on these proceedings.

I note that a planned assessment contact with the Guardian was cancelled by Mother as she chose to attend an advocates meeting as part of these proceedings. Mr C also did not attend the planned assessment contact, because he said he had to work until 10pm on that day. Mother did try to rearrange the contact for later that evening but the residential home was not willing to support parents having contact after 7.30pm.

It is also to be noted that there have been failures by Mother and Mr C to communicate with the care home to arrange contact and to set out what the planned activities are. Mother considers it “ridiculous” that the residential home have placed her in the same position as other parents as to the communication that has to take place before contact.

I find that Mother’s prioritising of these proceedings has been counterproductive and harmful for the children.

It has been mother's own choice to be a Litigant in Person. She is entitled to make that decision. I note the very detailed recital that was provided by District Judge Richards when Mother initially made the decision to act as a Litigant in Person, and no longer have solicitors or counsel acting for her. Those warnings from District Judge Richards were prescient.

Generally, it is not advisable for a parent to represent themselves when proceedings are as emotionally charged as public law family proceedings. It has meant that emotional distance and professional advice, that could have benefitted Mother, has not been provided to her. This may have contributed to Mother showing almost no insight as to the steps that she should be taking in order to seek reunification with the children. Mother has engaged in a course of conduct which is highly litigious and harmful to the welfare of the children.

Any focus taken away from the children is to be avoided and, sadly, Mother has chosen to conduct this Final Hearing in an inadvisable manner that has not focused on the needs of the children. This has included her contesting all of the threshold and welfare findings, without any realistic basis to do so.

I also find that Mother has manipulated Mr C such that his position has changed during proceedings, to his possible detriment. He has now provided a final statement which, without any credible reasons, seeks to fully contest all of threshold.

Mother has shown that she can be highly prepared and an able advocate within these proceedings. What she has not shown is that she can differentiate between good and bad points upon which to litigate.

Mr C has admitted in his evidence to the Court previously that he is not in a position to care for the children and welfare finding §17 is made out on this basis.

Overall, Mother and Mr C have demonstrated, before and after the start of these proceedings, that their adult-focussed actions, their toxic relationship, their mental health and substance misuse all risk causing significant harm to the children.

I find that Mother has manipulated Mr C and this has included her sharing his emails from his solicitor during these proceedings, as caused him to lose his legal representation, and her authoring and filing certain of his statements to the Court, as set out at welfare finding §13.

Mother in her own evidence sought to characterise that the home was "a zoo". She wished to mean by this that the home conditions were chaotic but fun. Z has described that the Mother's home was messy but not dirty. I have described the daily routine at home already and I do find that Mother relied heavily on Mr C for him to provide care for the children whilst she would frequently absent herself upstairs, on at least a daily basis.

I do accept that Mr C is a very motivated father in that he would seek to support Mother at those times and look after the children. I consider that Mother too would play an organising and active role in respect of the children and their movements. As Mother has pointed out, for 9 years she has had the care of Z and Y on the shared care arrangement, one week on and off with Mr A, and cared for X and W since they were born.

I find that the home conditions with Mother and Mr C were chaotic. I am concerned now as to how mother or Mr C would cope on their own and in looking after the children without the support of the other partner. These concerns relate to emotional harm and physical safety.

I have read and considered the negative parenting assessments that have been completed in relation to Mother and Mr C. I agree with the assessments carried out by the local authority. I do not accept Mother's arguments that this is not to be treated as an appropriate assessment. For completeness, I also agree with the positive parenting assessment that has been completed in relation to Mr A.

On 15/8/25 Ms R and one of her Social Workers attended at the Mother's property. She has taken pictures that are contained within the bundle of the home conditions. The house is messy to the extent of being unsafe. Mother’s psychiatric medication is accessible within the household. Mother denies this and states that the boxes of medication are either empty or, in relation to the medication which is on top of the microwave on show in the kitchen, that this could not be reached by the children. I disagree with mother's denials in this regard.

I have read contact notes when W is recorded as climbing up on items. In any event, with knowledge of children of that age, they would obviously be able to climb onto the kitchen tops and access the medication from the photographs. The photographs also show bedding that is unclean. Previously, the children would frequently sleep with Mother in her bed. The bed is covered with sand and items from a recent beach trip. There are various bits of random clutter throughout the property. It is patently not a safe or appropriate environment.

On 20/8/25 Mother attended Court and was seeking on that day for the immediate return of the children to her home. In response to the photographs of the home conditions, it was also arranged after Court for the Guardian to attend at Mother's property.

The Guardian, on attending Mother's property, found that the door to the property was open. The explanation given for this was that the Mother's father had been in earlier that day and left it open. The Guardian also found medication that was strewn around the home and accessible. She found the home conditions of mother to be comparable to that which are set out within the pictures taken on 15/8/25 and to be inappropriate. Sadly, the Guardian also found Mother to be confrontational and that she did not recognise her concerns when challenged as to the state of the property on 20/8/25.

I do find that the home conditions have been inappropriate. This is an indication of Mother's inability to cope and to provide safe parenting. It is also a further example of Mother's lack of insight in that she does not recognise or seeks to minimise the concerns of professionals.

In relation to the concerns over accessible medication, I do also note that during a contact session that mother provided a jacket to X which had her psychiatric medication in its pocket. The jacket was subsequently picked up and the medication was dropped in a play park. It was returned by a group of boys that were there and handed the psychiatric medication to the Social Worker. I accept that this incident was inadvertent and Mother had not meant for the medication to be there. It is, though, a further example of Mother not taking sufficient care and being lax in allowing medication to be accessible to the children. This is conduct which represents a significant risk should the medication be taken by any of her children or other children.

The matters set out herein and the negative parenting assessment, I find, are supportive of welfare finding §8, §11 and §18.

The local authority did seek to bring committal proceedings against Mother as result of her social posts and messages during these proceedings. Those committal proceedings have been withdrawn by the local authority.

However, in what I find is likely to be retaliation for those committal proceedings, Mother has brought her own committal proceedings against the three members of the social work team that been involved with her children and given evidence at this Final Hearing. I am not hearing any committal proceedings at this time and my focus is upon the welfare of the children.

I do though have to consider the social media posts and messages that have been sent by Mother. These are a further example of Mother’s opposition to the local authority and her failing to prioritise the children, and acting in a harmful way in respect of the children’s welfare and wider interests.

The messages sent to the children or about the children by Mother have often been deeply harmful and inappropriate. I do recognise that Mother might seek to explain some of these messages or posts on the basis of mental health crises or episodes. However, Mother has failed to recognise or take responsibility for these messages after the event, in particular as to the extent of harm these would cause.

Mother has failed to engage in treatment which might improve her mental health condition or avoid her repeating these harmful behaviours. Mother has consistently sought to minimise as to the harm that is caused by her actions in sending these messages. I find that Mother has sent and been responsible for these messages.

I agree with the local authority threshold finding §10 that on 10/10/25 Mother sent a text message to Z stating that she was going to prison and that it was Mr A’s fault. This obviously caused Z emotional harm. Mother acknowledged she sent the message to Z but did not accept that it could have been harmful to her. This event was confirmed by the Guardian in her evidence and by Mr A.

Recently, Mother sent a video to Z that included the repeated words, “I don’t give a fuck anymore.” Z shared that she had received this video with Mr A and Mrs A. Z was distressed and confused by the video.

Mr A in his evidence indicated that he was angry at what Mother had done, in sending content to Z that upset and worried her before bedtime. He described how he and Mrs A had had to sit down and console Z and try to explain what had happened. Mr A said he had to explain to Z about a message sent by Mother saying that Mr A was putting Mother at risk of being sent to prison.

I fully accept Mr A’s evidence and the threshold and welfare findings sought by the local authority to which this relates.

Some of the posts made by Mother on Facebook have been publicly available. Prior to proceedings Mother had posted on Facebook that she was not collecting the children from school, prompting emergency action by Paternal Grandmother and the local authority.

It is concerning that this is repeated behaviour by Mother, as observed by Mr A in his evidence. Mr A reported that in 2014 Mother had posted on Facebook about Z, “I’m getting pissed and she can scream her ugly head off until she’s blue in the face. I’m sick to fuck of hearing her horrible fucking screaming fucking voice.”

Mother has posted on Facebook about Mr C and the local authority involvement. She has posted a picture of the Section 47 child protection plan.

Mother has posted on social media about the detail of what has been taking place during proceedings. An example is her posting under a public group on social media, said to be about corrupt and secret organisations, about how she had witnessed during these proceedings a “massive flaw” in the legal system that was allowing social services to “manipulate court proceedings in their favour.”

Mother has shown a lack of insight into the consequences of her actions. I find that this makes it likely that she will continue to act in a counterproductive and harmful way, which is harmful to the children. This is likely to include continuing to erroneously contest legal matters, posting inappropriate messages on social media or sending hurtful messages to or about the children. The harm caused by Mother’s actions is significant. The effect on the children or on Mr C or Mr A and his family is very destabilising.

Of further concern is that the messages and social media posts have continued to take place, despite repeated warnings from Judges and the intended confidentiality of these proceedings. This causes me great concern that Mother will continue to destabilise and emotionally harm the children by her online activities and act inappropriately in relation to Court proceedings and Orders.

The social media posts and messages of Mother are indicative of a further serious problem in relation to Mother's behaviour. Mother, I find, has been deeply oppositional and confrontational with the local authority. Ms S described that in her working career, Mother has been one of the most “impossible” parents to seek to work with. She described how at one meeting she felt that Mother was trying to “cross-examine her” rather than focus on the children. This eventually caused Ms S to end the meeting. Again, I find Mother’s wish to focus on the litigation rather than to seek to take a child-focussed approach as a parent has been a major problem.

Mother's approach has often been to challenge the theoretical basis of the evidence rather than addressing the real issues. For example, Mother has spent considerable time challenging Dr Swart’s qualifications and his suitability in providing an opinion to the Court rather than seeking to follow his sound recommendations.

Similarly, Mother has unjustifiably sought to challenge the initial threshold decision and all of the findings sought, rather than to focus on the future and the children's welfare.

Mother has not recognised the help and support that the local authority has provided and that they wish to provide in respect of, for example, potential funding of the mother's psychological treatment. Instead Mother's approach and strategy at Final Hearing has been to attack the local authority. I find that Mother has wrongly considered that the local authority have a personal vendetta against her.

Mother desperately needs to move on from these proceedings and to start to engage in work with professionals, including those from the local authority and Dr Swart with his suitable recommendations. If Mother could do this, she could work towards eventual reunification, which is actually part of the local authority’s plans and hopes. However, at the present time, her preoccupation with the legal proceedings and her own battles with the local authority are prohibiting this.

Mother has made complaints about each of the Social Workers involved in the Final Hearing, either to the local authority or to Social Work England. Despite being subject to professional complaint or Contempt of Court proceedings brought by Mother, I found all of the local authority witnesses to be unscrupulously fair towards Mother and very balanced in their evidence. These were helpful and dedicated professionals, that were being subjected to often ill-advised challenges put forward by Mother during the Final Hearing.

Mr C has been inconsistent in respect of his engagement and work with professionals. He accepts that he has not done as much work as he should have in respect of his cocaine addiction and lack of engagement with agencies. I was heartened that Mr C does seem to recognise that he needs to do this. He expressed to the Court that he wants to do better with his engagement and to abstain from alcohol and cocaine.

The inconsistency of Mr C in working with professionals does partly have its cause in his relationship with Mother. Mother does manipulate Mr C. In conversations with professionals Mr C has complained as to how Mother would be "getting into his head." He did, for instance, tell the Guardian how the final statement in these proceedings had been submitted whilst he was asleep by Mother, and that he was not sure as to which statement had been filed with the Court. Almost immediately he informed Mother as to what he had said to the Guardian, and the Guardian received messages from Mother complaining that Mr C was being influenced by the Guardian.

Mr C has ultimately chosen to side with Mother in respect of this Final Hearing and the position that he has presented to the Court. This has been to the detriment of Mr C’s position, although I have taken into account all matters that I can in considering the alternatives that are available for the children and taking account of the fact that the Mother and Mr C present as Litigants in Person. Mr C, I do find, has been inhibited in terms of his ability to work with professionals and engage with them and that this has partly been due to the manipulation of him by Mother.

Mother and Mr C have both been provided with a new contract of expectations. Sadly, they have previously failed to follow the safety planning put in place by the local authority. It should though be understood that this new contract of expectations does provide a route by which the parents can work towards reunification with the children, which is part of the local authority plan. Unfortunately, to date there has not been engagement by Mother or Mr C in progressing these factors adequately.

Having conducted my analysis, I find that the totality of the threshold and welfare findings sought by the local authority have been established. This includes findings sought that Mother and Mr C had positive family time with their children, who enjoy spending time with them and that Mr A has been positively assessed and had care of Z and Y with no concerns raised.

I do find, as at §21 of the threshold and welfare document, that the children would continue to be at significant risk of emotional and physical harm and neglect should they be returned to the care of Mother or Mr C.

Mother considers that X and W should be immediately returned to her care. I have found that her behaviours have been deeply harmful for the children and that there is an unaddressed ongoing risk of emotional harm from Mother.

At this time, the only child with whom Mother has unsupervised access or contact is Z by way of the messages that she is able to exchange with her. During these proceedings Mother has sent a number of messages to Z which are hurtful and obviously harmful. Mr A has spoken in his evidence as to his concern at this and that Z has been upset. He has had to explain emotionally difficult matters in a sensitive way in response to situations that Mother has created.

It is not appropriate for there to be immediate reunification for Mother with the children. There are significant risks of emotional harm and other risks such as from the state of the property and Mother's ability to cope with parenting at this time.

Mother seeks a return to the shared care arrangement with Mr A that was in place prior to the local authority’s intervention in June 2025.

In respect of the practicalities as to this taking place under no Order or under a Supervision Order, Mr A would share parental responsibility with Mother for Z and Y. Mr A does not support Mother having unsupervised contact and he is deeply concerned by the behaviour of Mother. This, therefore, would be a shared care arrangement involving Mr A, when Mr A does not support that it should be taking place. Mr A might have to exercise his parental responsibility in those circumstances to prevent Mother causing harm to his children.

There are wider concerns and risks of future significant harm to the children from Mother’s behaviours, her lack of insight into her mental health, her neglectful parenting and home conditions and her failure to work with professionals. I do not, therefore consider that there would be any feasibility in Mother's proposals.

The advantages of a return of the children to Mother's care would be that Mother has a lot of qualities and the children have a lasting relationship with her. Mother is intelligent and loves the children very much. She wants to have fun with the children and they likewise want to see her and enjoy their time with her. Mother can meet the basic needs of the children during contact sessions. The children have stated that they would like to see their parents more often. Their expressed wishes include wanting to live with and to see Mother.

Sadly, for all of the reasons given within this judgement, that is not safe and appropriate at this time. It must though be recognised by Mother that the plan and hopes of all the professionals, including Dr Swart , the local authority and the Guardian is that she can take on board what is being advised to her and that there can be reunification in due course with her and the children.

Mr C would like for there to be “two happy homes” for X and W. Mr C states that he is in a position to put down a deposit on a house and he has access to properties through his cousin who runs an estate agency. He would like to set up a home and for there to be shared care between him and Mother.

The advantages of this taking place are similar to those in relation to Mother. I do consider that Mr C was a “hands-on dad” to X and W. Both children have spoken warmly of their time with Mr C. Z liked playing games with Mr C and, in particular, would like to live with him and V, the family dog, as well as W.

However, for this to take place Mr C would have to demonstrate sustained abstinence from alcohol and cocaine. He has not been able to do this for a prolonged period. He accepts that he needs to do more in relation to this and to engage with organisations such as Narcotics Anonymous. I am also very concerned that Mr C remains under the control and manipulation of Mother. The return of the children to his care at this time would inevitably fail as the children would be affected by the toxic relationship between Mother and Mr C in a comparable way to that which occurred during May 2025.

Mr C has stated that he would accept the presence of supervision in the home on a permanent basis to enable the children to return. The nature of his problems in relation to matters such as substance misuse, in respect of which he has not always been honest, his toxic relationship with Mother who still seeks to exert control over him and the risk of emotional harm mean that this arrangement would not be tenable at this time.

The local authority plan is for long term foster care for W and X and with a plan for fortnightly contact with their parents to be supervised by the local authority. As part of that Care Order and Care Plan there would be ongoing review and monitoring. The local authority's position is that it is not safe or appropriate for there to be reunification with the parents considered at the present time and that this is not in the children’s welfare interests. The disadvantage in this respect would be that the children were not with their birth family and had to live with foster carers. They would miss out on the advantages set out above in respect of living with Mother or Mr C. However, I do find that the local authority's care plan is the most advantageous plan available and the only feasible plan available in conducting this balancing exercise at this time.

Mr A was an impressive and child-focussed parent in his evidence to the Court. He did express concerns over Mother and concede that at times he has given in to Mother as he has been worried about her disproportionate reactions if she perceives him to act against her.

Z and Y have lived with Mr and Mrs A for 6 months. They are settled and well looked after with Mr and Mrs A. It is entirely appropriate that the older children remain there. This will also enable the contact planned by Mr A to take place, including inter-sibling contact which I find to be very important.

I agree with the plans outlined for contact which include a minimum of monthly contact separately for Mother, as well as the other family contacts.

The risks and difficulties presented by Mother make it highly desirable and plainly in the welfare interests of Z and Y for the local authority to remain involved by way of a Supervision Order for a period of 12 months. I find 12 months an appropriate period for the arrangements to be tested and for Mother to be able to demonstrate some progress.

Mother has demonstrated an inability to adhere to safety planning or to not exhibit damaging behaviours or disrupt the children whilst they are with Mr A. I find it appropriate to continue the terms of the Prohibited Steps Order for a period of 12 months.

The intention of the local authority care plan is that X and W will enter into a foster care placement. The ideal situation would be that Mother and Mr C could support this as part of their taking steps to progress their own engagement with the local authority and the children’s arrangements. I agree with the local authority plans for contact which includes planned fortnightly contact for Mother and Mr C.

In bringing together this broader assessment I have also had regard in detail to the matters within the Welfare Checklist at s1(3) of the Children Act 1989. I use the lettering set out at (a) to (g) of s1(3) and analyse matters further as follows:

The Guardian seeks a s91(14) Order to prevent applications under the Act by Mother or Mr C for a period of at least 12 months, and the local authority are in support of this position.

As I have found throughout this judgment, Mother has been oppositional to the local authority. Mother and Mr C have both failed to make reasonable concessions and failed to show insight or that they can consistently, honestly and productively work with authorities and the local authority. This has, at times, been more than a typical failure to co-operate and there has been a level of confrontation that has been very disruptive and harmful. Mother and Mr C have contested all threshold and welfare findings without any realistic prospects of succeeding in doing so. Mother has failed to accept past decisions by the Court or the instruction of the appropriate expert, Dr Swart and the drug testing company FTS results.

On the afternoon before this judgment, Mother has filed and served a document entitled “Manipulation of Court.” The emailed document from Mother was received and considered by me at her insistence. Mother’s “Manipulation of Court” document was not forwarded by the local authority as they wanted to ensure that the committal proceedings and these proceedings were kept separate. Mother in her email to the Court made clear that she wished her document to be urgently considered as part of these proceedings due to the local authority’s conduct in this matter.

Mother’s “Manipulation of Court” document is over 8 pages long and avers that the local authority has engaged in “procedural misconduct, non-compliance, manipulation of court process and systematic breaches of the Family Procedure Rules, Practice Directions and case law, resulting in unlawful interim removal decisions.”

These proceedings have been ongoing for 6 months. Mother has sought permission on previous occasions for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal which has been refused. She has previously, whilst represented, accepted some of the earlier developments in the litigation but now Mother fully contests all threshold and welfare findings that have been sought by the local authority.

Mother has repeatedly argued as part of the Final Hearing that the statutory threshold was not met on 10/6/25 when DDJ Nix made the initial ICO, interim care order. Her argument, in effect, has been that there was nothing particular about that date which would operate as a precipitating event. In fact, the local authority have explained that from the meeting on 5/6/25, and with what Mother said and threatened on that occasion, the local authority were planning to bring proceedings. It was, as the local authority witnesses such as Ms R explained in cross-examination, a cumulative process rather than a single event that caused for these proceedings to be brought.

I have read the “Manipulation of Court” document produced by Mother and I disagree with the allegations made. Two repeating assertions from Mother are that the local authority have admitted “it did not have evidence to issue proceedings on 10/6/25” and that the local authority, “had not met the threshold for interim removal.”

The first of these assertions by Mother is a misunderstanding of the evidence of Ms R. Ms R did not make this concession in her evidence. The local authority did have appropriate evidence and a suitable basis to bring proceedings and seek public law orders, and those orders were made by DDJ Nix. Mr McDonald on behalf of the local authority has sought to engage with Mother’s arguments and explained the initial basis for threshold and the application of the relevant legal test at length in his written closing submissions. I agree with Mr McDonald’s analysis, albeit it is not my role to relitigate the initial hearing on 10/6/25. Indeed, it is not my role to commentate upon the past judicial decisions within these proceedings. My paramount consideration and focus is the welfare of each of the children in making decisions at this Final Hearing.

Mother has sought to argue that there was non-compliance with bundle requirements by the local authority and the withholding of evidence in earlier hearings. Mother’s implication from her “Manipulation of Court” document is that there has been a deliberate campaign by the local authority, “where judges were repeatedly forced to make decisions in the absence of evidence” and the local authority’s approach amounted to “procedural ambush [by] delaying, withholding, creating artificial urgency, forcing the court to act [when there was not] urgency [to do so] and using each procedural foothold to push for removal.”

My assessment on the evidence before me is that the local authority have attempted to support Mother and Mr C. They have attempted placement with Mother with paid full-time supervision support. Mr C said in his evidence that the local authority are paying a considerable amount of money for X and W to be in a residential placement. The local authority’s plan had been to seek to progress towards reunification at an earlier stage but the Mother’s approach to matters has meant that the prospects for early reunification have diminished during proceedings.

The loss of the local authority’s initial hope for earlier reunification have been contributed to by Mother’s fixation on the legal proceedings and oppositional approach to the local authority or professionals. Mother’s fixation on past events in the legal proceedings has worsened her lack of insight, contributed to her unwillingness to co-operate, recognise or address her mental health symptoms or her behaviours and has been very harmful for the children.

Mother’s approach to the proceedings generally has been disruptive for the children. For example, this has involved a message sent by Mother to Z whereby she was catastrophising to Z over the consequences for Mother of the legal process. Mr A has confirmed this message was damaging and worrying for Z.

This matter has been heavily contested and the scope of dispute raised by Mother has been very wide for me to address in this judgment. I am not going to make decisions on the adequacy of bundles in earlier hearings or re-litigate past interim hearings. I do not though find there to be any substance to the polemical allegations raised by Mother against the local authority in the “Manipulation of Court” document.

Mother alleges that the launching of the committal proceedings against her was a deliberate attempt to “derail” a planned contested hearing. Mother fails to recognise that the committal proceedings may have been as a result of her own actions in posting on social media about the case when it had been warned against previously.

Mother has shown disregard for previous court warnings. She has been oblivious at times to the harm caused to the children by her overly involving them in the litigation, in particular in respect of Z.

I agree with the Guardian when she says she is very worried that Mother will not accept the Courts’ decision if it supports the local authority and this could result in further harm to the children.

As Recorder Pallo observed and warned Mother previously, Mother pursuing these proceedings in the way that she has is entirely counter-productive. I find, most pertinently, it has been harmful in its effects for the children.

Mother studied for a law degree previously, although she did not complete the course, and she has now returned to university to study. Whilst Mother has legal knowledge, the problem in this case is that she cannot see that her own best interests, and those of the children, is in accepting matters and seeking to work with professionals and the local authority. I would urge Mother to do so given she does have a lot to offer if she can address her behaviours and her mental health symptoms.

The position of Mr C at Final Hearing is unfortunate in that he has shown himself entirely open to manipulation from Mother. In his conduct of these proceedings he has been controlled by Mother such that this caused him to lose his previous legal representation. He has placed seeking to appease Mother above better considerations of his own interests in these proceedings and instead of prioritising the children and seeking to work with the local authority.

Mother and Mr C in recent times have gone about matters in relation to the children and these proceedings in the wrong way. There has been hostility and challenge to the local authority rather than seeking to make progress for the children and evidence positive change.

The Guardian commented in giving her evidence that the cases presented by Mother and Mr C at the Final Hearing had increased her concerns. Contrast this to the 2017 public law proceedings, during which the Guardian at that time found that the progress by Mother and Mr A ahead of the Final Hearing could result in a recommendation for shared care under a Supervision Order, instead of a Care Order.

The opportunity is there for Mother and Mr C but there has been distraction and fixation on complaints about the local authority over past events and these proceedings. This has taken away their focus from what should be done by them for the children and to work towards any possible reunification.

I have considered the relevant case law as set out above on the making of s91(14) orders. I agree with the analysis of the Guardian in this matter. In order to seek to prevent future harm for the children and in the interests of the welfare of the children I make a s91(14) order in respect of any applications under the Act by Mother and Mr C, for a period of 12 months.

The period of 12 months does also fit broadly with the periods of recommended treatment for the parents if they are to seek reunification. I note Dr Swart did indicate that for Mother successful DBT could start to produce improvements earlier within the course of treatments than at 12 months. I would expect the local authority to monitor and support Mother’s improvement and I would urge them to fund this treatment if Mother seeks it. Mother would have to evidence a sustained improvement in her behaviours in order to address the local authority’s concerns.

I agree that with the Guardian that the purpose of the s91(14) order is to act as a filter and not to debar entirely an application under the Act. This will act as a protective filter on behalf of the children and act in their interests, with their welfare being my paramount consideration.

The new formation under section 91A would include consideration of any other individual who could be put at risk of harm. Mr C and Mr A have both suffered past manipulation from Mother, as she admits to Dr Swart in respect of mentally “torturing” her ex-partners. If the ability of Mr C and Mr A to move on and progress their arrangements for the children were disrupted by Mother this could also be time consuming, disruptive and stressful for them. This is an additional support, under the new formulation of section 91A, to support the making of a s91(14) order.

I remind myself of the guidance in Re C-D (A Child) [2020] EWCA Civ 501 and that the power to make a s91(14) order is to be used with ‘great care’. The circumstances in which a child’s welfare will justify the making of such an order are varied. These circumstances are not confined to cases of repeated or unreasonable applications. The assessment is fact specific. The circumstances of these children, in needing to avoid harm and disruption is particularly acute. It will be for the children’s benefit to have a s91(14) Order to filter relevant applications made by Mother or Mr C in the next 12 months. Accordingly, I make the s91(14) Order for a period of 12 months.

I make the Orders as sought by the local authority. I find there is no viable alternative to the making of these orders and that the return of the children to the care of Mother or Mr C would create a substantial and significant risk of harm.

I urge Mother and Mr C to move on from these fractious proceedings and to seek to make progress towards child-focussed aims, such as addressing Mother’s mental health or Mr C’s substance misuse to improve interactions and support for the children, and having the children spend more time with them. There is a great deal of change and progress that is needed in order to benefit the children.

It is for Mother to elect as to whether she wishes to restore her committal proceedings against the social workers that gave evidence at the Final Hearing, and whose evidence and professional approach I found to be impressive. I am not tasked as to determining Mother’s application for their committal. The decision that Mother makes in relation to those proceedings may indicate whether she is able to adapt and make progress on behalf of the children, by taking a more collaborative approach with the local authority.

Finally, Z and Y have sent me a letter outlining their wishes and concerns about the proceedings and requesting a reply.

I intend to reply in the following terms:

“Dear Z and Y,

My name is Judge Jamieson. Thank you very much for your letter. Your letter was very well written and I have considered it carefully.

I am an independent person and I have been requested to decide this case about where you should live and your arrangements. This case has been a really difficult one. It is obvious that your Mam loves you very much and she wants to be as big a part of your life as she possibly can. I have also taken into account what you put in your letter and said to [the Guardian] when she has spoken to you both.

I have had to consider all the evidence in the case, including that from professionals and court experts that have said that it would be better for your Mam to complete more work on her mental health before you live with her. I really hope that your Mam can complete all the recommended treatment successfully so that in the future you will be able to see her more often.

I have decided that it is better for you to stay living with your Dad and to have contact with your Mam. That is my final decision.

I wish you both the best of luck in everything that you do.

I hope that Z can continue to do well in her dancing and I am sure that you are both looking forward to seeing V the dog soon.

In your letter you said that you missed X and W and wanted to see them more. The plan is that you will see them more often.

In your letter you said that you both wanted to see your Mam for Christmas. I have checked with your Dad and he has said that you will be seeing your Mam and X and W on Christmas Eve. I hope that you both have a wonderful Christmas and enjoy seeing your Mam and Dad and X and W.

I know that you have a Mam and Dad that love you both very much.

Best wishes, Judge Jamieson.”