S (A Child) (Relinquished Baby: Notification to the Father), Re

These proceedings concern a child relinquished by his mother for adoption in circumstances when the father is said not to know about the birth of his child. The principal issue in this judgment is whether to grant the local authority’s application for permission not to notify the father of the application by prospective adopters for the adoption of his son, and the intention for the child to be adopted.

In turn, the timing under which that issue has arisen raises a question about the legal basis upon which the court may, if so minded, make that declaration. Rule 14.21 of the Family Procedure Rules makes provision for a local authority to seek directions about this issue prior “where no proceedings have started”. Pursuant to rule 19.2(1)(c), the Part 19 procedure must be used when such directions are sought.

Unfortunately, directions on this issue were not sought by the local authority until a considerable time after proceedings had started. In turn, that raises the question of whether the procedure envisaged by rules 14.21 and 19.2(1)(c) is applicable where, as here, proceedings were already underway by the time the issue was identified. There is therefore a parallel application by the local authority under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court for an order permitting the non-notification of the father. That application has been made on the premise that, if rule 14.21 and the Part 19 procedure are no longer capable of being engaged in the present circumstances, the inherent jurisdiction would, in principle, be available to achieve similar effect.

In 2024, the mother discovered that she was 28 weeks pregnant. The news caused her great distress since she did not want to have a baby. She was still in her teenage years and felt that she would not be able to meet her child’s needs. She did not want the father of the child to know about either the pregnancy or, in due course, the birth of his child. Before the child was born, the mother arranged with the local authority to relinquish her child for adoption. Social workers explained the various options that were available to her, including the benefits for her child-to-be of knowing who his or her birth father is, and the prospect of other family members caring for her child. She was offered counselling and other support. Throughout this process, the mother was adamant that she intended to relinquish her child for adoption, and did not, and still has not, revealed the identity of the father. In documents prepared for these proceedings, one of the social workers wrote that the mother “has never once swayed from the idea or plan of adoption.” Cafcass was notified. Early permanent adopters were identified by the local authority. The mother was given the opportunity of meeting with them but declined.

S, her son, was born later in the year and was immediately accommodated by the local authority under section 20 of the Children Act 1989 with the mother’s consent as soon as he was fit for discharge from hospital. He was placed with the identified early permanence carers, on the assumption that in due course they would apply to adopt him. Only the mother is named on S’s birth certificate.

On 12 February 2025, the mother consented to S being placed for adoption and gave her advance consent to his adoption under sections 19 and 20 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) respectively.

On 28 May 2025, the early permanence adopters applied to adopt S. Only the mother’s consent featured on the application. The application, which had been submitted with the support of the local authority, did not seek directions or otherwise address the issue of notification of the father. The final adoption hearing was listed before me on 24 July 2025. At that hearing I identified the need for the court to give directions concerning notification to the father.

I accordingly adjourned the adoption hearing with directions for the local authority to make an application under Part 19 of the Family Procedure Rules, in accordance with rule 14.21 and the guidance given by Peter Jackson LJ in Re A, B and C (Adoption: Notification of Fathers and Relatives) [2020] EWCA Civ 41.

The local authority submitted a Part 19 application on 13 August 2025, accompanied by evidence to which I shall turn in due course. I gave directions for the Part 19 application to be determined, and the matter resumed before me on 17 September 2025 for a directions hearing. In attendance was the mother, with the benefit of legal representation and counsel (very sensibly and pragmatically) funded by the local authority, plus the social work team, and the guardian.

At the hearing on 17 September 2025, Mr Cottrell queried whether, in the circumstances of these proceedings, rule 14.21 was capable of being engaged at all. That was because the availability non-notification process addressed by rule 14.21 appears to be anchored to proceedings having not already been started. By contrast, in these proceedings the need for an application under Part 19 was only identified after the application for an adoption order had been made by the prospective adopters. Rule 14.21 provides, with emphasis added:

“Notice to fathers without parental responsibility

Where no proceedings have startedan adoption agency or local authority may ask the court for directions on the need to give a father without parental responsibility notice of the intention to place a child for adoption.”

That being so, Mr Cottrell submitted, the Part 19 procedure was not suitable for this court to grant the order sought by the local authority. The premise of his submissions was that rule 14.21 did not appear to cater for the situation where, as here, a local authority sought directions where proceedings had already started. The solution in Mr Cottrell’s submission was for the local authority to make an application to the High Court under the inherent jurisdiction, which could then be transferred to this court, to be dealt with by me sitting as a judge of the High Court. Mr Cottrell submitted that the High Court’s jurisdiction would not be limited in the way that this court’s jurisdiction was apparently curtailed by the timing of the application under rule 14.21. In his submission, those steps were necessary in order for this court properly to be able to consider the application for non-notification of the father. Mr Cottrell invited me to adjourn the application to enable the required application under the inherent jurisdiction to be made to the High Court, and for any additional directions to be given for the determination of the application.

I gave directions for the local authority to make an application to the High Court under the inherent jurisdiction, with a view to the application being transferred to me to deal with sitting in Newcastle. I proceeded to hear submissions about the substantive approach I should take to the issue of notification in any event, on the footing that Mr Cottrell’s submissions were correct, and the local authority’s application would be made to the High Court forthwith and transferred to me administratively, or that I otherwise enjoyed the power to give the directions even absent the inherent jurisdiction. I reserved judgment and set 16 October 2025 as the date for judgment to be handed down.

Very regrettably, it was not until 10 October 2025 that the local authority purported to issue the C66 application under the inherent jurisdiction. That application was submitted to the Family Court at Newcastle. I asked the court staff to inform the local authority that that was contrary to rule 12.36(1) of the Family Procedure Rules, which requires applications under the inherent jurisdiction to be started in the High Court. By 15 October 2025, the day before the scheduled hearing to hand down the judgment, the application had still not been issued in the High Court, still less transferred to be dealt with by me. It was issued later that day. By then it was necessary to postpone the hearing to hand down the judgment until the C66 application had been transferred here. The application eventually was received by this court on 31 October 2025, enabling the matter to proceed.

The 2002 Act makes provision for adoption with parental consent. The term “parent” in this context is defined as a parent having parental responsibility: see section 52(6). Consequently, the regime established by the 2002 Act establishes a statutory framework within which only the consent of a mother may be required. Similarly, the Family Procedure Rules 2010 provide that a father without parental responsibility is not an automatic respondent to proceedings for a placement order or an adoption order.

As noted in ReA, B and C at para. 33, the statutory material issued pursuant to the framework established by the 2002 Act provides strong indicators of the importance of engagement of the wider family in the adoption process. As Peter Jackson LJ put it:

“In the circumstances, any request for an adoption that excludes a father or close family members will naturally be carefully scrutinised by social workers and the court. That instinct is reinforced by the established domestic and European case law that emphasises that non-consensual adoption can only be approved if, after consideration of the realistic options, nothing else will do.”

The principles applicable to the decision as to whether or not a father should be notified in circumstances such as the present were summarised at para. 89 of Re A, B and C in the following terms:

“1.

The law allows for 'fast-track' adoption with the consent of all those with parental responsibility, so in some cases the mother alone. Where she opposes notification being given to the child's father or relatives her right to respect for her private life is engaged and can only be infringed where it is necessary to do so to protect the interests of others.

2.

The profound importance of the adoption decision for the child and potentially for other family members is clearly capable of supplying a justification for overriding the mother's request. Whether it does so will depend upon the individual circumstances of the case.

3.

The decision should be prioritised and the process characterised by urgency and thoroughness.

4.

The decision-maker's first task is to establish the facts as clearly as possible, mindful of the often limited and one-sided nature of the information available. The confidential relinquishment of a child for adoption is an unusual event and the reasons for it must be respectfully scrutinised so that the interests of others are protected. In fairness to those other individuals, the account that is given by the person seeking confidentiality cannot be taken at face value. All information that can be discovered without compromising confidentiality should therefore be gathered and a first-hand account from the person seeking confidentiality will normally be sought. The investigation should enable broad conclusions to be drawn about the relative weight to be given to the factors that must inform the decision.

5.

Once the facts have been investigated the task is to strike a fair balance between the various interests involved. The welfare of the child is an important factor but it is not the paramount consideration.

6.

There is no single test for distinguishing between cases in which notification should and should not be given but the case law shows that these factors will be relevant when reaching a decision:

(1)

Parental responsibility. The fact that a father has parental responsibility by marriage or otherwise entitles him to give or withhold consent to adoption and gives him automatic party status in any proceedings that might lead to adoption. Compelling reasons are therefore required before the withholding of notification can be justified.

(2)

Article 8 rights. Whether the father, married or unmarried, or the relative have an established or potential family life with the mother or the child, the right to a fair hearing is engaged and strong reasons are required before the withholding of notification can be justified.

(3)

The substance of the relationships. Aside from the presence or absence of parental responsibility and of family life rights, an assessment must be made of the substance of the relationship between the parents, the circumstances of the conception, and the significance of relatives. The purpose is to ensure that those who are necessarily silent are given a notional voice so as to identify the possible strengths and weaknesses of any argument that they might make. Put another way, with what degree of objective justification might such a person complain if they later discovered they had been excluded from the decision? The answer will differ as between a father with whom the mother has had a fleeting encounter and one with whom she has had a substantial relationship, and as between members of the extended family who are close to the parents and those who are more distant.

(4)

The likelihood of a family placement being a realistic alternative to adoption. This is of particular importance to the child's lifelong welfare as it may determine whether or not adoption is necessary. An objective view, going beyond the say-so of the person seeking confidentiality, should be taken about whether a family member may or may not be a potential carer. Where a family placement is unlikely to be worth investigating or where notification may cause significant harm to those notified, this factor will speak in favour of maintaining confidentiality; anything less than that and it will point the other way.

(5)

The physical, psychological or social impact on the mother or on others of notification being given. Where this would be severe, for example because of fear arising from rape or violence, or because of possible consequences such as ostracism or family breakdown, or because of significant mental health vulnerability, these must weigh heavily in the balancing exercise. On the other hand, excessive weight should not be given to short term difficulties and to less serious situations involving embarrassment or social unpleasantness, otherwise the mother's wish would always prevail at the expense of other interests.

(6)

Cultural and religious factors. The conception and concealed pregnancy may give rise to particular difficulties in some cultural and religious contexts. These may enhance the risks of notification, but they may also mean that the possibility of maintaining the birth tie through a family placement is of particular importance for the child.

(7)

The availability and durability of the confidential information. Notification can only take place if there is someone to notify. In cases where a mother declines to identify a father she may face persuasion, if that is thought appropriate, but she cannot be coerced. In some cases the available information may mean that the father is identifiable, and maternal relatives may also be identifiable. The extent to which identifying information is pursued is a matter of judgement. Conversely, there will be cases where it is necessary to consider whether any confidentiality is likely to endure. In the modern world secrets are increasingly difficult to keep and the consequences, particularly for the child and any prospective adopters, of the child's existence being concealed but becoming known to family members later on, sometimes as a result of disclosure by the person seeking confidentiality, should be borne in mind.

(8)

The impact of delay. A decision to apply to court and thereafter any decision to notify will inevitably postpone to some extent the time when the child's permanent placement can be confirmed. In most cases, the importance of the issues means that the delay cannot be a predominant factor. There may however be circumstances where delay would have particularly damaging consequences for the mother or for the child; for example, it would undoubtedly need to be taken into account if it would lead to the withdrawal of the child's established carers or to the loss of an especially suitable adoptive placement.

(9)

Any other relevant matters. The list of relevant factors is not closed. Mothers may have many reasons for wishing to maintain confidentiality and there may be a wide range of implications for the child, the father and for other relatives. All relevant matters must be considered.

7.

It has rightly been said that the maintenance of confidentiality is exceptional, and highly exceptional where a father has parental responsibility or where there is family life under Article 8. However exceptionality is not in itself a test or a short cut; rather it is a reflection of the fact that the profound significance of adoption for the child and considerations of fairness to others means that the balance will often fall in favour of notification. But the decision on whether confidentiality should be maintained can only be made by striking a fair balance between the factors that are present in the individual case.”

The position of the parties was that the local authority was, or may have been, “too late” to ask the court to give directions about the need to give the father notice of the intention to place a child for adoption, for the reasons set out above. They were also in agreement that only the inherent jurisdiction could provide a basis to remedy this major procedural defect if rule 14.21 was not engaged.

Having now had the opportunity to reflect on the position, I now doubt that the court’s case management powers are constrained in the way feared by the parties. I am satisfied that the court is able to give such directions, even without relying on the inherent jurisdiction, in the circumstances of this case. If I am wrong, the inherent jurisdiction would of course remedy that defect. I reach this conclusion for the following reasons.

First, the purpose of rule 14.21 is to direct the local authority or adoption agency to address the issue of notification of the father (or his non-notification) in circumstances where directions are required as soon as possible. The need for urgency in these sensitive and difficult cases is well established. The wording of rule 14.21 underlines the early stage in the process at which directions of this nature should be sought. At para. 86 of ReA, B and C, Peter Jackson LJ summarised the position in these terms:

“Where the mother requests confidentiality, it will need to decide at a very early stage whether an application to court should be made to determine whether or not the putative father or relatives should be informed and consulted. There will be cases where, applying the principles summarised in this judgment, the local authority can be very clear that no application is required and planning for placement on the basis of the mother's consent can proceed. But in any case that is less clear-cut, an application should be issued so that problems concerning the lack of notification do not arise when adoption proceedings are later issued.” (Emphasis added)

It would be surprising if rule 14.21 was intended to prevent the local authority from seeking such directions simply on account of a failure to identify the need to do so prior to the commencement of proceedings, or where it was initially thought that such directions were not required. That the rule is engaged “where no proceedings have started” is a means to empower a local authority to seek directions about a matter the court is not otherwise seized of. Ordinarily, seeking directions about proceedings that are yet to be started would be procedurally challenging, and even more so where no respondent has been identified. Thus rule 14.21 is an enabling power, rather than a restriction. It permits a party to seek the court’s endorsement of a procedural step that will define the parameters of any subsequent adoption proceedings before those proceedings have commenced and where, given the use of Part 19, no respondent has been named. Nothing in rule 14.21 says that a local authority may not seek directions where proceedings have already started; while the provision may be read as having that effect, it does not, in terms, go that far.

This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that an application for rule 14.21 directions will not be needed in all cases. In the extract from para. 86 of A, B and C quoted above, the Court of Appeal envisaged that not all notification cases would require a Part 19 application to the court. The fact that an exercise of judgement is required by a local authority to decide whether application will be necessary opens the door to the possibility of a such a decision being revisited at a later stage. There is nothing in the guidance in A, B and C to suggest that a pre-proceedings decision not to seek directions is irrevocable once proceedings have commenced.

While Peter Jackson LJ referred (as I have emphasised above) to the possibility of “problems concerning the lack of notification” arising when proceedings are issued in which notification is an issue without seeking directions of this nature, I do not consider that such “problems” entail extinguishing the court’s ability to make a decision concerning notification altogether simply on account of the stage in the process at which they were sought. Problems of the sort envisaged by the Court of Appeal no doubt included precisely the sort of problems that these proceedings have unfortunately encountered: a young mother, seeking to relinquish her child as soon as possible has been made to wait; prospective adopters and early permanence carers have also been made to wait, having attended what they thought was the to be the final, unopposed adoption hearing, only to find out that there were unidentified legal complications. Of course, there is the position of S himself, who is now approaching his first birthday, without the certainty and stability that all parties agree would be provided for him by his adoption by the prospective adopters. The overriding objective to deal with cases justly includes dealing expeditiously with cases. A prior application for directions will enable that objective to be met. This late application has meant that the progress that is so desperately needed could not be made promptly. There is no suggestion that the desired order is now beyond the reach of the court’s powers. There are examples of cases in which post-commencement directions were sought in circumstances analogous to those in these proceedings; see, for example, Re M (adoption - notification of birth father) [2023] EWFC 17.

Secondly, rule 14.21 addresses the ability of the local authority to seek directions on the need to give a father without parental responsibility notice of the intention to place a child for adoption. It does not purport to seek to constrain the court’s ability to give directions on the issue of its own motion and where not invited to do so by the local authority (as indeed happened in these proceedings). Still less does the rule regulate the point in the timeline of a case at which the court enjoys the ability to give such directions.

Thirdly, rule 14.21 is procedural in nature. At its highest, it concerns the giving of directions concerning notification. It does not address the court’s substantive decision (and subsequent order) as to whether notification should take place or may be dispensed with. Rule 14.21 makes provision for the court to determine the process that the local authority (or the adoption agency), the guardian and the mother should follow in order to enable the court to be fully equipped to decide whether to make an adoption order in circumstances in which the father has not been notified. Again, it would be surprising if the court’s determination of the substantive issue could be constrained by the timing of a local authority’s application for case management directions.

This point is reinforced by the form in which rule 14.21 was originally made. Prior to amendments made by the Family Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2020 which came into force on 6 April 2020, rule 14.21 was drafted on the premise that a decision about the non-notification of the father was a matter for the inherent jurisdiction. In the form originally made it provided:

“14.21.

Inherent jurisdiction and fathers without parental responsibility

Where no proceedings have started an adoption agency or local authority may ask the High Court for directions on the need to give a father without parental responsibility notice of the intention to place a child for adoption.”

As originally made, this rule assumed that the source of the power to decide not to notify a father lay in the inherent jurisdiction, not the Family Procedure Rules. The inherent jurisdiction is, of course, distinct from rules of procedure governing directions given pursuant to it. The Explanatory Note to the Family Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2020 implies that the Rule Committee considered that the family court enjoys the power to give such directions from a source other than the inherent jurisdiction. It states, “the directions referred to in that rule [14.21, as amended] can be sought not just from the High Court but also the family court.” The substantive power to authorise non-notification, whatever its source, accordingly differs from the procedure pursuant to which directions are given in relation to the exercise of that power.

Fourthly, rule 14.21, like all rules in the Family Procedure Rules, should be interpreted consistently with the overriding objective, and in light of the United Kingdom’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights.

As to the former, rule 1.1(2)(a) requires the court to deal with cases fairly. The court must give effect to the overriding objective when it interprets any rule (rule 1.2(1)(b)). The requirements of natural justice in cases of this nature have been identified since long before the requirements of the overriding objective sought to codify the concept (or before they were placed on a statutory footing by the Human Rights Act 1998): see para. 46 of A, B and C.

As to the latter, section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act provides that primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with Convention rights. The import of the Convention jurisprudence is that non-consensual adoption can only be approved if, after consideration of the realistic options, nothing else will do. That being so, rule 14.21 should not be read in a manner which prevents the court from entertaining a local authority application for directions about notification made after proceedings had started, or of its own motion.

Combined, these factors lead me to conclude that the local authority was not constrained from seeking directions on the need to notify the father, even after proceedings had commenced. Nor was the court prevented from giving such directions of its own motion. Seeking or giving post-commencement directions was not prevented by the terms of rules 14.21 or 19.2(c). Rule 14.21 was described as the “preferred route” by Cobb J, as he then was, in TJ (Relinquished Baby: Sibling Contact) [2017] EWFC 6, but it was not treated as the only route.

This conclusion means that it is not necessary to exercise the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to achieve this outcome. If I am wrong in that conclusion, then the criteria to permit the local authority to invoke the inherent jurisdiction would appear to be satisfied in any event.

In conclusion at this stage, therefore, there is no reason to doubt the validity of my order dated 24 July 2025 in which I directed the local authority to make an application under Part 19 of the Family Procedure Rules, even though proceedings had already started.

Against that background, I therefore turn to the substantive question that is before the court: whether to make an order dispensing with the need to serve notice of these proceedings on the father.

The mother had, very bravely, attended the hearing before me on 17 September. S was represented by his Guardian, who in turn had instructed Mr Dakers. Social workers from the local authority were also in attendance. I explained to the mother that, whatever the correct legal route was, I needed to ensure that I had enough evidence before me to decide whether to allow S’s father not to be notified. This was important for S, who one day may read this judgment, and ask what steps were taken when this life-changing decision was taken by the court on this behalf. While I had the benefit of written evidence from the mother’s social worker team leader about the work that had been done with her, including counselling, and copies of the letters that had been sent to her, I did not have any evidence from the mother herself. I was conscious that in Re C v XYZ County Council [2007] EWCA Civ 1206, Arden LJ observed, at para. 41, that:

“…the court or adoption agency cannot simply act on what the mother says. It has to examine what she says critically. It is a question of judgement whether what the mother says needs to be checked or corroborated.”

Similarly, in Re A (Relinquished baby: Risk of domestic abuse) [2018] EWHC 1981 (Fam) Cobb J held, at para. 19(vi), that:

“Respect can and indeed must be afforded to the mother's wish for a confidential and discreet arrangement for the adoption of her child, although the mother's wishes must be critically examined and not just accepted at face value”

To that end, in his summary of the relevant principles at para. 88 of A, B and C (Adoption: Notification of Fathers and Relatives), Peter Jackson LJ said:

“It is a matter for the court as to whether it should require written or oral evidence from the mother. Given the importance of the issue, the court will normally be assisted by a statement from the mother, whether or not she gives oral evidence, rather than relying entirely upon evidence from the local authority at second hand.”

At the hearing on 17 September, I therefore directed the mother to file a statement setting out what information she was willing to share regarding the identity of S’s father. I directed that, in the event she was unwilling to share such information, she should set out the reasons for that position.

The mother did not file a statement. By a position statement dated 15 October 2025, her solicitor stated that it had not been possible to take instructions from her. Numerous attempts had been made to contact her without success. A request was made to excuse her attendance from the hearings scheduled to hand down judgment on 16 October and 14 November 2025. It remains the case that I have not heard from her directly.

The steps taken by the local authority are set out in the statement of a social worker with the local authority dated 13 August 2025, and a social work chronology by S’s child permanence social worker. There has been no challenge to the contents of either document. They summarise the local authority’s engagement with the mother and the assessments of her that it undertook, in particular a Child and Family Assessment dated 5 November 2024, the involvement of Cafcass, and the counselling and the support that has been provided to the mother throughout. The statement dated 13 August 2025 cites an extract from the panel decision of Adopt North East:

“There has been much effort to try and establish the identity of S’s birth father; approaching this sensitively but also with S’s needs consistently being at the fore. There is currently no information which would assist in being able to move this forward and this remains unknown, thus meaning there are gaps in terms of S’s life story and also factors which could have implications for his future development. However, this has been carefully balanced and considered within decision making and it being determined that adoption is in S’s best interests.”

On behalf of the local authority, Mr Cottrell underlined the mother’s consistent position that she had not, and did not want to, reveal the identity of the father to the local authority or any professionals she has engaged with about the birth of her son. She has never revealed the identity of S’s father to any professionals, whether child protection or adoption social workers with the local authority, or the guardian. There is nothing to suggest that the father is even aware that he has a son. The mother has described her relationship with the father as casual and brief.

Mr Cottrell submitted that, pursuant to the local authority’s assessment of the mother, there were no welfare concerns about the mother’s ability to care for her son, and equally there were no concerns about her capacity or competence to give valid consent for his adoption. Throughout her engagement with the local authority, she had been offered counselling and support, as well as extensive details about the support that would be available to her in the event she was not to relinquish S.

On behalf the mother, Mr Bannister confirmed that the mother continued to consent to S’s adoption. She continued to decline to identify the father. She was not opposed to meeting with his prospective adopters, and received regular updates about S, including photographs. Future updates would be provided by the adoption agency.

For the guardian, Claire-Louise Goudie, Mr Dakers highlighted how the mother had provided no details of S’s father to any professional, starting with the midwife with whom she first spoke about her pregnancy. She did not wish to be involved in registering S’s birth, and nor did she inform Ms Towner-Reiter, the guardian with whom she first engaged about the birth of S, in February of this year. There were no details of the father in the child permanence report, and Adopt NE had expended much effort in attempting to establish S’s paternity. The social worker had been unable to elicit any details from the mother’s own mother. The mother had consistently refused to identify the father. Further steps to ‘extract’ the information from the mother risked overstepping the line, Mr Dakers submitted.

As the Court of Appeal acknowledged in Re A, B and C at para. 89(4), the information available in cases of this nature is often limited and one-sided. That is the position in these proceedings. I have decided that it would be inappropriate to attempt to extract further information from the mother about the identity of the father. She cannot be compelled to say more than she already has, and nor can her family members around her. Her objective is, and has been throughout, to relinquish S as swiftly and discreetly as possible. The common theme throughout all her interactions with professionals, and with the court, has been a resolute determination not to reveal the identity of S’s father. To this day, she has concealed those details from all professionals.

I am satisfied that the submissions made by all parties in these proceedings – Mr Cottrell, Mr Bannister and Mr Dakers – accurately reflect the position about the inability of the local authority, and in turn this court, to ascertain details of the father’s identity. I have reviewed the evidence with anxious scrutiny. One small benefit of the time that these proceedings have taken to resolve has been the opportunity that the chronology has afforded me to reflect on the factual matrix, and whether there is anything more that could or should be done to ascertain the identity of S’s father. I am satisfied that there is not, essentially for the reasons consistently given by the advocates in these proceedings, by reference to the underlying evidence. I was particularly assisted by Ms Goudie’s analysis, and the submissions advanced on her behalf, as well as the written evidence in the social worker’s statement of 13 August 2025. I am satisfied that the local authority, Adopt NE, and the other professionals involved in these proceedings have done all they can, using the information available to them, to ascertain the identity of S’s father. His mother was not previously known to the local authority. Her family, I am told, have not come across its radar. This is not a mother whose history and local connections are matters that the local authority is familiar with. On the materials before me, I am satisfied that thorough enquiries have taken place and have yielded no results. Expecting the mother to provide information about the father’s identity would be a futile exercise with which she would not comply.

I also accept the mother’s position about her former relationship with the father, as quoted in the social worker’s statement of 13 August, that “we were seeing each other but we do not speak any more”. The statement continues: “they hung out, and dated for a very short period of time”, and that the relationship was “really casual”. The mother has reported that the father’s ethnicity is the same as hers, and that he is also from the same part of the country. She also said that he was “young, not responsible, and she couldn’t see how he would be able to give a child a good life.” Those details, I find, are an insufficient basis for any further investigation to be made pertaining to the identity of the father, bearing in mind the steps already taken by the local authority.

Drawing this analysis together, I find to the balance of probabilities standard that the mother wishes to relinquish S, that neither the local authority nor any other professional knows the identity of S’s father, and that there is no realistic prospect of him being identified.

I must now strike a fair balance between the various interests involved. The mother’s desire for confidentiality, the respect that she is due in these circumstances, and the interests of S’s unsuspecting paternal relatives, especially his father, are all factors that must be weighed in the balance. S’s welfare is an important factor, but it is not the paramount consideration. I will take into account the factors summarised at para. 89(6) of Re A, B and C.

First, parental responsibility. S’s father does not hold parental responsibility for him. He does not hold automatic party status under Part 14 of the Family Procedure Rules. He is not automatically caught by the statutory regime for notice established by the 2002 Act.

Secondly, Article 8 ECHR rights. The father does not know about S’s existence. Family life for the purposes of Article 8 does not exist between S and his father. There appears to have been a fleeting relationship of sorts between the father and the mother prior to S’s birth. That relationship came to an end before S was born. The mother and the father do not speak anymore. On the material before me, the mother and father did not enjoy Article 8 family even during their fleeting relationship, still less does it exist between them at this stage.

Notwithstanding the above, the father will, in principle, enjoy rights under the procedural limb of Article 8, and under Article 6, to be notified of his son’s existence, and will, in principle, enjoy the potential to enable him to engage with these proceedings. Procedural fairness has for long been recognised by the common law as a fundamental factor to be addressed when taking decisions of this nature in any event: see para. 46 of ReA, B and C, referred to above. Those rights are not absolute rights, but they are weighty considerations.

Thirdly, the substance of the relationships. The relationship between the father and the mother was firmly towards the “fleeting” end of the spectrum of relationship depth. There is nothing to suggest that the father has paid any form of ongoing interest in the mother. He will know that their relationship was sexual. The possibility of the mother’s pregnancy following their sexual relations is a matter which should have occurred to him, even if only in superficial terms. Yet, on the material before me, he has paid no further interest in the mother. There is no suggestion that any members of his family had got to know the mother, such that there are wider members of the paternal family who may be knowingly affected by this decision. In these circumstances, there would be little by way of objective justification to any complaint that either the father or his wider family could later have about the circumstances of this case.

Of course, there are (at least) two sides to every story. The father does not know what he does not know. S’s existence is, for him, an ‘unknown unknown’. Yet the fact remains that, on the material before me, he has not sought to engage with the mother in any depth at all following the cessation of their sexual relationship. I doubt very much that the mother has presented a dishonest picture to the local authority, the guardian and other professionals; to have concealed an ongoing relationship with the father would have taken not only resolve and determination, but also a degree of calculated and consistent dishonesty which none of the professionals who know the mother have detected. The strong impression that they have all formed is that the relationship came to a complete end prior to S’s birth. They have formed the impression that she was honest in her disclosures about her relationship with the father. While noting the one-sided nature of the evidence before me, there is nothing that causes me to call the position of the mother into question to any significant extent.

Fourthly, the likelihood of a family placement being a realistic alternative to adoption. There may well be a family member on the father’s side of the family who would be willing to assume responsibility for S. But on the materials before me, there is no realistic prospect of either the local authority or the court being able to identify any such person, for the simple reason that the identity of S’s family is not known. There is simply no prospect of any family member being identified as a realistic alternative to adoption.

The mother’s family, of course, are aware of S’s birth. There is no suggestion that a maternal placement is a realistic prospect. The mother’s family appear to support her desire to relinquish S.

Fifthly, the physical, psychological or social impact on the mother of notification being given. The strong impression I have formed is that notification of the father would have a profoundly negative impact on the mother. Such is her inability to comprehend motherhood and all that comes with it that she declined even to register S’s birth. A social worker had to do it. Her resolute determination not to reveal the identity of S’s father, and her desire to relinquish the child, would readily translate to a corresponding level of despair were the court to order that notification should take place. The mother has sought to relinquish S for adoption confidentially and discreetly. The entire premise of each step that she has taken in order to do has been on the basis that there will be no possibility of the birth father finding out. She has indicated that even meeting the identified adopters would be overwhelming (see the social work chronology for 26 November 2024). Notification, assuming it could take place, would have a devastating impact on the mother.

Sixthly, cultural and religious factors. There are particular cultural or religious factors. The description the mother has given of the father’s ethnicity matches her own, and they are both from the same part of the country. The mother has drafted a pen picture of herself to be provided to S in due course; it summarises her education, her interests, her pets, those who are closest to her. Its contents are moving in that it demonstrates that she appreciates that her son will want to know something about his own life story in due course, but it does not reveal matters of particular significance for the purposes of this analysis.

Seventhly, the availability and durability of confidential information. As I have already set out, the father is not identifiable on the material available to the local authority. The mother’s handwritten pen picture of herself is unlikely to contain any material that will enable the identification of the father. I accept that in the age of social media and digital connections, augmented by the ever-increasing power of artificial intelligence, there is a possibility that the father may be identified in due course. An ancestry DNA search may one day reveal the identity of S’s father to him. That is a residual risk and there is nothing in the circumstances of these proceedings that increase the risk of the father being identified in time, or otherwise enables his identification at the present time.

I do not consider that it is appropriate to attempt to compel the mother, or members of her family who may be thought to know more details, to reveal what they know. For my part, it is by no means clear that the mother has revealed more details to her own family. Engaging in a speculative inquisition by interrogating other family members, for example summoning the mother or her mother to appear in the witness box and give evidence under oath, would cause immense distress to the mother, and the other family member(s). There is no guarantee that any information yielded by such a process would be reliable. It would inject further delay into the process.

Eighthly, the impact of delay. Mercifully, despite the delay in these proceedings, the early permanence carers are patient, and there is no basis for me to conclude that the placement is at risk on account of this process having been undertaken. In any event, the delay has already happened, and the court must now proceed to make a decision. Further delay must be avoided.

Finally, other matters. Non-notification may have profound consequences for S. He will be unlikely to know the identity of his father, and if he ever does find out, it may be years into the future. This will undoubtedly entail a sense of loss for him. I write this judgment expecting that he may one day read it. Assuming I make the adoption order, this judgment will have been the legal means by which that process was able to proceed without any involvement of his family, in particular his father. Early permanence adopters have been identified and, subject to this judgment, are ready for an adoption order to be made.

Drawing all these factors together, I have concluded that the only option available to the court is to grant the local authority’s application for a direction that it need not notify the father. Notification would, when all things are considered, be an impossible feat: the father’s details are not known to the local authority, any professionals involved, or the court. But that is not the only factor. The father had a fleeting relationship with the mother and, on the material before me, has paid no further interest in her. There is no suggestion that he has sought to enquire as to her welfare following their sexual relations. The father does have a right to procedural fairness, but that must be balanced against the respect that is due to a mother in the position of the mother in these proceedings and her desire for confidentiality, and the welfare implications for her of the father being notified (putting to one side the impossibility of doing so).

The welfare of S himself is more finely balanced. All things being equal, he should have the opportunity to be cared for by his family, or at least by members of his paternal family. The maintenance of confidentiality, as sought by all parties, is exceptional. S will never have the opportunity to be cared for by his father; his father will never have the opportunity to care for him. That will entail a sense of loss for S. Whereas the father may never know about his son, S will likely know that he has a father who never knew him. Yet if I grant this application, the court will be in a position to consider whether to make an adoption order in favour of the early permanence adopters. They have been selected and matched due to their suitability as forever parents for S. If I make an order for S’s adoption in their favour in due course, I will do so on the basis that that is consistent with S’s welfare interests throughout his life. Dispensing with notice to the father will enable the court to conduct that full assessment, placing S on the path to stability and certainty, in a forever home, in a manner that is currently not simply possible.

Drawing these factors together, I consider that a fair balance in this case is to take the exceptional step of permitting the local authority not to notify the father.

I will invite the parties to draft a suitable order.