Children: Parental Responsibility

I am concerned with three children, RF, aged six, born in 2019, AF aged four, born in 2021 and FA (known by M2 by another forename) , aged 14 months, born in 2024. I will refer to her as FA. The children’s biological mother is M1 and their biological father is F. Until February 2025 when I handed down judgment in respect of their parentage, the legal and de facto mother of RF and AF was M2.

The children have been represented in these proceedings by a Guardian. Until around May 2025 that Guardian was Ms S; Mr B has been their Guardian since June 2025. Their solicitor is Helena Aiyudubia and they have been represented in this part of the proceedings by Catherine Purdy of Counsel. The lay parties have all acted as litigants in person in this part of the hearing and although I directed that there should be QLRs appointed unfortunately, none was available for any party, despite best efforts. As a consequence, I asked the questions on behalf of M1, M2 and F. All parties had the opportunity to raise further questions after the questions had been answered. No one raised any issue with the opportunities they had to put questions and all parties worked very hard to achieve an effective hearing, despite its very emotional and upsetting nature.

The welfare hearing took place from 30^th July to 1^st August 2025. This judgment must be read in conjunction with my judgment of 10^th February 2025 (M1 v M2 &Ors (Children: Declarations of Parentage [2025] EWFC 344). I will not seek to set out the background facts which are contained in that judgment but will provide an update and put the applications before this court into context.

In my judgment handed down on 10^th February 2025, the Court determined that F was the parent of RF and AF. The Court refused the application from M2 to be declared the parent of FA. F remains on FA’s birth certificate as her father.

On 20^th February 2024 I dealt with M2’s application for permission to appeal my judgment, refusing that application.

On 7^th March 2025 Lord Justice Peter Jackson refused M2’s further application for permission to appeal. In his written reasons he comments as follows, “The judge directed herself correctly in law and reached a decision that was convincingly explained in an impressive judgment. An appeal could not succeed and there is no compelling reason for an appeal to be heard.” He continues,

“In refusing this application, I am fully aware that a cruel deception has taken place, whatever the reasons for it. However, nothing could be gained from hearing an appeal that would be bound to fail and would only prolong the divisions between the parties. The most important decisions about these young children have yet to be taken and they now need the adults who love them, and on whom their happiness depends, to look to the future and put their welfare first in a situation that is not of their making”.

The Declarations of Parentage were sent to the Registrar General for Births and Deaths and on 28^th April 2025 the birth of both children was re-registered showing F as the father of RF and AF and removing M2 from the birth certificates.

An application was made by M2 to the Supreme Court seeking to have the decision of the Registrar reviewed. This was refused on 24^th June 2025 and the decision of the Registrar was upheld. New birth certificates have been issued.

RF and AF have continued to spend half their time with M1 and half with M2. They see their father during the time they spend with M1. FA has had no contact with M2. Unfortunately, the adults have not been able to reach any sort of accommodation or compromise as to the way forward. M2 has spoken with both Guardians, Ms S and Mr B. She has been very clear to both of them that she cannot accept the Court’s findings. She said to Ms S on 16^th April 2025,

“she does not accept the findings made regarding parentage because M1 and F lied and the story they told is a fallacy….M2 stated that she will not stop fighting until the truth comes out and she is considering exhausting all the avenues of appeal available to her, up to the European Court of Human Rights.” She went on to say that “She does not recognise F as [RF and AF]’s legal parent, and she also wants recognition of FA in her favour.”

This was shortly after my decision on 10^th February and the Court of Appeal decision on 7^th March. However, M2 still had her application to the Supreme Court outstanding.

When Mr B met with her on 2^nd July 2025 she told Mr B, “she does not accept the fact finding of HHJ George and that M1 and F are ‘lying – they’ve lied about all of this... the actions they have taken and what they have done to the children is despicable’”. She is clear with Mr B that in her view F is a sexual predator and a risk to M1. She maintained that she would be making an application to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and “if this is unsuccessful, she stated she will be seeking a ‘law change – a lot of the law is inadequate, this could go on for a very long time, this is a complete injustice”.

This is therefore not a case like P v Q and F (Child: Legal Parentage): [2024] EWCA Civ 878 where at the end of the Appeal Lord Justice Peter Jackson was able to report, “After circulating our judgments in draft, we were informed of the outcome of the welfare hearing before the judge. It is good to hear that all outstanding matters were resolved, and that the judge’s order leaves all three adults with parental responsibility for X.” There has been no meeting of minds or ability to compromise in this case.

I am grateful for a comprehensive trial bundle which I have read. I heard oral evidence from M1, M2 and F. I also heard from the Guardian, Mr B who gave evidence last so he could hear all the parties’ evidence.

M1 has filed five statements in the proceedings as a whole. Three of those post-date the February judgment and are relevant to the welfare decisions of the Court. These are dated 10^th March 2025, 11^th May 2025 and 9^th July 2025. M1 has also had discussions with both Guardians and those discussions are reflected in the reports provided by Ms S and Mr B.

M1 is content with the outcome of the February hearing. She considers it is important that the children know “the legal status of their parents and have the opportunity to have a relationship with their father.” She supports F having a Parental Responsibility Order for RF and AF.

With regard to surnames M1 is fairly pragmatic and child focussed. She says in her July statement that she considers all three children should have the same surname. She wants them to feel connected in the future. She suggests that it should be her maiden name either on its own or with F’s surname. She does not support retaining M2’s name.

M1 has significant concerns about M2 and her ability to co- parent or to accept F as the father of the children. She considers that her behaviour has been hostile and has deliberately not included F in any decision – making. She is also concerned that she does not accept the reality of the situation, is excluding F and making unilateral decisions that she considers are in RF and AF’s best interests such as obtaining another country's passports and having them baptised.

She seeks a lives with order for all three children. She does not support the current shared care arrangement of 50/50. In her March statement she considered RF and AF should be in her care 60% of the time and with F and M2 20% of the time each. However, by the time of her statement in July her position had changed very significantly as follows,

“I am extremely concerned about the repeated focus on [FA], the unsavoury attempts at contact and how [M2] appears to simply make application after application if she disagrees with something – such as her repeated attempts to change back the birth certificates. I appreciate that the Guardian is yet to express a view on future arrangements, but I do think that supervised contact should be considered if [M2’]s views and behaviour do not change, and if the Guardian were to recommend this, at this stage I would endorse this recommendation”

In her oral evidence she confirmed her position and considered that contact with M2's family should also be restricted although if she felt there was a benefit to the children of the relationship, she would consider some sort of indirect contact such as letters, e - mails, video depending on the level of contact M2's family wanted. However, she was clear that to be of benefit to the children it needed to be consistent. In her oral evidence, she described them as a “paper family” meaning that they have no blood relationship with the children and the family has not been that interested, only since the relationship ended. She confirmed that she would facilitate the contact if it was in the children’s best interests.

She would like the children to be able to have holidays with the important adults but they are obviously subject to the issue of contact and whether it should be supervised or not. She was very concerned in her oral evidence about the suggestion of unlimited travel to M2's country of birth. She felt that M2 dictated when they were going and the pressure on her to agree to the trips felt harassing. It was clear from the to and fro of the cross examination that the trips to M2's country of birth had been a bone of contention although M1 usually agreed and facilitated the trips.

She does not support M2 having any relationship with FA who is neither a legal nor biological child. She does not consider it would be a benefit to FA and she confirmed this in her oral evidence, stating that she did not consider that FA was missing out and would adapt to not having a second mummy is her normality.

She is not supportive of baptism, not particularly due to the religious aspects of it but she says, “I can’t imagine a scenario where the adults in these proceedings could be in the same venue and come together for a religious celebration. It would only be fair to the children and right if all the adults could be present”.

She does not support the children having another country's passport at this stage. If they are entitled to one which she does not believe to be the case, they can apply for them when they are adults. She confirmed this position in her oral evidence.

She rejects all attempts by M2 to seek other parental or quasi – parental orders such as adoption or special guardianship considering such applications to be “inappropriate and hurtful, the children have two legal parents and there is no need for adoption.”

M1 has alleged throughout these proceedings that she has been the victim of domestic abuse from M2 – she says that M2 is a controlling and intimidating person; that she has been subject to mental abuse and has been subject to stalking and harassment for which there is an outstanding police investigation. However, she does not support a fact find. She says that she does not consider any such hearing would be necessary or beneficial. She says that the issues within the marriage are behind her and no longer relevant. She considers that any fact find would only serve to “drag up painful events of the controlling relationship”.

In her July statement she is clear that she has moved on and has no wish to reopen painful matters from the past. She says she has nothing to hide and the police disclosure shows the unhealthy relationship between herself and M2. She alleges that M2 has lied to the police but considers that these matters should be dealt with by the police rather than in the Family Court.

In response to the Guardian, she accepted that she had lied to the police in July 2024 when she told the police that FA was the result of a one night stand. She had no very satisfactory explanation stating that she was feeling stressed at the time and unhappy. However, she was clear that the pregnancy was planned contrary to what she told the police; she did not want to be with M2 and hoped M2 would leave the relationship. She (M1) had struggled to leave; being a mother was the single most important thing to her and she said she felt undermined by M2 who told her that she would not cope without her. She said that this was why she had agreed to RF and AF’s birth certificates having M2’s name on them.

For the avoidance of doubt, the Court has not considered it necessary to make findings in relation to any of these allegations in accordance with its decision not to have a fact finding hearing or fact finding element to this welfare hearing.

In her statement of 9^th July 2025, M1 sets out the concerns she has about M2 and the welfare of the children, in particular RF and AF. These include:

Just prior to the final hearing commencing the children’s solicitor was alerted to the fact that there was a posting on social media (Facebook) from M2 about the case and what she perceived as the injustice of it. M1 said she was able to see the post because M2’s sister had unblocked her and she saw it on her account. M1 was very concerned about the children finding out or parents of other children because although the Facebook account might be private the post can be shared. She thought it would be very unfair and hard for the children to know that information about their family lives had been shared so publicly. M2’s response was,

In cross -examination M1 explained that she was not in a continuing intimate relationship with F and had a new female partner. She continues to be friends with F and they co – parent. Whether he felt jealous of her new relationship was not her responsibility. However, she was satisfied that their relationship was such they did not need a child arrangements order as they could arrange contact between themselves.

M1 accepted to M2 that she does not feel good about the lies she and F have told but she thought it was better for the truth to come out now; continuing with the lie about the children’s parentage was not something she could continue.

In cross – examination it was put to M1 that she had taken money from an account for the children, which she accepted but said she had repaid it. It was also put to her that she had a serious gambling habit which she denied although she accepted that she did like to gamble, but only occasionally and for small amounts. She denied that the children went without due to her gambling or that she spent £800 per month on it. M2 was not able to produce any corroborative evidence to show that M1 was gambling at this level.

I have no doubt that M1 loves all three of her children. Becoming a mother was crucial to her. It is not possible to view M1 without also considering the deception she practised on her then wife, M2. It was of the cruellest kind, leading her to believe that she was the mother of two children and the expectation that she would be the mother of the third. It is hard to conceive how M2 must have felt when she was told that the whole basis on which she had built her family life was a lie and that her ex-partner had practised such a deceit on her. Her sense of anger, shock and grief must have been obvious to M1. However, beyond expressing remorse for having lied in the first place she seems to show little empathy for how M2 must feel now with the devastation of her hopes and dreams for the future. She does not seem to be able to mentalise and put herself in M2’s shoes.

Having said that I consider M1 would have been willing to continue to involve M2 in the children’s lives and to have shared parenting with her, albeit not equally; that was her starting position. However, M2’s inability to accept the position has made it very difficult for M1 to accommodate M2 in her plans for the children moving forward. She has given very clear and straightforward evidence about her worries; about the attitude of M2 and about the likely impact on the children of M2 not being able to accept the legal reality of the situation.

I thought she was generally a child focussed witness with a view to what was best for the children moving forward. I accept that she has lied in the past and I made that clear in February. However, that does not mean she has lied about everything nor that that she does not have the best interests of the children in mind.

F has filed four statements in the proceedings and three since the conclusion of the February hearing on 10^th March, 11^th May and 10^th July 2025.

F is content to be the children’s legal father. He considers the “truth needed to be told regarding the children” and he says in his March statement that he has “always wanted to officially be a dad to [RF] and [AF]”. He would like to cement that position as regards RF and AF by being granted PR for them.

He is very concerned about the position if M2 also retained PR. He does not know how the adults would co-parent as M2 will not acknowledge him as their parent and/or work with him. In oral evidence he said he could not imagine how making major decisions such as schooling or medical treatment for RF and AF would work – they would not be able to agree and M2 would not accept his involvement in the children’s lives. He said that he could not imagine a situation where M2 would even want to be in the same room as him. He gave as an example her removing him from Our Family Wizard App (OFW). Given the recent heated correspondence between the parties, he did not consider it would be in the children’s best interests for M2 to retain PR. He was very concerned that the children reported that M2 had told the children he was a “bad man”.

It follows that he does not support M2 having PR for FA and he does not support M2 having any relationship with FA. He does not consider that FA has missed out on any time with M2.

In his July statement F said that the three children should have the same surname, his surname, M1's maiden name or a combination. In his oral evidence his position was more nuanced and he said that until the Facebook posting he was content with RF and AF being M2's surname hyphenated with F's surname and FA being F's surname. Since the Facebook posts he was concerned that M2's surname would be a name that could be easily identified in all the circumstances and he would now consider M2's surname being removed. He did not support their names being triple barrelled.

He had no issue with the children being baptised but he did not think it could be a day of celebration in circumstances where the adults could not agree and could not get on with each other.

He does not believe the children are entitled to another country's passports following the change to the birth certificates.

In his oral evidence F was very clear that he had always been in the children’s lives, even if M2 was not aware; he would visit when she was not there during the day and would often see M1 after work. He occasionally saw M2 and they were polite; he would sometimes be called on to help out and had picked up RF from nursery on the day they moved house and did some odd jobs for them. However, after the discussions in 2019 about the method of RF’s conception there was little communication with M2.

He was clear that he did not believe M2 should have been put on AF’s birth certificate and up until the last minute he did not believe M1 would do so. He felt the relationship between M1 and M2 was toxic and he tried to support M1 to leave M2 several times.

He said there were no discussions about FA’s pregnancy with M2.

During this time RF and AF would call him “uncle” but he was clear in his own mind that he wanted to be part of the children’s lives as their father, not an “uncle”. However, he also knew that M2 did not want him as part of the children’s lives. For example, M2 was very upset and angry when RF read to him and he signed RF’s reading log, so much so that the matter was raised at school and RF ended up being given a new reading log. Despite what M2 says there can be no possible reason for F not signing the log if he heard RF read. I do not accept what M2 put to F that the school was very concerned about him being involved.

Throughout the cross -examination by M2 (questions asked by the judge), it was clear that F felt that M2 was out to destroy him. He explained that M2 contacted his employers and his ex-wife to tell them about the other children, causing great difficulties with his older children who then found out. He would have preferred to tell them himself. He was clear that M2 would not accept his role as RF and AF’s father and would not want him involved in their lives in any way. M2 continues to refer to him as the sperm donor or in the recent Facebook posts as “Mr Donor” which he finds dismissive and derogatory.

F thought that he and RF and AF had a good relationship; he does activities with them like going to the park and he and RF have car discussions. It was before Christmas 2024 that RF kept asking him if he was his dad and, in the end, he said yes and RF just carried on. He was clear that he did not instigate it.

I accept his evidence that he has been involved to some extent throughout the children’s lives. I also accept that he has built and is continuing to build a relationship with the children and has been in FA’s life since her birth. I have no doubt that as work colleagues and then parents M1 and F would have been in regular contact and F’s explanation of how he and M1 spent time with the children was credible and on the balance of probabilities I accept his account. I also note that M2 knew he was involved as he was available to assist with collecting RF from nursery when they moved – she would not have sent a total stranger to collect RF, it follows that she must have known there was more of a relationship than she now accepts.

I consider that F does want a relationship with the children. He has been through a lot at the hands of M2 with her contacting work and his family but he has persisted with his applications. I am also satisfied that he and M1 can work together as far as any contact is concerned. They have a good working relationship. I do not consider that any of the matters raised by M2 such as location of housing; jealousy of another relationship or his other family will prevent those contact arrangements taking place.

Having said that it cannot be forgotten that F is also part of the deception that has affected not only M2’s life and caused her such intense grief and anger but has also impacted on the stability and security of life for RF and AF. The role of M2 will be decreased and this is a loss to them.

M2 has filed six statements in these proceedings. Since the February judgment she has filed three on 10^th March, 20^th May and 15^th July 2025.

In her final statement dated 15^th July 2025 M2 sets out very clearly

I have set this backdrop out in some detail because it is fundamental to an understanding of M2’s position and opposition to F’s involvement in the children’s lives. She considers that the law and the process is discriminatory of her and her wish to have a family life and to two - mother families. However, her position wholly misses the point that this has nothing at all to do with undermining the stability of same sex relationships and everything to do with the application of the law to the tragic circumstances in which M2 found herself. The only issue for the Court was the method of conception. Once that had been determined, the rest followed. The reasoning behind my judgment is set out fully in the February judgment. Whether the outcome of that judgment is fair is not this court’s concern. Its role is to apply the law.

In considering this backdrop I have used it for context. However, the role of the Court is clear. It will consider all the applications before it, including the application to set aside the February judgment in light of the Police disclosure which I will come on to later. However, I will not be revisiting the issues that I resolved in the February judgment nor the evidence I considered in that judgment.

M2 sets out very clearly what it is that she wants the Court to do.

There are a number of common themes in M2’s statements. I will summarise these as follows:

It was very clear from M2’s oral evidence that the relationship with M1 had been unhappy for a long time. While M2 did not accept that the relationship was over in 2019 when M1 says it ended, it was not a happy relationship. M1 had been asking for some time to end the relationship, the first time in June 2019. She asked several times over the years before 2024 when the parties separated. M2 accepted that she had concerns about F but nevertheless agreed they should use him for up to four children. She accepted that M1 had told her they had had sex but she did not consider there had been an “affair”.

It seems clear from M2’s evidence that while there was agreement to F being the “donor” in her mind there was little real discussion about it and certainly none about FA. She seemed to believe that she would be able to continue to parent the children and that everything would be all right. This seems to me to be a very mistaken view given that M1 had expressed clear wishes to end the relationship and even M2 accepted that the relationship was not good. However, it seems to have come as a shock when the divorce papers were received from the Court and M2 realised that M1 was serious.

There was a difficult passage of cross – examination in which M2 was asked what RF would be told about his biological father. M2 said that this was not something she would discuss until he was much older, possibly after he was 18. She would not actively address him meeting his father; she was very clear that this was a two -mother family with a donor and that is how the children identify and she would want to support that identity

She was unable to satisfactorily explain why she agreed to someone whom she described as a “predator” and “bad man” as the biological father of her children. She said he was not a good choice, despite being M1’s choice and she felt it was her role to protect the children from him. She described him as “the most manipulative human being she had ever come across”. This is not a good prognosis for a future co – parenting relationship.

Somewhat unrealistically she said she would be able to “put a face on” for the children while still pursuing justice and public law changes. She said she was in touch with the parents in P v Q and F already.

On behalf of the children, she was asked about her recent Facebook postings. She struggled to see how putting the case on Facebook might result in the children being identified and that that could be harmful to them in the future. She could not accept that if the children were to find the posting when they were older it would be damaging to them.

In response to questions from M1 it was clear that M2 could not consider working with F; nor accept the court’s findings; nor take responsibility for the situation they were all in. She continued to allege that there were safeguarding issues with both M1 and F and was clear that she would report her concerns to Children’s Services. It also became very apparent that she would want to know where M1 was living, to the extent that she said in oral evidence that she gave M1 the choice of living anywhere and she would then move nearby. This would be very unsettling for M1 given the difficult relationship. M2 thought M1 was unreasonable in not agreeing to discuss this with her – there is considerable pre – final hearing acrimonious e - mail correspondence about it.

I have no doubt that M2 loves RF and AF deeply. She had a great desire to have children and a family and while together, M1 and M2 spent many years trying to achieve that. She provides them with good care and they are happy in her care. She does not have a relationship with FA but I am sure she would also provide her with love and care.

On a human level I have every sympathy for the trauma and distress that M2 has been subject to as a result of the deception and lies from her ex – partner and F. However, I am unable to see how she has prioritised the children in her approach to M1 and F. She has been unable to accept the Court’s findings and February judgment to any extent. She is set on a course that will not enable this family to move forward as a cooperative family unit. She has an implacable dislike to the point of hatred for F which came across in her written and oral evidence; she seems unable to see him from the children’s perspective as someone who is important to them as their father. While this arrangement is clearly not one she signed up to, it is now the reality of their lives and rather than trying to put the needs of the children first she is unable to move away from the sense of injustice and hurt she has suffered. The effect of this is that while she says she will “put a face” on things she cannot accept F as part of the children’s lives.

I saw no optimism for change in M2’s evidence; no scope for compromise and little to reassure me that she would be able to work with M1 and F. I was very concerned about her focus on where mother would be living and her wish to live close by, even to follow her and move near to her.

While I have no doubt that M2 was setting out her views to the Court as frankly as she was able to, those views caused me very real cause for concern for the children and in particular for them to be able to get on with their lives without further significant emotional disruption. On the one hand M2 says she is able to co – parent and wants at least a 50/50 shared care arrangement (or possibly 100% if she is not satisfied with her identified safeguarding issues) and on the other she has sworn to fight on and have the birth certificates reversed and the legal status for the children upset again. These two approaches to the children’s welfare are simply not compatible.

There have been two Guardians for the children, Ms S and Mr B. Ms S provided a report dated 6^th May 2025 following the conclusion of the February hearing. She was unable to carry on as the children’s guardian due to illness and Mr B was allocated on 16^th June 2025. Mr B’s final analysis is dated 23^rd July 2025. He also gave oral evidence.

Ms S felt unable to make final recommendations for the children. She considered that the Court should conduct a fact finding given the allegations between the parties. She was particularly concerned about the ongoing investigation into harassment of M1 and F by M2. Alternatively, she considered the full police disclosure should be obtained and considered. She recommended that M2 undertook some independent counselling to assist her in coming to terms with the Court’s findings.

On 29^th May 2025 at the dispute resolution hearing, I determined that there was no need for a fact finding hearing as it would be unlikely to affect the outcome of the proceedings and the delay for the children would not be proportionate. Further, neither M1 nor F supported a fact finding hearing. Any issues would by now be historic and I considered the court needed to look forward in light of the findings made about parentage and how the adults would manage those findings. M2 did support a fact finding into her allegations of domestic abuse and how she has been treated. However, it did not appear to me that this would progress matters, particularly given the change in legal status and the agreement from M1, in principle, that she should continue to have contact with RF and AF. I was also concerned that a fact finding hearing would reopen old wounds and make the relationship between the adults even more difficult in circumstances where the relationship was over and the adults needed to plan for the future.

Mr B has made extensive inquiries including meeting with all of the adults involved in the children’s care, observing RF and AF when in the care of M2 and reading the case file. M2 raised an issue about a statement from May 2024 that she was anxious for Mr B to read. He confirmed that he had done so.

Mr B assesses that the three children are at risk of significant emotional harm through the “complex and challenging situation in which they find themselves through no fault of their own”. He has real concerns about how the children will make sense of the family relationships as time passes and they grow older and more inquiring – RF and AF have a mummy, another mummy and a daddy. FA has a mummy and a daddy. He has no concerns about any of the parents’ ability to meet the children’s basic care needs. While they have different styles there is no evidence that they cannot provide good enough practical care for the children.

The interfamily relationships are complex with significant changes to the children’s care since 2024. Mr B does not consider that the “safeguarding risks” identified by M2 are in fact such that they would impact on their parenting. He has not seen any evidence to support the allegations.

Mr B expresses sympathy for the deception practised on M2 and the deceit and lies that were told by M1 and F. However, he goes on to say,

“I have been struck by the lack of transparency and communications between the three adults in this case around matters as serious and profound as the conception of children. In my view all hold a degree of liability for the ongoing impact this is now having and will forever have on the children’s lives”.

In particular he notes:

Mr B is clear that he does not consider the police evidence undermines the February findings nor do the videos made during M1’s pregnancies, simply that M2 was deceived. He is also concerned about M2’s reference to them being a “same sex family” or “two mother family”. They are no longer a family unit of whatever sort -they are separated with all that that brings.

At paragraph 89 of his final analysis Mr B identifies the concerns he has about M2 namely, “Because M2 has been so blindsided by the deception perpetrated against her she is unable to accept the new reality that she faces and to think about the impact on the children of the ongoing acrimony”.

His recommendations are,

Mr B heard all the parties give evidence before giving oral evidence. He sadly came to the conclusion that in light of M2’s inability to accept the findings that F has parental rights he does not consider that M2 can co - parent with F. In those circumstance he can only recommend that contact for RF and AF is supervised once per month. He considers the potential harm to the children is significant and any supervisor should be provided with relevant documents to ensure a full understanding of the factual matrix and the risk of harm to the children.

He was questioned by M2 about the type of harm the children were at risk of suffering and while he accepted that there was no evidence she was saying anything to the children at present his view was formed as a result of her presentation to the Court and his meeting with her together with his reading of all the documents. He did not accept that she would not speak ill of F -she has demonstrably done so in these proceedings. In something of a change, M2 then suggested to Mr B that in fact F was the victim of M1 and that it was M1 who was manipulative.

Mr B was clear that the “safeguarding matters” raised by M2 were not child protection issues including a family member vaping in front of the children or some limited drug use.

He remained of the opinion that F should have PR for all three children, without restrictions; he spends time with them; has an understanding of their personalities and their needs. He does not consider M2 should share PR for FA and it should be removed from M2 for RF and AF. He was worried about the ability to co – parent and M2’s involvement in the children’s schooling and their health. His concerns also stemmed from M2’s ability to manipulate the situation for example applying for an ISA for FA without her parents’ consent but informing the bank she had PR when she did not and causing an issue for RF over F signing his reading log and scrubbing out F’s name.

He recommended a s91(14) direction for a period of two years to allow things to settle down and for M2 to develop some acceptance of the situation.

There is little he can do to provide post hearing story book work as this goes beyond his remit. However, he agreed to try and signpost the parties to help.

There was nothing in the questioning by M2 that caused him to change his mind about his recommendations.

Mr B is a very experienced and skilled Guardian. In this matter he has tried to tread a line between the needs of the children and the difficult relationship between the adults. He has clearly taken great care in his recommendations and they are nuanced. He has carefully acknowledged the important role that M2 has in the lives of RF and AF and he acknowledges that she can provide those children with good physical care. However, he remains very concerned about their future welfare emotionally. They are potentially at risk of the person they regard as their mummy, and whom they love, disregarding the role of their father referring to him as the sperm donor and undermining their relationship with him. This would be very harmful. I put considerable weight on the views of Mr B.

I will deal with this application first as its outcome affects the issues before this Court. The law in respect of re - opening a fact finding is settled and can be found summarised at paragraph 8.83 of the Family Court Practice 2025. The first decision is whether the Court will permit any reconsideration of the earlier fact finding hearing. In considering this issue the Court must:

The findings made in February were very significant, changing the legal status of the parents and the children’s understanding of their parentage. Little could be more significant. I have therefore given this application by M2 very considerable scrutiny and care.

Although an order for disclosure was made to Police on 29^th May 2025, the disclosure was not provided until 10^th July, shortly before the welfare hearing. M2 has set out in her application dated 19^th July 2025 why she considers this disclosure is the key to overturning the findings made by me in February 2025 about legal parentage. She set out in her application that F describes himself as a “sperm donor”; that he offered to help M1 and M2 start a family; that he does not wish to be on the birth certificates and that he has been untruthful to the Family Court by stating that he was involved with M1 in a romantic/sexual/planned way. M2 considers he is “only a donor and he has purposely mis-lead the family courts”.

She also relies on the disclosure to argue that M1 accepted he was a sperm donor and not someone she was having an affair with. She alleges that M1 also misled the family courts.

Before considering this evidence, it is important to note that “sperm donor” might include both natural insemination and artificial insemination. As far as I am aware there is no legal definition of “sperm donor” that precludes natural insemination. At the risk of repetition, the issue before the Court in February was whether the children had been conceived by natural or artificial insemination. That was the factual issue. I concluded that it was natural insemination and that F was entitled to be declared the father of RF and AF which enabled him to seek to amend the birth certificates. The test was not and never has been whether he is a “sperm donor”. The consequence of this is that even if a man starts out as a sperm donor, if there has been natural insemination, he can at a later stage change his mind and seek to be a more active father than was perhaps intended, however unfair this might be on the original two - mother couple.

In my February judgment I acknowledged that both M1 and F had lied about what had happened and had deceived M2. This is not new evidence and has already been taken into account in my findings in February.

However, I have considered the additional disclosure. This Court has already determined that there is no need for a fact find in respect of domestic abuse and so the individual incidents are not relevant to my decision. The relevance of the material is whether it sheds any light on the February decision or raises any issues that would cause the Court to reconsider that decision in accordance with the law set out above.

In M2’s questioning of both M1 and F there was nothing to undermine what was said by the police in their reporting and nothing at all to suggest that the nature of the relationship whether transactional or not was anything other than sexual. Even if F and M1 describe F on occasion as a “donor”, that is not the issue. The issue is as described above and whether there was natural or artificial insemination.

I have considered the evidence with care. I accept that the findings made were significant welfare decisions but the need for finality in such a case given the change in legal status is also very important. As can be seen from my analysis of the evidence there is nothing relevant to the type of insemination used for conception. Indeed, it might be argued that the evidence is more likely to confirm the decision in February given the contemporaneous reports. There would be a very significant delay in any fact finding being dealt with and such delay is not in the interests of the children. Finally, and importantly, I do not consider the evidence is such that there would be any change to the original decision. There are not the requisite grounds for the earlier findings to be revisited. While accepting that both M1 and F have lied about the conception of the children at some stages between 2019 and 2024 there is nothing in the additional disclosure or in the oral evidence of M1 or F that undermines the findings made in the February judgment. I dismiss M2’s application and refuse her application to reconsider the February findings.

I remind myself and the parties that the burden of proving a fact is on the party making the allegations and that the burden of proof is on the balance of probabilities.

Under section 1 (1) of the Children Act 1989 when a court determines any question with respect to the upbringing of a child the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration. Section 1 (3) provides for what is known as the welfare checklist and the Court is required to have regard to a number of factors. In this matter, there are a number of applications where the children’s welfare is paramount. I have identified what I consider to be relevant factors within the welfare checklist in general terms. If there are specific matters that relate to a particular application, I will identify those separately.

In coming to the various decisions that are before the Court, it must keep in mind the welfare checklist even when not absolutely required and keep in mind that the children’s welfare is generally my paramount concern.

The Court needs to determine:

I am grateful to Ms Purdy for the helpful note she has provided containing a summary of the key aspects of the law. None of the other parties are represented so I have been greatly assisted by this note. I have considered the authorities she has referred to carefully.

Section 2 (1A) Children Act 1989 provides as follows,

“(1A)

Where a child—

(a)

has a parent by virtue of section 42 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008; …

the child's mother and the other parent shall each have parental responsibility for the child.”

Until 10^th February 2025 when my judgment was handed down, all parties (even if they did not turn their minds to it) worked on the basis that M2 had PR by virtue of this section because she was thought to be a parent to whom section 42 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (HFEA) applied.

Section 42 of the HFEA provides as follows,

““42 Woman in civil partnership or marriage to a woman at time of treatment

(1)

If at the time of the placing in her of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or of her artificial insemination, W was a party to a civil partnership with another woman or a marriage with another woman, then subject to section 45(2) to (4), the other party to the civil partnership or marriage is to be treated as a parent of the child unless it is shown that she did not consent to the placing in W of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or to her artificial insemination (as the case may be).”

At the time of conception M1 and M2 were married and therefore M2 was treated as the parent of RF and AF and she obtained PR by virtue of section 2(1A) of the Children Act for which she qualified by virtue of s42 HFEA. She did not gain PR by the process of registration on the birth certificate as a biological father might do or as a woman to whom s43 HFEA applies, where the women are not married.

Counsel for the Guardian submits that on the basis of the statutory framework, M2’s PR depended NOT on her registration as the second mother but by virtue of her qualification through s42 HFEA and s2(1A) Children Act.

The Court made the following finding in its judgment of 10^th February,

“97.

In this case, therefore, notwithstanding the fact that M2 is registered as the parent of [RF] and [AF], the court must look at the facts as determined. I have determined on the balance of probabilities that M1 and F had sexual intercourse on multiple occasions which on the balance of probabilities would have covered the conception windows for all three children. M2 has not been able to prove on the balance of probabilities that they were conceived by AI. As a consequence, the provisions of HFEA are not engaged. It follows that the presumption as to parentage will apply and F will be the children’s legal father.” [my emphasis]

This raises the question as to whether M2’s PR is void and of no effect from when RF and AF were born, PR not being dependent on registration or whether the Court needs to make an order removing or restricting PR from M2 if it is considered in the children’s welfare interests to do so.

S4ZA Children Act deals with PR for a second female parent who is not married at the time of conception. It provides,

“(1)

Where a child has a parent by virtue of section 43 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 and is not a person to whom section 1(3) of the Family Law Reform Act 1987 applies, that parent shall acquire parental responsibility for the child if—

(a)

she becomes registered as a parent of the child under any of the enactments specified in subsection (2);

(b)

she and the child's mother make an agreement providing for her to have parental responsibility for the child; or

(c)

the court, on her application, orders that she shall have parental responsibility for the child.

(2)

The enactments referred to in subsection (1)(a) are—

(a)

paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of section 10(1B) and of section 10A(1B) of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953; …

(4)

An agreement under subsection (1)(b) is also a “parental responsibility agreement”, and section 4(2) applies in relation to such an agreement as it applies in relation to parental responsibility agreements under section 4.

(5)

A person who has acquired parental responsibility under subsection (1) shall cease to have that responsibility only if the court so orders.”

This section appears to apply only to a parent qualifying under s43 HEFA and not s42. In this case s42 is the applicable section because M1 and M2 were married, even if M2 does not qualify due to the nature of the insemination. There seems to be no equivalent provision to section 4ZA (5) that PR will only cease if the Court so orders for PR acquired by virtue of s42 HFEA and s2 Children Act.

In MZ, FZ v X & Y (By their Guardian) v The Secretary of State for Justice [2022] EWHC 295 (Fam) the parties accepted that the court did not have power to remove the father’s PR on the basis that it had been acquired “automatically” under s2 Children Act because the parents were married at the time of the registration. This does not apply to unmarried fathers or to mothers falling into s43 HFEA.

Given that M1 and M2 were married at the time of the birth and registration of RF and AF it might be suggested that it follows that PR cannot be removed from M2 even though she does not qualify for PR through s42 HFEA. However, I found that the provisions of HFEA were not engaged and s42 did not apply. She has no biological link with the children at all. It is therefore hard to see how she could obtain PR at all through s2(1A) Children Act.

I have been referred to KL v BA [2025] EWHC 102 (Fam) which is a decision of Ms Debra Powell KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge. She summarises the issue before that Court as follows,

“The particular issue that currently falls for determination is whether the effect of a declaration of non-parentage in respect of a man who is not married to a child’s mother and is named on the child’s birth certificate as the father, but whom subsequent genetic testing shows is not the child’s biological father, is to render his putative acquisition of parental responsibility under s.4(1)(a) of the Children Act void ab initio, or whether he has and retains parental responsibility that can only be removed by order of the court. If it is the latter, the question also arises whether such an order is to be made automatically or whether it requires a welfare analysis.”

While not on all fours with this case it is sufficiently similar to merit consideration. M2 does not have a biological connection and acquired PR only by reliance on s42 HFEA which it turned out was not engaged. In KL v BA the father registered on the child’s birth certificate was found not to be the child’s biological father and acquired PR through registration under s4(1) (a) Children Act. At the time of the registration, he believed himself to be the biological father.

Ms Debra Powell KC reviewed the various recent inconsistent decisions including that of HHJ Case in re SB[2022] EWFC 111 and of HHJ Moradifar in re C [2023] 3 WLR 1. In considering the wording of s4(1) Children Act she says,

“Looking at the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used in s.4(1)(a), can it also be said that KL was, before the birth was registered, eligible to register MA’s birth with BA under that provision and thereby to acquire parental responsibility? The only possible answer to that question, in my judgment, is, as Mr Wilson submits, ‘no’: there is no ambiguity in the words used in the subsection, and KL was not MA’s ‘father’ under the common law, whether biological or legal, even though he believed that he was.”

She continues at paragraph 67,

“I respectfully agree with the statement of HHJ Case in paragraph 64 of re SB (No.2) that “the clear intention of Parliament was to convey parental responsibility only on biological fathers pursuant to section 4(1) of the Children Act 1989 ...”, and observe that that is the result that is achieved by applying the natural and ordinary meaning of the words in s.4(1)(a).”

In my respectful opinion, the same must apply to s42 HFEA that only married mothers whose children were born by artificial means were to be treated as the parent of the child born from those methods. Otherwise, PR could be conferred on a mother who did not meet the criteria of s42 under s43 HFEA.

There are strong parallels with this case. At the time of registration of the children’s births M2 believed the children had been conceived by artificial insemination and that she was eligible to be treated as the parent of the children (s42 HFEA) and to obtain PR by virtue of s2(1A) Children Act. However, it has transpired that she was operating under a mistake (not of her making but I do not consider that to be relevant) and the children were not conceived by artificial insemination but by natural insemination. S42 HFEA therefore never applied to her and she was never entitled to be treated as the parent of the children. S2(1A) Children Act therefore could not operate to confer upon her PR either at the time of their birth or later.

On the basis of my analysis of the statutory provisions and the assistance given by Ms Debra Powell KC in KL v BA, in my judgment M2 never had and therefore does not now have PR for either RF or AF.

This is a welfare decision and the Court must take account of the matters in the welfare checklist, bearing in mind that the welfare of the children is paramount. M1 and F do not support M2 having PR for RF and AF. The Children's Guardian was more nuanced in his oral evidence and considered the Court might restrict her PR for them.

RF and AF have always seen M2 as their mother; she has been a very important part of the life and has certainly fulfilled the role as a psychological mother even if she is not their biological or legal mother. However, it is clear from the evidence that she is unable to accept the change that the Declarations of Parentage brought about. She cannot accept the findings; nor can she accept that the children have a father with a part to play in their lives. The Guardian was very clear in his written and oral evidence that if M2 cannot find some way of coming to terms with the Court’s findings the children will be at risk of significant psychological harm. Further, it is also clear from all the evidence that the adults cannot effectively co - parent the children; their communication with each other is woeful, demonstrated by the appalling e mail correspondence from all parties in the weeks running up to the final hearing. The children have a biological father and mother who are also their legal father and mother.

I have considered the position of M1 and F and the Guardian. I have concluded that legally M2 does not have PR for RF and AF. The Court would therefore have to consider it to be in RF and AF’s best interests for some form of PR to be granted, whether full or as suggested by Mr B, restricted. In my judgment, it is likely to cause considerable confusion and distress for the children to have adults who cannot effectively cooperate. Granting even a limited form of PR may result in further disputes about the extent of it. This would be potentially very harmful for the children as they grow up. Very sadly in the circumstances I do not consider M2 should be granted PR for RF and AF, even in a restricted form.

FA is in a different position. M2 has never been registered as the mother of FA; she has never met FA and has no relationship with her at all. Both M1 and F oppose M2 being granted PR for FA. While M2 might argue that she has always wanted to have a relationship with FA and has been thwarted by M1 and F she has no biological relationship with FA. FA was born after the break down of the relationship and while there will be a difference between RF and AF who will have a second mummy; FA will grow up knowing that she does not and this will be her normal. I do not consider from a welfare perspective that this will be harmful if carefully handled. I do not consider that M2 should be granted PR for FA.

Although F is now registered on RF and AF’s birth certificates, he does not have an automatic right to PR for RF and AF; he has PR for FA. In deciding whether to grant PR to F the Court will consider his commitment to the children; his relationship with them and his reasons for seeking PR.

It is F’s case that he has always had some sort of relationship with the children, even when M1 and M2 were married. He says he would see them with M1 and even M2 accepts that he was sometimes at their house and would on occasion help out. Since the marriage broke down, he has shown commitment to the children, having regular contact. Both Guardians saw him with the children and reported a positive relationship. He is not seeking to care for the children in competition with mother but does seek to have regular overnight contact on a monthly basis and such other contact as they agree. M1 supports the grant of PR although M2 is opposed.

M2 is clear that she considers F’s interest in the children will be transitory and that he is only seeking PR in order to frustrate her position and diminish her role with the children. She considers his motives are not focussed on the children and that he is an abusive sperm donor.

In my judgment and on the balance of probabilities it is likely that F will continue to support M1 and to have contact with the children. He has been through these very painful proceedings and conducted himself with dignity even when facing significant abuse from M2. I consider he is committed to the children as their father; he has pursued the amendment to the birth certificates and while I accept that relations between the adults are very poor, I consider the reasons given by F namely that the children are entitled to know the truth about where they come from and their parentage is sound and one he is justified to hold.

I am satisfied that he has demonstrated commitment to the children and will be a part of their lives going forward. I consider it is appropriate and in the children’s best interest for him to share PR with M1. This will ensure that he can be consulted about schools, medical issues and other matters of significance.

It follows from what I have said above that I do not consider F’s PR for FA should be removed.

I have considered the evidence very fully and taken account of the welfare checklist. I have concluded that it is in the children’s best interests to live with M1. She is their biological and legal mother and will have day to day care of them going forwards.

Sadly, for M2 she has no biological nor legal status although she is and has been a very important psychological parent to the children who know no different and are certainly not concerned with legal status.

I have determined that she does not have PR for either of them. However, she remains an important person in their lives having been their mummy for all of their lives. I have considered the welfare checklist very carefully and taken account of the fact in making any order the welfare of the children is my paramount concern. Having balanced the issues and considered the very careful and considered views of the Guardian I have sadly come to the decision that M2’s contact must be supervised. I have real concerns about the emotional harm the children will suffer in such a toxic parenting arrangement and given M2’s strongly held views about F. Further, it is an artificial situation, and not in my view sustainable long term, for M2 to say she will be able to manage to hold herself together with the children and will not let them know how she feels. Children are very susceptible to adult feelings and I consider it unlikely in the long term when the scrutiny of the Court is no longer there that she will be able to rein in how she feels about the injustice of the situation and her strong views about the children’s legal and biological parents. She has told the Court that when they are older she will tell them “the truth” by which she means her truth, not the Court’s findings which she rejects. This would undoubtedly be upsetting and very confusing for the children.

I adopt the recommendation of the Guardian that the contact should be for 6 hours once a month with an agreed supervisor. I also consider that the supervisor should have access to both judgments and both reports from the Guardians so the issues of concern are clear.

I would like to believe that the children could have some indirect contact with M2 during the month between contacts. However, I cannot see how that could be arranged between the adults without there being conflict and I make no order for indirect contact. If the parties can agree indirect contact, it would need to be supervised.

It is a matter for M1 whether she wishes the children to have contact with M2's family.

FA shall live with M1. I do not order contact with M2 given what I have said above about there being no relationship with M2. Contact is for the benefit of the child and there can be no benefit for her in starting a relationship with someone with whom she has no connection.

I am content that M1 and F can make their own arrangements for all of the children without an order, based on the no order principle. I agree that the starting point is once a month staying contact for all three children. M1 and F can, of course, agree their own further or alternative contact.

Baptism – I agree with M1 and F that the three adults would not be able to attend a baptism and have a happy celebratory day. There seem to be limited religious reasons for the baptism and the children can make their own decisions when they are older.

Travel and holidays – it follows from my decisions about PR and contact that there can be no travel to another country on holiday. I accept that the recent holiday seems to have gone without a hitch but that was between the end of the Court hearing and judgment. It would have been very surprising if it had not gone smoothly. The children are still at risk of being exposed to negative views of M1 and F. This risk increases once the proceedings are over.

Passports – the UK passports should be held by M1 as the parent with the lives with order. There is no need for the children to have another country's passports. If they are entitled to them now, they are likely to still be entitled to them when they are older and can apply for them themselves.

Name Change – this is a difficult question and there was not agreement about what should happen. As was clearly identified in Dawson v Wearmouth [1999] 1FLR 1167 a surname is a profound issue for a child whatever their age. It is a welfare decision for the children concerned. A lack of biological connection does not itself determine whether the child’s surname should be changed. The Court is directed specifically to consider the effect of any change on the children. The name that appears on their birth certificate “is not without importance”.

Mr B proposed a triple barrelled name to recognise the three important adults in RF and AF’s lives. M1 and F were concerned about the recent posts on Facebook that included M2's surname; this was not seen as a significant reason for change by Mr B. The children are still young but they know themselves as M2's surname. They have a lot of change to cope with and it would be difficult to explain to them in my view why they were no longer to have that name. I also acknowledge that FA has F's surname so it may be desirable for the children to adopt that as part of their surname in order to ensure their sibling sense of identity.

I have no objection to the suggestion of the triple barrelled name proposed by Mr B. However, I know M1 and F do not support that. I consider M2's surname should remain, as this is the name they have been known by and forms part of their identity. They are at school/nursery and they should not have to start explaining why their name has changed completely. I therefore direct that RF and AF be known as M2's surname hyphenated with F's surname. This will retain their original identity; provide a link to M2, recognising the important role she has had in their lives and linking them to their sibling, FA.

I refuse M2’s application to change FA’s name to M2's surname.

Adoption/Special Guardianship – I have already indicated to M2 that any application for adoption will need to be properly made. I have also indicated that in my judgment it is a wholly inappropriate application to make in circumstances where the three children have good enough legal and biological parents. There would be no need for any adoption or special guardianship order. Such orders would not meet the children’s welfare needs.

There were a number of applications for Prohibited Steps Orders.

The Guardian considers it would be appropriate to make a s91(14) direction for a period of two years to prevent further applications to the Court without permission having first been obtained from the Court. These would be applications under the Children Act and would include applications for s8 orders; enforcement orders and any orders seeking to change the children’s status such as applications for adoption or for special guardianship.

The children and the adults have been subject to these proceedings for well over a year. The proceedings have been attritional with raw emotion exposed. The children need time for the adults around them to settle and adapt to the new arrangements without further Court battles. I am also very conscious that M2 has sworn to fight on. Nothing in my judgment prevents her from seeking to take this decision to a higher court but I consider any new applications to deal with the arrangements for the children need to be paused.

Further, M2 has made numerous applications subjecting the other parties and the children to stress and uncertainty. M2 is clear that she will continue to engage with court proceedings until she is successful. Making an order under s91(14) is to protect the child and any adult from harm which can include emotional harm.

I am satisfied that the children, M1 and F need the protection of an order under s91(14). It shall last for a period of 2 years until midnight on 29^th August 2027.

Subject to any submissions on 29^th August, I consider a copy of my February judgment and this judgment together with the Final Order should be disclosed to any supervisor of contact; the children’s nursery and schools; their GP and possibly to Children’s Services given M2’s threat to raise issues with Children’s Services.

That concludes my judgment. I am very sorry not to have been able to send it out to the parties sooner than Friday morning but I hope it is clear that very considerable thought and consideration has gone into the difficult issues confronting the Court.

It is hoped that final orders can be made on 29^th August to enable these children and the adult parties to reach some sort of a way forward.