E (A Child) (Disclosure to Regulator & Naming of a Witness in a Judgment), Re

On 16 April 2025 I circulated my draft judgment to the parties after a lengthy fact-finding hearing in a Private Law Children Act 1989 case concerning a child, E. The relevant case number is SD23P0094. On 2 May 2025 I formally handed down the judgment in the fact-find hearing in private. The accredited media, namely the BBC and Ms Tickle, attend the fact finding hearing. The BBC has also attended some of the case management hearings that preceded it and the subsequent hearings. Ms Tickle has attended the case management hearings when she has been available. On 24 July 2024 I made a Transparency order within the Private Law proceedings. That order remains in force.

The Transparency order in this case was made in standard terms. Thus, the prohibition in S92(2) Children Act 1989 continues to apply (see below). In the context of this case, it is also relevant to note that the terms of the Transparency Order do not prevent the identification of anyone named in a published judgment.

It is agreed by all the parties to the Children Act application that the judgment in the fact-find should be published as soon as possible. Publication of a judgment is however a matter for the discretion of the court. It falls to me to decide whether to publish the fact-finding judgment as well as a number of associated issues. Those issues initially included whether the parents should be named in any judgment which is published; and whether Aimee Dover, the psychotherapist who worked with the subject child’s sibling D, should be named in any judgment that is published. In addition, the father, strongly supported by the Child’s Guardian, has applied for permission to disclose the fact-find judgment to the therapist's regulatory body and her current employers.

During the proceedings before me on 10 June 2025, the contentious issues between the parties narrowed when it became common ground that the father’s application for the parents to be named should be adjourned to the conclusion of the Children Act proceedings. Before me, Ms Dover took the position that if I considered the fact-finding judgment should be disclosed to her regulatory body, any relevant LADO and her current employers, then she would not oppose that disclosure. She argued strongly that she should not be named in any published judgment.

The applications before me arise out of a fact-finding judgment which is lengthy. Within that judgment I set out the facts fully. I made many significant findings. That fact-finding judgment will be published at the same time as this and provides the factual context in which I make the decisions captured within this judgment. Within the fact-finding judgment I found that Aimee Dover began working with D, in a therapeutic capacity on 7 February 2022. From that date until the date of D’s death, Ms Dover provided D with counselling on a regular, almost weekly, basis. Initially Ms Dover provided such services through a Community Development Association (CDA). That is a registered charity providing, amongst other services, counselling to those within their area. Their counselling service is BACP accredited. The last session Ms Dover had with D under the umbrella of the CDA was 6 June 2022. Thereafter Ms Dover provided counselling to D on a private basis. On 17 December 2023 D died by suicide. Her last counselling session with Ms Dover had been on 1 December 2023.

Ms Dover is a qualified and BACP Registered Integrative Psychotherapist for children, young people and families. She currently works in schools and within the private sector. She was a witness of fact in the fact-finding hearing. Within my fact-finding judgment I made findings against her, at paragraphs 619-630. Within the analysis section of my judgment, particularly at paragraphs 729-745, I considered the impact of the findings I have made about Ms Dover on the allegations D came to make against her father. The findings I made against Ms Dover were within the ambit of the hearing before me and were all based on issues put to her in cross-examination on behalf of the Father and the Guardian. Ms Dover was given an opportunity to intervene in the proceedings to defend herself before the findings were made. She did not take that opportunity.

I circulated my draft fact-finding judgment to the parties on 16 April 2025. At the conclusion of my draft judgment in the fact-find, I said this:

Accordingly, a copy of the relevant parts of my draft judgment were forwarded to Ms Dover by the solicitor for the child acting on the instructions of the Guardian. They also notified her of the hearing before me on 2 May 2025 and informed her that she, together with her legal representative, had been invited to attend that hearing to make representations on why she should not be named. By email at 18.15 hrs on 1 May 2025, Ms Dover responded to the solicitor for the child. She had been, she said, searching for legal representation for the hearing before me on 2 May 2025 but had been unable to do so. Within the email she stated that:

Having read the above email and heard submissions from the then parties on 2 May 2025 I directed that

To enable the next hearing to be effective, I ensured that Ms Dover had a full copy of my fact-finding judgment as handed down formally on 2 May 2025. At the same hearing, I directed the father to make formal application by C2 in relation to his application for the parents to be named in my judgment. His application is dated 8 May 2025.

At the hearing before me the father was represented by Ms Venters KC leading Rachel Temple, Ms Traugott appeared with Ms Chhina for the mother and Ms Bazley KC led Ms Elsworth for the child instructed through the Guardian. At the hearing Ms Dover was represented by Mr Purss of Counsel.

To determine the issues before me I have received submissions in writing from all parties and on behalf of Ms Dover. At the hearing on 10 June 2025, I heard supplemental oral submissions. I am grateful to all for the hard work and the concise, focused submissions I have both read and heard.

The proceedings before me are ongoing. Thus, both S12 Administration of Justice Act 1960 and S97 Children Act 1989 apply - Clayton v Clayton [2006] EWCA Civ 878.

S97(2) Children Act 1989 states that:

S12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 states

In Re B (A Child) (Disclosure) [2004] 2 FLR 142, FD, Munby J said:

Section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 itself does not prevent the identification of witnesses - British Broadcasting Corporation v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council & X & Y [2007] 1 FLR 101, FD.

The court has power to allow disclosure of information which would otherwise be prohibited from publication – see FPR 2010 rules 12.73-75 and PD 12G. As noted by Gwynneth Knowles J in Re Z (below), the scheme of the current rules is that communication of information relating to children proceedings falls into three categories:

It is common ground in the case before me that neither (a) or (b) above applies and that the fact-finding judgment can only be disclosed to Ms Dover’s regulatory body and to the relevant LADO and the schools in which she works currently under (c). Thus, any permission for communication to Ms Dover’s regulator or a current school or to the relevant LADO must come by way of the court's permission under r.12.73(1)(b) FPR 2010. In in Re Z (Disclosure to Social Work England; findings of domestic abuse) [2023] EWHC 447 (Fam) Gwynneth Knowles J observed at paragraph 22 that the court's discretion to permit disclosure pursuant to rule 12.73(1)(b) is not unconstrained. Within her judgment, Gwyneth Knowles J reviewed the relevant case law. At paragraphs 64-65 of her judgment, she gave guidance on the steps to take when considering making disclosure to a regulatory body.

FPR r12.73 (2)states that

“Except as provided for under rule 12.73A, nothing in this Chapter permits the communication to the public at large, or any section of the public, of any information relating to the proceedings.

The wording is plain. Unless rule 12.73A applies, the scheme provided by the current rules does not permit communication to the general public of any information relating to proceedings heard in private.

However, the court may permit disclosure to the public at large under its inherent jurisdiction - Lord Dyson MR in Re C (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 798, and see the judgment of the Supreme Court in Abbasi (below).

The court has a duty to act consistently with the parties’ competing ECHR rights pursuant to S6 Human Rights Act 1998. A decision to publish a judgment involves balancing ECHR 8 and 10. What is required is an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case. Lord Steyn, in Re S (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2004] UKHL 47 at paragraph 17, said:

It is necessary to measure the nature of the impact on the child of the proposed publication. The interests of the child are not paramount, although they are a primary consideration they can be outweighed by the effect of other considerations - ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4. The right to respect for private and family life can include the wellbeing and psychological integrity of the individual.

Articles 8 of the ECHR states that:

Article 10 of the ECHR states that

The detailed guidance to the judiciary and practitioners, 'Transparency in the Family Courts: Publication of Judgments Practice Guidance' issued on 19 June 2024 by Sir Andrew McFarlane, President of the Family Division (2024 Guidance) states under 'Publication and Guidance: Purpose and Scope' at paragraphs 1.2-1.4:

The 2024 Guidance includes the following under 'key principles of anonymisation'

In Tickle v BBC [2025] EWCA Civ 42 Sir Geoffrey Vos MR stated:

The Supreme Court has recently given judgment in Abassi v Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals and others [2025] UKSC 15. The court held that:

In the lead judgment, Lord Reed PSC and Lord Briggs JSC (with whom Lord Hodge DPSC and Lord Stephens JSC agreed) confirmed that the inherent equitable jurisdiction is sufficiently wide to enable it to grant an injunction when failure to do so would be incompatible with Convention Rights but went on to qualify that confirmation as follows:

In relation to open justice, their Lordships said this

At paragraph 128 of the judgment, their Lordships then turned to the proper application of the Convention:

Theis J in A Local Authority v X and Y [2025] EWFC 126 at paragraph 65 and 66 considered Abassi (above) and stated:

It is right that I should capture the arguments raised before me within this judgment. In doing so I concentrate on the contentious issue before me, namely whether or not Ms Dover should be named in any published judgment. .

The father considers the judgment should be published. On his behalf it is submitted that it falls within The President’s Practice Guidance and paragraphs 3.6, 3.8 (i) and (xii). In addition, there are further public policy reasons advanced on behalf of the father. They are set out in detail in the skeleton argument filed on his behalf. In summary they are that the public interests are furthered by publishing judgments. Publication demystifies the work of the Family Court. Publication of this judgment will, it is said, show how the Family Court deals with allegations of serious domestic abuse and counter allegations of alienating behaviours without fear or favour. The judgment is said to illustrate how participation directions can be used effectively to achieve best evidence.

I am reminded that the subject child’s article 8 right is in play. It is submitted that the nature of the impact of publication that interferes with privacy rights is to be measured objectively; the mere fact that the child is too young to understand does not mean there is no such impact: Weller v Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1176, 13 [2016] 1 WLR 1541 at [20] (Lord Dyson MR). But when measuring that impact the court should not simply assume, or treat it as inevitable, that publicity would have an adverse impact; in each case, the impact of publication on the child must be assessed by reference to the evidence before the court: Clayton v Clayton [2006] EWCA Civ 878 at [51].

The President’s Guidance at paragraph 4.2 states “Some thought may need to be given to what is meant by identification or anonymisation. Is the court dealing with a generalised risk of identification, a risk of identification by peers or in the child’s local community, or a risk of the child identifying him/herself as the subject of a published judgment? The court will need to consider the nature, likelihood and severity of any such risk and any potential mitigations in making a decision”.

On behalf of the father it is submitted that with redactions as to the children’s names, location of this family, the schools, and other identifying features, the subject child’s identity can largely be protected, if the court considers it necessary

In relation to the issue of whether I should permit disclosure of the judgment to Ms Dover’s regulators and her current employers, I was taken to RE Z (disclosure to Social Work England: Findings of Domestic Abuse)[2023] EWHC 447 (Fam) which sets out the law in detail.. On behalf of the father it is argued that the Court has made serious findings against Ms Dover. It is right that she is identified. Specifically, it is said that:

I am reminded that the President’s guidance on publication of judgments and the anonymisation of professionals states “5.5.4 Anonymisation of professionals is only usually justified where its purpose is to ensure the anonymisation of the child/family. A speculative concern about harassment or criticism is insufficient”. It is submitted that the Court must consider whether there is any reason not to publish Ms Dover’s name.

Responding to the arguments raised on behalf of Ms Dover, I was reminded on behalf of the father that no authority has been provided for the submission that a special category of accountability attaches to professionals who are employed by the state as opposed to those who operate in private practice. Ms Dover’s duties/responsibilities, it is submitted, when working as a psychotherapist are determined by her professional body, not her employer. In any event, Ms Dover initially worked with D through a publicly funded provision and is now working in schools.

On behalf of the father it is said that there is no evidence that identifying Ms Dover will lead to ‘jigsaw’ identification of any of the children. Ms Dover’s relationships with D was a private therapeutic one. There should be no online or other association between Ms Dover and this family in the public domain. There is no evidence provided by Ms Dover, or set out in the skeleton argument, that demonstrates any real risk of this happening if she is named.

It is argued on Ms Dover’s behalf that she may face bullying/vilification. However, in response I was taken to the Guidance - “A speculative concern about harassment or criticism is insufficient” - to justify anonymisation. It is submitted that nothing in the skeleton argument goes beyond speculation. Ms Dover has not filed any medical or other evidence to support the contention that there would be a significant psychological impact upon her such that the balance would fall in favour of anonymisation. On behalf of the father, it is not accepted that Ms Dover’s Article 8 rights extend to protecting her from the publication of adverse findings per se. It falls to Ms Dover’s regulatory body to explore whether professional consequences arise from her conduct towards D. But it is said to be specifically in the public interest to know that it is said that she failed to adhere to reasonable professional standards, she lacked impartiality in her therapeutic relationships with a young, vulnerable child, and she provided the external appearance of professionalism . It is argued that it is in the public interest to reveal this, not least because Ms Dover continues to engage, in a professional capacity, with vulnerable young people, where there is no evidence of insight, change, re-training or other proper mitigation that might persuade the Court that the risk has reduced.

On behalf of the father, it is submitted that the Court has a duty to safeguard children. Ms Dover continues to work with children in her current role. It is important that her fitness to continue to do so is raised with her professional body. The judgment sets out the Courts concerns and findings succinctly and clearly. It also explains how and why the Court came to these conclusions. Ms Dover has already referred herself to BACP. That referral and anything that arises from it will be better informed by the Court’s findings. They are not binding. They are informative. would inevitably lead to the identification of the children, including

The mother accepts that the fact-finding judgment should be published. Further, on her behalf it is acknowledged that the decision to name Ms Dover in its judgment is ultimately a matter for the Court. The mother does however raise a concern that there is a possibility that, by naming Ms Dover, the children of the family, including the subject child will be identified. I am reminded that that is a concern raised by the President in the Publication of Judgments Practice Guidance (2024) in Table 1. It is submitted that it is not known, for example, whether D told anyone about Ms Dover or whether knowing Ms Dover’s identity could lead to jigsaw identification because of the location of her practice. These are said to be issues that should be explored in more depth.

In relation to disclosing the judgment to Ms Dover’s regulator and employer, it is submitted on behalf of the mother that that is a matter for the court.

On behalf of Ms Dover, it is said that it is a matter for my discretion whether I permit my judgment to be disclosed to her regulator, the relevant LADO and the schools and other organizations where she currently works. If I consider it necessary and proportionate to permit the disclosure, then I am told Ms Dover will not oppose that course. She has, in any event, referred herself to BACP and raised matters with her current employers although she has not sent them a copy of my judgment.

It is said on Ms Dover’s behalf that given the protracted nature of her therapeutic relationship with D, the secondary devastating effect of D’s suicide has had on Ms Dover cannot be overemphasised on a personal level. The findings I have made in relation to her professional conduct are said to compound her own sense of devastation.

Ms Dover, through submissions, sought to contextualise the findings I made about her record keeping. Through counsel she says that her primary motive was one of safeguarding. She has never had a complaint lodged against her within her professional practice and she followed the appropriate guidelines when D began to make allegations of rape.

It was submitted on behalf of Ms Dover that the facts of this case warrant anonymization of her name. She was not, at the relevant time, working in a state based professional role but was engaged on a private basis. This is said to distinguish her from the level of public accountability of those who hold public roles such as a police officers, social workers, or judges- see for instance – Tickle & Anor v The BBC & Others [2025] EWCA Civ 42 is said to be distinguished on the facts.

Within the skeleton argument filed on Ms Dover’s behalf it is submitted that Ms Dover and her interactions with D are extensively referenced within my fact-finding judgment. The court, it is said, will want to ensure that the anonymisation of the parents and the children is maintained. It is argued that I should consider whether Ms Dover’s identity in any way traces back to the subject child.

It is submitted that I should take into account the digital playground of modern life; bullying behaviour is an all too common feature where vilification of an individual can have an extremely deleterious impact on them both personally and socially. Publication of her identity would, it is said, inevitably result in a permanent online profile involving the current case.

It is said that I should consider the possible impact on Ms Dover who it is said is a therapist who not only intended to do no harm, but to do good. I am reminded on behalf of Ms Dover that when making my decision on whether or not to publish her name I must take into consideration her right to private and family life under Article 8 ECHR. The personal and potentially psychological impact of such publication on Ms Dover and the impact on her career, her right to work and developments as a psychotherapist.

I have properly taken to the relevant parts of Practice Guidance being issued by the President of the Family Division on the19th June 2024 under the heading ‘Transparency In The Family Courts - Publication of Judgments’. In particular I was taken to paragraphs 2.4, 3.11-12, 5.3 and 5.5.4 on behalf of Ms Dover.

The Guardian in writing and orally strongly supported the father’s application for Ms Dover to be named in any fact-finding judgment. The Guardian also continued to seek for the full fact-finding judgment to be sent to Ms Dover’s regulatory body, the relevant LADO and to her employers. I was told the Guardian remains gravely concerned that Ms Dover without completing any remedial work or training continue to practice with vulnerable children and young people. It was submitted that Ms Dover does not appear to accept the findings made against her and seeks to minimise and excuse her conduct. The Guardian was anxious that the vulnerable children and young people with whom Ms Dover continues to work should be protected.

I shall give my decision in relation to each of the issues before me in turn.

I begin by considering E’s interests. He is the subject of protracted and highly contentious private law proceedings. He has suffered a number of adverse childhood events, not least the death of his sibling D whom he still grieves. His relationship with his father and the paternal family had ceased and is only now being reconstructed. The private law proceedings are now consolidated with public law proceedings in which final welfare decisions have yet to be made. No one before me suggests that disclosure of the judgment to Ms Dover’s regulatory body, the relevant LADO or the schools at which she works will impact on E himself. E does not attend at a school where Ms Dover works. He has no professional or personal relationship with her. The disclosure sought will not impact the Children Act proceedings of which he is the subject and thus indirectly impact him.

As to the welfare interests of other children generally. I factor in that Ms Dover continues to provide counselling to young people and children. According to Ms Dover they all have their vulnerabilities and many are neurodiverse. I have made serious findings against Ms Dover that are critical of her record keeping and the impact her work had on D; on D’s mental health; and on what D came to allege. Those that use Ms Dover’s services place their trust in her. They and those who employ her expect high standards.

I factor into my decision making the gravity of the findings I have made. Ms Dover has not reflected upon my findings and accepted them. Instead, she has sought to excuse her conduct. She has taken no remedial steps in relation my criticisms of her. On behalf of the Guardian, it is submitted that the devastating impact on D and her mental health of Ms Dover’s “therapy” cannot be over-emphasised. The Guardian argues that if she continues to practice as she has in the past, then other children and vulnerable young people remain at risk. I agree with that submission.

There is a strong public interest in disclosing the fact-find judgment to the BACP, the relevant LADO and the school(s) at which she works. The BACP exists to regulate the work of psychotherapist and ensure high professional standards. Although Ms Dover has self-referred to BACP, what she has told her regulatory body is not known. What is known is that they do not yet have a copy of the fact-finding judgment. Its disclosure will enhance their investigations but not be determinative of it. A LADO is part of a local authority safeguarding team. They play a central role in ensuring the safety and protection of children in various professional settings including schools. They consider, amongst other matters, whether a person has acted in a manner incompatible with safely working with children and vulnerable young people. My findings against Ms Dover are directly relevant to their safeguarding role. The schools in which Ms Dover works place considerable trust in her and her work.

I place in the balance that the disclosure proposed will impact Ms Dover’s right to privacy. Potentially it will impact on her ability to work and her livelihood. That said, I also place in the balance that Ms Dover does not object to the disclosure as proposed and has raised no specific arguments against it nor has she evidenced the potential impact of disclosure upon her and her ability to work; she has stated those as general propositions.

The disclosure sought impacts E’s confidentiality and his right to privacy. However, appropriate anonymisation by removing the names of E and his siblings, his parent; names, names of schools and the names of the witnesses other than Ms Dover can minimise the risk that E and his family will be identified. Safeguards can also be put in place to ensure that disclosure is for a defined purpose only. Thus, disclosure to BACP can be limited to their investigation into Ms Dover’s fitness to practice. Disclosure to the relevant LADO can be limited to their exercise of their safeguarding functions. Disclosure to the school(s) need not be to the whole of the teaching staff and can be restricted to disclosure to a person within a school such as the Head Teacher or the Safeguarding Lead. It can be a condition of disclosure that there is to be no onward transmission without prior court approval. Those restrictions will, of course, become otiose if I decide that Ms Dover should be named in any version of the fact-find judgment that is published.

The fact-find was held in private subject to a Transparency Order. The importance of maintaining the privacy of the proceedings to encourage candour and frankness is weighty. It is only if parties and witnesses are candid with the court that the court can have the best evidence upon which it can proceed to make future welfare decisions for children. Fear of publication can inhibit frankness.

I take into account the Article 6 and Article 8 rights of E, the parties to the fact-find and Ms Dover. Standing back and balancing all the factors in this case for and against disclosure, I consider that the balance falls firmly in favour disclosure to the BACP; to the relevant LADO; and to the headteacher and safeguarding lead of the school(s) at which she is currently working. The need for public safety outweighs the privacy rights engaged in this case, including Ms Dover's right to privacy. I consider that such disclosure is lawful, necessary and proportionate.

I will redact the fact-finding judgment to remove material which might cause E and his family to be identified

Whether I publish my judgment in the fact-find is ultimately a matter for me in the exercise of my discretion. My task is to strike a balance between the rights that favour publication and the rights of the subject child, their family and Ms Dover to respect for their private and family life. I must conduct an intensive and fact-sensitive scrutiny of the competing considerations. I must evaluate various factors that tend to favour publication and those against. I must consider and scrutinise the cogency of any evidence relied upon to support any right or to justify any restrictions of them.

All parties to the private law proceedings (father, mother and the Guardian on behalf of E) agree that I should publish my fact-finding judgment in an anonymised form. Ms Dover does not seek to prevent publication, just her being named within it.

I have been taken by all parties to the Practice Guidance issued on 19 June 2024 by the President of the Family Division - Transparency in Family Courts, Publication of Judgments. I was specifically referred to paragraphs 3.6 and 3.8 of that Guidance which state:

The parties’ agreement to the publication of an anonymised version of the judgment is a tacit acknowledgement of (i) the public interest in the workings of the Family Court and the subject matter of the fact-find before me and (ii) that the fact-finding judgment can be anonymised in such a manner as to preserve the confidentiality of E and his family. In those circumstances it is accepted by all that the balance falls firmly in favour of publication. I accept that it does and have already stated an intention to publish the fact-finding judgment in an anonymised form. The contentious issue for me to determine is whether to name Ms Dover within that published judgment.

It is argued on behalf of Ms Dover that naming her may lead back to the identity of E and his family becoming known. The mother shares that concern. However, there is no evidence that the therapeutic relationship between D and Ms Dover is in the public domain. Indeed, it is accepted on behalf of Ms Dover that there is no known public connection between Ms Dover and D whether in the real world or on the internet. On behalf of the mother it is argued that D may have told her friends and peers that Ms Dover was counselling her. However, against that broad submission is the fact that there is no evidence that D did tell them. Within the remit of the fact-finding hearing and within the hearings since then, no evidence has been placed before me that even suggests that D had ever told her friends or peers of her therapeutic relationship with Ms Dover.

I have considered whether naming Ms Dover will lead back to the identity of E. Amongst his peers and those that know him and his family, there is a risk of identification that I acknowledge. However, that risk does not come from any association between him and Ms Dover or D and Ms Dover. It exists as a result of the factual matrix set out in the judgment, in particular the suicide of D. It exists because those close to E and D and their family will already now the facts set out in my judgment. There is a risk that by publishing this judgment in anonymised form, E will come to see it and know of it. However, a narrative for E has already been settled within the proceedings. It is basic and will be developed within therapy over time as he comes to terms with the factual matrix of this case which is his own history. Steps have already been taken to enable him to know, in a manner that is suitable for his age and understanding, what has happened and why it has happened. His parents, his brother C and his wider family are protective of him. E is unlikely to access the published judgment himself, and his parents, brother and wider family are, in my judgment, unlikely to bring it to his attention. There is always a risk that some member of the public in the small community in which E lives may bring it to his attention. Whether Ms Dover is named in that judgment does not augment or detract from any such risk. In any event, the risk is small and, if it were to come to fruition, E would simply read a judgment which describes his lived experience and the narrative that he will be given in a therapeutic context. Any potential impact of the publication of the judgment itself is thus mitigated.

I factor in that Ms Dover’s name is heavily referenced throughout my judgment. However, the number of times a person is mentioned does not establish a connection between Ms Dover and the subject child E. Ms Dover was D’s psychotherapist. She is heavily referenced within my judgment because she was an important witness of fact. The sessions she had with D impacted on D’s mental health and the allegations she came to make. The impact the counselling Ms Dover gave D on the allegations D came to make is of interest to the public as is its impact on D’s mental health.

I take into account paragraph 5.5.4 of the President’s Guidance 2024:

I place in the balance Ms Dover’s Article 8 right to private and family life. I take into account the possible impact of being named on her emotional and psychological integrity. I have been told in argument that she has suffered as a result of D’s death. I acknowledge that Ms Dover worked with D for a protracted period. On behalf of the Father, it is submitted on a proper evidential basis that Ms Dover lost her objectivity when working with D. I accept that submission. It is, in part, because she lost her objectivity and has no insight into that failing that there is a public interest in naming her. Against that I factor in, that it is her relationship with D that adds to the grief and sense of loss that I accept, as a matter of common sense, that Ms Dover is likely to have suffered. However, there is no evidence that Ms Dover has been specifically impacted, emotionally or psychologically, by the findings I made against her. The submissions made about the possibility of harm arising are broad, non-specific and are not rooted in evidence. In reality, they amount to an observation that there is a possibility that her emotional and psychological integrity may be impacted if I publish her name, just as the emotional and psychological integrity of any professional witness may be impacted if named in a judgment.

I acknowledge that there is a possibility that Ms Dover’s financial security and income may be at risk if she is named in the judgment. But against that I factor in that it is the specific disclosure of the judgment to the current schools at which she works, the LADO and BACP that is likely to have a greater impact on her ability to work, than naming her in the judgment. It falls to Ms Dover’s regulatory body to explore whether professional consequences arise from her conduct towards D and the LADO to determine whether any safeguarding issues arises.

It is submitted that publication of Ms Dover’s identity would inevitably result in a permanent online profile involving the current case in which she will be named. I take into account that digital playground of modern life; bullying behaviour is an all too common feature where vilification of an individual can have an extremely deleterious impact on them both personally and socially. However, there is no evidence before this court to support the submission that that risk would become a reality in this case.

As outlined above, it is submitted on behalf of Ms Dover that there is a distinction between the public interest in identifying those who work for public bodies and those who work in private practice. That submission, it seems to me, misses the point. Ms Dover is an accredited psychotherapist. She is a professional working with vulnerable young people and children. That role and how she practices attracts the public interest, not whether she works within or without the public sector. In any event, I note that Ms Dover worked in the past as a psychotherapist with D through CDA, a charity funded by a local authority and thus public money. Currently Ms Dover works in state schools.

I place in the balance that Ms Dover has not demonstrated any acceptance or understanding of the findings I have made against her. That is relevant because it means that she has taken no remedial action to improve her practices. I have already agreed with the Guardian that absent such remedial action Ms Dover continues to pose a risk to children and vulnerable young people. It is in the public interest to know the findings I have made against her.

I factor into my decision making that open justice is of vital importance to a democratic society and a properly functioning judicial system. With public scrutiny comes a greater knowledge and understanding of the work of the Family Courts and that is in the public interest. I consider that scrutiny is an important aspect of accountability in a democratic society. It holds our court system and the Family Court, in this instance, up to the light. It has a high value. Publication of the fact-finding judgment supports the principle of open justice. The anonymisation proposed in this case does not detract from the public’s ability to scrutinise the court process and my findings.

There is a genuine public interest in how the Family Court conducts itself; in how the Family Court determines allegations of domestic abuse and counter-allegations of alienating behaviours; and how the court facilitates and enables vulnerable parties and witnesses to give their best evidence in Children Act proceedings. I place in the balance against that that having hearing such as the fact-find in this case in private encourages candour and frankness. Holding hearings in public and publishing judgments may inhibit the candour and openness of some who give evidence before the court and thus diminish the quality of evidence upon which decisions concerning children are taken.

Having scrutinised the competing factors and the evidence before the court, I remind myself that there is no precedence, no weighted balance, in favour of Article 10 or Article 8. I make my decision balancing all the competing factors and on the facts, as specific to this case. In my judgment on the facts of this case, that balance comes down in favour of identifying Ms Dover in the fact-finding judgment when it is published. I consider that such identification is both necessary and proportionate.

This judgment will be published on 30 July 2025 together with the suitably anonymised fact finding judgment. The delay between hand-down and publication is deliberate. It will provide a period wherein Ms Dover can seek legal advice about whether she wishes to seek permission to appeal and a stay on publication pending determination of that application. The delay will also enable all parties to the Children Act proceedings to consider the fact-finding judgement and check that it has been properly anonymised before publication.

That leave one final issue – namely whether the parents should be named as the father contends that they should be. The parties before me on 10 June agreed between themselves that the father’s application for the parent’s to be named should be adjourned to the final hearing. The arguments in favour of adjourning the application are persuasive. The welfare aspect of the case is at a sensitive stage. The subject child E is now under an interim care order and placed in a family bridging placement. All parties before me agree that E should have direct contact with his father. In September 2025, I will consider whether E should live with his father, his mother, or whether there should be a shared care arrangement. That hearing may or may not result in final orders. The case needs careful managing. Both parents need to be able to focus on their child’s future welfare. Publishing his parent’s names and thus identifying him at this stage would simply raise the temperature of the case when what is needed is a way forward which puts E front and centre. Publishing his parents’ names at this stage would be an unwelcome distraction from what should be the primary focus of the proceedings, namely E’s future welfare.

That is my judgment.