AND IN THE FAMILY COURT SITTING AT BRISTOL
Before :
MR JUSTICE PEEL
Between :
SOMERSET COUNCIL | Applicant |
- and - | |
(1) THE MOTHER (2) THE FATHER (3) CHILD A, B and C (by their Children’s Guardian) | Respondents |
June Venters KC and Rachel Temple (instructed by Somerset Council) for the Applicant
Nkumbe Ekaney KC and Julia Gasparro (instructed by KSFLP Solicitors) for the 1st Respondent Mother
Andrew Bagchi KC and Anna Lavelle (instructed by RWK Goodman) for the 2nd Respondent Father
Sally Bradley (instructed by Nash and Co Solicitors) for the Respondent Children (by their Children’s Guardian)
Hearing dates: 10, 11 and 12 November 2025
Approved Judgment
.............................
MR JUSTICE PEEL
This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.
Mr Justice Peel :
These are public law care proceedings issued on dated 30 August 2023. I intend to make orders within those proceedings, and orders under the inherent jurisdiction. Accordingly, this court has sat both in the Family Court sitting at High Court Judge level, and in the Family Division of the High Court.
I am concerned with three children:
A (9 years old).
B (5 years old).
C (6 months old).
By the time the proceedings came before me for final hearing, the issues had narrowed, and it was not necessary to hear evidence from a raft of witnesses as had originally been anticipated. I heard directly from (i) the allocated social worker, (ii) both parents, (iii) an expert in the law of the Philippines and (iv) the Guardian.
I shall refer to other written evidence. I am conscious that I do so without such evidence having been tested in court because of the reduced scope of the hearing. I apply caution to such evidence. Overall, however, in my judgment the evidence is sufficiently clear to reach conclusions on the essential factual matrix and the welfare analysis.
The threshold is not disputed by the parents.
More difficult is the outcome which best meets the needs of the children. There is common ground that their mother (“M”) should be permitted to remove them to the Philippines without their father (“F”), and that protective safeguards should be put in place in that country. The precise structure to achieve this is not straightforward.
The background
M is a Filipino national. She is 45 years old.
F is a British national. He is 57 years old. A cognitive and capacity assessment dated 13 September 2023 by Dr Blagg diagnosed him with mild learning difficulties and “extremely low intellectual abilities”. Dr Blagg recommended participation measures, and an intermediary. A subsequent intermediary report set out the specific requirements for F. He has, as a result, been assisted by an intermediary throughout the proceedings. He has a significant history of mental health difficulties. He says that before he started a relationship with M, he had major issues with alcohol and inappropriate sexual behaviour. There are references to drug taking as well. Sustaining a relationship with M, and holding down secure employment, has had a positive impact on him.
M and F met in Hong Kong in 2015, and married in the Philippines in December 2015. Their first child, A, was born in the Philippines in 2016. F returned to the UK shortly after their marriage and they maintained a long distance relationship until M and A moved to the UK in 2018. Their other two children were born in the UK. All three children are British citizens, and the oldest has Filipino citizenship as well.
By the time of marriage in 2015, F had been the subject of very serious findings of fact in public law proceedings made by the court on two occasions in 2010 and 2013, as a result of which the relevant children were made the subject of placement orders.
It seems that between about 2015 and early 2023, F was unknown to this Local Authority (“the LA”). He changed his name on three occasions, and spent time abroad. It was not until January 2023 that the LA became aware that F was living in the UK, and had (at that stage) two further children who are now the subject of this application (the third child was born later). The LA was alerted by another local authority in January 2023 because of F’s involvement as an Intervener in proceedings in that area. Those proceedings led to further very serious findings being made against F in January 2024.
The threshold document
The threshold document is based on the previous court findings in respect of F exposing other children of his to harm. In summary:
In 2010, HHJ Tyzack determined in public law proceedings that F had caused two other children of his (born in 2003 and 2005, so aged respectively 7 and 5 at the time) significant physical, emotional and sexual harm while they were in his care. He had exposed both children to repeated incidents of physical and domestic abuse perpetrated by him on the children’s mother, his then partner. He made repeated false allegations regarding the children which resulted in unnecessary police involvement. He threatened to kill his children in front of them and in front of their mother. He exposed them to sexual behaviour and the older child was exhibiting sexualised behaviour. Care and placement orders were made.
In 2013, HHJ Robertshaw determined in a separate set of proceedings that F presented the same risks to another child by a different mother as he had presented to the children who were the subject of the 2010 proceedings. Again, a care and placement order was made.
In 2023, HHJ Flexman heard public law proceedings in respect of a child unrelated to F, whose mother was the same mother as of the children in the 2010 proceedings. F was joined as an Intervener. The judge heard the case over some 15 days. She heard oral evidence from multiple witnesses, including the older children from the 2010 proceedings (by then adults). She found that F perpetrated significant domestic abuse, strangled and raped the older children’s mother on more than one occasion, and that the children in the 2010 proceedings are likely to have seen or been aware of this. She found that F exposed the children from the 2010 proceedings to seeing him and their mother engaging in consensual sex (both live and on videos), and to an environment in which sexualised behaviour was the norm. Further, the children were exposed to an environment of a consistent and pervasive use of and threat of violence by F towards their mother. The judge was not satisfied that there had been any direct sexual abuse of the children involved in the 2010 proceedings. The judgment of HHJ Flexman needs to be read in full for a comprehensive analysis of the impact on the children who were the subject of the 2010 proceedings.
M is unable to protect the children from the risks posed by F because she does not accept that F poses any such risk to them, she has continued her relationship with F, and is motivated to preserve her relationship with him.
Both parties have formally accepted that the threshold criteria are met. However, it is important to note the caveats which they have put before me.
The above at 12(i) – (iii) are all court findings. F disputes many of the findings, vigorously telling me that they were wrong. F has repeatedly said, in writing and orally to me, that he believes it is all a fabricated conspiracy and he has been the victim of an injustice. He has put before me material which he says exonerates him. He intends to seek to clear his name. It seems to me, as was sensibly acknowledged throughout by F’s counsel, that unless and until an appellate court reverses the previous findings, or they are set aside by the court of first instance, I continue to be bound by them, and F is fixed with them. It is for F to make a formal appeal or application against previous findings. The fact that F denies the previous findings so adamantly is a cause of concern; if he does not acknowledge past behaviour, he is less likely to be able to guard against a repetition. In all the proceedings before the court from 2010 onwards, expert assessments have identified the continued risks posed by F, noting that F did not acknowledge the concerns raised for children in his care, that he did not undertake meaningful work, that he did not accept the relevant findings, and that he showed no insight into the impact of his behaviour on children. The consequence is, as I find, that he represents a serious potential risk to these three children.
As for (iv) of the threshold above, M clearly has difficulty with accepting that she is unable to protect the children because she does not fully appreciate the risk posed by F. Her experiences of F are incongruent with previous court findings. However, in my judgment, her ability to safeguard the children is compromised for the reasons set out in the threshold document.
For the avoidance of doubt, I am satisfied that the threshold criteria are clearly met.
Interim arrangements
Since the first interim care order, made on 2 October 2023, the children have remained in M’s care. F left the family home. There is an exclusion requirement that F is not permitted to re-attend the family home or enter a delineated surrounding area. So far as anybody is aware, that has been complied with. There is no real evidence (although the LA has some suspicions, based on uncorroborated snippets from the children) that F has been in contact with the children other than as arranged and supervised by the LA.
There was some criticism of the parents by the LA for breaching a schedule of expectations; it is said that they were not to meet each other whether with or without the children. However, it seemed to me that whether the schedule of expectations had been finally agreed was not at all clear; M had refused to sign the draft because it did not reflect what she had said. Further, F told me that he was not aware of the relevant clause, which had the ring of truth particularly given his particular difficulties. The Guardian thought that the parents were open about meeting up. And finally, I am not clear why they should have been prevented from seeing each other away from the children. In any event, the parents continued to meet on occasions in the local community (including in hotels) away from the home and the exclusion zone until C, was born, but not thereafter. At one such hotel meeting in July 2004, C was conceived.
Supervised contact between the two older children and F has taken place at a family centre near Taunton each week for 1 ½ hours. He has had video time with the youngest child. The observations of contact are generally positive, and I am not inclined to attach any weight to one or two concerns expressed by the LA about interaction between F and the children.
Relevant assessments and reports
A psychological assessment by Dr Warren dated 11 April 2024 (supplemented by an addendum report) concludes as follows:
F’s mental health is more stable than in 2010. In particular, he has reduced his alcohol consumption. His relationship with M is likely to be influencing his improved mental wellbeing.
F does not accept many of the findings, or the concerns about controlling/abusive behaviours. He minimises the effect of his actions.
M is resilient and relatively independent. She and F each give positive accounts of their relationship. M is relatively isolated in the UK. Until recently, her knowledge of F’s history was limited to his own account. She regards F as a good man who has been poorly treated or misrepresented by others.
M believes F’s account and therefore does not fully accept court findings. She bases her view of him on her own experiences. She believes the children are safe with him.
F has not engaged meaningfully in therapy or intervention to address his behaviours. But Dr Warren cannot recommend any therapy as F does not accept professional concerns or see any need to change.
F is vulnerable to re-emergence of behaviours if his alcohol consumption increases or he reverts to illicit drugs.
F denies engaging in any sexually inappropriate behaviour in front of his older children, although he accepts having shown them a video of him dancing naked. He denies rape or strangulation of his older children’s mother.
There is no evidence that F has directly sexually abused any of his children. In the case of his older children he has exposed them to sexual activities in his previous relationship.
M is not currently able to manage safely any risks which F may pose as she does not accept there are any risks and she is motivated to preserve her relationship with F.
A CUBAS parenting assessment by Jo Sutton dated 29 April 2024 concludes:
F is in denial, and projects blame for the situation onto others.
M can meet the children’s needs but has not demonstrated that she can protect the children from the risk of harm posed by F. She accepts F’s account uncritically. She does not accept the risks identified, or accept the findings against F made by the court. She places the blame on others (including F’s older children). M is resilient and capable but supportive of F’s narrative. She lacks a support network in the UK and as a result is heavily dependent upon F.
The children are accordingly at risk of emotional and sexual harm. They cannot be kept safe in their parents’ care.
Ms Sutton has no confidence that M would separate/remain separated from F. She wants to remain in a relationship with him, and care for the children together.
Sibling assessments dated 28 February 2025 and 20 September 2025 have been carried out by the LA. The two older children have an established, close relationship, and have shared interests. Although much younger, C also has a good relationship with his siblings. They have a close bond and are affectionate and warm to each other. To separate A and B would not be in their best interests. It would cause them undue distress both now and in the future. Both children would feel a great sense of loss.
Care of the children
There is no doubt that both parents love the children, and the children love them. They have solid and happy relationships. There is no evidence that F has subjected M to the degrading, indefensible behaviour perpetrated by him towards the mother of his older children. Nor is there any evidence that either M or F has caused the children in this case any harm. In this regard, I bear in mind that the relevant behaviour of F took place over 15 years ago. If, however, F does revert to that type and level of behaviour, the children will be exposed to a very high level of harm.
M has shown herself to be generally willing to engage and cooperate with the LA. She has abided by court orders. She has not breached the safety plan. All the evidence is that she provides good, consistent care to the children. They are well presented, tidy and clean. Attendance at school is good. There are no identified unmet needs. M is warm and affectionate towards them. She is a capable, practical parent. They live in a suitable, comfortable home. There have been no concerns raised about C since birth; he has thrived in M’s care. The picture is a positive one.
The issue about M is not her ability to meet the children’s general needs, but the risk that she will not be able to protect them from F should he revert to the type of behaviour found by previous courts. In that respect, her continued relationship with F, her acceptance of his narrative, her statements that F is kind and considerate towards her, and her inability to accept previous findings which do not fit in with her own experiences, all contribute to the risks involved. I note, however, that M decided that C should not have contact with F which is indicative of at least a degree of insight. And I formed a view of M in the witness box that overall she intends to abide by court orders; not necessarily because she acknowledges the risks posed by F, but because breach of orders might lead to the children being removed from her care.
F too has overall complied with the interim arrangements since proceedings were instituted, although he has not fully engaged with either the LA or the Guardian. The risk, in my judgment, is some sort of trigger event leading him back to the sort of behaviour he exhibited many years ago when, as he told me, he was totally out of control.
Development of the proposed care plans
There is an acknowledgment by the LA that to remove the children from M, their caregiver with whom they have their most significant bond and who provides a good level of basic care, would be a “significant and potentially traumatic intervention” which could, additionally, compromise their Filipino heritage. As against that, the LA has been faced with the risk to the children of significant harm if F resumes the behaviour found in previous proceedings to have taken place, compounded by M’s limited capacity to acknowledge the risk and protect the children from it.
The LA has clearly struggled with alighting upon the optimum solution for these children (as was apparent from the social worker’s oral evidence). The LA’s care plan for most of these proceedings has been for the children to be placed in long term foster care. The possibility of adoption has receded given the age of the children, and the preference for them not to be separated. As at 10 June 2024, the Guardian’s recommendation was for long-term foster care; adoption was not recommended.
In June 2024, M indicated she wished to return to the Philippines with the children, and to maintain a long distance relationship with F. F would not go with them, although they were still in a relationship.
As a result of this new option, the final hearing could not proceed and further inquiries had to be made about the possibility of the children relocating with M to the Philippines.
The focus since then has been on pulling together such evidence as may assist in establishing whether a move to the Philippes is a viable option. Those inquiries have taken what seems to me to have been an unreasonable length of time. An intended final hearing in April 2025 could not take place because of continuing gaps in the evidence identified by the Guardian and had to be adjourned.
Evidence in respect of a move to the Philippines
A legal opinion from specialist lawyers in the Philippines, Nicolas and De Vega, dated 17 January 2025 is supplemented by addenda dated 23 May 2025 and 29 August 2025, and attendance at a professionals meeting on 28 October 2025. I heard directly from Mr de Jesus from the relevant firm. The evidence on foreign law is as follows:
The presumption is that final judgments of foreign courts are respected and given effect to (but not interim orders). Such a judgment/order is not enforceable per se and there is no governing international treaty between this country and the Philippines. Thus, a party must apply for recognition. The Philippines will recognise an order. It will also recognise the contents of a judgment.
Absent countervailing circumstances (which focus on public policy and undue process, for example lack of a fair hearing in England, lack of opportunity for parties to be present and put their cases, fraud or other irredeemable prejudice) the foreign judgment will be recognised in a Philippines order, which in turn would be enforceable. There is very limited review of foreign judgments, and parties are not permitted simply to relitigate what has been determined abroad.
The Philippines authorities may impose restrictions on the international movement of F. A formal request for this needs to be made to the Bureau of Immigration via the Philippines Embassy. The LA can make the request. F may be barred from entering the Philippines because of (i) his behaviour as found by the family court and (ii) three historic criminal convictions for theft. Alternatively, he may be placed on a watchlist so that notification is given if he enters the jurisdiction.
In answer to questions from me I was told by Mr de Jesus:
The Philippines court would be likely to recognise a judgment of the English court, and requests to the Philippines court, which are made under the auspices of an English care order. Thus, even if s8 orders are not made, recognition would likely follow, based on the judgment and requests for orders to be made in the Philippines.
He understood the concept of wardship. If a wardship order were to be made in England, accompanied by a series of ancillary orders, those ancillary orders would be recognised in the Philippines.
If it were a choice between (a) above (care order and requests to the Philippines) or (b) above (wardship and ancillary orders) he thought that (b) would be preferable in terms of likelihood of recognition.
The procedure for recognition and enforcement of an English order is for M to file a petition in the Philippines (it can be done while she is in the UK). It must be accompanied by a certificate of authenticity. While in the UK, M would need to attend any hearings remotely from the Philippines Embassy. The entire process can be conducted by M from England; there is no jurisdictional bar.
Recognition can take up to 24 months.
Separately, an application may be made for “custody pendente lite” which is a form of interim child arrangements order. It is not an interim recognition order. It should be sought as part of, or ancillary to, substantive proceedings which includes an application for a recognition order. It is likely to be obtained in 3 to 6 months. It can include a wide variety of orders which would appear to encompass almost all the orders which might be applicable in this case.
A co-guardian (for example a relative) in the Philippines can be appointed to share parental responsibility and have delegated powers to support M. An order to this effect made in England would be recognised in the Philippines.
Protection orders can be made in M’s favour against F, including what in this country would be termed occupation orders and non molestation orders. Domestic abuse in its widest sense is fully recognised as harmful and a relevant consideration when considering what protective orders should be made.
As in England, social services can intervene if the children are placed at risk.
Undertakings are likely to be recognised if they are part of the order.
In principle, legal aid is available to M to make the necessary application.
The Embassy of the Philippines has provided a report from the Department of Social Welfare and Development in the Philippines dated 17 September 2025 that M’s family in the Philippines are reputable, suitable and appropriate as a support network. The area to which M would return is where she has a house, and her extended family live. It is an appropriate home, and close to medical and educational services. The proposed move to the Philippines is supported.
A report dated 24 September 2025 (updated on 14 October 2025 with replies to questions and by attendance at a professionals meeting on 28 October 2025) by a Filipino ISW with excellent credentials and an impressive career in social services in the Philippines states as follows:
The good standing of M’s family in Philippines has been verified by the local elected head of government, who said she would support the family and intervene as appropriate in the event of welfare concerns.
Primary identified family members include:
A niece, J
A niece, V.
A sister, M.
The family members have the capacity to provide consistent oversight and safeguarding to support M. They would be living near M (I am told only five minutes away). They would be a support network to ensure the children’s needs are met in a safe, stable and nurturing environment. They have all demonstrated insight into the LA’s concerns about F, and acknowledge the risks posed by him. They have been provided with details of the previous court findings, and acknowledge the seriousness of those findings. They understand that the findings encompass the risk of physical, sexual and emotional harm. They are united in the view that the children should not have unsupervised contact with F. They have the protective capacity to challenge M if necessary. They can provide practical help, oversight and safeguarding vigilance. They would report any unauthorised contact to the local head of government and to the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (“MSWDO”). They would oppose any relocation of the children outside the Philippines, and would report any attempt by M to do so to the local head of government and the MSWDO. They commented that M may not fully understand the risks, given her belief that reconciliation with F might be possible. Two of them are married with children. All have employment and there are no concerns about any of them. The LA have held meetings with them and are impressed by their level of commitment to the welfare of the children, and their understanding of the issues.
M’s mother is head of the household and is described as strict. She would live in the same house as M and the children. The family state that M would not act against her mother’s wishes.
The assessment recommends that the children relocate to the Philippines with M, but without F.
The family members have all provided witness statements in these proceedings which are broadly in line with what the ISW has reported.
Overall, the extended family are viewed by all the professionals in the case as a significant protective factor, and are regarded as impressive in their understanding of the issues, and the need to protect the children robustly.
My impression of the parents as witnesses
F presented in the witness box with a mixture of anger and sadness. Anger because of what he perceives as the injustice of previous court findings. Sadness at how his world has turned upside down and his wife (the woman he loves) and children will be leaving for a country many thousands of miles away, severing relationships with him for potentially a very long time. I thought he told me the truth (filtered through his own perspectives) about events within these proceedings. He deserves credit for accepting that the children should be permitted to relocate to the Philippines with M. That is a child centred approach and must have been difficult for him.
M, likewise, I think, was telling me the truth. She understands the need to ensure that the move to the Philippines works, and the need for clear boundaries. I am confident that she wants to protect the children, but she continues to find it difficult to accept that F poses a risk. Having heard M give evidence, I felt that she has struggled with the situation. Her personal experiences of F’s behaviour are different from what she has read and been told. But she wants above all to ensure that the children remain with her. Her proposed move to the Philippines is to try and escape what has befallen her here, and to ensure that the children are not placed out of the family. She understands that if she does not comply with court orders (governing her remaining time with the children in England, and thereafter in the Philippines), the children may be removed from her, whether under English public law proceedings or the equivalent in the Philippines, and I take the view that she wants to so comply. However, it is hard to know what would happen if she found herself under pressure from F, torn between the need to respect court orders and her own difficulty with accepting that F is a danger to the children. I had the clear sense that over time she has come to appreciate the implications of the previous court findings more fully, and see the risk, even if she cannot fully accept it. My overall assessment of her is that, although she wants to ensure that the children are protected, her inability to accept in full the past findings means that there is a real possibility that she would not be able to protect them fully if faced with an attempt by F to reintegrate himself into the family.
Both of them are currently subject to stringent oversight. My concern is that once the move has taken place, they may seek to renew their relationship, and F’s relationship with the children. F told me that he would not travel to the Philippines until he clears his name here; he is likely to want to try and find a way to maintain a relationship with the children. M still trusts and loves F. As time goes by, and particularly if the children say they want to see F, she may feel the wish or need to facilitate that.
The Guardian’s final report
The Guardian says (in her reports and in oral evidence) as follows:
Both parents love the children, and the children love them.
There is no evidence that during the proceedings the children have experienced significant harm in M’s care, or that she has breached any safety plans. In one of her reports the Guardian said, “It is hard to imagine M allowing someone to harm her children”. Her vulnerability is that she would have to see and experience the danger before taking protective steps and at present she does not fully acknowledge the risks.
If M and the children relocate to the Philippines, it should be to the exclusion of F; it is desirable that he does not travel there.
There is some indication that M would act protectively, notably that she decided not to make C available for contact with F.
She thinks that M would comply with court orders, and is the sort of person who takes guidelines seriously.
She is impressed by the focus of the maternal family and their understanding of the risks involved.
Although no plan is without risk, productive and collaborative work can minimise that risk and “remove the certain significant harm that all three children would experience if removed from the care of their mother and separated from each other”.
Any contact with F must be carefully managed with clear guidelines and expectations. Limiting contact with F would cause the older children sadness. The Guardian opposes any direct contact. However, the children (the older two in particular) need to retain some contact with F so they are not worried about him, and for identity purposes. She suggests six times a year video contact, and six times a year letter box contact. Contact should be supervised by a family member in addition to M.
The Guardian supports the move to the Philippines with a protective legal framework. It is the best option, albeit not without risk. The balance of harm falls firmly in favour of this option.
She would like to see social services in the Philippines ready to receive the family in full knowledge of why they are moving to the Philippines, and primed to provide a measure of support.
She supports the appointment of a co-guardian in the Philippines.
She believes that ideally the custody pendente lite order would be made in the Philippines before M and the children travel there but, if that process seemed likely to take longer than three months, she would prefer that M and the children be able to relocate anyway. She felt that the delay for the children is not in their interests and there are sufficient protective and support networks in the Philippines to assume that the risk to the children can be safely managed even if orders are by then not in place.
The care plans and the parties’ positions
The LA’s care plans filed for these proceedings envisage the children relocating to the Philippines with M, provided that appropriate safeguarding can be put in place. This change since the previous plan for adoption/long term foster care has taken place since receipt of the legal advice and the ISW report.
M wishes to move to the Philippines with the children (but without F) as soon as possible. She will agree to various protective orders and will apply for recognition of such orders in the Philippines.
F agrees with the children moving to the Philippines. He says he will not travel there. He objects to being cut off completely from them, and wishes to have continuing contact. Ideally, he would seek direct contact in England, perhaps each year, with M and the children returning for a visit. He told me that he would like to be able to travel to the Philippines and be reunited with his family once he has, as he put it, cleared his name in England.
The Guardian supports the LA’s plan in principle.
Welfare: the law
Once the court is satisfied that the threshold criteria are met, it must then go on to consider whether it is in the child’s best interests to be made subject of a care order. When the court is deciding whether to make a care order it is required to consider the permanence provisions of the care plan for the child. In considering the care plan, the court must consider how it deals with the impact on the child of any harm that s/he has suffered or is likely to suffer, the child's current and future needs (including those needs arising out of that impact), and the way in which the long term plan would meet the child's current and future needs.
When the court is considering the child's welfare it must carry out a welfare evaluation of which set of arrangements for the child's future care are in his or her best interests; Re G (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 965. The court must consider the realistic placement options (Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146) and do so by globally analysing those options in a holistic and rigorous evaluation rather than taking a linear approach.
The court should contemplate separation of a child from its parents only if satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate to do so. In YC v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 33, at para 134 the principle is stated thus by the Strasbourg court:
"family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and … everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, where appropriate, to 'rebuild' the family. It is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his upbringing."
However, there is no presumption that a child will be brought up by his or her natural family. The arrangements for the child fall to be determined by affording paramount consideration to the child's welfare throughout his or her life in a manner which is proportionate and compatible with the need to respect any Article 8 rights engage; Re W (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 793.
Structure of a move to the Philippines
This is an unusual case. Although there is a general sense of direction towards the children moving with M to the Philippines the structure to achieve this outcome is not straightforward. The court is faced with a conundrum:
Until final orders are made in England, they cannot be recognised in the Philippines. The process of recognition can take up to 24 months.
If a final care order is made, s8 orders (and various ancillary provisions) cannot be made under the auspices of the care order; s9(1) of the Children Act 1989. Therefore, no orders would be capable of recognition in the Philippines.
If no care order is made, s8 orders can be made which would be recognised in the Philippines, but (i) there would be a delay in the Philippines before appropriate orders are in place there and (ii) while M and the children remain in this country, the LA would no longer be involved or share parental responsibility.
Welfare: outcome
F, in my judgment, continues to represent a potential risk to the children because of his denial of the previous findings against him. Were he to regress to his past behaviours, the children would be at risk of significant, long-lasting harm. I acknowledge that the behaviour of F relied upon relates back to events over 15 years ago but the gravity of the consequences if he were to revert to that pattern of conduct is very high indeed and it would not take much (for example to start drinking again) to regress to previous patterns of behaviour.
M says that she can protect the children from the risks posed by F. However, given her continued support of F and the difficulty she has in marrying up her personal experiences with previous court judgments, M is not currently able to manage the risks without appropriate safeguards. That said, the picture is not entirely one way. As the Guardian points out, she opposed C seeing F at contact sessions, which suggests at least some recognition of the potential impact of F’s behaviour on the children. I regard this as being at least something to build on. And I have already commented on my assessment of M that she understands the need to respect boundaries set in place by court orders, for fear that otherwise the children may be removed from her.
As against these risks, the children are well looked after by M, and there is no evidence that they have been exposed to the sort of behaviour exhibited by F in the period to 2010 as recorded in court judgments. The risk to them is not based on what has taken place but what might take place. It seems to me that if the risk can be appropriately mitigated, the case for the children remaining in M’s care becomes commensurately stronger.
To separate the children from their mother would be, in my judgment, traumatic and contrary to their welfare interests and should be avoided if possible. It follows that adoption or long term foster care are not the preferred solutions and, in the case of adoption, the evidence is that to find placements for the two older children would be very difficult. The option of a Special Guardianship Order is not realistic as no feasible Special Guardian has been identified.
Continued placement with M and F in this country (whether under a care or supervision order) does not meet the identified risk of F regressing to past behaviour from which M, who is vulnerable and dependent on him, would not be able to protect the children. To place the children with M alone in this country on a permanent basis (again, whether under a care or supervision order) is not on the face of it sustainable or policeable in the long term, although it may be in the short to medium term. It would be difficult to prevent F from spending significant time with the children given M's support of him, her desire to continue their relationship, and the expressed wish of the older children for them all to live together as a family. F cannot be trusted not to behave again as he did before. M cannot be trusted to protect the children.
An important consequence of the plan for relocation to the Philippines is the much reduced ability of the children to spend time with F, and then only by remote and indirect means. I acknowledge that for F this will be devastating. For the children, too, this will be a wrench as they love him and want to be with him. They need to see him regularly to make sure that he is safe, to remain in touch with that side of their identity, and so they do not to feel the need to seek him out. On balance, I have decided that:
Pending the move to the Philippines, the older children shall see F every other week for 1 ½ hours, on a supervised basis, and the youngest child shall have videocalls with F twice per week.
In the Philippines, F should have indirect video contact with the children every two months (six times a year) and should be able to send cards, presents and letters every two months (either by post or by email) as well as at Christmas and on their birthdays. I do not consider it practical or appropriate for me to make orders (as suggested by F) that each year M and the children travel to England for supervised contact with F to take place. It is too soon to consider such arrangements. And in my judgment, once the children are in the Philippines, it will be for the courts there to consider such matters.
Given the risks in this case, it seems to me that any safeguards designed to enable the children to remain with M, whether in this jurisdiction or in the Philippines, must be robust because there is a real risk that (i) F would wish, if the opportunity presents, to travel to the Philippines and resume a relationship with M and the children and (ii) M cannot be completely trusted to prevent that taking place and thereby putting the children at risk. Once these proceedings are over, and M and the children settled in the Philippines, the temptation to attempt reunification might grow. However strong a protective factor the wider family may be, it would be contrary to the children’s interests to find themselves exposed to the very sort of conflict which it is intended to avoid.
Overall, it seems to me that the preferred option is for M and the children to relocate without F to the Philippines. For reasons set out below, I consider there are sufficient safeguards to protect their wellbeing. I bear in mind that once they do so, this court will no longer have jurisdiction over them, and the LA will have no further role; from then on, the Philippines would be charged with their welfare.
Should the children move to the Philippines, there are a number of safeguards available:
I accept that as a matter of principle of comity, I am entitled to assume that the Philippines legal and administrative systems (including social services) will act to ensure the welfare of the children if they relocate there. A copy of the papers in this case (in particular the various judgments) will be available, and orders will be made in England which should inform their understanding of the dynamics of the case.
I accept that the local head of government and the MSWDO will be well informed and vigilant. In this regard, I note also that the Embassy of the Philippines has been represented at a number of court hearings in this country and has taken an active interest in the case.
M’s extended family will be a significant protective and safeguarding support network.
I intend that a series of orders will be made in this country, to be recognised in the Philippines. That will provide a secure legal framework, and clear boundaries.
It will take time for the custody pendente lite order to be obtained in the Philippines. I acknowledge the Guardian’s reservations that the longer the delay, the greater the harm to the children who will be in limbo, waiting to start a new life in the Philippines. For example, it cannot be right to wait 24 months for a full recognition order before they can leave. On the other hand, a shortish delay until the custody pendente lite order is in place is probably justified to ensure that the best possible package is available. It is not easy to demarcate how long a delay is acceptable, but it seems to me that if the process of obtaining custody pendent lite is not completed within about three months (as suggested by the Guardian), the case for M and the children being permitted to relocate without such an order being in place becomes stronger. I intend to fix a review hearing before expiry of the three months to check on progress.
Preferred structure
Although at the start of the hearing there was no consensus amongst the very experienced legal teams as to the preferred legal structure in this country to enable M and the children to depart for the Philippines, by the end it was agreed that this is a rare case where the inherent jurisdiction is required to fill a legal gap.
I will grant leave to the LA to apply in the face of the court for orders under the inherent jurisdiction pursuant to s100(3) of the Children Act 1989, and dispense with the need for a formal paper application. In my judgment, both limbs of the criteria for giving leave at s100(4) are made out here; the result I seek to achieve cannot be secured through the making of any order other than by the inherent jurisdiction, and without the use of the inherent jurisdiction there is reasonable cause to believe that the children would be at risk of significant harm. A wardship order would vest in the court overall charge of the children, and the ability to put in place child arrangements orders and protective measures, although the children cannot be placed in the care of the LA by reason of s100(2) of the Children Act 1989 and (unlike with care orders) the LA would not share parental responsibility. The LA intends to keep the children on the child protection register, and M has agreed to the LA maintaining a degree of oversight (for example home visits) even though there will be no care orders in place.
In Z v V [2024] EWHC 365, I said this about wardship and the inherent jurisdiction at paras 19 and 20:
“19. In respect of wardship and inherent jurisdiction deployed for the protection of minors, I have been referred to a number of authorities, including Re A [2020] EWHC 451, A City Council v LS [2019] 1384 (Fam), Re M [2015] EWHC 1433 (Fam), Re M and N [1990] 1 AER 205, Re J [1991] (Fam) 33, Re B [2016] UKSC 4 and Re M [2020] EWCA Civ 922.
From these authorities I distil the following propositions:
The inherent jurisdiction derives from the Royal Prerogative, as parens patriae, to take care of those who cannot take care of themselves, and, when exercised in respect of children, is governed by reference to the child’s best interests; A City Council v LS(supra) at 35.
Wardship is a manifestation of the inherent jurisdiction or, to put it another way, an example of its use; A City Council v LS (supra) at 36.
The distinguishing characteristic of wardship is that custody of the child is vested in the court, such that no important step can be taken in the child’s life without the court’s consent; A City Council v LS (supra) at 36. The ultimate welfare decision rests with the court.
The inherent jurisdiction is strikingly versatile, and in theory boundless (Re M and N (supra) and Re M (supra)), but should be approached with caution and circumspection.
The inherent jurisdiction should not be deployed to cut across statutory powers designed to protect children: Re B (supra) at 85.”
In the recent case ofIn Re JK [2025] EWCA Civ 1309, Baker LJ explained at paras 44 onwards the circumstances in which the inherent jurisdiction can be invoked. I note his reference at para 56 to Re M [2020] EWCA Civ 922:
“…..Moylan LJ (with whom Henderson and Baker LJJ agreed) conducted an extensive review of the earlier cases. At the outset, he observed (paragraph 43):
"The court's inherent jurisdiction is, of course, not statutorily defined. It is also a jurisdiction which can potentially apply in a very wide range of circumstances and under which the court can make "many orders relating to children", as referred to by Lady Hale, at [26], in A v A …. Context is, therefore, very important for any analysis of the circumstances in which and the form or manner in which it is appropriate for the jurisdiction to be exercised."
In this case, in my judgment, there is a clear gap (the unavailability of s8 orders within care proceedings, such that there would be no orders to recognise in the Philippines even if such orders are necessary for their protection) which needs to be filled, and the inherent jurisdiction can and should be invoked to protect the children. It is flexible, and enables the court to retain oversight until the children and M have left the country.
Conclusion
I conclude that the following should be incorporated into my order:
The interim care orders shall be discharged. The care proceedings are adjourned, to be discharged upon the Philippines court making an order for custody pendente lite, or further order of this court.
Leave to the LA to apply for orders under the inherent jurisdiction, including wardship.
The children shall be made wards of court.
F is prohibited from travelling to the Philippines.
F shall deposit his passport with his solicitors until such time as (a) the custody pendent lite is made in the Philippines, or (b) he is embargoed by the Philippines from entering that country or (c) further order.
The LA shall request the Bureau of Immigration in the Philippines to consider placing F on its blacklist to prevent him from entering the Philippines.
The LA shall liaise with the relevant social services in the Philippines and send a document setting out what assistance is requested.
Whilst in this country:
The children shall live with M.
Contact between F and the two older children shall take place every two weeks, supervised, for 1 ½ hours. Videocall contact with the youngest child shall take place twice a week.
F shall not be permitted to contact the children outside those arrangements.
F shall not enter the exclusion zone around the FMH.
Neither M nor F shall remove the children from this country.
Permission to M and the children to relocate to the Philippines upon the first to occur of:
A custody pending lite order in the Philippines.
A final recognition order in the Philippines.
Further order of this court.
When in the Philippines:
The children to live with M.
A member of M’s extended family (R) should be appointed as a co-guardian (M needs to make some enquiries to be satisfied that this will not unduly compromise her ability to care for the children).
The children to have contact with F:
By videocall every two months, to be supervised by a member of M’s family, with or without M also present.
F to send letters/cards/presents every two months and in addition at Christmas and on birthdays.
F should have no direct contact with the children and shall not enter or attempt to enter their home and schools in the Philippines.
M shall not promote or facilitate contact other than as ordered by a court.
M shall at least once per quarter update F about the children.
I reject the suggestion that M and/or F should be prohibited from posting about the children on social media. That is disproportionate. However, for the avoidance of doubt, F should not contact the children on social media.
I reject the suggestion that F’s parental responsibility should be restricted. He and M are entitled to speak to each other about matters such as education and schooling. However, the order will record that M and F agree that M will be the major decision maker when in the Philippines.
M shall not take any steps to assist or facilitate F in travelling to the Philippines. If he enters the Philippines, she must inform her extended family and Filipino social services.
The children’s passports be lodged with a member of M’s family, and not to be released to her without order of the Philippines court.
The children not to leave the Philippines without order of the Philippines court.
All the above orders when recognised in the Philippines to be subject to variation by the Philippines court.
M shall apply forthwith in the Philippines for (a) custody pendente lite and (b) recognition of the orders made by this court. She should maximise her attempts to secure legal aid to do so, but I encourage the LA to consider providing her with funds to make the application if it takes a while for legal aid to be secured.
I shall provide for a review date in early February to consider the progress of steps taken in preparation for the move to the Philippines.
I grant permission for this judgment, and consequential order, as well as the three previous court judgments, to be disclosed to the Philippines Embassy, social services in the Philippines and the Philippines courts.