ED v AP

This case concerns the financial remedies proceedings arising out of the divorce between ED to whom I shall refer as “the wife”) and AP (to whom I shall refer as “the husband”).

The case proceeded to a final hearing over six days in September 2025.

Mr Daniel Bentham KC, Ms Emma Chamberlain and Mr Philip Blatchly (Counsel instructed by Kingsley Napley, Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the wife. Mr Geoffrey Kingscote KC and Ms Kyra Cornwall (Counsel instructed by Mishcon De Reya, Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the husband.

I want to thank all Counsel and their supporting legal teams for their hard work and helpful and clear presentations on the case. Both parties have been represented at a very high level, and the advocacy has been of the finest quality, but it has of course come at a cost. The wife has incurred costs of £1,156,990, of which £315,664 remains outstanding. The husband has incurred costs of £1,188,246, of which £258,087 remains outstanding. A total of £2,345,236 has been spent in legal costs by this family on this dispute and has been lost to the family forever.

The court was presented with three electronic bundles: a core bundle running to 699 pages (referenced as Cp.X), a library bundle running to 5,195 pages (referenced as Lp.X) and an additional bundle running to 301 pages (referenced as Ap.X). In addition, a number of documents were produced during the hearing. I have considered the material presented to me, in particular I have considered:-

I have also heard oral evidence from the wife and the husband, subjected to appropriate and skilful cross-examination. At one stage it was thought that I might also hear from BN, SA and Mr Daniel Sladen, but (for various different reasons) I did not in the end hear from any of them and the court day set aside for their evidence was not used for this case, hence the gap in the sequence of trial dates.

I have received excellent written opening notes and closing (partly oral and partly written) submissions from Counsel.

The history of the marriage is as follows.

The wife is aged 60. She was born and brought up in a foreign country X and is a citizen of X by origin, although later became a dual UK and X citizen. She identifies herself as a homemaker and housewife. She has not had remunerative employment since becoming pregnant with her first child nearly 30 years ago. She has some health issues. Her case is that she suffers from three autoimmune diseases as well as Osteoporosis and Post-traumatic Stress Disordered Anxiety and Depression; but these issues (while no doubt difficult) do not at present prevent her from living a full life.

The husband is aged 65. He was born in country Y but later moved to country X. He retains his X citizenship. He has had, and continues to have, a high-flying career in the world of finance. His current position is as senior manager of Company A, a private equity firm.His case is that he suffers from some cardiovascular issues and also has problems with his left knee; but, again, these issues (while no doubt difficult) do not at present prevent him from living a full life.

Both parties have X Nationality. They met in X in 1992, became engaged in 1994 and were married in X in August 1995 (it is common ground that they did not cohabit prior to the marriage). Soon after the marriage they moved to England, where they have lived ever since, a period that now adds up to about 30 years.

Since 2002 the family home has been in city F, which was initially rented but in 2012 was purchased and is owned in the joint names of the parties. Both parties continue to live in the family home. One of the controversial issues in the case is whether it should be retained by the wife (as she wishes) or sold and the proceeds of sale divided (as the husband wishes). The wife has described it as “my domain”.

The marriage produced four children aged between 20 and 28.

All four children happily have good and loving relationships with both their parents, notwithstanding the unhappy situation created by the divorce. All four children have been privately educated. All have attended university, all of which has been completed save that the youngest has one more year at University to complete his degree. All are in good health, though at the moment none of them have really worked out an orthodox career path for themselves, and none have remunerative employment, though they are still fairly young and there is no substantial reason why this should not still happen. All of them still have their main home at the family home to a greater or lesser extent; but soon they will all be adults beyond their first university degree and, in addition to what they should be able to earn for themselves in due course, the husband has already made generous provision for them.

In 2021 the husband financed the purchase of another property, Property S, which has always been held by the children, and is now held jointly and equally between the four children. This is in the latter stages of a refurbishment project and the plan is that it will soon be let, perhaps on an ‘Air B’n B’ basis, and the children will share the rental income, which is likely to produce a significant figure for each of them. A sum approaching £5,500,000 has been spent on purchasing and refurbishing this property. In addition, the husband has invested approximately £500,000 for each child in investment accounts, to which they have access or will do in due course. The effect of all this is that approximately £7,500,000 of liquid matrimonial assets has been transferred to the children, the large majority in the last four years or so. This generous provision, which the husband has executed in what he sees as a genuine and sincere attempt to promote the children’s best interests and future is no doubt welcome by the children. It has been done, however, with the knowledge but without the active support of the wife. It is controversial for her and she regards herself as un-consulted on and unhappy with this spending of matrimonial assets. She loves the children, and has their best interests in her heart, but is anxious that the children have received too much too young to the detriment of the development of their own ambition and drive. Despite her unhappiness, it has not been suggested by the wife that the court should set aside these transactions or that there should be an add-back in relation to them. It has been expressly conceded that ‘conduct’ within the meaning of Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 25(2)(g) is not being argued here (Cp.25); but it is a context for some issues in the case to which I will return below. These events illustrate how, to some extent at least, the husband sees the wealth that he has generated as his own with which he is free to do what he wishes, rather than family assets generated by a partnership of husband and wife. Whilst he sensibly acknowledges the legal position, I have observed an element of irritation in the husband for having to account to the wife for all this.

The relationship broke down over a number of years, but the point of separation for the purposes of these proceedings has been identified by both parties as being November 2023. In November 2023 the wife issued her divorce application and, a few days later she told the husband she wanted a divorce and served on him the divorce application. Despite the events of November 2023, which came as a shock and a disappointment to the husband, the parties have both continued to this day to live at the family home, albeit living separate lives and doing their best to avoid each other. No doubt this arrangement, which has now subsisted for nearly two years, has been difficult for both parties.

Conditional Order of Divorce followed in October 2024. There is not yet a Final Order of Divorce, but this awaits resolution of the financial remedies proceedings and is not in itself controversial.

The ‘duration of the marriage’ for my purposes was therefore from August 1995 to November 2023, some 28 years, on any view a long marriage.

In November 2023, the wife issued Form A, seeking a range of financial remedies.

Forms E were exchanged in April 2024.

A First Appointment was heard by DJ Hudd in May 2024. On this occasion, standard First Appointment directions were made and the case was timetabled to a private FDR (pFDR) before Mr Nicholas Allen KC in October 2024 and a post pFDR directions hearing before me in February 2025. With the approval of Peel J, the case was allocated to me sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge and I am hearing the case in that capacity.

The pFDR duly took place in October 2024 but no compromise was reached. For the usual obvious reasons, I have not been told, and cannot be told, what indications were given by the pFDR tribunal nor which of the parties declined to accept them, nor what without prejudice offers have been made.

In February 2025 I listed a PTR for July 2025 and a seven-day final hearing to commence in September 2025 (later reduced to six days). Both these hearings have now taken place as scheduled.

Section 25 narrative statements were exchanged in July 2025.

I have heard the evidence and submissions and written this judgment within the six-day time estimate.

In dealing with the claim I must, of course, consider the factors set out in Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, sections 25 and 25A, together with any relevant case law. Neither side has sought an outcome which includes spousal periodical payments beyond implementation so section 25A is not engaged here.

Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 25 reads as follows:-

In addition to these statutory factors, my analysis of the case has been and has to be conducted against the background of a number of relevant and well-established principles from the case law identifying how the court should produce a result which is fair as between the parties, which I shall summarise as follows.

First, in its computational phase, the court should seek to identify a distinction between matrimonial property and non-matrimonial property: “It is important to recognise that there is a conceptual distinction between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property. In general terms, this distinction turns on the source of the assets. Non-matrimonial property is typically pre-marital property brought into the marriage by one of the parties or property acquired by one of the parties by external inheritance or gift. In contrast, matrimonial property is property that comprises the fruits of the marriage partnership or reflects the marriage partnership or is the product of the parties’ common endeavour”: Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26, paragraph 47.

Secondly, in identifying what are the fruits of the marriage produced by the parties’ common endeavour, there should be no discrimination between the role of breadwinner and homemaker: “In seeking to achieve a fair outcome, there is no place for discrimination between husband and wife and their respective roles”: White v White [2001] AC 596, p.605.

Thirdly, in its distributional phase, the court should (at least as a starting point) seek to divide the matrimonial property equally between the parties; but to leave non-matrimonial property with the party who contributed it: “It is not in dispute that matrimonial property is subject to the sharing principle with the starting point being equal sharing… the time has come to make clear that non-matrimonial property should not be subject to the sharing principle”: Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26, paragraphs 7 and 48. In the words of Mostyn J in JL v SL [2015] EWHC 360: “Matrimonial property is the property which the parties have built up by their joint (but inevitably different) efforts during the span of their partnership. It should be divided equally. This principle is reflected in statutory systems in other jurisdictions. It resonates with moral and philosophical values. It promotes equality and banishes discrimination.”

Fourthly, the sharing methodology described above can be overridden if there is a good reason, for example a reason based on the needs or compensation principle: “each is entitled to an equal share of the assets of the partnership, unless there is good reason to the contrary”: Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 at paragraph 16.

Fifthly, an earning capacity is not an asset subject to the sharing principle: “Is an earning capacity capable of being a matrimonial asset to which the sharing principle applies and in the product of which, as a result, an applicant spouse has an entitlement to share? In my view, there are a number of reasons why the clear answer is that it is not”: Waggott v Waggott [2018] EWCA Civ 727 at paragraphs 121-122 .

Sixthly, once separation has occurred, endeavour by one party which post-dates this moment cannot be categorised as common marital endeavour: “Whatever regime was then put in place by the parties in relation to their mutual and ongoing contributions to their children's welfare and the financial support of the family, it was not an ongoing marital partnership. For this reason, and absent arguments about needs and compensation, I do not accept the wife's proposition that her ongoing contributions to the general welfare of the family matched those of the husband's and/or gave rise to any entitlement to an equal share in the husband's post-separation earnings”: C v C [2018] EWHC 3186 at paragraph 40.

I therefore turn to my section 25 analysis.

The children here are not minors, so while their needs and circumstances form a circumstance of the case, they are not my first consideration. In fact, there is sufficient wealth here already in the children’s names for their needs not to form any part of this case and this consideration has not significantly featured in the dispute before me.

I turn to consider the “property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future” and also “the income, earning capacity…which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, including in the case of earning capacity any increase in that capacity which it would in the opinion of the court be reasonable to expect a party to the marriage to take steps to acquire”. I have the following comments and findings to make on these subjects.

In assessing the capital resources here, I propose to place assets and debts in two separate categories. Category 1 Assets and Debts are those which exist at the moment and in relation to which, even where they are illiquid, a present value can be placed on them by conventional valuation methodologies. Category 2 Assets and Debts are those which are (to a greater or lesser extent) contingent upon future events which may or may not occur. The two categories need to be disaggregated because they fall to be treated in a different way in terms of what orders the court is likely to make. Where a foreign exchange currency conversion issue exists, I have adopted the parties’ mutual suggestion of using the following rates: £1 = 1.88 Canadian Dollar (CA$); £1 = 1.08 Swiss Franc (CHF); and £1 = 1.36 US Dollar (US$).

I turn first to Category 1 Assets and Debts. My conclusions on the numbers are set out in my asset schedule below. I shall set out below some findings and comments which explain the conclusions I have made about these items. Where I make no comment or finding, but include a figure in my asset schedule below, that is because the figure is agreed and the item uncontroversial.

The family home is held in the joint names of the parties and is mortgage-free. It has an agreed value for the purposes of these proceedings of £6,950,000. I have deducted an agreed figure for notional sale costs at 3% and so the net value is £6,741,500.

The husband also owns, in his sole name and mortgage-free, a property B abroad. It is common ground that this should be sold and that the net proceeds should be divided equally between the parties. Subject to this agreement being adopted, the value is agreed (for illustration purposes) at US$ 2,500,000. I have included this figure in my schedule less an agreed figure of 7% for sale costs, which after currency conversion produces a figure for net value of £1,709,559.

The LM Trust is a discretionary trust set up in March 2010 in which the husband is the Settlor and the trustees are NM Trust Limited and into which the husband settled, inter alia, a number of NM shares some years ago, the value of which was severely damaged. The husband has very recently been in strong dispute with the trustees about the management of this trust to the extent of exchanging legal letters with them (via instructed Solicitors, who have already billed for £50,000 in legal costs and been paid). The parties have differed on various aspects of how I should treat the LM Trust. I make the following comments and findings about this:-

The values of the parties’ respective pensions, and the tax attributable to them, are agreed figures in the asset schedule. It is common ground, given the ages of the parties and the nature of the pensions and the agreed tax figures, that I should regard the net figures as being immediately realisable and akin to cash in the bank and I have not on this occasion caused the pension assets to be placed in a discrete schedule of their own as this is unnecessary on the facts this case.

The husband has a debt to a medical professional, albeit at the fairly modest level in the context of the case, of £4,256. There is a County Court Judgment (CCJ) against the husband in this sum. Hearing his evidence, the husband plainly feels very strongly about this debt, is very angry with the medical professional and wishes to spend money litigating with a view to setting aside the CCJ. I propose to include this debt in my asset schedule (since it exists at present) but not include any figure for litigation spending on fighting the physiotherapist in court. If the husband wishes to litigate the matter further then he may do so, but at his own cost in terms of future outlays and at his own risk.

It is common ground that the husband holds some £2,200,000 in three identified Barclays Bank Deposit accounts. Since they exist, and since there is no security charged against them, and since it is open to the husband to spend this money if he so wishes, I take the view that this money needs to be included in Category 1 of my asset schedule. In doing so, I am cognisant of the fact that, in some ways related to these Barclays Bank deposit accounts, the husband owes some US$ 10,000,000 plus accruing interest to his employer, BN; albeit that the loan is not repayable until 2032 (Lp.561). Since this loan is not payable for many years to come, and the extent to which it will in fact be repayable is contingent on certain future events, I have decided not to include it in my Category 1 asset schedule; but I shall consider it again below in the context of my analysis of the Category 2 assets and debts and decide what are the appropriate consequences arising out of the existence of this loan on Category 1 and Category 2 sharing issues.

I turn to the issue of the husband’s interest in the ZP investment. This investment comprises a limited partnership off-shore in which the husband and his brother (JG) invested money (in 2021) which has been used to acquire interests in some of the Company A funds in the hope and expectation that they will achieve a long-term return, but not in this instance dependent on his continued employment with Company A. The husband has invested a total of US$ 5,590,000 (£4,110,294) in the ZP investment. There is a ‘waterfall’ arrangement between the two brothers whereby the husband’s brother receives all his capital plus a 5% ‘hurdle rate’ before the husband receives anything, in return for which the brother is liable for any future capital call which may arise. The investment is undoubtedly illiquid at the moment, but it may turn out to be valuable. The parties have differed on various aspects of how I should treat the ZP investment. I make the following comments and findings about this:-

Having made these determinations, I am now able to set out my assessment of the Category 1 Assets and Debts of the parties in my asset schedule. The situation can be summarised as follows:-

Joint

Wife

Husband

Subject to the attribution issues which I have resolved above and the dispute about how to treat the $10,000,000 owed personally by the husband to BN, which I have discussed above and to which I shall return to in detail below, it is common ground that all the Category 1 Assets fall into the category of matrimonial property to which the equal sharing principle (described above) prima facie applies.

If I assume (for the purposes of this discussion) that there is to be an equal sharing of all the Category 1 Assets, then the remaining headline dispute which I need to resolve is whether that equal division is to be achieved by transferring the family home to the wife with a lower equalising lump sum (as the wife strongly wishes) or to order the sale of the family home with an equal division of the net proceeds with a higher equalising lump sum (as the husband wishes). The mathematical illustration of these two positions is as follows.

Wife’s position on the equalisation of the Category 1 Assets/Debts

Husband’s position on the equalisation of the Category 1 Assets/Debts

The husband’s case before me is that he has no in principle opposition to the wife’s retaining the family home, but that (in his view) it cannot be done without leaving him with an unfairly low amount of liquid capital. Having considered this argument, I have reached the conclusion that it does not hold sufficient weight to cause me not to conclude that the fairest answer here is for me to accede to the wife’s request to have the family home transferred to her. Although I recognise the illiquidity of his ZP investment, there is in my view sufficient liquidity elsewhere in his assets to enable him to buy a suitable home mortgage-free with liquid money to spare. I attach some weight to the emotional argument advanced by the wife that she is a proud homemaker who regards the family home as her ‘domain’; but I also recognise the substantial saving on sale costs and re-purchase costs that would follow from the decision to retain it. Although the evidence before me suggested that a house purchase at £4,000,000 would very adequately meet the housing need of either party in city F, and therefore the wife cannot powerfully say that she ‘needs’ to retain the family home, she will be left as a result of my order in a financial position where retaining the family home is a financially viable option and I see no reason for imposing an order which stands in the way of this strong desire and I shall therefore make an order transferring the family home to her. A quid pro quo of this decision, in my view, is that it is reasonable to adjust downwards the lump sum due from the husband to the wife from the equalising lump sum of £3,643,771 referred to above by an amount which reflects that the husband is likely to incur substantial purchase costs on a new property (Stamp Duty alone on a house price purchase of £4,000,000 will be £393,750 at present rates) when the wife will not need to do so. This is a similar adjustment to the one I made in my judgment in OS v DT [2025] EWFC 156 (B) at paragraph 39 when a husband wished to retain the family home and his wife would have to purchase a new property. I shall discuss below whether an adjustment should also be made here to reflect the outstanding sum due to BN.

Neither the ‘needs’ principle nor the ‘compensation’ principle are engaged in this case. The figures on the above schedule are such that the wife’s sharing claim plainly exceeds any needs claim which she could reasonably advance and such a claim has (sensibly) not been pursued at trial by the wife. Since the issue of needs does not really arise here, and the sharing principle dominates, other section 25 factors such as standard of living during the marriage and contributions do not feature much here. Both parties have made a full contribution in the present context.

Before I turn to the Category 2 Assets and Debts, I propose to say something about present and likely future income of the parties, since in the husband’s case the likelihood of his continuing to work may have a significant effect on what will be derived from some of his private equity carry.

The wife is aged 60 and, as I have said above, has not had remunerative employment for nearly 30 years. She has been the homemaker and this was the way the family conducted their arrangements. It is really too late to change this and it has (sensibly) not been suggested by the husband that the wife has any earning capacity relevant to this case and it is common ground that she will be living off capital for the remainder of her life. In view of the figures involved here, that capital will be sufficient to meet her income needs (on a Duxbury basis or otherwise) so there is no need for any analysis here of her likely investment returns. As I have already said, if she decides to retain the family home and have a smaller Duxbury fund then that is a matter for her.

The disclosure has revealed an unusually extensive amount of information about the husband’s past and present income, the figures going back nearly 20 years. For my purposes I shall focus on the figures since 2018 (when the husband joined Company A). I am cognisant that there were a number of less good years in the period 2013 to 2018, but some very good years in the period before that when he was working for Company B. I am not sure that averaging these figures out over a long period of time, whether it be 10, 15 or 20 years, is of any great assistance to the court in determining the issues I have to decide. My overall impression is that the husband is good at what he does, works very long hours and is valued and trusted by BN, whose decisions will play a crucial role in what happens in the future. One piece of evidence supporting this proposition is the note BN handwrote on the husband’s bonus letter in January 2024, thanking him for his role, although I do not want to read too much into this. The husband indeed holds a number of positions with Company A, reflecting various different but important roles within the business. He is a senior manager. A significant part of his role is the fundraising element; but he also has wider role in managing investment managers and leading general business development. A screenshot of a recent remote meeting (which I have seen) provides some evidence that BN is thinking that the husband will have a significant role in the future alongside an element of succession planning reflecting the fact that the husband is aged 65. The figures in the table below covering the situation since 2018 are as follows:-

On any view the husband has been a high earner with Company A up to and including the present; but it is important for me to make an assessment of what is reasonably likely to happen in the future. I observe that the husband’s presentation of the likely future throughout these proceedings has emphasised his advancing age, his wish to work fewer hours and his expectation of imminent retirement. His Form E (in April 2024) suggested that “he intends to retire from all executive roles at the end of 2024 and no later than 30^th June 2025”. This date has, of course, passed without the retirement having taken place. His replies in July 2024 said: the retirement date was “increasingly likely to be 31^st December 2025”; but as this date approaches that is now not the plan. His July 2025 witness statement updates this thought by saying “I have just turned 65 and have made no secret of my desire to retire from my executive roles sooner rather than later…I want to be able to step back” (Cp.325). I accept that these comments represent his genuine thoughts on this matter; but this would also impact on his deferred compensation. An attractive scenario from the husband’s perspective would be for him to continue his employment (so attracting the continuing future benefits) but in a less demanding, less executive and more strategic role. In the end, therefore, I have to make an assessment with the limited information we do have, albeit on a broad basis. On a balance of probabilities, I have reached the conclusion that the most likely outcome is that the husband will continue to work at the present level for the next year or two and that, thereafter, a compromise outcome will be reached

In the context of all the above information, I now turn to the Category 2 Assets and Debts, which are those which are (to a greater or lesser extent) contingent upon future events which may or may not occur. The assets in this category all arise out of interests which the husband may receive in the context of his work for Company A and, in diverse and complicated ways, turn on contingencies which the court must do its best to assess. The court must also address the likely quantification of these interests as best as it can.

It is common ground that the division of these assets should be carried out on a Wells sharing basis. Whilst Wells sharing solutions are, as a starting point, unattractive and are, generally speaking, “a matter of last resort as it is antithetical to a clean break” (Mostyn J in WM v HM [2018] 1 FLR 313, quoted by Lewison LJ in Versteegh v Versteegh [2018] EWCA Civ 1050 at paragraph 196), in cases involving significant amounts of contingent assets, these solutions are necessary to avoid “considerable unfairness”: Versteegh v Versteegh [2018] EWCA Civ 1050 at paragraph 135.

The difficulty which then arises in these cases, as it does here, is how to frame a fair Wells sharing order which reflects the general sharing principles described above. Before turning to the detail of these interests, I propose to set out some of the applicable law, which builds on the general principles discussed above and specifically applies in situations such as this. In particular, this engages a discussion about the reported cases where private equity carry is involved: notably the decision of Coleridge J in B v B [2013] EWHC 1232, the decision of Mostyn J in A v M [2021] EWFC 89 and the decision of Sir Jonathan Cohen in ES v SS [2023] EWFC 177:-

The parties’ positions on the Category 2 Assets and Debts are reflected in the helpful draft orders which each legal team has produced.

The wife’s open position is that (coupled with a clean break) she should be entitled to receive lump sums equivalent to 50% of all sums (net of tax) received by the husband in respect of:-

The wife accepts that, as a quid pro quo for receiving her share in these interests, she will give an undertaking to be liable to pay one half of the loan monies owed to BN (pursuant to the loan of US$10,000,000 dated 2022) in so far as it falls to be repaid directly to BN as and when it is due, including accrued interest. The loan document itself requires repayment by 2032. She doesn’t offer up any specific security for this obligation, which is both large and a long way away in time.

The wife further argues that, rather than have a set percentage of anything which the husband receives in due course in relation to his work on two other funds – the Fund A4 (Fund A4) and Fund B2 – she should have her overall lump sum payable now increased by £413,000.

The husband’s open position (also coupled with a clean break) is as follows:-

In order to decide what order I should make I propose to identify some features of all the funds (and other items) over which the wife mounts a claim. I propose to do this in the following tabular form:-

I think there is also some weight (in a broad rather than mathematical sense) to be attached to a contemplation of how these rights would have looked if the husband had resigned from his employment in November 2023. His account (Cp.335) is as follows:-

“I feel that it is important for the court to understand what would have happened to my Company A interests had I left Company A when ED ended our marriage in November 2023. I was in any event thinking about leaving at that point in time due to internal politics…. Had I left then:-

(i)

I would have had no chance of increasing my vested Fund A3 carry (37.5% at that stage).

(ii)

I would have lost all of my allocated but unpaid CYT in Fund A1 and FUND A2.

(iii)

I would have lost all of my APP entitlements (as no HC had vested).

(iv)

I would have lost my salary and bonuses.

(v)

I would have had no chance of receiving any carry in FUND A4.

…I have worked extremely hard since November 2023 (probably harder than prior to that date). As a result, the liquid resources have increased… and I now have considerably more potential Company A assets than I had at separation.”

Stepping back and considering all the above facts and principles I have reached the following conclusions about the sharing issues for the Category 2 Assets and Debts:-

Drawing together the threads from all of the above, I propose to make the following order in this case:-

The net effect of these two proposals on the Category 1 assets and debts can be illustrated in the following table:-

Division of the Category 1 Assets/Debts

What the wife receives in the future from the Category 2 assets will depend on how the various assets pay out and cannot be predicted with guaranteed accuracy; but this outcome is intended to produce a fair and equal distribution of matrimonial property overall.

This is my decision and I invite Counsel to produce a draft order which matches these conclusions. Given that I have already received two very helpful draft orders, I am hoping that this can be done relatively swiftly. Any differences can be referred to me by email in the first instance. Can I invite a communication to me by email by no later than Wednesday 8^th October 2025, which will hopefully include an agreed version of the order for my approval but might be an explanation of why the draft has been controversial and not agreed.

As indicated at the hearing, I am hoping to deal with this order without another hearing in court; but if there are significant disputes then I may have to convene a hearing.

I am sending out this judgment by email on Wednesday 24^th September 2025 and this will be the relevant date for calculating the 21-day appeal period. If either side wishes to make an application to me for permission to appeal then I am prepared to receive it by email.

As indicated at the hearing, I am content for this judgment to be shared straight away with the parties.

My provisional view (noting the contents of the President’s Guidance of 19^th June 2024: Transparency in the Family Courts: Publication of Judgments) is that I should publish this judgment, but with appropriate redactions and anonymisation to ensure that the parties’ identities cannot be discovered and that commercially sensitive material is not included. As discussed at the hearing, I would like to invite the legal teams to see if they can agree a suitably redacted and anonymised version for me to approve. I am prepared to receive any representations on the point if anybody wishes to go down a different path.