J (A Child) (Inflicted injuries), Re

These proceedings, initiated on 29 October 2024, concern a young boy to whom I shall refer as ‘J’. He was born on 23 May 2024 at 26 weeks and 3 days gestation (his anticipated due date had been 26 August 2024). Birmingham City Council (‘the local authority’) applies for a care order and a placement order in respect of J.

The local authority is represented by Mr Matthew Stott; J’s mother (‘M’) by Ms Lucy Hendry KC and Mr Matiss Krumins; his father (‘F’) by Mr Andrew Duncan; and his children’s guardian (‘CG’) by Mr Richard Hadley KC and Ms Sarah Buxton. I am grateful to all counsel and to their instructing solicitors for the assistance with which they have provided me.

The local authority alleges, amongst other things, that M is responsible for causing J serious harm. It proposes that J should be made the subject of a care order. Its care plan is that J should be placed for adoption. It asserts that M cannot safely parent J and that there is no other family member in a position to do so. F is serving a sentence of 5 years and 10 months imprisonment, following a guilty plea to an offence of wounding with intent arising from an incident where he stabbed another man.

On 30 September 2024, aged 4 months (but with a ‘corrected age’ of approximately 5 weeks), J was admitted to hospital by ambulance, following a 999 call made by M. M told the call handler that J had stopped breathing.

Following J’s admission to hospital, CT and MRI scans were performed and X-rays taken. It was discovered that J had sustained injuries including subdural and subarachnoid bleeding to the brain and spine, extensive hypoxic-ischaemic brain damage, retinal haemorrhages to the left eye and oedema to the high cervical region of the spine (the local authority does not now suggest that M was responsible for the oedema which is likely to have occurred following his admission to hospital). J had also, at some point, suffered seven rib fractures on his right side, a shaft fracture of his left ulna close to the wrist, a shaft fracture of his left tibia close to the ankle, and a fracture of his right humerus. There was no fracture to his skull.

Within these proceedings various clinicians have been instructed as single joint experts to prepare reports, including: Dr Andrew Curran (paediatric neurologist), Mr Jalloh (paediatric neurosurgeon), Dr Fionnan Williams (neuroradiologist), Dr Oystein Olsen (consultant radiologist) and Dr Patrick Cartlidge (consultant paediatrician). They all agree (apart from Dr Olsen who was not instructed to comment on this aspect of the case) that the most likely cause of J’s brain injuries is a traumatic event involving shaking or a movement akin to shaking which will have take place around the time of the emergency call made by M on 30 September 2024. Dr Olsen and Dr Cartlidge agree that the fractures are likely to have been caused by a degree of force which was abusive.

The local authority’s case is that the injuries were inflicted by the mother; it says that the brain injury was sustained after M shook J forcefully minutes before she made the 999 call. F was in prison at all material times and cannot therefore be responsible.

M denies responsibility for all of the injuries. She offers no positive explanation for the fractures, but suggests that a contributory factor may have been J’s weakened bones, a weakness resulting from his premature birth. M denies shaking J at any time. On her behalf it is submitted that his brain injuries may have been caused by her panicked response to seeing him stop breathing and turn floppy. This response included running down the corridor on the eighth floor of the block of flats where she lived in order to take the lift to the ground floor to meet an ambulance that had been called.

The injuries sustained by J have been described as ‘life-threatening’. The independent medical evidence suggests that they are likely to have profound life-altering long-term consequences for J.

Following J’s admission to hospital on 30 September 2024, he remained there until he was discharged on 2 December 2024.

Since December 2024, J has been cared for by the same foster carers and enjoyed regular family time with M (this has been arranged to take place on a twice-weekly basis, although a number of sessions have been missed). J has not, however, spent any time with his father (‘F’) since the commencement of the proceedings, despite the local authority having assessed that it was in his best interests to do so. F’s incarceration has made contact more complicated to organise.

M was arrested as a consequence of the injuries to J. The police investigation remains ongoing. She is subject to bail conditions which do not permit her to have unsupervised time with J.

The local authority invites the court to find that the threshold criteria are met on the basis of a number of allegations set out in its amended ‘Schedule of Findings Sought’, most of which relate to the injuries which J has been found to have sustained. Aside from the injuries, the local authority relies upon M’s two previous convictions in 2019 for offences of violence and an incident on 28 September 2024 when M was involved in a fight with two men in the early hours of the morning. It also alleges that M is an online sex worker who has defrauded customers. Its case is that, even if I were to absolve M of responsibility for the injuries, I should come to the conclusion that J was likely to suffer significant harm as a consequence of her care on the relevant date (30 September 2024).

It is the local authority’s case that (a) it is in J’s interests that he be made the subject of a care order on the basis of a care plan that he be placed for adoption, and (b) that the court should make a placement order for J, dispensing with the parents’ consent.

Whilst admitting some of the matters set out in the local authority’s schedule, both parents deny that the threshold criteria are met. M’s case (which F supports) is that if the court were to make the threshold findings sought by the local authority, it should adjourn the proceedings to enable her to be further assessed on the basis of those findings. In the event that the court makes care and placement orders, both parents ask the court to make orders for contact pursuant to section 26 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.

The children’s guardian, Catherine Lloyd, adopts a neutral stance in relation to the disputed allegations. In the event that the court finds the ‘threshold criteria’ met, her recommendation is that the court should proceed to make the care and placement orders sought by the local authority.

As I noted above, these proceedings were initiated on 29 October 2024. They have now been ongoing for approximately 50 weeks, well beyond the 26 week time-limit prescribed in section 32(1) of the Children Act 1989.

The relevant legal principles are not in dispute. I shall set these out in summary form. I agree with the helpful note of the principles relevant to fact-finding prepared on behalf of M. I remind myself that the burden of proof in relation to disputed issues of fact lies at all times on the local authority. Allegations must be established on the balance of probabilities.

The court cannot make a care order unless it is satisfied that on the relevant date (the date when child protection procedures were initiated which, in this case, is 30 September 2024) the child ‘is suffering’ or ‘is likely to suffer’ significant harm and that the harm and likelihood of harm is attributable to the care given to him or likely to be given to him if an order is not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him. Even if so satisfied, the court must make a decision that accords with the child’s best interests as its paramount consideration, having regard to the welfare checklist in section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989. The court should not make any order unless doing so is better for the child than making no order at all.

A placement order can only be made if the court is satisfied that it is justified, treating the child’s welfare ‘throughout his life’ as its paramount consideration. In considering the child’s welfare in this context, the court must have regard to the enhanced welfare checklist contained in section 1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. Moreover, absent consent from the parents, the court can only make a placement order if it dispenses with their consent. It can only do so if satisfied that the welfare of the child ‘requires’ this, a term which carries ‘the connotation of the imperative, what is demanded’ as opposed to ‘what is merely optional, reasonable or desirable’: Re P (A Child) [2008] EWCA Civ 535.

It is well-established that the court starts from the proposition that if at all possible a child should be brought up by their parent or parents. It must be ready to tolerate diverse standards of parenting as long as that which the parents are able to provide is ‘good enough’. Making an adoption order or a placement order without the consent of the parents should only be contemplated as a last resort in ‘very exceptional circumstances’: see, for example, Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33; YC v United Kingdom [2012] EHRR 967. It must be a necessary and proportionate response to the child’s welfare needs. The court must consider less Draconian options and should only sanction an adoption or placement order if ‘nothing else will do’. A global, holistic and multi-faceted evaluation is required of all of the ‘realistic options’ for the child through the prism of the child’s lifelong interests and the enhanced welfare checklist: Re B-S [2013] EWCA Civ 813; Re G [2013] EWCA Civ 965. The court must guard against undertaking ‘a linear analysis’, considering and discounting lesser options in isolation leaving adoption as the only remaining solution.

The court has the power to make orders for post-adoption contact under section 26 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. It has been established in a series of authorities that the imposition of contact on unwilling adopters is an ‘extremely unusual’ course to take: see, for example, Re B (A Child: Post-Adoption Contact) [2019] EWCA 29; R and C (Adoption or Fostering) [2024] EWCA Civ 1302. Whilst there has been recent research and public discussion highlighting the potential benefits to children of maintaining contact with their birth families post-adoption, the principles enshrined in the case-law have not changed (see R and C at paras 37 to 40).

I begin by setting out the medical evidence which is the foundation of the local authority's case (although not the only evidence on which it relies). There is no challenge to the conclusion of the clinicians that J’s head injuries were caused by a traumatic event on 30 September 2024, a date when J was being cared for by M. As for the fractures, M denies all knowledge of their cause. As well as emphasising the weakness in J’s bones, she relies on the fact that during the period of time when they might have been caused, J was cared for by a number of people including in hospital.

There is no significant disagreement between the expert clinicians. I can summarise briefly the conclusions of those who did not give oral evidence. The only one who did so is Dr Cartlidge.

Dr Curran, paediatric neurologist, prepared a report dated 24 March 2025. He reached the conclusion, on a balance of probabilities, that from the perspective of his discipline J sustained a non-accidental injury which caused the inter-cranial injuries shown on scans; the event which caused J’s brain injuries will have occurred within 30 minutes of the arrival of the ambulance crew on 30 September 2024.

Dr Curran also considers, on a balance of probabilities, that as a consequence of his brain injuries J will have significant developmental delay which will be global (i.e. affect all areas of his functioning) and be life-altering.

Mr Jalloh, paediatric neurosurgeon, prepared two reports dated 28 March 2025 and 23 June 2025. He concluded that the most likely cause of J’s brain injuries is ‘an episode of trauma involving shaking’. This is likely to have occurred minutes (rather than hours) before the 999 call on 30 September 2024.

Mr Jalloh describes J’s clinical presentation on admission to hospital as having been ‘life-threatening and at the more severe end of brain injuries that we see (that are not fatal) in infants’. He says that although J appeared to make a reasonable recovery at the time of discharge ‘he is at very high risk of long term neurological and cognitive problems including learning difficulties and movement disorder (akin to cerebral palsy)’.

In his second report, Mr Jalloh comments upon M’s account of running down the corridor with J and expresses the view that this is unlikely to be relevant to the cause of the brain injury. He does not comment on the potential for J to have suffered an ALTE or ‘funny turn’ (see below).

Dr Williams, neuroradiologist, prepared a report dated 30 March 2025. He considers that accidental trauma is an unlikely explanation for J’s injuries ‘unless a major trauma was described’. His view is that ‘the mechanism of injury is likely to have involved shaking’. Whilst he cannot exclude a co-existent impact injury against a softer, more yielding surface ‘the imaging findings are consistent with acceleration-deceleration forces which would be encountered in shaking’.

Dr Williams’s view is that once he sustained the brain injury ‘[J] would have displayed an abrupt and sudden change in his behaviour. A brain injury this severe would have no or little lucid interval and would likely require urgent medical intervention essentially straight away’. Dr Williams too considers that J’s injuries are likely to have profound consequences for him and that he is at risk of developing cerebral palsy, learning difficulties, epilepsy and blindness.

Dr Olsen, consultant radiologist, prepared a report dated 1 April 2025 in relation to the fractures sustained by J. He does not comment on the brain injuries.

Dr Olsen concludes that none of the fractures dates back to J’s birth or the period before mid-August 2024.

The fractures to J’s ribs and upper arm were identified on 30 September 2024. Dr Olsen’s view, based on the images, is that it is ‘close to impossible’ that these fractures were less than a week old when the scan was taken and that it is more likely than not that they were at least one and a half weeks’ old. The latest date on which these are likely to have been caused is therefore 19 or 20 September 2024.

The fractures to J’s ulna and tibia were identified by x-ray on 4 October 2024. Dr Olsen’s view again is that it is close to impossible that these were less than a week old on that date and that it is most likely that they too were at least one and a half weeks’ old. This means that the latest date on which they were likely to have been caused is 23 or 24 September 2024.

Dr Olsen’s evidence is that the matrix of J’s skeletal injuries can only be explained by ‘at least five applications of force’: at least two to the chest and one to each of the right arm, left forearm and left lower leg.

He opines that the rib fractures will have been caused by excessive bowing caused by force excessive to that used in the normal handling of a child. The fractures to the ulna and tibia are likely to have been caused by bending forces. The upper-arm fracture could have been caused by a twisting force or a bowing force applied directly to the upper arm itself.

The fractures may all have occurred on the same date or on different dates.

Dr Olsen comments that the presence of ten fractures represents significant injury. ‘Even in a child with x-ray evidence of severe metabolic bone disease of prematurity, it would be exceptional to see that many fractures unless there had been clearly-defined trauma’.

Dr Cartlidge, paediatrician, prepared a report dated 6 May 2025 and an addendum dated 19 June 2025. He also gave oral evidence to the court. I found his evidence balanced and insightful and have no hesitation in accepting it.

His opinion is that ‘shaking, or a movement of the head similar to that seen when an infant is shaken (i.e. vigorous back and forth movement) was the principal cause of [J]’s head injury’ (my emphasis). The absence of scalp swelling or skull fractures is evidence against the head having hit a hard surface although he cannot exclude it having impacted with a semi-yielding object (in his oral evidence he offered the arm of a sofa as an example of such an object).

Dr Cartlidge expressed the view in his first report that since J was in a collapsed state when M made the 999 call, the causal event is likely to have taken place no more than a few minutes earlier.

In his first report Dr Cartlidge said that he had experience of babies having an apparent life-threatening episode or ‘ALTE’. In oral evidence, Dr Cartlidge explained that premature babies are more prone than others to experience such an episode - which he also described as a ‘funny turn’ - especially babies who have gastro-oesophageal reflux as was the case with J. Lung disease is another strong indicator of a child’s propensity to experience a ‘funny turn’. Milk can run up their throat and go down the wrong way which can cause the baby to go pale and floppy. He considered that M’s description of J spitting out a dummy and gasping for air was consistent with the possibility of an ALTE having occurred.

Dr Cartlidge explained in his evidence that an ALTE in a baby can trigger panic in a carer whose reaction may inadvertently cause marked back-and-forth and side-to-side movements of the head thereby causing inter cranial lesions similar to those sustained by J. His evidence is said that the two reactive mechanisms he has encountered which have caused such injuries are (i) resuscitative shaking, and (ii) running with a baby held upright by a carer, but with the head unsupported. In his oral evidence, Dr Cartlidge elaborated that in identifying the second of these mechanisms, he had in mind a case involving an obese woman who, after experiencing an ALTE in her young infant, had run holding him upright in front of her without supporting the child’s head. Her body shape had meant that her running motion involved a side-to-side movement of her upper body.

Dr Cartlidge made clear that infant brain injuries caused by a ‘response shaking’ are uncommon. He has only seen this occur in 2 or 3 cases out of several hundred he has dealt with. He explained that in order to cause this type of injury, the baby’s head would need to have rocked back and forward on the neck and round and round to an extent that a reasonable person would be alarmed by it. He did acknowledge that a very young baby such as J has ‘virtually no neck strength’ and is unable to resist the actions of a carer or gravity. He agreed with Ms Hendry KC that the brain cannot distinguish between an abusive shake and a panicked movement.

Dr Cartlidge made clear in oral evidence that the type of ALTE he was describing usually resolves naturally within 30 seconds, at which point the baby will probably start to splutter and cry.

On the basis of M’s account, Dr Cartlidge, when he prepared his reports, did not consider that the actions of M running to the lift could have caused his injuries. At that stage he had not seen the relevant CCTV footage. By the time he gave his oral evidence he had viewed both CCTV clips (which I describe below as Clip 1 and Clip 2). These did not cause him to change his view. He maintained this view when it was suggested to him that a forward movement where J’s head dips, shown in Clip 2, could have been the precipitating cause of the injuries.

In oral evidence, Dr Cartlidge made clear that a carer who vigorously shook a child sufficiently to cause a brain injury in response to an ALTE would be aware that they had done this.

Dr Cartlidge considers it likely that J had metabolic bone disease (‘MBD’) during the period in which he sustained bone fractures. On the basis that Dr Olsen did not detect any radiological features specific to the condition, he considers it more likely to have been mild to moderate rather than severe. MBD will have made J more vulnerable than an average infant to sustaining bone fractures.

Dr Cartlidge did not consider that the fact that J was taking omeprazole is likely to have materially impaired his bone strength. Research suggests that the drug is associated with a 10-20% increase in the occurrence of fractures; the fracture risk in a young infant is, however, ‘very low’ and therefore a 10-20% increase in occurrence would still leave a very low risk.

Although the precise force needed to cause J’s fractures ‘cannot be known with certainty’, in Dr Cartlidge’s opinion ‘the causal force would be less than usual’. He said that rib fractures are usually caused by the chest being squeezed, occasionally by an impact. Fractures to J’s arms and lower leg were probably caused by a bending force.

In oral evidence, Dr Cartlidge said that the lower arm injury could have been caused by pulling the baby in a yanking manner while he was lying down; another possible cause was impatiently trying to force the baby’s hand into a babygrow while the baby was struggling. He considered that the most likely explanation for the tibia injury sustained by J was a frustrated yank to the ankle during a nappy change. It will have been caused by a level of force ‘that should not have been used’. As for the upper arm, the fracture could have been caused by a twisting force or by holding the baby’s arm in the middle of his humerus and yanking upwards using one hand.

Dr Cartlidge was struck by the number of fractures sustained by J, commenting that in his 27 years of practice as a paediatrician he had never previously encountered an infant pre-term child who had sustained this many. His opinion is that ‘multiple fractures would not have been caused by the use of force appropriate to the care of such a young baby’ although ‘a force less than that usually expected to produce a fracture could have been causative’. Although MBD increased J’s vulnerability to fracture, ‘forces in excess of normal infant care must have been used to cause so many fractures’. Dr Cartlidge characterises this type of force as ‘most likely abusive (i.e. reckless or deliberate)’.

Dr Cartlidge’s view is that the fractures will have been painful for J and that any person witnessing the events which caused them would have realised that J had been hurt. Others who did not witness the relevant events might have found J to be more fractious than usual for several days but are not likely to have realised that fractures had been sustained. In oral evidence, Dr Cartlidge said that the injury to the humerus will have resulted in J not using his right arm as much as his left, which should have been apparent to his carer.

As to the prognosis for J, Dr Cartlidge said in oral evidence that it may take several years to know the extent of the brain damage he has sustained.

The experts held a joint meeting on 8 September 2025 at which each of them made clear that they continued to stand by their written opinions. In advance of the meeting, the experts had been sent CCTV Clip 1 from 30 September 2024 which shows the mother holding J and running along the communal corridor outside her flat towards the lift. None of the experts considered it likely that J’s injuries will have been caused by that which they observed on this video clip. Dr Cartlidge expressed the view that ‘it needs the head to move around to [a] quite alarming degree I think for it to cause the brain injury’.

In response to questions raised about J’s MBD and increased propensity to fractures, Dr Cartlidge stated that ‘the really large number of fractures that this child has sustained would make me think that this is more than routine handling and more than minimal trauma that’s gone on’. Dr Olsen’s view was that ‘it would be an unusual[ly] great number of fractures even in [an infant with] significant bone weakness caused by prematurity’.

Although both parents filed evidence, by virtue of an earlier direction of the court only the mother gave oral evidence. The other witness who gave oral evidence was a woman to whom I shall refer as ‘P’.

M was born on 27 February 1999. She was aged 25 at the time of J’s birth; she is now 26.

J is M’s only child and it is very clear to me that she loves him dearly and wishes him to be returned to her care.

M lives in an apartment on the eight floor of a block of flats in Birmingham. The block has a lift. She has lived there since 2021.

M has had a difficult background. Her parents separated when she was aged approximately 12 years and thereafter she lived with her mother and step-father. M lost touch with her father following her parents’ separation and the two of them had a limited relationship. When he died in 2024, M did not attend his funeral, explaining to the children’s guardian that it would have been ‘fake’ of her to do so.

When M was aged 16, her mother pleaded guilty to a serious criminal offence, receiving a significant custodial sentence. This conviction received attention in the media and this attracted unwelcome attention for M. She described to the guardian feeling embarrassed and receiving death threats on social media. She stayed with her maternal grandmother for a period and was able to complete the course she was undertaking at college (although at one time she was close to her grandmother, it appears from information communicated by M during her parenting assessment that this relationship ‘has drifted’). M did not visit her mother in prison and received no letters from her. She declined offers of support and counselling.

There was a period when, prior to obtaining her own rented accommodation, M stayed in hostels where she encountered substance users. Upon her mother’s release from prison, M resumed living with her for about a year but their relationship was difficult.

While M was completing her college course, she also worked for a pizza delivery chain to support herself. She has also worked in clubs doing bar work.

M also accepts that she is or has been ‘an adult content creator’ who has taken intimate photographs and made explicit videos of herself which she has sold online, initially through the OnlyFans platform and latterly through her own website. M denies being a ‘direct’ sex worker, but accepts that through her online profile she has scammed people by accepting payment from them to perform sexual services but then not abiding by arrangements to meet them.

M has a number of previous convictions. These include driving offences, possession of both class A and class B drugs, failing to surrender to custody, assault occasioning actual bodily harm and wounding with intent. I do not consider these convictions to be relevant to the factual issues I have to determine, save that they highlight that M’s life has been generally unstable.

M has also reported being a victim of sexual and physical assaults, threats and other communications intended to cause distress.

On 13 November 2024, a report on M’s cognitive function was prepared by a chartered psychologist, Dr Frank Furlong. He assessed that M’s ‘Global Intellectual Functioning’ is within the ‘Below-Average’ range, with an estimated Full Scale IQ score of 80 (on the 9^th centile). He identified that M had a number of weaknesses including a ‘limited capacity for holding verbally presented information in memory while performing specific tasks’ and ‘underlying weaknesses related to efficiently processing and responding to rapidly presented visual information’. She also ‘experiences literacy, numeracy and written language difficulties’. She does not, however, satisfy the criteria for a diagnosis of a ‘Significant Learning Disability’.

Dr Furlong’s assessment was that M ‘demonstrated that she is capable of understanding information that is presented to her (using simplified language where necessary)’. He recommended that she should undertake a parenting assessment and that she should have the support of an advocate (an advocate has been with her during this hearing). He did not consider that her difficulties were such as to justify the involvement of an intermediary (although in fact M has been assisted by an intermediary for part of this hearing, including when she gave her evidence).

M filed four statements in these proceedings and gave evidence for approximately 4 hours over two days. I regret to say that I did not find her to be credible as a witness and I have found it necessary to give myself an R v Lucas direction in relation to her evidence.

As I explain below, I am completely unable to accept her account as to the circumstances which led to J suffering a brain injury. It may be that she has told a deliberate lie about this, but it is just as possible that the truth is too painful for her to acknowledge. Her failure to tell the truth about this central issue does not of course mean that she has lied about other matters, but it does have an impact on her credibility.

I also consider that M has been untruthful about the circumstances which led to J suffering a number of fractures. This too has an impact on her credibility.

My overall impression of M is that she is distrustful of childcare professionals and the court process more generally. She views the local authority social workers as working towards the permanent removal of J from her care. I found her to be defensive in her evidence: reluctant to make concessions about her parenting and repeatedly falling back on her refrains that following J’s birth she was ‘a single mother’ and ‘a new parent’.

I also find that M lacks insight into her weaknesses. Her suggestion in oral evidence that ‘the local authority judge my parenting because of [F]’ was wide of the mark. It is clear to me, however, that she does not accept there is any real validity to the local authority’s concerns about him.

It is also clear to me that from the time of J’s birth, M has struggled to give priority to his needs on a consistent basis. This is not, I emphasise, because she does not love J. In my judgement, it is likely that she has felt overwhelmed by the circumstances in which she has found herself. Her poor mental health, her difficult relationship with F, the lack of support from him after he was incarcerated and the adverse experiences she has suffered in her life left her poorly equipped to manage the demands of a young baby, especially one born as prematurely as J.

F was born on 3 February 1998 and is now aged 27 years. He was confirmed to be J’s father following a DNA test in December 2024 (M having first suggested that another individual might be the father).

F too has had a difficult background. He was raised by his mother with his two sisters in the USA before the family moved to England in 2012 when he will have been aged 14. A pre-sentence report prepared on 3 March 2025 records F as having reported that the absence of a father in his life led to him taking on the role of ‘man in the house’. The family lived in London for a period where, according to F, he became involved with a gang, leading to a move to Wales.

F’s mother and sister have returned to live in the USA. According to his pre-sentence report this has left him in the UK without any family support meaning that he lacks guidance or stability in the community. F’s mother has an incurable serious condition.

F has a number of convictions. These include driving offences, possession of class A and B drugs, failing to surrender to custody and two convictions for wounding with intent.

As a consequence of the most recent offence of which F has been convicted, he was arrested and remanded in custody since a few days after J’s birth. Earlier this year, he was sentenced to a term of 5 years and 10 months imprisonment following a plea of guilty to wounding with intent. This resulted from an incident where he stabbed another man in the stomach causing him a ‘life-threatening’ injury. His anticipated release date is in 2028. He has not had contact with his mother or sister since his incarceration. According to F, one of his sisters is in prison in the USA following a conviction for murder.

For the purposes of F’s pre-sentence report, the probation officer performed various risk assessments, the results of which suggested variously that there was ‘a medium risk’ that F would commit a further serious offence within the next two years, that he posed ‘a medium risk’ of imminent violence towards a partner and children but ‘a high risk’ of imminent violence towards others.

I heard evidence from ‘P’, a former neighbour and friend of M, who gave a statement to the police on 1 October 2024, the day after J was admitted to hospital. Although P’s cross-examination elicited some relatively minor inconsistencies between her written and oral evidence, I formed the view that she was truthful and motivated to give evidence by a concern for J’s welfare. I must, however, be cautious about her evidence: as she fairly accepted in cross-examination, she did not personally witness a number of matters which formed the subject of her evidence.

According to P, she and M first met a number of years ago when they were living in supported accommodation; I assume this must have been in the period after J’s maternal grandmother was sent to prison. In P’s words ‘we both had a lot going on at [that] time, we both suffered with our mental health and so I feel like we bonded and that has meant I have always felt protective over her’. The two of them remained friends.

In about 2021, P helped M obtain an apartment in the block where she was already residing. The two women saw a lot of each other following M’s move. They have both continued to live in their respective apartments since then.

P describes M as being ‘almost obsessively’ clean and tidy (a ‘neat freak’ is the alternative description which was put to P on M’s behalf). P acknowledged that she looks after her apartment very well.

According to P, following M’s move to her new apartment, she initially seemed to be doing well. Soon afterwards, she acquired a dog (D1). P’s written evidence is that M could not cope with the dog crying or making a mess and would lash out and hurt the dog. M eventually gave D1 away. M later acquired a second dog, D2. P’s written evidence is that neighbours ‘used to say that they would hear the dog crying out’; that she has previously seen M lose her patience and lash out at the dog; and that on one occasion she heard the dog ‘screaming’ and had to run up to M and grab hold of her.

When P was cross-examined by Ms Hendry KC, it became unclear to what extent she personally had witnessed M mistreating either dog. When pressed as to what she had witnessed personally, P spoke about an incident when M appeared to be ‘quite stressed’ after she had been for a walk with the dog. M and her dog got into the lift while P stayed downstairs. P said that she heard the dog screeching in the lift which she attributed to some form of mistreatment by M. I do not consider P’s evidence to be sufficiently reliable to enable me to make a finding that M was responsible for mistreating her dogs although I do accept that she found them difficult to manage and that they were a source of stress for her. M, however, did not have a dog in the period in September 2024 when J was in her care.

According to P’s written evidence, M’s relationship with F was ‘quite toxic’ (an expression which echoes what F is recorded as having told the probation service – see below). They would ‘argue a lot’ and the arguments would sometimes become violent. P’s evidence suggests that F was affected by jealousy. She relates that he would sometimes ‘lash out’ and refers to occasions when he caused damage to the M’s front door and the doorbell. Her evidence is that her level of concern for M’s safety was such that, without telling M, she asked the manager of the building to ban F from the premises. In her oral evidence, P made clear that her views of F had been formed partly by what she had been told by M, but also by things she had witnessed personally which included him sitting outside the house for hours on end (which P considered to be a form of ‘stalking’) and reading aggressive messages which F had sent to M.

P describes M as a person who struggles to ask for help. She once sent her pictures of her body covered in bruises but gave no further information about how these had been caused. P recounts that shortly before M became pregnant (i.e. towards the end of 2023), M cut off her previously long hair, an event which struck P as ‘a massive cry for help’. P advised her to seek professional help but M did not want to do so. P was so concerned about M’s safety that she called the police, but they in turn were persuaded by M and F that there was no cause for concern.

Following M’s pregnancy, according to P’s oral evidence she told M that she should not keep the baby. This resulted in a falling out between the two of them and thereafter they ‘barely spoke’ before the birth, although (as set out below) there were occasions when they did so.

P gave evidence about an incident during M’s pregnancy when M reported to her that F had cut her face and threatened to release her dog onto the street. M accepts that there was an occasion when she sustained a cut to her face, but maintains that it happened at work and denies that F was responsible. P was clear that M had told her that the cut was caused by F. I accept her evidence that this is what M told her, although I am unable to make any finding against F.

About a month before P’s birth, P had another conversation with M. Her evidence, which again I accept, was that M made comments about feeling suicidal and spoke about having an abortion and feeling under pressure from F to keep the baby.

P had been concerned that during the initial period following the birth when J was in hospital, M appeared to be struggling with having to combine visits to hospital with taking responsibility for walking the dog. P spoke about how M would go out every weekend. She continued to go out after J was in her care. I accept all this evidence.

I am unable to make specific findings about F’s conduct towards M in circumstances where pursuant to an earlier case management direction he has not given evidence at this hearing. It is entirely clear to me, however, that the parents had a very volatile and toxic relationship which was a cause of anxiety for M. I also accept that M struggled to ask for help

During her oral evidence, P acknowledged that there were positive aspects to M’s parenting. She had got J’s nursery ready for him before the birth. He has a pram and lots of clothes. Although some items were bought by M’s mother and grandmother, M too bought things for him. P also acknowledged that, although she and others had been concerned when J was discharged by the hospital into M’s care, she had never seen M handle J unsafely or shout at him or do anything to cause her to feel that J was unsafe. She made clear that she had not been around M enough following J’s discharge to form a view about what his life with M was like.

In this section of the judgment, I set out the relevant factual matrix, including my findings in relation to matters in dispute. I shall not repeat the findings I have made above.

From information provided by M during her parenting assessment, it appears that she and F first met in 2021. They met through social media and mutual friends. M will have been aged 22 at the time.

In 2022/23, F served a period of six months in prison, during which M moved to her current property in Birmingham. Their relationship endured during his incarceration. M recalled that upon F’s release from prison he had an electronic tag which was linked to her property.

During M’s parenting assessment, which took place in the early part of 2025, M made clear that despite F’s anticipated lengthy prison sentence she remained committed to him as he was ‘her boyfriend’. She was visiting him in prison, sending him money and clothes and speaking regularly to him by telephone. She described feeling ‘a loss in her life’ with him being in prison, referring to F as a person ‘similar in character’ to her, someone upon whom she could rely ‘to be there for her’ and a consistent person in her life.

F’s pre-sentence report sets out that it has been recorded that F previously described his relationship with M as ‘toxic’, a description which I consider to be apt on the basis of the evidence I have read and heard. He accepts that the two of them have argued but denies that there has been any actual violence between them. The nature of the relationship between M and F featured in the evidence given by P, which I have already addressed.

M’s case is that she has recently separated from F. I find this difficult to accept. Her oral evidence was that she is ‘currently’ separated from F ‘because of the circumstances’, in particular the fact that the local authority ‘made me feel I have to separate from [F]’. She went on to say that F has been her partner for a long time, that she is never going to stop loving him and that he provided a great deal of assistance to her and was part of her life: ‘that is not going to change’. In my judgement, M has felt compelled to present herself as having separated from F for forensic purposes. She does not recognise or, still less, accept the concerns which professionals have expressed about F. It is highly likely that M will renew her relationship with F in the relatively near future; he is a source of support and comfort for her.

J’s early birth is likely to have come as a great shock to M; she will not have been prepared for it. Although she was in a relationship with F at the time of the birth, she was uncertain as to whether he was the father, an uncertainty which is likely to have contributed to the sense of turmoil she must have experienced at that time.

Following his birth, J was diagnosed with a number of serious conditions, including respiratory distress syndrome, neonatal jaundice, anaemia of prematurity, hyperglycaemia, patent ductus arteriosus, feeding problems secondary to prematurity and presumed sepsis. It is not difficult to conclude that his perilous condition will have been enormously stressful for M, contributing to the poor mental health from which she already suffered.

When J was just 10 days old, F was arrested following the stabbing incident to which I have referred above. From that point onwards, M was left to parent J alone, without the help of the person who had been her partner for three years and upon whom she depended for emotional support.

M suddenly found herself in a situation where she had a newborn baby in hospital, a partner in prison, a dog to look after and a need to work to support herself financially. In those circumstances, it is perhaps unsurprising that she struggled with the competing demands facing her, demands she was ill-equipped to meet.

It is a matter of record that over the initial period J spent in hospital, M’s visits to him were sporadic. For example, when J was just two days old there is a record which notes that she was unable to see him as she was working in a bar, causing hospital staff to be concerned and make a referral to social services. M’s later suggestion to the police that she visited J on a daily basis during this period was untrue: in the 33 days between 25 May 2024 and 26 June 2024 (inclusive), she visited 11 times, an average of once every three days. I am unable to accept M’s oral evidence that she was told by a nurse that she was visiting too much.

I have considerable sympathy for M, who found herself in a hugely stressful situation suddenly and unexpectedly. I also readily accept her oral evidence that it will have been distressing for her having to express milk to leave with the hospital while doing bartending work. I do, however, find that there is validity to the point made by the local authority that she responded to her situation in a manner which illustrates her struggle to prioritise J. I accept that M needed to earn money, but not to the extent that she did. She did not, for example, need to provide funding to F while he was in prison or to fund her expenditure on nights out. These were choices she made which were to J’s detriment as he saw less of her as a consequence.

The birth of a new baby is enormously tiring for any parent. It will have been especially so for M, who was continuing to work as a bartender in a club and also continuing to enjoy nights out as a form of respite from her otherwise stressful life. It was inevitable, therefore, that she felt tired when she was spending time in hospital with J. M’s tiredness will have made it harder for her to respond appropriately to J’s needs. In her oral evidence she said that when she was tired she felt ‘overwhelmed’ at times by J’s crying.

On 8 July 2024, a hospital note records that there might need to be a referral to social care as a consequence of M’s ‘minimal contact’ and F being in prison.

On 12 August 2024 (when J was a few weeks old) it was recorded at a safeguarding review that M was feeling very tired and fed up with coming to visit J in hospital; she wanted J home, appeared distracted, was struggling to stay awake, was feeling too tired to change a nappy and was finding oxygen training too difficult.

Other hospital records made in August 2024 are also illustrative of M’s tiredness, her frustration with her situation and her inability to respond positively to help and advice being offered by professionals involved in J’s care. Some of the notes suggest a degree of impatience on her part in relation to J.

At a speech and language feeding review on 22 August 2024, M reported that she was in pain and could not sleep in hospital, referring to J as ‘naughty’ and ‘a shit’. Whilst she agreed to having ongoing provision in the community, she made clear that she had had enough of ‘being in hospital seeing professionals’. She felt that members of staff were too condescending and that they came into the room too much, depriving her of sleep. That same day, the nurse in charge raised safeguarding concerns about M after she had left the hospital and gone home earlier than expected. A note records that the staff were concerned that she may have learning difficulties (noting, for example, her ‘questionable ability’ to make up a bottle), that she was ‘reluctant to learn’ and that she has had to be woken up and reported being very tired.

On 24 August 2024, a safeguarding review took place with M by telephone. M communicated that she ‘will not be talking to anyone anymore not completing the oxygen competencies’. She said of J that he ‘is a little shit and has bipolar he’s so naughty’.

On 29 August 2024, a hospital note records that M had telephoned upset and tearful. She did not want to come to the hospital as it was stressful and she felt that no-one was listening to her.

On 31 August 2024, it was recorded that M had yet to complete her ‘home oxygen competencies’, having not come into the hospital as had been arranged. Her visits were noted as having been ‘sporadic’, with M having gone days without having contact with J.

On 3 September 2024, a decision was made that J could be discharged home. The plan was that following J’s discharge, M would receive support from the Health Visitor and from the Neonatal Community Outreach Team (‘NCOT’), with visits from the latter three times a week. A note records that M made no contact with the hospital that day, despite having been expected.

On 4 September 2024, J was discharged home He had a corrected age of 41 weeks and 2 days and weighed approximately 3.5 kg. He was ‘tolerating feeds’ from a bottle at three hourly intervals. Hospital records show that upon discharge he had the following ongoing ‘active problems’: chronic lung disease, gastro oesophageal reflux (for which J was prescribed omeprazole) and vitamin D insufficiency.

Following J’s discharge from hospital on 4 September 2024, in accordance with the plan that had been made, M and J were visited regularly by the health visitor and a member of the NCOT Team, Hayley Ball.

On 5 September 2024, the first visit from the health visitor took place. No concerns were noted. The following day, 6 September 2024, the first visit from the NCOT worker took place. Again, the record of the visit shows that no concerns were noted. J was described as alert and active. Similarly no concerns were noted when the NCOT worker visited on 9 September 2024.

On 12 September 2024 a further visit by the NCOT worker took place. It was noted that J was gaining weight. He was also noted to be settled ‘with no excessive crying’. The notes also refer to M describing feelings of exhaustion and referring to ‘how [J] was naughty crying and waking’. During the visit, M cut three of J’s nails causing them to bleed, refusing to accept advice to wait until he was less tired before doing this. The notes also record that M declined to have an assessment from ‘Early Help’ (which I understand to be a service offered to new mothers by the local authority) and rejected advice that she should take J to A & E if she could not manage his tiredness and crying.

On 13 September 2024, M did take J to A & E as a result of her concern that he had ‘snuffly breathing’. J was reviewed and discharged home. I consider that this is an example of M’s ability at times to behave responsibly and meet J’s needs.

On 16 September 2024, there was a further visit from the NCOT worker. No concerns were noted, save that J's weight had increased only marginally since the previous visit. It was suggested that he might need a dietetic referral for slow weight gain. That night a sleep study was performed. J’s mean oxygen saturation levels were recorded at 96.46%, with ten desaturations per hour.

On 19 September 2024, there was a home visit by the health visitor. J was noted as being ‘clean, active and alert’. M described herself as ‘just very tired and fed up with weekly visits’. The notes record the health visitor ‘watching [M] as she walked around the flat’. M was screened for depression but ‘no professional concerns’ were noted.

On 21 September 2024, according to P’s evidence, M went out leaving J with a friend of hers. M’s oral evidence was that this was one of three occasions when she went out clubbing during the September 2024 period when J was in her care. I assume that she stayed out until the early hours of the morning of 22 September 2024; according to her oral evidence she would sometimes leave the club after it closed at 4am, although sometimes she left before closing time.

On 23 September 2024, the NCOT worker visited the home but there was no answer at the door and M did not answer a telephone call. Another telephone call was made later in the day during which M described feeling ‘too tired’ but said that everything was ‘OK’. M declined to have further visits to have J weighed and declined the request that the sleep study be repeated (following a discussion with a doctor it was determined that the results of the previous sleep study had been ‘borderline’ and accordingly there was no ‘requirement’ for a new study to be undertaken). M was discharged from NCOT.

On 25 September 2025, M and J went to see the GP who prescribed J cholecalciferol.

On 26 September 2024, it appears from the GP notes that J was reviewed in the paediatric clinic although there is no further information about this.

On 27 September 2024, M took J to the neonatal unit office where he was noted to be ‘very smiley’. No concerns were raised.

On Friday 27 September 2024, M again went out leaving J to be cared for by P. She dropped J off at around 10.45pm stating that she would collect him at around 4am. She left two nappies, a bib, bottle and blanket.

According to M, she spent the early hours of the morning in a nightclub with two other friends. Shortly after 4am the three women left the club and made their way to a second club where they chatted to the security guards, whom they knew. M says that they were then repeatedly approached by two men who were ‘invading [their] personal space’. Although M says in her written evidence that she does not recollect precisely what occurred ‘it ended up with myself and the two males getting into an altercation’. M said in her written evidence that she had been drinking but ‘not a lot’ and was not drunk. She also said that she regretted what occurred.

In her oral evidence M elaborated that she had had ‘a few’ or ‘a handful of’ drinks but did not go ‘overboard’. M also said that the altercation with the men had occurred when she and her friends were on their way to a chicken shop. She claimed that she had acted in ‘self-defence’, a claim I find difficult to accept as it did not feature in her written evidence. M also said that ‘both sides had a part to play’ in the altercation, which (based on the totality of the evidence I have seen) is more likely to reflect what in fact occurred.

The altercation was observed on CCTV and this resulted in a police unit being called and M getting arrested on suspicion of affray. Police evidence shows that officers were called to the scene at 5.20am and that the time of the arrest was 5.50am. M had clearly decided to stay out significantly later than 4am, the time that she had told P she would be collecting J.

The police evidence (based on accounts given by security staff) suggests that M had taken exception to attempts by the men to film her; that she attempted to grab one of their phones and that a fight then ensued. M and the men ended up on the ground. The CCTV operator described M as ‘the main aggressor’. M sustained grazes and was bleeding slightly when seen by the police. The police later viewed the CCTV footage and their records simply state that it shows that M was ‘involved in a disorder’ along with other persons. The alleged victims of M’s aggression declined to give statements to the police and when spoken to at the scene denied all knowledge of what had occurred. Other evidence suggests that the physical altercation may have started after M attempted to remove a mobile phone from one of the men who was filming her, but what precisely occurred is unclear.

At the police station at 6.38am, M was noted to be emotional and slurring her words. In her oral evidence, M sought to explain that ‘her speech is not the best’, but in my judgement she had clearly had too much to drink.

M contacted P from the police station shortly before 7am according to P’s evidence. Knowing that P had to go to work, she asked her to hand J over to be looked after by another friend; a little later P did so.

M spent to the rest of the day in custody at the police station. She was interviewed by the police at 4.45pm. CCTV images show that M eventually returned home shortly after 8pm, pushing a pram, speaking on her phone and carrying a shopping bag and changing mat. She had collected J on her way home.

I am not in a position to make findings as to what precisely occurred during the altercation that took place on 28 September 2024. I am satisfied that whatever did occur, M behaved completely irresponsibly. She stayed out until well after 5am, having drunk too much and knowing that she would have to resume the care of a very vulnerable child when she returned home. She was already suffering from tiredness and struggling with the demands of a young baby. Staying out as late as this will have compounded her difficulties. It was not the first time she had gone out like this, but on this occasion her irresponsible actions were made worse by the fact that she became involved in an altercation.

I turn now to consider and set out my findings in relation to the injuries sustained by J.

On the balance of probabilities I accept Dr Cartlidge’s evidence that, notwithstanding that J suffered from MBD and the presence of other risk factors for weakened bones, the number of fractures he sustained over a relatively short period of time leads to the conclusion that they were occasioned by incidents involving a level of force which can only be regarded as abusive.

Dr Cartlidge was clear that none of the fractures will have been caused by what he referred to as routine gentle handling. Individually, they could, however, have been caused by the forceful reaction of a carer to a sudden movement on J’s part, such as a lurch forwards. In response to such a movement, a carer might react instinctively looking to protect the child from harm. He did not consider that the number of fractures seen in J could be accounted for in this way. I accept his evidence. Aside from the inherent improbability of several such events having occurred over a short space of time, it would have been apparent to a carer that J had been hurt and was in pain after sustaining a fracture. A reasonable parent would have exercised additional care before again acting in the same manner.

In my judgement, notwithstanding the ‘window’ identified by Dr Olsen it is improbable that any of the fractures will have occurred while J was in hospital. The hospital staff involved in his care are very unlikely to have handled him in a way which caused him injury. Had he sustained an injury, it is probable that it would have been spotted immediately and noted in J’s records.

Accordingly, I consider that the fractures are most likely to have been sustained between 4 and 20 September 2024 (in the case of the ribs and the humerus) and between 4 and 24 September 2024 (in the case of the ulna and the tibia).

M has provided no positive explanation for how the fractures may have been caused. There were periods when J was looked after by friends of hers, including overnight, but M does not suggest that these friends are likely to have caused the injuries to J. In any event, I think it is unlikely that J would have sustained injuries of this type from different people.

On the balance of probabilities, I find that all of the fractures were caused by M by the application of abusive force five times during the period I have identified. I consider it more likely that there were five separate occasions when such inappropriate force was used than that M applied such force to J sequentially as part of a single event.

I do not find that M intended to hurt J when she applied abusive force to J. In my judgement, it is likely that she behaved impatiently and recklessly in a situation where she felt overwhelmed by the pressure of handling a newborn baby at home without the support of her partner. The pressure she felt will have been magnified by her tiredness, not helped by the occasions she chose to go clubbing until very late. The hospital records evidence that M at times felt frustrated by J and that she could be impatient with him. Her impatience is likely to have been more prevalent if she was having to look after J at home on her own without the support of hospital staff.

I do accept that M loved J and was capable of being warm, affectionate and loving towards him. She was unable, however, to provide the consistency of care that he needed or to control her frustrations. This resulted in J sustaining serious injuries as a result of instances which involved M grabbing and squeezing him with excessive force or yanking his limbs, pulling him with one hand.

I have given careful consideration to the point made on M’s behalf that over the period in question J was seen regularly by independent professionals, none of who detected that he had been injured. As to this, I accept Dr Cartlidge’s evidence that the injuries sustained are unlikely to have been apparent to persons seeing J some time after the events which caused them for only a brief period of time.

I accept Dr Cartlidge’s evidence that a reasonable parent will have appreciated that J had been injured by their actions. The fractures will have been painful for J who will have cried; a carer should have realised that he was moving his right arm less. M took no action to seek medical attention for J. I do not think she was trying to conceal his injuries; were that her motive, it is unlikely that she would have taken J to hospital on 13 September 2024 (although it is of course possible that the injuries were inflicted after this date). Rather, I find that she was wholly negligent in failing to appreciate what she had done. No doubt her tiredness contributed to her failings in this respect.

My findings about the fractures are further supported by the conclusions I have reached about the brain injuries sustained by J and vice versa. As Mr Stott submitted, it is necessary for the evidence to be considered in its totality and not in compartments.

M’s accounts of what precisely occurred on 30 September 2024 have differed.

In M’s statement dated 1 January 2025 she explained that parts of the day were ‘a blur’ and that she was hampered in her ability to piece together what had occurred by the fact that the police had her mobile telephone. With those caveats, she said that at approximately 11.35am she gave J his three hourly feed (slightly earlier than usual) before putting him down for his nap in his bouncer chair. A video taken by her of this feed shows him being ‘perfectly fine’. At around 12 noon, a delivery man arrived with some clothes M had ordered for J. She had planned to book a professional photo shoot so that J could be photographed in these clothes. M was excited to see what J would look like in the clothes and so she decided to try these on him and take her own photographs, staging them by covering J’s baby bath chair with a grey blanket and sticking a white sheet to the wall behind where she placed the bath chair. I am prepared to accept her evidence about what occurred up to this point.

In her January statement, M said that after setting up the photographic scene she woke J and changed his nappy. She then proceeded to change him into the outfits which had arrived. She said that she put him in ‘two or three’ different outfits, each time placing him on the covered bath chair and taking pictures of him.

According to M’s written evidence, shortly after 12.50, J became unsettled. She offered him a dummy which he spat out. At this point she says she noticed that J ‘was making funny noises and appeared as if he was struggling to breath’. She said that his face was pale, his eyes were not as focussed as usual and when she picked him up he was ‘a bit floppy’.

M’s written evidence is that she was so concerned about J’s presentation that she rang 999 immediately from her apartment to call for an ambulance. It has been recorded that the 999 call was made at 12.54:38. M says that she then ran out of the apartment with J to the communal lifts in the block. In her oral evidence she said that before exiting the apartment she put on her sliders which were kept by the door. In M’s statement she says:

M has subsequently prepared a video clip (‘M’s clip’) which shows the walk along the corridor from the door of her apartment to the lift. The short journey involves (i) going through a fire door, (ii) going around three turns in the corridor in quick succession, (iii) going through a second fire door, and (iv) walking through some double doors on the left of the corridor to the lift lobby.

M’s clip shows that walking at a gentle pace the walk from outside her apartment to the lift lobby takes approximately 30 seconds; from her front door to the first turn takes approximately 15 seconds; the short section involving going around the three turns takes approximately 5 seconds.

There are two CCTV cameras in the corridor between M’s apartment and the lifts. The first of these has been placed in the top corner of the first turn. It points in the direction of the first fire door; when this is open the short segment of corridor between M’s apartment door and the fire door can be seen. I shall refer to footage from this CCTV camera as ‘Clip 2’ and to the camera as ‘Camera 2’.

The second CCTV camera has been placed at an angle in the top corner of the third turn. It captures the very short bit of corridor between the second and the third turns and the slightly longer bit between the third turn and the second fire door. I shall refer to footage generated by this camera as ‘Clip 1’ and to the camera as ‘Camera 1’.

A person walking from M’s apartment to the lift would first be captured by Camera 2 and then by the Camera 1. There is a very small amount of the corridor between the first and second turns which is not captured by either camera. A person walking along the corridor at normal speed would be out of view of both cameras for no more than two seconds.

The cameras each have microphones and are able to capture sounds made before a person appears on camera. Thus a person talking while walking towards Camera 2 will have their image captured only on that camera, but the sounds they make will be captured on both cameras.

In this case, the footage shown by Camera 2 shows M walking towards the camera making a humming or crying noise; she is not speaking to anyone. Camera 1, by contrast, captures the sound of her speaking to the 999 operators off camera for some 12 seconds before her image comes into view.

Whilst I accept the submission made on behalf of M that the footage in Clip 2 precedes chronologically that in Clip 1, I find it difficult to accept that the two clips show the same walk from M’s apartment to the lift. If that were so, Clip 2 would surely have caught M’s conversation with the emergency operator, but it does not. It may well be that there is some further CCTV footage which has not been produced in these proceedings (I understand that the overall CCTV footage held by the police runs to in excess of 489 hours). It may also be the case that M walked down the corridor outside her flat at least once prior to the conversation she had with the emergency operator, possibly after making the call and waiting for it to be answered (see below); it may also be the case, as postulated by Mr Hadley KC and Ms Buxton, that M paused for some time during her walk out of sight of both cameras but this possibility strikes me as highly implausible. These points were not put to M in cross-examination. She maintains that she walked only once between her door and the lift. When I raised the issue and invited further submissions after the parties had already made their closing submissions, Ms Hendry KC and Mr Krumins made the valid the point that the CCTV footage has not been the subject of forensic examination. I accept this. Without further investigation (which would not be proportionate) the lack of continuity between the two clips remains a puzzle I am unable to resolve. Ultimately, the conclusions I have reached about J’s injuries do not turn on this issue.

‘Clip 2’ shows M walking from just outside her front door to the first turn in the corridor. The camera is pointing in the direction of the fire door in front of the door to M’s apartment. Through the glass in the fire door, M can be seen walking away from her apartment 1 or 2 seconds into the clip (at this point the clock in the footage jumps from 12.31:44 to 12.59:26 – the accuracy of these times cannot be verified; the jump in time is explained by the fact that the cameras are triggered by motion). Five seconds into the clip, M emerges through the door. At this point she is holding J with her right forearm, pressing him into her body. Her phone is in her right hand. Her left hand is momentarily free, having just been used to open the fire door. A second later her hand moves to support J’s head. As she moves through the door, J’s body changes position, moving down and forward. A second later M moves J up towards her body again. She is last seen on Camera 2 10 seconds into the clip as she walks round the first turn. At this point she is holding J’s head which seems to be tilting backwards slightly. M is walking fast in the clip and appears to be either humming or, more likely, crying. As I have set out above, the footage does not capture her speaking to the emergency operator. Aside from the noise made by M, the only other sound comes from a male voice off camera; it sounds as though he is speaking in a foreign language.

The footage in Clip 1 captures the very short segment of corridor between the second and third turns and the segment between the third turn and the second fire door. M’s voice can first be heard off camera 4 seconds into Clip 1 at a point when the clock jumps from 12.31:51 to 12.59:24 – again the accuracy of these times cannot be verified. Although initially her words are inaudible (at least to me) it almost immediately becomes clear that what can be heard is the start of her conversation with the 999 operator. M first appears on camera 16 seconds into Clip 1, walking fast. There is this a period of 12 seconds during which M can be heard off camera speaking with the emergency operator which does not feature in Clip 2.

When M appears on camera in Clip 1, her left hand is supporting J’s head. She is using her right forearm to hold him to her chest while holding her mobile phone in her right hand. The phone is on loudspeaker enabling the emergency operator’s voice to be heard. M disappears from view 24 seconds into clip 1, shortly before she increases her pace from a fast walk to a run.

M’s written evidence is that she descended from the eighth floor to the ground floor in the lift, which was also occupied by two other men. Once on the ground floor M says that she placed J on the floor in ‘a small space in the lobby’ and gave him ‘mouth blows’. She tasted blood and saw a small amount of blood emerging from J’s nose. She said in her statement that she did not give J chest compressions.

There are some inconsistencies between M’s account in her written evidence and the accounts she provided contemporaneously and in her oral evidence in relation to two issues: (i) the moment she first noticed that J was bleeding, and (ii) whether she gave J chest compressions.

The transcript of the 999 calls shows that in the initial part of the emergency call M reported that J had stopped breathing. The first mention by her of bleeding came approximately 3 minutes into the call at which point M was in the downstairs lobby and being given instructions by the operator about performing mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. M reported to the operator that there was blood coming out of J’s mouth. The operator’s instructions to M were that she should blow into J's mouth enough to make his chest rise; she should then ‘[t]ake [her] mouth away and watch for the chest to fall’. The operator did not initially tell M to perform chest compressions. She first did so approximately 5 minutes into the call when she instructed M to put two fingers in the centre of J’s chest and ‘press his chest down at least one third of its depth’. It is not clear from the transcript whether M followed this instruction. Immediately after giving it, the operator asked M whether the paramedics were with her and she said that they were. A paramedic confirmed this.

James Pringle is an ambulance technician. According to his statement, he and his ambulance crew arrived at the block of flats at 12.58pm on 30 September 2024. On arrival in the foyer of the building at 12.59pm he saw M ‘in a panicked state’ holding J; she was not performing compressions or mouth to mouth resuscitation. J was ‘very grey’ in colour and had blood coming from his nasal passage. Mr Pringle placed him on the floor. Mr Pringle’s evidence is that M gave a history of what had occurred ‘after the police arrived’: she explained that she was trying to take pictures of J when he coughed and blood appeared around his nose following which she called 999. Although Mr Pringle recollects M giving this account after the arrival of the police, the transcript of the police bodyworn camera footage reveals that it was in fact Mr Pringle who communicated this account to the police after M had left the scene to collect a blanket for J.

Mr Pringle was accompanied by a paramedic, Faye Jones. According to her statement she followed him into the foyer of the block. She too saw M holding J; she says that J looked dead. One of the first things she noticed after J was placed on the floor by Mr Pringle was that J was bleeding from his nose. J was not breathing and had a very low heart rate (60-70 beats per minute). She says that CPR was performed. According to Ms Jones (and consistent with Mr Pringle’s evidence), M provided inconsistent accounts about J’s bleeding: she said that she had been taking pictures of J when blood came out of his nose and she called 999; she later told someone else blood came out of J’s nose after she had called 999 when she was performing mouth to mouth resuscitation.

PC Luke Street is an officer who was on duty on 30 September 2024. He arrived at the scene at a point when ambulance staff were providing medical assistance to J. He observed blood around M’s mouth; she stated that this was caused by her giving J mouth-to-mouth and that blood had been coming from his mouth. Another officer, PC Resu Ram, was also at the scene and describes M as having been visibly upset.

The police bodyworn camera footage corroborates the fact that M gave the account related by PC Street at the scene. M was taken by an officer to her flat shortly afterwards and asked further about the blood. She said that J had been in the lift when ‘a little trickle’ of blood came from his nose. She confirmed that there was no blood in the flat, ‘only downstairs’.

The medical bundle includes a report prepared by the Suspected Inflicted Head Injury Service. Internal page 10 of that document sets out the account provided by M and also that which she gave to the ambulance service. I do not think this document takes matters further as it appears to me that it merely repeats information obtained from other sources.

M was arrested on 30 September 2024 and interviewed by the police under caution on 1 October 2024. During her interview, she gave an account of what had occurred which is broadly consistent with her written evidence in these proceedings, save that she said that she had performed chest compressions on J. She told the police that she got through to the emergency operator some three or four minutes after placing the call, a point which is consistent with the fact that CCTV Clip 2 does not capture this conversation.

When M was cross-examined by Mr Stott on behalf of the local authority she departed from her written evidence and said that she had performed chest compressions before the ambulance attended. In cross-examination on behalf of F, she said that she performed these compressions just before the ambulance crew walked in; they then took over. She was unable to say what level of pressure she had applied but said she did not want to be ‘too heavy-handed’.

Before reaching my conclusions I have watched the CCTV footage in Clips 1 and 2 multiple times including frame by frame. I have also re-read the written evidence, my notes of the oral evidence and the written and oral the submissions made to me.

I accept the submission made by Ms Hendry KC that, save for what has been recorded by the two ambulance paramedics, the evidence is broadly consistent in relation to M’s account of when she first noticed that J was bleeding. I am prepared to accept that at the moment when the paramedics arrived, M will have been in a state of complete panic and, in circumstances where the focus will have been on providing life-saving treatment to J, there is plenty of scope for the paramedics to have misunderstood what M was saying about J’s bleeding. I will proceed on the basis therefore that M has been consistent in saying that she first noticed bleeding when J was downstairs, not in her flat prior to making the emergency call.

On balance, I am prepared to accept that M gave chest compressions to J but knowing the harm he had already been caused, I think it is unlikely that she did so vigorously. I was not assisted by this finding in reaching my conclusions about the fractures.

Having watched the CCTV footage, I am unable to accept the submission made by Ms Hendry KC that J’s injuries were likely to have been caused accidentally while M was running down the corridor. I have not seen anything in the footage – including what is asserted on behalf of M to be the sudden forward movement shown in Clip 2 – which would equate to the type of vigorous movement which Dr Cartlidge said would be needed to give rise to the injuries. This is a view shared by Dr Cartlidge himself.

M herself has given no explanation for how these injuries occurred. She has not suggested, for example, that in response to J going floppy she attempted to resuscitate him by shaking.

On the balance of probabilities, I have come to the clear conclusion that J’s injuries were caused by M shaking him. I find that the shake occurred prior to J going floppy, not in response to it. I do not find that M caused J’s head to strike a semi-yielding object. The evidence about this is speculative.

It is inherently improbable, although not impossible, that a parent would shake a child to revive him; M has not suggested that she did so. It is far more likely, in my judgement, that M shook J in frustration in what was characterised by Ms Hendry as ‘a momentary loss of control’. Her tiredness is likely to have contributed to her feelings of frustration and impatience. I bear in mind that two nights previously she had gone out until after 5am only then to spend most of the remainder of the day in a police cell.

Only M can know what precisely caused her loss of control. Her actions in waking J and subjecting him to repeated changes of clothing may well have caused him to cry, triggering M to respond in that way. It is quite possible that M finds it difficult or impossible to confront what she did, given the gravity of the harm caused to J by her actions. I have no doubt that seeing J go floppy will have caused her to panic; she will have realised at that point that his life was at risk.

M’s actions have caused J to suffer devastating injuries to his brain, summarised above and at paragraph 1(a) to (f) of the local authority’s Schedule of Findings. He was clearly suffering significant harm as a consequence of her actions on 30 September 2025. He is at risk of developing cerebral palsy, epilepsy and blindness.

M’s previous convictions are a matter of public record. She admits working as a ‘content creator’ of intimate videos and to scamming customers. I do not accept that any of these matters give rise to a conclusion that J was at risk of significant harm in her care. I consider their relevance to the welfare issues I have to consider to be peripheral.

I reach a similar conclusion about the events of 27/28 September 2024. I find that M was wholly irresponsible to go out until the early hours of the morning but this alone would not lead me to find the threshold criteria satisfied. I am unable to make clear findings as to the cause of the ensuing altercation. I do consider that M’s repeated decision to go out until late while caring for a young baby who had been born prematurely is relevant to the welfare issues engaged.

For the reasons set out above, I find that the threshold criteria in section 31 of the Children Act 1989 are met. On the relevant date (30 September 2024) J was both suffering and likely to suffer significant harm attributable to the care given to him by M if an order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give him.

M’s case is that having made my findings of fact, I should adjourn the proceedings to enable her to be further assessed. I reject this.

Mr Stott is right to make the point that the proceedings have now been ongoing for almost a year, well beyond the 26 week limit enshrined in statute. The statutory limit would not have deterred me from providing for a further assessment if I thought that there was a realistic possibility of it leading to a different outcome from the assessments already undertaken by the local authority and the guardian. I do not.

There is an abundance of evidence which demonstrates that M struggles to maintain a consistent commitment to J. The parenting assessment records that she missed 10 out of 33 periods of the twice weekly family time which was arranged for her between January and April 2025 (albeit with good reason on 3 occasions).

There is also a considerable amount of evidence which demonstrates that M is unreceptive to advice. I shall not repeat the extracts from her medical records I have referred to above. For the purposes of the local authority’s parenting assessment, she was offered 15 parenting sessions. She agreed to 13 of these, but then attended just 5. The guardian similarly struggled to engage with M. M did not respond well to being advised on occasion by contact workers to exercise care when, for example, she moved away from J on his changing table. Ultimately, I agree with the assessment of Ms Downing in her parenting assessment when she says at paragraph 140:

I acknowledge that in the very recent past M has agreed to take up one specific referral proposed to her, but this has only happened at the eleventh hour in the shadow of this hearing and I have no confidence that M will go through with that to which she has agreed. Ms Hendry KC is able to make the fair point that M was able to maintain regular commitments with professionals (in particular the health visitor and NCOT worker) during September 2024 when J was in her care. The majority of these visits, however, took place at her home and even then she was unable to keep to one of them.

I consider, moreover, that at J’s young age, a delay in the proceedings for a period which would be measured in months is inimical to his welfare. He is presently in limbo and urgently needs decisions to be made about his future. If, as the local authority and guardian recommend, the best outcome for him is to be adopted, the process of finding a suitable adoptive family needs be commenced without delay. As a consequence of J’s injuries and the disabilities he is at risk of having in future, it may well be more difficult to find a suitable adoptive placement for him than it would be for another child without those difficulties.

I entirely accept that if at all possible children should be brought up by their parents or alternatively other members of their family. Adjourning the case for a further assessment would leave open the possibility of an outcome for J which I accept is the optimal outcome for most children. It is the outcome which would best meet his identity needs and maintain the bonds he has already established with M through the family time which has taken place. It is not, however, a possibility that should be kept open at all costs. Sadly, I do not regard it as realistic to conclude that the adjournment sought by M will ultimately serve any purpose. Aside from the issues relating to her inability to engage with an assessment and respond to advice, I cannot ignore the fact that I have found her responsible for inflicting very serious injuries on J. She has not acknowledged what occurred and has been untruthful about it.

My rejection of the mother’s adjournment application does not mean that I must accede to the local authority’s applications. A care plan entailing adoption coupled with a placement order is a Draconian solution for any child. It needs to be clearly justified as a proportionate way of securing J’s best interests throughout his life; otherwise it would be an infringement of his Article 8 rights and those of his parents. Before alighting upon the right solution for J, I must give careful scrutiny to all the ‘realistic’ options for him including returning to the care of M, remaining in foster care under a care order and being placed for adoption as the local authority and guardian propose.

Moreover, I cannot make a placement order unless I find it is necessary to dispense with the consent of J’s parents on the basis that his welfare demands it.

Within her final SWET statement, Ms Downing has conducted an analysis of the ‘realistic options’ and considered each of the matters set out in the welfare checklist that features in the Children Act 1989. In her addendum final statement she has addressed the matters in the ‘enhanced welfare checklist’ that finds expression in the Adoption and Children Act 2002. I essentially agree with her analysis in those two documents and shall not lengthen this judgment by repeating it. I also agree with the child impact analysis of the guardian which, again, I shall not repeat.

With regret, I have been driven to the conclusion that for a combination of reasons it would not be safe for J to be cared for by M. The injuries sustained by him are serious and mean that throughout his life he is going to need a level and consistency of care which M is not capable of providing for him. M has perpetrated the injuries and been unable to acknowledge what she has done. In my view, notwithstanding the points made by Ms Hendry KC and Mr Krumins at paragraph 86 of their closing submissions, J would be a risk of suffering further serious injuries were he to return to her care in those circumstances. This is especially so, as M has demonstrated that she is unwilling or unable to receive and respond to parenting advice. I note in any event that at present the conditions of M’s bail would preclude her from caring for J.

F is in prison and will not be released until 2028. There are no other family members who can care for J.

I have given anxious consideration to the potential for me to reject the local authority’s care plan and make an interim care order with an invitation for it to formulate an alternative.

Adoption should only be contemplated as a last resort if ‘nothing else would do’. There is no guarantee that if J is placed for adoption, a suitable placement will be found. Adoption will lead to his ties with his birth parents being severed and this may well have long-term implications for J’s sense of identity. Adoptive placements break down, a potential which may be more likely with a child such as J who is likely to have needs that are challenging.

Long-term foster care is also an imperfect solution for a child, especially one as young as J. Many of the reasons for this are generic and relate to the inherent deficiencies in the care system and the stigma that may be felt by a young person growing up within that system. I respectfully adopt what the guardian has said at paragraph 94 of her final analysis in this respect. In considering the option of long-term fostering as an alternative to adoption, I have also been assisted by the analysis of Baker LJ in Re R and C (Adoption or Fostering) (citation above). Each case is, however, fact specific. It does not follow from R and C that what was right for the children in that case will necessarily be the best outcome for J.

In addition to the generic factors about fostering to which I have referred, I am told that J’s current foster carers are relatively old. They have not offered to care for him on a long-term basis; even if it was decided that J should remain in long-term foster care under a care order there is a likelihood that he would need to move at least once to new foster home. Conversely, I accept that long-term foster care could have the benefit to J of enabling him to continue to have family time with his parents (albeit, in F’s case his present incarceration poses challenges in this regard); the force of this point is reduced, however, by M’s lack of consistency in attending family time. Long-term fostering may not carry the same risk as adoption to J’s sense of identity although, as pointed out by the guardian, it carries the risk that J will feel stigmatised as a child in the care system.

J has already had a very disrupted start to his young life with two prolonged stays in hospital punctuated by a short period in his mother’s care when he experienced episodes of abuse. As a result of his enhanced needs, he is a child who - more than most children – has an urgent need for a stable home. He has suffered very great physical harm and needs and deserves the opportunity to have a permanent home which can offer him that stability. In my judgement, this pressing need can only adequately be met if an adoptive placement is found for him. J’s need for permanence and the stability this would offer him outweighs by a considerable margin the advantages of maintaining links with his family that could be achieved were he to remain in long-term foster care. J’s identity needs can to some extent be met through careful life story work which will be undertaken.

In all the circumstances, I am entirely satisfied that making the care order and placement order sought by the local authority accord with his welfare throughout his life. A placement order is an order of last resort, but in J’s case I am satisfied that that such an order is necessary and proportionate; nothing else will do. I am also satisfied that that J’s welfare requires me to dispense with the consent of his parents to the making of a placement order.

So far as family time is concerned, the local authority proposes that J’s present twice weekly contact with M should reduce over six weeks from weekly to fortnightly to monthly. It would continue to take place on a monthly basis until an adoptive family has been found when a final ‘wish you well’ visit would be offered.

Following input from the guardian, the local authority has revised its position in relation to F’s family time and proposes to set this out in an amended care plan Subject to the consent of the prison governor and suitable facilities being made available it proposes to facilitate monthly visits to him also.

In its care plan, the local authority proposed that post-adoption contact should take place on a yearly basis with each parent by letterbox. The guardian suggests that it should take place on a six monthly basis and I understand that the local authority now agrees with this. I also agree, whilst accepting the point that it would not be appropriate at this juncture to be overly prescriptive if this had the effect of limiting the potential placements for J.

Mr Duncan in particular submits on behalf of F that the local authority should not simply be trusted to implement the family time arrangements which are to be set out in their amended care plan. He points out that even though it has been concluded that J should be able to see F in prison, no such visits have yet taken place. He invites me to make an order pursuant to section 26 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 setting out the arrangements for family time in order to ensure that they take place. I understand his position to be supported by M who also seeks an order for contact.

Although I have a degree of sympathy with the parents’ submissions about contact, I have come to the conclusion that the better way forward is to record the proposed arrangements in a recital to my order. In my view, it is in J’s interests that the local authority retains some flexibility as to the arrangements; it is difficult for them to predict how M in particular is likely to react to a decision which will be devastating for her. In F’s case, the arrangements will always be subject to the consent of the prison governor and will depend on the availability of suitable facilities. If issues arise in relation to family time, it will be open to either parent to apply back to court; any such application should be reserved to me and can be dealt with remotely at least in the first instance.

After circulating the judgment in draft I have been asked on behalf of M to provide further clarification in relation to certain paragraphs. Although I am not convinced that the judgment requires any further clarification, I address this request below.

On behalf of M, it is suggested that the injuries could have been caused inadvertently by M after she was last seen on camera in Clip 1. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the fact that at the end of Clip 1, M increases her pace in what is suggested to be a sign of rising panic. I have been asked to clarify my reasons for rejecting this suggestion. They are as follows:

I am invited by M to provide ‘reasoning and basis’ for my clear conclusion, which was reached on the balance of probabilities. I do not consider this an appropriate request. My conclusion is based upon the totality of the evidence. I have set out the medical evidence. I have explained elsewhere in the judgment my rejection of alternative explanations ventured on behalf of M. I have made findings in relation to other injuries suffered by J. I have made findings in relation to M’s parenting more generally and her tiredness, impatience and frustration. I shall not repeat these.

I do not consider it appropriate for me to elaborate further in relation to these paragraphs of the judgment.