A (A Child) (Mother killed by Father), Re

I am asked to determine the following questions: -

I heard this final hearing on a remote basis over two days and at the conclusion of the hearing reserved judgment. I have considered the papers contained within two hearing bundles; the evidence of the witnesses who gave evidence before me, and the submissions of counsel. I have also heard representations from the London Borough of Haringey (“LBH”) who attended the hearing throughout as an interested party. I also heard brief submissions as to the transparency order from Mr Woods, criminal correspondent for The Times.

To an extent the hearing had two parts. The paternal grandparents heard all the evidence but by prior direction were not present to hear the submissions made with regards to the issues between the applicant and first respondent and which considered questions (i) to (iii) above.

The facts which underlie this hearing are tragic and no summary can do proper justice to the great loss and immense sadness experienced by A’s maternal family as a result of these events.

A was born on [ ] and is now 3½ years of age. A’s mother was Kennedi Westcarr-Sabaroche. On 5 April 2024, aged only 25, she was strangled to death by the first respondent. On 1 September 2025 having accepted a guilty plea based on diminished responsibility, HHJ Newbury sitting at the Inner London Crown Court made a hospital order with restrictions. HHJ Newbury observed the first respondent’s time in hospital ‘will be measured in years and possibly be lifelong.’

The full sentencing remarks can be found at https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/R-v-Gogoa-Tape.pdf. For this judgment I consider it important to cite the following paragraphs from the remarks of HHJ Newbury:

It is in this context that I come to assess the issues in the case.

On 12 April 2024, seven days after her daughter’s killing, the applicant applied to the Court for an order for A to live with her. She also sought (1) a prohibited steps order to prevent A being removed from her care by the paternal grandparents and (2) parental responsibility. On that day, the applicant was granted permission to bring the application on a without notice basis, and the Court made a prohibited steps order as sought. The Judge requested that LBH attend the return hearing which was fixed on 16 April 2024.

On the return date the Court heard from LBH and was ‘entirely satisfied’ it was in the child’s interests to remain in the primary care of the applicant. The Court made an interim ‘lives with’ order and thus granted the applicant parental responsibility for the duration of the order. The Court made clear she was in the interim solely entitled to make decisions for the child. The Court continued the prohibited steps order and gave further directions leading to a review on 20 June 2024.

On 20 June 2024, the paternal grandparents attended the hearing. The applicant sought an interim supervision order, but this was refused by the Judge given the agreement of LBH to remain involved and to keep under review the question of care proceedings. The paternal grandparents sought contact, but this was refused although they were given permission to pursue this application. LBH made certain financial commitments to support the applicant. By this point the applicant was seeking the court to consider the making of a special guardianship order and an assessment was directed together with a section 7 report.

On 26 September 2024 and following consultation with MacDonald J. the application was reallocated to be heard by a Judge of the High Court with permission for the same to be heard by a Deputy Judge of the Division. It is on this basis that I hear this case.

On 12 November 2024, the child was joined as a party to the proceedings and a section 16.4 guardian appointed. The paternal grandparents withdrew their own application for a special guardianship assessment, and a risk assessment was ordered as to spending time arrangements between them and the child. The proceedings were timetabled towards a Dispute Resolution Appointment on 28 April 2025.

On 28 April 2025 directions were given towards this final hearing.

At the heart of my decision-making rests the child’s welfare as my paramount consideration. I will approach this using the checklist found at section 1(3) Children Act 1989. This will be shaped in the light of the fact that this is a case impacted by domestic abuse and thus caught by PD12J and as such I must consider each feature of the welfare checklist with the facts of the established domestic abuse in mind.

Special Guardianship is provided for under section14A-G of the Children Act 1989. It is intended to be an order that provides a heightened level of permanence for a child who cannot live with either parent. This is signified by the fact that any application to discharge such an order requires the permission of the Court to be entertained. A holder of special guardianship has an enhanced form of parental responsibility which permits that person to determine the way in which matters of parental responsibility should be exercised and in the event of a dispute between holders of parental responsibility that special guardian has authority to decide the outcome. The question of whether a special guardianship order should be made turns on the welfare assessment.

Parental responsibility is a collection of rights and responsibilities which automatically accord to a mother and to a father married to the mother of the child. An unmarried father will obtain the same rights if he is named on the child’s birth certificate and may alternatively obtain these rights following parental agreement or order of the Court. The Court cannot remove parental responsibility from a married father but may do so in the case of an unmarried father pursuant to section 4(2) Children Act 1989. The applicant holds parental responsibility under her lives with order and can make this application: section 4(3).

In D (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ. 315 the Court of Appeal held:

In CW v SG (Parental Responsibility Consequential Orders) [2013] EWHC 854 (Fam) the Court held:

In Dawson v Wearmouth [1999] UKHL 18 the Court made clear any change of name is a serious matter requiring careful consideration and to which the welfare test applies. To justify a change, it is necessary to show the change would be better than retaining the status quo. In Re W, Re A, Re B (Change of Name) 2 FLR 932 the Court identified a list of likely relevant considerations:

The Court has power to control future applications by imposing a provision that future applications will require the permission of the Court before they may be issued and served on respondent parties. Through this filter the Court can restrict future applications and refuse the issuing of the same. Under section 91(14):

The is well established case law setting out the way the Court should approach this question. Such an order infringes upon the article 6 rights of a potential party and must be exercised with care. In recent times the notion of such orders has been extended in cases of domestic abuse to protect a victim of abuse from further abuse through the continuation of proceedings. This extension has significantly relaxed the circumstances and way in which the Court approaches such decision-making. No longer is it necessary to first establish a foundation based upon vexatious behaviour or repeated applications. No longer is any sense of exceptionality required. The Court is now more willing to utilise this power to provide protection and to achieve an emotionally safe environment. The Court must nonetheless provide a reasoned explanation when it makes such an order and must continue to be mindful as to questions of proportionality when fixing the duration of such orders.

I am asked to determine a range of significant matters for A. Nevertheless, the evidence heard was limited in scope. Mr Tape did not give evidence but made brief submissions as to revocation of parental responsibility and name change. The main evidence concerned the request of the paternal grandparents for contact but even that must be seen in the light of their significant concession as to this being indirect contact only by the end of the case. As such I can deal with the key issues in relatively short order.

I intend to grant Ms Westcarr special guardianship. She has been doing an excellent job caring for her granddaughter and ensuring her welfare needs are well met. I appreciate she does so with the support of family members. This is a sign of strength not weakness. A is lucky indeed to have had her mother’s family ready and available to step up and care for her following theses tragic events. Whilst I am no doubt this approach is founded on the love they have for A, I am sure it is also a function of the respect and love they had for her mother and their wish to honour her through raising her daughter to be the adult she would have wanted to have seen her become.

This outcome is one which is supported by the professionals and opposed by no-one.

I consider a child arrangements order would be an inadequate alternative solution on the facts of the case as I consider A requires the permanence and stability that can only be offered by the making of a special guardianship order. This will fortify her placement and provide a solid protective legal wall around it helping ensure it carries her through her childhood without challenge or interruption. It will also ensure Ms Westcarr is the decision maker with respect to the important decisions that will come to be made for A. Finally, it will provide necessary support to assist Ms Westcarr in continuing to meet A’s welfare needs to a high standard.

This is plainly the right answer when one applies the welfare checklist. A is thriving and happy in her grandmother’s care and whilst her wishes and feelings are those of a young child they must be considered. Her needs are being well met, and this order will provide Ms Westcarr the support and confidence to continue providing the same over the coming years. Whilst it might be felt this does not amount to a change of circumstance that would be a superficial assessment. The granting of special guardianship will not change the facts on the ground so far as A is concerned but it will provide to Ms Westcarr invaluable support and legal status which will solidify the care she is providing. Furthermore, it will help meet A’s identity needs in being the best connection she can have to her mother and the best route through which she can come to know her mother in her absence. The placement has so far met her needs fully and it will continue to keep her safe. Finally, it is clear Ms Westcarr is competent, committed, and capable of meeting A’s needs into the future. I have considered the relevant assessment and accept its recommendations without hesitation.

The arguments in this regard can be simply stated. Mr Tape objects to the removal of his name (and particularly so when considered at the same time as the request for revocation of parental responsibility) on the basis that it will sever his connection to A and will remove him from her life irrespective of whether he is in fact wishing seeing her. In contrast the counter argument made is that this continuing link is a matter of significant distress to the maternal family and particularly to Ms Westcarr and that this distress has the potential to have a meaningful and negative impact on the care provided to A. It acts as a constant reminder of Mr Tape and thus maintains the hurt and distress arising out of his actions. Finally, it raises a significant emotional question with regards to A insofar as she bears the name of the person who killed her mother. At some point in time there would need to be an explanation to her as to why such an outcome has been deemed to be the right approach.

I have also been asked to insert into the child’s name her mother’s name as a tribute and reminder of her role in her daughter’s life. This is not controversial between the parties.

I agree with the inclusion of the name ‘Kennedi.’ I can only see this bringing a positive impact on the child. There is no doubt she will miss her mother and the inclusion of her mother’s name into her own name will give her a level of comfort which I consider to be important. I hope this will be the case. It will provide an important continuing link to her mother which I believe she will come to cherish as a significant part of her identity.

I have reached the conclusion it is A’s welfare interests to change her surname and remove the name Tape. I agree its continued use is likely to have a profound negative impact upon her. I agree this will arise in one regard through the impact it will have on those caring for A and being compelled to use the name of the individual who killed her mother. But there is also an obvious and predictable emotional impact for A of having to understand and attempt to come to terms with why it is that she continues to bear the name of the man who killed her mother. It is difficult to conceive of circumstances which will be other than highly negative for her arising from the same. This would compound the challenge for the maternal family who would then be required to help her navigate through this notwithstanding the very same impact it is having upon them.

I agree one must have regard to the decision making of the parents at the point of name registration and their choice to signify the significance of Mr Tape as A’s father by the insertion of his name. This was an important decision which confirmed A’s identity and her broad cultural heritage. In many cases this would be a weighty factor countering the proposed change. I accept in many cases in which a relationship is not continuing the fact of a name is an important residual connection. However, on the facts of this case the connection is now entirely seen through the prism of the subsequent tragic events and these circumstances amount to a material change of circumstances that lead to a resetting of the significance of the initial decision making.

Should a time come when A reflects on the circumstances and wishes to reinstate her father’s name then she would be at liberty to do so. But at this time when considering her welfare needs, I am confident it is the right decision to make to remove Mr Tape’s name from her name. I have explained why this brings a clear and obvious welfare positive when compared to making no change.

It should be borne in mind that this order will not change A’s birth certificate which will continue to retain her full registered name. The parties are referred to the President’s Guidance in such regard dated 24 October 2025. There are only limited circumstances in which the GRO can amend the birth certificate, and the circumstances of this case do not permit the same.

The arguments in this regard had parallels with the arguments raised with respect to the proposed change of surname. Those proposing revocation highlighted the impact that preserving parental responsibility would have upon Ms Westcarr, notwithstanding the making of a special guardianship order, and upon A. In contrast Mr Tape submitted this would further undermine his role and status and would thus negatively impact A. Finally, he made the point that he would be unlikely to seek to actively exercise his parental responsibility in any event and as such there was in fact no need to revoke the same.

The answer to this question follows in my assessment from the history of the case. I make the following points:

In my judgment this is a case in which it is right to revoke parental responsibility.

Having regard to the range of points set out above I have concluded it is appropriate to make a section 91(14) order. This is a case at the extreme of domestic abuse, and I consider Ms Westcarr and A are victims of domestic abuse through the prism of PD12J and in accordance with section 3 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. The effect of this abuse will be life long and will continue to impact on A at all stages of her life.

I consider Ms Westcarr, and A needs the fullest space available to permit repair of the harm done and to rebuild their lives without Kennedi as part of those lives. I am in no doubt any application which might come to be made by Mr Tape must first have applied to it a filter of consideration prior to being issued.

This is a clear case in which it will be important to protect the family from ill judged applications, applications which are premature and applications which have little or no merit. To permit applications to be issued without filter and indeed to leave open the possibility of the same is in my assessment bound to be harmful to the family unit.

As such there must be a section 91(14) filter applied. On the facts of this case this is one of the rare cases in which the filter should endure over the currency of the A’s childhood. I intend to make an order until her 18^th birthday.

Of course, this will not prevent applications being made but it will ensure only appropriate applications proceed. Ms Westcarr has asked to be informed if an application were made but refused. On the facts of the case, I agree this approach should be taken.

It was this issue which engaged most of the live evidence in the case. I heard from the social worker, guardian and both grandparents. At the outset of the hearing the grandparents were asking the court to consider ordering direct contact between themselves and A. However, by the time of final submissions they were accepting of indirect contact only. A second issue related to whether there should also be a s91(14) order in their regard and if so, for how long.

In final submissions the grandparents suggested there should be a minimum of yearly birthday and Christmas indirect contact (a present and card) together with 4 letters each year. They argued there was already a filter in play in their regard under section 10(9) Children Act and as such there was no need for a section 91(14) order. However, if one were required then it should be restricted to a period of 5-years.

I listened to the evidence with care. I have reservations as to accepting the evidence of the grandparents at face value.

In the written evidence the professionals had expressed the understanding that the grandparents continued to advocate for a role for their son in A’s life. This concerned the professionals as to the potential for this to undermine the emotional wellbeing of the child. In evidence both grandparents told me they had from the start accepted he should have no role in her life. Having heard the evidence, I favour the professional account.

Secondly, I was concerned by the evidence given by the guardian as to the willingness of the grandparents to engage with her assessment process. The grandfather indicated he would only meet with her towards the end of the process with a lawyer present and on the basis the meeting was recorded. This calls into question their attitude and motivations. The guardian recorded the grandfather having elevated emotions when in communication with her. She fairly expressed a level of understanding as his feelings. But this does reinforce the impression that emotions remain high, that there is a level of distrust between the families and that there is a real risk of destabilisation of A arising out of the same.

Thirdly, I accept the evidence that there were some unseemly behaviours from the paternal family (for the avoidance of doubt not the paternal grandparents themselves) at the sentencing hearing. The evidence indicates there was shouting at the maternal family. I consider this further indicates a continuing high level of emotional conflict which has the potential to undermine A’s care.

The evidence indicates a lack of insight and understanding as to the situation. The professionals expressed concern as to A hearing unfiltered views from the paternal family were contact permitted. The response from the paternal grandparents was that this was equally possible when she spends time with the maternal family. I felt this indicated a lack of awareness and understanding of the fact that the maternal family come from a very different position in considering the history and thus are most unlikely to provide a narrative to A that undermines her understanding of her life history.

I accept the professional evidence that A’s welfare now demands a period of sustained reparative care and that at point in time it is inconsistent with her welfare for there to be anything other than indirect contact with her paternal family. She needs to come to understand and make sense of her history and this is best achieved in a safe emotional space in which there is a clear accepted narrative which shapes her understanding. This can be best achieved through a focused role for the maternal family alone. Whilst I accept her paternal family have had a role to date in her early life; her future care and management of her emotions must now be approached through the events that led to a profound change for her. Again, this will be most successfully managed by it being undertaken by her maternal family alone. I am not willing to entertain any orders which will or may likely undermine this crucial process of repair.

I therefore endorse the suggestion of indirect contact only. On my assessment this is best set on two occasions per annum. To the extent that I disagree with the professional recommendations, I consider this a relatively small disagreement. In any event the management of the indirect contact from the paternal grandparents, and how it may be shared with A will fall to Ms Westcarr in the first instance. The letters are intended to assist with life story work for A, and I am neither expecting nor requiring Ms Westcarr to provide a response to the same.

I agree there should be a section 91(14) order. The process under s10(9) is a filter exercise but importantly it does not prevent the application being issued and notified. It is only then that permission is considered. The benefit of s91(14) is that it can filter out unmeritorious claims without significant impact on the suggested respondent. In cases which engage issues of domestic abuse this is an important function of the section 91(14) order. I consider there should be a distinction though as to the length of the order as it relates to the paternal grandparents. In my assessment an appropriate period for this order is to cover A’s primary school years. I consider that is a proportionate period and I will make it to last until her 12^th birthday. That amounts to a significant period in which to allow A to make the necessary progress. Of course, it neither means an application should be issued thereafter or that if so, it will succeed.

In the normal course of events, I would have published this judgment on an anonymised basis. I am asked to make a transparency order permitting reporting. This is not opposed by any party, and I agree the balancing exercise of article 8 and 10 rights point in favour of such permission and order. There is a natural and justified public interest in reporting this case. The circumstances of the case are sadly less unusual than one would hope for and the mechanism and manner by which the family justice system considers and resolves such cases is a matter worthy of fair reporting. The question of revocation of parental responsibility remains a matter of significant political debate and it is important the public can see that such issues can be considered and resolved in a child focused manner within the existing legal structure.

An unusual feature of this case is the wish of Ms Westcarr, the press and guardian for the right to report the identity of Ms Westcarr, Ms Westcarr-Sabaroche and Mr Tape. No one is suggesting the child, or the paternal grandparents should be identified. It is agreed the local authority can be identified but there is disagreement as to the naming of the social worker. I should make clear Mr Tape does not dispute the making of such an order.

The local authority has questioned the propriety of naming the family members on the basis that this will risk identifying the child. I have considered these points but reject them as there is very clear evidence of existing reporting in the public domain concerning the criminal process which has already identified the family members in very clear terms. This judgment will join up public understanding, but it will not go any further to identifying A than the reporting to date will have done.

In my assessment any appropriately balanced assessment plainly weighs in favour of transparency and the making of the order sought.

But I do not agree the transparency should extend to naming the allocated social worker. This is a case in which the local authority has been subject to significant criticism by Ms Westcarr and part of the logic for reporting on her behalf is to enable a proper ventilation of the perceived failings of the criminal and family justice systems. Yet the allocated social worker is not in fact the subject of any of these criticisms. I am concerned there is a danger of a critique of the local authority being wrongly attached to the social worker with significant potential personal implications which are objectively wholly unjustified. I do not intend to name him in this judgment which will be placed into the public domain subject to appropriate redactions and I do not include him within the transparency terms. This will certainly not stifle Ms Westcarr’s legitimate wish to draw attention to her concerns surrounding this case anymore than it will limit the ability of the press to report these proceedings.

In preparation for this final hearing, it appeared I was being asked to consider whether the local authority had manifestly failed in its duty to the maternal family. However, at the outset of the hearing I was told that these issues, so far as they were relevant were not being pursued in the context of this final hearing of the Children Act proceedings. As such this judgment does not engage with those issues and there is no need for me to detail the same.

I have though been asked to reflect on the way in which the case has been managed when considered against the leading guidance in respect of cases in which parental homicide has occurred. I agree it is appropriate to address these points within this judgment.

In Re A & B [2010] EWHC 3824 (Fam) Hogg J. gave clear guidance as to the approach that should be taken in cases in which one parent kills or is believed to have killed the other parent. This guidance remains valid and has been repeated on numerous occasions. The guidance is short, clear and should be known to professionals working in the field of child protection.

In essence the guidance recognises the real challenges that may arise following such a killing. There may be a real likelihood of a child or children being caught up in significant family turmoil in the days following the death of one parent. They may find themselves subject to disputes as to the reality of what has taken place and dispute as to their placement and with all of this coming at the very worst moment for the child who will be struggling with the loss of one parent at the hands of another. There is the obvious potential for this to be a safeguarding risk.

Hogg J made the following points:

The guidance continues to explain the interaction between the different justice systems and the role of professionals and support for the children and carers.

Complaint is made in this case as to the local authority failing to issue proceeding whether before or after the point at which Ms Westcarr issued her own application. The sense of the criticism is that the local authority failed to act in accordance with the guidance. Many of the points which were to be placed before (but were not) related the differences that may have arisen for the family had A come to be viewed as a looked after child rather than a child subject to a private law order.

Having considered these points, I do not find the criticism of the local authority is merited. In this case there was a short delay before the local authority was notified of the tragic events. They had no previous involvement with the family. Within days thereafter Ms Westcarr appropriately acted by seeking and obtaining a child arrangement order which safely met the welfare needs of the child. It was in this context that the local authority was required to consider the question as to whether proceedings were required. I can understand why they judged this was not required given the Court had already acted and the child was being provided with secure care. Indeed, in a different context the local authority may have been criticised for a lack of sensitivity if they had then acted in a manner which appeared to suggest they might remove the child from her maternal family. In my assessment this simply cannot be said to be a situation in which the separate parts of the family were left to resolve the dispute themselves. As I make clear action had already been appropriately taken and the arrangements had been formally sanctioned by the Court.

I agree there have been some procedural errors. There was delay in the appointment of the guardian and in the reallocation of the matter to High Court level. Having said this the Court acted promptly to safeguard the interests of the child and made immediate decisions which can be seen with hindsight to be well judged. In due course the necessary procedural steps were taken. Ultimately A’s placement with her grandmother was secured and the dispute (such as it was) was contained within the secure environment of the Court. It is disappointing it has taken so long for there to be a resolution although it is not obvious from the procedural timeline where time savings could have been made.

These are my conclusions.

Before concluding this judgment, I would wish to pay tribute to the legal team for Ms Westcarr. They have represented her on a pro-bono basis, but this has in no way devalued the high-quality content of the work they have done and the submissions I have heard on her behalf. She is lucky to have received such support, and I am immensely grateful for their efforts which have been deployed on her behalf. Ultimately A has been the beneficiary of this work, and I am sure this is sufficient reward for Mr Barnes and the legal team behind Ms Westcarr. They have my thanks.

I will now send this judgment out in both an open and redacted form (the form in which it will be published). I will accept any corrections and requests for clarification by 9.00am on Monday 3 November 2025. The judgment will be handed down electronically without attendance at 10am on 3 November 2025. I would like draft orders by 4pm on 3 November 2025. I would ask the local authority to liaise with the hospital to ensure a copy of this judgment is appropriately supplied to Mr Tape. The judgment can be shared with both lay and professional clients.

I wish A and those who care for her the very best.