M v F

I provide this reserved judgment in respect of a three-day final hearing held between 22 and 24 September 2025 following which I received written submissions from counsel on 29 September 2025. In this judgment I refer to the applicant mother as M, the respondent father as F and the children, Y (d.o.b. 2022) and Z (d.o.b. 2024) by their first names.

The hearing proceeded as an attended hearing - save in the case of the evidence of the expert witness who gave evidence from X. I heard from both parents, the expert witness and the section 7 reporter (Ms K of the London Borough of […]). I have also considered the papers in the hearing bundles and the variety of additional documents, including audio and video files, relied upon by the parties. I bear all of this in mind when reaching my conclusions whether I explicitly reference the same or not.

The issues are as follows:

The proceedings commenced in March 2025 when F applied for a prohibited steps order to prevent M removing the children from the jurisdiction. I made a without notice order on 13 March 2025. This was continued and remains in force at the date of final hearing. On 19 May 2025 M made application for child arrangements and for an order permitting her and the children to relocate to X. This became the lead application in the proceedings. Directions, including a section 7 report, were made on 21 May 2025.

On 16 July 2025 HHJ Downey (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) set down interim child arrangements providing for the children to live with M and to have indirect contact with F. The application was reallocated to the High Court and expert international jurisdictional evidence was directed along with disclosure directions and witness statements. A PTR and this final hearing were listed. The PTR followed on 15 September 2025 with the terms of this final hearing being confirmed.

Separate to the above on 8 June 2025 both paternal grandparents and aunt applied for permission to seek a child arrangement spending time with order. This application has been held over to the handing down of judgment hearing (see concluding paragraphs of this judgment).

I have a helpful chronology from which I take the following points. F is aged 40 and M 31. F was born in the UK and is of [ ] heritage. His close family live in this country. M was born and raised in X where her family remain. The parents met on a Muslim dating site in February 2021 and had a religious marriage ceremony in X in May 2021. M travelled to this country pursuant to a spousal visa in December 2021 and took up residence with F. Y was born in the following August with Z following 2 years later.

In March 2025 M separated from F with the assistance of a health visitor following allegations of domestic abuse. The parties have not reconciled since this date and have had no contact. M and the children have been provided with refuge accommodation. On 5 March 2025 F was arrested and subsequently charged with a number of offences. He was initially remanded in custody but subsequently released on bail conditions in April 2025. The indictment before the Crown Court alleges (1) threats to kill against M; (2) GBH against M; (3) ABH against M; (4) Assault by beating of M, and (5) Cruelty to Z. F has pleaded guilty to some of the charges but awaits trial for the balance of the matters. This was due in September 2025 but has been rescheduled to May 2026.

The allegations in this case have been reduced to a very helpful 18-page schedule. This sets out the allegation in chronological order and colour codes the same by reference to categories of abuse being: (1) Verbal and Physical abuse of the children; (2) Physical abuse of the mother; (3) Threats to the mother including threats to harm and/or kill her; (4) Verbal abuse of the mother; (5) Emotional abuse; (6) Controlling behaviour towards the mother. I attach this as Annex 1.

F makes substantial admissions. In addition, at the top of the schedule F further concedes that it would have been emotionally harmful for the children to have been living in the home in which this abuse was taking place. The abuse is evidentially supported by contemporaneous recordings and various messaging. Realistically many of the allegations are difficult to dispute in the light of the same. The chronology of abuse runs from 10 April 2022 (4-months after F entered the jurisdiction and at a point at which she was pregnant with Y) to 4 March 2025 when F and the children left the family home. Any consideration of the agreed matters makes clear that this was a consistently abusive relationship throughout.

In the light of the admissions, I was asked by F to dispense with the need for further fact finding. I did not agree with this submission. The matters remaining in dispute largely touch on issues of physical abuse (both of M [allegation 2a; 2c-g] and Z [allegation 1b]) and I did not consider the Court would have a sufficiently formed understanding of the impact of abuse on M and the children without resolving the same. I note in respect of the allegations of physical abuse of M certain matters are admitted whilst disputing the full details of the incident.

In determining the matters in dispute, I remind myself it is entirely for M to prove each of the allegations. F has no burden to disprove any of the allegations. An allegation will be proven and thereafter treated as a fact in the case if it is established as being more likely than not to have occurred. If an allegation is not established to this extent, it will be entirely ignored when I turn to the welfare determination. Each allegation must be proven in its own right, and it would be wholly impermissible to take a short cut and find specific allegations of physical abuse proven simply because I have found a separate allegation of such behaviour proven. But this does not mean I cannot have regard to specific findings when considering other allegations placed before me. Indeed, I must have regard to the full canvas of evidence when considering these matters with a particular focus on the evidence given by the parents. The process of fact finding can be particularly challenging in the arena of the family court as many matters in dispute occur in the private family sphere with only family members present. Often allegations are not made at the point the event occurs and there are complex considerations to bear in mind around the way in which parties to domestic abuse behave. The Court’s understanding of the significance of domestic abuse and its impact on the children is now well understood and clearly articulated in the Court of Appeal decision of Re H-N and Others (children) (domestic abuse: findings of fact hearings) [2021] EWCA Civ 448. I bear both this and other related authorities in mind when approaching the fact-finding determination in this case.

Of the two parties I found M to be by far the more impressive of the two. I am entitled to have regard to demeanour when reaching conclusions but in this case, I was able to reach clear conclusions without particular reference to the same. Nonetheless, I found M to be a clear and impressive witness. She dealt with matters clearly and without evasion. Notwithstanding the allegations she demonstrated a level of balance in her approach, and it seemed to me she was doing her best to give truthful evidence. She is assisted by the support given to her account by a range of contemporaneous documents and by the truth of allegations once denied but now admitted by F. In contrast F was less credible and struggled to reconcile aspects of his case with the available documents. He was in the unfortunate position of having to explain away compelling information and struggled to do so in a convincing manner. I of course have regard to the fact that he has lost direct contact with his children and that for both parents this process will have been emotionally challenging. Nonetheless this is my overview.

In considering these allegations I bear in mind the admissions made by F in which he accepts verbally abusing M and threatening to harm her. I accept that a threat to harm is distinct from carrying out the threat, but it remains a relevant factor. I also bear in mind that F in fact admits physically assaulting M including by hitting her with an implement (a dustpan). It is relevant that he has felt able to act in this manner on occasion. This must be relevant to considering whether he has committed similar actions.

[2a]:On 3 June 2023 the parties were in a car driven by F. Y and her mother were sitting in the rear of the car. It is alleged F became aggressive and reached behind hitting out at M in the course of which she suffered a cut (scratch) to her side. M maintains the allegation which is denied by F who argues he remained focused on driving with care and would have not acted in such a risk-laden manner. I am satisfied this happened as alleged by M. Of the physical abuse allegations, it is perhaps the least serious in nature, but this is not to diminish it. My sense is this is at the lower end of the spectrum because it is likely to have been one of the earlier occasions on which M experienced physical abuse. It is by no means unusual for behaviour of this sort to escalate as the perpetrator of abuse realises they can act without consequence. By this point in their relationship F had threatened to hit M [18.5.22: 4b]; made degrading comments to her [18.12.22: 5a]; been abusive and controlling by belittling her and threatening to send her back to X [30.12.22: 4c]; physically assaulted her and threatened to do it again [14.3.23: 4d]. I have a video of the incident. F can be seen driving in a highly dysregulated manner. Whilst he is plainly controlling the car his emotions appear to be overtaking him and he is angry and abusive stating:

[2c]: M claims to have been assaulted on8 November 2023. Her evidence is that F was complaining as to the cleanliness of the property and then without warning assaulted her kicking her in the ribs and face whilst she was curled up on the floor. F denies the assault but accepts using threats and inappropriate language towards M in the ‘heat of a highly charged argument’. It is agreed this all took place in the presence of Y. I have a video filmed on this day. M alleges this followed the assault. I have a transcript of the audio. F calls M a ‘bitch’ and ‘a prostitute’. This language has to be considered within the context of the conservative culture in which the parents live. To name-call M as a prostitute is seriously denigrating and indicates a high level of anger on the part of F. F can be heard to say ‘I beat the mum’ whilst holding Y in his arms. He is recorded as saying ‘I will kill you’ and ‘you deserve a knife in the stomach’. I have a photograph of M taken after the event. She has a clear bruise to the side of her eye. I have WhatsApp messaging from the next day in which M shares the injury and describes her pain and messages that F ‘kicked her in [her] chest’. Whilst he denies the allegation there is no doubt M is complaining as to what was done to her. In live evidence F could ‘not recall’ the altercation or causing the bruise but agreed it ‘looked like he pushed her’. He told me ‘maybe she fell on something’. I am confident F is telling the truth. It is telling that at no point can F detail a contrary conversation he had with his wife as to why she had a black eye and was sharing it with him whilst explicitly alleging an assault upon herself by him. In my assessment it is highly unlikely M would in private allege these things to her husband unless something of this nature took pace, and, if she did, I am in no doubt I would see a strong rebuttal of the same. This was a serious assault of a pregnant woman laying vulnerable on the floor. I cannot say with confidence whether she was kicked or hit. I suspect M assumes she was kicked, and she may be correct, because of her positioning. But nothing turns on this. However she was struck it was done with force. It is clear it left her in real pain and with a black eye. She was vulnerable, her daughter was present and yet this did not cause her husband to treat her with the respect she was due.

[2d]: This is an allegation relating to 5 December 2023. M alleges being assaulted but cannot now recall what happened. But she asks me to have regard to a photograph she took and alleges she was bitten by F. F suggests M may have bitten herself to support her case (‘gather evidence’). On the schedule the response is made that there is no expert evidence to prove a bite. I have a video showing M’s arm. I consider I do not need expert evidence. I can see a visible bite mark on her arm. It is noteworthy F does not suggest other than there was a bite –indeed he suggests M bit herself. I have considered all the evidence. I am persuaded this is a bite mark. The evidence is clear in this regard. I am confident this was caused by F. A puzzling feature is that F accepts an assault on this occasion but denies biting. Yet M only alleges a bite as having occurred and so it remains unclear what F admits to doing. When questioned he could provide no illumination. I find it most unlikely that M bit herself as suggested. Once again F cannot detail a conversation in which he enquired with his wife as to why she had such an evident injury on her arm.

[2e]: This relates to 27 February 2024 with M alleging a further assault in the car. She alleges being hit repeatedly to her arm causing bruising. F denies the same claiming this was simply an argument over a dispute surrounding the use of a navigation device. I have the benefit of a photograph showing M to have a significantly bruised arm. I accept this was caused by F as alleged by M. I prefer her evidence. It fits with the pattern of behaviour on the part of F. It is striking he has no account of how his wife ended up with these significant bruises and no account of any conversation relating to the same in which he sought to understand how it was that she had come to be bruised. Faced by these contradictions I have no hesitation in preferring the account given by M. It simply fits with the circumstances which are admitted or otherwise found by me to have been existing at about this time.

[2f]: This event occurred on 14 July 2024 only 10-days after M had given birth to Z. It is said F became angry with M when his family visited, and she was in the shower and did not realise. She claims to have been punched to the face on a number of occasions causing a black eye, a nosebleed and bruising. Later the PGM came into the house and witnessed the mother upset. F denies the same. I have a photo showing M with a bruised and marked face. I have contemporaneous messaging between the parents in which M is referencing her black eye and bruised nose. In his live evidence F agreed he may have pushed M and that his own mother told him ‘not to abuse M as she is the mother of his children’. I have struggled with the suggested explanation of the marking being related to eyebrow threading. Such personal care does not cause the marks seen in this case. I am left in little doubt this was a further incident of abuse and that F hit M on a number of occasions causing the marking seen, the black eye and the nosebleed. I have regard to all the evidence and particularly the contemporaneous records. I prefer the clear and consistent account given by M over the account given by F.

[2g]: An assault is alleged and accepted. However, F does not accept there is evidence of resultant marking to M’s face. I have seen the photographs and agree she is bruised as a result of this assault which happened in front of the child. It is striking that in the WhatsApp messaging M’s sole focus is on encouraging F to put things right with Y who witnessed the event.

[2h]: On this occasion in December 2024 M alleges being hit with a child’s scooter and evidences the marks caused to her arms as she sought to protect herself. This all arose out of F’s dissatisfaction with a meal which had been provided to him. He agrees he threw the scooter at M but disputes hitting her with it as alleged. Again, I find the photographic evidence compelling and supportive of the allegation. I find this proven.

It is clear to me this relationship was seriously abusive from a very early point to the point of separation. I am in little doubt the matters placed before me are simply representative of those matters which M has been able to directly evidence through videos and photos. I am confident that whilst this is not ‘the tip of an iceberg’ it is but part of the abusive experience suffered by M.

This allegation relates to 11 October 2024 a point at which Z was 3 months of age. The evidence consists of ‘baby-cam’ footage which is alleged to show F acting inappropriately in his engagement with the child. Over a period around 25 minutes, he is alleged to have shouted at the child to ‘shut up’ and shaken him repeatedly. When M entered the room, he told her to get out. M, relying on the footage, argues this behaviour was physically abusive of Z. F accepts the content of the footage but argues the manner in which he was engaging with Z was within the bounds of appropriate ‘rocking’ of the child. He denies the suggestion that he was shaking him. This is an unusual allegation in that it has been caught on a baby monitor, and I am essentially asked to determine what I see on the captured video. Whilst any viewer is entitled to draw their own impression the evidence, I have is the best evidence and it is accepted M has no separate independent understanding on which to draw. I have considered the video with care. It amounts to four separate periods of time between 22:13 and 22:38 hours. Each scene is of about 6 second’s duration. I have associated transcripts where F speaks other than in English. I find as follows:

These are my findings which supplement the admissions made. There can be no doubt this was an abusive relationship incorporating a range of abusive actions and behaviours which subsisted over the length of the relationship. It is troubling many of these events occurred in the presence of at least one of the children. During this period M was isolated and vulnerable and wholly dependent on F. This aggravates the likely impact upon her. I have focused on the physical abuse as this is the area in respect of which dispute remained. I do not lose sight of the verbal abuse, the denigration and belittling suggested within the admitted facts. I keep in mind elements of controlling behaviour in the making of serious threats. I have not made the findings at 6(j)(v), (k-m). I do not think they materially change my understanding of the case and on the evidence available I am not satisfied they are findings that require a determination. I do not for instance consider it is appropriate to make a finding that the application for the prohibited steps order was an act of intimidation. There are other legitimate reasons why this was sought. I also do not consider it is appropriate to make a finding as to the willingness of F to allow M to work during this period. For much of the period she was either pregnant or caring for a young child. In such a context it is difficult to view these decisions through the prism of fact finding.

The decisions I make as to child arrangements are made with the children’s welfare as my paramount consideration. I keep in mind section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989 (‘the welfare checklist’) and I also have regard to the presumption that the children will benefit from maintaining a relationship with both parents. This presumption is premised on the relationship being one which is safe. I have to bring into my assessment of welfare the findings made and the impact the same may have on both the safety of the children and M when considering and making child arrangements. This follows from PD12J Family Procedure Rules 2010. I am entitled to require F to obtain advice, treatment or other intervention as a precondition of a child arrangements order being made.

This is a case in which there is no question as to the children continuing to live with their mother. F does not challenge this as being right for them. Although he does make some criticisms of the mother’s care giving, he also acknowledges she is a good mother and caring for the children well. I agree and have regard to the section 7 report which raises no concerns in this regard. M has been caring for the children in financially and emotionally challenging circumstances since separation. It is to her credit that she has managed this without difficulty. The section 7 reporter described her as a model participant insofar as working with the concerns in the case.

The real issue raised is as to the spending time arrangements between the children and their father. This is currently set at an indirect level, and the natural question arises as to whether and when direct contact might commence. F not seen his children and they have not seen him since the separation in 2025. I accept the evidence from M that Y expresses a wish to see her father. I also heard and accepted the evidence of M that she would wish to facilitate contact once it is safe to do so. Notwithstanding the findings M was clear, and I accept her evidence in this regard, that she continues to recognise the importance of the children having an opportunity to maintain a relationship with their father.

In fact, there is no real dispute in this regard for me to resolve. The section 7 reporter explained what is now expected of F. This will be for a domestic violence programme to be undertaken (Men and Masculinities) which will take around 6 months from commencement (it may take 6-8 weeks to commence). It will also be helpful to engage in a parenting course. The reporter also supported the father pursuing support around his dysregulated behaviour (anger management) through his GP. She considered this would globally likely amount to a 12-month period to enable the work to commence, be completed and for the learning to be imbedded. My understanding is that F accepts the basics of this advice although he would hope the time frame to be shorter.

I broadly agree with the guidance of the section 7 reporter. I have regard to a number of factors in reaching this conclusion:

Having regard to the above I have concluded there should be orders for the children to live with their mother and for indirect contact to continue with a requirement for F to engage with a domestic abuse course and to obtain assistance with respect to anger management. The parenting course will help, and I encourage the same. I cannot predict the timetable for the same let alone the outcome and success of this work. Contact will need to be reassessed at the appropriate time in the future when this work has been done. I am in no doubt these outcomes are ones which best fit with the welfare needs of the children. Their welfare is strongly correlated with the continuation of the good care being given to them by their mother on a daily basis. It is meeting their needs, both emotionally and physically. It is safe and predictable. I consider an order is required to formalise this reality.

As to contact. In principle the children have a need to see their father. Y is expressing this wish. But the contact needs to be safe and sustainable. Were contact to lead to a return to the previous behaviour then it would fundamentally undermine the stability and security the children have now obtained. This would be unacceptable and cannot be countenanced. At this time the only safe contact is indirect contact. That has been working and I judge that can continue consistent with the principles of PD12J. I bear in mind M agrees. I am unclear when this might be able to change. So much is dependent on progress that needs to be made by F.

This aspect of the case was the most controversial placed before me. M sought to return to her home country where she would have the support of her family and would be better placed to meet the future needs of the children. F opposed this and expressed concern as to the impact this would have on his relationship with his children. Having regard to the fact X is not a signatory to the 1980 Convention I received expert evidence as to the processes that would come into effect were permission to be granted and were M to thereafter prevent contact / compliance with any orders made by this Court. Importantly M made clear that were she not to be granted permission she would still need to relocate internally within England and Wales. Her refuge support is ending, and she will likely be offered alternative accommodation outside London. If suitable accommodation is offered but refused, she might well be judged intentionally homeless and so will likely accept the same. In the course of the hearing, it became clear there is some understanding on her part of where this will be, and I heard it was about 2-3 hour’s drive away from London. For his part F appeared to accept this would be an inevitable consequence of a refusal to permit international relocation.

I was also asked to consider the question of discharging the prohibited steps order in the event that I did not give permission to relocate. M wants to be able to visit X if she cannot relocate there. Ultimately F appeared to accept this taking place so long as there could be appropriate safeguards in place to ensure the return of the children after any trip.

The expert attended remotely and was questioned regarding her report. I found her a clear and helpful witness. As will be seen below her evidence was balanced and fair. Whilst she was challenged as to some of her answers concerning previous experience, I judge she was well placed to provide this expert evidence. The key point from her evidence was as to the future vulnerability M would face to an application being made by F in X were she to relocate. The parents are members of the Shia sect and the relevant Sharia Court in that jurisdiction will likely place significant importance on the role of the paternal family when making decisions about the children. This will be irrespective of any decisions I make. It is therefore highly likely that were the children to relocate, and were F to apply to that Court locally, then he might well achieve outcomes different to those set by this Court. In relation to certain issues viewed as falling within the ambit of ‘guardianship’ I would not be able to successfully pass the same to M so far as that Court would be concerned given that as a matter of policy these must remain with the paternal family. I was also told that by age 7 custody rights would automatically devolve to F. I was told that it was important my orders are very clear to ensure they can be actioned in X, but it was also clear there was little I could do to stop a revised discretionary approach being taken once there and that any such discretion would reflect a male bias.

In the light of this evidence, I was told M would be reflecting on her proposed way forward. It was then confirmed to me prior to submissions being received that she would be seeking to pursue relocation. However, it was only with the receipt of submissions that I discovered that this was envisaged to be done pursuant to a further application under which M would seek for the children to be made Wards of Court prior to relocating. In response submissions on behalf of F the point was made that this was too late to be raising such argument. That it was far from clear as to the timetable for the same let alone the practicality of this proposal. Rather than adjourning the application (as sought by M) I was asked to dismiss it altogether.

This leaves me in a curious position in which I am not in fact being asked to make a decision with regard to relocation other than to dismiss it as argued by F. I consider this to be an unsatisfactory state of affairs having heard the evidence and having by now formed views as to what is best for the children.

I have been addressed in regards to the law concerning this issue. Ultimately, the children’s welfare is paramount but particular regard has to be given to the ‘safety’ issues associated with the potential for orders made not to be respected and to be unenforceable were relocation to take place. Authorities concerning non-Hague countries have made clear the Court has to consider the risks associated with non-return; the impact on the child were this to arise, and the availability of measures that might mitigate this risk and permit effective action to return were this to occur. I bear in mind recent authority considering the distinction between a planned visit (followed by non-return) and a plan for relocation under which habitual residence would be intended to change. In such cases the issue is the maintenance of contact rather than the risk of retention in that jurisdiction – which is the very plan being proposed.

I have been taken to authorities which highlight the importance of establishing a relationship prior to relocation. In many ways these authorities do no more than remind as to the fundamental proposition that the children’s welfare is the only true test in considering these issues and that whilst factors previously identified in authorities such as Payne continue to carry appropriate weight (and can be taken into account as circumstances dictate) they do not displace the paramountcy of welfare. As such I would always have regard to the practicalities of the proposal and its sustainability as I would have regard to the motivations which underlie the plan and the likely impacts the same would have on the existing and future relationships that the children have with other family, and in particular with their left behind parent. The reality of a stark interference with such relationships means the Court is invariably taken into the territory of considering the Article 8 rights that are in play and is required as a result to have a holistic view on the proposals under consideration. I have particular regard to D v O (Domestic Abuse: International Relocation) [2025] EWCA Civ. 888 which provides a comprehensive overview of the principles governing relocation applications with a particular focus on the facts of a case involving domestic abuse.

There is no doubt, and I agree that were relocation not to occur that M must have the ability to relocate internally pursuant to her housing opportunities. If remaining in this country the children need secure and stable accommodation and the reality of the London housing market means relocation will be likely. There is no foundation for suggesting this is aimed towards limiting the father’s relationship with the children, nor need it. In my assessment any such move should come with confidentiality pending the relationships being safe.

I also consider M should have the permission to travel internationally (including to X) that flows from the fact the children live with her (up to a period of 1-month without consent). I reach this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that X is not a signatory to the Hague convention. I take into account the relevant case law principles but importantly have regard to the expert evidence which has made clear F would in fact hold all the legal ‘cards’ were litigation to arise in X following a wrongful retention in that jurisdiction. The irony of the expert evidence is that it confirms such permission to travel comes with limited risks around retention. I consider F should be given notice of travel (save in the case of a genuine emergency) by being told of the plan to travel (at least one month before it happens). He need not be told the exact dates but must be informed as to the month in which it will occur and the planned length of the journey. Within 7 days of return he must have confirmation of the same. I consider more detailed information might at this time be a safety issue. In time this may change.

I am not going to dismiss the application to relocate, and I am not asked to order the same. I make no comment as to the Wardship suggestion save that I consider this would be a matter for a High Court Judge of the Family Division (not a Deputy) given the issues of comity that might arise. It seems to me it would require a complex assessment and should be heard by a Judge with the experience and understanding of the practicalities to properly weigh what is being suggested.

But I do not leave the matter there. I consider it appropriate to set out some of the points that I had under consideration prior to the position in submissions. To the extent these may assist any future consideration I observe as follows.

I consider there are strong factors in support of the proposal in principle. I have particular regard to the isolation of M in this jurisdiction. This country is not her home, and she only came here to be a partner to a marriage with F. This turned out to be a relationship which was abusive throughout and in my judgment there are strong reasons as to why she and the children would benefit from the support that will only be available to her in X. For her to have to remain here is purely to permit the maintenance of the relationship between the children and their father. This might well appear a continuation of a form of the control exercised over her during the relationship and it has in any event to be assessed in the light of the likely prospects and timetable for direct contact to be resumed. I also bear in mind that her living circumstances here are likely to be significantly impaired compared to what will be available to her were she to return to X. There she can work whilst being supported with childcare by her family. Her plans are practical and would give the children a secure and comfortable lived experience. I am concerned they will not have the same in this jurisdiction and that this less satisfactory lived experience is justified on the basis of permitting a window of opportunity for her abuser to make changes to himself.

On the facts I of course have had mind to the importance of the children obtaining and improving their relationship with their father. But this is a PD12J case, and this must be considered in the light of the findings made and the restrictions arising out of his behaviour. At this point I have real uncertainty as to the timelines for change and the prospects of the same. I am also mindful of the likely impact the criminal process may have. I consider the forced residence of M and the children in this jurisdiction whilst such uncertain steps are taken is a PD12J consideration as it will have impact on the emotional security of M and thus on the children. In my assessment M needs the space to repair herself to be the best mother she can be to the children, and this is likely to be best achieved in an environment in which both she and the children have the loving and nurturing care they deserve.

It seemed to me this balance indicated a likelihood that the Court would have given permission to relocate. The challenge though is as to the sustainability of such a decision were it to be challenged by F in future in X. My sense was that it was for M to assess this feature in determining whether she wished to pursue this outcome. She has now made this decision, and I judge the application should be adjourned for a limited time (after which it would be dismissed if not restored) to enable it to be processed accordingly.

I will now send this judgment out to the parties. I intend to hand it down (remotely if requested) at a direction hearing with a time estimate of 30 minutes at 10am on either of 14 or 15 October 2025. I will sit at 9.30am if this assist. Can I have any suggested corrections, requests for clarification and redactions (to permit publication) by 4pm on 10 October 2025? For the avoidance of doubt this judgment can be shared with the lay parties.

I remind myself this judgment should be shared with the family members, and I will as directed consider whether they should have permission to apply at that hearing.