TY v XA (No 3)

This is a further judgment in these proceedings under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, and Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989,in relation to which I initially heard evidence and submissions from both parties between the 9th and 16th May 2025. The parties are TY(now aged 41) and XA(aged 42), whom I shall continue to refer to in this judgment, conventionally, as the husband and wife.

I handed down a substantive judgment in the principal applications on 1 July 2025, after a draft had been circulated to the parties on 6 June. At the adjourned hearing on 29 July 2025 I have had to deal with a number of sequential issues such as timing and security, and the important issue of how the wife’s costs are to be provided for – whether by a further lump sum to discharge them as a debt, together with other outstanding liabilities which she has, as she is seeking; or by way of a costs order, which the husband argues should require no more than the payment of the significant sums already paid under the various legal services orders.

As at the trial, the wife has been represented by Mrs Carew Pole KC and Vardags, and the husband by Mr Horton KC and Helen Pidgeon. The wife has attended court today, but the husband is absent on holiday – I have excused his non-attendance.

This case concerned a 9-year marital relationship where two agreements had been reached, one being an Austrian pre-nuptial agreement and the other a later German Separation Deed, both of which were very clearly needs-oriented and determined the underlying basis upon which provision should be made to the wife. As set out in my substantive decision, this matter has an unfortunate history of protracted litigation both in Germany and in this jurisdiction. Here, there have been two set aside applications brought by the husband against the initial grant of permission under Part III, both heard by Moor J, as well as an FDR before Peel J, multiple directions hearings and a 6-day final hearing in May 2025 before me.

The parties ultimately agreed with the German Law Expert, Dr Cornelia Maetschke-Biersack, that the German Separation Deed is a “valid and binding instrument and an authentic instrument for the purposes of Art 17 of the EU Maintenance Regulation” at the 18 October 2024 directions hearing. I accepted in my substantive decision that for the purpose of this case, to which the EU Maintenance Regulation applies, I was bound to act in a way which was not clearly contrary to its terms. By Art.21 of the Maintenance Regulation, I determined that a variation of the provisions contained in the German Deed would be permissible in the event of a sufficient change of circumstances, but that a consideration of the fairness of the original provision would not be.I was satisfied that the wife’s current, and likely future, inability to work did constitute a sufficient change of circumstances to justify a reconsideration of the terms of the maintenance provision in the German Deed.

On the basis that the changed circumstances of the wife undermined the assumptions upon which the German Deed was calculated, I was clear that both an extension of the term for the provision of housing for the wife, and of spousal support for her, were warranted, as well as a reconsideration of quantum. I made the following provision:

This outcome did not reflect the open position adopted by either party at the trial. At that point:

Reconsideration. I will begin with the argument which Mr Horton KC advances for the husband that I should now reconsider the substance of the orders which I determined to make at the May hearing. At that hearing, the husband’s open position, which he had articulated in an open offer made as recently as March 2025, was as explained to purchase a property for occupation by the wife and the children during their minority, and in lieu of any continuing spousal maintenance, a higher level of child maintenance. He did not offer any further lump sum. This offer was said to be ‘subject to his ability to obtain a mortgage’, and he made reference to the impact on his finances and liquidity of the fall in the value of his Company E stock. His position at trial was that his net worth was now in the order of £16m. I finally took the figure of £17.3m for his net worth at that time.

Mr Horton now says that the husband’s own proposals then ‘were simply not feasible, even on the known position in May’.  By the time of trial, he makes the point that he was inviting the court to order maintenance to cover rent instead of a lump sum, given the husband’s liquidity issues. He also asserted that his property, in prime West London, which was valued for that hearing at £11.5m, has been on the market for sale but has only so far had one offer at £9m. He blames this on the state of the high end London property market and the reported exodus from the UK in recent months of wealthy non-domiciled families. He also says that his property in Paris, valued for the trial at €10.5m, has also been marketed but has had only one offer at €6m. He states that his Company E stock has now gone, owing to the drop in prices and some collar hedge arrangements he has assertedly made earlier this year. Also down-valuing a number of other properties which he owns, he says that his net worth can today be counted as no more than £6m. He therefore suggests that a lump sum of £2.55m for lifetime rent, as ordered, now looks ‘wholly excessive’. He also cites a series of obligations and future financial commitments.

Since the handing down of my substantive decision, the wife was informed on 7 July 2025 by the children’s school that the husband has not paid the school fees for the summer term, in breach of the order of Moor J dated 4 July 2023. The husband also remains in breach of the LSPO order made by me on 18 October 2024, having failed to pay the final instalment of £28,000 due on 1 May 2025. The husband has further openly sought advice on the enforceability of the final proposed order made by this court in France, in breach of the embargo on the draft judgment. Mr Horton KC has provided written submissions in which he acknowledged and apologised for the embargo breach, and I have decided that no further action would be taken in relation to this.

The husband has not sought to adduce any sufficient fresh evidence at this hearing in support of his arguments, other than an updated spreadsheet produced by his accountants, and some updating bank balances. He has made no formal application to set aside determinations within the judgment which I have handed down and to reconsider, ab initio, the appropriate order in light of what he says is this dramatic collapse in his financial position. Indeed, he has chosen not even to attend court for this hearing. The wife does not accept his financial presentation today. As I will explain, the costs in this matter are already out of control. What he is proposing would effectively require the complete relisting of the final hearing, save in relation to the underlying legal issues already determined. The order which I have determined should be made was clearly affordable for him on the basis of his own financial presentation at trial.

In those circumstances, I have declined Mr Horton’s oral request to relist the final hearing for further reconsideration. Such an application, if properly made, would require very clear evidence in support in circumstances where the capital figure was in fact slightly less than that which the husband has proposed in his open offer, albeit on very different terms, and the income levels ordered commensurate with the totality of the interim provision being made. His position would also presuppose that the husband was in a position to make further significant provision to fund the wife’s legal costs whilst any further consideration was being given. There is no evidential basis before me today to allow me to accede to such a fundamental and far-reaching request.

Finally, Mr Horton also seeks to argue that the wife’s rental payments should not be capitalised, because of the consequent impact on her finances of the significant debt to her solicitors. He is inviting the court to leave her unable to settle that debt, deliberately. I am not prepared to reconsider that element for a number of reasons: firstly, the debt to Vardags was already known and understood when I handed down my original judgment; secondly, I am satisfied that the overall impact of the provision which I am making, including the costs provision that I will consider in this judgment, will meet the wife’s needs to a sufficient extent as I will explain below; thirdly, whilst declining to capitalise an order for the provision of housing, so as to avoid creating a situation where lawyers are able to enforce any outstanding costs bills owed by reason of the proceedings, might be permissible in certain very limited circumstances, I am not satisfied here that such a course would be reasonable, or fair to the wife. I observe that, given the interest provisions which will continue to run until the bill owed is discharged, not being in a position to pay that bill foreseeably would leave the wife in an unhappy and indefinitely precarious position, to say the least.

Costs and debts. I now turn to the other principal issue between the parties at this hearing, which relates to the treatment of the wife’s costs. In this case, the costs position is both unfortunate, and stark. At this point the wife’s total costs of the application amount to some £1,448,593. Those of the husband are significantly less, at £533,210. There are some reasons advanced on the wife’s behalf for that discrepancy, which I will address below. However, this means that the total spent by both parties in the litigation comes to some £1,981,803. Whilst there have been some legal issues to be considered, addressed in my earlier judgment, it is the case that the eventual order which I have made is for the wife to receive a capitalised sum of maintenance for her rent at £2,550,000, and ongoing periodical payments for herself and the two children at the combined rate of £15,000pcm. As I indicated in my earlier judgment, the maintenance sum for the wife, if capitalised, would have added a further £1,200,000 to the husband’s obligation. On the basis then of an award in total quantifiable at £3,750,000, the parties have between them spent 53% of that amount on the costs of this application. The wife’s costs alone amount to 57% of the value of her capitalised receipt, excluding her maintenance, and 39% of her whole award. Absent some quite extraordinary circumstances, that amount appears grossly disproportionate.

Here, for the reasons which I set out at some length in the substantive judgment, the wife does not have a sharing claim available to her. The award which I determined was appropriate for her was one based upon her needs. That this was a likely outcome had been flagged to her and to her representatives throughout the litigation, and eloquently by Moor J as long ago as 27 March 2024 when at an interim funding hearing I am told that he made clear that:

He then described the likely outcome at the end of the proceedings as ‘needs light’, a phrase which he then repeated in his judgment reconfirming permission on 9 May 2024. The wife’s solicitors have provided for today a detailed breakdown of how her costs were incurred, throughout the proceedings, with the intention of demonstrating their reasonableness. I accept that there are in this case some valid reasons why the wife’s costs might legitimately have exceeded those of the husband, as advanced eloquently by Mrs Carew Pole KC. They include:

I accept that all of those reasons might account for the wife’s costs coming in at a higher level than those of the husband. If they had been half as much again as those on the other side of the case, so overall a 40/60 split, or even twice as much (33/67), that might have been striking, but not necessarily exceptionable. However, in this case, the husband’s costs amount to just 26.9% of the total expenditure.

Of course, in a case where the assets are to be shared, and each party can expect a substantial receipt, then this sort of apparent overspend might make little odds, and can easily be left at the door of the party who has allowed their costs to spiral out of control. However, this has always been a needs case, and acknowledged to be such by the wife. Following the remarks made by Moor J, I am satisfied that there did need on the part of the wife and her advisers to be serious consideration given to the proportionality of the amounts that they were spending, and the significant risk that they would not recover the fully capitalised sums that they were seeking on her behalf, and further that they might not recover on top all of the costs which were being incurred. Even if her solicitors had protected themselves by an agreement with her, they should have made very clear to the wife the very significant risk that she was running by spending so freely in pursuit of an outcome which was ultimately beyond what might have been possible on the best of days. I must assume that they did so, and that she entered into her agreement with them fully aware of the risks that she was running.

At paragraphs 103-04 of my earlier judgment I had said this:

That remains the position today. In addition to her costs of these proceedings, the wife also has a number of other liabilities, including that to her German lawyer, as well as a further £63,609 in other historic medical and legal costs, and including £46,937 owed to her parents. I should say that I have taken the slightly different figures provided for this hearing by Mrs Carew Pole in her note, rather than those calculated in the final ES2 as at the date of trial, which in part may be down to moving exchange rates. Some additional liabilities are now included, and some may be down to the husband’s failure to comply with his ongoing obligations to the wife and children since the conclusion of the final hearing. The most striking difference is that the interest which the wife’s solicitors are now claiming on their fees has already increased from £90,721 at trial to some £114,774 now - a further £24,000 in some 2 ½ months. It is also noticeable that the delay between the two hearings is due in large part to the unavailability of the parties’ legal teams during this period.

The further reality, as Mrs Carew Pole frankly acknowledged, is that none of the wife’s other outstanding liabilities can or will be capable of being met until 100% of the amount owing to her solicitors has been paid. Their position was made very clear in a letter to the court sent by Dr Bence, the CEO of Vardags, on 8 May 2025. He stated the Firm’s position to be that:

The inevitable consequence of this I am assured is that, unless the husband is ordered to pay 100% of the amount which is currently owed to them, any receipt by the wife for any other purpose will be taken first to satisfy their debt and its accruing interest. Thus any repayment of the debt to her German lawyer, or to her parents, or to the German tax authorities, will only be possible once all of the sums owed the solicitors have been discharged. And further, on receipt of the capitalised maintenance provision calculated by me at the conclusion of the final hearing, that sum too will be vulnerable to the solicitors. That is the commercial arrangement into which the wife entered, and which remains in place.

In those circumstances, should the husband then be required to pay all of the wife’s costs of these proceedings, even though they are apparently so disproportionate, simply because her award has been calculated on a needs basis? I remind myself that in this case the wife’s open position at trial was for a lump sum of £7 million, and a further figure of £1,400,000 to discharge that costs bill. She has received significantly less than that. It is also right, in fairness, that the award, especially as it was capitalised in part, is pitched at a greater level and in much more favourable terms than any amount volunteered by the husband, so that in pre-FPR Gojkovic consideration, this wife has ‘had to come to court’ to get her award. That is no longer of course the court’s starting point.

The law. The law that I have to consider in relation to this issue is not in substantive dispute. In Azarmi-Movafagh v Bassiri-Dezfouli [2021] EWCA Civ 1184, to which I have been referred by both parties, King LJ said, under the heading ‘Costs in Financial Remedy Cases’:

The court then went on to deal with three first instance decisions ‘where the court has grappled with the problem of how to treat the costs of the recipient of a needs award’. The cases cited were Francis J in WG v HG [2018] EWFC (Fam) 84; [2019] 2 FCR 124; Holman J in Daga v Bangur [2019] 1 FLR 1340 and Cohen J in MB v EB (No 2) [2019] EWHC 3676 (Fam) 3676; [2020] 1 FLR 1086, from which King LJ went on to conclude (at [53]) that:

I entirely accept that proposition. Mrs Carew Pole however also places reliance on what King LJ went on to say at [59], namely:

Then at [63], she continued:

In MB v EB (above), Cohen J in fact made an order which left the applicant husband with a Duxbury sum of £325,000 (£25,000pa for life) to meet his needs which included health difficulties, an additional sum of £150,000 for his costs, a car and a modest flat worth less than £500,000. He also had an outstanding debt to his solicitors inclusive of interest (he had instructed the same firm as the wife in this case) of around £380,000, after the wife had already funded an additional £236,000 under a legal services order. The judge described the husband’s costs in that case at [16] as having been ‘wholly disproportionate to what has been in issue’. So, in order to meet his solicitors’ bill after the judgment he would either have had to forgo over 70% of his modest income fund, or to have sold or charged his home. However achieved, his living standards were therefore left significantly affected by the debt to his solicitors, his modestly assessed needs notwithstanding.

In WG v HG (above), where the judge had also held that the wife had incurred a substantial part of the costs unreasonably, she had otherwise received a property mortgage free worth £1.65m and a Duxbury fund of £2m to produce an income for life of £90,000 pa, and she was left to find some £500,000 (just over half of the total owing) in order to fund that part of the costs which Francis J did not order the husband to pay. Again, she was left with a choice between a reduced income and more modest property fund to pay what she was left owing.

Daga v Bangur (above) was a different and unusual case, where the husband had failed absolutely to satisfy the court that he was entitled to any award on a needs basis.

Therefore, whilst of course I acknowledge that in any needs-based assessment one of the most important elements will be security of accommodation at an appropriate level, it cannot be said that in no circumstances will the court make orders which risk affecting the level at which a party will be able to live or house going forward, in the right case. There is clearly a difference of degree between those cases, such as MB v EB, where the respondent’s award is quantified on what might be termed ‘bare needs’, and those like WG v HG, and this case, where the basis of assessment is considered in accordance with the parties’ lifestyle in the marriage, and so, even if debts remain, needs at a lower level can still be properly met. Also as in this case, in WG v HG there were minor children whose needs had to be given first consideration. Nonetheless, whether after a bare needs assessment (MB v EB), or where there are minor children (WG v HG), the court can still leave a party with a significant debt of costs to be found from their needs-based award if the circumstances merit it.

Where King LJ speaks of the housing needs of the recipient party, at [59] of her judgment in Azarmi-Movafagh v Bassiri-Dezfouli (above), I am therefore clear that she is not suggesting that a party can never be left with a hard choice as to how to meet their outstanding debt, which may include housing at a lesser level than that assessed by the court, as an alternative to a reduced available income. That is especially so where the fund made available for housing is in excess of £2.5m. Leaving a party needing to relocate to a less exclusive neighbourhood is not in my judgment necessarily leaving them ‘unable to meet their housing need’. Further, I remind myself that the award in this case was quantified on the basis that the wife would be paying a rent at the current level (in fact above that assessed on an interim basis by Moor J), and only reducing when the children had ceased to be the court’s first consideration. There is thus scope for the wife either to move earlier, or to defer the impact of any costs liability on her available housing fund until the children have grown, if in fact she chooses to continue to rent, as I had provided. In any case where their needs assessed are on the basis of lifestyle, as opposed to ‘bare’ needs, a party would be unwise to assume that their unreasonably incurred costs are bound to be laid at the door of the other party in any circumstances.

Mrs Carew Pole as explained addresses the factors in FPR 2010 r.28.3 in turn on the wife’s behalf, highlighting as follows:

For the husband, Mr Horton makes the following points: (i) that the wife has always exceeded her costs allowance, in the belief that she could simply ask the husband to pick up the tab at the end of the case; (ii) that she has pursued some points unsuccessfully (he cites a failed application under s.37 MCA 1973 to set aside the transfer of the husband’s London home into joint names with his subsequent partner) and he says, that she has run up costs unnecessarily; (iii) he says that that no costs order is warranted applying the principles in FPR 2010 r.28.3.  He points out that the court’s decision falls squarely between the parties’ open offers (albeit he suggests nearer to the husband’s position than that of the wife); and (iv) he says that even if the court were to consider some costs order were warranted, it could not possibly exceed the amount that the husband has already been ordered to pay by way of costs allowance (£633,000). 

I do accept that there has been a proliferation of applications in this case due to the manner in which the husband chose to litigate. As well as MPS and three legal funding applications by the wife, there were two unsuccessful set aside applications by the husband, one unsuccessful application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal by him, and various other interlocutory applications (including for disclosure, SJE valuations of properties, to admit surveillance evidence, for a Notice to Admit Facts, and for participation directions). As a result, the final hearing bundles contained in excess of 2,500 pages. These include SJE reports on German law, as well as other documents produced from German lawyers acting for the parties, as well as extensive medical reports and material relating to the wife’s ill health, which has only been necessary as a result of the husband’s unsuccessful challenge to the truth of her evidence about her health.

Is this then a case where a costs order against the husband is warranted, applying the criteria in r.2.83(7), and so taking the case beyond the no order principle in 2.83(6)? Taking those criteria in turn:

I appreciate that in Azarmi-Movafagh, King LJ at [53] spoke of a ‘wide discretion’ in the context of the court making a lump sum award to a party ‘designed wholly or in part to satisfy their outstanding costs bills’. Here, I do propose to make a costs order against the husband, as opposed to awarding a lump sum to provide for the wife’s costs. In part, this is because of the uncertain jurisdiction to make any further capital award in this case, even if meeting need as opposed to addressing entitlement. It is also, and importantly, because here the wife’s costs have been incurred at what I am satisfied is a wholly disproportionate rate, and in consequence it is fairest to both parties if the amount of those costs which I am going to require the husband to pay is assessed on the basis of costs principles, rather than simply packaged as meeting a need. I will however later cross-check the outcome of my costs determination against the wife’s needs in all the circumstances.

To make a costs order against the husband, I must first be satisfied that the criteria under r.2.83(7) have been fully taken into account and justify making such an order, and I do also have in mind PD28 para.4.4. Having considered all of factors identified above, I am satisfied that the husband should pay the wife’s costs of the application, but as I shall explain, I am not satisfied that he should do so on any other than a standard basis. Were I to break down the different issues in the case and consider the costs position separately in relation to each one, I am broadly satisfied that I would arrive at a similar conclusion. Although the wife has not achieved the orders that she was seeking, the husband has never acknowledged that in circumstances where the evidence demonstrated that she could not expect to resume paid work substantively in future, she had needs which required to be met through the medium of these proceedings, over and above the discharging of their joint obligations to their children.

I have considered whether an indemnity award is merited in this case. The test for such an award was considered (in a different context) by Joanna Smith J in Cabo Concepts Ltd v MGA Entertainment (UK) Ltd & Anor [2022] EWHC 2024 (Pat), where she said:

I also will apply this formulation. Whilst I have found that the husband’s litigation conduct has been deficient, and his open position has not been sufficient to meet the needs which I have found the wife and the children required, I must also bear in mind that the wife has not beaten her own offer, and a significant proportion of the costs incurred will have been toward issues on which he did ultimately succeed, principally in relation to the legal status of the deed. Whilst I also bear in mind the husband’s current defaults under existing orders, these may be remedied swiftly if caused by temporary illiquidity, and if enforcement measures become necessary, then the husband may incur further separate costs liabilities. I am clear, notwithstanding the general rule, that the criticisms of the husband’s litigation conduct, especially when considered alongside the eventual outcome of the application and the financial effect on the wife if no order is made, are such as justify an order being made against him that he should bear the costs of these proceedings, but they do not satisfy me in all of the circumstances that his conduct has been sufficiently ‘out of the norm’ as to warrant an indemnity order being made against him. The overall outcome works in his favour in this regard.

I will assess the wife’s costs summarily, to avoid the need for any further time or money to be spent on the process. For the purpose of assessing the amount of the costs order that I will make on the standard basis, I propose to adopt the figure of 70% referred to by King LJ at [51] of Azarmi-Movafagh, derived from the judgment of Mostyn J in JM v CZ (Costs: ex parte order) (above). In all of the circumstances, I consider this to be a fair and reasonable overall proportion of the wife’s costs of this litigation for the husband to have to bear, in addition to all of his own costs. In this regard I have firmly in mind CPR 44.3(2):

The result of such an order will be that the husband’s total costs liability to the wife will be in the sum of £1,014,015.10 (70% of her total bill), of which he has already paid £605,000, as indicated. This is very nearly double his own total costs of these proceedings (£533,210). The balance owing to the wife is therefore £409,015.10 (including sums already ordered but as yet unpaid), and she will be left with £434,537.90 still owing to her solicitors, as well (unavoidably) with her other debts of £177,360, about which I make no further order in the circumstances identified above. Even after discharging all of these, she will still left very nearly £2m as a housing fund, and I am satisfied that the needs of the children and of the wife will still be appropriately met from that sum, together with the ordered income provision. This will be so whether she chooses to buy or rent. I am satisfied that this will also be so, even if they are not met the same level in relation to both housing and lifestyle as would have been the case had the wife’s costs bill been more reasonable and proportionate.

As in those other cases referred to above, the wife will have choices to make. Such a situation for her is the very avoidable consequence of the extent of the costs liability which the wife has incurred in pursuing this application, which I am satisfied has been disproportionately incurred, given the quantum of recovery which was always likely. However, in the event that she chooses to rent, she will be able to supplement the ordered capitalised fund from the monthly periodical payments due, and any impact on the children’s housing as minors can therefore be suitably ameliorated. I do not consider given what she will have available that reasonable accommodation for her and the children can properly be said to be under threat.

Time to pay. I propose, given the husband’s currently asserted liquidity issues, to give him an extended time within which to make the capitalised payment due under this order, on the basis that the current interim arrangements shall continue until then, including the payment of school fees. Having considered both parties’ contentions on this issue, I consider that an extended period is appropriate for that payment, but not inordinately so. The payment (not including the costs payment) should be made by 31 May 2026, with interest to run after that date. I leave it to the wife’s solicitors to decide whether, in all of the circumstances, it is appropriate for interest to continue to run against the wife during this period on their outstanding costs bill. I am satisfied that the husband should be in a position to make his further costs contribution within a shorter period – that is by 30 November 2025.

Security. The husband offers security against the equity in the West London property which is currently for sale. I agree that this is sensible and appropriate. I will not order further security at this point in circumstances where there appears to be a fresh significant issue over both the extent of the current decline in the husband’s financial position, and what other practical or effective mechanisms might be capable of being put in place. There has also not been time for these issues to be fully explored at this hearing. However, if there is ongoing default, I will reconsider any further targeted applications by the wife in relation to additional security if it becomes necessary.

Chattels. I set out at [106] of my previous judgment that I accepted the husband’s position that any issues relating to chattels had been determined under the auspices of the German Deed and could not now be reopened. This was especially so given the passage of time that had since elapsed. The wife now asks me to deal with certain furniture which in 2019 was held in the parties’ property in Vienna that was then let, which the Deed (at Clause 3.4) recorded as belonging to her and to her mother. By the Deed the husband was to give her notice of the end of the tenancy, so as to enable her to arrange for the removal of the furniture. This did not happen, and the furniture has now either been sold with the property or otherwise disposed of. I have no means of accurately determining the value of this furniture (the wife post-hearing has estimated a value of £154,000), nor am I clear that there would be jurisdiction to substitute a capital sum for chattels whose collection was provided for under the deed. Ostensibly, this is a claim based on entitlement, rather than need. Insofar as the wife’s needs have been increased by her requiring to replace the items lost, I am satisfied that she will have the means to do so from the level of maintenance which I have ordered that the husband should pay her going forward. I am satisfied that this is at a much greater level than she would be likely to have received had the German Court still had jurisdiction in relation to the variation of this Deed. I will therefore make no further order in that regard.

Extras. The wife also seeks the payment of various additional items for the children, over and above those provided for on the school bill and so included as regular educational expenses, and the child maintenance figure already provided for at £42,000pa per child. If such items are not agreed between the parents, and are not on the school bill, then they should be the responsibility of the wife to pay for from the child maintenance provision. If they are on the school bill, then they should be included within the school fees and extras provision. The wife adds to this list private health insurance premiums for the children. Whatever the position has been in relation to private health insurance for the children or the past six years (since 2019) should be continued, and the premiums paid by the parent who has previously had that responsibility.

Finally, since the hearing on 29 July, I have been sent correspondence by both sides relating the husband’s failure to pay the school fees for the newly started September term. There remains in place an order made by Moor J on 4 July 2023 that the husband should pay those fees, which I confirmed in my earlier judgment would continue. The husband did not then contest that provision. If the husband wishes to be released from that obligation, then he must make a formal application for that to happen, and in the meantime, he should continue to ensure that the fees are paid. The wife may disclose a copy of the 2023 order, suitably redacted, to the school if required.

That is my judgment.