S (Children) (Interim Threshold), Re

The tension between allowing parents to be autonomous in their decision-making in respect of their own children and sanctioning state intervention in the lives of those family members in the name of child protection is well known. Striking the correct balance between the two has been a long term problem for both legislators and judges. This is particularly so when dealing with a situation where the harm has not yet occurred. The current incarnation of that dichotomy is to be found in a combination of s.31(2) and s.38(2) of the Children Act 1989 by which Parliament has determined that a judge must have reasonable grounds to believe that in the absence of intervention a child is likely to suffer significant harm attributable to parental care which it would not be reasonable for the parent to give to the child.

If getting the balance right as to when autonomy must give way to child protection was an intellectual challenge for the drafters of the Children Act it can pale into insignificance as a practical problem for social workers trying to apply that test on the ground. To compound the problem it can be not only a difficult task but a thankless one too. Intervene early and you are criticised, intervene late and you are criticised. Far too often the ‘Goldilocks’ moment is not just elusive but visible only in hindsight.

In judging the situation a good social worker must navigate between a titan of American literature and the longest serving Lord Chancellor of the nineteenth century, quite possibly without knowing they are doing so. According to Ernest Hemingway ‘the best way to find out if you can trust somebody is to trust them’ (Footnote: ¹) (in this judgment all quotes are in italics). But there can lie the primrose path to the very public inquiry. During his twenty five years as Lord Chancellor, Lord Eldon could be found at the opposite end of the spectrum. In a judgment in 1827 he stated that ‘it has always been the principle of this court, not to risk the incurring of damage to children which it cannot repair, but rather to prevent the damage being done.’ (Footnote: ²)Prevention may be better than cure in medicine but too much social control and certainly any social engineering are anathema in a society which places considerable store on privacy, liberty and the autonomy of the individual. Lord Eldon never had to contend with the Human Rights Act or the twenty-first century citizen suffused in and increasingly vocal about a rights-based culture. For all its social iniquities the nineteenth century was at least blessed with the absence of the keyboard warrior.

Child rearing has always been an art not a science and a broad view is required as to what is best for a child. Against that and as relevant in the twenty first century as it was in the nineteenth is the generally accepted view that children should not be damaged beyond repair, not even by their parents, and for all the importance of autonomy there is a point where even it must yield to protection. This case is concerned with the intersection of parental autonomy with child protection. It is a situation where the worst that could happen to these children as a consequence of their parents’ choices could be potentially life-threatening but at the same time their parents are recognised as being people who would never want that to happen to them.

I am concerned with four children whom I shall refer to as A, B, C and D and who range in age between school years 11 to 4. They are the only children of father (F) and mother (M). All four children live with their parents and on all accounts appear to be being well cared for by them. The children each have very good school attendance records, there is no question of neglect or abuse, all the children are thriving and whilst the youngest child does have some health issues these are being appropriately managed by the parents in partnership with health professionals. Most importantly there is no doubt that the children are loved by and attached to their parents

The parents are nationals of a country which I shall refer to as X and were born and brought up in that country where they also met and married and where their elder two children were born. Just over a decade ago the parents made the hard decision to leave X on account of the civil disorder in that society and the regime in place at the time. It has never been suggested that the parents were forced to leave X because of anything they were doing there or as a result of any targeting of them by anyone else, simply that they did not like how things were going. Accordingly the parents sold their home and moved to a nearby state where they lived for three years. A move to this country then took place and the family, by now increased by two younger children, came to the northwest of England where, in due course, settled status was granted to them by the Home Office. The parents say that as part of the process of acquiring a right of residence in this country they had to surrender their X passports and since that time the family have all used only UK passports when travelling abroad subsequently.

Nothing the parents did in X or the country to which they moved prior to coming to the UK brought either parent to the attention of the authorities. The same has been true in this country as well. There is no information which has been made available from the Police or any intelligence service that the parents hold any views which indicate a likelihood of seeking to associate with any political or quasi-military organisation which has as its aim violent action towards either the state or specific groups in X or any surrounding countries. All the parents have done is to care for each other and their children, ensured the children went to school, attended to their health needs, particularly D’s, and otherwise simply got on with their lives.

In keeping with that approach the family was barely known to the Local Authority prior to these proceedings. The one reference in social services’ files was to an occasion when there was an allegation made by D, the youngest child, whilst at school that F had hit M. There was Local Authority intervention and F briefly left the home whilst a safety plan was put in place to which both parents agreed but nothing beyond that. Even at the time it was noted that there was no corroborating evidence in terms of police call outs, M ever being seen by anyone with injuries, any concerns raised by the three older children or a lack of either co-operation or transparency by the parents. On the contrary, all the respective schools reported having a good relationship with both parents and had no concerns with the family. No statutory agency investigated matters any further, no court proceedings of any sort were initiated and certainly no findings (whether family or criminal) ever followed. Similarly during the early part of these proceedings the parents were also noted to be co-operative and open with the Local Authority. Matters certainly soured as the weeks passed but at the outset at least there was no suggestion of any attempts at non-disclosure, distraction or re-direction.

Finally, it should be noted that the allocated social worker and the Guardian in their dealings with the children each found them to be respectful, polite, engaging and courteous. The professionals noted a strong attachment between the children to each other and to their parents, which is mutual. Unlike many families who end up in the Family Court there is no evidence of dysfunctionalism, lack of attachment, neglect or abusive childhood experiences here. This is a family which is loving, caring and mutually supportive and, as a result, a source of strength, comfort and resilience to each of its members.

On 23 May 2025 F spoke with D’s school to ask permission to remove D prior to the conclusion of the school term for the purpose of taking him, with his siblings, to X. At or around the same time school recorded that D had informed his teacher that not only was he ‘going on holiday with his Dad’ but that ‘me and my dad are going to kill the bad people’ before adding ‘they are killing all the people and we need to kill the bad people.’ Not unnaturally the school were perturbed and made contact with the Local Authority.

The Local Authority spoke with both parents who explained that as emigres of X they each have family members there, some of whom have never met the younger children, and that F’s own father had now been diagnosed with an illness which they understood to be life-limiting and therefore had only added impetus to their desire to make a trip to their homeland.

Notwithstanding D’s comments about going to X to kill bad people – a comment which has never been further explored, supplemented or otherwise better deciphered – the Local Authority’s concern was and has remained that the children would be spending time in X rather than any assumption of what they might do once they were there

That concern was neither irrational nor unreasonable. X is a country which has had a history of difficulties including armed conflict, civil war and social upheaval. That history reaches into its present. Understandably given this context X is a country which the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) advises UK nationals against travelling to it at all. There was a time when to look at a map of the world and see a country coloured red was to see a part of the British Empire where, theoretically at least, a British citizen might expect stability and a place at relative ease. Not so now. The FCDO operates a four level system. For countries other than those which present no obvious risk a traffic light-style system is operated whereby a map of the country is shaded into green, amber or red depending on the nature of the risk involved in going there. According to the key green means ‘see our travel advice before travelling’, amber means ‘all but essential travel is not advised’ and red means ‘advise against all travel.’ Even where a country does not present a risk which requires illustration via a map the FCDO takes a cautious approach. Anyone intending to travel to Monaco, Switzerland or Denmark, traditionally not countries notorious as hotbeds of risk, and looking for advice will read that, in the view of the FCDO: ‘No travel can be guaranteed safe.’

In his initial conversation with the Local Authority F explained that he had visited X earlier in the year by himself in order to see his father. His view was that X is now a safe country in which the new regime has gained control over most of the territory and that any pockets of the country not under control were hundreds of miles from where he would be staying. F acknowledged the Local Authority’s concerns and their view that as the FCDO’s advice is against travelling there it should be a clear indicator of the risks involved but he was clear in his own view that the capital city, where he intended to stay, was not an inherently unsafe place for his family. Notwithstanding his view, however, F indicated that if the Local Authority was not so persuaded he would not go to X but instead travel to an adjoining country, Y, and there meet family members who would travel from X to see them.

There the matter appears to have been left until 17 June when a further discussion took place as the Local Authority had now formed the view that travel to Y was also contrary to the advice of the FCDO. In fact this was not accurate, the FCDO website is clear that some parts were red but some parts were also amber and some even green. (Footnote: ³) The Local Authority informed the parents that it was undertaking a risk assessment in respect of the family’s plans. It is not known whether this piece of work was ever concluded as a copy of the same has never found its way into the court papers but as a result the parents were asked about issues such as medical care or an unexpected eruption of conflict. F was clear that he was aware of available medical resources through his own experience of living in that country, his recent visit and also the local information provided by his wider family as to what was available. Similarly, he was clear with the Local Authority that the decision to take the children to X, one taken jointly with his wife, was based upon real time information from his family as to what was happening on the ground where they were living in X and therefore where the family would be staying. Notwithstanding the FCDO’s advice F was confident that the family would be safe in the places he planned to take them because members of his wider family were there and had been safe for a long time. F was clear that he would never take his own children to a place which he considered was not a safe place for them to be.

In an attempt to placate the Local Authority and to ensure that the family could travel F suggested that the family would travel to a third country, Z, which was neither adjoining nor even adjacent to X but where M had family and to which paternal family might travel. Z was not a country in respect of which the FCDO advised against travelling to and is a very popular holiday destination with UK citizens. This appeared to settle matters. That remained the position until 11 July when the school which is attended by two of the children contacted the Local Authority to inform them that F had been in contact to explain that those children would be missing the final few days of term as they were planning to see the paternal grandfather. The school informed the Local Authority that it understood that the plan was to travel to country Y on one way tickets.

On the same day a Duty Social Worker contacted F who, according to that social worker, explained that he was intending to travel to an entirely different country not even in the same region as X, Y or Z but that despite going to that country intended to see the paternal grandfather in Y. There has never been any other reference to this fourth country and no party has invited it to be considered as a prospective destination. How the reference to that country survived any verification check with F prior to its inclusion within the Local Authority’s statement of evidence remains, to me at least, a mystery.

Matters swiftly deteriorated from this point between the parents, particularly F, and the Local Authority.

On the same day as the above conversation had taken place the Local Authority visited the family home accompanied by the police. The Local Authority have averred that upon arrival 13 suitcases were clearly visible packed and ready for a departure, the inference being that a very significant amount of luggage was being taken, far greater than would be expected for a holiday even for a family of six, which might give rise to a concern about leaving permanently. The parents are clear that whilst there were thirteen bags they were a mixture of suitcases and hand luggage to carry on to the plane and have always been clear that they have no plans to permanently leave the country. F denied having mentioned a fourth country earlier in the day to the Duty Social Worker and asserted that only Y had been referenced, the principal city of which begins with the same letter as the fourth country and a bad connection might have caused a mishearing to have occurred. The Local Authority reiterated its (incorrect) understanding of the situation vis-a-vis country Y and F insisted that the correct position was that some areas of Y were not considered too unsafe to travel even by the FCDO’s standards. This appeared to go unchecked by the Local Authority who instead promptly sought the children’s passports. When this request was not immediately acceded to the police officers present intervened. The following is set out in the statement of evidence of th4 social worker:

The result was that the parents acquiesced, and the children’s passports were handed over. They remain with the Local Authority, albeit now by reason of a court order. I will return to this incident in the conclusion of my judgment.

Despite having secured control over the children’s passports the Local Authority were concerned that the parents might attempt to travel by means other than on flights and that F may have already acquired second passports from X on his earlier visit or be in a position to do so and so enable the family to leave the jurisdiction despite the Local Authority holding their UK passports. There is no evidence to support such concerns.

As such on 16 July 2025 the Local Authority applied on very short notice for a phalanx of orders. Care proceedings were immediately issued and a hearing that day obtained where interim care orders were sought with a plan of separation of all four children from their parents. In addition, a parallel application was made to the High Court for permission to invoke the inherent jurisdiction for the purpose of securing a Port Alert order and an injunction prohibiting the children being removed from the jurisdiction and the parents from attempting to obtain any international travel documents.

The matter came on before a Judge of the Division who happened to be sitting in Liverpool for what was in effect a one-sided hearing because, whilst the parents were present, they had no legal representation and had had little if any time in which to consider even such scant papers as there were. A Guardian had been appointed and aligned herself with the Local Authority insofar as the necessity for orders was concerned including the application for separation at that stage but impressed upon the court the need for an informed review as soon as possible thereafter.

The outcome of that hearing was that as a holding position interim care orders were made but separation was not sanctioned and the children remain at home with their parents. The inherent jurisdiction was invoked and a Port Alert order was granted together with an injunction prohibiting removal of the children nor the securing of any alternative international travel documents. The matter was transferred from the Family Division to the Family Court to be heard by me sitting as a s.9(1) judge.

The matter came before me on 25 July 2025 for what was recorded in the first order as a review hearing in respect of the orders which had been made. By this point all parties were represented and significant differences of opinion were beginning to be identified between the Local Authority, the Guardian and the parents.

The Guardian had now met both the parents and, separately, all four children. She was impressed by all members of the family. In her view the parents demonstrated clear ability in looking after their children, even D whose health issues requires a different approach to his older siblings. The parents were welcoming, their home was in very good order and in their discussions with the Guardian, both together and separately, the parents demonstrated both engagement and an appreciation of positions other than their own. The parents were clear about their understanding of risk and of the purpose of their planned travel. They were flexible as to their proposed destination and not insistent upon only travelling to X. The children, as noted above, were polite, friendly, clearly well looked after, courteous and engaging with the Guardian, who saw them all separately from their parents. The children were keen to travel and disappointed at the thought of not being able to go abroad.

Notwithstanding the positive impression made by each member of the family upon her the Guardian was mindful of the risks involved in travelling to either X or Y and considered that those risks required to be guarded against. However in terms of the welfare of the children other than in being taken to X or Y the Guardian had no qualms and queried the necessity of care proceedings and certainly the continuation of interim care orders.

The Local Authority was clear that injunctive orders against travelling continued to be necessary and considered that care proceedings should continue but that the children should remain at home in the interim, albeit subject to a requirement to inform the Local Authority in advance if they intended to travel within the jurisdiction, e.g. to Cumbria or Wales, even for a few days.

With considerable reluctance the parents accepted that the prohibitions against travel abroad should continue whilst refuting any suggestion that they could or would engage in any covert attempts to flee the jurisdiction and baulked at the necessity for any internal controls upon their movements. In court a curious debate took place about whether the parents should give either 14 days or 7 days’ notice of any travel plans within the jurisdiction. There were no submissions made as to the jurisdictional basis upon which a Local Authority, either with or without an interim care order, could legitimately control parents as to where they went with their children inside the jurisdiction. Given the views I was about to express it was not a point which I considered needed to be determined.

The tenor of the case having been agreed in pre-hearing discussions I was invited to approve directions which would effectively allow for the collation of information, the obtaining of an expert report upon the risks of travelling to X and for the matter to be re-listed three months hence. All was agreed prior to the hearing subject only to my view about the length of notice point as to which a determination was invited.

In fact what followed from me was not a view as to whether 7 or 14 days was a proportionate notice period but an indication of a very provisional view that there was a larger and more pressing issue to resolve which was whether, even on an interim basis, the necessary threshold was crossed for the making of care orders. The Local Authority had identified the case as a single issue case and all agreed that the issue was one of risk, specifically the risk to the children that by being in X they were likely to suffer significant harm. To my mind it was not automatically obvious that the threshold was crossed, even on the lower evidential standard of simply having reasonable grounds to believe that the circumstances are as mentioned in s.31(2) (Footnote: ⁴). In addition, the question of whether threshold was crossed was, in my judgement, inextricably intertwined with the question of the proper scope of parental responsibility and the importance of calibrating that exercise of parental responsibility in accordance with the knowledge, understanding, intentions and considerations evidenced by the parents whose actions were allegedly creating the risk of significant harm which merited Local Authority intervention.

It is fair to say that this view from the bench caught all concerned rather off-guard and the Local Authority, perfectly reasonably, indicated that it would welcome an opportunity to reflect upon what had been said and invited an adjournment. A further hearing was set up for the following Tuesday (29 July) when the issues could be explored further. In the interim the existing orders remained in place.

The Local Authority, having been taken by surprise by the view it heard from the bench, prepared a Position Statement in advance of this further hearing which sought to clarify its case. In one respect that document was helpful, in two others it was not. It was a helpful document in that it squarely set out the reasons the Local Authority relied upon for seeking continuing protective / restrictive orders. Where the document was unhelpful was in the extent of the unevidenced speculation upon which the Local Authority now sought to rely and the more intensive outcome it sought from this interim hearing.

The Local Authority’s position had changed since the previous hearing in that it now sought the continuation of the interim care order, a Prohibited Steps order to prevent the children from being removed from the jurisdiction, the continuation of the Port Alert order, the continuation of the injunction preventing removal of the children or the obtaining of alternative travel international travel documents and, now raised for the first time, the electronic tagging of the parents. In effect, the Local Authority was ‘doubling down’ (Footnote: ⁵) on its previous position.

In setting out its stall the Local Authority appeared to have misunderstood the limitations set out under s.9(1), Children Act 1989 which prohibit the making of a Prohibited Steps Order with respect to a child who is subject to a care order. Counsel for the Local Authority, who had not prepared the Position Statement, was alive to the point and did not seek to press it. It would have been open to the Local Authority to seek leave to apply for such an order if care proceedings were no longer in being (Footnote: ⁶) but even that option has been judicially deprecated in robust terms. (Footnote: ⁷)

The suggestion of the parents now being electronically tagged was unexpected. The introduction of tagging represented quite a leap on the part of the Local Authority. Previously there had been no intimation that the Local Authority considered the parents to present such a risk as to require that their location was continually known to the Local Authority. As mentioned above, at the previous hearing inter-party discussions had centred upon whether an interim care order was required and what period of notice should be given by the parents if they proposed to travel within the jurisdiction. Electronic tagging was not in anyone’s contemplation.

The option of electronic tagging, whilst not unknown in the Family Court, is rarely used. In 2019 the Court of Appeal noted that just four such cases had been reported and one further was known of anecdotally. (Footnote: ⁸) The guiding decision regarding the use of tagging is the decision of Sir James Munby P in Re X and Y (Children) [2015] EWHC 2265 (Fam). This was a case involving two Local Authorities each dealing with a different family in which the mothers wished to remove themselves and their children from this jurisdiction to travel to Turkey, allegedly for a holiday. In each case there was a concern that the final destination for each family was not Turkey but Syria and in particular that part of that country which was then controlled by the organisation known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In each case it was alleged that the true purpose of the departure from this country was not to enjoy a holiday but to join ISIS, a terrorist organisation proscribed in this country which was, at the time, engaged in military action against a number of existing states as it fought to establish a pan-geographic Islamic Caliphate.

In those cases interim care orders had been made and the children removed from maternal care and placed in foster care on the basis of the risks to the children of being taken to Syria for the purpose of joining with ISIS and thereby exposing the children directly to the risks of war. In each case the allegation was refuted by the respective parents who sought the discharge of the interim orders and the return of their children to their care. The possibility of tagging the parents was a judicially inspired idea emanating from the President (Footnote: ⁹) stemming in part from the fact that whilst the practice was largely unknown in the family courts it was of widespread use in the criminal courts. Following that decision it was clear that whilst tagging could be an option in a family case it would be expected to be used sparingly, in accordance with guidance provided by HMCTS and only ever authorised by a Judge of the Division.

For the purposes of this case the proposal that the parents now be tagged appeared to me to be misconceived for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Local Authority had been clear that its case was based upon the risk to the children of being in country X, not that a parent was intent on taking the children to a war zone with the purpose of once there joining with, supporting or otherwise seeking to engage in activities which would directly expose the children to the risk of conflict. It was the state of unrest in X which was the concern, not what a parent would then seek to do in X. Secondly, there was no evidence to support any assertion that either parent held views sympathetic to any proscribed organisation and certainly nothing which indicated that they harboured desires to abandon a life in this country which had been built up over time and where they had given every indication of seeking to root their children in this country to enable them to have fulfilling and stable lives here. There was no police information at all, let alone of any extremist or pro-violence views, no wider intelligence from any other source and no evidence from the parents’ own histories of any such sympathies. What there was in the Position Statement now being relied upon was considerable supposition about whether the parents might have ulterior motives in seeking now to travel to X but, as counsel for the Local Authority readily accepted, supposition is not evidence from which findings can be based and inferences then drawn.

Thirdly, tagging cases were often concerned with the risk of abduction but, as above, whilst there was considerable supposition about a possible covert removal of the children there was no evidence to suggest that it either could or would happen. In fact the evidence was against that possibility. The issue of travelling to X had been raised nearly two months earlier, the Local Authority’s opposition to such a journey had been clear for the same period and the parents had not sought to travel despite having every opportunity to do so. On the contrary the parents had accepted the Local Authority’s concerns and offered to shift and re-shift their travel plans to alleviate them. In any event at this point the parents had no access to the children’s passports and suggestions that alternate travel documents had been or could be obtained were entirely without foundation. It was all castles in the air.

The issue of tagging was not pursued thereafter.

The Local Authority was clear that it maintained its view that X was an inherently dangerous place and evidenced that proposition in two ways.

Firstly it relied upon the advice provided by the FCDO which it regarded as being both indicative of the risk and a benchmark by which to address the reasonableness of a parents’ actions. In essence the Local Authority’s case was that if government advice was against travel to a country a decision to travel to that country is of itself one which enables the threshold for state intervention to be crossed because the mere act of taking the child to that country means that the child is likely to suffer significant harm. I deal with that proposition later.

Secondly, the Local Authority had hyperlinked into the Position Statement web pages in which where reports of recent conflict in X provided by international news organisations. From a technical point of view this was relatively novel and certainly digitally dexterous. From an evidential perspective however bare reliance upon third party news reports as the evidence upon which it sought to rely was, in my judgement, inadequate even for the Family Court. I regard myself as a judge who generally attempts to uphold the tradition of flexibility regarding evidential processes routinely practiced in the Family Court but some limits must be acknowledged. Fortunately for the Local Authority no one, including myself, took issue with the proposition that X is a place acknowledged to be presently not yet in a state of civil stability.

The parents’ position was united but it was not singular. Whilst the parents refuted any suggestion that their wish to take the children to X was likely to expose the children to harm which no reasonable parent would countenance they did not stand on that point. They had previously agreed not to take the children to X but instead to Y and when that proposal fell foul of the Local Authority offered instead to travel only as far as Z. Given the acceptance by all parties that this was a single issue case involving whether the children being in X would expose them to unacceptable risk the offer not to travel to X or even Y might have led to a view that the problem was solved. That it did not indicated the lack of trust which had been allowed to grow between the parents and the Local Authority and which required the latter to seek to restrict the former despite their offers. For the parents it was argued that not only were their offers not to travel to unacceptable countries genuine but given the absence of any evidence of their posing a flight risk and the copious evidence that the family as a whole was settled in this country, any breach of undertakings or even just agreements reached could have effective sanctions as it would confirm the unreliability of the parents and make only more necessary the imposition of restrictions upon their autonomy. In short they had nothing to gain and everything to lose if they reneged upon the offers made to the Local Authority in court.

The Guardian no longer supported care proceedings continuing and so was not in favour of maintaining the interim care order. It was clear from her enquiries that the children were well cared for and that the parents presented no risk to their welfare. The only issue which concerned the Guardian was travel to X and in her view the proportionate response was not care proceedings but the orders made under the inherent jurisdiction. The Guardian was not against a further fine-tuning of that part of the injunctive order which prohibited travel out of the jurisdiction and the prohibition being focused upon X and Y or, slightly more widely, any country in respect of which the FCDO advise against travelling to. In the Guardian’s view it was sufficient for the parents not to take the children to X otherwise she considered that they should be free to continue as they wished with regard to family life.

In this case I have the benefit of an initial statement of evidence from the social worker, the relevant parts of which were set out earlier in this judgment. In addition, I have a document entitled Position Statement dated after the initial hearing and two days before the first hearing conducted by myself. It is not a statement of evidence as it fails to include the necessary statement of truth but it was clearly intended by the Local Authority to be taken into consideration as under a sub-paragraph entitled ‘Reasons for this Position Statement’ is set out ‘this statement is provided to the court to advise of further updates and outline the Local Authority’s current position.’ The practice of witnesses filing a Position Statement or even less helpfully a document entitled Position Statement of Evidence is unfortunately all too common in my experience but a practice from which Local Authorities should be discouraged.

That document contains ‘pen pictures’ of each of the children which not only provide a little background as to each child but helpfully records their views as to their parents and on visiting X. In each case the children express positive views about their parents and A, B and C all express dissatisfaction at the thought of not being allowed to travel to X to visit their family there. Given his age the views of D as to either are not set out but it is not disputed that D loves his parents and raises no issues as to his care.

The document also notes the shared views of the parents about their wish to go to X and their view that parts of that country are safe to travel to, that it is not the case that Y is ranked in the same manner as X by the FCDO and their rejection of the view of the Local Authority that being allowed to leave the jurisdiction would inevitably mean that they would travel to X, whether directly or indirectly.

Finally the document sets out its conclusions and recommendations which I can summarise as being the following:

The final document provided by the Local Authority was a further Position Statement, this time not masquerading as a statement of evidence but clearly emanating from the Local Authority’s legal department. As previously referenced it contained a number of assertions for which there was no evidence in support.

Finally, the Local Authority rely upon an Interim Threshold Document which is annexed to this judgment and which will be referred to in detail below.

I have had the benefit of a statement from each parent. In her statement the mother responded to the Local Authority’s Interim Threshold Document The statements of the parents have already been referred to above but it should be mentioned that M’s written evidence was clear: she has had no involvement with the Local Authority previously; both she and F love their children and have no intention of causing them harm; she had understood the advice of the FCDO and took that into consideration in the decision-making along with her own experience of X, the information from family members there and F’s recent visit thereto. M was clear as to the reason for going to X, which was only ever to visit family there and emphasised the compliance with the requests of professionals not to travel when asked not to and to hand over the children’s passports when faced with that request from the Police. None of that evidence is challenged by the Local Authority.

Like M’s statement F’s deals in part with the Local Authority’s threshold grounds and then provides greater detail about the decision to leave X, their previous travel abroad (not to X), the situation of F’s father and the travel plans which were put in place as a result of this information. F was clear that his decision to travel to X was based upon as full as assessment of the situation as he could make but was assisted by his own knowledge of the situation on the ground where he had proposed to stay, the information from family members present there, his commitment to his family and specifically to their safety and also his commitment to his family’s continued residence in the UK. This point was included to meet any assertion that the plan to visit X was in fact a plan to return there. F was also clear that he continued to be open to advice from the Local Authority and would not dispute expert evidence if made available which confirmed greater security and safety risks in either X or Y that he presently identified.

The legal issues in this case concern not just ss.31 and 38 of the Children Act 1989 but include the importance of welfare, the scope and effect of parental responsibility and the importance of establishing necessary facts on the basis of evidence.

Welfare

The starting point is always welfare, it is the court’s paramount consideration (Footnote: ¹⁰) by which is meant it rules upon or determines the course to be followed. (Footnote: ¹¹) Welfare is a wide-ranging concept which has long been taken to have the broadest application so as to encompass all relevant factors which might impact upon a child. In Re G (Children)(Education: Religious Upbringing) [2012] EWCA Civ 1233 welfare was defined by Munby LJ (as he then was) as follows:

That broad approach does not exclude parental considerations but they are not a determinative let alone dispositive factor in that evaluation. Welfare is not determined through the prism of whether a parent has exceeded the scope of their parental responsibility. (Footnote: ¹³) But there remains a place for parental views within the wide definition of welfare. In J v C which, despite its relative antiquity, still retains a place in the canon of family law, Lord MacDermott, even though his judgment comprehensively analysed the historical development of the law away from precedence being accorded to parental rights and fixed upon welfare as the sole criterion of decisions in respect of children, set out the following:

This point continues to resonate in present day jurisprudence through the application of the welfare checklist set out at s.1(3), Children Act 1989. When considering applications under Part 4 of the Children Act 1989, of which an application for an interim care order is one, the ‘welfare checklist’, which is not a checklist in the modern sense of a series of steps necessary to fly a plane or manage an operating theatre but a collection of factors referencing different aspects of a child’s life. Within the factors to be considered are two issues independent of the child but of great importance to their situation, being any risk of harm facing the child and the capability of the parents in meeting the child’s needs. (Footnote: ¹⁵) It is clear that whilst parental wishes do not determine any question as to a child’s welfare neither does the welfare evaluation exclude them. Parental capability, which arguably includes their views, rationalisation and reasoning, remains a factor of importance in any decision-making by the court.

Parental responsibility

The above is underlined by the importance of the role of the parent in decision-making in respect of their child which is longstanding and pre-dates the coming into force of the Children Act by decades. Rare will be the family law advocate who has not at some point quoted Lord Templeman’s words:

Lord Templeman offered that opinion in 1988 but they resonate the same clarity and authority today as then because the importance of the place of the parent at the heart of the child’s life remains a kernel of family law as understood in this jurisdiction. Earlier in 2025 Hayden J stated

What was being referred to in that sentence was the introduction of the concept of parental responsibility at s.3(1). Defined in the statute as meaning ‘all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his property’ (Footnote: ¹⁸)its introduction in the Children Act 1989 has been described as ‘a fundamental change’ (Footnote: ¹⁹) to the law relating to children. It was a key concept in the new legal arrangements which emphasised ‘that the duty to care for the child and to raise him to moral, physical and emotional health is the fundamental task of parenthood’ (Footnote: ²⁰) and the importance of its proper exercise by parents has been a daily exhortation in the Family Court ever since. Parental responsibility is an obligation undertaken for the benefit of the child, not the parent and is a duty which continues throughout minority survives divorce, separation, isolation and even abandonment. Parental responsibility may be controlled or limited by the making of orders, both private and public, under the Children Act but it is not lost thereby. Only a court order can remove parental responsibility (via adoption or an order for the termination of parental responsibility).

Parental responsibility creates an expectation that parents, not the state, bear primary responsibility for their children and it is parents who should look to meet the welfare of their child, by meeting their needs and making the significant decisions about the key aspects of their child’s upbringing. The point was made by MacFarlane LJ (as he then was) in Re W (Direct Contact) [2012] EWCA Civ 999:

The Children Act is now almost 34 years in operation but the importance given to parental responsibility has lost none of its force over the decades. If anything the intervening years have seen a strengthening of the position through the embedding of the European Convention of Human Rights into the domestic legal system and the consequent importance of the right to family life. The exercise of parental responsibility imbues a parent with a considerable degree of autonomy and this is even more so when two parents, each holding parental responsibility, agree upon the course of action for their child. What erodes parental responsibility is the developing autonomy of the older child, to quote Lord Denning what ‘starts with a right of control and ends with little more than advice.’ (Footnote: ²²)That being so the corollary is that where the parents of an older child are agreed upon a course of action and that child themselves is of the same mindset the course upon which all are set is one from which any diversion should be for good reason based upon clear grounds and properly reflective of the importance of autonomy.

It is not disputed that the exercise of parental responsibility is not boundless and the importance of child protection is not downgraded because parents are singing from the same hymn sheet. However where parents are acting in accordance with their parental responsibility it will require evidence of such harm, or the risk thereof, to justify intention. Baker J (as he then was) put it in the following way:

The threshold test

The above reference to a child suffering or likely to suffer significant harm as a result of the care given to the child not being reasonable to expect a parent to give if a clear reference to s.31(2), Children Act 1989 and the ‘threshold test’. The relevant part of section 31(2) sets out the following:

The threshold test is a jurisdictional gateway which must be passed through if a Local Authority seeks to intervene in family life in a manner which would amount to a limit or circumscription of parental authority. As such it is the bulwark against arbitrary state intervention. It is an objective test and is to be considered from the perspective of the child and not though the eyes of the parents. It is also a threefold test.

First there must be either evidence of significant harm having occurred or evidence upon which it can be found that there is a risk thereof. If the former the harm must be proved on the simple balance of probabilities, either the harm occurred or it has not (Footnote: ²⁴).

In the second case, that of a risk of harm, the correct interpretation of that phrase has been considered on a number of occasions by the senior courts but the accepted definition remains that of Lord Nicholls:

However notwithstanding that a risk of harm concerns what might happen in the future, by definition that which has not yet occurred, it is still necessary to establish facts proven on the balance of probabilities in order to have a foundation for that future risk. As Lord Nicholls put it:

The necessary factual matrix is important because the threshold test is the protection against unwarranted state interference, not an attempt to shield a child from any harm. The likelihood that on their journey to adulthood children may suffer some harm is an almost inevitable consequence of growing up. Children have accidents when parents are not supervising them properly because they are preoccupied with their mobile phones; children suffer isolation and neglect when parents are distracted, inadequate, career-focused or just selfish; children suffer hurt when they row or even fight with their siblings or their friends; children face innumerable pressures from peers or from the dystopian world occupied by so-called social media influencers; children’s ability to concentrate, think and communicate evaporates as they gorge on a vacuous deluge of sneezing pandas and dancing dogs beloved of those social media platforms which aggressively target the under-age viewer through pumping out click-bait videos. All of those are familiar examples are harm children suffer from time to time but none of them would automatically result in state intervention, it would depend upon the consequence actually or likely to be suffered. Some harm is not enough, only proven significant harm, or a factual basis sufficient to render it likely, will do.

But even significant harm of itself is not sufficient to enable the state to intervene. The second test if one of attributability, of stemming from what a parent has or has not done. The child playing on a climbing frame in a park who suffers a serious injury such as a fractured skull but which occurred despite the focused attention of an observant parent is not going to become the subject of care proceedings. Even a serious accident is still an accident. But the parent whose child was injured when they fell because the parent had wandered off out of sight and earshot and in leaving the child to fend for themselves was too far away to hear cries for help to assist and so the child fell is in a different position. The issue here is in whether the parent’s actions where that which a reasonable parent would have done. This is the third limb of the threshold test.

The actions of the parent which caused the harm must also be not what a reasonable parent would have done. A parent who is forced to leave a child on a climbing frame because of a medical emergency involving an elderly relative is not acting unreasonably. Not so the parent who abandons their child at the top of the climbing frame to go and buy a beer, let alone the parent who passes out whilst their child is on that climbing frame by reason of the drink taken. It is only when such harm can properly be gauged as being significant, stemming from parental in/action and that activity / the lack of it being other than what a reasonable parent would do that the threshold is crossed and the state can break through the protection afforded a family by their right to privacy and to live their family life according to how they believe it should be lived.

But the reasonable parent is not a single identikit character. As referred to above the art of parenting is both a big tent and a broad church and the concept of parental responsibility provides a very wide scope to parents in how they choose to live their lives and so raise their children. That necessary discretion has its own impact upon how the threshold test in s.31(2) should be interpreted. A further common quote, heard probably even more frequently than Lord Templeman’s, is that of Hedley J in Re L (Threshold Criteria) [2007] 1 FLR 2050 who, having himself recited Lord Templeman’s words, went on to state the following:

It follows that the reasonable parent is not to be drawn narrowly and a significant degree of tolerance must be accepted when evaluating what constitutes reasonable parenting. Not for the first time this point is best expressed by Baroness Hale when she put it so:

I have dealt with the above in some detail because it is important to have done so in the light of the conclusions which I have reached and which are set out below. I am cognisant, however, that I am dealing with the matter at an interim stage and that, pursuant to s.38(2) of the Children Act the basis upon which I must approach matters is not that the threshold test must be satisfied to the necessary civil standard of proof but only that there should be reasonable grounds for believing that the threshold test is met. Notwithstanding the undoubtedly lower level of the appropriate test it remains a test which has to be met and the Local Authority must establish that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the children are likely to suffer significant harm attributable to the care given to them by their parents which would be acts which are outwith what reasonable parents would do. To do so requires evidence and it is necessary therefore in the light of the evidence filed in the proceedings to consider what constitutes evidence in support of the submission that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the threshold is crossed.

The Family Court Practice notes that ‘family proceedings are subject to the same rigorous evidential and forensic principles that govern all civil proceedings.’ (Footnote: ²⁹) To many a Family Judge this is a rule noted more in its breach than its observance. Although the trend in civil cases for ever heavier reliance upon ‘lawyered’ documents to both frame and underpin a case has not been fully followed in the Family Court (despite the ever growing size of the court bundle in even a standard care case) one area where it is accepted that clarity, precision and care are required in a written document prepared by a lawyer and not a social worker is in the drafting of the Threshold Document (whether Interim or Final). Too often, particularly at the initial hearing, a somewhat sprawling and wide-ranging document is proffered, if such a document if proffered at all, which requires a considerable degree of unpacking and re-shaping to pass muster as anything approaching something which sets out clear allegations which, if proven, will establish not only the significant harm upon which the case is based but how it stems from parental care.

Just as important is the evidence put forward in support of the matters which, if proved, would enable threshold to be crossed in all respects, i.e. evidencing either significant harm or the sound basis for the risk of such harm in the future, being attributable to parental care and outwith what a reasonable parent would do. What follows hereafter is a composite of those matters first referenced by the then President in Re A (Application for Care and Placement Orders: Local Authority Failings) [2015] EWFC 11 and helpfully summarised by Aikens LJ in Re J (A Child) [2015] EWCA Civ 222:

How the above guidance has been applied in this case is dealt with below.

I am concerned not just with the application for an interim care order but separately with applications under the inherent jurisdiction. The focus so far has been upon the primary application for a care order but it is important to deal with the care application in detail first in order to the contextualise the discussion in respect of the inherent jurisdiction applications.

Turning first to the ‘Applicant’s Initial Threshold Statement’ at Annex 1 below based upon the evidence filed in the case and considering each paragraph in turn I make the following comments:

It follows from the above that there is only one basis upon which the Local Authority assert that the threshold test is met, that the decision to travel to X will place the children in serious risk of physical and emotional harm.

This is therefore a single issue case which can be defined as follows: is it the case that the wish of these parents to take their children to X means that there is a real possibility in the sense of one which cannot sensibly be ignored, that the children will suffer significant harm and that the children being taken to X is not what a reasonable parent would do?

Despite the dubious evidential value of hyperlinked references in a Position Statement to recent reports of civil strife in X there is no doubt that X is not a state which enjoys a settled civic order. There is good reason why the FCDO has for many years advised UK citizens against travelling to X. The risk of injury or even death is a possibility anywhere in the world to which travel can be undertaken but there are forces in play in X which render it less unlikely a greater risk than in many other countries. The developments in X over the last nine months, following on as they do from the civil war which was being waged against the former regime means that is undoubtedly a place of internal conflict and therefore of risk to those within that country. The risk includes injury and even death. However that risk is not uniform in terms of persons, geography, ethnicity or religion but will vary according to a multiplicity of factors some of which will be static and some which will be dynamic. What this means is that the risk may change without warning and without any action by anyone in X at the time. The uncertainty only adds to the matters to be considered by anyone contemplating travelling to X. It weighs against the reasonableness of a decision to take one’s children to that place.

Against that is the fact that despite its unpredictability those outcomes remain only a risk. There is no evidential basis for the proposition that injury or death is a probable outcome of travelling to X. No one travelling to that place is likely to be injured or to die. People have been injured or killed in the various internecine conflicts in X even since the start of this year but many more people have neither been injured nor died there, this includes not just F in the period that he was in X but also all the members of the wider family who are in X and who have been living there for many years. The same could not be said if the parents were intent upon taking their children to a place of both intense current conflict and where the general circumstances in terms of food availability were likely to affect anyone who went there. Anyone intending to visit such a place would more likely than not be exposing their children to one or the other or both. X, for all its lack of civil stability, is not such a place and it is a question of the evaluation of the risk of what could happen rather than attempting to mitigate a likely outcome.

The primary evidence upon which the Local Authority relies is that of the FCDO website, as relied upon in the final paragraph of its ‘Interim Threshold Statement’. The Local Authority assert that in acting contrary to that advice the threshold test is met. It is important therefore to consider that source of evidence.

There is no doubt that the information available to the FCDO will be informed, detailed, drawn from a variety of courses, including from intelligence sources not all of which would be available to a member of the public, and likely to have been considered by those with specialist expertise and knowledge in the country in question, in regional geopolitics, in the light of diplomatic activity and quite possibly with military knowledge. It will be an informed and rounded view and not to be ignored.

Having acknowledged the strength of that advice it is useful to consider what the FCDO states about its own advice. On the section of the website specific to X the FCDO, having set out its advice against travelling there and advising those there to leave states the following:

On the general page of the FCDO Travel Advice website the following is set out:

The FCDO offers well sourced advice in respect of which due diligence has been exercised by those in a position to assess it for accuracy and reliability. However it is advice only, not an instruction and much less a prohibition and any failure to follow it will not lead to enforcement action. Further it is general advice, not bespoke to any particular situation. The FCDO acknowledges the limitations of attempting to provide unform advice to individuals in a multiplicity of different situations. It is very clear that responsibility for deciding to travel rests with the individual at all times, even where the advice is against any travel.

It follows therefore that insofar as the Local Authority relies upon the advice of the FCDO as amounting to a positive prohibition against travel it is an inaccurate interpretation of what is set out there. Insofar as the Local Authority asserts that a failure to follow that advice is evidence of a real possibility of the risk of significant harm outwith what a reasonable parent would do, the caveats to the advice, in my judgement, do not allow the Local Authority to place such weight upon that advice. It is not indicative of anything, it is advisory as to the situation and a warning to be heeded but also to be weighed against other sources of information and particular personal situations, including local knowledge, familiarity and the need to be present in that country.

Against all of the above must be considered the actions of the parents to date which would appear to be as follows:

In addition, the following points must be considered in respect of the parents:

To all of the above must now be added certain other, undisputed, matters which must be fed into the question of whether the parents in seeking to take their children to X are acting in a manner likely to expose the children to a real possibility, one that cannot sensibly be ignored, of significant harm which could not be regarded as being what a reasonable parent would do:

When all of the above are taken into consideration it builds a picture of parents who have a significant knowledge bank upon which to base a decision through the evaluation of the relative risks and benefits to their children of a visit to X. That information, when added to the evidence of their parenting ability to date, suggests that they are parents who regularly make positive decisions in respect of their children, whose behaviour and interactions with both the Local Authority and the Guardian of themselves are evidence of the parents’ good parenting. Such evidence underlines rather than undermines the parents’ own evidence of their prioritisation of the welfare of their children and at the very least casts doubt upon the assertion that the parents would act unreasonably in their decision-making in respect of their children but more accurately positively dispels it.

To this must be added the importance of subjectivity in assessing parental actions, of the centrality given to parental responsibility and the acknowledgment that a very broad view is taken as to what constitutes acceptable parenting, including ‘the eccentric, the barely adequate and the inconsistent’ to quote from Hedley J. It must follow therefore that when parenting is shown to be the informed, the careful and the good and the parents themselves have sound reasons and a clear basis for undertaking a particular course of action a court must properly reflect all of that before coming to a conclusion that such parental actions are both not what a reasonable parent would do and likely to cause significant harm.

Acknowledging the low bar that is set by the combination of requiring only reasonable grounds to believe that the threshold test is met and that the test itself, focusing as it does upon the risk of future harm, and needing only to be a possibility that cannot sensibly be ignored, is a comparatively low bar, according to Lord Nicholls, it is still a test which must be met on an evidential basis. It is not the case that any action or any risk can justify an interim care order something more is required to enable state interference. However in this case and despite the evidence of the risks posed in being in X the wider evidential picture conclusively demonstrates in my judgement that the parents are alive to that risk, that they have carefully factored it into their decision-making, that they are not determined to go to X come what come may and have always prioritised the welfare of their children, including taking the difficult decision to leave X when it appeared that it was not a place where they wished their children to be and that to conclude that their wish to go to X is indicative of actions which will expose their children to risks which cannot sensibly be ignored is not the case. In fact the evidence is clear that the parents, far from ignoring the risks, have sensibly considered and evaluated them in their plans for the children.

For all of those reasons I do not find that the Local Authority have established that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the children would be at risk of significant harm by being taken to X by their parents. It follows that the application for a care order is dismissed.

The dismissal of the care proceedings does not of itself end the proceedings before the court. In addition to the interim care order and the care proceedings as a whole was a Port Alert order and an injunction to prevent the parents from securing international travel documents nor removing the children from the jurisdiction. The question therefore is whether those orders should continue.

The orders were made upon permission being given to the Local Authority to invoke the inherent jurisdiction pursuant to s.100, Children Act 1989. That relevant parts of that section set out as follows:

When the orders were made at the initial hearing the information available to the court was significantly more limited and the opportunity available for proper investigation of the position was non-existent due to the concerns of the Local Authority of the need for protective orders and the lack of representation of the parents at that hearing. I have had greater time, more detailed information and the benefit of counsel representing all parties at two subsequent hearings as well as time in which to reflect upon the evidence and thoroughly review all matters. None of that was available at the outset.

The orders which were made were properly orders to be made under the inherent jurisdiction because of their wider effect than would have been available under a care order. Whilst a care order prohibits a child being removed from the jurisdiction without permission of the Local Authority (Footnote: ³⁰) there is no basis upon which a Local Authority can control whether a parent seeks a travel document for the child from a different state nor enforce a prohibition against travelling.

Notwithstanding the appropriateness of the orders s.100 (4)(b) is clear that permission can only be given to a Local Authority without leave and that leave is dependent upon the court being satisfied that without such orders a child is likely to suffer significant harm. In this case that harm stems from being taken to X. However for the reasons set out above I have concluded that it is not the case that the children are likely to suffer significant harm even if the parents were to decide to take them to X and therefore the orders should not continue and I discharge them. It follows that the children’s passports should be returned to the parents immediately and the restrictions upon travel or upon securing new international travel documents are discharged.

I make such orders notwithstanding the fact that at the second hearing the parents were prepared to accepting of an injunction limited to preventing any travel to a country which was a ‘red’ country in the FCDO list would be tolerated. It might be wondered why that was not an acceptable basis for this court to proceed upon given the limited impact upon parental autonomy and the obvious benefit to the children of the elimination of risk in being in X. In my view the answer is that court orders should only be made where proper grounds exist and not as a holding device or to reflect the tug of pragmatism. In my judgment any restriction on parental autonomy and upon the family’s right to its privacy and its freedom to travel was unwarranted on the evidence, despite the evidence of risk in being in X and it would be wrong to limit the family without full and proper justification. The test is there for a reason and if it is not met the order should not stand.

I cannot leave this case without addressing the issue of the removal of the children’s passports on 11 July 2025.

On the evening of 11 July when the Local Authority aided by the police effectively corralled the parents into handing over the children’s passports. It is not at all clear to me that it was appropriate for the Local Authority to involve the Police to secure the children’s passports. It is even less clear that the Police were acting in accordance with their powers in removing the passports at all. The focus of this judgment is not on inappropriate use of discretionary police powers but my understanding of the position, which was never raised let alone argued before me, is that whilst the police possess powers to seize passports those powers are heavily caveated in terms of their exercise and the period of time as to which a passport so seized can be retained. It is my understanding that it is not a common law power but one created by statute in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. Section 1 of that Act refers to Schedule 1 which authorises a constable to seize a passport from a person who is suspected of intending to leave the UK for terrorism related-activity outside the country and is already as a port. (Footnote: ³¹) These parents were not at a port and they were not suspected of involvement in counter-terrorism and therefore the basis for asserting that passports could be removed under ‘their powers’ (Footnote: ³²) is dubious in the extreme. The only other statutory basis upon which a passport can be removed by the police appears to be under Schedule 8 of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 and is limited to cancelled or invalid passports, which was not the case here.

I am afraid that the whole episode has more than a flavour of coercion to it.

But this is in-keeping with the general degree of heavy-handedness in its dealings with the parents which the Local Authority has, in my judgement, demonstrated and which reached its nadir in the passport episode discussed above. The family indicated as long ago as May that it wished to travel to X and no attempt has been made to do so covertly. On the contrary the parents have, in my view, been open and willing to listen to the Local Authority and to take on board its concerns. In all the information, whether in evidence or Position Statement, relied upon by the Local Authority I am unable to see how the Local Authority have sought to listen to the parents and attempt to see matters from their perspective. The Local Authority formed a view that going to X was unacceptable, based largely upon the advice of the FCDO, and then set about imposing its will on the parents to not going there and then to not going to a second country which it wrongly miscategorised as being equally dangerous.

That dictatorial approach has continued to characterise the Local Authority’s applications and their positions. A plan for separation of the children was always disproportionate and highly unlikely to meet the now settled test for such an order. (Footnote: ³³) It is unsurprising that it was given judicial short shrift. At the next hearing the Local Authority, despite having secured a continuance of the injunctive orders, was intent on seeking to control internal travel by the family without setting out any basis upon which it could lawfully exercise such authority or by which a court could sanction such a control structure. At the second hearing the Local Authority introduced the idea of tagging the parents. Another speculative and unreasoned basis upon which to proceed but indicative of a desire to impose unreasonable controls contrary to the rights of each parent and without anything approaching justification for such a position.

Local Authorities have important responsibilities in terms of child protection and as noted at the outset of this judgment, being able to navigate the right course in the discharge of those duties is not always easy to do, particularly in the middle of a changing situation which requires judgement and re-calibration. Hindsight is a wonderful thing but it is often the luxury of the courtroom rather than in the field where the social work is taking place. However even allowing for that it is incumbent upon special workers and police officers to have at least a broad appreciation of where the limits of their duties and powers lie, of what can lawfully be done and particularly where genuine agreement ends and coercion begins. Co-operation looks and feels far different from control and is easily distinguished from capitulation. In my judgement clear boundaries have been overstepped in this case when with some thought and reflection it should have been obvious that individuals were straying from their proper authority.

I hope the parents do not read this judgment as any indicator that they should go to X regardless of the situation there. It is not intended as such. The parents were being restricted from exercising their own judgement in relation to where they should take their children by operation of court orders which were imposed upon them but which will now be discharged given that I have determined that the legal basis for such restrictions is not made out. That should not be read simply as a ‘green light’ to go straight to X. A significant factor in that determination was the clear evidence of the parents’ love, commitment and care for their children and their obvious desire for them to be kept safe and well. It is in the confidence that the parents will not take their children to X if they consider that it is not safe for them to be there that I discharge the orders restricting them from making that choice. The court is statutorily required to regard the children’s welfare as being its paramount consideration but it is clear to me that the parents operate to that same standard. The difference is that in their case the parents act not out of duty but out of love for their children. It is my clear conclusion that their parents’ judgement is the best determinator of what is right for these children.

That is my judgment.

The Court is concerned with the children A, B, C and D. Their mother is M (hereafter the Mother) and their father is F (hereafter the Father).

It is submitted that, in relation to the children named at paragraph 1 above (hereafter ‘the children’), there are reasonable grounds to believe that the provisions of s.31 of the Children Act 1989 are satisfied, on the basis on the basis that, at the time preventative measures were commenced, they were suffering or likely to suffer significant harm, such harm or likelihood of harm being attributable to the care being provided to them by their parents not being what it is reasonable to expect a parent to give.

It is submitted that the facts that are relied upon to satisfy paragraphs 2 above are in particular:

On the 23^rd May 2025 D’s school raised concerns the father had asked to take D out of school a week earlier in July so they could go on holiday to X. D had told his teacher ‘I am going on holiday with my dad’ when asked if they were going to see family D is reported to have said ‘no me and my dad are going to kill the bad people – they are killing all the people, and we need to kill the bad people’.

Children Social Care explained to the family the concerns and risks of taking the children to X and advised against this travel. An assessment was undertaken where it was made clear to the father that such travel was opposed by the Council and why attempts to make the journey with the children would trigger safeguarding intervention. The parents informed children social care they would not travel to X but intended to go to Z where they also had family.

On the 11 July 2025 the youngest child informed his school he was travelling to X to ‘kill people’ at the weekend. Children social care and Merseyside Police attended the property on the evening of 11 July 2025 and noted 13 suitcases packed and the family confirmed they were travelling to Z but had booked tickets to Z with connecting flights to O with the family informing children social care they would not take the connecting flight to O. The eldest girls were spoken to, and they confirmed they were going to X.

Merseyside Police considered using their Police Protection Powers but decided again this as a request was made to the parents to hand over the children’s UK passports which the parents done [sic]. It is not clear to children social care if the family hold X passports.

The parents intended to travel to a country despite being informed of the risk to the children placing the children in serious risk of physical and emotional harm. In terms of risk, the information provided by the UK Government is clear in stating that it is not safe for people to travel to X or Y.