A Local Authority in Wales v GDA & Anor

These proceedings pursuant to Part IV of the Children Act 1989 (“CA89”) concern one child, namely [X], who was born [in 2024] (“X”). It follows that X is rapidly approaching his first birthday.

The relevant local authority is [a local authority in Wales] (“LA”). The LA has been represented by Mr Jones, solicitor, at this hearing.

GDA is X’s mother (“M”). M is a citizen of [another country] (“Country Z”). She has been in the United Kingdom (“UK”) since the latter part of 2023. M has been represented by Mr Ogunbusola, counsel, at this hearing. M also had with her for the first 4 days of the hearing, with the agreement of all parties, [MM] (“MM”). She is one of M’s witnesses in relation to her support network. She was also an emotional support to M during the hearing. I will return to this witness in more detail later in this judgment. I also record, for completeness, that shortly before the fifth day of the hearing on 2/4/25, the court received a “Petition” from a lawyer (purporting to represent both M and X) from Country Z to participate remotely in the hearing. Following submissions from all parties, and by consent, I refused to allow this lawyer to be remotely admitted to the hearing.

I note at this point that the identity of X’s father has not been confirmed during the preparation for this hearing. I will return in more detail in relation to the circumstances surrounding the court’s attempt to secure confirmation of paternity of X later in the judgment. It follows that there is no other parent with Parental Responsibility (“PR”).

X has been represented via his Cafcass Cymru Guardian (“CG”), and by Ms Naylor, solicitor. This case has, in fact, continued for far longer than expected at the outset of the proceedings, with the result that the hearing of evidence in this case concluded the day before the CG’s retirement from Cafcass Cymru. A replacement CG has been appointed for the next stage of these proceedings.

I also record that Ms L, of Country Z’s consular team, has also attended this hearing. I digress to note that she has diligently attended most of the previous court hearings and has been, at times, a source of considerable assistance to the parties and the court, for which I specifically record my gratitude.

The LA has sought a care order (“CO”) and an interim care order (“ICO”) in relation to X pursuant to an application dated 2/5/24 [346-/3653]

This hearing can be most appropriately characterised as a partial or provisional final hearing. The court has been invited to determine all remaining issues in relation to threshold criteria in accordance with s31 CA 89. In addition, the court has been invited to make a provisional welfare determination in relation to X.

The LA contends that the s31 CA89 test is passed in this case. In relation to the welfare outcome, the LA robustly contends that X cannot be safely returned to M’s care and that no further assessment of her is necessary. The LA case is that X should ultimately be placed with his maternal uncle and his partner (“uncle and aunt”) in Country Z pursuant to a Special Guardianship Order (“SGO”) following a positive assessment of them in Country Z by a social worker working with Children and Families Across Borders (“CFAB”). It is proposed that they should travel over to the UK for no less than 2 weeks in order to meet and spend increasing amounts of time with X.

Whilst the LA had previously hoped that this visit by the uncle and aunt would have formed part of a confirmed transition plan for X to be placed finally in their care in the UK before their return with him to Country Z, the LA now agrees with the CG that, in the light of the evidence heard by the court in the course of the hearing, there needs to be a further focused piece of assessment work on them to confirm their capacity to keep X safe in Country Z, along with further input from a lawyer with specialist knowledge of the legal system in Country Z. The LA therefore seeks in closing a further ICO in advance of a further substantive final hearing. The LA is effectively neutral as to whether that ICO is underpinned by a direction pursuant to s38(6) CA89 or by temporary approval of the uncle and aunt as kinship foster carers, with their further assessment pursuant to Regulation 26 of the Care Planning, Placement and Case Review (Wales) Regulations 2015 (“the Welsh Placement Regulations”).

M’s case can be summarised as follows: Whilst she makes a number of limited factual concessions, M denies that the threshold criteria test pursuant to s31 CA89 is passed in this case. In the event that the court finds against her in that regard, it is, and remains, her primary position that X should be immediately returned to her care, with her remaining either in the UK or by returning to Country Z. In the event that she remains in the UK, she would not oppose the making of a Supervision Order (“SO”) in relation to X. M’s second preference at the outset of this hearing was for the court to adjourn the final hearing to allow for the further assessment of her as X’s future carer. She did not oppose the continuation of an ICO in such circumstances. I note that this second preference does not appear in the closing written submissions filed on her behalf. However, I will still consider this as a potential option in any event. M’s final preference is to endorse the LA’s plan to place X in the care of his uncle and aunt in Country Z. On my understanding of M’s overall position, she would not oppose the continuation of the ICO to cover any period for any further assessment of them.

Whilst the CG has sought to remain out of the arena to an extent in relation to threshold criteria, helpful submissions have been advanced in relation to the relevant evidence placed before the court. In a separate Position Statement, it is clear that the CG also agrees that the s31 CA89 threshold criteria test is made out in this case. The CG is extremely anxious, as is the LA, about the welfare outcome in this case. He agrees with the LA that X cannot be returned to M’s care. His stance in this respect is as robust as the LA. It was his view in evidence that, ideally, X should be placed with his uncle and aunt in Country Z. X has by birth the nationality of Country Z. In many ways it could be said that it was an “accident” that he was born in the UK and still finds himself here. However, the CG remains concerned about the risks posed to X by M in the event that he is placed with the uncle and aunt in Country Z. That has informed his position, which supports a further focused assessment of the uncle and aunt. If anything, this position is more robustly advanced following the hearing in the closing Position Statement filed on his behalf. I digress to note that this document is not reflective of any concerns as to the uncle and aunt’s abilities as carers per se. Rather, there are concerns as to whether they can keep X safe from M in the light of the evidence in the hearing. He submits, through the child’s solicitor, that the ICO underpinning such the further litigation should be pursuant to s38(6) CA89.

The evolution of the threshold criteria aspect, as with other features of this case, has been exceptional. The court would normally expect to see a narrowing of issues in relation to threshold criteria over time, with the aspiration of a full agreement by the time of the final hearing. In this case, the opposite seems to have prevailed.

In M’s initial threshold response she accepted that the s31 CA89 test was met and made a number of substantive concessions [156-/3653]. In M’s second response [167-/3653] this was confirmed. It is fair to say that there was then a change of direction in relation to threshold criteria (and M’s approach more generally) to which I will return in around October 2024 when she changed solicitors. In the next threshold criteria response M was equivocal as to whether the s31 CA89 test was met, with a revision also on her part in relation to a number of the underpinning facts [177-/3653]. The up-to-date position was summarised by the LA in a composite document [182-/3653]. Then at the outset of this hearing it was confirmed by M’s counsel that she did not accept that the s31 CA89 test is met in this case. That is also confirmed in the closing submissions advanced on her behalf.

I digress at this point to note that M now contends that her first solicitors failed to properly engage with her, failed to reflect her instructions in her early CA89 statement and in her early threshold response documents (and more generally in the case) and failed to send her own statements and other important documents in the case. I will deal further with such assertions later in this judgment.

The unconventional position in relation to threshold criteria continues up to this point in the proceedings, in that the LA contends in closing that it has had cause to reflect on a number of previous fundamental factual assertions by them about M in terms of the wider background informing its case under this heading. This reflection is necessary, on the LA’s case, other than in a positive way in relation to M. Whilst the LA continues to assert in closing that the test pursuant to s31 CA89 is met, the LA submits that there are now fundamental uncertainties about past “givens” as to how M came to be in the UK and whether she was “trafficked” into the country. The LA is also uncertain now as to whether M was compelled to work as a ‘sex worker’ in the early months following her arrival and her personal circumstances immediately before X was born. I will set out the details in this respect, along with other aspects relating to s31 CA89, more fully later in the judgment.

There is no agreement in relation to the welfare decision for X arising from M’s primary or (previously) secondary position. As indicated above, M’s final preference in terms of outcome does coincide with the (now) provisional position of the LA and the CG.

The fundamental and overarching issues relating to the welfare aspect of this case can be summarised briefly as follows:

There has been a wealth of evidence placed before the court to inform those fundamental issues. The following is a short overview of some of the underpinning issues relating to the welfare aspect of this case:

I have had placed before me 4 separate trial bundles (albeit with duplication between the condensed, remote witness and full bundles). I will seek to deploy references from the full bundle, which amounts to some 3653 pages, in this judgment. In addition, some further loose documents were produced in the course of the hearing. I confirm that I have read all the core evidence relating to the LA’s application.

I have also heard taken oral evidence from a number of witnesses: (i) Professor Gray (Forensic Psychologist); (ii) [KO] (Social Worker from the LA’s Pre-birth Team) (“KO”), (iii) [LHa] (Midwife) (“LHa”), (iv) [HL] (Maternity Care Assistant) (“HL”), (vi) [LHi] (Midwife) (“LHi”), (vii) [HM] (Midwife) (“HM”), (viii) WA (Specialist ELAN Midwife) (“WA”); (ix) [JB] (X’s Allocated Social Worker) (“JB”), (x) M, (xi) [MM] and (xii) CG.

The law has not been contentious at this hearing. I refer briefly at this point to a short summary of the relevant legal principles.

It is the LA which raises the allegations against the parents and therefore bears the burden of proving those matters. The standard to which the LA must satisfy the court is the simple balance of probabilities i.e. more likely than not that a relevant disputed event occurred. If so, then that event is deemed to have occurred. The binary converse is equally true. If the court finds that something is more likely not to have occurred than to have occurred, then it is deemed not to have occurred.

In this context, there is no room for a finding by the court that something might have happened. The court must decide either that it did or that it did not, see Re B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35 at paragraphs 2 and 4.

Sir James Munby P in Re A (A Child) [2015] EWFC 11 (Fam) and the Court of Appeal in Re J (A Child) [2015] EWCA Civ 222 gave detailed guidance in relation to the establishment of the threshold criteria and the need to specify in the case of each allegation how and why it would establish that the child 'is suffering or is likely to suffer' significant harm.

In S & H-S (Children), Sir Andrew McFarlane P gave the following guidance on this issue:

Findings of fact must be based on evidence and not on suspicion or speculation. The court acts on facts, and not on worries or concerns. It is however legitimate to rely on inferences which may properly be drawn from the evidence (Re A (Fact Finding: Disputed findings) [2011] 1 FLR 1817).

The decision about whether the facts in issue have been proved to the requisite standard must be based on all of the available evidence and the court should have regard to the wide context of social, emotional, ethical and moral factors, see A County Council v A Mother, A Father and X, Y and Z [2005] EWHC 31 (Fam).

It is trite that the Court will have to survey the ‘wide canvas’ of evidence available.

The evidence of any parent is of crucial importance. The court must form a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability. That should not be based solely on the behaviour exhibited in the witness box (or by extension at court) during an emotionally charged contested family dispute. Demeanour and performance in court is just one aspect of the assessment, see Re M (Children)[2013] EWCA Civ 1147, Macur LJ at paragraph 12.

It is not uncommon for witnesses to tell lies during the investigation and the hearing. This is a very important feature of this case. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for various reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, distress. The fact that a witness may have lied about some matters does not necessarily mean that he or she has lied about everything, see R v Lucas [1981] QB 720.

In H-C (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 136 at paragraphs 98 to 100 of the decision Lord Justice McFarlane said:

“98.

The decision in R v Lucas has been the subject of a number of further decisions of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division over the years, however the core conditions set out by Lord Lane remain authoritative. The approach in R v Lucas is not confined, as it was on the facts of Lucas itself, to a statement made out of court and can apply to a "lie" made in the course of the court proceedings and the approach is not limited solely to evidence concerning accomplices.

99.

In the Family Court in an appropriate case a judge will not infrequently directly refer to the authority of R v Lucas in giving a judicial self-direction as to the approach to be taken to an apparent lie. Where the "lie" has a prominent or central relevance to the case such a self-direction is plainly sensible and good practice.

100.

One highly important aspect of the Lucas decision, and indeed the approach to lies generally in the criminal jurisdiction, needs to be borne fully in mind by family judges. It is this: in the criminal jurisdiction the "lie" is never taken, of itself, as direct proof of guilt. As is plain from the passage quoted from Lord Lane's judgment in Lucas, where the relevant conditions are satisfied the lie is "capable of amounting to a corroboration". In recent times the point has been most clearly made in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division in the case of R v Middleton [2001] Crim.L.R. 251. In my view there should be no distinction between the approach taken by the criminal court on the issue of lies to that adopted in the family court. Judges should therefore take care to ensure that they do not rely upon a conclusion that an individual has lied on a material issue as direct proof of guilt.”.

Whilst events leading up to the relevant threshold criteria date are often the only such events directly relevant to the assessment as to whether threshold criteria are made out, events that occur after that date can sometimes be relevant to threshold if they are informative of harm or likelihood of harm at the earlier date, see the judgment by Hale LJ in Re G (Care Proceedings: Threshold Conditions) [ 2 FLR 1111.

The trafficking of people across international borders has figured prominently in this case. Such conduct, and other similar conduct relating to the facilitating of unlawful immigration, amount to a variety of criminal offences in England and Wales, including offences contrary to s2 Modern Slavery Act 2015, s59(a) Sexual Offence Act 2003 and s25 of the Immigration Act 1971. However, in accordance with the clear direction in a number authorities, I propose to steer clear of criminal law principles in this judgment. In relation to this aspect of the case I can do no better than endorse, as part of this section of my judgment, part of the closing submissions on behalf of the CG which drew my attention to the official UK Government guidance which indicates trafficking is defined as:

Each stage of the trafficking process poses different risks to a trafficked person’s health and wellbeing. They may be at risk of psychological, physical and sexual abuse. They can be forced and coerced into conduct against their will, exposed to substance abuse, social restrictions, and manipulation. Other risks include economic exploitation, debt bondage, legal insecurity, occupational hazards, and abusive working and living conditions. Trafficking is a hidden crime. It is rarely obvious that an individual has been trafficked. However, red flags might include a combination of the following:

I have cause to specifically remind myself in this case, both in relation to threshold criteria, and welfare, that this is not a court of morals. The court must be willing to apply a wide degree of flexibility to the moral codes and compasses of parents. The court must also be open and tolerant in relation to a wide spectrum of parenting that ranges from traditionally conventional to unconventional which can be outside usual ‘norms’, see judgment by Hedley J in Re L (Care Threshold Criteria)[2007] 1 FLR 2050.

In the event that threshold criteria are made out in this case, then the court has jurisdiction to make a CO, SO, SGO or, by application of the last interventionist principle, no order. The child’s welfare is the court’s paramount consideration pursuant to s1(1) of the CA89. The court must address the welfare checklist further to s1(3) of that Act as part of the exercise.

The Article 8 rights pursuant to the European Convention on Human Rights in relation to the parent/s and the subject child/ren are engaged in the court’s determination exercise.

Lies in the context of welfare determinations are also significant and requiring of care evaluation. In short lying by a parent does not necessarily exclude that parent as a future carer for the subject child/ren. Peter Jackson LJ noted in Re K (2020) EWCA 1503:

When deciding whether to make an order and, if so, which order to make, there must be a rigorous approach to the evaluation of the child's best interests by reference to the principle of proportionality. This approach comprises two stages.

The court must undertake a global, holistic evaluation and analysis of the child's welfare needs. It must then evaluate proportionality by conducting a balancing exercise in which each of the realistically available options for meeting the child's identified welfare needs is evaluated in the degree of detail necessary to analyse its own internal positives and negatives in order, having regard to the duty to afford paramount consideration to the welfare of the child, to reach a decision as to which of the realistically available options is the most proportionate means of meeting those needs and avoiding a linear analysis whereby the available options are rejected one by one with the final option left standing, see Re G (A Child) [2014] 1 FLR 670, CA.

The welfare analysis is not a proportionality evaluation. The proportionality evaluation requires a comparison of the welfare analysis for each placement/welfare option and a consideration of whether, having regard to the benefits and detriments of each realistic option, the proportionality of interference proposed by the local authority is justified, see Surrey County Council v S [2014] EWCA Civ 601.

The court would ordinarily proceed to set out, without undue controversy, the accepted background to court proceedings. However, I pause at this point to set out a qualification in this case. For reasons I will set out later, the court has cause to be wary about many aspects of the reported background that are based on M’s own account. Therefore, this section of the judgment will be far more heavily caveated than would ordinarily to be expected.

I can be confident that M was born and raised in Country Z. She was one of a number of siblings, one of whom (a half sibling) has been positively assessed in these proceedings to be X’s future carer. M’s father was seemingly not a consistent figure in her childhood. M has previously reported that he murdered a man in Country Z, possibly in around 2012. M has also at one time alleged that he was in prison as a result. M was raised by her mother, with positive encouragement to achieve her potential academically. M has reported that she last saw her father in 2017 but had indirect contact more recently.

I am less confident in relation to the account of M’s employment history in Country Z. I note that she denies that she worked as a ‘sex worker’ in that country. It would appear that she lived and worked away from her home area within Country Z for a number of years, with the result that she had little contact with her family for some time. It may be the case that M experienced traumatic events in this part of her life that have not been disclosed which may be relevant to her current psychological presentation. It is recorded that M was diagnosed with syphilis in 2018, which she attributes to a particular former partner. If correct, that must have been a painful if not traumatic period in her young life.

M has described having had a limited number of relationships with men in Country Z. She has referred some professionals to a long-term relationship she had with a man called “JI”, with that relationship ending in 2020. She has also reported having a relationship with a man “JA” in early 2022. After about a year they moved in to live together in the summer of 2023. However, after a few weeks, that relationship ended in early July 2023. I will refer to JA in more detail later as he has figured as a reportedly putative father of X.

In view of the date of X’s birth, it appears M became pregnant in [date] 2023. The reported likely date of X’s conception is around [date] 2023. She says that she was living in Country Z at that time. I am satisfied that this is probably correct. As indicated, she now contends that the man JA is X’s father. However, X’s likely conception date does not appear to coincide with when M has previously reported that she last had sexual intercourse with him. She has reported that they last had sexual intercourse in early [date] 2023. She has also previously reported (but now denies saying the same) that she had a “one night stand” with man called “JC” and that she became pregnant as a result of that encounter. JC has been reported by her to be a married man with this own family. In the circumstances, I cannot presently be satisfied that I have been given an accurate account as to X’s conception and his paternity.

I now turn, with further inevitable hesitation, to the period leading up to M travelling to the UK. She has said, and still says, that she had been introduced to a woman “L”, through her male friend, JM, in 2023. It was L who told her of the opportunity to travel to the UK. She contends that she hoped to travel to work as a cleaner or as a delivery driver in [date] 2023. Her travel to the UK was to be financed by L, at a cost of £3k, with her being required to repay this amount from her income from employment in the UK.

did not meet her face to face before she left Country Z. Even on M’s account, if accurate, M demonstrated naivety and extremely poor judgment in such circumstances. She knew that she was pregnant by that time. It follows that the extent of her immediate employment capacity going forward to repay her travel costs was necessarily uncertain. Yet, on her account, M took this ‘leap’ into the ‘unknown’ on the word of a stranger. This is part of M’s narrative that she was trafficked to the UK. I will deal with my findings in this respect later in this judgment.

M contends as part of this trafficking narrative, that she travelled to the UK via Country Y, staying there about 10 days duration. It is recorded that M has reported that, whilst she was in Country Y during this period, JA drugged and then raped her. It has also been recorded that M has reported that this alleged rape caused X’s conception. However, I digress to report that X’s conception could not have occurred at the time M says she was in Country Y.

M has contended that when she arrived in the UK in [date] 2023 she was directed by the woman L to a city in England where it quickly became apparent, she says, that she was in a brothel. She also now contends that she was thereafter compelled to work as a ‘sex worker’. She received no payment. The payments all went to L. She has reported that she felt trapped and afraid. She was also moved around the UK to different towns and cities by L in order to avoid detection by the authorities. That said, M has given contrasting accounts about this aspect of her recent background. I will set later out my findings later in relation to this aspect of the background.

I now turn to the circumstances leading to M meeting the man called RP (also known by another name) in around [date] 2023. It has been recorded that M has said that she first met him in London when he started to attend the brothel where she was being kept. She has referred to him as a “client”. It has also been recorded that M reported that they first met in a queue in a post office or bank in London. She has also said that they met in [a place in Wales].

I therefore turn at this point to briefly summarise what is reportedly known about RP’s background. He is seemingly a national of Country W. He has reported to the LA that he was trafficked into the UK costing £10k approximately [number of] years earlier when he was in his late teens. He has reported that he escaped from his traffickers but still owed them £5k in payment for his passage. He also said that he absconded from holding centres. Different ages have been given by RP. It is thought by the LA that he is aged c22 years old. He has been recorded as a missing person (or “misper”) on police records in the Midlands, with apparent connections to his traffickers. He has had numerous temporary addresses. He has also reportedly experienced homelessness. There has been no formal determination in relation to his status in the UK. Whilst it is understood that he currently remains in the UK unlawfully, his current confirmed whereabout are unknown.

As set out earlier, M now denies having had any sexual contact with RP. She says that they have only ever kissed. She says that when she was a ‘sex worker’ and he paid her, from what would have been limited funds on his report of his circumstances, this was only to spend time with her. He became her confidante and offered to help her escape. M says that they later devised a plan for her to escape from L, which was successful. The date of this escape is uncertain. However, M has also reported to JB that she was able to pay off her £3k debt to L by [date] 2023. M and RP remained together in a relationship, albeit that relationship did not develop at any point, on her account, to be sexual in nature.

M’s pregnancy was confirmed to her in [date] 2023 following a privately funded scan. She appears to have had a urinary tract infection (“UTI”) at that time. However, it is part of the LA case that M, whilst knowing she was pregnant, did not seek treatment for that UTI until [date] 2024.

On [date] 2024 M required emergency hospital treatment in [a hospital in Wales]. She was subsequently diagnosed with urine sepsis. She was also diagnosed with syphilis. As indicated earlier, M reported that she had previously had syphilis in 2018. It was reportedly made clear to M at this time that she needed treatment for her unborn child as well as herself and that, if treatment for this condition was not administered prior to the baby’s birth, then the baby would require treatment following birth because of the risks associated with the infection. M received treatment, but RP reportedly refused the same treatment, which gave rise to concern that he may represent a risk of reinfection to M.

There was a referral to the LA on [date] 2024 [760/3653] with concerns for X, then unborn. The concerns arose from M’s unusual relationship with a man with a different nationality, with no common language between them and who was not the unborn child’s father. They were seemingly communicating through ‘Google Translate’. M had also reported that RP had her passport. Health staff had also noted that another male, who was said to be RP’s “cousin” was reported to be “guarding” them by being present around the hospital for long periods of time. Health staff also referred to concerns around potential trafficking and modern slavery, M’s late pregnancy booking and her other health issues. The hospital had allocated M a specialist midwife, WA, who had particular experience with mothers involved in trafficking and / or other immigration issues.

On [date] 2024 M told WA [702/3653 that she had arrived in the UK of her own free will and that she had been staying with a friend in London. She denied at that time that she had been a victim of domestic abuse or that she had engaged in sex work. However, M did allege to WA that she had been drugged and raped by a friend.

Following M’s discharge from hospital on [date] 2024, she was provided with follow up appointments to treat the syphilis infection and for other ante natal care. Whilst she was given the first dose on [date] 2024, and did attend an obstetric appointment on[date] 2024, it is part of the LA case that M failed to attend follow up appointments on the 6/3/24. She did attend an appointment on [date] 2024 but then failed to attend again for her final dose [1970/3653]. I will deal with my findings in this respect later.

It would appear that M was living with RP in in a number of temporary properties around [Wales] at this time. M has reported that they lived off RP’s ‘cash in hand’ work as a labourer. There has also been reference by M to RP’s “cousin” living with them at this time.

On [date] 2024 a social worker managed to locate M and RP during an unannounced visit to an Air BNB property in [a Welsh town] where they were living at that time [760/3653]. M was told that there would need to be an assessment as there were child protection concerns for the then unborn baby. M reported that they would like support with housing, but that they did not consider they needed any further support. M reported that she was in the UK on a holiday visa, but that she wished to remain and raise her child here as there were “better opportunities”. M suggested she could go back to work and leave the baby when born with RP for him to provide care. RP advised the social worker that he had no legal status in the UK. They appeared to the social worker to be unrealistic in their plans and to have had little understanding of immigration laws. M did attend an antenatal appointment on this day.

On [date] 2024 M failed to attend to receive the third dose for her syphilis infection [717/3653].

On [date] 2024 a further social work visit was undertaken to the same address. However, M and RP had left the property by this date. The furniture in the property had also been removed. M was also sent a message inquiring whether she wanted a further 3 doses of treatment for syphilis.

On [date] 2024 a strategy discussion was held [761/3653]. Following the meeting a report was filed with police as multi-agency personnel were becoming increasingly concerned for M’s safety and that of the unborn child in the light of her whereabouts being unknown along with incomplete syphilis treatment and missed health appointments and query trafficking. It would appear that M was with RP when she had been reported as missing.

On [date] 2024 M sent a text to WA reporting that she and RP had had an argument, with a request to collect her from a disclosed location. The police located her and escorted her to hospital to have a health check and to restart her treatment. M later discharged herself from hospital that evening without letting health staff know. However, she did return the following day to collect her hospital notes before leaving again [761/3653].

M and RP then reportedly resumed their relationship. They reported to M’s midwife that they were homeless and effectively destitute. They advised that, until that time, RP’s associates had accommodated them. Following the involvement of statutory services such as police and social workers at their properties, the associates no longer wanted to support them [705/3653]. The LA agreed to fund a hotel room on [date] 2024 and to provide them with financial support whilst assessments were undertaken for the unborn baby.

Subsequently from early April [date] 2024 onwards, M was then provided support by an organization called Black and Asian Women Seeking Opportunity (“BAWSO”) and the Red Cross. I digress to note that these organizations provide invaluable support to, amongst others, women involved in trafficking and modern slavery.

M did then receive further doses of treatment for syphilis on [dates] 2024 10/4/24 [716-/3653].

On [date] 2024 M underwent an interview with the Red Cross. M reported to that organization that she had been subject to trafficking and had been compelled to work as ‘sex worker’ [676/3653].

At about this time the LA offered M financial and practical support to return to Country Z to her family before the child’s birth. However, M stated that her father was serving a life sentence for murder and that she was at risk of death from a revenge attack from the family of his victim. She also stated that her mother could not support her due to lack of money and lack of space in her property [677/3653].

On [date] 2024 an initial child protection conference (“ICPC”) was held [2059/3653]. M was present when the risks were explored as follows: RP’s links to trafficking / trafficking associates, M’s vulnerability to trafficking and being exploited, her reported reluctance to attend accommodation for those who have experienced trafficking without RP, her poor engagement with health and children’s services, lack of recourse to public funds, homelessness and her lack of any viable plan to provide her child without accessing appropriate accommodation. It was the unanimous decision at the ICPC for the unborn child’s name to be registered at birth on the Child Protection Register (“CPR”) under the categories of neglect and emotional harm. M later reportedly said to a number of health professionals that day she had told lies, without details, as she had been desperate.

On [date] 2024 M was provided by the LA with the Public Law Outline (“PLO”) letter. M’s eligibility for free legal advice was explained to her. However, M declined to instruct a solicitor.

X was born on [date] 2024 at the same hospital in [Wales] where M had received some of her earlier treatment. I digress to deal with X’s health situation at this point. Following his birth, whilst tests did not confirm that he had syphilis, he received precautionary intravenous antibiotic treatment. There were no positive syphilis test results when further testing was carried out after one month and three months. I note that he is due to undergo one final test shortly to make sure that he does not have any trace of syphilis.

The LA was updated following X’s birth. There were ongoing concerns reported to the LA during M’s admission that a number of men were seen in a car bringing RP to the hospital. The identity of these men was unclear, with concerns in the prevailing circumstances that they may have had links to trafficking or other organised crime.

The LA offered a residential mother and baby placement to M. However, M refused this offer. The LA contend that she said that she would not be separated from RP.

Then on [date] 2024 M informed the initial intake social worker (KO) that her problem was now ‘solved’ and that she would return to Country Z with X and RP. When the risks of returning to Country Z were raised by the social worker, she replied that she would live with X’s maternal grandmother and have police protection.

On [date] 2024 the same social worker (KO) provided M with a copy of the LA application and initial supporting documentation. M initially said that she did not have a solicitor and was not going to get one. The social worker stressed the importance of legal representation. M later reported that X’s father was looking into getting one. He was also paying for flights back to Country Z for them. When asked by the social worker, M at that time confirmed that this was man she said had raped her. However, she added that he was a “good man” and would be a good father. KO pointed out to M that she was worried that this man had been violent towards her and this presented a risk for her and X. M replied that this would not a problem as she would not be pressing charges. KO asked M if she still intended to go back to Country Z with RP. She confirmed that this was her wish. The social worker referred to RP having no travel documents. M responded that Country Z’s consulate would give him “papers”. The social worker was concerned about M’s lack of basis understanding as the relevant official processes were conducted. In the course of this discussion KO was aware that M was sending text messages from her phone. She said that she was speaking to X’s father and he was organising a solicitor in London.

Later at about 5.30pm on [date] 2024, a man claiming to be X’s father who gave the name “JA”, telephoned the social worker, indicating that he was trying to resolve M’s situation. She outlined briefly the concerns, including M’s allegations that he had raped her. He said that he would be willing to come to the UK to be part of assessments and any court proceedings. He said that he lived in Country Y. He asserted that he was a “good man” from a “good family”. He denied M’s allegations about him.

Also on [date] 2024 M reported to a midwife [718/3653] via a translation app that she had told a lot of lies, which she regretted but did not provide any elaboration about the “lies”.

On [date] 2024 there was an incident at the hospital involving M and RP. The LA seeks a finding that RP was seen acting aggressively towards M outside the maternity ward. Whilst M agrees that there was an incident with RP that day, she denies the accuracy of the accounts given by LA witnesses and denies that he was aggressive towards her. I will deal with my findings in relation to that disputed issue later in this judgment. M also reported to nursing staff that day that she had lied in order to get to the UK. She also said that the lying had been a mistake. She referred to having sound finances, with regular financial support form her mother in Country Z.

Also on the morning of [date] 2024 M sent a message to the social worker stating that her solicitor had advised her to tell the truth, that she came to the UK knowing she was pregnant. She had been arguing with X’s father and that she came voluntarily. She suggested that she had been ‘sex working’, stating “I no longer wanted to do this with the baby in my belly”. She added that she accepted RP’s proposal to live with him. She also said that her father did murder someone five years before but that he was not arrested. She added that the man he killed regularly beat his wife and that it was “a relief” that he was dead. She stated that she has never been threatened by this man’s family. She added that she had previously misled about this so she would not have to go back to Country Z. She added that her mother is a “good woman” who works as the equivalent of a civil servant in Country Z and that she did not know that M was in the UK until the day before. She said that she was very sorry for her lies. She was embarrassed. She desperately wanted to stay with X and would now accept a place at a mother and baby foster care placement.

In light of reportedly changing accounts provided by M, together with the emerging risk of abduction, the LA did not advance placement in a residential centre. These developments then formed the immediate background context to the LA issuing public law proceedings

On [date] 2024 there was a NRM referral from a BAWSO worker on behalf of M to the Home Office (“HO”) [2876/3653]. In the document M is referred to as “PV” (i.e. potential victim). The referral document records an account of M’s family which does not accord with the information provided within the CFAB assessment and other information from M. I will set out the details of M’s report about being trafficked later in the judgment.

I pause at this stage of the judgment to note that the following section is also somewhat more comprehensive than is usually the case in the light of the occurrence of a number of events ‘on the ground’ involving M and others during the currency of these proceedings.

The LA had issued the application for a CO on 2/5/24. The LA also sought the immediate interim removal of X from M’s care. The hearing of the application for urgent removal application was listed before me on 3/5/24. M joined the hearing remotely and spoke through an interpreter. She was unrepresented at that hearing. Whilst I was very concerned about M’s overall situation, I was equally very concerned about the nature of the reported risks to X at the time. I determined that an ICO and a ‘Port Alert’ order should be granted and adjourned the application until 8/5/24 on the basis that M would have extensive daily contact with X over the intervening bank holiday weekend. By the time of this hearing, M was asserting that she was no longer in a relationship with RP and that she would be having no further contact with him.

Following the first hearing, X remained as an inpatient. X’s proposed foster carer was introduced to him so as to allow for the proposed transition of his care to her in hospital. The LA provided M with hotel accommodation. She duly returned to the hospital each day to have extended contact with X.

The next hearing took place before me on 8/5/24. By that hearing M had secured legal representation. She did not oppose the continuance of the ICO. The proposed arrangements at that time were for X to enter foster care and to have 90 minutes supervised contact with M on three occasions each week. Specific arrangements were put in place to ensure that X would not be followed from the contact centre. M was to remain in her LA funded hotel accommodation.

I utilised this second hearing on 8/5/24 as a Case Management Hearing (“CMH”). I confirmed the ICO. I renewed the Port Alert order. I made the usual early disclosure directions. I timetabled the proceedings as best as I could at that time to an IRH later in the year. I also made directions relating to JA to hopefully progress the identification of X’s father and for any other alternative carer to be assessed. The CG raised the potential instruction of Professor Nicola Gray. I made provision for a Part 25 application in this regard.

Following the hearing on 8/5/24, the LA initially succeeded in making contact with JA via WhatsApp messaging. However, he then stopped responding. M then reportedly put forward an alternative person as X’s father, namely the man called JC. This was later confirmed in her position statement dated 15/5/24. The LA tried to make contact with him, but without success.

The order of 8/5/24 permitted M to make a Part 38(6) application for residential assessment by 5/6/24. Her representatives indicated that a place was available for her at a specific centre. The LA and CG responded that consideration of that application could not be undertaken in advance of a full application with sight of a viability assessment which dealt with the particular risks posed to X. In the event that application was not progressed.

The first Further Case Management Hearing (“FCMH”) took place on 16/5/24 before Mrs Justice Morgan. The court granted the application for Professor Gray to be instructed, along with some re-timetabling.

On 17/5/24 M was accepted into the NRM with a ‘Reasonable Grounds’ decision in her favour dated 17/5/24. M was referred to the Salvation Army for support [2161/3653; 35/138].

There was then an incident on 17/5/24 at M’s hotel. RP was present in M’s hotel bedroom when the police arrived. There are a number of factual issues arising in relation to this incident. I will set out my findings in relation to that aspect of the updating background later in my judgment. By 21/5/24 it was established that RP had used the false name of “MK” in order to enter M’s hotel [3030/3653].

On 22/5/24 M applied for asylum in the UK [2899/3653]. M’s passport had reportedly been left with the HO. M was also relocated to a BAWSO refuge by this time on 23/5/24 [2883/3653]. The police reported concerns that there was risk that M could bring RP or others to the refuge [2891/3653].

On 29/5/24 M filed her first threshold criteria response document. As indicated earlier, at that time M accepted that the s31CA89 test had been met by the LA, along with some underlying factual concessions. She also asserted as part of her response that she had been trafficked to the UK.

On 31/5/24 a Review Child Protection Case Conference (“RCPCC”) [2164/3653] too place. In view of X’s placement in foster by that time, it was the unanimous conclusion of the RCPCC that his name should be removed form the CPR.

On 16/6/24 it would appear that M sent a message to her father [1393/3653] albeit that the message was sent to a person with a different name.

On 18/6/24 M saw Professor Gray. As part of her account of past events, M reported that she came to the UK voluntarily using flights paid for by L in the belief that she would obtain employment other than sex work. I will set out further details of her account at this time to Professor Gray later in this judgment.

Also on 18/6/24 a viability assessment on X’s maternal grandmother (“MGM”) was completed [728/3653]. The outcome was negative. I will deal with that assessment briefly later. MGM was notified of the outcome shortly thereafter. I digress to note that this outcome has not been challenged by her.

On 25/6/24 Professor Gray provided her cognitive assessment in relation to M [1224-/3653]. I will set out her findings later in this judgment.

M’s first CA89 statement was signed on 5/7/24 [1087-/3653]. M set out the details of her history in this (now disputed) statement. She reported that her father would come and go during her childhood. He left permanently in 2012 when he committed a murder. She had lost contact until he messaged her on Facebook in 2023. They had no further contact following when M found they had nothing to talk about. She reported that she had been in a sexual relationship with JA but she did not believe him to be X’s father as they had last had sexual intercourse on [date] 2023, which was before his date of conception on [date] 2023. She said that she had previously lied about JA raping her. She said that she had a ‘one-night stand’ with JC on or around 26/7/23. She added that in around March 2023 she was invited to come to the UK by L. She made contact with her in September 2023 having discovered that she was pregnant. She flew from Country Z to Country Y in September 2023 with the belief that she would have employment as a cleaner. She stayed there for 10 days, which made it easier for her to travel onto the UK. M said she stayed briefly in [a city in England] before travelling to engage in sex work in various other cities around the UK, including [place in Wales]. She then went to London for a short period briefly before returning to [place in Wales]. She met RP in [Wales] where he was “a client”. In November 2023, she told L that she did not want to work with her anymore and arranged for RP to collect her the next morning. She did not hear from L again. She had stayed in various short-term places with RP, which were organised by his sister in his country of origin. The account from M implied that she was able to leave her life with L without particular difficulty

M continued in that statement that she had ended the relationship with RP following the court hearing on 3/5/24. She said that she had met him on 17/5/24 in to collect her shoes. She had lied about there being a threat to her life in Country Z in order to get “government help”. She had thought that she was not trafficked because she had travelled voluntarily, but having spoken with an immigration solicitor, had come to understand that she had been manipulated and exploited and that coming to the UK was not in reality her choice. She also said that she had lied about JA raping her to give her a better chance of staying in the UK. It was more likely that JC was X’s father.

The parenting assessment on M took place during the summer of 2024 [757-/3653]. JB covered M’s account of her move to the UK in sessions on 24/6/24 and 8/7/24. M reported, inter alia, that she been tricked into coming to the UK. She said that she had been made to engage in sex work for three months in order to repay £3k debt to L for her travel expenses, which was confirmed as the amount repaid. I will set out further details reported in the assessment later in this judgment.

On 1/8/24 M filed her response to the LA’s revised threshold criteria case. She once again confirmed that she accepted that s31CA was met by the LA, along with a number of underlying factual concessions.

On 8/8/24 M applied for viability assessment in relation to her brother and his partner i.e. the uncle and aunt [444/3653]. I directed a short hearing before me for enquires to be made of CFAB. On 16/8/24 I granted the application [459/3653].

In view, in part, of the events earlier in the year, not least the events at M’s hotel on 17/5/24, the LA felt that it was necessary to seek authority for a forensic inspection of M’s mobile telephone [462/3653]. An agreed application was approved submitted by the LA. I approved the instruction sitting in an administrative capacity on 19/8/24 [477/3653].

Athena Forensics duly conducted the analysis of M’s phone on 21/8/24 [1276/3653]. This exercise revealed that the phone had been reset to factory settings, deleting her call and message history at 9.29am on 20/8/24 i.e. the day after the court order for the analysis and just before it was submitted for analysis. The limited remaining messages accessible to Athena included an exchange between M and her father on 16/9/24.

The viability assessment on the uncle and aunt was completed on 3/9/24 [744/3653] and was positive, with the recommendation for a full assessment. The assessment noted that the uncle and aunt appeared to have no idea of the risks to which M exposed herself. In light of the positive viability assessment, the LA submitted an application for assessment by CFAB.

At the FCMH before me on 9/9/24 the CFAB assessment was directed so that time should not be lost, albeit this was subject to further consideration at the next hearing on 10/10/24. Directions were made for the filing of documents by each party addressing the risks that M might pose to X if he were placed within her wider family.

M then filed a statement dated 16/9/24 in relation to her phone. She conceded that she had reset the phone. She said in the statement that there had been communications by her with RP via Instagram. She added that her relationship with him was platonic, with no romantic or sexual element to the same. She was worried that the revelation of such communication would negatively affect her case. She said that she had done the resetting. She asserted that she could see, with hindsight, that her actions were worse than being open and honest with the child professionals and that her actions had been a huge mistake, which she regretted.

On 19/9/24 Professor Gray provided her psychological assessment in relation to M [1385-/3653]. I will also set out her findings in respect of this instruction later in this judgment.

On 24/9/24 JB completed her parenting assessment in relation to M [757-/3653]. The outcome of the report was negative in relation to M. I will set out a summary of her report, and its conclusions, later in this judgment

On 28/9/24 M made a further report of human trafficking to the police in [place in Wales] [268/3653] even though she had already been accepted onto the NRM since earlier in the year as set out above. I digress to comment that further report of trafficking of M his appears to have followed on from the filing of the LA’s negative parenting assessment

On 30/9/24 JB received a call from a person identifying herself as ‘M*******’. [843/3653; 2324/3653]. I digress to note that MM accepts that she made this call. JB recorded that MM said that she was seeking a different solicitor for M as the one that she had was not doing her best for her in that M had not been sent any paperwork and as doing nothing to help her at all. She had told her to change. She also added that the UK Government had done nothing to help M and that the LA had no right to separate her from X and that this was an unfair thing to do. JB told MM that she was unable to discuss matters with her due to confidentiality. JB contends that MM said that she was from BAWSO. MM denied saying this. JB said that she later checked with BAWSO and found that MM was not employed by that organisation. I will set out my findings in relation to this specific factual issue later in the judgment.

On 1/10/24 M’s first solicitors confirmed that they were no longer instructed by M. M proceeded to instruct new solicitors, who remain her current solicitors.

A further meeting between took place between JB and the uncle and aunt on 6/10/24 [812/3653]. They made a number of reassuring comments about keeping X safe. However, it appeared to JB that this might have stemmed from their concern about getting into trouble for breaching a court order, rather than from an actual informed understanding of the risks posed by M.

On 7/10/24 an application for X’s birth certification from Country Z was issued online to the consulate of Country Z [4/138]. The making of this application was not disclosed to the child professionals.

There was a FCMH before me on 10/10/24. All parties agreed that the CFAB assessment on the uncle and aunt should continue. However, arrangements for their attendance at the hearing on 18/10/24 were retained at the CG’s request. The LA invited the court to allow Professor Gray’s report, the parenting assessment, the LA’s local authority schedule of risks and the CG’s risk report to be shared with the uncle and aunt in a translated format. This was granted. I timetabled the matter to a relisted IRH on 7/3/25, exceptionally along with an early provisional final hearing date on 24/3/25 with a time estimate of 4 days. The LA and CG were aware at that hearing that M might wish to apply for a new parenting assessment. Directions were made for such an application, supported by evidence, to be filed on 16/10/24.

M duly filed her application by 16/10/24, together with a statement setting out her criticisms of the assessments undertaken by JB and Professor Gray. M made, inter alia, very serious allegations against JB, implying that she had been racist in her approach to her [853/3653].

On 15/10/24 the LA then received initial advice in e mails from AA, a Family Law Specialist, in Country Z, which suggested that there is a mechanism (independent of the Hague Conventions) by which a SGO made in England and Wales may be recognised in that country and that X’s uncle might then be recognised as his guardian under local law. I will set out a fuller account of this advice later.

Also in mid October 2024 M’s mother arrived in the UK. On 15/10/24 M stayed with her at her accommodation. It is asserted that she did so without first seeking the approval of BAWSO [2948/3653].

On 18/10/24 M’s application for a parenting assessment was listed. The application was refused. I confirmed arrangements for the CFAB assessment of X’s uncle and aunt. I also directed that further efforts should be made to contact JA, who had been further referenced in M’s updating evidence. I digress to note that the LA was unsuccessful in its further efforts in that regard. Further advice about the relevant law in Country Z was sought and received from AA on 12/11/24.

On 12/11/24 a third party (i.e. MM ) submitted an application for a birth passport and passport for X to the relevant consulate [4/138]. The application was rejected on 14/11/24 as there was a missing signature. The submission of this application was, once again, not notified to any of the professionals or the court at the time.

Then at some point in later November 2024 a television production company from Country Z became involved with M and later these proceedings. M has asserted that on 12/11/24 she spoke with a member of this television production crew about her experience of human trafficking. She says that she was interviewed on camera about this in a park in [place in Wales] on 14/11/24. Later that same day the film crew attended the LA’s outsourced child contact centre. M was attending there for contact with X that day. I digress to note that the attendance of such a film crew gave rise to considerable consternation amongst other centre users and the staff.

On the following day, 15/11/24, the court received an email from a journalist associated with the television production crew, setting out her credentials and seemingly having some knowledge about the background to these proceedings. She sought an “official statement” regarding the progress of the case, with reference to her “deadline”. I referred the request to the HMCTS Press Office, which declined to provide the statement sought. I also note that the LA, contact centre and the relevant police force received emails in similar terms from the film company [260-/3653].

The LA suspended M’s contact with X as a consequence of this development. M was informed of this change. The LA contends that M initially denied any knowledge of the television production company [845/3653]. The LA duly applied to the court for an order for further authority to withhold contact in accordance with s34(4) CA89 [616/3653] beyond 7 days.

On 20/11/24 a representative of CFAB in Country Z emailed the LA stating that on 18/10/24 there was a report that M had found the local social worker who was conducting the assessment on the uncle and aunt in Country Z on Instagram and had tried to contact her. She had therefore temporarily removed her Instagram profile. There was also confirmation that she would not be speaking to M.

On 20/11/24 the consulate of Country Z received a letter by M for the court. That letter was passed to the court via the LA. The English translation [1140-/3653] reads as follows in relation to the involvement of the media in Country Z:

“…… The police didn't give me much hope about the investigation, so I decided to seek help in [Country Z] since the traffickers who brought me to the United Kingdom are [from Country Z] and one of them is currently in prison in country Y for international drug trafficking. Given the circumstances, I decided to take a course on Human Rights and Human Trafficking (e mail link provided) to understand more about the subject. I started to have contact with people who cover this topic and, in one of these conversations, the TV representative contacted me to talk about my case. I accepted because I thought about the help I could receive for the investigation and to strengthen the fight against human trafficking of women (from Country Z) to Europe. Consequently, everything I am suffering at the moment is a result of human trafficking. I believe that this matter is of public interest, and so I respectfully ask Your Excellency for authorization to make this case public. In order to minimize these cases for this country and for (Country Z).

The next FCMH before me took place on 21/11/24 [625/3653]. M denied in her Position Statement that she had asked the television production company to film the contact centre [272/3653]. The court was informed by the LA that both AA, and the consulate of Country Z, advised that, as in this jurisdiction, equivalent family court proceedings in Country Z are subject to a high degree of confidentiality. M gave court undertakings (over and above the proforma warning in all court orders) not to share material from these proceedings with others. I also made a further port alert order. I was also satisfied that a s34(4) CA89 order was necessary at that time pending clarification of the situation in relation to the television film company. The s34(4) CA89 order was to continue until 16/12/24. Provision was made for two further potential hearings, namely, to hear any application for an injunction contra mundum arising out of the television production company’s conduct and the potential further extension of the order pursuant to s34(4) CA 89. I digress again to note that, in the event, neither follow up hearing was required.

On 22/11/24 the applications for a birth certificate and passport for X by the consulate of Country Z were cancelled [4/138].

On 25/11/24 the LA tried to make contact with JA once again as part of its attempt to progress confirmation in relation to X’s paternity. There was no reply forthcoming.

On 9/12/24 Professor Gray provided her first addendum report in relation to M [1445-/3653]. I will set out her findings later in this judgment.

On 17/12/24 M attended at the relevant consulate of Country Z for her application for a birth certificate issued on 7/10/24 [4/138]. M was advised not to continue with the application in the light of the ongoing court proceedings [5/138]. Again this attendance by M was not known to the child professionals at the time.

At some point, seemingly in late December 2024, M met the [mayor of a place in Wales] at an event and began to tell her about her experiences. According to M, the mayor invited her to write to her. M duly wrote on 27/12/24 [1608-/3653] stating, inter alia, that a friend of a friend contacted her and convinced her to come to the UK for a month. I will set out the fuller contents of that letter more fully later.

The final CFAB assessment of X’s uncle and aunt was also received on 31/12/24 [857/3653]. In summary the report concluded that the uncle and aunt were fully suitable to care for X in Country Z if a number of conditions were met: (a) adding an additional bedroom for X for which they would require financial assistance, (b) they would need to all immediate practical necessities for X’s care (the cost of this one would be equivalent to one month’s family income), (c ) follow up visit by CFAB should be done three months after X’s arrival in order to verify home conditions, child development, and routine / organisation, (d) the uncle and aunt should be granted access to legal advice free of charge to obtain a mirror court order made in the UK in their own country’s court.

It was a specific CFAB recommendation that the uncle and aunt should be granted a SGO as this could be easily ratified by the court in Country Z. That would mean the order would have validity in that country without a new legal process needing to be commenced. In order for X to be fully protected and have easy access to all of his rights in Country Z, the SGO made in Wales should be translated and apostilled as should the personal documents relating to him (i.e. birth certificate, his vaccination record and British Passport - if he has one). Other health documents should be translated but they did not need to be apostilled. In addition the local social welfare office in the relevant town where the aunt and uncle live in Country Z should be notified that X is being placed with his family there so that they can guarantee child protection support. This step could also be taken by CFAB. In relation to M’s contact with X if he is placed with his uncle and aunt, the report recommended that such arrangements should be made explicit.

On 14/1/25 photographic evidence of M’s limited leave to remain in the UK was provided by her solicitor. It is noted that M’s limited leave is due to expire on 09/1/27.

On 15/1/25 the LA filed a C2 application, supported by a position statement, seeking a hearing and indicating that it was not in a position to file its final evidence by 27/1/2. There was a request to re-timetable as a result of the remaining steps that needed to be taken.

On 17/1/25 JB met remotely with the uncle and aunt and noted they were happy with arrangements being made for them to travel to the UK to meet X and to attend supervised contact with him. In respect of having time off work for a period of two weeks, the uncle stated that he was currently on the last day of his current allowance for holidays. He would therefore need to speak to his employer for additional time off. He was informed that if he had to have unpaid time off work, the LA would cover his loss of earnings. They stated that the uncle should be unable to secure time off work, the aunt would travel to the UK alone. The couple later confirmed on 20/01/2025 that if the uncle could have time off unpaid for two weeks to visit the UK. The couple did not have passports. They were to confirm the costs of acquiring them. The MGM was going to care for their children during their visit to the UK. They were reassured that the LA would arrange for them to be collected from the airport. They were also to be provided with living expenses whilst they were in the UK.

The uncle and aunt enquired if they were able to meet up with M whilst in the UK. The LA informed them that there would be no objection as long as they understood that when in Country Z there was to be no unsupervised contact between M and X. They confirmed they were so aware.

There was then a FCMH before me on 24/1/25. I retained the hearing on 24/3/25 for 4 days for a decision to be made as to whether the placement of X with M was in his best interests or whether he should be placed with the uncle and aunt. I also listed a provisional final hearing on 16/5/25 to cater for the conclusion that the court decided that X should be placed with the uncle and aunt and for a hearing to make a SGO in their favour. I also made various directions to assist in efforts to obtain passports for X and for the uncle and aunt. Time was also extended for M to put forward proposals for the preparation of an agreed threshold document. I also gave permission for M to put questions to Professor Gray and to the CFAB assessor and for an application to be issued if either of them was required for cross examination. I digress again to note that, since the hearing on 24/1/25, X and the uncle and aunt have all been granted passports.

M attended an interview at the HO on 3/2/25 (or possibly 4/2/25). She was subsequently notified that her case had been assessed in detail and a decision had been made there were no longer conclusive grounds to accept she had been a victim of modern slavery. She was notified that a “second pair of eyes review” of that decision had also been undertaken. I digress to note that it is not clear whether this outcome has been the subject of challenge by M.

M also filed a further response to threshold on 3/2/25. This appeared to contradict her earlier responses in some respects and no longer unequivocally accept that the s31CA89 threshold test was met by the LA. The updated composite threshold criteria position was set out in a document dated 14/2/25. As part of that response, M said she was forced to perform ‘sex work’ under constant threat of physical violence or death. The woman L had made her and the females in the group change cities because she did not want to attract the attention of the police or immigration authorities. She asserted that X had not been at risk. She had been made previously to make the s31 CA89 concession and other concessions. She contended that she had been open and honest with child professionals. RP had only ever been a source of assistance to her.

On 13/2/25 the LA submitted an application for a passport to the consulate of Country Z [4/138]. I note that M later attended at the consulate of Country Z with child professionals on 25/2/25 for X’s passport to be issued.

On 21/2/25 Professor Gray provided her second addendum assessment in relation to M [1463-/3653]. I will, once again. set out her final responses in relation to M later in this judgment.

On 26/2/25 M’s accommodation via BAWSO came to an end. She moved to new accommodation provided by the National Asylum Support Service (“NASS”). M has provided the address to the court.

The court timetable for the filing of filing final evidence was met. The LA filed and served its final evidence, which ruled out M as the future carer for X and endorsed the uncle and aunt in that role. The LA also filed and served a final care plan and transition plan of X to experience increasing amounts of time in their care when they travelled to the UK and ultimate placement in their full-time care as part of relocation plans to Country Z. M’s final evidence and the CG’s final analysis were also filed and served.

The IRH took place on 7/3/25. Further efforts were made to clarify the position on threshold criteria to establish if this aspect of the case could be agreed, but to no avail. Directions were made allowing M to file and serve further statement evidence. Following the IRH, further evidence was filed in support of M’s case. The statement by MM was filed and served, along with a statement from M’s friend, EG.

This hearing proceeded before me over 4 days from 27/3/25. An additional day was required on 2/4/25. During the intervening period between day 4 and day 5, the court received the “Petition” dated 31/3/25 by a lawyer in Country Z referred to earlier. As already set out, it now appears that M has seemingly at some point also made a complaint of “Trafficking of Persons for Sexual Exploitation” to the International Criminal Court.

For convenience, I briefly set out now my overarching assessment of all the witnesses who gave evidence before me, even though some relate specially to factual issues concerning threshold criteria and others gave evidence relating either to factual welfare issues or the overarching welfare determination more generally and some (e.g. Professor Gray, JB and M) covered all aspects.

Professor Gray is a Consultant Clinical and Forensic Psychologist. She sets out her professional qualifications and experience within her report [1389/3653]. She is extremely experienced in her field. In this case the LA also relies, to an extent, on the factual element of her report in terms of the accounts that M gave to her. In that respect, Professor Gray informed the court that she made contemporaneous records when conducting her interviews, which have been made available to the parties. In short, I have no reason to doubt the accuracy and reliability of her factual recording.

In relation to the expert opinion element, Professor Gray provided two comprehensive reports and two addenda. She was open to points advanced on behalf of M in cross examination. In particular, she acknowledged the challenges facing M through the language barrier and interpretation in a number of respects. Firstly, she was aware of the need for particular care around the need for accurate understanding of some vocabulary (e.g. the correct meaning of the term “impulsive”). Secondly, she was alive to the more nuanced implications rising from the presence of another, namely an interpreter, when highly personal points were being considered. She was balanced, noting that M positively responded to her comment that she had given limited or one-word answers in their first session in the follow up session. She was happy to confirm that M was polite and respectful during their contact. I accept her evidence that she had to canvas plainly challenging aspects of M’s narrative as part of her instruction. This was necessary and not in any gratuitous. Professor Gray was careful not to stray outside the area of her expertise. She confirmed that sensitivity to cultural differences is high on her list of priorities in her assessment work. She was alive to the potential impact on M’s presentation as a consequence of exposure on her part to trauma. She was not dogmatic in any way. In short, I found Professor Gray to be an impressive witness.

As indicated earlier, KO was a member of the LA’s Pre-birth Children’s Services team at the time of her allocation on 27/2/24. She transferred the case to JB on 8/5/24. In her role KO complied records of her involvement with M, which have been made available to the parties. Part of M’s case now is that KO told her to exaggerate her account about the dangers facing her in Country Z and to lie about RP’s behaviour towards her to help her claim asylum in the UK. I accept KO’s evidence that whilst she was empathetic towards M and suspected that she had been a “victim” of other/s, her role was to assess whether M’s unborn child was exposed to any risk. KO’s contention that telling M to exaggerate her account was of “no benefit” to her and “not worth” her “job” and “professional reputation” all rang true. She merely ‘signposted’ M to making a potential asylum claim. There was also no suggestion that her evidence was at odds with her written records. In short, I am satisfied that KO was an accurate witness, who appeared entirely appropriately motivated towards M, albeit within the bounds of her fundamental duty to X.

LHa was the midwife responsible for the care of M and X on the evening of 2/5/24 into the following morning. She gave her evidence in a clear and direct manner. She was balanced about M in that she agreed that she was appropriately attuned emotionally to X and met his other needs on the ward. Whilst I am satisfied that she too was an accurate witness, in the event not a great deal turned on her additional oral evidence.

HL was a maternity care assistant who was working on M’s ward on 3/5/24. She was present when M returned to the ward after seeing WA and RP. It is LA case that RP was acting aggressively towards M immediately before she returned to the ward, which was witnessed by HL, along with HM. This account was robustly challenged on behalf of M in the hearing before me.

It is correct that HL, in view of particular role on the ward, did not herself make any records about the incident. She made a statement on 24/5/24 which was some 3 weeks or so after the incident. It follows that whilst a period of time did lapse before she gave any account in writing in relation to this incident, this period was relatively short. HL had access, as ever, to her statement as part of her evidence. She told the court she had a clear memory now of the relevant incident. She plainly gave her oral evidence based upon her recollection of events, rather than by reference to any other documentary source. I find that she did so in a clear and assured manner, without appearing in any way overly assured. There was also no suggestion of any animus towards M. In short, I am satisfied that HL was a reliable and impartial factual witness to this single event.

HM was a midwife on M’s ward on 3/5/25. She was also, on the LA’s case, a factual witness to events involving M and RP that morning. In view of her status, this witness did make recordings in relation to M. She had made a record of this incident later on 3/5/24 [138/138]. Whilst she had access to this record when she made her statement, the record was not before the court in the either the core or full trial bundle at the time she gave her oral evidence. Hence the inclusion of this record in the supplementary bundle.

It is correct that there was, on any view, an error in this witness’s CA89 statement. She referred to the date for the relevant incident as 29/4/24 [723/3653]. This date was wrong. However, I am again satisfied that this was a simple error, which was at odds with the date of the record made by her on 3/5/24 in any event.

Save for the details about the date, I found HM’s account to be clear and cogent. It was also broadly consistent with the account by HL, albeit without any suggestion that the accounts had been copied. On reviewing HM’s account by reference to the record she made, which was available subsequently, no inconsistencies emerged. Like HL, HM had no reason to make up any allegation about M. In short, I am satisfied that HM was a reliable and impartial factual witness as to the events on the morning of 3/5/24.

LHi was another midwife who worked with M. She appeared particularly nervous when she gave her evidence. That said, the witness’s presentation did nothing to undermine the fundamental reliability of her account. In short, I was satisfied that she was a reliable and impartial witness.

As indicated earlier, WA is a specialist mid wife, who provides an invaluable service, borne out of her particular experience, for women coping with experiences of trafficking and other traumatic experiences. I am entirely satisfied that WA was an honest and reliable witness, albeit that she demonstrates an understandable desire and real commitment to help the women with whom she works.

JB is X’s allocated social worker. She has been allocated since May 2024. In addition to ongoing case responsibility, she prepared the parenting assessment in relation to M. In her role she has complied records in relation to her ongoing duties and further specific records arising out of the parenting assessment sessions. These records have been made available to the parties. No material inconsistencies were put to JB by reference to these records in the course of the hearing.

Indeed, no meaningful inroads were made in relation to the quality of JB’s evidence and her social work analysis more generally in the course of her cross examination. That said, she accepted a number of points put to her. She was not dogmatic in any way. For the avoidance of any doubt, I am satisfied that she acted entirely professionally at all times in her dealings with M and her family, demonstrating family orientated ethos firmly in the forefront of her approach to her role.

For the avoidance of any doubt, I am also satisfied that JB was not racist or otherwise inappropriate in her approach to M at any time.

Before turning to set out my assessment on M, I confirm that I have reminded myself of the following throughout my assessment of her: (a) she has been in, to her, a foreign country since late 2023, had her first child and then found herself involved in care proceedings here since Spring 2024 which must all have been bewildering for her; (b) she has given previous accounts, statements and oral evidence in the course of the hearing via translators, with the potential for some of the meaning of her narrative to be ‘lost in translation’; (c) it seems likely, on any view, that M has been exposed to at least some trauma in the past and following her arrival in the UK, with the potential for adverse impact on her memory formulation; (d) M has claimed asylum since her arrival in the UK and it is not uncommon for there to be inaccurate and / or exaggerated assertions to bolster such claims. I digress to observe that, whilst the latter scenario is, of course, wholly reprehensive and most unfair to genuine asylum seekers, such dishonesty may not be directly relevant to the assessment of risks posed to child/ren. I should also bear in mind Professor Gray’s opinion that M presents with the consequences of complex trauma in terms of her current psychological presentation.

I therefore turn to my assessment of M. The first relevant aspect to my assessment arises from the preliminary section of her oral evidence, which was very unusual. The court is customarily taken by a parent’s counsel through each of the relevant CA89 statements, threshold response documents and any s9 police statements and/or police interviews. Corrections to aspects of an overall narrative are not unusual. Admissions of past lies, with explanations for the same, are also fairly typical. In this case M’s counsel sought to avoid M’s first CA89 statement entirely. M’s case is that her solicitors had not properly taken her instructions and had not sent the final versions of her statements to her. However, I note that she did sign the translated version of the statement. She sought to dissociate herself from this source of evidence. This required the LA’s legal representative to explore, in some detail, aspects of this evidence as part of his cross examination. That exercise, in fact, revealed that substantial sections of M’s first CA89 statement were said to be accurate. Indeed, substantive details as to M’s background and other historic aspects can have only come from M. At the end of this aspect of cross examination on behalf of the LA it was established that M confirmed that parts of her earlier statements were indeed true and correct and parts were inaccurate and inconsistent with her instructions. However, I do digress to note that many aspects of the account within that first statement are consistent with what others (e.g. JB in her parenting assessment) recorded at about the same time.

I then turn to the substance of M’s narrative. Having made the abovementioned allowances, I have to record that there are major concerns about M’s fundamental honesty, even on her own case. By way of illustration only, she firstly accepts that she has lied about an important matter. She accepts that she lied when dealing with professionals at the outset when she asserted that her father was serving a prison sentence for murder in Country Z and that her fundamental safety was at risk there due to potential reprisals from the victim’s family. Whilst there was an incident many years ago, M's father was seemingly never sent to prison. M’s explanation was that she was encouraged to exaggerate this aspect of her background by KO to bolster her claim for asylum. I return to my findings in this respect later.

There have been numerous references by professionals to M making past admissions of lying to Professor Gray, nursing staff, KO and JB. A very serious example recorded by KO and JB is that JA raped and drugged her. She later accepted that she lied about this. She now not only denies that this allegation is true, she also denies that she ever made that allegation.

There have also been considerable reported inconsistencies in the evolution of M’s narrative as set out above as follows:

M is plainly capable, on her own case, of manipulating relevant evidence in this case. One of the important issues in this case has been the nature and extent of her relationship with RP. As set out above, I made a direction for the forensic evaluation of her mobile phone. In the event the phone was returned to its factory settings, reportedly by M herself, immediately before the forensic testing could be undertaken. The effect of this action was to permanently delete all meaningful data from the device and access to M’s social media data. M says in her second CA89 statement that she did this as she had been in contact with RP after all. She says that she feared for the consequences and made a mistake in resetting the phone, which she now regrets. I have no doubt, based on M’s own case, that the mobile phone would have contained relevant evidence in relation to her relationship with RP, and also probably in relation to other aspects of the background to this case. However, that relevant evidence has been, in effect, deliberately destroyed by M.

Some aspects of M’s account are at odds with independent third-party documentary evidence. By way of illustration, with further details to follow, M’s account of her involvement with RP at her hotel on 17/5/24 are at odds with the near contemporaneous entries made in the police investigation log at the time.

It is also deeply troubling to note that M has made a number of very serious allegations against others during these proceedings. I have already referred to her recorded allegation that JA drugged and raped her. That is a very serious allegation. Whilst she now denies that she made the allegation, and apologises if she had previously given that “impression”, I confirm at this point that I am satisfied, even allowing for the involvement of translators, that this past allegation by M has been accurately recorded by professionals. This allegation has, in turn, been reported by the LA to JA. He has ultimately declined to respond to inquiries in relation to X’s paternity. The LA concern that JA may be concerned about his exposure to allegations by M appears well made out.

However, this is far from being the only allegation that M has made. Other allegations by M include the following:

Indeed, I note that Professor Gray, who has also been made subject to an allegation which I will refer to you later, recommended that steps should be taken to protect professionals from false allegations by M.

Some of those subject to M’s allegations gave evidence, such as HL, HM, KO and JB. This provided an opportunity thereby on the one hand for such allegations to be explored with them and, on the other hand, for the relevant professionals to have an opportunity to rebut them. Others, such as other clinical staff involved in assisting M with contraception, the police involved with M on 17/5/24 and M’s former solicitors did not give evidence. It follows that an issue arises as the extent of weight that can be attached to alleged conduct by others when they have not been called and subjected to cross examination.

In relation to the allegation that M was compelled to undergo the fitting of a contraceptive device, I find that this scenario is inherently unlikely. I understand that the LA used an accredited translator when working with M in relation to whom no complaint was made at the time in terms of her proficiency in the relevant language. In relation to M’s former solicitors, it is clear that they complied with the court’s direction to obtain a version of M’s first CA89 statement in the relevant language, which was also signed by M. They did the same with M’s second statement, which M did endorse in her oral evidence. In my judgment M’s allegations about them have to be seen in the contexts of these steps. In terms of the police involvement, the court has been provided with the entries that were made by the officers in the police log who attended M’s hotel on 17/5/24. In short, I find as part of my judgment, that the above-mentioned allegations by M lack any substance, which then informs, in part, my assessment of M as a witness.

In addition, I also find that M making allegations against others has been very much a thematic aspect of M’s narrative throughout the case. She appears able and willing to do so without pause for thought.

I also found that M was, at times, both hesitant and avoidant in parts of her evidence.

In short, I confirm that I found M, for a variety of reasons, to be a profoundly unhelpful witness. I have specifically reminded myself of the principles arising from R v Lucas, albeit that M, in fact, now denies that she has said many lies. In the circumstances, I have concluded that it is necessary to proceed with very considerable caution when considering M’s account to me.

At the outset, I confirm that I am assessing MM as a factual witness only, who is said to be part of M’s supportive network. Whilst she is also a non legally qualified ‘case worker’ with M’s current solicitors, she has not, on her account, discharged that role in relation to M and has had no access to her case file. Despite contrary suggestions in the course of her cross examination, there were no closing submissions as to MM having any inappropriate motivation.

MM seeks to support women caught up in trafficking and/or who have been subject to other forms of abuse. Such victims are plainly worthy of much help and support. She is certainly fervent in support of such victims. Indeed, she refers in her CA89 statement to her own life experiences as a driver in terms of her motivation. However, I found that, perhaps in part as consequence of her own life experiences, she lacks a degree of objectivity. It is her instinct to mount a 'fight' on behalf of those she assists. Whilst such an approach may be wholly meritorious in many such cases, other cases call for a rather more nuanced approach.

I have come to the clear conclusion that MM has deployed her binary instinct in terms of her support of M. There has plainly been a marked change of direction in M's overall response to the LA's legitimate concerns about her that can be placed in time from when MM became involved in assisting her from early Autumn of 2024 onwards.

I was greatly assisted by the CG in the course of his oral evidence. He is plainly a very experienced professional in child social work and as a CG. He too properly accepted a number of points put to him in cross examination. I am satisfied that he acted entirely professionally at all times in his dealings with M. He prepared records relating to his inquiries, which have also been made available to the parties. I am satisfied that CG gave M every opportunity to fully engage with him. I am equally satisfied that the CG has had the required family orientated ethos of CA89 firmly in the forefront of his approach to his role and to this case before his retirement.

The cognitive assessment on M dated 25/6/24 [1244-/3653] completed by Professor Gray (to inform the professionals’ assessment and court process at an earlier stage) may be summarised as follows: The estimate of M’s intellectual function indicated that her cognitive abilities are broadly intact and are in the low average range of ability (i.e. 10^th percentile). Therefore, there were no significant concerns about her capacity to understand complex information relating to the childcare proceedings. However, M’s ability is close to the cut-off for the borderline range of intellectual ability, which indicates that she has poor intellectual ability. It was Professor Gray’s view that M would possibly need support to overcome her difficulties with working memory and attention. She would also possibly need support with general knowledge if she struggled to understand information provided to her during the parenting assessment or during the legal proceedings. Professor Gray was satisfied that the process of cognitive testing was appropriate. The test results were valid despite the need for language translation. The estimate of M’s intellectual function was an accurate reflection of her cognitive function. She did not require a more specialist PAMS or CUBAS assessment of her parenting ability.

In terms of M’s reading age for English words, that was assessed to be 8 years, 11 months. She was able to read basic words written in English. Obviously, her reading age in the language of Country Z would be expected to be significantly better than this. However, it was stressed that just because M could read a word in English, that did not necessarily mean that she knows the meaning of this word. It followed that M needed important documents to be translated for her.

When Professor Gray asked M about her education, she gained the impression that M was “evasive”. She formed the opinion that M was attempting to distort her educational experience. She found that there were inconsistencies in her account. It was difficult to understand the chronology of what she was describing with the result that this section of the clinical interview was confused. She also formed the view that M was deliberately trying to obfuscate. She recommended that copies of M’s qualifications and certificates should be obtained.

In terms of her overall impression, Professor Gray was again concerned by the evasiveness of M in terms of her account. This included different accounts about who was X’s biological father, along with inconsistencies about moving around the UK with RP i.e. changing where she met him from London to [place in Wales] and then back to [place in Wales]. She was of the view that the inconsistencies, and the reasons for them, should be further explored in the risk assessment on M. She acknowledged that M may have been instructed by the traffickers not to talk to anyone, with a consequential impact on her ability to recount freely. She also wondered if trackers were still monitoring M via her mobile.

Professor Gray then provided her follow up risk assessment on M with a report dated 18/9/24 [1385-/3653]. This report may be summarised as follows: Professor Gray found this to be “an unusual case” in that she felt that there was little corroborative information on which she could rely when assessing M. In addition, Professor Gray’s view was that M showed a guarded presentation, only engaging superficially. She showed minimisation and denial of the key issues of concern. She appeared to Professor Gray to be trying to say what she thinks professionals want her to say or which will further her aim of having X placed in her care.

M was careful, in Professor Gray’s opinion, not to commit to one position or the other in case this would go against her. M was watching carefully to try to evaluate which position was to be the preferred option. Professor Gray felt that this was a form of ‘disguised’ compliance. M was attempting to present a falsely positive version of events to professionals in order to manipulate the situation to attain her goal of caring for X and to disguise issues of risk. Disguised compliance poses significant difficulties for professionals working in child protection. Parents can be adept at distraction, manipulation, and grooming of professionals to create a façade that conceals the true extent of the presenting risks to the child. She adds that the presence of disguised compliance also significantly increases the risk that there will be breaches in any safety plan as parent/s can be actively working against child protection strategies while appearing on the surface to be fully compliant and cooperative. Such conduct makes effective supervision and management of risks to the subject child/ren very difficult, if not impossible.

According to Professor Gray, M accepted that there had also been times during the childcare proceedings when she deliberately presented an exaggerated and falsely negative version of events to professionals e.g. she was at risk of her death in Country Z if she were to return, that she had been subjected to a drugged rape by JA as believed that this would lead her to gain the help and support she wished for. She opines that this pattern of falsification, minimisation of some issues and exaggeration of others means that there is little reliable information on which to base any analysis of risk.

Professor Gray elaborated that when efforts are made to gain corroborative information (e.g. searches of her mobile phone) M had acted to destroy the evidence. She identified the key question arising as to why M behaved in this way, namely was this action born of fear and coercion from traffickers, RP (or both) or was this the result of M’s independent actions for then unknown reasons. She queried what was preventing M from engaging honestly and with authenticity. Irrespective of the answer to these questions, it was her opinion that such conduct by M left professionals and the court in the position of uncertainty, with an inability to be confident that X could be effectively safeguarded if placed in her care. In short, it was her view that if X were to return to M’s care, it would be impossible to know what sort of situation he would be placed within and what sort of risks to which he would be exposed.

Professor Gay also referred in her risk assessment to her opinion that complex trauma had led to emotional and psychological vulnerabilities on M’s part. This is an important factor giving rise to the symptoms of depression reported by M. This included the formation of negative self-beliefs that she does not believe that she is important or that her feelings are important (beliefs which were most probably formed through a process of childhood abuse and invalidation), reporting that she had held these beliefs since early childhood. M reported that these negative self-beliefs that nobody cares, and that she does not deserve to be helped, have prevented her from seeking therapeutic intervention. In Professor Gray’s opinion, these beliefs also led to a fundamental interpersonal distrust and a disbelief that her needs will be met or her best interests supported. M has formed a pattern of behaviour where she feels unable to be truthful with people (and perhaps particularly people in positions of authority). Her opinion continued that M will instead attempt to manipulate the situation by minimising some issues and exaggerating others in order to try to have her needs met. Professor Gray did not recommend any therapeutic intervention for M as she was not ready for, and receptive to, such intervention.

The first addendum psychology report by Professor Gray is dated 9/12/24 [1446/3653]. She commented on the assessment reports that were filed by this time, including M’s parenting assessment. She commented again on inconsistencies that emerged in M’s narrative both in other reports and by reference to the account given to her by M e.g. about the rape allegation. She referred to the “shifting sands” of M’s account [1452/3653].

Professor Gray also went on to deal with pseudologia fantastica and pathological lies in this addendum report [1453/3653]. She commented that an analysis of M’s tendency to be untruthful and her lies to the MGM about living in Italy (among the other inconsistencies in her account) make her question whether the account of people trafficking is true or whether this too was an elaborate deception on M’s part. She questioned what corroborative information the parties had to support this account. She was mindful of the social worker’s statement that M had told her that she had willingly consented to engage in sex work and also how easily she appeared to disentangle herself from the traffickers once she had decided she wanted to leave and to move to live with RP. These pieces of information appeared to her inconsistent with models of people trafficking and human slavery.

Professor Gray referred to the statement by M in October 2024 which she felt had “an angry tone”. The statement made a number of serious allegations against JB and other professionals referred to earlier. She added that these accusations reinforced her opinion that M is prone to make false allegations against people and professionals when she is angry e.g. the alleged drug rape by JA, which M was by then stating was a false allegation made impulsively and which she had ‘blurted out. She was concerned about M’s propensity to make malicious allegations against others those people. This led her to recommend that professionals ‘co-work’ the case.

Professor Gray also referred to M’s comment about her involvement with the television production company [1457/3653] in November 2024. She noted that M reported that ‘Professor Gray asked me if I would have the courage to throw myself in front of a train’. Professor Gray confirmed that this was not an accurate description of their earlier discussion. M had reported “terrible thoughts”. Professor Gray’s objective in asking her questions was to evaluate her risk of suicide and whether she had ambivalence as to whether she lived or died. She confirmed that her earlier risk assessment of M remained unaltered.

The second addendum report by Professor Gray is dated 21/2/25 [1464/3653]. She had been asked further questions on behalf of M. Professor Gray confirmed, inter alia, that it was her opinion that M presented with symptoms of complex trauma. Complex trauma can lead to symptoms of emotional dysregulation, hypervigilance, substance abuse and dependence, negative self-beliefs, risk-taking behaviour, interpersonal difficulties, anxiety, and depression. She also confirmed that M had reported to her that she had been dishonest with professionals. Professor Gray also opined that M evidenced key symptoms characteristic of Borderline Personality Disorder, but did not have time to investigate this further. She dealt with potential treatments for such a disorder. She further opined that M requires therapy to address her history of severe depressive illness and her presentation of complex trauma arising from alleged interpersonal abuse. Professor Gray confirmed the contents of her earlier report in which she did not recommend any therapeutic intervention for M.

In the course of her oral evidence, Professor Gray confirmed that she had seen M’s further updating evidence. She saw no reason to change her opinion. She confirmed that M probably has significant mental health issues and moderate depression resulting from complex trauma. Whilst M could, in principle, benefit from therapy, she is currently ambivalent about this and is not ready to engage in such work, which would be very challenging for her. In relation to the therapy that M has already undergone, in addition to her not being yet ready, she was also not satisfied that the model of therapy has been entirely appropriate and that this is also only the start of the process of helping M to change. In relation to M making allegations, Professor Gray’s view was M was externalising blame and seeking to blame others rather accepting responsibility for past deficits herself. She has a distorted view of herself and others

I confirm, as indicted earlier, that I found Professor Gray to be an impressive witness and I accept her opinion evidence.

AA is an expert in the relevant law in Country Z. He deals in e mail reports dated 15/10/24 [292-/3653] with the legislation relating to the guardianship of minors in Country Z when parents do not have parental authority (e.g. due to death, incapacity, or deprivation). The guardian has the duty of custody and representation of the minor in all civil acts. There is full protection of minors. Guardianship may be granted to close relatives, such as uncles in cases of parental incapacity. A Guardianship case in Country Z is a suitable mechanism to formalise the care and protection of minors by relatives. He opines that the placement of X with his uncle would be compatible with the law of Country Z.

In relation to the recognition of foreign judgments in the Superior Court of Justice in Country Z, he states that one of the crucial points in cases of international transfer of guardianship is ensuring the enforceability of the foreign judicial order in country Z. Country Z adopts the procedure of Recognition of Foreign Judgments. He deals in his report with the legislative background in that regard. The recognition of a foreign judgment in the relevant court in Country Z allows a judicial decision issued in another country to be recognised and enforced in there. In relation to this case, any “Special Guardianship Order” issued by the court in this jurisdiction can be submitted to the relevant court there for recognition, which would eliminate the need to initiate a new guardianship action in Country Z.

AA adds that it is worth noting that there would be required documentation for recognition purposes, including the original foreign judgment or a certified copy, along with an official translation into the relevant language. It is also essential to prove that all parties involved were duly notified in this jurisdiction of the process and had had the opportunity to defend themselves.

In relation to the effectiveness of a foreign judgment, he comments that, once recognised, the judgment from this jurisdiction will have full validity in Country Z which would thereby recognise X’s maternal uncle as responsible for guardianship, without the need for a new judicial process regarding the merits of the guardianship in Country Z.

In relation to a possible ‘Mirror Order’ he notes that Country Z does not formally adopt this terminology, but the equivalent is the recognition of foreign judgments, which ensures the validity of the foreign decision in the country. After recognition, the decision on special guardianship from the UK will become enforceable in Country Z, with the same force as a decision rendered by a court in that country. This means that there will be no need to review the issue of the removal of parental responsibility or X’s placement with the uncle, as the court will have already recognised the foreign decision. The report continues that the recognition procedure tends to be swift, especially in cases involving the child’s best interests.

AA continues that, once the special guardianship order is recognised, X’s uncle will need to comply with the relevant laws in Country Z regarding the duties and responsibilities of a guardian. This includes: (i) registration of the guardianship with the relevant registry office and (ii) he must care for X’s education, health, and well-being, as well as manage any assets he may have in accordance with his best interests.

The involvement of the consulate of Country Z in London in the process is essential to ensure X’s rights are upheld and to facilitate legal procedures between the two countries. The consulate can assist in obtaining documents, certifications, and even supporting processes for repatriation or the relocation of X to Country Z.

In a second report [292/3653] AA confirmed the following: (i) M does retain parental rights (known as "parental authority”) under the laws of Country Z in relation to X unless a specific judicial decision in the country determines removal, (ii) parental authority is regulated by the relevant judicial code of Country Z which encompasses rights and duties concerning the upbringing, education, and protection of minor children, except when revoked by a court due to inappropriate behaviour by the mother or inability to exercise these functions, (iii) if this court, in its special guardianship order, determined the temporary or permanent loss of M’s parental rights, such a decision still needs to be recognised in Country Z through the recognition of foreign judgments by the Supreme Court in Country Z and until then M would technically retain her parental rights in Country Z except in urgent situations where local authorities may take provisional measures to protect the child.

AA was asked to consider if M were to resume X’s care in breach of the order, would the authorities in Country Z intervene. He replied by confirming that they would. The relevant authorities can intervene if M were to attempt to resume X’s custody in violation of a foreign judicial order recognised in Country Z or guardianship order made by the court in that country. In short, if the guardianship order made in this jurisdiction is recognised in Country Z, it will be valid and enforceable. In this scenario, M would not be able to legally remove X from uncle's care without breaching the court order. In the event of non-compliance, relevant local authorities can be called upon to intervene and ensure the enforcement of the guardianship. Furthermore, judicial measures may be sought from the relevant ‘Juvenile Court’ to ensure that X remains under the care of the appointed guardian.

AA adds that M could contest the Guardianship Order in Country Z after the foreign judgment has been recognised. She would have the right to seek judicial reversal of guardianship if she can prove that she is fit to resume X’s care and that this return to her care is in his best interests. This route could be pursued through a review action or a guardianship removal action in Country Z in accordance with the relevant legislative articles dealing with the cessation of guardianship. However, the jurisprudence arising from the courts in Country Z tends to prioritise the stability and security of any subject child, with regard to their emotional and psychological well-being. If the circumstances that led to M’s loss of parental rights had not significantly changed, it would be difficult for her to overturn the decision.

In theory, X’s uncle could attempt to agree to M resuming care, but he would not have the authority to relinquish guardianship without a court decision authorising such a change. Guardianship is an institution that involves legal responsibility for the child's protection and cannot be informally surrendered or delegated. Should X’s uncle, for any reason, wish to return the child to M’s care, this would need to be done through a court decision that assesses whether she is fit to resume custody and whether this is in the child’s best interests. To prevent such a situation, the legal mechanism that would protect X would be the maintenance of formal guardianship by court order. Once guardianship is granted, the guardian (i.e. the uncle) can only be relieved of this responsibility through a new court order, and any decision regarding custody or return to the mother would be subject to careful review by the [relevant] Court in Country Z, always aiming for the best interests of the child.

Additionally, if there are concerns that X’s uncle might informally allow M to resume his care, it is possible to request the court to impose preventive measures, such as the imposition of sanctions or enhanced monitoring of the enforcement of guardianship by the judiciary or local authorities in Country Z.

In a follow up e mail report dated 12/11/24 [304-/3653] AA confirms that the time frame for registration can vary, depending on the complexity of the case, between 2 to 6 months. This period may be shortened if the case is prioritised. The process requires that the foreign judgement be authenticated and translated by a certified translator and proven to have observed due process of law in the country of origin. The guardian (i.e. the uncle) must take steps to have the UK order registered in the relevant office and appear at the relevant registry office with the recognised decision to formalise the registration and ensure that the guardianship is executed according to local law. Until the judgement is recognised, M technically retains PR, except in cases of protective measures that may be applied in urgent situations and deals with the statutory provision in this respect. The measures include: (i) removal of the child from the presence of the parent who poses a risk to the child and (ii) appointment of a temporary guardian to ensure essential care while awaiting the recognition of the foreign order. Such measures are provisional in nature and are determined by a judge based on the necessity to protect the child’s welfare. Should the special guardianship placement be terminated, and the child cannot return to M's care, alternative care arrangements to ensure the child’s protection. Options include a foster family or an orphanage. However, the law prioritises family reintegration or foster family placements.

AA was later asked to consider the recommendations from the CFAB assessment and answered [127/3653] as follows: (i) the uncle and aunt should be granted access to legal advice free of charge to mirror the court order made in the this jurisdiction in Country Z, confirming his view that this should be via a SGO as this can be easily ratified by the relevant court in Country Z without a new legal process needing to be done there; (ii) in order for X to be fully protected and to have easy access to all of his rights in Country Z, the care order/SGO made in this jurisdiction should be translated and apostilled as should the personal documents pertaining to him (i.e. including his birth certificate, any British Passport and his vaccination record with other health documents being translated but without being apostilled.

AA has also confirmed that he is prepared to be instructed to fully assist the uncle and aunt ‘on the ground’ in Country Z with all his recommendations and to assist with practical matters, such as assisting them to obtain passports. AA’s reports have not been explored in cross examination and have therefore not been challenged.

As already indicated, the parenting assessment on M [757-/3653] was conducted by JB. The assessment sessions took place between 10/6/24 and 2/9/24. The LA reports that a further session was arranged for 19/9/24 to discuss the forensic phone analysis and M’s admission that she had returned the device to factory settings and her potential continuing relationship with RP. According to the LA, M failed to attend the last session. She provided an initial explanation that she was ill and that she had forgotten the session

The assessment report sets out M’s early family and life experiences in detail. As part of this account she reported troubled and inconsistent involvement in her life by her father. She provided details as to her academic and employment history, with relocation on her part in Country Z when she was older. She reported that she formed a friendship with JM. They lived in the same property, albeit not as partners, for c 12 months.

M account to JB about the background to her travelling to the UK was as follows: She met L who had arranged for her to come to the UK, through JM. She was looking for employment. JM and L were friends. L was reportedly based in the UK. L informed her that she was able to get her to the UK, where life was easier and less expensive than in Country Z. JM passed M’s telephone number to L. M was not of the view that JM was involved in the ‘trafficking ring’.

In relation to relationships in Country Z, M stated that she only had two relationships in Country Z, firstly with JA. She said that she had a lot of feelings for him but this was not reciprocated. M said that she moved in with him in July 2023. However, this only lasted one month. She went back to live with JM. Following the breakup of the relationship M stated that she then went out a lot with her girlfriends in the evenings. M informed professionals that she was drugged and raped by JA, alleging that the offence had taken place whilst she was in Country Y. She had alleged that he was X’s father of her baby. The report notes that the LA contacted JA, who stated that he had not ‘drug raped’ her. He reported that they had been in a relationship. During the assessment M stated that she was still in contact with JA on a regular basis, but that now that she had worked ‘the dates out and it was not possible for him to be the biological father.

M also reported having a relationship with JC. This was not long after ending the relationship with JA. She stated that she was with him as ‘boyfriend and girlfriend’, but that ‘they did not have sex together’. M said that she found out that he was a married man with a family. She had not known this and ended the relationship with him.

M stated that she never informed JC that she was pregnant. However, she said that she did tell JA as she thought that he was the father. She said that M stated that she remained in contact with JA whilst in the UK. However, in view of the dates, she thought that JC was X’s biological father. That said, she also said that her relationship with him did not involve sexual intercourse and was more of a friendship. X’s paternity was therefore unclear.

In relation to travelling to the UK, she referred again to the woman L’s involvement. She reported L would invite her to the UK and find a good job for her. L did not specify what type of work it would be and she did not ask. JM told L that she was pregnant. L called M and said that it would be better for the baby to be in the UK with her, as work in Country Z was very difficult to find. L had informed her that from the UK she would be able to work and financially support her mother if she wished to do so. Life was less expensive than Country Z and that her child would have a good education and a good quality of life in UK. She referred to L and another woman “R”, whom she had also not met, who made the arrangements for her travel. L informed M that she would obtain a six-month visa for her. When JB inquired if M knew that she would be entering the UK illegally, she stated that she had not as she was aware that she could enter the UK on a six-month visa and did not check the requirements.

M reported that she was picked up from the home of JM and provided with tickets to UK via Country Y. M had not provided any of her own money for the trip. She had never before left her birth country. She flew to Country Y. She stayed in a hostel there for seven days, which then became 10 days. She was told that the cost of her travelling to the UK was £3k, which M knew she had to pay back to the two women L and R. M reported that she did not completely trust the two women.

M also reported to JB as part of her account that she had deceived and was untruthful to her mother and informed her that she was residing in another Country before she came to the UK and that she was doing very well there. She did not tell her mother or her family the truth. M reported that when she arrived in the UK she did inform her mother that she was in the UK and stated that her mother was surprised and quite annoyed when she told her. M did not tell her mother that she was pregnant initially. She said she told her when she was about five months pregnant.

When M arrived in the UK, she stated that she was three to four months pregnant. When she arrived at the airport, she telephoned L to tell her. She had instructions from her to go to another city in England. She said at that point ‘something hit home in her’ when L was not at the airport to collect her. She started regretting leaving Country Z. She travelled to the city as directed. She had 800 euros to convert. When she arrived at the address, she was greeted by two girls. When the girl opened the door she was surprised as she was scantily dressed, with a dressing gown over her and clients were arriving at the same time. The girls received a message that they would be moving to another city before the owner could report. It was then M said she understood that L and R brought her to the UK to work in the sex industry. She said she had nowhere to go and owed her traffickers money. She therefore had no option other than to continue working for L until she had paid her debt of £3k off.

M reported that she and the other girls and L would travel all over the UK, renting Air B&B properties for a week or a fortnight at a time and then move to another location. M reported that it took three months for her to repay the debt that she owed to L. JB raised concerns with M that this seemed a reasonable or low fee for bringing her to the UK, and that normally traffickers would charge far more than that. JB was concerned that M was not telling her truth.

M reported that she met RP in [place in Wales] when she and the other girls visited the area for work. RP was initially a “client” whilst she was working in [place in Wales], although she did state that he had been with another girl in the flat whom he had chosen from the line out. Following meeting in [place in Wales], M also stated that RP kept in touch with her on a daily basis and told her that she should not be working in the sex industry. M reported that he informed her that he wanted to provide her with a home so that she did not have to continue She said that she knew he was from a different Country W and that he had been trafficked to the UK M reported that after a period of travelling around differing cities returned to the [place in Wales] and she left with him.

In relation to RP, M has confirmed that she did not want to be separated from him. She denied that she was being controlled or monitored by him. She stated that she had ended her relationship with him following the initial court hearing as she had been advised to do so. She stated that RP would not normally lose his temper, but on 3/5/24 he had become agitated that he was not allowed into the hospital. M stated that he said a “bad word” to the midwife and this, together with the fact that he had been trafficked into the UK, led to assumptions being made that people were after him and he still owed them money. However, she continued that these concerns did not exist.

M was asked throughout this assessment about the status of her relationship with RP and whether she was having any ongoing contact with him. She continually denied this. During the session on 12/8/24 M was asked if she still loved him. She reportedly replied, without hesitation, that she still loved him as he had done no harm to her and had always looked after her.

There were increasing concerns during the assessment that M was not being honest in respect of her contact with RP. When asked why she had been fitted with a contraceptive implant, M stated that she had been “forced” to have it fitted. JB asked M who had ‘forced her’ to have the implant. She replied it was her GP. When JB advised her that she would not have been ‘forced’ into using contraception and that would have been her own choice in the UK, she maintained that she had been forced. She denied that she was in a relationship with RP or anyone else. Various other comments by M to JB suggested that this was not accurate

In relation to M’s capacity to parent X in terms of his basic needs for food, drink, warmth, and personal hygiene, no concerns were raised in relation to her care of him during family time with him. In terms of emotional warmth, M has been noted to interact wholly appropriately with him. The absence of family members in the UK, if X were to be returned to M’s care, was noted. However, it was recorded that she had developed a particular friendship with another woman at her church who is also from Country Z (i.e. her network support witness EG).

The parenting report recorded a number of other strengths in relation to M. It is noted that she has attended all parenting assessment sessions save for the last session that was scheduled for the 19/9/24. She has also shown a commitment to contact with X.

In relation to concerns, significant attention is placed in the report as to the inconsistency in M’s accounts of her background and the circumstances relating to the period before the commencement of care proceedings. There were also significant reservations about the limited extent of M’s insight in relation to the LA concerns. Openness and honesty in working with child professionals was identified was a vital component in working effectively with parent/s of child/ren with past child protection concerns placed in parental care. There were significant issues about M’s capacity to engage openly and honestly in the way required. There were also concerns that M had failed to consistently meet her own health needs prior to X’s birth.

In the course of the report JB commented as follows in relation to M and change:

“ The capacity to change can only be measured over time, when clear and honest information has been given in respect of behavioural patterns. The fundamental components for the capacity to change is the motivation of the individual, an ability and willingness to acknowledge that there is a problem and an ability to see professional intervention as valid and helpful (Reder & Lucey 2003). I am of the view that this has not been achieved”.

The report also drew attention to the significant number of allegations that M had made against professionals. It was JB’s analysis that M attempts to minimise, manipulate situations and professionals for her own gain and attempts to redeem herself by alleging that she did not understand what has been reported to her. She went on to confirm that during the assessment she ensured that the interpreter checked with M that she had fully understood what had been discussed. She was also of the view that there was an element of disguised compliance e.g. she informed professionals that she had ended her relationship with RP, which is what she believed the professionals wanted her to do and to try to ensure X is returned to her care. She further comments that this conduct by M leads to the following: ‘…is their further information that M is not being open about?’ JB also confirms that she took into account the report by Professor Gray dated 18/9/24 in particular in relation to this concern

In JB’s conclusion to her report, she drew together the various concerns, having previously identified in a balanced way the positives and strengths referable to M. She concluded that she could not support the placement of X into her care.

As indicated earlier, JB was appropriately responsive to some of the cross-examination points advanced on M’s behalf during cross examination. JB did not change her professional conclusions in the light of the further evidence referable to M filed immediately before and heard during the hearing.

I can be properly brief in my reference to this document. The viability assessment report [292-/1348] reached a negative conclusion, which has not been the subject of any challenge by MGM.

The report was complied by AS. It is very impressive. Indeed, the CG expressed the view that the report was the most impressive of its type that he had seen in his long career. The following summary of the conclusions and recommendations does not do full justice to the report

AS confirms that she was able to develop a clear understanding of the uncle and aunt through her visits to the home and the supporting documents. I digress to note that the confirmation of information in supporting appendices was extensive. She expresses the opinion that they would be able to work with other professionals in X’s best interests. They presented stable home life for their own children, securing significant improvements in their housing situation, which is a reflection of their determination to provide a better life for their children, than they experienced, and their resilience to maintain a positive path for their family. They work well together. She feels that they would be able to offer X a stable and loving home. Whilst they do not have much left over for the luxuries in life, they have the benefit of a stable community around them.

AS adds that the uncle and aunt have evidenced their motivation to care for X, having clearly thought through what would be involved in doing so. Their wider family is also able to support them in this task. They have experience of bringing up their own children. They have been through challenging times, especially with their eldest son. AS sees that as evidence of their resilience as parents. There are no concerns about the quality of physical home environment. They are also attuned to the emotional needs of each and their children.

However, the report does record some concerning features of any placement of X with them. Sadly, a number of these concerns resonate with this court’s experience on placement within this jurisdiction. In particular, AS notes that organised crime groups operate where the family live with risks for X in the future. There is also the potential influence from organized crime groups and exposure to drugs. However, the uncle and aunt have ensured their children are growing up safely. They are conscious of these threats and endeavour to shield their children. She is confident that they would offer X the same degree of protection.

AS records that one of their children has exhibited some challenging behaviour at school, which the teachers consider typical for his age. However, he clearly does all of his academic work and is well integrated into school and church life, with an appropriate friendship group approved by his parents. She did note that the uncle reported that he had difficulty speaking to his son about subjects concerning the male body and sexuality. However, he also demonstrated insight in this respect, attributing this to the fact that his father had abandoned his mother when he was small with the result that he grew up with no male role model. AS notes that that, although this may be a challenge, in her view, other aspects of his life show his application to provide a positive male role model.

There is a practical limitation in terms of the size of their home. It would be necessary to build another bedroom to allow for their daughter to have her own room and for X to share with their son. They also feel that a further layer of security to their boundary wall would be welcome. AS concludes her assessment positively, albeit with the following conditions:

AS recommends that the uncle and aunt should be granted an equivalent to an SGO. She expresses the view that such an order can be easily ratified by the [relevant] Court in Country Z. Any SGO made by this court should be translated and apostilled as should X’s personal documents, including his birth certificate, British Passport (if he has one) and his vaccination record. Other health documents should be translated but do not need to be apostilled. The local social welfare office in the relevant town should be notified that X is being placed with the uncle and aunt so that they can guarantee child protection support. AS also adds that any contact between X and M should be clear and defined

AS also provided answers to some further questions put to her arising out of her report [900/3653].

Before I turn to the specific threshold issues arising, I pause at this point to set out, in outline only, M’s final account before me in evidence. M continues to contend that she was trafficked to the UK. She knew she was pregnant when she left Country Z. She was tricked into prostitution and physically confined in this role. She sees herself as a victim in that respect. RP rescued her from this servitude. He was always kind and loving towards her. He was never aggressive or abusive towards her. She did not seek antenatal care as she thought she would have to pay. She became unwell suddenly with the UTI in February 2024. She received treatment. She was also diagnosed with syphilis. She did from this time attend for treatment for this condition, and for her pregnancy more generally, but missed some appointments for reasons beyond her control. She never knowingly put her unborn child at risk.

I turn firstly to consider the relevant date. The LA asserts that 2/4/24 applies as the date on which it issued care proceedings and provided a copy to M. M accepts that date. I agree and endorse this as the relevant date for s31 CA89 purposes in this case.

As previously indicated, M has previously accepted that s31 CA89 is met in this case. M has more recently resiled from that overarching concession. She now asserts that the court should view her solely as a “victim” of human trafficking [183/3653]. In the circumstances, I shall refrain from dealing with whether the overarching test is met pending my determination of underlying factual issues informing the LA case in this regard

I therefore turn to the findings sought by the LA by reference to the final composite document dated 14/2/25 [182/3653] but also to the LA’s closing document. It is correct to say that there has been a further revision in relation to the number of findings sought in the light of the evidence that emerged during the hearing. That said, I have further edited a number of the headings that deal with the findings sought.

The LA invites the court in closing to find this particular proved. In fact, I can properly deal with this finding shortly in one sense as it is accepted by M and it does accord with a number of earlier references in the evidence before me. However, M ultimately contends via counsel’s closing document that this is “not proved” in that, on my understanding, this fact is not supportive of the LA’s case as to risk to X at the relevant date.

Further to the closing submissions advanced on behalf of M, and in isolation, I agree that this fact in and of itself is not a s31CA89 finding. However, in my judgment, it is relevant in terms of the wider canvas to threshold criteria in this case. Further to my earlier comments, it was at best naïve, and at worst, reckless for M to embark upon her relocation to the UK in the circumstances whereby her pregnancy was known to her at the time. She now says that there was no threat of harm or other intolerable reason why, on her case, she had to leave Country Z. She chose to do so when her future circumstances, in the light of her pregnancy, were inherently uncertain, with inevitable risk to a degree for both her and her child as a consequence.

The LA contended for this finding in its earlier iterations of the threshold criteria [184/3653]. However, further to the LA closing submission, and very unusually, the LA seeks to resile on its earlier case even when there is an admission by M in relation to it. The LA’s final position is that, whilst its earlier case predicated on M being trafficked into the UK is finely balanced, it ultimately invites the court to find that this particular is not proved.

In relation to the part of the limb of this issue that refers to “…. for the purposes of sex work”, the LA contends that M’s engagement in ‘sex work’ is not in issue and is dealt with more fully later. The LA now contends that there is doubt as to whether M was trafficked at all and for the purposes of sex work.

The LA has referred in closing to the various accounts advanced by M in relation to how she came to the UK which I will review briefly:

The LA has helpfully drawn together in its closing document the features in support of a finding that M was trafficked to the UK within the broad meaning of that term as defined by HM Government:

The LA has then also drawn together the features, which it is submitted, are at odds with M being trafficked to the UK:

The LA therefore suggests in closing an alternative finding under this heading, in that the proper conclusion is that M’s failure to tell the truth has prevented the court from being able to either confirm or negate trafficking of M.

In response to these submissions, it is my understanding that M invites the court to effectively confirm the original finding sought, namely that she was trafficked into the UK through operation on her of deceit and coercion, but also in the overarching context of finding her to be unqualified victim of such behaviour. The wider meaning of trafficking is developed in support of M’s case in closing. Inconsistencies in M’s overall account are acknowledged but it is submitted that her core narrative has remained the same. The court is urged to bear in mind the nature of the conduct to which M has been exposed by traffickers in part to explain any dishonesty on her part in accordance with the principles in R v Lucas. Reliance is placed on her evidence to the court that she was deceived into coming to the UK and thereafter compelled to engage in sex work. Reliance is finally placed on the LA’s distillation of factors in support of a finding of trafficking referred to above.

In making my determination I remind myself that the LA bears the burden of proof under this revised heading. Whilst the alleged trafficking and being involved in ‘sex worker’ are, in many ways, inextricably linked, I will concentrate in this part of my judgment on the circumstances relating to M entering the UK.

In respect of the relevant issue requiring determination, I specifically remind myself again as to the many ways in which trafficking can occur and the consequential pernicious and frightening effects that exposure to trafficking can have on those unfortunate to be caught up in this form of human misery perpetrated by others.

I confess that I have found making a precise determination under this heading very challenging. This has been, in large measure, the result of the changes in M's account over time. M has lied repeatedly, albeit she now disputes the extent of her recorded lies. Further to my acknowledgment just set out, I remind myself that there is a potential set of explanations for such dishonesty on her report.

I am satisfied that there is an element of truth in relation M's account as to how she came to the UK in the sense that others were probably involved on making and implementing the arrangements with and for her. She had no real connections with the UK. She had never left her country of her birth previously. This required organisation. I also bear in mind the other submissions set out earlier in support of such an outcome, including RP’s recorded connection with trafficking. It all contributes to an emerging culminative picture.

What has troubled me troubled me in my determination is the degree of M's actual vulnerability in relation to her involvement, and the extent to which actions on her part were actually procured by the deceit and / or coercion by others, which are features closely associated with trafficking in the true sense of the term. 

As a result of my assessment of M during the hearing, and prolonged and mature reflection subsequently, I have formed a clear view of M and draw on the vernacular in setting out, in part, my conclusion. I find that M has been, and remains, to a degree a 'chancer'. She takes opportunities as and when they arise. She shows little, if any, hesitation in saying and doing what suits her agenda at any particular time. As I have set out, she makes serious allegations against others if this is necessary to extricate herself from challenging situations or is otherwise required. Indeed, to that extent, there is an element of ruthlessness on her part. I find M's association with the television production company in November 2024 to be a further illustration of this willingness on her part to do, perhaps impetuously to a degree, what she feels is required.

I therefore endorse and accept the LA’s closing submission to a large extent in this judgment. As a consequence of M’s ‘shifting sands’ narrative, it is now indeed impossible to piece together a reliable understanding of what actually led to her arriving in the UK. That said, and as previously set out, I am satisfied that the LA has proved, in fact, that M was not an unqualified victim in relation to her involvement with the arrangements that led to come her to come to the UK.

The LA invites the court to find in closing that these previous asserted facts about flights to Country Y and the UK, and L’s involvement with them, are unreliable and not proved. The LA relies upon the earlier submissions advanced in relation to M’s narrative generally about her movements. The LA also refers to the absence of reliable independent evidence of the existence of L (or R) or the payment of flight costs by any third party. In response, M submits concisely through counsel in closing that these facts should still be found to be proved.

In relation firstly to M’s route to the UK, by way of completeness, I am satisfied that she probably did come to the UK via Country Y. This has always figured as part of M’s narrative. However, whilst I have found that others were probably involved in the arrangements for M to come to the UK, I endorse the LA’s closing submission that it is simply not possible to know whether the woman L (or R) actually existed and was involved in arrangements for M’s travel to the UK.

The LA invites the court in closing to find this particular proved. Whilst the LA acknowledges that the direct evidence of this aspect of M’s recent past arises from her own account, when other aspects of her account are not considered reliable, it relies upon the following in support:

In response, M through counsel accepts the original LA finding sought, albeit on the basis that her engagement in this work was procured by coercion by others.

In making my determination, and in the light of my earlier finding, I do bear in mind that M could have made up this aspect of her account as part of contending that she was trafficked in order to be able to stay in the UK. I also bear in mind that M does appear to have had access to some finances from Country Z after her arrival. However, I am satisfied that the LA has proved this limb of its case independently of M’s agreement. I will deal with M’s contention as to coercion under the next heading.

I read into the this issue the previous underlying assertion that M was effectively compelled to work as a ‘sex worker’ against her will and was confined to varying places to achieve that aim. In closing the LA now invites the court to find that this particular is not proved. This aspect of the LA’s closing document should be read in conjunction with the related submissions about trafficking above and M’s varying account over time about the sex work element to her background.

In reliance upon its revised closing case on this point, the LA refers to M’s narrative about the woman L, which is now said to be far from clear and reliable. The LA also refers to M’s own report only that she was unable to leave the properties in which she was sex working, which the LA also contends is contradicted by M’s other accounts. In particular, the LA relies upon M’s first own CA89 statement wherein she previously suggested that she left sex work by simply walking out one morning before bookings began. I remind myself that M now dissociates herself from that part of that statement.

The LA then refers to how M’s account changed within her threshold response of 3/2/25 to the assertion that she could not leave the properties freely. She made it clear that she fled early one morning when she was sure that everyone was asleep. RP was essential in helping her to escape.

The LA also referred in closing to M’s oral evidence, by way of further refinement to her overall account, in which she said that she had been locked in and that she had been subject to direct threats of the most serious kind. She said that she took the door keys from L when she was asleep. She also confirmed in her evidence that she had heard no further from L after she left, which the LA contend is improbable

On behalf of M in response it was submitted that this aspect of her account has been broadly consistent, albeit with some further detail in her account as to how she left the final property.

In making my determination, I bear in mind the whole of M’s evolving response in relation to this aspect of the case. In M’s first threshold response document dated 24/5/24, albeit in response to the LA pleading at that time that she was “….. made to work as a sex worker despite being pregnant” [157/3653] she confirmed that “… she was made to go straight into sex working”. It follows that there has been an element of compulsion and/or coercion associated with her account from an early stage. It is a source of some surprise that an assertion that M was not physically allowed to leave the places where she worked was not made clear by her earlier. I do bear in mind that this aspect of the case may be very embarrassing for M and that embarrassment may have an impact on her response. However, in providing the early responses that she did, I frankly fail to see why M did not provide these additional details about her physical confinement as well.

I do note in M’s first CA89 statement, in addition to the reference above, she said at paragraph 42 [1094/3653] that she and the other females with her were not allowed to freely the properties as there were appointments at any time. This part of the statement suggests a degree of restriction on her. However, that restriction does appear to have a practical element arising from the need to ‘service’ the clients rather than physical confinement when considered alongside the later account of how she left with RP [1095/3653].

I therefore turn to my determination in relation to this aspect of the case. I remind myself again at this stage that I must guard against any morality judgments.

I am satisfied that there is likely to have been a degree of compulsion associated with M's involvement in sex work. Indeed, I proceed on the basis that very few people indeed willingly enter this damaging and often dangerous world to sell themselves for the sexual gratification of others. The difficulty in this case is the extent to which M's engagement in this lifestyle was the result of trickery, coercion, threats and / or physical confinement by others.

 I am satisfied that, whilst there may well have been elements of general compulsion operating on M’s mind arising from her financial circumstances at the time, I do not accept that M was some from of 'sex slave' who was effectively imprisoned and compelled under verbal and / or physical threats to provide sexual services for others for no reward. I find that that the reasons for M's involvement in sex work were far more nuanced. In making this finding, I draw upon my earlier findings as to M's capacity to do what she needs to do in the circumstances. I also bear in mind the recording, now disputed by M, of what she reported to the BAWSO worker (and set out in the referral to the HO earlier) [83/138] in that she “…felt forced into working as a prostitute”. In addition the above-mentioned details of fees and how the costs were met, along with other reported features of the work from this record, which can only have come from M, are inconsistent with the final evolution of her account that she a ‘sex worker’ who was physically restricted and compelled as such as was reflected in her oral evidence.

The LA, in closing, invites the court to find this particular finding proved as pleaded. The LA refers to aspects of the evidence that supports the finding that M has misled professionals as follows:

In response M submits in closing, through counsel, that it was accepted that she lied at an early stage about reporting that her father had murdered a man in Country Z and that she was in danger as a result there. However, as counsel carefully submits in closing, M’s position has changed following her evidence at this hearing and that the collection of reported “lies” are in fact explicable as being details that have been “lost in translation”. Extensive submissions are then advanced on her behalf in her closing document by reference to authorities following R v Lucas.

Turning to my determination, I firstly note that the “lie” about M’s father’s involvement in murder is still accepted by M. However, I also digress to comment that this lie is now represented with an explanation. She suggests that she was effectively encouraged to tell this lie by KO in order to promote her prospects of gaining asylum.

Secondly, whilst more basic methods of interpretation (e.g. Google translate) were on occasion been used by nursing staff, formal interpreters have been used by the LA and by her first set of solicitors when engaging with her. I note the certificate of translations signed in M’s early CA89 evidence in that regard. I am satisfied that an extensive number of lies, summarised above by the LA, have been accurately recorded by a range of professionals working with M without difficulties associated with translation.

In short, I make the finding in the terms sought by the LA that M has repeatedly lied to child professionals.

I digress to further find that, in the light of my other findings, M has also lied on oath to the court during her oral evidence before me.

The LA invites the court to find this particular proved in closing. The LA submits that this is still accepted by M and is supported by various independent professionals of both of them

This is confirmed in the closing submission advanced on behalf of M. However, she contends in closing through counsel that the relationship commenced “coincidentally” when she was working as a ‘sex worker’, albeit that she has previously referred to meeting him when he was a “client”.

It is therefore uncontroversial for the court to make a finding in the terms sought by the LA under this heading.

In terms of the nature of the relationship, I note that the LA does not invite the court to make any findings in relation to RP’s connection, if any with M’s work as a ‘sex worker’. There were suggestions in the course of the hearing that RP may have been M’s “pimp” and that his cousin was some form of “minder”. Whilst there were suggestions and suspicions in support of such a connection from the evidence before me, I draw back from making explicit findings in this regard due to the absence of sufficient evidence in support and in the absence of any specific finding sought by the LA in this respect.

Nevertheless, whilst I will deal with other aspects of the nature of the relationship between M and RP shortly, I do feel able to find, as with the LA case as to trafficking more generally, that I am not in position to draw any safe conclusions as to the fundamental dynamic in the relationship between M and RP in terms of M’s life as a ‘sex worker’.

The LA invites the court in closing to find this particular proved. In support of this finding, the LA firstly submits that that particular has been accepted by M in her threshold responses prior to her response dated 3/2/25. The LA also refers in support of its closing submission to the earlier reports about what was known about RP’s circumstances relating to his arrival and continuing presence in the UK.

In addition, the LA refers to M’s views expressed in her interview with Professor Gray. Professor Gray’s records as follows:

“I asked [M] how many times she had met [RP] before she had decided to leave with him. She reported that [RP] had gone to see her three days in a row and that she had then moved to another city, but that they had spoken every day via Instagram. She said that ‘everyday he would call and message me and it went on for a month’. [M] added that at work [RP] ‘went with another girl. We had to stand in line so he could choose who he wanted. During the time in [other city] we only communicated by Instagram and then when I came back to [place in Wales] I left. It was a week before I left with him. I told him when I got here, and he came to see me every day. Every day I was with him she was checking he was paying and she made me give her the money” and later

“… when I went to live with [RP] I had not known him that long. I know it was risky to go and live with him when I did not know him in depth, but I wanted to get out of the situation I was in when working with people (sex working). I was incredibly lucky that [RP] was a good person”.

The LA also submits that M accepted in evidence the basic facts which underly the LA case in this regard that she could not risk assess RP’s risk due to the following:

By way of M’s closing response, it is submitted on her behalf that she has continuously asserted that RP was a loving and caring person and he was never violent towards her. I digress to comment that such comments were indeed recorded by others. Reference is on her behalf as to RP’s purported involvement in saving M from the place where she contends she was confined for sex work. It is also submitted that RP’s reported background in and of itself does not mean that he was, as a matter of fact, a risk to M and X. I digress to comment that latter point is not the pleaded finding sought by the LA.

It is accepted on behalf of M that she met RP for the first time in November 2023 when she a ‘sex worker’ and that they did not speak the same language. However, in further response to the LA’s closing digest of factors is it asserted as follows:

In making my determination, I draw directly upon the LA’s distillation of the bare facts set out above. Whilst I accept that RP’s reported experienced of being trafficked into the UK is not, in and of itself, evidence that he posed a risk, the other factual circumstances set out are directly supportive of a finding that M was plainly unable to assess whether he did pose a risk. That said, their initial meeting when he was M’s “client” would, I find, put any reasonable parent on notice that he may present as a risk. On M’s closing case, she did not know him when they started living together. She had no confirmation of his background circumstances. They did not speak the same language and had to communicate in the most artificial of ways. Against this background, it also has to be accepted that they only been together a matter of a few months when X was born.

In short, I do make a finding in the specific terms sought by the LA under this heading that M did not know RP and could not have properly formed a view as to whether he was safe or whether he posed a risk to herself and / or X.

The LA invites the court in closing to find this particular proved. The LA relies upon the evidence by HL and HM. The LA submits that their evidence was confirmed on oath and that they were consistent with one another. The LA also refers to HM’s record [138/138] which was made available following the oral evidence. The LA also refers to M’s acceptance in her evidence that RP did take hold of her arm lightly but, on her account, that took place on the ground floor of the hospital.

The LA submit that M’s account accords with what M reported to Professor Gray on 18/6/24: “[M] continued by stating that she had told [RP] that ‘it wasn’t for you to say that’. I went towards the lift and that’s when he held my arm to talk to me. He did not pull it. He did not hurt me. After that I went up and he stayed downstairs’.

The LA submits that these accounts are not reconcilable with the LA evidence. Neither LA witness would have seen events taking place downstairs. They also both described the incident as involving aggression by RP and that M appeared upset by his behaviour. The LA submits that the credibility of its witnesses is preferable to M

M’s response is that the two LA witnesses must be wrong. She had had an encounter with RP earlier when he had lightly touched her arm, but his actions were not aggressive. This had happened earlier and downstairs after she had just been with WA. HL and HM simply could not have seen this. It was also suggested that they would not have been able to see what occurred outside the ward through the door. Whilst not advanced in closing submissions, I note that M’s account is consistent to an extent with her earlier account to Professor Gray as set out above.

Turning to my determination. I am entirely satisfied that the LA witnesses gave an accurate account of this incident. They would have had a clear view of events through the glass aspect of the doorway to the ward. Whilst there were some minor differences between them in terms of the precise details, that is to be expected in an account by two witnesses from slightly different perspectives whose accounts are truly independent. I also accept the submission that HM’s account was consistent with the account that she recorded on the same day. On her own account, M referred to RP being upset and angry that day about X being removed. In my judgment at least part of that aspect of M’s account as to the background context was probably correct. The LA witnesses could not have been mistaken in their accounts and could not have seen the events between M and RP downstairs. On M’s case it would follow that they gratuitously made up their accounts against her. Yet they had absolutely no reason to do so, with no indication that they behaved other than entirely appropriately towards her.

In short, I make a finding in the terms sought by the LA under this heading. I also go on to further comment that this was an ugly and concerning incident. Whilst I note that this was not the most serious example of physical force deployed by another in terms of domestic abuse, the context was nevertheless significant. M was highly vulnerable at this difficult time. RP was plainly not able to prioritise M’s need for support and was, in fact, a source of further distress to her. In my judgment this behaviour is demonstrative of this relationship being dysfunctional in nature. I also note that RP was clearly prepared to behave in this way towards M in a public place directly in front of others, which gives rise to concern as to his potential for further abusive and dysfunctional behaviour towards M when away from others.

The LA again invites the court to find in closing that this particular is proved. The LA acknowledges that this event post-dates the relevant threshold date but effectively asserts that it is of relevance when assessing risk to X at that earlier date.

By way of specific submission, the LA contends that the facts are not really in dispute. Within her threshold responses, M “part accepted” the allegation. M’s reservation was limited to the suggestion that she could not comment on whether or not RP ran away from the police [187/3653].

The LA refers to JB’s record of M’s account about her relationship with RP. She said on 2/9/24 as follows : “…. the meeting with [RP] on 17/5/24 was due to [RP] collecting his shoes from the hotel room. I asked how [RP] was aware of which hotel she was staying in as she had moved hotels a number of times. [M] stated that she was unsure and was not sure if [RP] had ‘followed’ her to her hotel as it was just in front of the previous hotel”.

The LA also sought to rely upon the occurrence log from South Wales Police Occurrence Report in relation to the incident [3058/3653] which records, inter alia, that M was by the door in a towel and a male (i.e. RP) was in the bathroom “getting dressed”. M confirmed to the police that she was not being forced into anything.

The LA referred in closing to M’s account about this incident on oath during the hearing. It is submitted by the LA that she gave an account which moved with questions put to her. She was asserting that this was a short meeting in which RP “….was there to drop off my suitcases” and not to collect his shoes. Ultimately, her account was that she had gone to meet RP in the hotel reception, and returned to her room with him so that he could leave a suitcase. RP had then got undressed because he was bleeding and was therefore, coincidentally, in a towel when the police arrived. Contrary to the log entry, M asserted that RP was not undressed. The log records that the male (i.e. RP) ran off.

A number of submissions are advanced on behalf of M in response. It is firstly submitted that these events post the relevant date threshold date and are thereby not relevant under this heading. Secondly, it is submitted that it would be unfair for the LA to rely upon RP’s behaviour on this occasion against M. Reference is also made to the fact that Body Worn Camera (“BWC”) images were not played as part of the hearing, which may have been relevant.

Firstly, in relation to the underlying facts concerning this incident, I proceed on the premise that the commentary in the police log is likely to be accurate. Frankly, there is no cogent explanation for RP’s presence in M’s room at all on this date in view of her assertion that the relationship was over by that date and in the light of events at the hospital on 3/5/24. The circumstances in relation to their respective states of dress are also supportive of contact between them which was not confined to the exchange of items, whether by way of collection or return.

In short, I am satisfied that M was still meaningfully engaged in a relationship with RP at this time, which I have already found to be dysfunctional in nature.

I now turn to consider the submission advanced on behalf of M in relation to the date of this incident. I am satisfied that the finding sought by the LA is relevant in terms of threshold criteria. Although the events relate to 17/5/24, in my judgment they are demonstrative of the probably enmeshed and dysfunctional nature of M’s relationship with RP a few weeks earlier at the relevant threshold criteria date and, as a consequence, are directly relevant to the assessment of likelihood of harm to X at that time.

I digress to further comment that, in the event, that I am wrong in this respect, my finding of an ongoing enmeshed relationship between M and RP would be, in any event, directly relevant in terms of the welfare aspect of this case and a further illustration of M’s ongoing lack of honesty in terms of her engagement with the LA.

The LA invites the court to find this fact proved in closing. The LA refers to the evidence submitted by M of her scan with the advice about the need for ongoing treatment.

In response it is submitted on behalf of M that, having paid for a private scan, she would have sought ongoing ante natal care if she thought she would have been entitled without payment being required.

Counsel for M accurately summarised in his closing document WA’s evidence of her experience of many women she deals with expressing the same misunderstanding. Whilst I remind myself that the test pursuant to s31 CA89 refers to the standard of parenting of a reasonable parent, as opposed to a parent from a specific section of society, and whilst I have concerns and suspicions as to other reasons why M may not have sought regular antenatal care after the scan, they remain suspicions and, in the circumstances, I do not make a finding against M in this respect in terms of s31 CA89.

The LA invites the court in closing to find that this particular is proved. It is submitted that this has been previously accepted by M, at least to a degree by M, and that the finding accords with the evidence of the nursing witnesses and M’s own medical records. Whilst the LA notes that M, in her oral evidence, expressly asserted that she had no previous symptoms prior to the onset of pain that day, it is submitted in closing that that this is unlikely to be true. As part of its submission, the LA refers to M requiring inpatient treatment for a number of days, including intravenous antibiotics.

It is submitted on behalf of M in response that she reported that she had no previous symptoms before the day of her admission. It is also submitted that it is not clear from the medical evidence what symptoms M would have had to have alerted her that she was suffering from UTI and that urgent medical attention was required.

In making my determination, whilst I note that M has previously accepted this assertion, that concession was qualified by reference to her further assertion that she was not aware that she had a UTI until [date] [188/3653]. Whilst it is submitted that it is unlikely that M would have been symptom free in advance of that date, I am not satisfied that the nature and extent of medical evidence before the court is sufficient for me to make the finding sought by the LA, even allowing for the extent of M’s treatment for this condition on and after 25/2/24.

The LA invites the court in closing to make the finding sought as pleaded. The LA refers to the earlier admission by M that she did not attend her appointment for a further dose on [date] 2024 and, therefore, had to re-start a course of treatment which then ran too close to X’s birth. The LA refers to an extract from M’s medical records in support of its case in its document, including M’s failure to attend on [date] 2024.

In response on behalf of M, it is accepted that M was told she needed 3 doses of the relevant medication. M’s case for missed appointments is related to not having transport or having access to limited funds. At the time M asserts that she was living some distance from the hospital. Reliance is also placed by counsel in closing on M’s attendance at other appointments.

I am satisfied that M was told about the significance of her taking the 3 doses of medication to safeguard both herself and her unborn child’s health. I am also satisfied that she had advance notice of the relevant date for the third appointment. In my judgment any reasonable parent would have prioritised attendance at the third such appointment.

I also draw a distinction between this failure on M’s part and her earlier poor compliance with medical advice from the time of her scan. Firstly, by this time she knew that she was suffering with syphilis again, which required medical treatment, as opposed to a pregnancy that may not have had any obvious issues. Secondly, M knew by this time that there would be no cost for undergoing the recommended treatment, having already received medication without charge previously. Thirdly, I am satisfied that she would have been advised that the treatment was necessary not just for herself (which would have been her choice to decline) but also for her unborn child.

In short, in relation to this aspect of M’s medical examination / treatment regime, I do make the s31CA 89 finding sought as pleaded by the LA under this heading.

The LA invites the court in closing to find this particular proved. The LA refers again to M’s earlier acceptance of this in a previous threshold document dated 6/8/24 but revised in the response dated 3/2/25. The LA relies upon unchallenged medical evidence in support of its case i.e. statement by an ante natal screening midwife CR [716/3653] who was not required for cross examination and WA.

M in response through counsel relies upon another midwife (SW) [693/3653] whose statement was also not challenged. However, that statement deals with details relating to M attending to receive 3 subsequent doses of medication for syphilis to that set out above.

In relation to the finding sought by the LA, I note the following unchallenged extract from CR’s statement alone which reads: “[M] attended her Obstetric appointment [date] 2024 but did not attend her Fetal Medicine appointment [date] 2024 or her appt for in the specialty clinic for her 3rd dose of treatment [date] 2024. [M] was given another appointment for the Fetal Medicine Unit [date] 2024 but did not attend”.

In the light of this evidence, I make the finding sought as pleaded by the LA.

The LA invites the court in closing to find this particular proved. Once again, reference is made to M’s earlier acceptance in her previous threshold response. However, the LA acknowledged in closing that in her evidence WA could not say whether X had been put through additional treatment post-birth because M had not completed a course of treatment in sufficient time before his birth. WA also thought that treatment post-birth might be usual anyway.

The LA instead relies upon the evidence of CR, who it is submitted was more directly concerned with this treatment. She recorded in her unchallenged statement as follows:

“As [M] did not have her 3rd dose of treatment she needed to recommence 3 further doses of treatment and I tried to contact her by phone to discuss this but had no reply. [M’s] midwife [WA] messaged to remind her attend her appointments in Antenatal Clinic and Fetal Medicine 20/3/24 where this would be discussed but she did not attend either of those appointments. …

[M] did receive a further 3 doses of treatment [date] 2024, [date] 2024 and [date] 2024 but as this was less than 30 days before her expected delivery date the birth plan was for her baby to have investigations following delivery and for treatment with intravenously for 10 days”.

In closing, unsurprisingly, M also relies upon the evidence by WA referred to the LA above. It is submitted that M received a further 3 doses of treatment on [dates] 2024 with the result that she received, in the event, numerous doses.

In my judgment, it is appropriate to rely on the unchallenged evidence of the specialist screening midwife CR. Furthermore, in any event, X did, as a matter of fact, undergo precautionary intravenous syphilis medication following his birth which would not have been necessary if M had complied with the relevant medication regime pre-birth.

In the light of this evidence, I make the finding sought as pleaded by the LA.

Therefore, I return, as previously indicated, to address the overarching issue as to whether the test pursuant to s31 CA 89 has been met by the LA in this case. By drawing together the findings made in relation to the various strands of the LA case set out above, I am satisfied that, in addition to making a number of the underlying findings sought by the LA, the overall s31 CA89 test is plainly met in this case.

Before I turn to the specific issues arising in relation to my welfare determination in this case, I pause at this point once again to set out, and again in outline only, M’s final account in this respect as well. M does not accept that that threshold criteria have been passed. She has not exposed X to any risk. In relation to her parenting abilities, she feels that she is a competent carer in terms of the practicalities of parenting. She is also attuned to her son’s emotional needs and provides him with a mother’s love and affection. Whilst she does not accept that the test in s31 CA 89 is met, she would do anything to secure X’s return to her care. In particular, she would agree to a SO. She has been receiving therapy, which she has found helpful. Whilst RP was not abusive to her, the relationship is over and he is no longer part of her life. She has a support network, with her support witnesses and other members of the community from Country Z residing here. She would take up MM’s offer of accommodation and support to enable X to return to her care.

I have already set out my distillation of the core principal and underpinning welfare issues. I now turn to make my findings in that regard, which will, in the process, also address the specific further findings sought by the LA as part of this aspect of the hearing. I deal initially with the underlying findings.

Sadly, M has demonstrated, not least in the light of her stance in relation to threshold criteria, little if any insight into her past deficiencies as a parent and the reasons why these care proceeding has been necessary. This is clear from the LA’s parenting assessment and the LA’s final evidence, CG’s analysis and my own findings. This does not augur well for the placement of X into her care

I accept that M has undergone counselling with VA [1165]3653]. However, I also accept the evidence of Professor Gray that this was not the sort of therapy that she would recommend. The form of counselling she envisaged would require an accurate understanding of M’s history, which is currently absent. Furthermore, Professor Gray was also of the view M was not in place to benefit from counselling at this point. I also find that M’s presentation during the period leading up to this hearing, and during the hearing, is not demonstrative of M having gained benefit from therapeutic input to date.

I have already found that M has consistently not been honest with child professionals during these proceedings both before and following the relevant threshold criteria date. I have also already found that she has not been honest with the court in the course of her evidence on oath. Ongoing lack of parental openness and honesty makes it very challenging, if not impossible, for child professionals to effectively work with a parent to keep a child safe in parental care.

This is difficult for the court to determine. There were unconfirmed suggestions in the evidence before me that RP still resides in [place in Wales]. M maintains the relationship is over. Even if this is correct, in view of the evidence of M’s reported feelings about RP, I am satisfied that there are realistic prospects that the relationship will resume in the future.

M’s principal support network individual going forward is MM. She has offered M a home in one of her two properties, namely her home in the North West of England. MM splits her time between her home there and in her home [elsewhere in UK]. She would not be in that home with M for 3 days a week. She suggested in her evidence that cameras in her property would enable her to monitor M. In my judgment, whilst this proposed arrangement would not offer the extent of practical and other support ‘on the ground’ that one would expect from a person who offers to share their home, the suggested use of cameras as part of support is both inappropriate and unworkable in equal measure. In my judgment, this suggestion reflects a lack of appropriate and joined up thinking on the part of MM underlying her offer of help to M.

There is also a specific issue in relation to MM that requires determination in this part of my judgment. As indicated earlier, MM accepts that she contacted JB in October 2024. JB has told the court that she said she was calling from BAWSO when informed that confidential information about M could not be disclosed. MM denies that she made such a statement. However, I am satisfied that MM did indeed make that representation. I have reached the conclusion as it follows that a social worker would indeed have said that she could not discuss M’s case with a stranger. Secondly, JB contacted BAWSO after the call to check if the caller was from BAWSO. I find that JB’s only motivation in doing was the result of what she told in the conversation with MM.

Therefore, in the light of this finding, and my earlier observations about MM, I am concerned that MM would not be a constructive facilitator or support to M in working collaboratively with the LA in the future.

In relation to M’s other support witness, I note that she lives in [Wales]. Therefore, the extent of support available to M by this is likely to be at a distance and therefore relatively limited.

There are examples of M engaging, at least at one level, appropriately with the LA. I also note that M has engaged in this litigation and has cooperated with the assessment and other directions relating to her, save importantly in relation to the analysis of her phone. It could be said that this is demonstrative of her capacity to work with professionals in the future. However, Professor Gray and JB were concerned with ‘disguised compliance’ by M. I specifically endorse that concern. In the light of this conclusion opinion, and in the light of my other findings set out earlier, especially about M’s lack f openness and honesty, I am currently satisfied that M will struggle to meaningfully collaborate with the LA and other related child professionals in the future.

It is factually clear that M applied for a birth certificate from the consulate of Country Z on 7/10/24 without informing the child professionals and the court. It is M’s contention that she did so to ensure that X had confirmed his birth from the country of his birth and for him to be guaranteed to be a citizen of Country Z. Whilst I would have some sympathy with this approach, in isolation, what troubles me is why M felt that this step was necessary at that time (when the court was exploring a potential return of X to Country Z in any event) and why she failed to share the details of her application with others and the court.

M also applied for a passport for X via a third party (i.e. MM) on 14/11/24. I have the same concerns arising from her actions in this respect as in relation to X’s birth certificate set out above. I am satisfied that these applications were made surreptitiously.

I have already set out the history in some detail in relation to this development in November 2024. M says that she was motivated in doing so as a consequence of her exposure to trafficking as a victim. My findings in this judgment indicate that M’s relevant recent background is both more uncertain and more complex.

Furthermore, I am satisfied that this decision by M to involve herself with the television production company should be seen as part of a strategy of her ‘going on the offensive’ following the filing of the adverse parenting assessment by the LA. This conduct cannot be divorced from her stance in the care litigation at this time, and the application for a birth certificate for X and the application for a passport for him summarised above. Despite M’s assertions, it is unclear whether her involvement with this production company was entirely and solely her idea. However, the precise origin of this decision is not terribly important in view of the fact M clearly ‘owns’ responsibility for her involvement.

I am satisfied, in the light of the evidence before the court, that M did indeed seek to contact this child professional in the period leading up to 20/11/24. M’s assertion that she merely found her on Instagram is incompatible with the information that AS plainly felt was important for her to share with the LA via CFAB. In a different context, I have referred to M’s impulsivity and recklessness. In my view judgment, this is yet another example of the way M operates. The timing of this behaviour, in the light of the immediately preceding findings, is significant once again.

I have considered this aspect most anxiously. I have come to the clear conclusion, in the light of my findings set out immediately above, that M has presented, and continues to present, as a flight risk in relation to X. In addition to my earlier finding as to M’s conduct in October and November 2024, I also draw upon my earlier finding that M is a ‘chancer’ who will do whatever is necessary to further her agenda. Port alerts remain essential.

M has said to the court that she will return to Country Z if the court orders that X should be placed in the care of his uncle and aunt. Before the hearing I was uncertain if that would indeed be so, not least in the light of M’s conduct in coming to the UK and the steps that she has taken to try to remain here. However, following the hearing, I am satisfied that it is indeed likely that she will return in the scenario I have just set out.

I have referred earlier to a summary of the overarching welfare issues that have to be addressed, namely what would be the nature and extent of risk posed to X if he were to be placed in M’s care, can X be kept safe, whether M would be capable of keeping X safe in the future? Can any steps be taken to mitigate risk etc. I will set out my conclusion in relation to these fundamental issues as part of my holistic assessment of the options later.

I now turn to address the welfare checklist pursuant to s1(3) CA89. Whilst I may not expressly address each criterion in a fully developed manner, they have all figured in my approach to the welfare determination prioritising X’s welfare.

X’s age is such that I plainly cannot have regard to his wishes and feelings, save for the generality that, all things being equal, he would ideally prefer to be raised by his own parent/s.

X has the same needs as any other infant of his age to be fed, kept clean, clothed, love, stimulated etc. X is currently in foster care. He will have to move placement on any view. Happily, he can remain in his current placement pending his next and hopefully final move. Whilst a change of carer is always significant, I accept the evidence that I have summarised already in relation to the development of X’s attachments and the prospects for transfer of the same.

I now turn to X’s background, characteristics and heritage, which in my judgment is an extremely important feature of this case. X has the benefit of his cultural inheritance from Country Z. As expressed in the course of the evidence before me, X appears before me court in this jurisdiction in a sense ‘by accident’. I draw again on the vernacular when I say that every ‘sinew’ should be ‘strained’ within the fundamental bounds of keeping X safe and meeting his welfare needs in order to try to restore to him to the nationality, language and rich cultural heritage that is, frankly, his right and entitlement. I have also summarised the parenting capabilities of M and the uncle and aunt.

I have already found that X was, at the relevant date, likely to suffer significant harm. I have also set out the continuing risks of such harm posed to him if he is returned to M’s care. The really concerning feature of this case is the true nature and extent of harm to which X would be exposed if he is returned to M’s care. I deal with this point further later in my judgment.

I therefore turn to consider side by side the options before this court, which in outline amount to the following: a possible return of X to M’s care with or without a SO (or alternatively an adjournment of the case for further assessment of M with this aim in mind) or the placement of X in the care of his uncle and aunt subject ultimately subject to a SGO. By way of completeness, the other potential outcomes, not canvassed before me at the hearing, would be long term foster care (“LTFC”) and adoption.

One possibility is the return of X to M’s care, either now or following an adjournment. The potential advantages of such an outcome are obvious but nonetheless fully merit being stated explicitly by the court as part of this judgment. It could be said that such a placement would be, in the natural order of life events, frankly how things should be and rightly so. It would mean that X would grow up being cared for by his own mother, with the day-to-day experience of her love and affection born out of direct blood ties. Overall, there are no concerns about X’s basic parenting abilities. X could expect to have all his basic needs met. This outcome would also mean potentially direct contact for X with his extended maternal family. This would cement X's sense of identity as part of his family of origin in time as he grows through childhood and matures in adulthood and would meet his linguistic and cultural needs arising from his country of origin.

If a return to M’s care can be made without any order, then so much the better. Although not specifically canvassed, a likely palatable alternative, from M’s perspective, would be a placement of X with her without a court order but with the benefit of a Care and Support Plan (CASP). On either of these two outcomes, the degree of intervention in the family life of X and M, with all potential for stigmatising of X, would be either absent or, with a CASP, marginal. It would auger well for a ‘normal’ childhood for X alongside his peers without distinction in terms of his status.

The disadvantages in the form of risks of such an outcome in this case arise from the extent of risk posed to X from M’s recent past dysfunctional lifestyle, together with her lack of open and honest engagement with child professionals. The court has found that X would be exposed to significant risks of physical, emotional harm and impairment of his development if he is returned to M’s care. I have explicitly accepted the CG’s evidence that we simply just do not know the extent of risk to which X would be exposed in M’s care, albeit it is likely to be at the most serious end of the spectrum of such risk. That must be the court’s ‘default setting’. In short, the court is not satisfied that X could be kept consistently safe if returned to M’s care.

The issue therefore for the court is whether, as part of its wider assessment, the risks in terms of a placement with M can be mitigated sufficiently or whether they remain too great when compared, in the balance, with the disadvantages and risks associated with other potential outcomes.

This leads the court to consider therefore, alongside this first option, a revised version of the same, namely return of X to M subject to a SO. The many advantages of the placement with parent/s set out above would plainly be present, albeit with a more ‘light touch’ public law order, with minimal potential for the stigmatising impact of a full CO.

The disadvantages of such an outcome in this case again arise from the extent of risk posed to X, even with a SO in place, which the court has found will continue to prevail. The court must closely consider whether those risks can be met in order to keep X safe sufficiently safe with a SO.

As part of wider arrangements around a SO, there could be a system of un/announced visits to check on X. He would also see other child professionals such as a health visitor and potentially for a longer period than for his peers. Whilst again not explicitly explored in the hearing, the LA could assist with the provision of a nursery placement that would involve perhaps even daily monitoring by child professionals of X in such a setting. In short, there would be a de facto ‘safety net’ of sorts around him. Advice and assistance from the LA, if accepted, would potentially empower M in her parenting journey. I have referred to a SO as ‘light touch,’ with much reduced potential for singling out the child as different from his peers.

However, no safety net can be in place around any child for 24 hours a day and for 7 days per week. Any such placement ultimately requires the court to have confidence in reposing fundamental trust in the parent/s that he, she or they would seek help on encountering any risk, danger or any aspect of their lives that potentially or actually do negatively impact the relevant child’s fundamental safety.

In this case, there are real concerns around the extent to which the court (and the LA) can repose any trust in M at all, even with a SO. These concerns must be factored into the assessment of the outcome options for this child.

Whilst once again not canvassed, a return home of X under a CO would also be presumably palatable to M. I deal with this option in passing out of completeness only as a theoretical alternative only. Once again, the fundamental advantage of the child’s home being secured with his birth parent would be achieved with all the associated potential advantages already set out. The CO would be a more formal arrangement and rather more intrusive from M’s perspective. The LA would, of course, share PR with her in relation to X. The LA would ultimately drive PR decisions, if so required, further to s33 CA89.

There would also be a number of implications for X in terms of being ‘looked after’ by the LA. However, the impact of the same would be tempered by him being at home with M. All of the safety measures set out, and the more structured review process to which he would be subject, would be in place to try to ensure she was kept safe and that all her other needs were met.

Sadly, even with the more vigorous measures associated with the now more exceptional outcome of a CO with a child placed at home, there still remain the concerns identified earlier herein around X’s fundamental safety if returned to M’s care. The same issues in terms of mitigation of risk arise. There remains the core need to be able to trust the parent/s, even with a CO in place, if child returns home. The court’s concerns in relation to M in this regard must again be in the forefront of the court’s mind as part of this section of the court’s final assessment and determination

Let me firstly set out the numerous benefits associated with this option. It could be said from a lay perspective, albeit that this would not be entirely consistent with the court’s child specific approach, that this outcome would be the ‘next best alternative’ to parental care. It would mean that X would grow up being cared for by his ‘flesh and blood’ family, with the day-to-day experience of their familial love and affection borne out of family ties. There are no concerns about their parenting abilities. What they may lack in terms of material advantages, they make up for in terms of their established proficiency as carers. X could expect to have all his basic needs met. This outcome would also potentially mean direct contact for him with M and his extended maternal family. This would also, albeit from a different angle, cement X's sense of identity as part of his family of origin in time as he grows through childhood and matures in adulthood. This outcome would also meet his linguistic and cultural needs arising from his country of origin

If the court makes an SGO in favour of the uncle and aunt, this would mean that X’s future in their care would be confirmed and, to an extent, settled for his minority. However, the court understands that, as in this jurisdiction, it would remain open to M to apply to the relevant court in Country Z to revisit the placement decision. I return to, and develop this aspect, later in the judgment.

On this outcome, the degree of state intervention in the family life of X with his family would be absent. This would effectively mean a ‘normal’ childhood for X alongside his peers.

The disadvantages in relation to this outcome may be briefly summarised. There are some limitations in relation to the home environment. However, the LA plan seeks to address such points by way of financial allowance to the uncle and aunt.

More fundamentally, it is clear from M’s case at this hearing that, whilst she purports to accept this family outcome, it is certainly not her first preference. She clearly wishes to see X restored to her care. It therefore follows that there is a risk that this outcome will cause a degree of tension within the maternal family to which X could be exposed as he gets older. As set out earlier, it would also be open to M to apply to the relevant court in Country Z, thereby potentially further enhancing the degree of family disharmony.

I have also found that M is a flight risk. In my judgment there is cause for concern that she could, once again further to her impetuous nature, try to remove X from the care of the uncle and aunt immediately following his return to country, either via the relevant court process in Country Z before that court could be fully appraised of the full background in the UK or, alternatively, outside the court forum by simply removing him from their care or from the care of other family members, nursery etc in Country Z.

In terms of mitigating the above-mentioned risks, there is little that could be done to address the likely possible tension within the maternal family in the longer term. In terms of the prospects of M applying to the relevant court in Country Z to change the placement, no party is suggesting that the system of Family Justice in Country Z is in any way inadequate. It seems to me that I can, and I should, trust the court system in Country Z to determine any application in the future with access to all the evidence before me and this judgment (and any subsequent judgment) translated as required with X’s welfare at the forefront of its approach.

In relation to any action that M may seek to take summarily on X’s return to Country Z either judicially or extra judicially, the LA and the CG invite the court to further assess what can be done to mitigate that risk by further short and concentrated assessment of the uncle and aunt when they come to the UK and by way of further focused questions to AA as to what, if any peremptory judicial or local public children services steps could be taken in advance of X becoming habitually resident there.

I propose a very short review of the advantages and disadvantages of this option (and adoption) by way of completeness to the backdrop of the range of options ultimately before the court.

This outcome would see, of course, some immediately obvious benefits for X and M. It would mean that they would continue to see each other in contact. X would continue to develop to an extent his bond with her and her relationship with him. There would be the potential for some wider family ties to be developed. Every effort would no doubt be made to meet X’s linguistic, cultural and identity needs as part of the vigorous identification of the long-term placement process. This outcome would also effectively address the abovementioned risks currently associated with placement of X in the care of uncle and aunt.

However, the court would be required, if LTFC became one of the realistic options, to bear in mind the inevitable risks and disadvantages of this option as an outcome. There would be no real certainty in terms of placement for X, even with the deployment of great care in terms of matching him to long term foster carers. Approved long-term foster carers can, without criticism, simply change their minds if their circumstances change. X would have to move on. Numerous changes in foster care placements, sadly, represent the reality for too many looked after children, contributing in some cases to a relatively rootless childhood and adolescence. No doubt linked with such uncertainties, the longer term academic and career life prospects for some former looked after children are comparatively poor alongside their peers. There would also be the restrictions associated being looked after by the LA in terms of medicals, reviews etc and potential for stigmatisation of X. This outcome would also probably mean that his cultural, linguistic and identity needs would not be fully met.

In the absence of realistic prospects of the discharge of a CO, it would also follow that X would face the prospects of LTFC, with inevitable uncertainties and deficits, for nearly the whole of his precious minority.

I therefore will next turn to the final other potential outcome, namely adoption. There would be some potential advantages to such an outcome. It would offer X the chance of real permanence in a new family, with a new family committed to offering him a life-long home and family life with them. Matching of X with prospective adopters in terms of cultural and heritage would be given at least some priority, albeit probably not at the cost achieving permanence for him. Such an outcome would be free of all structural implications of being a child looked after by a LA. It would essentially mean a ‘normal’ childhood. This outcome would also, once again, address the abovementioned risks currently associated with placement of X in the care of uncle and aunt.

There would be, of course, disadvantages and risks associated with adoption. It is a very draconian outcome. In my judgment it is important to keep this stark implication in mind throughout my determination process, even when adoption is not presently one of the realistic options before the court. Adoption means the severing of all links with the parent/s along with their PR. There are no ‘gold plated’ guarantees with adoption. Some adoptions sadly do fail. Some children struggle with the impact of adoption on the development of their identities, usually during the later stages of their childhood or adolescence. Some children develop idealised views of their birth families, again more usually associated with the more challenging later stages of children’s development. Once again it is probable that all X’s vital cultural, linguistic and heritage needs would not be met.

I have most anxiously considered the options set out above following my wider assessment of M’s case and my application of the welfare checklist. I have reached the provisional determination, which I accept will be most painful to M, that placement of X with uncle and aunt is the only outcome that prioritises X’s welfare. I have reached that conclusion for a number of compelling reasons:

I have qualified my conclusion by reference to this being my provisional determination. It is necessary for there to be further focused assessment of the uncle and aunt in terms of capacity to keep X safe ‘on the ground’ in the light of my judgment. They need an opportunity to consider its contents as part of that further piece of work. Alongside this development, the court will also want further assistance from AA as to what further peremptory steps could be taken to further safeguard X in the days and weeks following any move to Country Z.

In view of this welfare determination, I must explicitly consider the proposed arrangements for contact between M and X going forward [916-/3653]. The LA proposes a reduction in contact to allow for the facilitation of its plan for X to move to the care of his uncle and aunt 920/3653]. The care plan also sees a period when there should be no contact for her for a period of 10 weeks following any relocation to Country Z.

Whilst I acknowledge that this will be painful for M, I see the underlying force in this approach. I have made a decision that will be profound for X in terms of the remainder of his minority, in that his home will not be with M. His primary care givers will be his uncle and aunt. He needs a period of adjustment to allow for such a transition. Very frequent ongoing contact with M is likely to send mixed and confusing messages to X during what may be a challenging period.

That said, and despite my serious findings against M in this judgment, there are grounds to hope that, if contrary to my concerns, she is able to accept the outcome of this judgment (and any later judgment) that sees X remain within his wider family, there are grounds for optimism that M will be able to develop a meaningful relationship with X in the future. The proposed regime of contact does not seek to interfere with that longer term aim.

I am therefore satisfied that the only outcome at this stage that prioritises X’s welfare is placement in due course in the care of the uncle and aunt subject to an SGO. However, for the reasons set out earlier, that cannot be the final order at this time in view of the need for specific further assessment. Further directions will be required at or following the hearing when this judgment is formally handed down.

Again, for the reasons set out within this judgment, it is absolutely imperative that the ICO continues at this point to allow the LA to continue to share PR with M. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that this further assessment, which is at the court’s direction, should be pursuant to s38(6) CA89 rather than a placement with the uncle and aunt pursuant to Regulation 26 of the Welsh Placement Regulations.

I therefore explicitly approve the revised and now provisional final care plan for X’s permanence via placement with the uncle and aunt, subject to that further assessment. I also explicitly approve the plan for M’s reducing regime of contact with X with immediate effect.

As acknowledged earlier, I am most conscious that, despite my findings, M does love X in her way but that this love has sadly not been either unconditional or unqualified. I also acknowledge that M will have found this hearing very challenging and will find this judgment painful to read.

I am, as ever, grateful to the parties’ legal representatives for all their obvious conscientious work and assistance to the court both during and following this hearing.