IN v CH

The wife is represented by Alexander Thorpe KC and Phillip Blatchly. The husband is represented by Brent Molyneux KC and James Finch.

This is the hearing of the wife’s application for financial remedies ancillary to the parties’ divorce.

In summary it is a case in which the parties have enjoyed fabulous wealth which has fallen away as a consequence of war and there is an argument over what there is left, and how it should be divided between them.

This judgment is produced under considerable pressure of time. The evidence ran long such that time set aside for judgment was reduced and given an imminent sale of the family home the parties need to know the outcome quickly. It is hoped that this judgment explains to the parties why I have reached the conclusions that I have. I acknowledge that it will be more difficult for those not involved in this litigation to follow. I apologise to counsel that I have not had time to reflect each nuance of the case that they have advanced.

This judgment shall be handed down in draft initially. As will be set out below there are some calculations that I have made as to the valuation figures on the asset schedule using excel formula provided to me. I have sought to check apparently anomalous figures with counsel by email as I have worked through this judgment. Consequently I have been provided with an amended excel worksheet (prepared by RDA, one of the accountancy firms who have given evidence to me), which I have used and am told will have resolved those issues. The amended worksheet has been accepted by both sides, on the basis that it does not achieve complete precision, but it is close enough for my purposes. I am grateful for the assistance I have received.

The wife is in her late 30s. She has not worked outside the marriage. She was young when the relationship started and had not developed any independent earning capacity. She was a student and a model when the parties met. She told me in her Form E that she was considering going back into higher-education and taking a psychology degree. In her oral evidence she told me she no longer wanted to do this.

The husband is in his mid 60s. He relates that he is in poor mental health given, he says, the separation of the parties, his concern about his relationship with the children, and war . The wife says he has difficulties with alcohol. He has been a successful business man, at least until the war began . It is his case in his written evidence that he had largely left the running of his businesses to others since his relationship with the wife. In his oral evidence he described a more gradual withdrawal.

They have three children: two in their mid to late teens and one slightly younger.

All three children are at boarding school or the intention is for them to attend boarding school.

The parties agree that they started to cohabit long before the marriage in the mid 2000s. They did not marry until 2018.

This was the husband’s second marriage. He separated from his first wife in the late 1990s but did not get divorced from her until some 20 years later.

The husband had established very substantial business wealth by the time the parties started to live together. I am told he was worth in excess of £565 m in 2007. In the course of his oral evidence he accepted that his wealth had at one stage been estimated as in excess of this. Much of it derived from initial business speculation in the early 1990s and subsequently the income generated by the businesses that he had thereby bought. He relates that the sale of one business he had acquired generated ‘vast wealth’ prior to their relationship.

The parties moved to London in in the early 2010s. The husband relates that this was linked to the eldest child starting school. The family home was bought shortly thereafter.

The parties agree that the wife told the husband that she wanted a separation in late 2021. There were then attempts to reconcile such that divorce proceedings brought by the wife in May 2022 were withdrawn by her in September 2022. The parties agree they in fact separated 5 years after their marriage in April 2023. There was a joint application for divorce in that month, April 2023, and that was followed by an application for financial remedies in July 2023. A first appointment took place in January 2024, and a private FDR over 2 days before Mr Dyer KC in July 2024. There was a conditional order for divorce in October 2023.

The husband has recently moved from away from London and the jurisdiction. He tells me that is in part a consequence of the breakdown of the marriage, and the fact that the children will soon all be at boarding school. There are also tax advantages to him of moving. The wife makes the point that the husband’s move means she will necessarily be the children’s primary carer.

There have in the course of these proceedings been a number of other court appointments which have been heard by me (many while I was a deputy High Court Judge) and orders made, including:

This litigation has come at staggering expense. The wife has incurred cost of some £2.24m of which has been paid largely by the legal service payment orders made against the husband.

The husband has spent some £2.8m. He tells me he owes some £600,000 of that sum to his solicitors.

Over £5m on any view is a horrifying amount. It is right that this is a case where there has been enormous wealth. It is right that there are real issues as to valuation, made far more difficult than in most cases by the war. It can be said that the court has sanctioned a significant part of the expenditure by the legal services costs orders made, but the parties (and the lawyers) do need to look to themselves and reflect on whether or not there might not have been a better way to approach this litigation.

The wife said on the 30 May 2025:

In very round terms (ignoring maintenance) the wife is seeking £72.5m.

She can be criticised for not making an offer as she is required to do so by the rules after the FDR. There were some indications as to approach offered by Mr Thorpe, under questioning from me at earlier hearings. He made clear that the wife did not accept the SJE’s valuations and that was preventing a formal offer.

The husband said on the 6 June 2025:

Again, in round terms, he is offering some £6m.

This is a reduction on an earlier offer made following the FDR on the 17 July 2024. In short that was the wife should receive £13,386,164 (coming from the sale of the house and a subsequent lump sum), the child maintenance was at £50,000 pa, and he did not seek to enforce the June 2024 costs order.

Mr Thorpe and Mr Blatchly in their opening note tell me that the wife’s claim should be assessed by reference to her reasonable needs. They make the point that the parties had a lifestyle of abundance, a very valuable main home, and spending of about £12 m per annum. They say that should be the benchmark for my needs assessment and make the point that the husband’s move abroad will mean that the wife will make a significant future contribution to the care of the children. In short, they put the needs claim at £70m. They say that involves reductions from the standard of living during the marriage. They posit a net worth of the husband at about £160 m (not a figure on the joint Asset schedule – but see further on this below). They say to me that the wife is a ‘fully entitled wife’.

Their position is that the husband has not been truthful, and, that the SJE has mistakenly undervalued the business assets. They prefer the valuations of the second expert, RDA.

As to the husband’s lack of truth, they rely on the following points (combining the oral and written opening):

Mr Molyneux KC and Mr Finch tell me that the war has changed the husband’s world, that I should follow the SJE’s assessment of the value of his businesses, because RDA is partial, and that there is real political risk threatening the husband’s ability to remain solvent. They stress both the enormous reductions in his financial circumstances over the period of the parties’ relationship and the unrealistic nature of the wife’s needs claim. They say to me that there is no liquidity to raise any more money than the proceeds of the matrimonial home.

They remind me of the astronomical level of fees incurred by the parties – nearly all of which has been funded by the husband, and some £600,000 he still owes to his solicitors. They remind me that I cannot expect the ready production of information in relation to businesses in a war zone. They tell me of the ‘broken’ nature of the husband. And they say to me that because the husband has met the legal service payment orders made and the interim maintenance orders made, I should not think that he will be able to make provision at that level hereafter.

The joint asset schedule provided to me before the hearing contained some errors which were corrected during Mr Thorpe’s opening and Mr Blatchly provided me with a revised schedule. According to that the wife records the husband as having some £192m, and her as having some £1.7m. The husband records himself as being in debt to the tune of -£74m and the wife having £1.5m.

The net debt position is the husband accepts somewhat arbitrary because he acknowledges there is limited liability in relation to company liabilities (although there is intercompany borrowing so the debt of one will affect another) and in that respect I note, he formally accepts at this trial that there is no difference between English law in this regard and Country A’s law, namely, that corporate liability is not personal. I do note that he has asserted on occasions during the proceedings that a shareholder can become liable for the debts of the company in Country A, but I shall ignore those assertions. He has however in the run up to this hearing expressed concerns that he may find corporate liabilities turn into personal criminal actions against him.

The husband relates that his wealth has diminished throughout the marriage, but in recent years it has been hit hard by the war. He relates many particular incidents: bombs blowing buildings up, power cuts, loss of customers, loss of workforce to the army, difficult economic circumstances in Country A, and his financial institution’s consequential dependence on state debt as to which there may be default. He relates recently that some of his businesses have become embroiled in litigation with the state, which gives rise to a potential claim in excess of £100m. This has led to state enforcement agencies searching dozens of offices

The wife does accept that the war will have had a negative effect on his overall wealth, but it is her case that it is far from obliterated, some parts of his business have done well as a consequence of the war, and he is in prime position to profit from the reconstruction following the war. She alleges that he has been dishonest in his presentation of his business affairs. She says that they continued to live in until separation notwithstanding the war, as they did during the rest of their relationship. The paring back, she says, that has since occurred, is a consequence of the separation not the war.

At the First Appointment the wife (having made an application on paper) opposed the instruction of a single joint expert forensic accountant, in the light of the difficulties of valuing businesses in a war zone. I agreed with the husband that given the large difference between the parties as to wealth of the husband, an SJE would be necessary, and selected the SJE from the three he had proposed.

I made provision for the wife to have funds to instruct a shadow expert to consider the report. Forceful criticisms were made of the SJE report such that fairness required me to allow a second court expert, Rodwell Disputes Advisory (RDA). RDA had been the shadow expert acting for the wife, but they act now as court experts. I will need to set out below some cross examination which took place of Mr Rodwell on this issue.

A consequence of the way in which each expert has been instructed is the other side considers him or her partial. They might instead reflect that the valuation exercise which is fragile at the best of times is massively uncertain in times of war. Were peace to come there will be the possibility of rebuilding, but it is going to be difficult for me to speculate about what cost (as to land or industry) peace might carry.

To give an idea of the gap between the experts and treating the husband as the beneficial owner of GHI (which is necessarily a point that needs to be considered) the SJE put the husband’s business worth at -£78m (in 2023) whereas RDA put it at +£98.4 m (in 2024).

This disparity is all the more surprising because RDA concluded, given that they were not able to receive the documentation and information that they sought, that the only way they could sensibly do their job of valuing the husband’s business interests is to accept the basic building blocks of data used by the SJE and report by way of a critique of the analysis of the SJE.

I have been provided with over 3100 pages of expert reports and appendices relating to the value of what may be loosely described as the EF made up of some 35 companies (and many subsidiaries) (in addition to 845 pages of witness statements, 522 pages of ‘applications and orders and evidence’, and some 2000 pages in a cross-examination bundle.) It is unrealistic to think I can master all that documentation, and counsel accept that I cannot. The documents have been a library for counsel to refer to either in evidence or submissions.

At this point in this judgment, I will only deal with the joint statement which the SJE and RDA have prepared for this hearing. That lists a significant number of agreed points of correction to the SJE’s initial report, and a number of points where RDA agrees the SJE’s approach. There are however 24 areas of disagreement. I shall need to explore these areas when considering their evidence below. A significant part of their disagreement is, unsurprisingly, the impact of risk. Mr Molyneux and Mr Finch tell me that I should prefer the SJE’s approach because they are the ones with practical experience of what someone buying something in Country A would pay for it. As they say, they are Country A experts opining in a ‘Country A case’. Mr Thorpe and Mr Blatchly say the SJE have gone far too far and have got so many things wrong I should not rely on them.

Here I will set out where the difference between the parties exceeds £10m per item on the joint asset schedule at the beginning of the case. I do this to try and highlight the differences between the parties and the experts as to the value of the assets that I need to decide:

The wife was cross examined for about a day across two days. She gave evidence through a translator. She appeared to be properly engaged in the process but appeared fixed in her case and concerned to yield nothing.

Mr Molyneux exposed a tension in her presentation, namely that while apparently conceding in her open position that the husband’s financial position had worsened because of the war in Country A, it was her view that the real reason that he had tried to restrict her access to money was not because of a change in his financial position but because of their separation.

Mr Molyneux pressed her on whether, given that during the months before separation the husband was depressed, was drinking too much, had gone into rehabilitation, had sold a private jet, had marketed the yacht (discussed below), and the husband’s home city was under violent attack things were not ‘normal’. She acknowledged that these things happened but asserted that they did not reflect on their finances, indeed she said that the sale of the jet was because it was old, and it made sense to buy a new one.

It is clear that it is her view that so far as their living arrangements were concerned the real motivation for the husband’s cut backs was their separation, not the war in Country A.

The wife had put her income needs at £3.6 m annually in her section 25 statement. This, the court had been told, was a cutting of her cloth given the fall in the husband’s financial fortunes following the war in Country A.

Mr Molyneux took the wife through her budget. He repeatedly put to her that her figures were based on the way the parties had lived in the family home and showed no reduction either because her new property would be (on her own case) smaller, or a reduction to reflect the reduced financial circumstances of the husband.

Her answer was that she had little experience of budgeting and so based her figures on what had been spent previously. She did point out that she was seeking to move to a cheaper and smaller property.

Mr Molyneux contrasted the wife’s Form E budget, for approximately £1.4 m pa and that with her section 25 statement, for approximately £3.6 m pa, and asked in relation to a number of items why the figures had increased. The wife said that she did not have the information needed to put together her original budget. She said that was withheld from her by the family office. And further, as time passed, she understood better what it would mean to be independent.

Mr Thorpe was able in re-examination to point out that some of the original budget was marked TBA, and some was revisited, and that the revisitation was proportionate, in the light of expenditure during the marriage.

Nonetheless, I conclude that there was no real attempt by the wife to reduce her outgoings in her £3.6 m budget. She was seeking to maintain the marital standard of living.

Mr Molyneux briefly questioned the wife as to housing. He showed her particulars of a six-bedroom property, with a swimming pool in SW16. He said that met her needs. The wife was clear that it did not. It was 30 minutes’ drive from the family home and it was not a ‘luxury home’. She was clear when asked that she would only live in a ‘luxury home’. Her case was that she needed a property costing in the order of £25 million. Further, whereas she had said at an earlier stage in the proceedings she might manage in a four-bedroom property, she was now clear that she required six bedrooms.

Mr Molyneux briefly questioned the wife as to her plans to return to work, pointing out that she was in her late 30s. The wife made clear that she had no such plans. She said she had an important role in looking after the children. She said she had not investigated a psychology degree, and the employment prospects arising from that, at all.

At the beginning of the hearing I was faced with a preliminary application for the husband to have the benefit of participation directions to the extent that when he was listening he needed a break every 60 minutes and during evidence he needed a break every 45 minutes. His application was based on a unilaterally obtained medical report, which I refused to admit, and the facts that he had been hospitalised for depression (to a private clinic) some 6 times since the separation and was on anti-depressants. I was told that he would not be able to give his best evidence without these breaks. I granted the application even though it was opposed. I will not repeat my reasons here. The breaks took place. This placed a burden on the court staff because we started early and finished late each day to accommodate the breaks in an attempt not to fall behind on the hearing timetable.

The husband gave evidence through a translator too. He often answered questions, particularly those asking for details of transactions that, ‘he could not remember’, even when the transaction was of some significance and only a few years ago. Notably he said this in relation to his own address, but I do reflect that he had only just moved there. I shall have to weigh up whether he genuinely could not remember as much as he said or whether, as Mr Thorpe put to him, this was a mechanism for blocking questions that might be difficult.

He presented as a tired and frail old man; with just a shadow of the authority he must have once commanded. This stands in contrast to what he has achieved, and may be, as I shall need to consider, a misleading presentation.

He gave his evidence over two and a half days. Notwithstanding the breaks the days were tiring. We started early and finished late. By half way through the last day I formed the view that he was tired. His engagement with the process was less good. It was necessary to slow matters down periodically. I remind myself that being tired after a day and a half of cross examination is not a mark of particular frailty.

The husband did accept on occasions that he had got things wrong, so at the very beginning of his cross examination he accepted he had given a wrong answer as to jewellery he had gifted to the wife. He did make concessions which were apparently contrary to his interests, so he accepted that the transfers as to some of his interests in his companies to B and A were in part because of the divorce – more will need to be said on this below – and he accepted that the fall in the free access to money was caused by two things, the war and the wife’s application for divorce. He did on occasions however just stick to what appeared a wrong and unhelpful answer in a blunt way. So, he did not accept that B was a lawyer, while subsequently agreeing he dealt with all the corporate law issues for the companies. On repeated pressing he sought to justify this by saying he did not know where B went to university or what he read there. In re-examination he was referred to a document in which B is described as an economist. What the husband did not do was volunteer information necessary to explain himself. It felt as though he was adopting a strategy of saying as little as possible.

This impression was borne out by the contrast with B’s evidence. He, later in the hearing, was asked the question and immediately answered that he dealt with corporate law issues, but he was not a professional lawyer.

In what follows I do not give a full account of the husband’s evidence. The cross examination was long and often circled round the same issues. I pull out the points that I found relevant (given the issues I need to decide) and on occasions pull evidence from cross examination on different days and re-examination together.

In relation to the transfers of corporate interests, which were considerable (from 2% to 20%), he said these occurred because he needed to tie B and A into the businesses to keep the businesses going as he was withdrawing from them. He was questioned on why (given they had been loyal employees for some 30 years) more was needed now. He answered that he was withdrawing further from the business, and said at one point, that this was because of the divorce proceedings. He was questioned as to why there was not any evidence of any arm’s length negotiations. He said they negotiated the deal directly and all of them knew the companies well.

After some initial confusion he accepted that he had originally asked for payment for the transfers after three years (in the agreements of November 2021 and early April 2022) and then extended the term to three years after the end of war. When asked why he didn’t ask for immediate payment, his answer was that the employees had earned this advantage by their past service. When asked why there was an extension of the term when war was declared, he said it was something they all discussed and was agreed. He had given a fuller answer to the points in his written answers to questionnaire, namely that the war had not been resolved as quickly as anticipated, but he only gave this answer, and then only by confirming his written answer, in re-examination.

He insisted the deal was commercial. He described it on one occasion as ‘situational’, which I took as a term describing his need for the employees to maintain, preserve, and try and advance the business as he withdrew.

When questioned as to whether A received dividends in the order of US$6 m as about a quarter of some $25 m of dividends that the husband had had allocated to him in 2023 he said he did not know. This was an implausible answer. It was not long since the transaction and a significant sum of money. He did say that in relation to any allocation from 2024 though there was a dividend declared he would not have received any because none has been paid out from the company.

He was referred to his mortgage application in relation to the family home of July 2023. (This is in fact a 12-month loan secured on the family home which needs to be renewed annually.) That recorded his net worth as about £150m. He was asked in particular about the value of YZ, for which accounts were produced signed by A showing a net equity of some $70.5 m. He was reminded that he had signed the mortgage application saying the information was true. He answered that this was something prepared for him which he had just signed, and that the accounts of YZ from which the figure of $70.5 m derived was something prepared and signed by B.

Faced with that valuation of $70 m for YZ, within the 2023 mortgage application he was asked why 10% of YZ (held in a holding company) was sold to A for $2m in April 2022. Again, he could not remember but said it was a consensual agreement.

He was re-examined on this point and taken to what the SJE had said about the value of YZ, which is much lower. He repeated that he just signed what was prepared for him by his office.

On the second day the cross examination returned to the mortgage applications. He was shown his 2024 application, which recorded him as then worth some $112 million. He was asked whether that was a fair presentation. He said that it was. He was taken through other business assets which were not declared in that application, including the yacht. He did at that stage refer to the various intercompany loans which were not referenced in the account of his assets in the mortgage application. In re-examination he repeated that he simply signed what was put in front of him.

I reject as implausible his account that he did not have any idea of what he was signing. I find he knew full well that he was overstating his assets and was deceiving the mortgagees by leaving out of account the full panoply of corporate debt. He did so because he wanted to secure the mortgage.

On the second day further cross examination took place in relation to other corporate interests that were transferred to B and A (as tabulated in the questionnaire and his written answers) which generated similar answers.

It was drawn to the husband’s attention that it was about the time of the transfers and the extension of the time for payment that the wife had indicated that she intended to divorce him. Her first divorce application is in fact dated May 2022 – which was very shortly (a matter of days) before the delaying of payment date for the transfer of shares in AZ. He was unable to recall whether he had received the application by the time of the transfer. That struck me as an implausible answer. The receipt of a divorce application is likely to be a memorable event.

Questions were asked of him as to whether he had manufactured a case that the family house needed to be sold. It was put to him that the mortgagee, would have been happy to extend the mortgage and, at the time he made the application to the court he was motivated not by a fear that they would force a sale but a desire to put pressure on the wife. He answered that the problem was that he could not afford the mortgage. He agreed by reference to letters sent that the mortgagee appeared to be prepared to extend the term. He said this was because they were making a lot of money from the interest.

That differed from the case which I had heard in June 2024, when I dealt with the application in relation to the sale of the family home. I was told then that the mortgage would not be extended, and he had had indications to that effect. Those same (or similar) letters had been drawn to my attention then, but I was told that they were formal letters, and the informal indications were to the contrary.

I reflect that there is an extent that I am dealing with different sides of the same coin: that is, because he could not afford the mortgage it meant that when it actually came to its renewal it would not be extended. Nonetheless the different emphasis in the evidence given now does trouble me and leads me to wonder whether the push to get an order for sale was, as is alleged, part of a strategy to pressure the wife. I shall return to this below.

It was put to the husband that contrary to his case as presented in his Form E and in his statement supporting his application prepared in advance of hearing dealing with a sale of the family home (which also had a cross application brought by the wife to sell the yacht) he was in fact the real owner of the Z Yacht. He was taken to the 2022 accounts for AB Ltd (the company which is the legal owner) which records him as the ultimate beneficial owner of AB Ltd, the company which holds the yacht (this was through a shareholding in the company that owns AB Ltd, DEF). This it was said reflected the true position, and the transfer which he had said had taken place on the 5 April 2022 to A in DEF was not recorded here because it was not real. The husband said that the accounts would have been dealt with by the office. He denied that the transfer of the shares was not real. I shall need to reflect on this.

He was reminded that he had in those proceedings asserted when under cross examination from Miss Hussey KC that the yacht was his. He was unable to deny that but continued to assert it was in reality a corporate yacht. I consider this to have been an occasion when the everyday language of possession took over from a lawyerly approach to ownership. It is like an employee with the use of a corporate car referring to the car as his or her car.

Later in the cross examination, but in relation to the yacht, he was asked as to why, given it cost some €4.6m to run each year he hadn’t sold it. His response was that the market was down. He was intending to sell it and expected to get €40m. He expected to be able to get that within 6 months to a year. There had been an offer to buy it in the low €30 millions in 2024. His evidence was that he thought he would do better than that.

The husband says that there is a debt to the business that maintained the yacht, CD. He puts that debt at some £20 million. He has said it was incurred in relation to a refit and the cumulative annual cost. He was repeatedly pressed as to what security there was for that debt. His consistent answer was the yacht itself. He said CD would be paid when the yacht sold. He had by way of recent letter disclosed that a new company had been found to maintain the yacht, to which he was now incurring debt. He was not able to explain clearly how it was that CD were confident that they would be paid that which he said was owed to them.

In relation to the property which would be a home for the wife and children, he accepted if there were more money he would expect them to have more money for a house than he had suggested. He was reminded that he, in his Form E, had suggested he would on divorce buy a smaller house in the same area as the family home. He said that things have changed and there is now no money.

Questions were put to him about the support of the wife’s family. He acknowledged that he had provided for them over the course of the parties’ relationship. His straightforward answer was that it ‘stood to reason’: the reason being his then enormous wealth.

He was pressed on the third day as to why when the corporate jet was sold, he used the money to discharge the borrowing with the mortgagee secured against the yacht, rather than the borrowing with mortgagee secured against the family home. This was put to him as part of the argument that he planned to put pressure on the wife. His instant answer was merely that this was a difficult question to answer. He did however return to it during the course of the day. Later on, he said that mortgagees were less worried about borrowing secured on a London property than they were about borrowing on a yacht in another country. I see force in this response, but I question why it took half a day to be given. I form the view that it points not to the invention of a defence but that the husband was not on top of the details and did not have a good recollection of what has happened.

He was pressed about $20 m which he had paid into the financial institution he owns (ABC). He had at an earlier hearing said this was not available to meet the parties’ needs, on the basis it was needed to capitalise the financial institution. Then some $10 m was paid to AZ, one of the significant businesses within the companies he controls. There were two lines of question: (i) if it was needed for capitalisation how could $10m be paid out and (ii) did he receive any interest on the money and where has that interest gone. He answered that he was not aware of the operational details, but that there had been no lying. The money was needed for AZ because of the losses it was making. He was not able to explain why it was needed at one stage in the financial institution and not at another. As to interest he thought it had probably gone in maintaining the businesses in Country A, but in re-examination he was not able to confirm that the money had even been held in an interest-bearing account.

I do accept that the husband does not have operational detail, but it is odd that he could not give an explanation as to what changed to allow the $10 m to be paid to AZ. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that there are occasions when the husband tells the court what he thinks it is convenient to tell the court.

A double page A3 schedule was passed to the husband analysing payments in and out of a number of his accounts. It was said that this showed that he had managed to extract dividend payments from Country A, and route them through YZ (a non-Country A company) by way of buying and selling securities to make payment to himself in this country. I allowed cross examination on the alleged principle (and none was put on the detail of the financial institution transactions). The husband responded to this document by again saying that he was not on top of this sort of detail. Mr Thorpe did however rely on it to press the point that the husband was not dependent on a loan from YZ to meet his living expenses during these proceedings as it was clear that he had had been able to pay money to YZ, which it had then passed to him. In effect he was saying that there was a counter balancing loan.

The husband did advance one line in response beyond denying operational knowledge: he said that money had been needed in Country A to support the businesses there.

The husband was pressed on a number of pieces of evidence in relation to the profitability of AZ:

The husband’s default answer was that he did not know because he did not operate the business on a day-to-day level. He was able to answer the tax point by explaining that AZ had a lot of employees and so tax would be paid in relation to them. He denied that there was any lying going on. In re-examination it was suggested to him that the quality of the produce might affect its price. He thought that likely.

I could gather little from this line of cross examination. If the case was to be made that the accounts were false, then this needed to be raised in advance and explored properly. It cannot be sprung on the husband when giving oral evidence. The different price of different produce might be an adequate answer to the calculations made by Mr Thorpe. I do not, however, need to consider this matter further because Mr Thorpe (having heard this evidence and B’s evidence on this issue) did not pursue it in closing.

The husband was provided with a schedule prepared by Mr Thorpe which Mr Thorpe maintained demonstrated that the husband had not properly accounted for the receipt of the dividends from AZ in 2021 and 2023 which he said were paid out in full. The unaccounted figure is, according to the schedule (which was corrected orally) some $20m. The husband, faced for the document for the first time while giving oral evidence, was unable to explain where the money might have gone. He confirmed that the money due to him had been paid out. Mr Molyneux, a few moments later, in re-examination was able to explain a significant amount by the fall in the value of the Country A currency against the $ from the time of the EGM which approved the dividend to the time of the payment – the dividend was of course declared in the Country A currency. Again, if a case was to be made that the husband’s dividend income had not been accounted for properly, then that case needed to have been set out in advance to give him the opportunity to answer it, rather than by a document produced when he is giving oral evidence.

Overall, I formed the impression that this husband is right when he says he is not on top of the detail, however, I also conclude that he adopted a policy of saying as little as possible. This is in part because he was not on top of the details, but it is in part because he is concerned that anything he might say might be used against him. I will need to determine each of the various points before me in the round, but the husband was a witness in whom I felt able to repose only limited confidence.

B gave his evidence after the parties. He was cross-examined by Mr Thorpe for about half a day. He too used a translator. He engaged well with the process of giving evidence and it appeared as though he wanted to assist the court.

Again, I shall not record the entirety of his evidence but those points that struck me as important.

He confirmed, as the husband had related, that there was no written negotiation around the acquisition of company interests by him and A. The transaction was simple. There were no external lawyers and the documents were drawn up within the business. He did not consider that the transfers were to do with the divorce, and said he did not learn of the divorce till later. The transfers were to reward him and A and to incentivise them. He related that he had received bonuses in the past and that there were many ways of rewarding and incentivising employees.

He was pressed as to his receipts from dividend payments from AZ (of which 2% had been transferred to him). He acknowledged that from the dividend in 2021 he had received some US $1 m. It was put to him that A had received $ 4m. He corrected that to $10 m – with which Mr Thorpe agreed. I was impressed that he took what was in effect (and he would have been aware) a point against the husband at this stage and did not just ride with the arithmetical error of Mr Thorpe.

He was then asked about subsequent declaration of dividends: 2023 and 2024. He answered that there had been declarations, but he had not received payment of the funds. He was pressed as to how much was owed to him. He replied some $500,000. This was corrected by Mr Thorpe on the basis that the figure would have been $500,000 for each year. B said he thought the figure was $750,000 to $800,000. He explained the difference as a change in exchange rate and tax having been paid on the dividends by AZ. His evidence at this stage came across as very much less reliable. Mr Thorpe put to him that he was ‘embarrassed’ about the transaction because he considered it bogus. I consider it entirely possible that B took the view that it was not real money until he had been paid it.

He was asked questions about B’s company. This was a company of which he was the owner and which he had set up after leaving Country A to live in Country B. It provided management services to the husband’s group of companies. He was asked why B’s company had entered into a contract with the husband personally rather than the companies. The answer was that (i) the husband was the shareholder, ‘singular’, and (ii) given that the husband was outside Country A he was the only one able to receive funds and pay for the services. He acknowledged when pressed that the husband was not the only shareholder, but his use of the word ‘singular’ is something to which I will have to return in considering Mr Thorpe’s arguments. His answer in relation to the problems in moving funds struck me as likely to be true.

He was asked about whether employees were keeping track of intercompany debt, by reference to two documents showing there were up dated figures for YZ’s intercompany debts. He had in his statement set out the difficulty in keeping on top of the accounting exercise given the loss of workforce and the destruction of records in the war. He agreed that in relation to YZ an employee had updated loan documentation, but this process was not taking place across the various different companies.

In the same manner that the husband was, he was asked to consider a letter from AZ to the husband in September 2024 asking for a loan, protesting that the price of the material produced had dropped. He was taken to the leading index and told that it never got that low and asked to comment. He said he did not know the price of it, and he (as the husband did in re-examination) said that this might be to do with the quality of the product.

It was put to him, as had been put to the husband that the EF group of companies had paid a lot of tax in 2024, a significant increase on the previous year. He, like the husband, said this was not to do with profit of the company but income tax paid on the salary of the employees, and, he added, VAT.

Towards the end of his evidence Mr Thorpe put to B the accounts from a company called GH. By reference to them he was asked whether the husband was the beneficial owner of a series of three further companies. B said that these companies were part of the EF Group and through that the husband would have an interest in them, he was not sure whether it was by way of 85% or 90%.

The accountants were heard collectively, by way of ‘hot tubbing’. Two experts appeared for the SJE and Mr Rodwell for RDA.

Before we started the collective evidence there was an extended interchange between Mr Rodwell and Mr Molyneux. Mr Rodwell had read the husband’s opening position statement and had seen there an attack on his impartiality. He started the hearing by explaining to me that he saw his duty was to the court and to advise me as to the true value of the husband’s businesses. He recognised, he told me, that he no longer had an allegiance to the wife, having become a court expert. He resented the attack on his professionalism.

Mr Molyneux attacked him in two ways. First, there were a number of occasions where Mr Rodwell had given answers to legitimate questions raised by Mishcon de Reya which appeared facetious. One example is that he responded to an enquiry as to whether he had properly classified two insurance business as life insurance businesses (which it was said they were not) by saying the life insurance market was more comparable than ‘supermarkets’ or ‘leisure facilities’, or ‘plumbing’. No one had thought for a moment that these businesses had anything to do with any of these three industries.

Second, Mr Molyneux questioned Mr Rodwell about his involvement in the wife’s legal team before he became appointed a court expert. On this Mr Rodwell at first failed to note that he had produced a memorandum expressing a view on the SJE report before the private FDR in this matter. He did reveal that he had attended an in-person consultation and some video conferences.

The latter error as to the memorandum before the FDR is explicable. The same memorandum was updated and then put before me in the proceedings before his appointment. He had overlooked that it had appeared in a different form at an earlier stage. As to the attendance at the consultations I need to reflect on that. I do comment that this is an inevitable consequence of a ‘shadow’ expert becoming court appointed. The fees however that would have been incurred to start with yet another expert meant that there was no realistic alternative.

As to the facetiousness of the answers given by Mr Rodwell on some three occasions he conceded after reflection (time being available for reflection because of a break for the husband) that his answers had appeared facetious, and he apologised for that. They do give me cause for concern that Mr Rodwell had at that stage been drawn into the proceedings on more of an adversarial footing than was appropriate.

Before turning to the issues between the accountants, and making my determination of those issues, it is necessary for me to consider this attack further, and Mr Thorpe’s response to it.

In closing submissions Mr Molyneux, with reference to Vernon v Bosley (no. 1) [1996] EWCA Civ 1310 and Gallagher v Gallagher [2022] EWFC 53, warns me of the risk that Mr Rodwell, though entirely honest and acknowledging properly that his duty is to the court not the wife, will be subject to unconscious bias. He has, for a period, using the language of Vernon v Bosley, walked down the street with the wife and will have been drawn into her approach, not least by attending consultations with her. Mr Thorpe responded in his closing by drawing to my attention counterbalancing points: Mr Rodwell has proposed many observations that have been accepted by the SJE; some of his suggestions would lead to a lower value (when obviously it would assist the wife to have a higher value); and that his behaviour differs markedly from the accountant criticised by Mostyn J in Gallagher.

I record here that as an oral witness Mr Rodwell was thoroughly helpful. He has provided me with Excel spread sheets to work through the effect of my decisions. He would summarise for me each of the issues I needed to decide when otherwise I would have needed to go through the interpreter to have a summary from the SJE. He was better able to adapt to the time pressure that we found ourselves under and provide me with short answers, than did the SJE.

It is my job to assess the arguments on the basis of the reasons advanced. I have the benefit of counsel and the other experts to flag up where there may be flaws in the arguments. That will be a guard against unconscious bias. It is accepted that there is a subjective element in a valuation exercise which may be more difficult to guard from unconscious bias. I remind myself to be astute in considering that in the decisions I need to make below.

Further I record two more general points which will bear on my determinations:

Turning then to the issues between the experts, as to which the evidence was given together, I first note that these issues were not put to me as differences in value of particular businesses, but differences in approach which would alter the values of more than one business. Second, I note that this evidence took longer than had been timetabled. In part the reason was that the SJE needed translators. In part the reason was that the issues between the parties were high level issues in relation to a web of companies. Explaining them to me therefore took more time than explaining them to someone who had already worked through all the previous steps. Finally, there were a lot of points to get through. Counsel co-operated in limiting time on points, but nonetheless an extra day was taken. Some points were left by agreement between counsel to be dealt with in submissions and some were compromised. Finally, I note that in what follows I am heavily reliant on the joint report. I appreciate that this will make the judgment more difficult to follow for anyone other than the parties. Time (both of the hearing and composing this judgment) does not allow a fuller rendition.

I record as follows.

The first point of disagreement, D1, was which industry group a company called IJ should be recorded as: retail distribution say the SJE, oil/gas distribution says RDA. It is a point worth some £3.5m. Neither classification is quite right: IJ sorts out the purchase of energy by other group companies and that is mainly electricity. The rational approach therefore is to split the difference between the experts. (I shall do this by using the SJE figure for the formula but adding an extra £1.75m in my schedule.)

D2, I heard evidence on but it has been since compromised between the parties at the mid-point and I will not quarrel with that compromise.

D3 and D4 can be taken together. D3 is whether it is appropriate to include a specific risk premium when calculating discount rates for DCF (discounted cash flow) entities, and D4 is whether the specific risk premia adopted are appropriate. The clash on D3 is whether or not the entities are sufficiently diverse to do away with the risk, and/or whether the buyer will be able to diversify the risk. The SJE tell me that the cash flow calculations (by experience) do not sufficiently allow for the risks that they have by this process discounted, and so a potential buyer would discount for them. Mr Rodwell tells me that the businesses are diverse already and what is more international theory posits a buyer who can diversify. I prefer the practical advice of the SJE on this point.

On D4 Mr Rodwell says the weight given to the different factors by the SJE is arbitrary. The SJE tells me that this is the way that the valuation is done in Country A. Indeed, they say that the market in Country A was less sophisticated than here or the United States, and this is the way that businesses were valued even before the war. I prefer their local evidence.

D5 and D6 can similarly be taken together: D5 is whether there should be a discount for size and D6 is how to calculate the discount. This point is worth £20 million. In short, the issue is whether the businesses are so small that their value should be reduced to reflect extra risk. The businesses are big for Country A, but the SJE say that the valuation data which informs their approach derives from the US market, and these businesses would be small in the US market. Mr Rodwell tells me that there is already a discount being applied to reflect the fact that these businesses are in Country A, and to discount for size, when they are big in Country A is to discount twice for the same thing. Intuitively at some stage he must be right. Accumulating discounts will mean something that generates a significant income would be worth nothing. I raised the point that the businesses had a web of intercompany loans which suggested they were running as a group and so mitigated the risks of being small. In essence, I was told at first that this point might have had some force if the entire group were to be sold, but not for individual companies. On recalculation Mr Rodwell subsequently told me that this observation would have little or no effect on the dispute.

As to D6, Mr Rodwell said that the data used in the formula effectively derived from the US market and was inappropriate for the Country A market, and the differences would be exaggerated because the equation applied was cubic. I saw force in his observations. I note that in written closing Mr Molyneux objects that no alternative calculation has been provided, and so I should stick with the SJE’s calculation. While I understand that I do not see it as tackling the fundamental issue.

I take the view that each has a point on this issue. I agree with Mr Rodwell that there is some double counting here. I see the logical response from the SJE. I determine, having considered the various issues in the round, that I will work on the basis of Mr Rodwell’s approach here, and hold in mind that I have yielded more to him here in relation to keeping down discounts than his arguments warrant when considering D8 below. (For the sake of keeping a check on the arithmetic I consider I would otherwise have split the difference here, i.e., the valuation is high by some £10 m.)

D7 is worth between £1m and £7m (depending upon my findings on other disagreements). The evidence heard on this point was wider in its ramifications than merely the issue highlighted by D7, which, narrowly, is whether the ‘build up model’ is used or a ‘capital asset pricing model’ in relation to two businesses. The SJE related that the assets valued (GHI and JKL’s real estate) are real estate and ‘build up’ is the normal method of valuing real estate. Mr Rodwell related that (a) this is inconsistent with other valuations and (b) the ‘build up’ method allows for discounts that just reflect the starting points of the valuer. In essence this is a repetition of his double counting point. The SJE were convincing that their method is how valuations of real estate are done in Country A, and so I was inclined to accept their position, but, since their valuation one of the properties, which they had valued at about £2.75 m was sold by way of (i) shares in another company and (ii) a deferred payment for a sum such that (after deduction of tax) Mishcon de Reya (the husband’s solicitors) said the total was equivalent to £6.34m.

Mr Molyneux said this was not £6.34 m really, because it was not a cash deal. I am stuck however with no other value for the transaction than that ascribed to it by the husband’s solicitor. I cannot ignore this. At the very least it must increase the value of JKL’s assets by £3.59 m.

The SJE were very slow to accept that this presented straightforward evidence that their value was too low. They did, after some time, suggest that the difference was that this was not a cash deal. I do accept that where there is barter monetary prices have less importance, but I see no fair way of escaping from the assessment given by Mishcon de Reya as to the value of this transaction, and so I must conclude that the SJE’s valuation of these real estate companies, cannot be relied upon and prefer Mr Rodwell’s.

While considering this issue I was taken through the peculiar situation whereby the husband (or a company of his) is in law no longer the owner of GHI. They have moved to a company owned by A, but the debts of these businesses are a negative pull on the husband’s businesses. This is because (a) in relation to some of the debts his businesses have guaranteed the liability, and (b) there is a large amount of debt owed to his businesses.

As part of this discussion I asked about the evidence in relation to debt. The SJE, like RDA had asked the husband for an organogram and a schedule of intercompany debt. None was provided. They managed in the best way they could, from the company accounts. That is of course likely to be right (on the assumption the accounts are right), but it will not be up to date. I acknowledge that it has been said that the group is too short staffed (given the war) to have supplied what both accountants asked for, but, I do have to hold in mind that there is this caveat in relation to all the valuations that I have. This must be afforded some weight in my ultimate decision given my diffidence in the husband’s evidence.

D8 was whether a country risk premium, which it was agreed should act as discount on DCF valued entities, should itself reduce over time. This was worth about £82 m. Mr Rodwell said it should and pointed to some words of Professor Damodaran (whose reasoning was heavily relied on by him and the SJE generally) in support of this proposition. Further, he pointed to the inconsistency of increasing cash flow over time on a premise the war will be over but not reducing this discount over time on the same premise. The SJE resisted this and said it had been a topic of discussion in Country A and the policy adopted by valuers was not to reduce this premium. That was the practice they told me in Country A. The reasoning was that the 17.55% discount employed was in fact a smoothing out of what would otherwise be (by reference to US and Country A government bonds) a substantially higher discount, which would, they accepted have then needed to be stepped down. Mr Molyneux pointed to the implicit compromise in increasing cash flow while leaving the discount constant, and to the fact that were the calculations to be redone today then they would be substantially more negative. Mr Thorpe said that the 17.55 % was not a smoothing figure. In his written closing submissions he drew my attention to the SJE taking the approach, for which Mr Rodwell urged here, in relation to property-based businesses (GHI and JKL), namely reducing the discount over time. While that appears inconsistent with their approach here, I note that they are different classes of assets.

The obvious reflection that I make on this point is as to the uncertainty of value in times of war. If the husband survives this war with his businesses intact, then he will reap the £80 m increase several times over, if the war is lost, he may lose everything. The other reflection is that if, as the SJE relate, other valuers in Country A apply the country risk premium without step down, then I need to take that into account in the value I attach to the husband’s assets now.

On balance my view is that both sides have a point. The SJE point as to local practice is much the stronger but Mr Rodwell’s point has some logical force, insofar as the SJE appear to be assuming the end of the war for some valuation purposes but not for others. I have determined that I shall accept the SJE’s position because of their local knowledge as to how businesses are valued in Country A, but I shall effectively reduce their discount by about £10m given the strong point made by Mr Rodwell. This then balances out with my decision on D6. I remind myself that the figures in the schedule are very uncertain.

Issue D9 was Mr Rodwell’s introduction of a war premium. It has a value of £11m. He suggests it given his reductions elsewhere (D3 and D4 in particular the special premia, but also D8) would, if allowed, leave insufficient discounting for City A based assets. Given that I am not with him on D3, D4 and D8 I am against him on this. It would be to double count to include it.

Issue D10 was compromised on the basis of a midpoint.

Issue D11 (not heard in numerical order but recorded here that way) is to do with forecasting net working capital. Mr Rodwell says that this has been done inconsistently across nine entities by what he refers to as ‘Damodoran 1’ and ‘Damodaran 2’. This will have an impact of some £20 to £30 million. Mr Rodwell prefers consistency. The SJE say they looked at the particular working capital in each case, and its availability. That individually tailored approach led them to their decisions on working capital. So far as it goes, I prefer their approach. It is necessary for me to flag at this stage three points that arose in their evidence on this point: (1) The SJE asked about a debt for some £20m, they got no information, and considering the debt not to be payable did not factor it in to working capital (Mr Rodwell followed them on that point), (2) they repeated that they struggled to carry out the valuations because they were not provided with details of inter-company borrowing, which they requested and (3) they were not provided with company forecasts for most of the businesses, which they recorded made their job harder.

I accept the SJE’s position on D11, but I need to hold in mind these limitations on their valuations.

Issue D12 was compromised on the basis of the midpoint.

Issue D13 was an issue as to whether it was appropriate in relation to AZ to rely on its historical accounts to assess costs margins (per Mr Rodwell) or to look to equivalent businesses in similar emerging markets (per the SJE). The issue carries a value of some £25 m. The SJE looked to equivalent businesses in the far east (e.g. Thailand and Malaysia) as their comparisons. The reason they took this step which might be considered unusual was (1) there had been a dramatic change in the price of the company’s produce (downward) and an upward inflationary increase in costs, and (2) AZ has recently lost 50% of its customers. Historic accounts were not therefore of much use. They accepted that this was a more conservative valuation but given the losses made by AZ considered that appropriate. The questions of the advocates did not assist me much on this issue. I preferred having heard both experts the views of the SJE. I consider that a buyer of the business is less likely to be concerned by past profitable margins (given the changing markets and current losses) than the current market.

Issue D14 and 15 is the treatment of monies recapitalising ABC and KL. This issue is worth £17m. The SJE tell me I should not take it into account because it is necessary for the businesses to function, so it just goes to the generation of income. Mr Rodwell tells me I should take it into account because it will increase the capital value. I prefer Mr Rodwell’s evidence. The money in ABC is money in an account provided (ultimately) by the husband. When it sells (if it sells) he will take out his equity and the new purchaser will need to provide the capital (if the rules require it). In relation to KL the injection is necessary to improve the functioning of the business. After the changes are implemented which are funded by the capitalisation money, it will be a better business. I accept that the business may not improve in a pound for pound way, but that is the best estimate that I can apply. It does of course follow that in so far as the capitalisation requirements are set by the authorities in Country A that the monies do not add to liquidity.

Issue D16 related to whether it was necessary to take into account a bad debt held by MN. This amounted to £10m. The SJE said that they had seen that MN held the debt for some time and understood it was irrecoverable. It turns out by questions put by Mr Thorpe that the debt is owed by another entity in the control of the husband, GH (as featured in the cross examination of B). Given that the basis of the valuation is that the circle of debt needs to be balanced against the assets, it is appropriate that I do not write off this debt. So, I agree with Mr Rodwell.

Issue D17 was compromised on the basis of mid-point.

Issue D18 and 19 were only argued by counsel in written closing submissions. They relate to cross checks. Mr Rodwell argues that cross checks indicate that his valuations are right. The SJE agree in principle with the utility of cross checks but say there is nothing appropriate with which to carry out the check. In the written submissions I am told that the cross checks referred to ‘as published by Professor Damodaran’ in fact relate to three companies, one of which is no longer operating. I prefer the evidence of the SJE on these points.

Issue D20 is whether the transactions in shares provided good reason to value KL. This issue is worth £4m. There were four transactions in 2023, and a subsequent one at a similar price. The four are marked as part of a negotiated deal. The SJE relies on the share transactions as good evidence of value. Mr Rodwell, while accepting that is normally a good approach, says these transactions are too few, and too likely to be involved in particular transactions of the husband to provide a reliable value, notwithstanding the shares are quoted on an open market. I agree with Mr Rodwell that I should use the SJE’s corrected DCF valuation rather than the share price.

Issue D21 is whether there needs to be an extra discount in relation to the price per square metre of land of OP. The SJE argue for it because the plant is atypically large and much of the space is unused. This means the space is out of all comparison with what would otherwise be considered comparables. Mr Rodwell considers this is a discount too far and renders the valuation unrealistically low. I prefer the evidence of the SJE. They have expert local knowledge of land values.

Issue D22 and D23 were taken together. The issue here is in relation to the value of VWX. As to D22 the SJE are concerned (i) that the accounts do not represent market value of the assets and (ii) that there is a bad debt in relation to a business known as QR. The SJE downgraded the valuation and accepted representations from the management that the debt from QR was bad. The SJE complained that they did not have proper information to allow them to make their assessment but just did their best. Mr Rodwell resists those reductions. I am with him on this. There is sufficient concern about the probity of the information provided and the circle of corporate debt not to provide the benefit of the doubt on this issue to the husband. D23 is in essence whether assets which are pledged in relation to debt should be excluded from the valuation process. The obvious effect of this is that it means the debt is counted twice: once as a debt, second as the security. The SJE rightly say that a buyer will not want to take on a pledged asset, but I am with Mr Rodwell that is not a reason to count the debt twice.

Issue D24 was similarly dealt with only in closing submissions. A liquidity issue caused the SJE to discount the value of the investment. Mr Rodwell argues against that. A rational investor would only lose liquidity if there were to be good long-term return, he says. The answer to that point is that in Country A investment fund instruments are not used for future income but for current tax optimisation. The upside of this investment them will already have been taken. I therefore accept the SJE’s position. I should however point out that they do say (i) they only have information provided by the EF in support of this but (ii) it seemed ‘realistic’.

I am not going to rehearse here the closing submissions of Mr Molyneux and Mr Thorpe. I will reflect the arguments that they raise in the analysis of the issues on the case that face me.

I consider the proper order for that analysis in this case to be as follows:

There is a sale and purchase agreement between B and the husband for 2% and between A and the husband for 20% of AZ in November 2021. Payment is to be made in 3 years.

The wife tells the husband she wants to separate later that month. His evidence is that this came to him as a surprise.

In December 2021 AZ declares a substantial dividend. B gets about $1 million and A gets $10 million.

[Redacted]

There is a sale and purchase agreement between A and the husband as to 10% of three holding companies in April 2022. (I take this from the chronology. I understand in fact 50% of one holding company was transferred. That has not been explored before me and it is unnecessary for me to engage in it here.)

In April 2022 the payment date of the April agreements is deferred until 3 years after the war ends.

In May 2022 the AZ agreements have the date of payment deferred until 3 years after the war ends.

The husband says:

The wife says:

The wife has not brought an application under section 37 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. It was indicated at the PTR that she was going to bring what was described as a Purba application, by reference to Purba v Purba [2001] 1 FCR 652. I expressed in the course of Mr Thorpe’s closing that I did not consider that this was the sort of transaction in which a set aside could be sought without a proper application putting A and B on notice. That has not been sought. All that is sought is a notional reattribution to the husband of funds that should (Mr Thorpe argues) be his. He says this reflects the reality that the shares and dividends are effectively held on trust for the husband. For much of the hearing Mr Molyneux’s response to this line of attack was that it would simply reduce the husband’s assets because the fall in value of the companies has meant that the money owed to him according to the share purchase agreements exceeded the extra value of an increased interest in the shares. The amount owed under the share purchase agreement totals some £13.9 m. The value of the argument run by Mr Molyneux of course depends on the value I put on the businesses, but it is not likely to be negative given the dividend payments made to A and B which have emerged during the hearing and will logically fall to be reattributed to the husband if I accept Mr Thorpe’s argument.

I note that given there is formally no application under section 37 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, there is no presumption of intention that the husband made the disposition to defeat the wife’s claim.

I look at this matter in the round and reflect on the evidence that I heard from the husband and B. In relation to the parties’ arguments I consider:

While I might have accepted an incentivisation rationale in relation to a 2% transfer I do not accept it in relation to a 20% transfer with a $10 million dividend coming shortly thereafter. I have considered whether I treat the different transactions differently but reject that on the basis that the various transactions are clearly part of the same scheme.

On that basis I conclude that the dispositions were intended to defeat the wife’s claim.

I ask myself what is the effect of this? There can be no set aside of the transactions given that there has not been an application made against A and B. I can however treat the money which the husband would have had were it not for these transfers as notionally belonging to him, including the dividends. I must in all fairness also ignore the money which is owing to him as a consequence of the transactions. It might be said that is treating him with assets he does not legally have but I take the view that the husband having by his machinations brought about this state of affairs I will have to leave him to his machinations to manage his way out of the consequences.

I have been provided with an Excel worksheet that enables me to enter my conclusions as to the accountancy disputes and the issue as to how I treat the share dispositions and it will tell me what the value of the corporate assets are which I can then substitute into the joint schedule provided for me at the beginning of the case.

I have explored with counsel by way of some trial runs with the worksheet some of the consequences of different selections. That led to the schedule being amended. Counsel agree I should use it. There are some results which appeared odd to me, one was the apparent significant fall in the value of AZ. In fact this was a consequence of the different valuation dates used by the different experts. AZ’s position worsened considerably over the year 2023 to 2024 and so the figure produced by the SJE for 2023 and then used by the husband in the ES2 needed to be adjusted downwards. That has in effect happened through the Excel workbook produced to me, and my decisions on the issues between the parties. Counsel agree that I should take the 2024 figures which are now produced. Counsel also say that there is inevitably some lack of precision that will be generated by the worksheet, but that is acceptable given the over-riding uncertainty in this valuation exercise.

I have used the Excel worksheet and the formula in it provided to me. Using it, I have created my own schedule, which is attached to this judgment. What follows is to explain the steps that I have taken. I do need to be clear that in the circumstances of this case, and for the reasons set out below, I do not think the resolution of this case is dependent on a precise figure in the schedule.

The only difference between the parties in relation to real property is that the wife includes two properties in Country A, which the husband says are held in companies. I will deal with them under corporate interests.

There was very little difference between the parties in relation to bank accounts. The husband was some £500,000 lower. He was not challenged on this and I will accept his account. It is entirely likely he has met either his or the wife’s costs.

The business interests have been updated in the light of the assumptions that I have made and the calculating spreadsheet provided to me. Three issues require further comment:

I turn now to the section headed chattels. I have adopted the parties’ figures for themselves for the usual chattels. The significant issue under this heading is the yacht. The wife’s case is that the CD debt is either no debt at all or a soft debt. I do not accept that it is not a debt. It has not been argued that money spent by CD on the boat has not been spent on the boat. There is not any argument that CD has already been paid. As to whether it is a soft debt the wife advanced in her section 25 statement that behind it lay a named friend of the husband. That argument was not pursued. There was a line of questioning that the fact that CD was no longer managing the boat but no security had been provided for their debt of over £20 m meant that this could not be a proper commercial relationship. I found the husband’s answers to this line of questioning unsatisfactory. It might well be that the world in which yachts of this size are bought and sold is sufficiently small that CD need not worry because they will know when a sale is imminent. And I do note that shifting the boat to a new managing company is inconsistent with CD just being, in reality, a wealthy mate. If it were why would the boat not just be left in their management? I conclude however on balance that the husband’s relationship with CD is one based on trust, but nonetheless I should take this debt into account as it will have to be paid on the sale of the boat. As to the figures owed to YZ and EF in relation to the yacht, I record the figures as advanced by the husband. There is no question that the money has been paid: the issue is whether there is a counterbalancing personal debt between the husband and YZ given the movements in the husband’s bank accounts upon which he was cross examined. I will consider that below. I do note here that the repayment of the debt to YZ will afford the husband with liquidity. What comes back from the boat, like what came in from the sale of the jet, is able to be lent out. That would generate some £13.8 m of liquidity.

Under the category headed other, I follow the parties’ representations save:

I turn next to liabilities. I have accepted the figures advanced by both parties in relation to themselves. In dispute were the husband’s debts to his companies, in particular I heard questions that relate to the YZ debts. What I have not heard is any argument but that the money was paid. The point in issue is whether in circumstances as put to the husband in cross examination and recorded above there appeared to be a flow of money from the husband in Country A, to YZ via an account in Country C, there was in reality a separate loan account the other way which would offset this debt. On the evidence before me I cannot conclude that there is. The husband was faced with a schedule in effect when being cross examined (in fairness, but with no materiality, I note that I was told the schedule was sent - I assume without explanation as to what it was purporting to show - on the first day of the trial and he was called on the third day). He said he had no knowledge of any of the transactions. The transactions do appear to show, as Mr Thorpe alleged, dividends being paid into an account in Country A, American securities being bought, and then the securities being paid into an account in the name of YZ. Had this point been raised at an earlier time then it might have been open to the husband to check what had happened with YZ. I cannot criticise him for not knowing during the course of giving evidence. I suggested to Mr Thorpe that the husband had had to pay a lot of money in the run up to these proceedings: some £5m in costs; the mortgage on the family home; the maintenance of the staff (which was part of my MPS order); the MPS order itself; and school fees. It seems entirely probable that the husband was trying to get together what money he could to meet those liabilities. This money may well have been in addition to what he here says was borrowed – and may give rise to no countervailing debt back to YZ because as it was paid by him to YZ so it was advanced to him. I cannot draw the inference that Mr Thorpe wants me to draw when the point is taken by way of cross examination from a recently created schedule.

I further note that Mr Thorpe takes in his written closing submissions a point that these debts are not properly reflected in the valuation of VWX (of which YZ forms part) and so argues that they cannot be included here without an increase in the value of VWX. I cannot accept that argument merely in written closing. It would need to have been put to the experts and Mr Molyneux put on notice of it to consider his response.

I do however record that the YZ loans are ‘soft’ loans in the sense that I am confident YZ will lend to the husband what they can to help him, subject always to keeping the business empire afloat. That is some £11.3m.

I can see no good reason to ignore the debt to B’s company. B has set this up to manage the affairs of the Country A companies. It will require payment.

It is without doubt the case that the husband did not provide the accountants with the information they sought. It is without doubt the case that their valuations are less reliable than they would otherwise be. It is without doubt the case that the information as to intercompany loans being missing the accountants have had to rely on filed accounts which means they are out of date. There are further complaints about failure to provide forecasts, and failure to draw to the expert’s attention till late in the day that new accounts have been produced.

B gave forceful evidence in his statement as to why this has happened. The short version is, ‘there is a war on’. I highlight here a few of his points; most of the accountancy staff were women and many of them have left Country A; what was a staff of 8 is now a staff of 4, they are struggling to manage pay roll and day to day issues; the head of financial monitoring and auditing had attended the office only occasionally, and he has now left.

I balance this with a degree of scepticism: saying little does appear to have been the husband’s approach to oral evidence; given the legal costs could more not have been done?

I conclude that there is some truth on both sides of this issue: the war has massively disrupted the supply of information, but the husband is not unhappy to have this limit on the flow of information and has not strived to remedy it.

Mr Thorpe points to the following arguments: (i) transfer of shares about the time of separation; (ii) misleading presentation in Form E; (iii) use of jet proceeds to pay down borrowing on the boat; (iv) forcing the sale of the family home; (v) not selling the boat; (vi) and he adds, a derisory low offer.

I have already found in his favour on (i).

As to (ii) I consider he has made out the following:

As to (iii) I do consider that the husband was telling the truth when he said that the bank preferred the mortgage on the boat paid off to that on the family home. I consider however that the husband was happy to deal with the borrowing in this way because sale of the house was something he saw as inevitable, while he wanted to retain the boat.

As to (iv) It is clear that the husband wanted a sale of the family home. I have recorded that his comment to Mr Thorpe during his cross examination in this hearing, that the bank was happy to lend because they would have collected interest, was not how it was presented to me in June 2024. I do consider that ultimately this is something of a cross-examination point rather than cutting through to the reality. I was told in the June hearing of a difference between bland formal reminders of the need to renew the mortgage and the conversations that were taking place as to the reality of the bank’s attitude to extending the mortgage without an orderly sale. It is plain from the expert evidence that an honest presentation of his finances to the bank would have led to them requiring a sale. I do however consider that this is an illustration of the need to treat the husband’s protestations sceptically.

As to selling the yacht, it is plain that he should have accepted the offer of made in late 2024. That he did not is, I consider, because he does not want to sell it. It is not a point which leads me to believe that there is significant undisclosed wealth, it is an example of him clinging to his past life when he was one of the super-rich, much as the wife is clinging to it in her demand for a ‘luxury’ home.

I consider his offer low, but not derisory. The wife’s in contrast is unrealistic.

As to the issues raised in opening:

I turn now to those issues which I listed above which Mr Molyneux drew to my attention.

My recasting of the schedule leaves me with some £36.8 m in the husband’s name and £1.7 m in the wife’s name: a total of £38.5 m.

As to income, I am left with the short answer that it all depends on how the war goes, but it does seem to me appropriate to bear in mind that the effect of the risk discounts of the businesses is that they are generating more income than other businesses with a similar value.

There is a hope that the war will stop and the husband will become super wealthy again. There is the risk that the war carries on and his position gets worse or indeed his financial position is destroyed.

I do remind myself that I have recorded above that:

25 (2) (b): The needs of these parties will not be able to be met in the manner that they were during the marriage. The property particulars provided by the parties will not be of any assistance to me. Nor will I be assisted by the schedules of income needs, based on how the parties lived during the marriage. I am dividing approximately £38.5m between them. It is in essence the housing fund and income fund on both sides. The husband’s income stream is the business: what he realises for the wife as a consequence of my order he does not have as capital. If he chooses to leave what is left as a business – as I assume he will have to – it may generate an income but it would be to double count it in these circumstances to consider it both capital and income.

I accept that the wife will be the primary carer of the children. They are my first consideration. I accept that she will need short term assistance with housing. I accept that the husband will be left with illiquid assets and the wife will be left with cash. That is to her advantage. I note, counterbalancing that liquidity point the husband has overstated his difficulties previously and has not provided the fullest of information.

In the order that I made when I allowed the sale of the house I required the wife to have rent of £39,000 pm, albeit paid from the proceeds of sale. That level of accommodation is clearly no longer realistic. I assess on a rough and ready basis that the wife needs to have an extra payment equalling 6 months of £30,000 a month rent to manage the transition. That is £180,000.

25 (2) (c): The standard of living in this case was very high. Given the reversal of fortunes it is not sustainable.

25 (2) (d): The wife is in her late 30s. The husband is in his mid 60s. The relationship has lasted approaching 20 years. It has materially altered the life that the wife would have lived, but I do consider that she will have a long life after this marriage and she can overtime adapt to her new circumstances. I am not attracted to an argument that her needs are greater than the husband because she has longer to live, particularly in circumstances where he started the marriage having already made his fortune.

25 (2) (e): Whilst I would not classify the husband as suffering from a disability, he is clearly not in the robust good health of youth. He has been treated for depression. The wife says he has an alcohol problem. While I hope his businesses revive, I cannot expect him to return to world and make a fresh fortune.

25 (2) (f): As to contributions, I have already drawn attention to the fact that the husband is the source of the wealth, but I must not overlook that the wife has been his partner and mother to the parties’ children for not far off 20 years.

25 (2) (g and h) do not arise.

My conclusion is that the assets should be divided broadly equally save for some minor adjustment in the wife’s favour relating to short term housing and reflecting her position as the primary carer of the children in the light of the husband’s relocation. I consider a broadly equal division is appropriate notwithstanding the source of the wealth because over a long relationship both parties have lived at a much higher level than can be sustained now. The fall in standard of living should be broadly shared. The adjustment is made because the wife will be the primary carer of the children and will be in a difficult housing situation given the imminent sale of the family home. I am conscious that the precision of the figures that will follow suggests that this process is more scientific that it can properly be considered given the uncertainty as to business valuations in these circumstances. In effect, it is the best that I can do to get to a fair outcome.

I do bear in mind that the husband is left with the ‘worse’ assets (and note in particular in this regard the declared but unpaid dividends in AZ) because the wife will largely have cash, but I balance that against the points I have made at [189] above.

£38.5 m divided by two is £19.25 m. To that I provide a further £180,000 to the wife for the short-term housing needs. That takes her to £19.43 m. It is inevitable that a range of extra costs will fall on her as she manages the children into their new lives. Bearing them in mind I consider it is appropriate to round up the figure which she will have at the end of the marriage to £20 m (recognising of course that this will come at the expense of reducing what is available to the husband). She has in round terms £1.7 m so she needs £18.3 m to be paid to her.

Will she be able to manage: she clearly will. Both her level of income and her housing will be much lower than she has enjoyed during the marriage, but this is a consequence of the fall in the husband’s wealth. It will be a matter for her how she divides the money she is to receive between accommodation and income fund. If she were to leave her own funds on one side at this stage she could buy (including stamp duty) for roughly £9m and have an income fund of roughly £9m. Allowing for stamp duty and other costs a housing fund of £9 m will allow a purchase at about £8m. A fund of about £9m over 20 years would provide her with about £530,000 a year. Over a lifetime it would produce some £261,000 a year, but of course she will have the option to move to a smaller house when the children get older, and I have ignored in that calculation her own assets, which I accept is mainly jewellery.

Will the husband be able to manage: he will have, according to my assessment, about £18.5m. In a similar way, he can manage, but I do acknowledge he will struggle with liquidity in order to make a payment of £18.3m. On the basis the wife takes £6.6m from the sale of the house she will not have enough to buy at £9m. I am going to require him to find the approximately £2.4m to take her to £9m in short measure. I propose 4 months. That may mean he needs to ask A to return some of the $10m. I acknowledge that he will also need to recover funds to pay the £600,000 owing to his solicitors. The balance of £9.3m will be payable in 12 months, or prior sale of the yacht. The boat should, on his own evidence, have sold by then, and that will enable him to borrow more money from YZ to fund the payment.

On a point of detail, I note that Mr Thorpe did not press his request for a charge on the yacht in closing given the obvious difficulty that it is an asset of a foreign company. If the husband were able to procure a charge on the yacht to cover the balancing payment I agree with Mr Thorpe that it would be a gesture which will allow the wife to feel some confidence that the husband will honour the order, and it might avoid further litigation for security.

Pending payment of the two lump sums the husband will need to pay spousal periodical payments to the wife because the wife is in due course to use the balance of the lump sum as an income fund. I acknowledge that liquidity is not easy for the husband but a consequence of the order for sale that has been made is that the mortgage payments on the family home will stop at the end of the month. I determine that the logical approach to the delayed payment is to provide him to pay periodical payments at a rate equivalent to the Bank of England Base Rate, currently 4.25% on the outstanding sum. The figure can be calculated by counsel but as a guide after four months when £9.3 m is owing the figure will be £395,250 pa (£32,937 pm). There will be a clean break on the final payment. For the avoidance of doubt, late payment of either lump sum should attract interest at judgment debt rate but payment of periodical payments after the relevant lump sum becomes due shall count on a pound for pound basis to reduce the judgment debt interest.

I do not consider the wife needs further money to buy a property in Country A. She can use some part of her settlement to do that should she wish.

As to child maintenance: I put the figure at that of the husband’s first proposal. So, I order child maintenance at £50,000 pa, per child until the end of a first degree (with 2/3 direct to the child when at university). I do not go to the £70,000 per annum per child which the wife seeks because I take the view that she has a duty to maintain her children too, and she has slightly more than half the assets following my division. I do however provide for consumer price indexation.

I accept the husband’s offer to pay private school fees and also require him to pay tertiary education costs, limited to a first degree. I also require him to pay agreed reasonable medical expenses until the children complete their first degree.

Finally, I do agree with the husband that the wife should meet the costs order than I have made against her already for some £69,400. That may be deducted from the lump sum of £2.4 m in 4 months.

I need to consider this matter in the round. I reflect that the wife will have about £20 m at the end of a long relationship to a man who was for most of their relationship super wealthy. His finances have however clearly been badly damaged by the war but I do not find that he has been rendered penniless. He continues to control very significant businesses. It has crossed my mind when thinking about the potential approach to this case that it might be that I should direct that it is necessary to wait and see what happens. It might be that he emerges from the war and his resources grow again. It might be that disaster awaits. Neither side has urged that on me. The costs of these proceedings and how the parties would manage pending an end of the war are good reasons why finality is the right answer.

I invited counsel to provide any typographical style corrections to this judgment when I sent it out in draft on the 3 July 2025. They have done so. I now invite them to (i) agree an order reflecting its terms; (ii) provide an anonymised version of the judgment, and short submissions on the need for anonymisation for which both contend.