West Berkshire Council v Mother & Ors

In relation to threshold I have made the following findings:

A Child in Need Plan was initiated on 25th August 2022, various efforts were made to support the family via CAMHS, the social work team, the Emotional Health Academy and the Eating Disorders Team but appointments could not be arranged or were cancelled by the Mother.

C was not seen between November 2022 and 31 December 2022.

On 29th January 2024 Father stated that the family will no longer engage with the Local Authority and the Child in Need plan

On 15 March 2024 the allocated social worker and CAMHS attempted a joint home visit but the door was not answered. There is no evidence that this was deliberate disengagement by the parents.

On 8 and 21 March, 15, 19 and 25 April, 2, 13, 16 and 28 May, 12, 20 and 26 June, 11 and 24 July 2024 Father denied entry to the home either on grounds the social worker was trespassing or because he reported C did not want to see the social worker.

On 26 March 2024 the Father informed the Local Authority in a video meeting he would not engage with the Local Authority under the Child in Need plan and informed the Local Authority they had no right to visit the family home without permission.

On 10 April 2024, the CAMHS Team recommended a Care Education and Treatment Review for C as a prerequisite to having a LDA (Learning Disability and Autism) ‘hospital-at-home’. Father did not consent to West Berkshire Children’s Services or the Berkshire Keyworking Team being involved.

During the pre-proceedings meeting on 14 June 2024, the parents stated that they did not agree to any proposed assessments of C and of themselves.

A tier 4 hospital at home bed referral was closed around 5 July 2024 because the Father declined face to face treatment.

On 16 August 2024 the court was satisfied that:

The local authority has reasonable cause to suspect that C is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm;

An assessment of the state of C’s health and development is required to enable the local authority to determine whether or not C is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and

It is unlikely that such an assessment will be made, or will be satisfactory, in the absence of a child assessment order under section 43 Children Act 1989.

C has been home educated from age 7. C has had limited opportunities to learn about other settings; she was home educated from the age of seven and although she regularly engaged in home education groups and had some playdates in other people’s homes before she became unwell, her day-to-day experience has been in her home with her family. This has also affected her opportunities for peer relationships.

On 1 January 2023 C was admitted to hospital with a history of limited fluid and no food intake in the previous 72 hours.

C did not leave the family home between discharge from Basingstoke Hospital in January 2023 and being sectioned under the Mental Health Act in August 2024 save for a 3 day admission to Basingstoke Hospital between 15 and 17 February 2023.

Following discharge from Basingstoke Hospital two meetings with CAMHS were cancelled by the Mother before 2 February 2023.

Mother’s ways of understanding C and interacting with her have caused harm to C’s development.

Father’s approach to professionals has undermined C’s own ability to trust professionals in supportive roles.

I have found that the threshold test for making public law orders is met.

I consider that a Care Order with a care plan for C to remain in a residential placement is in C’s welfare interest and I approve the arrangements for contact.

I make the following Non-Molestation Order against the Father to last until C turns 18 or leaves her residential placement permanently pursuant to a change in her care plan whichever occurs first:

I also make an order under section 34 Children Act 1989 directing that there shall be no indirect contact between the Father and C and a further paragraph to the Non-Molestation Order to support that:

I will direct substituted service of the Non-Molestation Order pursuant to FPR 6.19 by Royal Mail tracked delivery with the Local Authority to file a certificate of service attaching the delivery receipt.

I make the following order pursuant to section 91(14) Children Act 1989:

In order to maintain anonymity in the event of publication of this judgment I will refer to the parents as Mother and Father or M and F and the child with whom I am concerned as C. I shall refer to C’s older sister, in relation to whom a connected persons assessment is being completed, as A. I mean no disrespect to any of them.

The Guardian’s final analysis provides the following background:

The following is taken from the Local Authority case summary for the hearing on 8 October 2024 [A296]:

And from the case summary for the hearing on 15 May 2025:

C is a 16 year old girl. She has four adult siblings; two live in the family home with Mother and Father, two live independently including A who is married and subject to a connected person assessment. Although the parents live together they are not married and are no longer in an intimate relationship.

C is subject to an Interim Care Order granted by me on 3 September 2024. Until 21 August 2024 C lived with both parents. Between 21 August 2024 and 12 February 2025 she was an in-patient at an adolescent psychiatric unit. She was then placed at a CQC regulated but Ofsted unregistered therapeutic placement. A Deprivation of Liberty Order (DOLS) was granted by HHJ Moradifar on 4 July 2025 in case FD25C40693. That was on the basis that C had engaged in very risky behaviour on 10 April 2025 when she left the placement to meet in person with adults aged 26 and 27 who she had met online. Messages passing between them indicated the adults’ intention to engage in sexual activity and “allude to C seeking to get pregnant” [M7/2.16].

A DOLS review was listed on day 1 of this final hearing, 4 August 2025. I extended the DOLS order but only to 6 August 2025 because I was informed that following a public complaint about a child in the placement Ofsted had informed the home that because they were not registered they must cease operating. Taking that and the home’s perception of the risk posed by the Father into account they decided to end the placement for C pending consideration of an application for Ofsted registration. I wanted the Father to have notice of the change of placement. On day 3, 6 August 2025, I extended the DOLS order to 16 September 2025, the day I intended to hand down this judgment. The plan was for C to move to an associated placement where the same staff could care for C whilst the original placement continued to pursue the Ofsted registration it had applied for. I will say a little more about this below. Accordingly C has now moved from her parents’ care, to hospital, to the first and now a second placement with a care plan she will return to the first placement.

On 5 August 2025, having heard evidence from Ms Arnold, I queried whether the Local Authority had given thought to protecting the security of C’s placement. On 7 August I made an order requiring the Local Authority to file an updated care plan (addressing therapy for the Mother) and a statement “with regards to any request to the court to make ancillary orders to secure C’s placement” and a statement from the placement provider by 4pm 8 August 2025. As the Father was not in court and noting that whilst he had not been excused attendance he had said in correspondence he would not attend on 11 August (the next listed day) or 12 August (when he was due to give evidence) and being mindful of his preference to address the court in writing I gave him permission to file and serve a witness statement in response by 4pm 11 August 2025. He did not file a statement.

On 12 August 2025 I made an order reciting:

I directed that those issues would be considered on 14 August (when I was due to hear closing submissions) and would be determined on submissions.

The parents share parental responsibility for C with the Local Authority under the Interim Care Order.

I need to say a little more about the Father and his engagement with the proceedings. I note he has an autism diagnosis.

He has made numerous applications (40 in July alone) which were not issued as no fee was paid and he was not eligible for Help With Fees. The final hearing was listed by me on 15 May 2025, this was on a provisional basis because the IRH had not yet taken place but there was a need to set aside final hearing dates prior to C turning 17. The Father did not attend the hearing on 15 May 2025 although subsequently he was served with the order. The hearing dates were confirmed at the IRH on 1 July 2025 which the Father also did not attend. He informed the court by email dated 30 July 2025 that he was not going to attend the final hearing on 7 August (Dr Prentice’s oral evidence), 11 August (Mother’s oral evidence), 12 August (Father’s own oral evidence), 13 August (the Guardian’s evidence) and that he may not be able to attend on 14 August (submissions). The order of 15 May 2025 recorded that all parties were required to attend the final hearing and “should a party fail to attend, orders, including final orders, may be made in their absence” [B284]. I have reminded myself of FPR 27.4(2). I am satisfied by his own admission the Father was aware of the hearing dates and, given the imminence of C turning 17, decided it was in her welfare interest for me to continue and it would be contrary to the overriding objective to delay proceedings which at the date of first day of the final hearing were already at 11 months post-issue.

I confirmed participation directions at the IRH for the Father’s benefit, including that the Father could join the hearing remotely by video with his camera off save when asking questions or giving evidence, extended times for any cross-examination by the Father to allow reflection time by him, permission for him to put questions in writing for me to ask to be filed by 4pm the day before and/or for supplementary questions to be put in writing using the CVP chat function. It was necessary to limit the length of any written opening submissions to 10 pages (I limited all other parties to the same, save for the Local Authority who were allowed 15 pages) and closing submissions to 20 pages. At the IRH I refused permission for the Father to audio or video record the hearing, a matter which I had previously directed I would re-consider at the IRH having previously refused it for interlocutory hearings.

It is fair to say the Father did not agree with those directions, as evidenced in part by the numerous unissued applications following the IRH on 1 July 2025. Whilst I did not formally consider the applications as they were unissued I did read them and they included requests, sometimes duplicated, for permission to file longer documents, for questions of him to be provided to him in writing 5 days before the hearing, for him “not to be interrupted during any oral presentation”, for an “independent assessment of reasonable adjustments”, a “re-run of the advocates meeting” and a re-listing of the IRH, for 5 days after the close of evidence to prepare a written response and for an adjournment of the final hearing.

Throughout the course of the proceedings the Father has never attended a hearing in person, sometimes he attended hearings remotely and sometimes not; at hearings he has attended he has sometimes refused to speak and at other times has done so.

The Father did not file a witness statement as directed by 11 July 2025 nor a position statement as directed by 31 July 2025. As noted above he did not attend to give evidence and has not filed closing submissions.

On the working day before the final hearing was to commence he sent an email to the local court office (rather than to the CTSC) saying that he would audio record the final hearing and that if he was sent a CVP link he would take that as meaning permission was granted to record. I asked HMCTS to reply copying in all parties in these terms:

He responded to that by asserting, again, that if received a link to join the hearing the court will be “consenting to the father asserting his rights under the Equality Act 2010” and that he “will not engage further during the hearing”. He indicated if the court does not consent to him recording he should not be sent the link.

In accordance with my previous order (at the IRH giving permission for the Father to attend remotely) a link was sent and at the outset of the hearing on 4 August I asked the Father to confirm he was not recording the hearing and will not do so and said that if he fails to confirm this he will be disconnected. Using the chat function he indicated he could not confirm that he was not recording and I therefore asked that he be disconnected. On 5 August, upon him indicating he was recording, he was disconnected. On 6 August the court did not sit at 10am because there had been time to hear from the witness due to give evidence that day on the previous afternoon. My clerk informed me the Father had not attempted to join although in a later email he asserted he had and was waiting for 45 minutes. He did not join the hearing at 2pm for the DOLS review. On 7, 11 and 12 August the Father did not join. He had sent correspondence indicating he would not do so. The court did not sit on 13 August as there was no further evidence to hear; although the correspondence from the Father indicated he would not join that day, later in the day he emailed the court to say he had in fact joined by CVP. He was not admitted because the court was not sitting. On 14 August, the day timetabled for submissions, he had indicated he might join the hearing. He did join by CVP but refused to say orally or in the chat box whether he was recording even after I warned him he would be disconnected and accordingly he was he was disconnected.

The Local Authority seek a final Care Order with a care plan of C remaining in a residential placement, the plan being to move back to the first placement which was terminated by reason of the complaint to Ofsted. The care plan provides for a full connected persons assessment of A and her husband under the auspices of the Care Order with a consideration thereafter of whether a transition to their care is in the welfare interest of C.

The plan for contact with the Mother is a continuation of current contact namely twice a week for 2 hours supervised by the placement and which may take place in the community and once a fortnight for 1.5 hours in the family home, again supervised. There is also provision in the amended final care plan for the Mother to have parenting sessions with a systemic psychotherapist in the CAMHS children in care team until C turns 18; this is designed to support the Mother to develop her capacity to tolerate C’s distress and be alert to being “pulled into helping C in ways that may be counterproductive” [D39].

Prior to the start of the final hearing C was having contact with the Father once a week for 1 hour supervised in the placement. Because of evidence received from the placement during the course of the final hearing the Local Authority moved this to a contact centre to reduce the risks of the placement being destabilised; that was reflected in an amended care plan. I have considered this further below. In addition the fortnightly supervised contact at the family home for 1.5 hours will continue.

At the outset of the hearing the Mother did not accept threshold was met and she sought the return of C to her care or placement with A.

In her position statement for the final hearing she stated:

On the day before I was due to hear submissions I was informed by counsel that she had changed her position and he updated me that her position was:

The Father does not accept threshold is met and seeks the return of C to the home or for her to be cared for by her older sibling, A, and her husband.

The Guardian supports the Local Authority’s application and care plan.

Whilst I have considered the bundles (the main bundle, medical records bundle (referred to as MED in this judgment) and the Child Assessment Order application bundle (referred to as CAO in this judgment)) I have particularly considered the following documents:

I heard oral evidence from the former social worker, Ms Rosier, the assistant team manager, Ms Arnold, Dr Prentice, the Mother and the Guardian. The Father did not attend court on the day he was due to give evidence.

I remind myself that the burden of proving the need for a public law order rests with the Local Authority on the balance of probabilities.

I must consider if the Local Authority has proved that the threshold test set out in section 31(2) Children Act 1989 is met. It provides:

I remind myself that the relevant date for the purposes of making the assessment is the date on which the Local Authority initiated the procedure (Re M (Care Order: Threshold Conditions) [1994] 2 FLR 577) but subsequent events and behaviour are capable of providing relevant evidence about the position before the relevant date (Re L (Care: Threshold Criteria) [2007] 1 FLR 2050).

I also consider Hedley J in the same case at para 49

“…society must be willing to tolerate very diverse standards of parenting, including the eccentric, the barely adequate and the inconsistent. It follows too that children will inevitably have both very different experiences of parenting and very unequal consequences flowing from it. It means that some children will experience disadvantage and harm, while others flourish in atmospheres of loving security and emotional stability. These are the consequences of our fallible humanity and it is not the provenance of the state to spare children all the consequences of defective parenting. In any event, it simply could not be done.”

In relation to threshold I refer to the summary of the principles set out by Sir James Munby (then the President of the Family Division) in Re A (a Child) [2015] EWFC 11 which was given by Aikens LJ in Re J (a Child) [2015] EWCA Civ 222:

“56.

The fundamental principles underlined by the President in Re A, which, as I say, are not new and are based on statute or the highest authority or both, can, I think, be summarised thus:

i)

In an adoption case, it is for the local authority to prove, on a balance of probabilities, the facts on which it relies and, if adoption is to be ordered, to demonstrate that "nothing else will do", when having regard to the overriding requirements of the child’s welfare.

ii)

If the local authority’s case on a factual issue is challenged, the local authority must adduce proper evidence to establish the fact it seeks to prove. If a local authority asserts that a parent "does not admit, recognise or acknowledge" that a matter of concern to the authority is the case, then if that matter of concern is put in issue, it is for the local authority to prove it is the case and, furthermore, that the matter of concern "has the significance attributed to it by the local authority".

iii)

Hearsay evidence about issues that appear in reports produced on behalf of the local authority, although admissible, has strict limitations if a parent challenges that hearsay evidence by giving contrary oral evidence at a hearing. If the local authority is unwilling or unable to produce a witness who can speak to the relevant matter by first hand evidence, it may find itself in "great, or indeed insuperable" difficulties in proving the fact or matter alleged by the local authority but which is challenged.

iv)

The formulation of "Threshold" issues and proposed findings of fact must be done with the utmost care and precision. The distinction between a fact and evidence alleged to prove a fact is fundamental and must be recognised. The document must identify the relevant facts which are sought to be proved. It can be cross-referenced to evidence relied on to prove the facts asserted but should not contain mere allegations ("he appears to have lied" etc.)

v)

It is for the local authority to prove that there is the necessary link between the facts upon which it relies and its case on Threshold. The local authority must demonstrate why certain facts, if proved, "justify the conclusion that the child has suffered or is at the risk of suffering significant harm" of the type asserted by the local authority." The local authority’s evidence and submissions must set out the arguments and explain explicitly why it is said that, in the particular case, the conclusion [that the child has suffered or is at the risk of suffering significant harm] indeed follows from the facts [proved]".

vi)

It is vital that local authorities, and, even more importantly, judges, bear in mind that nearly all parents will be imperfect in some way or other. The State will not take away the children of "those who commit crimes, abuse alcohol or drugs or suffer from physical or mental illness or disability, or who espouse antisocial, political or religious beliefs" simply because those facts are established. It must be demonstrated by the local authority, in the first place, that by reason of one or more of those facts, the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering significant harm [my emphasis]. Even if that is demonstrated, adoption will not be ordered unless it is demonstrated by the local authority that "nothing else will do" when having regard to the overriding requirements of the child’s welfare. The court must guard against "social engineering".

vii)

When a judge considers the evidence, he must take all of it into account and consider each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence, and, to use a metaphor, examine the canvas overall.

Welfare

So far as the law on welfare issues is concerned my paramount concern is the child’s welfare. In assessing whether to make an order I must take account of the matters set out in section 1(3) Children Act 1989 (welfare checklist). I must then have regard to the realistic options put forward taking a holistic and balanced as opposed to linear approach to them consistent with the guidance given in Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146.

In reaching a final decision I must start from the position that the least interventionist alternative is to be preferred applying section 1(5) of the Children Act; I must not make an order unless I consider that doing so would be better for the child than making no order.

I remind myself I must also have regard to Article 6 and 8 ECHR rights. Pursuant to Re B (Care: Interference with Family Life) [2003] 2 FLR 813 I must not make a public law order unless I am satisfied it is both necessary and proportionate and no other less radical form of order would achieve the need to promote the welfare of the child.

If I make a Care Order I must consider the permanence provisions of the care plan pursuant to section 31(3A) Children Act 1989 and the contact provisions pursuant to section 34(11) Children Act 1989.

When assessing risk of harm I must ask (by reference to the summary in Re T (Children: Risk Assessment) [2025] EWCA Civ 93 at paragraph 33):

The Local Authority invite me to make a Non-Molestation Order against the Father in reliance upon Re T (A Child)(Non-Molestation Order) [2017] EWCA Civ 1889 from which the following extracts are taken (my emphasis):

The Local Authority have also invited me to make an order against the Father under section 91(14) Children Act 1989 which provides as follows:

The Children Act 1989 has been amended by s.67(3) Domestic Abuse Act 2021, which inserted s.91A into the Children Act 1989 (my emphasis):

PD12B and PD12Q contain guidance on the application of section 91(14) Children Act 1989. The Practice Directions indicate that orders under s.91(14) are available to prevent a person from making future applications under that Act without leave of the court and that section 91(14) leaves a discretion to the court to determine the circumstances in which an order should be made. The Practice Directions highlight that the circumstances in which such an order may be made are many and varied. Those circumstances include where an application would put the child concerned, or another individual, at risk of harm as provided in section 91A. In exercising the court's discretion, the Practice Directions make clear that the welfare of the child is paramount. With respect to the type of conduct that may justify an order, paragraph 13A.2 of PD12B provide as follows (my emphasis):

With respect to the procedure to be adopted when the court is considering making an order pursuant to section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989, Part 3 of PD 12Q states as follows:

In Re A (Supervised Contact) (s 91(14)) [2021] EWCA Civ 1749 King LJ also observed that section 91(14) is not limited to cases where a party has made excessive applications, nor do the Re P guidelines say an order should only be made in exceptional circumstances (Re P (Section 91(14) Guidelines) (Residence and Religious Heritage) [1999] 2 FLR 573, CA) and at paragraph 40 (my emphasis), “… it seems to me that in the changed landscape described…above there is considerable scope for the greater use of this protective filter in the interests of children. Those interests are served by the making of an order under s 91(14) in an appropriate case not only to protect an individual child from the effects of endless unproductive applications and/or a campaign of harassment by the absent parent, but tangentially also to benefit all those other children whose cases are delayed as court lists are clogged up…”.

The Local Authority rely upon lack of care (section 31(2)(b)(i) Children Act 1989). I will consider each of the allegations in turn.

The composite threshold records:

Within the bundle there is a record of a strategy meeting on 7 February 2023. It refers to a referral from the CETR in relation to a sibling. It seems to erroneously record the sibling and C being made subject to a Child Protection Plan on 25 August 2022 although goes on to say “since the CIN plan”. The minutes of the meeting record:

The minutes record CAMHS attempting to see C the previous week but “M reported it wasn’t a good time” and when they later met “M reported C would rather meet via facetime” [F93].

The Assistant Team Manager reported the social worker visiting every 15 days “but on the last two occasions she hasn’t been able to physically see the children or go upstairs, but Mum has given excuses for this” [F94].

The report from the “Emotional Health Academy” was minuted as “F said he noticed there was a number of attempts to arrange an appointment for C via Mum and Mum informed the emotional health academy her phone wasn't working which did ring alarm bells around her potentially blocking communication” [F96].

The Eating Disorders Team reported “A said Mum often calls in on the day to cancel the appointments and will report different excuses such as car issues, or her own health difficulties.” [F98] and the Risk Factors section of the minutes recorded under the heading “What are we worried about” a “lack of engagement from parents which is hindering [the] progression of the CIN plan and health plans for the children/disguised compliance”.

On this contemporaneous evidence I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that:

The composite threshold records:

The minutes of the strategy meeting indicate C was seen by CAMHS on 6 February 2023 [F93] and that C was admitted to Basingstoke hospital in January 2023 [F92]. The CAMHS note of a professionals meeting on 3 February 2023 records “Social Worker has not seen children since November, upstairs during visits to home and Mum reports they do not want to be seen. GP offered home visit to see C regarding eyesight, this was declined by Mum” [MED B51]. The CAMHS record indicates that C was an in patient at Basingstoke and North Hampshire Hospital from 31 December 2022 [MED B70]. Accordingly I find the following on the balance of probabilities:

The composite threshold records:

The evidence of the social worker was:

Father says “this statement is a lie”. I have not seen the letter but the Father says the letter said:

I find the allegation proved on the balance of probabilities:

The composite threshold records:

In her witness statement Ms Rosier said:

When Ms Rosier gave evidence she said that on some of the visits F expressed that she was trespassing on private property and did not have the right to attend and on other occasions that C did not wish to see her. Ms Rosier was appointed on 13 February 2024.

On this evidence I conclude on the balance of probabilities:

The composite threshold records:

The Local Authority evidence is:

Ms Rosier gave oral evidence that she chaired the meeting on 25 April 2025 and the note is accurate.

The Father’s response is:

The Father has not filed a final statement and did not cross-examine Ms Rosier or Ms Arnold (having been removed from the hearing for indicating he was recording and refusing to desist from doing so). On the balance of probabilities I make the following findings which are consistent with the Father’s admission that “the family was exercising its legislative rights not to engage”:

The composite threshold records:

The Keyworking Team chronology records receiving an email from the Father on 10 April 2024 “regarding withdrawal of consent for Key Working Team” [CAO F66]. The CAMHS record of a professionals meeting on 1 May 2024 records:

The reference to “Alice” is to a member of the CAMHS team. On this primary evidence I accept the Local Authority allegation on the balance of probabilities:

The composite threshold records:

The evidence above supports the allegation of withdrawal of consent but there is no evidence this directly or indirectly led to a deterioration in C’s health. The allegation is not proved on the balance of probabilities.

The composite threshold records:

The GP record for 25 April 2024 records “some deterioration in condition since last visit” [MED C8]. The allegation that F requested an end to face to face visits is not evidenced in any primary document. The Core Group meeting minutes for 6 June 2024 record the GP saying she had not been able to see C for 6 weeks but was due to visit that day and reported that prior to the visit on 25 April 2024 C “had made a vast improvements [sic]” [CAO F48]. Accordingly, save that “some deterioration” was noted on 25 April 2024, I do not find the allegation proved.

The composite threshold records:

The minutes of the meeting record:

I have not found any evidence that the deterioration reported was “attributable to the parents’ persistent failure to engage” as alleged. Accordingly, save as noted above, there was noted to have been some deterioration between March and April 2024 which I do not consider relevant to threshold and I do not find the allegation proved.

The composite threshold records:

Ms Rosier’s oral evidence was that although she had no direct recollection of the discussion about assessments at the PLO meeting “we would discuss assessments, what they mean and what they would look like”. I accept that evidence on the balance of probabilities. That is in part the point of the pre-proceedings meeting, it would be extraordinary if the reasons for assessment, essentially the reason for invoking the pre-proceedings process, was not given. In essence though the allegation is admitted and I find:

The composite threshold records:

The CAMHS record for 5 July 2024 records:

On that primary evidence I find the allegation proved, although the note refers to “the family” not consenting the allegation is pleaded against the Father and I go no further than that:

The composite threshold records:

This is a matter of court record. The order was made by HHJ Greenfield on the grounds alleged [CAO B17]. I find the allegation proved:

The local authority has reasonable cause to suspect that C is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm;

An assessment of the state of C’s health and development is required to enable the local authority to determine whether or not C is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and

It is unlikely that such an assessment will be made, or will be satisfactory, in the absence of a child assessment order under section 43 Children Act 1989.

The composite threshold records:

The in-patient Responsible Clinician’s report (form T131) prepared for the First Tier Tribunal confirmed detention required by reason of a mental health disorder and in relation to assessment recorded:

It recorded detention was justified or necessary in the interests of C’s health or safety and if discharged she would likely act in a manner dangerous to herself [J5].

Whilst there is evidence that discharge prematurely would not have been in C’s welfare interest (and the application was in fact refused) there is no evidence that the Father applied for the discharge as opposed to C. I do not find the allegation proved.

The composite threshold records:

There is a short report from the Elective Home Education service at [F6]. It records full engagement, no concerns about the education being provided and it concluded:

I think the allegation as originally drafted confuses the acronym EHE with “Emotional Health Academy” and there is no evidence of cancelled appointments with the Elective Home Education service or of declined support.

However, as amended there is more merit. The GOSH report records:

When M gave oral evidence she did not accept the allegation. In relation to peer relationships she said “C was mixing in home ed groups before Covid but not since”. I find the allegation proved to this more limited extent:

The composite threshold records:

A GP record for 30 December 2022 records “hardly eating” [MED A79].

The admission record from Basingstoke hospital dated 1 January 2023 records:

The Safeguarding Children Liaison form from Basingstoke hospital dated 3 January 2023 records:

The discharge summary of 12 January 2023 records:

In oral evidence the Mother accepted it was around 3 days that C had not eaten for. On that and the contemporaneous evidence I find that:

The CAMHS record for 27 March 2023 records C not leaving the house “since early 2020 (apart from two hospital admissions)” [MED B19]. The GP record for 4 April 2023 records a call to the Mother referencing “was in Basingstoke hospital earlier this year” [MED C28] which suggests a single visit some time before. However, there is a discharge summary dated 17 February 2023 from Basingstoke hospital recorded a 3 day admission with fever, enuresis and abdominal pain [MED A88]. On balance therefore I find that:

The composite threshold records:

There is no suggestion in the relevant discharge summary of a reluctant discharge [MED A90]. A home visit was cancelled by the Mother on 23 January 2023 because C was asleep [MED B59], it was rescheduled for 26 January 2023 and went ahead [MED B57], the next visit due on 31 January 2023 was cancelled as the Mother said she had been sick [MED B56], the next meeting was to have been on 2 February 2023 [MED B57] but the Mother messaged that day as she had been trying to wake C for 40 minutes [MED B53], the meeting went ahead although C was not seen [MED B53]. Accordingly I find:

The composite threshold records:

Denied by Mother.

The GOSH report concludes:

I have considered the GOSH report in much greater detail when considering welfare below. On the evidence set out, in particular under the heading “Capability of parents: Mother”, I make this finding on the balance of probabilities:

The composite threshold records:

The GOSH report concludes:

As above, I have considered the GOSH report in much greater detail when considering welfare below. On the evidence set out, in particular under the heading “Capability of parents: Father”, I make the following finding:

The composite threshold records:

The GOSH report concludes:

This evidence is insufficient to reach the conclusion sought on the balance of probabilities.

Particularly by reference to my findings on allegations 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15 and 16 I find that the first limb of the threshold test in section 31(2) is made out on the balance of probabilities. Whilst I do not find that C’s presentation was fundamentally caused by the parents I am satisfied its extent has been because it has left C less able to access support to aid recovery.

I now turn now to the considerations under section 1(3) Children Act 1989

The Guardian has set out her engagement with C in this way; it is important to set this out because the Guardian’s position does not match that of C. C’s solicitor has consistently assessed her as lacking capacity to conduct this litigation and that is supported by an assessment by GOSH (7 February 2025 [E348]):

On her wishes the Guardian reported:

C tells me in her letter that she feels sad all the time and is only happy when with her family but the time with them is too short. She tells me she will return home when she turns 18 and does not feel she is getting the right support in placement and wants her dog to be with her. She wants to either return home or live with A and her husband. The letter could not be clearer to me; her views are obviously strongly held and given her age I give them significant weight.

The GOSH report summarises C’s presentation and background in this way:

On admission to the psychiatric unit in August 2024 GOSH report her presentation as:

It developed in this way:

In the chronology C then moved to the first residential placement and GOSH report increasing refusal to attend education and spending more time in her room than “downstairs” [E469].

The GOSH report summarises her diagnoses:

Their evidence on treatment needs was:

In her updating statement Ms Arnold says that she observed a decline in C’s wellbeing in April 2025 after C had left the placement apparently to meet with strangers with an intention of falling pregnant, but “This has changed, and C is now going to Exceed to look after her rats, and she is engaging well with another young person in the placement”.

Ms Laulik-Walters summarises the care arrangements in the former placement (and I assume this continues in the associated new placement) in this way:

She went on to report:

The Guardian’s oral evidence was:

Ms Laulik-Walters says:

She was asked to consider the effect of a Care Order further in cross-examination and said “I think it’s likely C will struggle, it could impact her mental health negatively, increase her OCD, might see a regression, alternatively when she knows what is happening and has some certainty it may help her to settle”.

Regrettably, on day 1 of the final hearing I was told the placement had received a closure notice from Ofsted, the placement not being registered with Ofsted. It was necessary for C to move placement within 48 hours to another, short term but Ofsted registered, placement within the same care home group. This is likely to have been highly damaging for C: first it was a move of placement, second it was during the course of the final hearing and third because of the unexpected urgency. The care plan is for her to move back to the original placement after it becomes registered. That has the potential for further emotional harm to C.

Ms Laulik-Walters was asked to think about the risks to C of a final care order contrary to her wishes. She accepted there was a risk she “may vote with her feet”. The consequences for C may be repeat DOLS applications or an unplanned breakdown in the care plan. Both present risks to C’s emotional wellbeing. She asserted that C “has to be involved in the care plan” to mitigate the risk. I took her to mean C to be informed, supported and encouraged to understand the benefits.

Dr Prentice’s evidence was that a Care Order and the care plan, being contrary to C’s wishes, may lead to possible “temporary regression” with C isolating herself more and a lowering of C’s mood.

The Mother’s evidence was that the making of Care Order would have a hugely negative impact on C, she thought she would not want to continue living, she could see that stalling her progress or causing regression, see her “just giving up and losing the will and hope”.

The Guardian’s evidence was “she will be very unhappy” but it is difficult to know how things will go; she said that “the progress in care is positive and when she has certainty around the care plan I hope she will engage more”.

The Local Authority case summary summarises the testing evidence of the Mother in this way:

Recent alcohol testing dated 21 July 2025 indicates no chronic or excessive consumption from January to June 2025 and abstinence (as the Mother says) or low alcohol consumption in the month to 14 July 2025 [E874].

The Local Authority case summary in relation Dr Musters’ assessment sets out the following (I have added the relevant bundle references and the summary accords with my reading of the report):

Interestingly, the Mother’s original position for this hearing demonstrated a shift from her position to Dr Musters in that he recorded:

In cross-examination, Ms Laulik-Walters was asked about the Father’s behaviour (becoming annoyed, animated, raising his voice, shouting when disagreeing with the GOSH report) and how that may impact on C. She thought C may become dismissive of professionals if she saw her father’s response and did not consider the Mother had the capacity to prevent that. When Ms Rosier gave evidence she agreed the PLO meeting on 14 June 2024 lasted 2 hours but “nothing was really accomplished” and that the Review Child Protection Conference on 9 July 2024 was “terminated because the Father was so focused on his needs”. I address this further below as it touches on the Father’s capacity but in relation to the Mother Ms Rosier was asked if she had demonstrated an ability to “pull the Father back to talking about C’s needs”; she said the Mother had not and she had never seen her to challenge or disagree with the Father in meetings. Ms Arnold later agreed.

The Mother’s position has changed several times. Earlier in proceedings the Mother was expressing a desire to leave the family home and for C to live with her elsewhere and Ms Laulik-Walters in her final assessment reported that at the time of the interim assessment the Mother was keen to move out but at the time of the final assessment said she “is not currently looking to move” and “She feels that she and F both bring their “own strengths” and “it makes sense for them both to remain present to support C together” [E787-E788]. That was her position in her witness statement dated just two weeks before the commencement of the final hearing [C299/28], yet in her position statement she reverted to her previous view and ultimately after hearing all the evidence she adopted the position set out above of not opposing a Care Order.

When she gave oral evidence the Mother set out a little more of her thinking. She said the reason for the change indicated in her witness statement was that assistance offered by her parents was withdrawn and she did not have the finances to fund her moving out; but her intention now is to put the family home on the market when these proceedings conclude, this will realise her share of the capital. She would then find alternative accommodation for her, C and C’s two adult siblings currently living at home. In the meantime she said the Father would move out. That does not accord with her witness statement which, as above, was of there being strength in her and the Father parenting together. She was asked about that on behalf of the Guardian and gave a very unsatisfactory explanation that her position statement is what she would have wanted to say in her witness statement but she had not finished re-writing the statement by the time it had to be filed and served and she felt under time pressure. It was put to her that in fact what was in her statement is what she told Ms Laulik-Walters so there had really been no time pressure.

The Mother was also cross-examined on the practicalities of such a plan. She thought it was realistic for her to care for C’s adult siblings, notwithstanding she reported to GOSH that one of those siblings had “much higher” needs than C [E495/5.195]. She was asked if the Father had agreed to move out and said she did not have anything in writing. She was asked where he would go and she said to the Paternal Grandmother but did not know if she had agreed that plan. She was asked what would happen if the Father in fact came back, given that he was a co-owner of the home, in particular if he then did not let social workers see C, as has occurred in the past. She said there would be rules and boundaries and she said she would seek help from the Local Authority and the police. I said to her I had not seen evidence of that in the bundle and she said she had stood up against the Father “just not in front of people”. Of course I have to decide the case on the evidence presented. In particular, it was put to her that when the Father was given a letter indicating a change in contact arrangements for the Father on 8 August 2025 he was frustrated, he said in front of C he was not going to have contact in a contact centre and clung on to C saying “you might never see me again, it might be the last time you see me”. She agreed that happened, she said it was “disgraceful” behaviour by him, “hurtful” and would make C feel vulnerable. She also agreed, and this is the important bit in relation to C returning home, she did not do anything to stop it although said that was a judgment call in the moment so as not to inflame the situation. I could accept that evidence if that was the only example of the Mother not standing up to the Father, but it is not. In the course of her evidence other points were considered:

When the Guardian gave evidence she said of co-parenting with F, “It’s tough, it’s complicated, I suppose the concern is she hasn’t through any work with professionals challenged him and the first sight of that is in this hearing…she is at the beginning of a process on that”.

Whilst Ms Arnold agreed the Mother’s change of position was a positive step and indicated an increasing willingness to work with the Local Authority, in light of the previous changes there must be some concern that if C returns to the family home the Mother will not put any plan to move out into effect.

Ms Laulik-Walters was asked about the change in oral evidence. She said that she was worried there had been changes and how unsettling that might be for C “not knowing what was happening there”. She was asked how the revised position affected her assessment of risk. She said that if the Mother remained in the home and the Father moved out but was visiting regularly to be involved in meeting the adult siblings’ care needs it would not make a difference, there would remain a risk of the Father not letting professionals have access to C. Conversely, if the Father moved out and did not return to assist that would be a lot for the Mother to manage and she agreed there would be a risk of the Mother being “spread too thin”. She had been asked earlier in her evidence about her assessment of risk if the Mother moved out and she said her concern was still the Mother’s ability to allow others to care for C, she was not aware of a change in that area and if Mother and C were together without the Father there was a risk “it could become very enmeshed”. She agreed that “in the immediate future it’s just too risky” for C to be cared for by Mother at home with the Father leaving the home.

Dr Prentice was also asked to consider the options in her oral evidence. She said there was a high risk of relapse, “if C is very anxious and says ‘I can’t do that’ I think it would be difficult for the Mother to not step in and help her”. Specifically on returning to the home environment she was concerned that the presence of two adult siblings with difficulties “would also get in the way of C’s development” and “might present an alternative normal that she slips in to”. In relation to living solely with the Mother she thought concerns would not be mitigated, “concerns about lack of independence, only feeling safe with M and were she just to live with M nothing to suggest that wouldn’t persist”. She also referenced the Mother’s changing position suggests she is “unsure what is gong to be most helpful” and “it may be difficult for the Mother to know what is best for C at the moment and that is not best for C either.”

When the Guardian gave evidence it was a similar picture. She described the Father bombarding professionals, undermining them. The Mother would have to “put in place plans to boundary him”, that was yet to be seen in practice and there is a risk of the Father obstructing professionals working with C and his narrative that the professionals are “incapable and not doing our jobs properly” trickles down to C and “that will be hard for the Mother to deal with”. She also considered how Mother caring for the adult siblings would fit with seeking to care for C and said, “I struggle to see how M could challenge C [in her OCD] in that environment…what is not known is how the family would function without F”.

Dr Musters also sheds some light on why the Mother’s relationship with C may be contrary to C’s welfare:

But whilst Dr Musters considers that might be right it is a complex issue.

The following comments were made in the GOSH report:

When giving oral evidence, Dr Prentice said that the Mother was not directly saying to C she was not able to manage but having the view that “you have this disability, you can’t manage demands, focus on what not able to do, that comes from a place of care but unfortunately it comes at a cost of not promoting independence, coping skills and resilience”.

I have considered this in more detail below under the risk of harm heading.

The Mother disagrees with the GOSH assessment. I note a somewhat rigid response in her witness statement (for instance taking issue with GOSH recording “C appeared disabled by her symptoms of OCD” [E466] and the Mother commenting OCD is “a disability by definition” [C294]). Whilst the Mother is no doubt right this demonstrates quite well what GOSH have highlighted. Doing my best to paraphrase the lengthy and nuanced report it is that the Mother focuses on what C cannot do rather than challenging her to live independently. That is echoed in her complaint that GOSH record “a tendency for C to retreat when stressed” [E466] saying that is “a symptom of her condition and an example of a way that I do not feel C’s diagnoses have been taken in to account” [C295]; it is a focus on what she must not be able to do because of her condition rather than what she may be capable of doing.

Ms Laulik-Walters reported the Mother to have been thinking about the home environment with C in mind [E788/2.3] and noted:

The Mother said she thought she was being portrayed as a “monster” in proceedings. Ms Laulik-Walters considered rather that increased observation of the Mother since C had become looked after had “allowed increased assessment” of the Mother leading to the various conclusions being reached.

She reports the Mother feeling like she comes across as controlling because people have not done what they say they are going to do and it is her who has to fight “tooth and nail for everything” [E793/3.11] but Ms Laulik-Walters’ reflection was that the Mother presented as anxious about the care her daughter was receiving and that “unconsciously impacts her interactions with C”; she gave a specific example of this that she witnessed [E793/3.12]. That is also picked up in the report of the Mother’s view that the support provided to C “is not sufficient for her”, as Ms Laulik-Walters comments this “is likely to impact how she engages with the professional network, and possibly C” [E798/4.12]. That was developed further when considering the Mother’s (and Father’s) concern that the professional network were exaggerating the progress C was making. Ms Laulik-Walters was “struck by the somewhat overwhelming manner” in which this was done with both continually questioning accounts provided and suggesting they were “essentially being provided in an attempt to deceive”. She felt this was unlikely (as do I) and wondered whether C was being questioned by them about it, which may feed in to a narrative of dependence or a feeling on C’s part she has to paint a poorer picture of the situation to appear loyal [E800/5.8]. Neither alternative bodes well for a return to the parents’ care.

Ms Laulik-Walters also expressed concern that well intentioned intervention to meet care needs on the part of the Mother could “sometimes cause C to regress somewhat, allowing her mother to take over and there is a danger that both could slip back to M (unconsciously) increasingly doing things for C, rather than supporting C to do them for herself” [E802/5.12]. Allied to this, whilst she acknowledges the Mother to be a “font of knowledge” she is concerned how this may be perceived by C; if she understands her mother to be advocating that only certain engagement methods can work and no-one else can care for her it may “affect her motivation, self-belief, and emotional wellbeing” [E804-5/5.19]. That lead to her opinion that “C’s emotional needs are significant and, were she to return home, I feel she may again become reliant on her mother to manage” [E807/5.27] and:

Ms Laulik-Walters reported the Mother being frank that she had no active support network she can rely upon [E794/4.1] and that the Father was “her main source of support” [E795/4.4], which of course begs the question how that might impact the Mother’s capacity were they to separate as she now proposes.

It is important to note that despite the negative assessment Ms Laulik-Walters freely and enthusiastically agreed that “M is absolutely committed to C…I believe she’s always tried to do her best for [the children]”, she can speak in detail of their needs and the support she had tried to get for them, she is a skilled parent who has worked incredibly hard to understand C’s needs, she is warm, compassionate and strives very hard for her and her “knowledge of C’s diagnoses is immense”, she is incredibly skilled. The Guardian echoed this:

However, Ms Laulik-Walters noted some lack of insight (for instance the Mother did not believe her provision of snacks to C to be a significant issue even when it was pointed out it reduces the incentive on C to leave her room [E796/4.7]).

Ms Laulik-Walters felt that if the Mother was not able to accept some of the issues she would be concerned how she would work with professionals in the future and from reading her recent statement she noted she is not ready for that and “it is quite deep rooted”. She was asked to consider what work might be undertaken to address that and said it was more the area of expertise of the multi-disciplinary team. She agreed if the Mother could be helped that would be beneficial to her and C. Dr Prentice’s oral evidence was that the treatment could come via CAMHS although their provision is variable. She said an independent psychotherapist could undertake the work but they would need to join regular professionals’ meetings and meet with the CAMHS treating clinicians directly and be provided with sufficient information about the court proceedings.

I noted there was no provision for therapeutic work for the Mother in the care plan and invited the Local Authority to reflect on that which they did in producing an amended final care plan.

I thought that Ms Arnold summarised the Mother’s current position very well in saying that when she read the Mother’s final witness statement, which was highly critical of the GOSH report, she was worried but on reading her position statement for this hearing (including the revised position of planning to practically separate from the Father) she thought she was “seeing an inkling of insight creeping through but it’s later in proceedings and there’s still work to be done”. Later she set out what was required of the Mother: separating from the Father as a first priority and then gaining insight into what has come out of the professional assessment (by GOSH) with honesty about whether there has been emotional abuse, perhaps controlling behaviour, by the Father in the relationship.

I noted that when M was cross-examined she said she worked “so hard with professionals and following advice” and C being unwell was not anything to do with the care she was giving C. Whilst I acknowledge how difficult it must be for a parent to accept shortcomings, especially in the context of care proceedings challenging their parenting, it demonstrated a stark lack of insight into the harm the professional evidence indicates M’s approach to parenting has caused, albeit I accept with no deliberate attempt to cause harm on M’s part. On reading the GOSH report it is really quite impossible to form the view that M’s parenting had no negative impact on C’s welfare.

When cross-examined about what would happen if C went home and said she did not want to see the social worker in person (as was the case prior to admission to hospital) M said “I’d work very closely with the social worker to ensure that we attempted to facilitate that happening”. When it was put to her that is what she said she had done before she agreed. There was no acceptance that what was done before was not sufficient.

M was asked if there was anything about the way she parented C that needs to change. Her response was that if it was something to do with her parenting then she is open to sitting down to find out where her deficit is. First, I cannot accept it is an “if”, the professional evidence all points to C’s condition being contributed to by her parenting. Second, the GOSH report sets out clearly what needs to be done. If M cannot recognise that yet it is hard to see she is in fact open to finding out where the deficit is.

Finally I acknowledge that the Mother changed her position immediately prior to closing submissions. I credit her with that. It was brave and child-focussed. As will be apparent from the rest of this judgment, I consider it reflects the welfare needs of C. It further reflects the Mother’s emerging insight; I hope she will forgive me for putting it in this way, I mean it positively not patronisingly.

Ms Laulik-Walters concluded:

Even if there was sufficient insight there is risk with the living arrangements proposed (as set out above) but also the Guardian said her worry was that “what we’re asking M to do is very complex, C is and has been very unwell and will immediately expect M to resolve her distress and for M to shift [her response], that will be very difficult”.

The Local Authority case summary sets out the following (I have added the relevant bundle references and the summary accords with my reading of the psychiatric report):

By way of further detail I note:

As noted above from the GOSH report:

Further:

I have covered some of Ms Laulik-Walters assessment above as she held a joint session with the parents to consider the GOSH report at their request. The crucial starting point for an assessment of the Father is encapsulated within two paragraphs of Ms Laulik-Walters’ report because it addresses the Father’s focus on his disability and his needs (with my emphasis):

In similar vein later in the report:

This very much reflects how he has approached these proceedings with an intense focus on his needs and rights (for instance the 40 applications made in July), which to a great extent has deflected from a focus by him on C’s needs. It has, at times, been hard to keep proceedings focused on C’s welfare for this reason.

Similarly, another aspect of my experience of the Father’s engagement with proceedings is echoed in this passage in the report:

She reaches the following conclusions (my emphasis):

I note that F sent a reply to my judicial response confirming he would be admitted to the final hearing by CVP if he wished but would be asked to confirm he was not recording; he sent a further message attaching a document written by C giving her consent to him recording. It demonstrates him involving C inappropriately in the court process and again risks demonstrating to C his disagreement with the process.

Ms Laulik-Walters continued in relation to C absconding from the placement:

It is quite hard to reconcile this with the position he adopted in response to the Local Authority application for a Deprivation of Liberty Order which was heard by HHJ Moradifar and which was vehemently opposed by him in correspondence and he has sought permission to appeal (although I am not clear whether that has progressed in the absence of him paying the appropriate fee). The Guardian commented on this in her final analysis saying “it seems to indicate a lack of recognition of the risks that C can put herself in” [E892] (a comment that she applies to both parents in this context).

The report continued in relation to F’s response to the therapeutic team around C:

When the previous social worker, Ms Rosier, gave evidence she was taken to her evidence at [C20/1.18] in which she referred to the suggestion of stepping down the Child Protection Plan to a Child in Need Plan to attempt to “eliminate [the parents’] fears of professional involvement”. Her oral evidence was that would not normally be a reason for a step down and she was asked whether, from her involvement, professionals’ worries about complaints from the Father may have played a part. She agreed and also agreed that his presentation was “very powerful and that affected the decisions about a very vulnerable child”. She gave concrete examples of that: that the Father would “often record me at the property stating I was trespassing, we had to have a second social worker attending because of intimidation”, he was verbally aggressive and she agreed the obstruction particularly by the Father “had a considerable impact on professionals’ ability to help C and keep her well”.

That evidence was echoed by the assistant team manager, Ms Arnold who, in answer to a question about how the Father had presented during proceedings said:

That last piece of evidence has been my experience during these proceedings: there is an unremitting focus by the Father on his needs almost to the exclusion of appropriate focus on C’s welfare needs. That is amply demonstrated by the Father’s refusal to confirm he will not record hearings the consequence of which has sadly been that he has been unable to play an active role in this final hearing addressing C’s welfare.

Ms Arnold went on to say it was important for the Mother to support any final care order but that it would be difficult for her if the Father was undermining the placement. Worryingly she said:

A review of the DOLS order was listed to be heard on the first day of the final hearing (4 August 2025), it having been granted on 4 July 2025. I was informed that day that an alternative placement was having to be sourced and I extended the order to 6 August 2025 to enable notice to be given to the Father. The Local Authority filed a position statement on the morning of 6 August the content of which was extremely disturbing:

I extended the DOLS Order to the date of handing down this judgment on 16 September 2025. C was fortunately able to be accommodated in an alternative provision close by with the same educational provision and the support staff could be moved with her. As noted above the fact there was a change of placement and the fact it was at such short notice must have been exceptionally upsetting for C. Whilst I was not invited to make a finding, there must be a suspicion that the “member of the public with concerns” about a 16 year old in the placement was in fact the Father and in giving oral evidence the Mother said that the Father told her he had emailed Ofsted. If it was the Father it chimes entirely with Ms Arnold’s evidence, set out immediately above.

In the event a final Care Order was made then placements ending for reasons other than C’s welfare would be very destabilising for C and would have the potential to cause great harm to her.

Ms Laulik-Walters variously reported (my emphasis):

Ms Laulik-Walters concluded:

Much of the evidence in relation to risk of harm has been covered above when considering parenting capacity but drawing some strands together I note the following evidence:

The GOSH report considered predisposing and perpetuating factors (my emphasis):

The report concluded:

In the Local Authority final evidence Ms Arnold said “I am not confident that M would be able to override F’s views and allow professionals into the home without the Court’s oversight.” [C260]. That is entirely consistent with my experience of the Father in these proceedings. Whilst it may be the result of his disability, the Father has at almost every turn put up barriers to engagement with the proceedings (for instance demanding documents are served only by post and the Local Authority were not even permitted to hand deliver documents to his door). Ms Arnold also relies upon comments by the Mother to Dr Musters:

Of course the Mother did not at that stage step in and take over and the risk is she will not do so in the future and the Father will, in her words, really struggle to keep working with the Local Authority.

Ms Arnold also made reference to the Father’s comment in the parenting assessment that he always encouraged C to meet with social workers except when she “stated she did not want to see them” [E838]. She said, and I agree, “Should C return home and state (again) that she does not want to see professionals, then it is highly likely that F would stop all support, and this would result in C deteriorating” [C262].

The Guardian has summarised the evidence very succinctly (and I cannot improve upon it) in this way:

As to the risks from the Mother’s revised position Ms Arnold gave this evidence:

When giving evidence, M accepted there is no reason to think F’s undermining of relationships between her and professionals would stop; she said the Father “is who he is and even the risk of losing C, he has not amended his ways”.

The Guardian presents a summary of the parties’ roles in this way:

The consequence is:

The initial viability assessment of A and her husband is very positive. The couple have a good understanding of C’s medical conditions and empathy towards them [C238], together with lived experience of meeting similar needs [C242]; they demonstrated a clear understanding of the importance of education [C241]. From a practical point of view work needs to be done to bring their accommodation up to standard and renovation works are under way [C240]. Of greatest need for fuller assessment are their medical conditions set out at [C242] which include depression and social anxiety (A’s husband) and autism, anxiety, depression, PTSD, OCD and Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome. That requires both fuller investigation and consideration of how C’s complex needs can be met adequately whilst managing those conditions.

The kinship assessment plan envisages a full connected persons assessment being completed by 31 October 2025 [C305].

The Guardian identified the risks in this way:

It is plain I am not in a position to be satisfied at present that they can provide good enough care to C in light of C’s current presentation. They remain a viable option and as noted above the Local Authority will assess them further.

The GOSH report considers:

This reduction in contact was sanctioned on an interim basis and represents the current arrangement.

Ms Laulik-Walters said, and I agree, “C is currently 16 years old and there is a small window of opportunity prior to her reaching adulthood where she can be supported to increase her independence” [E810/5.39].

In her oral evidence Ms Laulik-Walters confirmed she recommended a Care Order under which there could be an assessment both of A and her husband and to assess whether the Mother can make changes such that she is in a position to offer C safe care.

The Guardian has considered the options in this way:

I come now to consider the balancing exercise that is required by B-S.

Realistic Option 1: Return home

Realistic Option 2: Remaining in placement with a Care Order

Realistic Option 3: Placement with A and her husband with a Care Order

I was struck by a sentence in the Guardian’s oral evidence when she was asked about the risks of a Care Order, having said C would be very unhappy she said “but the risks of returning home are clear, relapse on OCD, are clear whereas the progress in care is positive”. I observe the risks arising from a Care Order are real and significant but the response in care has been positive. The risks of a return home are also real and significant but the evidence is that at home there was deterioration not progress. Putting it clearly, the evidence suggests some uncertainty about improvement in care but conversely relative certainty that at home there will be no progression; that is what all the professional evidence and recent past history indicates. I am balancing uncertainty but with the hope of progress against virtual certainty of no progress. On that analysis the weighing of the factors leads inexorably to a conclusion the least worst option for C, that which is in her best interest, is the making of a Care Order with a plan to remain in residential care.

Whilst the contact aspect of the care plan proposes a continuation of current contact arrangements for the Mother it proposes a change for the Father, namely a move from the placement to a contact centre (keeping supervised contact in the home fortnightly). The Guardian agrees the plan and in her final analysis said:

The Local Authority say the change for the Father is necessitated by the evidence of the operations director set out below. That evidence is supported by the Mother’s oral evidence set out above that at contact on 8 August 2025, when the Father was informed of the change in the plan for his contact, he was frustrated, he said in front of C he was not going to have contact in a contact centre and clung on to C saying “you might never see me again, it might be the last time you see me”.

In the witness statement of the placement operations director it is said that F’s behaviour at contact “has not been acceptable or appropriate” [C322]; I have set out the specific examples of this relied upon under the heading “Non-Molestation Order against the Father” below.

Moving to a contact centre has a number of disadvantages: it involves travel for C, it is a less natural environment for C, it would mean she could not more directly share what she has been doing in placement and the supervisors will, at least initially, not be known to C or F which may make it more awkward. However, it avoids the risk of placement breakdown which I consider further below. The consequences of this would be harmful to C’s welfare. I also note there is no reduction in contact proposed. On balance I consider the proposal is in C’s welfare interest and of course the Local Authority will keep it under review as part of the LAC review process.

As regards indirect contact, the Guardian expressed concerns about indirect contact with the parents and considers boundaries are required [E909/42]. She developed this in her oral evidence saying the position is different for each parent: C has a close relationship with M and C’s “lifeline” is her phone so she would not want there to be restrictions, taking it away would be “detrimental but it is something that needs to be kept under review” although with M it is “okay”. She went on to consider restrictions on the Father in relation to a Non-Molestation Order and section 91(14) Order and she thought a Non-Molestation Order in relation to the Father’s indirect contact “could be helpful”. I will consider this further below.

By section 63(1) and (2)(g) Family Law Act 1996 these are “family proceedings” being brought under Part IV of the Children Act 1989. Accordingly, and on the authority of Re T if needed, there is power to make a non-molestation order against the Father notwithstanding there is no application for the same. The Local Authority invite me to make the order. The Guardian supports the order being made. The Mother was neutral. I proceed on the basis the Father opposes the making of such an order although he did not address me on the issue as he was disconnected from the hearing on 14 August because he refused to confirm he was not recording.

The Local Authority initially invited a Non-Molestation Order in these terms:

I would say immediately that an injunction to direct the Father to focus on C’s welfare is not an injunction that can be made under section 42 of the Family Law Act 1996. The extent of the power is to prohibit molestation (section 42(1)) not to mandate behaviour. The Local Authority recognised that and in closing submissions did not pursue the point.

Next, I consider if there is evidence of harassment of C noting that the placement cannot be considered an “associated person” as would be required for an order under section 42(1)(a) by reference to the definition of associated person in section 63(1) which in turn refers to section 62(3) to (6).

I derive some further assistance from the specific facts of Re T (above). In that case the behaviour complained of was set out in this way:

The judge at first instance determined that did not amount to harassment sufficient to call for the intervention of the court, the reasoning being, as set out in Re T:

The Court of Appeal disagreed, McFarlane LJ holding (my emphasis):

I have considered whether it would be a proper exercise of the court’s jurisdiction to use the mechanism of a Family Law Act injunction to prevent the Father communicating directly with the placement in the exercise of a statutory right to request information, such as under data protection legislation, but I am reassured the injunction sought does not prevent such requests but would require them to be directed via the Local Authority. That is similar to an injunction preventing direct communication with a co-parent about the exercise of parental responsibility and requiring it to be via that other parent’s solicitor or third party as is often ordered when making a Non-Molestation Order.

The Local Authority rely upon a statement prepared by the Operations Director of the company running both placements (the one C was in prior to it changing during the course of the final hearing and the one to which she moved). Her evidence was not challenged in cross-examination and is of the Father sending “a number of emails over the period from 27.2.25 to the 10.4.25” to the registered manager. The manager is described to have found them “demanding and threatening in tone”. They ceased on 10 April 2025 when an email was sent informing the Father communication must be through the Local Authority. It is reported the Father made a false allegation about the manager reporting him to police which was not the case. Communication then commenced with the operations manager and is described in this way:

The Guardian’s oral evidence was that she has found interactions with the Father “bombarding and undermining, there was a time it was daily, instructions on what I should do, criticisms of my practice, that I should step down, that NYAS should do my job, I was constantly having to defend my practice, the ongoing interaction is hard to manage...it was similar to the communications with the placement”. That is consistent with my experience of the Father’s dealings with the court. I have made reference to the number of “applications” he has made but there has also been a significant volume of correspondence directed to me and I am also aware to HMCTS. The Guardian said Cafcass and the Local Authority can put strategies in place to respond but “if you bombard the placement you risk them giving notice, it’s stressful, difficult to manage and that would be awful for C. It is a high risk because it’s a pattern of behaviour that has happened over quite some time with professionals”. She went on to say “You can’t explore it with him, his understanding or his motivations, the bigger issue is if a Care Order is made he will struggle to accept that and what that means for all professionals acting”.

It is clear from this evidence that the placement stability is at risk by reason of the Father’s communications, that is akin to the foster placement in Re T. As noted in Re T there is no requirement for harassment to be intended, and I do not make that finding, but it is evidence of harassment. Further evidence comes from the operations director in relation to the Father’s behaviour at contact. I note that the Local Authority care plan is to move contact with the Father out of the placement and to a contact centre to mitigate this risk but it is evidence I can take into account in considering whether his conduct is such as to justify the making of an injunction as it is a predictor of likely future behaviour. The operations director says:

I also consider the Guardian’s oral evidence on the Father “using C as a means of trying to control a situation”. She was referred to two instances of F seeking C’s consent in furtherance of an objective of his. First, the Local Authority referred her to the Father’s “application” (not issued as no fee paid) for permission to record the final hearing. On 29 July 2025 the Father uploaded seven unissued applications to the portal. The last, uploaded at 12.03, said that “Both the mother and the child support the father’s reasonable adjustment.” On 1 August 2025 the Father sent an email to the court indicating he would record the hearing and that he had the Mother and C’s consent. He attached the following document which was dated 19 July 2025 and appeared to have been written by C, it ended with her name which I have removed:

When asked about this the Guardian said:

I then asked her about a series of emails from the Father to the operations director of the placements. In an email dated 21 July 2025 he said “I have raised a valid SAR [subject access request] with [the placement] and provided written consent from my child” [C350]; the written consent is not in the bundle but it would certainly be consistent with the above evidence for it to have been obtained. The Guardian said:

I asked if she had factored it in to her view on the Father’s indirect contact, she had not, she said that I could order no indirect contact but was concerned how that might be enforced. It seemed to me one possibility might be by way of an extension to the Non-Molestation Order the Local Authority were inviting me to make and she said:

On that evidence I conclude on the balance of probabilities that the Father has engaged in conduct that constitutes harassment; I accept the evidence of the operations director about the Father’s behaviour to them and in contact and on the Father’s own account I find he has sought to involve C in furthering his desire to record the hearing and obtain details about C held by the placement. I consider that calls for the intervention of the court: the continuation of the placement is threatened by the actions of the Father and it is not in C’s welfare interest for the Father to seek to involve her in “his agenda” to quote the Guardian.

Since this is an order made in care proceedings I am mindful of the Father’s article 8 right to respect for private and family life, home, and correspondence. Any order I make interfering with that must be necessary and proportionate. For the reasons given I consider it necessary. As to proportionality I turn to the specific wording and in particular the restriction on the frequency of contact with the placement via the Local Authority. The Local Authority invite me to restrict this to 1 email per week and I do not consider this unduly harsh or restrictive, in circumstances where I am making a Care Order such frequent communication about the placement might be said to be generous, certainly it is proportionate to the risk identified by the evidence.

In the circumstances I will make this order against the Father until C turns 18 or leaves her residential placement permanently pursuant to a change in her care plan whichever occurs first:

The Local Authority invited me to make a zonal order restricting the Father’s attendance at any placement. I am conscious the Father did not have notice that the Local Authority would seek such order as it was not prefaced by anything in the Local Authority’s evidence and not referred to in the order listing this consideration at [B343]. In the circumstances I decline to make the order.

As to restricting the Father’s indirect contact after a period of reflection the Local Authority ultimately did not invite me to extend any Non-Molestation Order to prevent indirect contact. The Mother remained neutral and, albeit considering it finely balanced, the Guardian supported it. For the reasons given above I assume the Father would oppose it.

I note the provision of section 34(5) Children Act 1989:

By section 34(4) “the court may make such order as it considers appropriate with respect to the contact which is to be allowed between the child and that person.”

In addressing me in closing submissions the Local Authority outline their rationale for not inviting any restrictions. First, because C communicates with her Father by telephone and perhaps via a gaming platform. If she were to send him a message and he felt obliged to reply there would be a breach. I do not consider that is strong factor against making the order, if the Father is served with the order he will know its terms. Second, the Local Authority were concerned how the order would be policed (the Guardian was keen for them not to be checking C’s phone). Again, I do not consider that a strong factor against making the order; the fact it is hard to police is irrelevant to whether it should be made, it is designed to be preventative in the first instance and in any event the Local Authority agreed they would be keeping indirect contact under review so to the extent monitoring compliance with a Non-Molestation Order is difficult so is reviewing the nature of the contact without an order being in place. Third, the Local Authority were concerned whether it would be in C’s welfare interest for the Father to be arrested and prosecuted in the event of a breach. That would be a matter out of the Local Authority’s hands but it seems unlikely C or the Father would report a breach so if anyone was going to it would be the Local Authority and no doubt could consider at that point whether it is in C’s welfare interest to do so. Lastly, they were concerned how such an order might be viewed by C and that it might be communicated negatively to C by the Father (perhaps along the lines of “they are now saying they are going to arrest me if I contact you”). Since the rest of the Father’s communication is supervised that should not happen in direct contact and indirect contact would be prohibited by the order. The related concern is how C may view the order when, as she must be, she is informed of the restriction. This can be mitigated by a careful, age-appropriate explanation to her, just as the making of a Care Order will need to be explained and as the change in contact arrangements for the Father will have been (i.e. his contact moving from the placement to a contact centre).

I canvassed with the Local Authority whether an application could be made by them to discharge the order if it was in due course appropriate and Ms Flowers suggested an application under section 34 to vary the contact restriction at the same time, the court being seised of the matter, the Non-Molestation Order could be varied or discharged.

During a short adjournment when hearing submissions Ms Honeyman took instructions on the above points. The Guardian’s position was put in this way:

As noted above the Guarding thought it finely balanced but supported the making of an order under section 34 and an allied Non-Molestation Order.

I consider such orders are necessary and proportionate. It is in C’s welfare interest to make both orders to avoid the risks identified by the Guardian. It will be open to the Local Authority to apply to discharge both orders in the event they consider indirect contact can resume in C’s welfare interest and the concerns raised by the Local Authority are not such as to tip the balance the other way. The terms of the section 34 Order and mirror Non-Molestation Order shall be:

Since the Non-Molestation Order must be served on the Father to be effective (FPR 10.6) and because there have been issues with serving the Father (he has refused to accept service by email, and withdrew implied permission to the Local Authority to enter the boundary of his property to personally serve or post documents through the letterbox) I will direct substituted service pursuant to FPR 6.19 by Royal Mail tracked delivery with the Local Authority to file a certificate of service attaching the delivery receipt.

The Local Authority invite me to consider making an order under section 91(14) Children Act 1989 restricting the Father from applying for a discharge of the Care Order or for an order for contact until C reaches 18. The making of such an order is supported by the Guardian, she said in evidence that if a Care Order is made the Local Authority will be able to make decisions for C independently and she worries that will prompt the Father to make applications as a way of making changes for C that he felt was best for her but she could not see how C could settle “if we were constantly coming back” to court. The Mother’s position is neutral. The Father is presumed to oppose the making of the order but as above did not remain in the hearing on 14 August 2025 to make submissions or state his position.

In support of the Guardian’s analysis I note that of the 43 “applications” filed from 1 July to 12 August 2025 the majority were for case management orders or reasonable adjustments by way of participation directions. However, two were for capacity reports of C, one was for disclosure from the placement, one was for an assessment of A and her husband prior to the final hearing and one was to vary contact between him and C. There is a legitimate concern that absent an order under section 91(14) there will be “endless unproductive applications and/or a campaign of harassment by the absent parent” which is not in the interests of C but also a detriment to “all those other children whose cases are delayed as court lists are clogged up” to adopt the words of King LJ in Re A (Supervised Contact)(s91(14)) (see above). Whilst I have refused to formally consider the unissued applications each has required reading, digesting and reflection and HMCTS staff time has been taken up processing them. All of that time could have been used meeting the needs of other children within the family justice system. I am in absolutely no doubt that a section 91(14) Order is necessary and proportionate to protect C and in her welfare interest and to enable the court to most effectively discharge its duties to other children. I acknowledge that the terms of such an order will be such that applications cannot be made “without the court’s permission” and the court will need to engage with requests for permission but the time taken to do so should be less than otherwise would be required (I would hope it might deter unmeritorious requests from the Father and if not then consideration might be given to the making of a Civil Restraint Order) and the parties’ time will not be taken up because they will not be notified of the application unless the court is considering giving permission and an oral hearing is listed.

Accordingly, I will order that the Father may not apply to discharge the Care Order or make an application for contact without the permission of the court until C reaches 18 and any request for permission will be considered on the papers and the parties shall not be notified of any request for permission unless the court, upon review of the papers, considers an oral hearing is necessary to determine the request.

In light of the above analysis I make a final Care Order pursuant to section 31 Children Act 1989 and approve the care plan. I approve the care plan in respect of contact arrangements.

This has been a challenging and lengthy case for the reasons set out above. I have no doubt it placed great strain on the social work team and Cafcass. Whilst they are “doing their job” it would be remiss of me not to praise Ms Rosier, Ms Demerdjiev, Ms Arnold, Ms Sutherland (the former Guardian) and Ms Morreale for their perseverance and resilience in doggedly focusing on what is best for C. I would be grateful if Cafcass could pass this comment to Ms Sutherland and for the avoidance of doubt, given she has left the service, give permission to share this information.

The end of a judgment is always an opportunity to step back, reflect and, ideally, offer hope. In this case whilst the decision I have made is wholly contrary to the strongly held views of C and her Father I have done my very best to focus on what is right for C. I have written a letter to C which I hope will help her to understand, if not agree, with my decision and I sincerely hope she will engage with the plan to enable her to make progress in getting better. In that I offer her my very best wishes.

Unusually, I end with a message to the Mother, reminding her of something that Ms Laulik-Walters said in her evidence on day one: “M is absolutely crucial to C’s recovery”. She is quite right. I encourage her to fully engage with the plan to get C well again so she can fulfil her full potential. That may mean sacrifices, almost certainly separating from F and engaging in some reflective work or therapy to adjust her style of parenting to match C’s needs, but it would be wrong to finish without paying tribute to the obvious love and desire to try and do what is best for C that has characterised her parenting to date. The fact I have made the order I have does not mean she has failed, but it does mean she needs support to be fully effective. I earnestly hope she feels able to seek out and act on that for C’s benefit and her own.