BS v CL

I have been dealing with the parties’ applications for financial remedy orders following the breakdown of the marriage between the wife (“W”) and the husband (“H”).

I can take the history of the parties’ marriage shortly. The parties are both European. They met at university in their home country at the age of 18. They are now aged respectively 56 (W) and 55 (H). After a two year period of cohabitation they married in 1995.

They have three children, all in their twenties.

They moved to London in 1995. Their marriage was lived in London, mainly at their family home into which they moved in 2001. They have had for a number of years a holiday home in their home country and the valuation of that property is one of the issues upon which I have had to rule.

H has long worked in property. He was an employee of major financial institutions in London until 2012 when he set up his own business known as AA.

At the time of moving to London, W was undertaking a PHD course which she completed in London. Thereafter she worked as an IT consultant. With both parties in demanding jobs, W by agreement with H gave up her work so that she could raise the family and support H in his career. She did not work thereafter until the recent completion of her training to be a mathematics teacher, which now occupies her in a full-time role.

In or around 2020 the marriage became unhappy and in April 2021 W discovered that H was having an affair. Over the next 12 months they sought to see whether the marriage was able to be salvaged but in March 2022 the decision was reached that it was beyond repair and the parties became permanently separated.

H’s work is primarily based in the parties’ home country. That is where the majority of his business assets are situated. He lives in a flat owned by one of his businesses and spends time in what was the parties’ holiday home.

From the outset of H’s business, W gave him active assistance and was much involved in it. That working relationship inevitably came to an end with the breakdown of the marriage, and it is an understandable source of frustration to W that in these proceedings she has been deprived of access to information and documents previously available to her.

It is convenient to deal with the standard of living at this stage. Despite the wealth of the parties and the very substantial income that H earned before he started his own business, the parties have always lived a modest standard of living. Apart from a short but expensive holiday in the summer on a yacht, there was little by way of luxury in their lives. It is obvious that each will be more than able to meet their needs on a division of their assets.

It is unnecessary for me to say anything more about the history of the marriage at this stage in the light of what is rightly set out in H’s note for the final hearing which contains this:

In July 2022 W issued her proceedings by way of Form A. These became allocated to the High Court and assigned to me.

There have been significant delays in the proceedings primarily caused by H raising issues of confidentiality.

When the matter came before me on a FDA the parties had agreed that they should jointly instruct Mr Davie of FTI Consulting as a single joint expert to report on the value of H’s business interests and associated matters. Paragraph 19 (b) (vii) of my order of 15 February 2023 stated that H shall provide the expert with any reasonable assistance requested in compiling the report, including the provision of any necessary information and documentation within a reasonable timeframe of the request.

A series of requests have been made by Mr Davie for documents from H. It was only on 18 July 2023 that H asserted that the requests for information raised “issues of confidentiality and fiduciary duties and that he was seeking legal advice in respect of those issues”.

W took out the inevitable application for an order for production of documents. Just a couple of days before the hearing fixed for 15 December 2023 H served what purported to be a legal advice, unauthorised by the Court, from PWC Consulting setting out (wrongly as it transpired) the legal difficulties in the way of the production of documents under the foreign laws governing the relevant businesses. In consequence, W’s application had to be adjourned with an order that H pay costs and came back before me on 7 February and 23 October 2024. On the latter date I ordered that the information that was asserted to be confidential should be provided to W and FTI by way of permitting password-based access to view such material in a secure online data room.

The provision of this information has delayed the case by some 15 months or so and has made the task of the SJE significantly more difficult.

On 5 March 2025 H’s solicitors wrote to set out his open proposals for settlement. It started with what has always been the one agreed feature of the case, namely that the family home in London will be transferred by the parties into W’s sole name and that they would transfer into H’s sole name the parties’ holiday home.

There were various provisions in relation to other investments which it is unnecessary to detail but included an equalising payment with regard to the non-business assets of €4.5m. In respect of H’s interest in his business, he offered four payments of €4m each to be paid over a period from the second anniversary of the order through to the fifth anniversary of the consent order.

This was an offer that was consistent with his duty to file and serve an open proposal for settlement.

On 28 March 2025 W’s solicitors sent their client’s open proposals. They included these words:

This is the only open offer made by W until her closing submissions and I do not consider that it satisfies the provisions of FPR 9.28 which reads as follows:

Mr Marks KC is right to say that this was not an offer capable of acceptance by H. It provides no figures. Indeed, it was only in closing submissions that W has for the first time given a figure that she would accept.

On 25 June 2025 H revised his open proposals for settlement. The material aspect of the new offer was to reduce the payment made to W in respect of H’s business interests from €16m payable over 4 years to €12.3m payable over 3 years.

At trial H’s position was not adjusted. In closing, Mr Southgate KC for the first time in the case enumerated what his client was seeking, namely an equal division of all the assets which were calculated at just shy of €77m,which would require the payment of a lump sum after giving credit for what Walready has and the FMH of€34.6m,payable as to€15.45mforthwith and the balance by 3 annual payments of approximately €6.4m.

This case is one that should have been capable of settlement. As is well known, the valuation of a private business is a subjective matter and different experts will come to different views. The differences between the parties are now seen to be not so great as to preclude settlement. As I see it, the following factors have come into play.

H has controlled discovery in a way that has significantly complicated the job of the SJE. Mr Davie was instructed as long ago as 14 March 2023. For the reasons already set out, a large amount of material was not received by him until much later. His report was dated 17 February 2025, nearly two years after instruction. As Mr Davie said, the process of H’s disclosure has led to delay and inevitably increased the costs of his report because he was repeatedly having to revisit his work, reacquaint himself with it, and update his figures.

His work was frustrated by him not being given up to date information so that he was having to review historical documents and surmise as to what had happened to the business in the intervening period. He had some documents which provided updates but not others.

H’s failure to give prompt and up to date information to Mr Davie has fed into the suspicions that W has of H’s discovery. Her mathematical training and background has encouraged her to seek exactitude without having the information to do so.

Her suspicions have been increased by her reliance on H having told her that their worth was €100m.

I accept W’s evidence that H did say this. I found his evidence unconvincing when he said that he had no recollection of saying it, but that if he did it was in the context of an argument about whether the heating was to be put on. W recollects that it was said in discussion about a spreadsheet. It does not matter which is correct about the circumstances of the discussion, but I am satisfied that it was said.

No one suggests that this was intended to be an exact figure for the wealth of the parties, nor was any consideration given as to what the tax or other implications of realisation might be. It may or may not have been broadly accurate but business conditions are now much more difficult. It is not a figure that I put reliance on. It is however part of the background as to why this case has fought.

At a regrettably late stage of these proceedings W applied for her own expert to be able to comment on the valuations given by Mr Davie. The particular focus was the valuation given to the CC business (as described in paragraph 46(ii) below) and in respect of which Mr Davie had allowed for ongoing maintainable earnings of just €200k, which is less than 1% of revenue. Although the application was expressed widely I limited the instruction of Mr Taylor of Interpath to the maintainable earnings of that business. To do otherwise would have put the holding of the fixture at risk.

Even with this limitation, Mr Taylor’s report only came in on 10 June 2025. This was followed by an updated report from Mr Davie on 24 June 2025 and a joint statement from them on 27 June 2025, the Friday before this case began on the Monday.

At least part of the delay was caused by H’s failure to cooperate with experts. He refused Mr Taylor’s request to speak to Mr G, his CFO, something that was unprecedented in Mr Taylor’s experience. Primary documents were not provided. Everything took longer than it should have, all because of H’s fixation with confidentiality.

H has found the proceedings frustrating. He is steeped in the property world and sees himself as better informed about the value of his business than others. He provided an extensive “Valuation Memorandum” in support of his Form E which was plainly substantially written by a shadow accountant. He has provided critiques of Mr Davie’s work on various occasions and his section 25 statement contained more argument than evidence, including extensive argument about the value of the holiday property notwithstanding the agreement of the two experts.

So determined was he to put his case, that he sent his s.25 statement unilaterally to Mr Davie. Consistently, when at a very late stage an issue arose about CGT and the applicable base cost, he unilaterally corresponded with the SJE instructed to report on this issue, seemingly in an attempt to show that he may have been incorrect. It is unacceptable for this to happen and I am surprised that H’s experienced lawyers permitted it.

I have considered carefully the submissions made on behalf of W that H has quite deliberately failed to provide documents that might show an improving position for the business and that he has deliberately delayed the production of information so as to take advantage of the declining business environment. There are a variety of examples quoted by W’s legal team in support of these arguments.

I am not prepared to make these findings. Mr Davie accepted that he could not point to an example where he either discovered an asset not revealed by H or an instance where later information showed that earlier information provided to him had been shown to be wrong. H is a man who is very particular and concerned with detail. He was also ultra cautious in what he disclosed in case any of his clients or business associates, not all of whom are favourably inclined towards him, became concerned. I must also bear in mind that he had all the pressures of running his businesses throughout these proceedings and that he faced various health issues. This has led to him becoming slow in providing information and resolved to provide what he thought was important even if it was not what he was being asked to provide.

The parties rightly agree that the non-business assets should be shared equally. There is no dispute about their valuation save in respect of the holiday property.

This had been valued by a SJE, in 2023 at a figure of €2.240m. In 2024, but not disclosed until early 2025, W obtained a report from a different valuer who placed a figure of €4.050m as the value of the property. Following a Daniels v Walker application, I agreed to the admission of this second valuation.

The two valuers had a series of conversations between them and wrote a joint report, agreeing the figure of €3m. H was not happy with this figure and required it to be challenged. Mr Marks told me that he only intended to cross examine the SJE and despite arrangements having been made for W’s expert to attend, he was not called.

The SJE gave evidence. She explained that the principal factors that persuaded her to increase her valuation were as follows:

I share Mr Marks’ surprise that two experts could be almost 100% apart and then, in effect, split the difference. However, the reasoning of the SJE was entirely logical. The SJE was not persuaded to adjust her valuation and I accept it, agreed as it now is by W’s expert. Realistically, in closing submissions Mr Marks accepted that the Court would be bound to accept the figure of €3m.

W earns £36k pa as a teacher in a secondary school. She deserves praise for having retrained following the breakdown of the marriage. H takes between €160-200k pa from his business, which I accept is far less than an employee who did not own his business might expect, and receives about €100k pa towards his housing expenses.

Although there are some 40 underlying companies, they can conveniently be taken as falling under three heads. These are as follows:

There is no doubt that in recent times the business has suffered. The decline has been due to a number of different factors:

I heard the evidence of W and H, and Mr Davie and Mr Taylor in respect of H’s business interests, Mr Taylor limited to CC.

I am satisfied that all the witnesses were doing their best to assist me. I do not think that H was deliberately trying to downplay the value of his business or its prospects in a way that was dishonest.

It is right that I should record that both parties came across as nice and decent people. They did not seek to disparage the other. They are both plainly very intelligent.

I have been required to adjudicate on no less than some 18 areas of dispute on the figures with one additional issue parked for the time being. That issue relates to the base figure to be taken for the assessment of the tax payable upon the realisation of H’s business interests. This was flagged up as early as February 2025 and it took H until the end of April to say that he thought that Mr Davie had got it wrong and taken too high a base figure. It was very unsatisfactory that neither party drew this issue to the attention of the court until just before trial. I was left with no alternative but to require the parties to obtain the advice of an independent accountant. That process has not been completed as I write this judgment. The initial indication is that Mr Davie was correct but H wants this endorsed so, as Mr Marks told me, he can sue if the advice turns out to be wrong. The sums involved are considerable - about €4m - and I have determined that there is no alternative but to park this issue until there is more clarity.

At the end of the hearing I informed the parties that I would release my ruling the following day on the figures to be used for the valuation of assets and required them to give me a revised assets schedule using these figures, taking into account tax, sale costs etc. I attach to this judgment a simplified asset schedule which incorporates my figures.

The value of these assets excluding only H’s business interests and the carried interest and giving credit for the liabilities produces a figure of €19,518,084.

On the basis that the FMH will go to W and the holiday property to H, and that H will take over the small joint account, a balancing payment to W is due. In assessing it, I take into account her own savings and liabilities and the costs provision that I set out later.

I turn now to the issues upon which I have adjudicated:

The debt owed by H to HMRC

H is said to owe HMRC a UK income tax debt from 2016-2017. There are three areas of dispute between him and HMRC..

W asked me to take a middle point of what H assesses to be his liability, on the basis that it is binary and that it will be all or nothing. H told me when I asked him what he thought was fair that I should reduce the debt by 1/3 to reflect the likely outcome. I consider that this was appropriate and I adopt it.

Carried interest

H has three carried interest investments. I will deal with them individually:

My determination is that W should receive 50% of each of the first two funds and 0% in relation to the third. Mr Marks calculates that from inception to trial W’s share would be 46% of Fund 1, 36% of Fund 2and 23% of Fund 3. If taken to the date of separation as I have found it to be, the percentages are reduced to 30%, 4% and 5% respectively.

It is undesirable in principle that H and W should remain financially entangled for another 5 years. The matrimonial element of Fund 3 is very small. Fairness to W can be achieved by giving her an increased percentage of the first two carried interests. Both of them were invested by the time of the parties’ separation and I regard it as fair that W should receive a half share of each of those in lieu of her small interest in the third.

Valuation issues relating to BB

However, I consider that Mr Marks is right that I should allow a discount to reflect the current illiquidity of the investment. If H was able to sell it, then the value would inevitably be discounted by the fact that it is not realisable until maturity in 2032. He has provided me in his opening statement with various monetisation scenarios and asks that I should discount by 40%. He compares this with the fact that gilt bonds, with their virtual guarantee that they will be repaid in full, on time and in cash, are trading at a discount to face value of around 20%, albeit with a much lower interest rate than these bonds.

I have read with care the submissions by both parties on this issue. I have determined that the best figure to take is a discount of 30% and that is what I allow. It would not be right to ignore their current illiquidity.

HH

This is a hotel development venture which is turning out to be much more costly than H had anticipated. Originally it was said that it would cost €2-€3m to develop and the figure is now estimated at over €6m. However, H said in evidence that he was satisfied that when the works were concluded, he expected to break even at a total value of €9.37m, being the cost of the works and the land purchase. The parties agree that this figure needs to be discounted but the issue is to what extent. H argues that I should take the figure of €4.5m which Mr Davie uses. However, this was a figure arrived at before H’s acceptance that he expected to break even. I agree with Mr Southgate that the best estimate to take is that of €7.2m which is the balance sheet figure.

The flat

H purchased a luxury flat through the business. He spent €6.7m inclusive of costs. It has been valued by CBRE at €4.8m. He explains the difference as being caused in part by a fall in the market and in part by the fact that he had paid a premium for the convenience and amenity which extended, as he put it, to it being furnished and equipped so that he could walk straight into a ready-made bed. Unsurprisingly, W says that I should not accept the CBRE valuation when H has “wasted” some €2m.

I do not think that it is right for me to take an artificial figure above that determined by CBRE. On the other hand this loss of funds can properly be taken into account when I assess the percentage that W should receive. I also allow the deduction of €400k which will need to be paid by the end of next year to reflect delayed stamp duty. Whether H was wise to purchase a property which contained this latent liability is another matter, but its existence is not in doubt.

Enterprise value of CC

The financial performance of CC shows that its turnover has over the past 7 years been consistently in the bracket of €28-€31m. Its profits up to 2022 have averaged around €4.4m. However, over the last 3 years its performance has plummeted. It is not now currently making a profit unless the interest received by the business, which I will deal with separately, is taken in to the financial performance.

Documents that I have been shown indicate that the property market is coming out of the doldrums, albeit not very fast, with particular problems relating to subprime office development..

On the back of these figures, Mr Davie applied a multiplier of 12 to €200k pa maintainable earnings so as to produce an enterprise value of €2.4m.

Mr Taylor thought this to be unduly pessimistic. He pointed out that maintainable earnings of €1m amounted to no more (in fact slightly less) than 3.5% of revenue which was less than the comparables to which he referred. He pointed out that this figure could be achieved either by a reduction in costs or an increase in revenue by negotiating better contracts, or a combination of the two.

H was unenthusiastic about cutting costs, which in practical terms meant reducing his workforce. A reduction of 5% in the workforce would on its own produce the necessary increase in profit. But, H pointed out that not only did he regard that as unethical but that it was also very expensive to do. The applicable labour laws provide considerable protection for an employee and the costs of the exercise would significantly eat into the potential increase in profits. Whilst the potential to increase charges was plainly there, H was anxious about the loss of clients, to which Mr Taylor replied that other companies would be doing exactly that and that there would be little that the customerwould be likely to find at a significantly cheaper rate.

Mr Davie, recognising the force of the points made by Mr Taylor, revised his valuation to reflect the range of possibilities by taking the mid-point between his initial valuation of €2.4m and Mr Taylor’s of €10m and applying an equal weighting to produce an overall valuation of €6.2m.I regard this as a fair and reasonable approach.

I do not accept Mr Marks’ characterisation of this approach to the maintainable earnings of CC as “a fudge”. It seems to me to be a proper reflection of the current state of the business whilst giving appropriate weight to its past and future potential profitability.

Interest received by CC

Both valuers agreed that the interest income that CC received on its client funds had not been included in their estimates of maintainable earnings. The sums involved are significant. In the two years to 31 December 2023 and 2024 the interest received by CC amounted to €1.2m and €2.1m respectively.

Mr Taylor said it would not be unreasonable to assume that €.5m-€1m of interest income might be retained and/or swapped out for better terms of business in the broader contractual relationship. In terms of quantum, applying a multiplier of 12 would capitalise a valuation increase €6-€12m. This wasagainst a background of an anticipated interest income receipt in 2025 of €1m, reflecting the reduction in interest rates since 2024.

Whilst not opining upon a figure, Mr Davie said that it would not be appropriate to take a multiplier of 12 given the risk as to the loss of the interest income. I accept his reservation that 12 would not be an appropriate multiplier.

I agree with Mr Southgate that I should take the midpoint of €750kbut I take a reduced multiplier of 6, so as to produce a value to be added of€4.5m. The reduced multiplier reflects the uncertainty of its receipt in the long term.

Working capital

The company has cash of some €5.4m. It has a surplus of liquid assets over current liabilities in the ratio 13:11, which satisfies the Quick Ratio test. That said, both sides agree that the business needs to have some cash. H argues for €2m and W argues for €1m as the appropriate figure for working capital. Although Mr Davie mentioned the figure of €2m, this was not a formed opinion and was more by way of example. Bearing in mind that the quick ratio is satisfied without any cash, I have decided that it is reasonable to split the difference between the parties and allow a cash reserve of €1.5m, with the balance being deemed as surplus.

Litigation expenses

H has had a very unsatisfactory experience at the hands of his senior employee whom he had to dismiss last year. This has led to difficult and protracted litigation on which already some €1.5m has been spent. It is accepted by the parties that an error was made in Mr Davie’s calculations by a double counting of this sum but there remains an issue as to what should be taken as the cost of concluding the litigation.. I have determined that it is proper to work on the assumption of further costs of €500k.

With or without H

H argues that there should be a significant discount to reflect the fact that without his involvement the business would be worth significantly less. In principle the argument is logical but it must be seen against H’s clearly expressed intention to continue in the business for many years, and when and if he does then get rid of it, no doubt he would have engaged in succession planning. I note in this context that one of the parties’ children is now working in the business.

Mr Davie assesses the value of H to the business at a little over €4m, most of that to be found within the company which includes CC. The mark down is explained by the reduction given by Mr Davie to the enterprise value without H. However, the experts were clear in evidence that it was not necessary for H to remain in CC long term and that he could plan to put in a senior officer who could take over his role given proper training and introduction. In my judgment it is artificial to make the discount in circumstances which will not arise.

Value of EE (UK) Corporate Bond

This is the same issue as that which arose in respect of the BB bond. EE holds a bond recording a value of £867k and that on the insolvency H expects to receive only 5%, namely £83k.

As with the BB bond, I take this figure but I do so with a reservation that it is a worst case scenario and needs to be reflected in a provision which enables W to share in any surplus.

Costs

W asks me to make 3 adjustments to the asset schedule to reflect different elements of costs:

In my judgment there is no good reason why W should have to share the surplus of costs in its entirety by my not making an addback. I accept that it would not be right for me to work on the basis that there should be precise equality between the parties. I also accept that H will have had the increased costs from dealing with lawyers in other countries. However, I see nothing wrong with the principle of an addback in the circumstances. The disparity is too great for me to let it go.

However, I do not accept that W was entitled to say that she wished to have finalised reports from the experts before making a proposal in a figure that H could then consider. She should not have sought the exactitude which she did. I do not accept that she could not have made a good stab at what her award should be once she had received Mr Davie’s report. It is not acceptable for a party to make a first offer with figures in closing submissions. It negates any chance of settlement. I have therefore decided to reduce the sum that I allow in respect of the disparity to £200k plus VAT. This is the sum that is to be added back.

After submissions had concluded, a dispute broke out about the valuation of a further asset, namely an interest-sharing loan due to YY. In his section 25 statement H made it clear that he thought that it should be subject to the same discount as applied to the ZZ bond and that the same considerations applied.

Mr Davie had taken the view that no discount was needed as YY’s assets comfortably exceeded its liabilities, so that there was no risk of non-recovery.

W did not cross-examine H on this aspect of his statement and H did not challenge Mr Davie. Although H had referred to this point in a schedule to his closing submissions, W had not picked up on it. Neither side addressed me upon it. The result of this was that the parties were unable to produce a schedule of assets capturing my findings. They accordingly attended before me whilst I was judgment writing.

The net sum involved was a little over €500k. I determined that in the light of the relatively modest value of this issue and in the absence of any helpful evidence, the fairest way to deal with it was to make a 50% allowance for the sum in issue.

There is no issue about H’s ability to pay promptly W’s share of the non-business assets. The issue relates to the liquidity within the business structure.

H calculates the available liquidity at €6.34m whilst W calculates it at €9.7m. Both these figures are arguable. They each rely to a greater or lesser extent upon the report of Mr Davie.

It is well known law that the court must approach the valuations of private businesses as fragile. As Lewison LJ said at paragraph 185 in the well-known case of Versteegh v Versteegh [2018] EWCA Civ 1050:

In this case I am satisfied that I have sufficiently reliable figures, save in one respect, to make a fair finding of the value of the businesses. My findings are based on the evidence that I have been given and which I have found to be sufficiently reliable.

The exception to which I have just referred relates to the figures for the value of the two corporate bonds which are due to be realised in 2026, written down from an aggregate of €2.767m to €233k. This enormous decrease is undocumented and dependent entirely upon H’s say so. I am not suggesting that H has attempted deliberately to depress the figure but it would be fair when there is such uncertainty, for W to share in any uplift of the net increase in value over the minimal figures that I have adopted in the same proportions as I have allocated to her of the business assets.

I must apply all the factors set out in section 25 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. My overriding task is to be fair as between the parties.

All the non-business assets are liquid or can easily be made liquid. The parties agree that they should be divided equally. Accordingly W is entitled to €9,759,042 subject to the costs adjustments. She is to receive the FMH at €3,232,040 on the basis that H will be responsible for the CGT that will be payable of €122,947. In addition she has her own savings of €733,431 and a debt to her solicitors of €287,156 net of the sum held on their client account. The parties agree that she is accordingly entitled to receive €6,080,723 to equalise the non-business assets, after making the necessary adjustments to reflect my ruling on costs.

H’s non-business assets include the OCUs arising from his previous employment. He wishes to make part payment in respect of the non-business assets by transferring to W half of his OCUs. If W is content to receive them, that is of course acceptable, but if she wishes her award to be paid entirely in cash, that is equally her prerogative. As the OCUs have an agreed value and are readily realisable, I can see no basis for requiring W to receive her award other than in cash.

W in closing submissions calculated the value of H’s business interests at €56.83m and the total assets at just a few Euros short of €77m (just under £65m). She sought just under €38.5m. This would give her a 50/50 division. H valued the business assets at €41.59m and sought that the business assets should be divided 60:40 in his favour.

I have not in various respects agreed with all the calculations of the value of the assets, any more than I have with H’s valuations. My total is €49.87m. However, I do not agree with W’s starting point of sharing equally the value of the business assets.

It is very well-established law and practice that a departure from equality of outcome may be appropriate where one party is to receive cash while the other party retains an illiquid business asset. This is not an invariable rule but it is a proper reflection to the weight to be given to the risk which is inherent in a business which is subject to fluctuations beyond the control of the party. As Moylan LJ said in the case of Martin v Martin [2008] EWCA Civ 2866:

It is not helpful for me to go through the various authorities but it is rare to find a 50/50 division of business assets and such a case would be most likely to be one where most of the business assets are or are capable of being made liquid and the business can easily be sold: see for example, DAV v KV [2024] EWFC 389.

In this case the business is not sellable, certainly at the current time, and its assets not easily able to be made liquid in the immediate future. Having divided the non-business assets equally, I divide the business assets in the proportion 58:42. In reaching this determination I have looked at past authorities. I have not overlooked W’s contribution to the business until the marriage broke down. I have taken into account the relative illiquidity and the risk attached to the business, particularly as shown in its performance over the past few years. Having considered a range of percentages, I deem the differential of 16% to be appropriate in the circumstances of this case. This will result in the business assets of €49,869,885 (which I round to €49.870m) being divided as €28.924m (H) : €20.945m (W).

Subject to any uplift which may arise in respect of the corporate bonds, this leaves the parties in the following positions:

I will hear counsel further on this issue. I can see no reason why the payment in respect of the non-business assets should not be made in 28 days or so.

I am minded to order that the first payment to W of her share of the business assets will be made by 31 January 2026, and the balance by payments on 31 January 2027, 31 January 2028 and 31 January 2029. I will hear the parties on whether the payments should be of equal value and on interest.

This seems to me to strike a proper balance between leaving cash in the business and providing for W to receive her funds as soon as is practicable.

I will also hear the parties on the issue of security when they have had an opportunity to digest the figures.

SIMPLIFIED ASSET SCHEDULE