The Director of Public Prosecutions v Christian Alexandru Boureanu

This is an application (the “Application”) by the Director of Public Prosecutions (the “DPP”) for the appointment of a receiver to enforce an external order, made by the High Court of Cassation and Justice, Criminal Division, Romania (the “Romanian High Court”) on 26 May 2023 (the “External Order”), under art.27 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (External Requests and Orders) Order 2005 (the “2005 Order”). The Application is made in respect of property, funds held in accounts at Bilderlings Pay Limited (“Bilderlings”), in the names of:

The Application is made pursuant to an external request by the Romanian authorities, and seeks the execution of the External Order, which was declared final, following appeal, on 26 May 2023. Since then, the Defendant has made no effort to satisfy the External Order.

The Application is supported by the witness statements of Heather Chalk, a Specialist Prosecutor in the CPS Proceeds of Crime Department, dated 2 May 2025 and 21 November 2025. The witness statement by Mrs Chalk dated 24 April 2025, tendered in support of the DPP’s application to register the External Order as an order of this Court, provides useful background context.

The Defendant attended the hearing of the Application before me on 9 December 2025. He was not represented by Counsel or solicitors, nor did he give evidence, but he made very clear and articulate submissions opposing the Application. Intermell did not attend the hearing, either by an officer or director of the company or some other person authorised to appear on its behalf. The company had, however, previously indicated to the Applicant through its representative Ami Kamanitz that it would oppose the Application.

The Application itself raises a threshold issue. For the Crown Court to give effect to an external order, the 2005 Order requires the conditions in art.21 to be met. By art.21(2), the first condition is that the external order was made consequent on the “conviction” of the person named in the order, and no appeal is outstanding in respect of that conviction. The word “conviction” is not defined in either the 2005 Order or s.447 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (the “2002 Act”), which defines certain terms set out in “Part 11 Co-operation” of the 2002 Act.

The Defendant says the effect of the appeal judgment given on 26 May 2023 was to quash the conviction upon which the External Order was consequent, such that the threshold condition in art.21(2) is not met. If the Defendant is right, then it must that one of the statutory conditions for the registration of the External Order in art.21(2) is not met, and, consequently, this Court would be obliged to “cancel” the registration pursuant to art.22(3).

By an order dated 16 July 2019, made on notice without a hearing, His Honour Judge Grieve QC registered two freezing orders of the National Anti-Corruption Directorate, Prosecutor’s Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice, Romania on 9 October 2018 and 12 March 2019 as a restraint order of this Court (the “Restraint Order”), pursuant to reg.10 of the Criminal Justice and Data Protection (Protocol No.36) Regulations 2014 (the “2014 Regulations”). (Footnote: ¹)

The effect of the Restraint Order was to restrain the Property, up to the value of £1,970,000 (the then Pounds sterling estimated equivalent of the Defendant’s alleged offending). The making of that order by Judge Grieve QC has not been challenged by the Defendant or Intermell.

The Defendant was a prominent member of the ruling political party in Romania, the then Liberal Democratic Party, at the times material to the allegations which resulted in his conviction, allegations which the Defendant denied and continues to deny.

In a judgment of the Romanian High Court dated 24 March 2022 (Judgment No.127), the Defendant (a defendant in criminal proceedings for which the 16 July 2019 restraint order was made) was convicted by a three-judge and assistant magistrate panel of the Court (the “Trial Court”) of the offence of “influence peddling” contrary to art.291(1) of the Criminal Code, and sentenced to a total of 4 years, 3 months’ imprisonment, including 3 years, 6 months’ imprisonment for the influence peddling offence. The Defendant was also disqualified from exercising certain rights, a “special confiscation order” was made in the sum of EUR 2,111,799.71 (i.e., the External Order), and the “precautionary attachment” or freezing orders in respect of the Property were maintained. All this followed a trial at which evidence was called and witnesses were cross-examined.

The summary facts underlying the Defendant’s offending are set out at pp.318 to 322 and pp.325 to 326 of the certified translation of the Trial Court’s judgment, as follows in relevant part:

“The present case concerns the prosecution of several corruption offences involving dignitaries and senior public officials of the Romanian state, with the rank of minister or secretary of state, and parliamentarian respectively.

Corruption is a complex phenomenon with economic, social, political and cultural dimensions, defined as the ‘misuse of public office or links with it to secure improper benefits for oneself or a third party.’ …

…

These corruption offences essentially consisted of the Austrian company [Swietelsky AG (“Swietelsky”)] remitting, on the basis of previous agreements, fabulous sums of money, approximately 20 million euros, to Romanian officials or persons with influence over them, so that, in exchange for these sums, they could ensure the conclusion of contracts and payment of invoices for the Bucharest-Constanţa section and payment of the outstanding VAT for the Bucharest-Câmpina section.

The payments were made to persons who were holding or held positions of public dignity or were senior civil servants in the central public administration of the Romanian state.

Thus …

…

… [the Defendant] was a member of Parliament in two legislatures and a prominent member of the Liberal Democratic Party, serving as Vice President.

The ‘commission’ paid by Swietelsky was a percentage of the amount of each payment made by the Romanian state and was paid successively, after [Swietelsky] in turn received the amount of the works carried out from the Romanian state, i.e. from [Compania Națională de Căi Ferate CFR], with the percentage being initially 3.5% of the contract price in 2005, and then increased to 10% in 2009.

This alleged commission was paid … for the influence which [the Defendant was] to exert on Romanian officials in relation to the payment of the works carried out and the outstanding VAT.”

In the result, between March 2010 and November 2013 the Defendant received a total amount of EUR 2,111,799.71.

At p.313 of the judgment, the Trial Court held in relevant part:

“Therefore, [the Trial Court], after analysing all the evidence adduced during the entire criminal trial, considers that the charges brought against … [the Defendant] of influence peddling … are proved beyond any reasonable doubt, and [he] must be convicted of the offences committed, as set out above.”

In the course of its judgment, the Trial Court examined at some length the relationship between the Defendant and Intermell. Investigations found that the Defendant opened bank accounts in the United Kingdom. Intermell’s bank account was opened at a time when the Defendant’s assets were already subject to the Romanian freezing order dated 9 October 2018. The Romanian prosecutor obtained a further freezing order, dated 12 March 2019, to restrain assets held by Intermell in this jurisdiction.

Intermell was joined to the criminal proceedings in Romania as an interested party, and was represented in those proceedings by the Defendant, who held powers of attorney for it. The Trial Court heard evidence on the nature of the relationship between the Defendant and Intermell and the Property. The Trial Court considered evidence obtained from other jurisdictions, including Bulgaria, Lithuania, and the United Kingdom, and, in particular, banking evidence provided by Bilderlings. The Trial Court found that the Defendant was the beneficial owner of the Property held in the name of Intermell. In its judgment dated 24 March 2022, the Trial Court found as fact:

These findings led the Trial Court:

“to the clear conclusion that the sums of money in the bank account whose formal holder was [Intermell] belonged to [the Defendant], who directly and exclusively disposes of the company’s funds. The bank statements do not show that this company carried out any economic activity, as its accounts were not credited by receipts from possible clients, the financial transactions were carried out with companies under the control of [the Defendant], for the personal benefit of him, his relatives or close persons”,

(see p.346 of the certified translation of the judgment). The Trial Court was satisfied that the bank account whose formal holder was Intermell belonged to the Defendant.

In the premises, the Trial Court made a confiscation order against the Defendant in the sum of EUR 2,111,799.71 pursuant to arts.256(2) and 257(2) 7 of the previous Criminal Code (at p.354 of the judgment), and, in addition, maintained the freezing orders over the funds in the two Bilderlings accounts pursuant to art.404(4)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (at pp. 347 to 348 and p.370 of the judgment). The freezing orders previously made by the Romanian High Court had been challenged on appeals brought by both the Defendant and Intermell, but those appeals were dismissed on 1 September 2019 (see p.344 of the judgment).

All the defendants (including the Defendant) appealed to a differently constituted five-judge panel (the “Appeal Court”) of the Romanian High Court. That appeal was heard on 13 March 2023, and took the form of a retrial on the papers. The evidence relied upon by the Trial Court was considered in some detail.

On appeal, the Defendant sought to set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and his acquittal of the offence of influence peddling on the ground that the constituent elements of the offence were not met. To that extent, his appeal was dismissed. The Appeal Court expressly found that he had committed the act provided for by Romanian criminal law (i.e., influence peddling). But, as the proceedings had taken more than eight years to conclude, the Appeal Court found that it could not activate the sentence imposed by the Trial Court. In a judgment dated 26 May 2023 (Decision No.48), the Appeal Court said this, at p.502 of the certified translation of the judgment:

“The offence of influence peddling provided for in Article 291 of the Criminal Code in the light of Article 6 and Article 7 para.(1)(a) of Law No.78/2000, held against the defendant Boureanu Cristian Alexandru, took place between January 2009 and November 2013 (acceptance of the promise/receipt of money), so that the limitation period of 8 years, provided for in Article 154(c) of the Criminal Code, expired in November 2021.

Under these circumstances, the High Court – Five Judge Panel, finding the defendants … and Boureanu Cristian Alexandru guilty, and giving effect to their expression of will to continue the criminal proceedings, will order the termination of the criminal proceedings for the offences of influence peddling, provided for in Article 291 of the Criminal Code.”

As for the confiscation order, the Appeal Court said this (at p.506, emphasis added):

“From the analysis of the legal provisions mentioned above, it follows that security measures are taken against persons who have committed acts provided for by the criminal law. Given their preventative nature, security measures can be taken even if the offender is not sentenced.”

In those circumstances, the Appeal Court upheld the confiscation order and maintained the “precautionary attachment” in respect of the two Bilderlings accounts.

On 31 May 2024, the Romanian authorities made an external request in relation to the confiscation order made final by the 2023 judgment (i.e., the External Order) to the United Kingdom Central Authority, which was referred to the DPP pursuant to Title XI of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (Treaty Series No.8 (2021)) (the “TCA”). Following clarification of some details by the Romanian authorities, an application was made by the DPP to register the External Order under art.21 of the 2005 Order as an order of this Court. As I mentioned, that application was granted on 25 April 2025.

On 2 May 2025, the Registration Order was served by the DPP on the parties together with this Application for the appointment of a receiver.

The Application was listed for directions before His Honour Judge Weekes on 22 September 2025. Shortly before the directions hearing, the Defendant sent an email to the Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”) stating, among other things:

“You have been misinformed by Romanian Authorities based on the decision of the Court in 2022 which was NOT FINAL.

In 26th of May 2023 the FINAL Decision of the Court has stated that the facts in the file were prescribed facts and I am a FREE man.

As an abuse they decided to keep my money and Intermell’s money, based on the NOT final decision of the first Court.

And then they wrote again in UK, to a different Court, saying the same lies from 6 years ago, that the money are from corruption.

I am a free man, I was not convicted and I will attach the documents.”

Attached to the email was the certified translation of a “Certificate of Criminal Record”, apparently issued by the Romanian authorities on 8 October 2024 (the “Certificate”), stating that the Defendant had “no criminal record”. Additionally, the Defendant claimed that the funds held in Intermell’s Bilderlings’ account did not belong to him: he had withdrawn what was his “a long time ago”.

At the directions hearing, the Defendant attended, as did Ami Kamanitz, who as I understand it is the person recorded at Companies House with significant control of Intermell. Judge Weekes considered the Certificate and tried to establish what the true position was as regards the Defendant’s conviction and the External Order. In the event, the hearing was adjourned to enable the DPP to make enquiries of the Romanian authorities as to whether the Defendant’s March 2022 conviction had survived the May 2023 appeal.

In light of the Defendant’s representations, the CPS sought clarification of the position from the Romanian authorities. Alexandru Ciuciu, the Legal Adviser at the Romanian Ministry of Justice in Bucharest, replied on 3 October 2025 as follows (emphasis added):

“[The Defendant] appealed the first instance court decision, and as a result, the custodial sentence was overturned because the statute of limitations had intervened. However, this only affects the custodial sentence.It does not negate the fact that the crime was committed, nor does it prevent the imposition of other criminal sanctions. For that reason, the appellate court upheld the confiscation of the proceeds of crime, while overturning the prison sentence.

So, in short, this measure is a particular feature of our system and is equivalent to a criminal conviction, even if no prison term can be enforced. The fact that a custodial sentence couldn’t be imposed is really just a technical limitation and doesn’t change the criminal nature of the sanction itself. As for the certificate dated 8 October 2024 that the defendant produced, that’s just a standard criminal record extract. It doesn’t capture this type of criminal judgment, precisely because no custodial or suspended sentence was involved.”

This was confirmed in a letter dated 3 October 2025 by Judge Stoicescu, the judge responsible for international judicial cooperation, to the Directorate for International Law and Judicial Cooperation at the Romanian Ministry of Justice in Bucharest, where the judge said this (emphasis added):

“… the [Appeal Court] found [the Defendant] guilty and held that his actions constituted the offence of influence peddling, but that there was no longer any legal possibility of imposing a penalty.

It should be noted that if the [Appeal Court] had considered that [the Defendant’s] actions did not constitute the offence of influence peddling, it would have delivered an acquittal, which is completely different from the decision to terminate the criminal proceedings due to the statute of limitations on criminal liability.

With regard to confiscation, we note that this is a security measure, a sanction in criminal matters, but a concept distinct from that of punishment. In these circumstances, Article 107 of the Criminal Code provides as follows:

‘(1) Security measures are intended to remove a state of danger and prevent the commission of acts provided for by criminal law;

(2)

Security measures shall be taken against persons who have committed an unjustified act provided for by criminal law;

(3)

Security measures may also be taken in situations where the perpetrator is not punished.’

From the analysis of the legal provisions set out above, it follows that security measures are taken only against persons who have committed acts provided for by criminal law. Given their preventative nature, security measures may be taken even if the perpetrator is not punished.

On the other hand, we emphasise that the measure of special confiscation may only be applied by the criminal court at the end of the criminal proceedings and only if it is found that the defendant has committed an act provided for by criminal law. In other words, the intervention of the statute of limitations on criminal liability does not transform the dispute into a civil one, nor does it change the nature of the form of legal liability for the commission of unlawful acts.”

In other words, it seems to me that what Judge Stoicescu said was that the External Order depended upon a finding of guilt in criminal proceedings by the Appeal Court. I return to Judge Stoicescu’s letter below.

As the request is an “external request” made by the Romanian authorities pursuant to art.6 of the 2005 Order for the execution of the External Order by the appointment of a receiver, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union (Treaty Series No.8 (2021)) (the “TCA”) applies.

The 2014 Regulations no longer maintain; the legislative regime after 31 January 2020 (the date on which the United Kingdom withdrew from the European Union, pursuant to the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (Exit Day) (Amendment) (No.3) Regulations 2019, reg.2 (“Brexit”)) is governed by the European Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020 (the “2020 Act”) and regulations made thereunder to implement the TCA.

Recitals 23 and 24 to the TCA provide:

“23.

CONSIDERING that cooperation between the United Kingdom and the Union relating to the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences and to the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and prevention of threats to public security, will enable the security of the United Kingdom and the Union to be strengthened,

24.

DESIRING that an agreement is concluded between the United Kingdom and the Union to provide a legal base for such cooperation”.

The TCA came into force on 1 May 2021, having been provisionally applied from 1 January 2021, the day after the end of the Brexit transition period.

Part 3 of the 2020 Act covers general implementation. It creates broad powers for the UK Government to make regulations to implement the TCA. Section 29(1) provides, in particular and in relevant part:

“Existing domestic law has effect on and after the relevant day with such modifications as are required for the purposes of implementing in that law [the TCA] … so far as [it] is not otherwise so implemented and so far as such implementation is necessary for the purposes of complying with the international obligations of the United Kingdom under the agreement.”

Part 3 of the TCA concerns “law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters”. The objective of Part 3 is set out in art.522 as follows:

“1.

The objective of this Part is to provide for law enforcement and judicial cooperation between the Member States and Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, on the one side, and the United Kingdom, on the other side, in relation to the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences and the prevention of and fight against money laundering and financing of terrorism.

2.

This Part only applies to law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters taking place exclusively between the United Kingdom, on the one side, and the Union and the Member States, on the other side. It does not apply to situations arising between the Member States, or between Member States and Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, nor does it apply to the activities of authorities with responsibilities for safeguarding national security when acting in that field.”

Title XI of the TCA in entitled “Freezing and Confiscation”. It largely adopts the regime which existed in the 2005 Warsaw Convention. (Footnote: ²) The objectives and principles of cooperation are set out in art.656 of the TCA:

“ TITLE XI

FREEZING AND CONFISCATION

ARTICLE 656

Objective and principles of cooperation

1.

The objective of this Title is to provide for cooperation between the United Kingdom, on the one side, and the Member States, on the other side, to the widest extent possible for the purposes of investigations and proceedings aimed at the freezing of property with a view to subsequent confiscation thereof and investigations and proceedings aimed at the confiscation of property within the framework of proceedings in criminal matters. This does not preclude other cooperation pursuant to Article 665(5) and (6). This Title also provides for cooperation with Union bodies designated by the Union for the purposes of this Title.

2.

Each State shall comply, under the conditions provided for in this Title, with requests from another State:

(a)

for the confiscation of specific items of property, as well as for the confiscation of proceeds consisting in a requirement to pay a sum of money corresponding to the value of proceeds;

(b)

for investigative assistance and provisional measures with a view to either form of confiscation referred to in point (a).

3.

Investigative assistance and provisional measures sought under point (b) of paragraph 2 shall be carried out as permitted by and in accordance with the domestic law of the requested State. Where the request concerning one of these measures specifies formalities or procedures which are necessary under the domestic law of the requesting State, even if unfamiliar to the requested State, the latter shall comply with such requests to the extent that the action sought is not contrary to the fundamental principles of its domestic law.

4.

The requested State shall ensure that the requests coming from another State to identify, trace, freeze or seize the proceeds and instrumentalities, receive the same priority as those made in the framework of domestic procedures.

5.

When requesting confiscation, investigative assistance and provisional measures for the purposes of confiscation, the requesting State shall ensure that the principles of necessity and proportionality are respected.”

Article 657 of the TCA provides definitions of the principal terms used. “Confiscation” is defined to mean:

“a penalty or a measure ordered by a court following proceedings in relation to a criminal offence or criminal offences, resulting in the final deprivation of property.”

By art.665(1), the State which has received a request for confiscation of property situated in its territory shall:

“(a)

enforce a confiscation order made by a court of the requesting State in relation to such property; or

(b)

submit the request to its competent authorities for the purpose of obtaining an order of confiscation and, if such an order is granted, enforce it.”

By art.665(3), the obligation to enforce a confiscation order also applies to confiscation consisting in a requirement to pay a sum of money corresponding to the value of proceeds, if property against which the confiscation can be enforced is located in the requested State. In such cases, when enforcing confiscation pursuant to art.665(1), the requested State shall, if payment is not obtained, realise the claim on any property available for that purpose.

Article 666(1) of the TCA makes clear that:

“[the] procedures for obtaining and enforcing the confiscation under Article 665 shall be governed by the domestic law of the requested State.”

Grounds for refusing a request are prescribed by art.670. So far as confiscation is concerned, paragraph 5(d) of art.670 provides that a request may be refused if it:

“does not relate to a previous conviction, or a decision of a judicial nature or a statement in such a decision that an offence or several offences have been committed, on the basis of which the confiscation has been ordered or is sought.”

Finally, art.689(1) mandates that:

“Each State shall ensure that persons affected by measures under Articles 663 to 666 have effective legal remedies in order to preserve their rights.”

However, by art.689(2):

“The substantive reasons for requested measures under Articles 663 to 666 shall not be challenged before a court in the requested State.”

Although somewhat differently worded, art.689(2) is of comparable effect to the provisions of reg.10(6) of the superseded 2014 Regulations.

Article 27 of the 2005 Order provides that the Court may appoint a receiver in respect of property where an external order is registered and has not been satisfied:

“27.

— Appointment of enforcement receivers

(1)

This article applies if—

(a)

an external order is registered,

(b)

it is not satisfied, and

(c)

in the case of an external order for the recovery of a specified sum of money, any period specified by order under article 26 has expired.

(2)

On the application of the relevant Director the Crown Court may by order appoint a receiver in respect of—

(a)

where the external order is for the recovery of a specified sum of money, realisable property;

(b)

where the external order is for the recovery of specified property, that property.”

Section 447(2) of the 2002 Act defines an external order as follows:

“An external order is an order which—

(a)

is made by an overseas court where property is found or believed to have been obtained as a result of or in connection with criminal conduct, and

(b)

is for the recovery of specified property or a specified sum of money.”

Where the external order is for the recovery of a specified sum of money, by art.28(2) of the 2005 Order the Court may confer upon a receiver power to take possession of and realise sufficient realisable property. The definition of “realisable property” in a case where the external order specifies a sum of money is provided in art.49(1) as:

“any free property held by the defendant or by the recipient of a tainted gift.”

Article 54(1)(b) provides that, in Part 2 of the 2005 Order, the word “defendant” means:

“in relation to an external order, the person convicted of criminal conduct”.

For the Crown Court to give effect to an external order, the 2005 Order requires the conditions in art.21 to be met. Article 21 provides, in relevant part (emphasis added):

“21.

— Conditions for Crown Court to give effect to external orders

(1)

The Crown Court must decide to give effect to an external order by registering it where all of the following conditions are satisfied.

(2)

The first condition is that the external order was made consequent on the conviction of the person named in the order and no appeal is outstanding in respect of that conviction.

(3)

The second condition is that the external order is in force and no appeal is outstanding in respect of it.

(4)

The third condition is that giving effect to the external order would not be incompatible with any of the Convention rights (within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998) of any person affected by it.

…

(7)

In determining whether the order is an external order within the meaning of the Act, the Court must have regard to the definitions in subsections (2), (4), (5), (6), (8) and (10) of section 447 of the [2002 Act].

(8)

In paragraph (3) “appeal” includes—

(a)

any proceedings by way of discharging or setting aside the order; and

(b)

an application for a new trial or stay of execution.”

By art.21(2), the first condition is that the external order was made consequent on the conviction of the person named in the order and no appeal is outstanding in respect of that conviction. The word “conviction” is not defined in either the 2005 Order or in s.447 of the 2002 Act.

In Richards v R [1993] AC 217, Lord Bridge, delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, said this (at 222):

“It has been said many times that the word ‘conviction’ is ambiguous and it has sometimes been construed in a statutory context as referring to nothing more than a finding of guilt. But, in the absence of something in the context which suggests that narrower meaning, the authorities in the nineteenth century and earlier all seem to point to the conclusion that the requirement to establish a conviction requires proof not only of the finding of guilt but also of the court’s final adjudication by sentence or other order.”

Some 23 years earlier, in S (An Infant) v Recorder of Manchester [1971] AC 481, Lord Reid held (at 489):

“Much of the difficulty has arisen from the fact that ‘conviction’ is commonly used with two different meanings. It often is used to mean final disposal of a case and it is not uncommon for it to be used as meaning a finding of guilt.”

Later, at 506, Lord Upjohn said this:

“The primary meaning of the word ‘conviction’ denotes the judicial determination of a case; it is a judgment which involves two matters, a finding of guilt or the acceptance of a plea of guilty followed by sentence. Until there is such a judicial determination the case is not concluded, the court is not functus officio and a plea of autrefois convict cannot be entertained. …

…

But the word ‘conviction’ is used also in a secondary sense, that is, to express a verdict of guilty or acceptance of a plea of guilty before the adjudication which is only completed by sentence. Not only is the word used frequently in this sense in many judgments but also in many places in statutes dealing with these matters. As Tindal CJ, said in Burgess’s case [(1844) 7 Man & G, at 504]:

‘The word “conviction” is undoubtedly verbum aequivocum [an ambiguous word]. It is sometimes used as meaning the verdict of a jury, and at other times, in its more strictly legal sense, for the sentence of the court.’”

As I set above, art.21(2) of the 2005 Order requires this Court to give effect to an external order if it was made consequent on the conviction of the person named in the order and no appeal is outstanding in respect of that conviction. The meaning of the word “conviction” in this context was considered by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in Dines v DPP [2020] 1 WLR 3007, where the appellants were alleged to have been involved in a major international tax fraud in connection with telecommunications companies based in Italy with which they were connected as directors and/or shareholders. They entered into a “patteggiamento” by which a defendant in criminal proceedings in Italy proposes, in exchange for an agreed penalty, to renounce any defence or challenge to the charges which he faces in those proceedings. A patteggiamento was subsequently agreed with the prosecuting authorities, and resulted in a judgment (a “sentenza di patteggiamento”) recording the agreed fines and custodial sentences in excess of three years. The judgment also recorded confiscation orders made against each appellant, to which they had not agreed. Giving the judgment of the Court, Davis LJ said this (at 3015, 3021, and 3025):

“25.

… the ultimate question for this court is by reference to the provisions of Article 21(2) of the 2005 Order: which is, of course, to be interpreted under English law.

26.

We were taken to a number of authorities as illustrating what a ‘conviction’ connotes in English law. It is not necessary to refer to all of them. It has not infrequently been said that the word is ambiguous; certainly much will depend on context. It is, however, generally taken as extending to a finding of guilt, although sometimes (depending on context) it may extend further so as to include the final disposal of a case in the form of sentence. But it also can extend to an admission of guilt as reflected in a plea of guilty tendered to the court and formally recorded.

…

56.

It is, as we see it, crucial to identify that two separate issues need to be addressed. The first issue (which is a matter of Italian law) is whether a sentenza di patteggiamento counts as a conviction under Italian law. For if it does not, then at the outset it cannot be conceived that there was here an external order which could properly be the subject of registration under article 21 of the 2005 Order. If, however, it does, then the second issue (which is a matter of English law) is whether it counts as a conviction for the purposes of article 21(2) of the 2005 Order. It is plain that although there are undoubtedly common elements to considering both issues—in particular the elements of what actually is involved in a patteggiamento—they are legally distinct. We thus agree with Mr Keith that even if a patteggiamento does constitute a conviction as a matter of Italian law (a point he disputed) it does not follow that it necessarily must constitute a conviction for the purposes of article 21(2) of the 2005 Order as a matter of English law. In this regard, it is also clear that the matter must be assessed by reference to the substance of things: not by reference to labels. Mr Keith and Mr Newbold were agreed on that, and rightly so. Adapting phrases used by the House of Lords in the (extradition) case of R v Governor of Pentonville Prison, Ex p Zezza [1983] AC 46, one looks at the ‘nature and characteristics’, or ‘nature and substance’, of the postulated conviction in order to see whether it constitutes what would be recognised as a conviction under English law.

…

58.

As we have said, the judge made no express findings as to the aspects of Italian law debated before her; albeit her ultimate conclusion connotes at least an implied preference for the opinions of Professor Vigano and Professor Gatta. We have in such circumstances considered the reports on Italian law for ourselves. In truth, the areas of disagreement between the experts were limited. It was, however, perhaps somewhat unfortunate that Mr Sangiorgio was asked, among other things, to consider whether the patteggiamento approved by Judge Capri on 13 June 2013 could be considered a ‘conviction’, interpreted, as he had been instructed, as a finding of guilt or an admission of guilt, for the purposes of the 2005 Order. He valiantly, as instructed, sought to answer that question. But, with respect, the only proper province for the experts on Italian law was to explain the elements of the law and procedures relating to the sentenza di patteggiamento and whether it was a conviction for the purposes of Italian law. Whether it amounts to a conviction for the purposes of the 2005 Order is then solely a matter of English law.

59.

We conclude, in agreement with the judge, that it was a conviction under Italian law.

…

70.

As we have said, accepting Mr Keith’s submission, such a conclusion on Italian law does not of itself determine the outcome of this appeal by reference to the 2005 Order. Thus we cannot, with all respect to the judge, regard it as determinative that the Italian authorities regard the patteggiamento as a conviction under their law and acted in good faith in so describing it. The position still has to be assessed under English law. This involves assessing the nature and substance of the sentenza di patteggiamento pronounced in 2013.

71.

In our judgment, the features of a patteggiamento, as discussed above, do show that it is to be regarded as a conviction for the purposes of article 21 (2) of the 2005 Order.”

At [74], Davis LJ went on to say this in construing the word “conviction” in art.21(2):

“Self-evidently the article is designed to operate in the context of a conviction in the courts of the requesting state. But equally self-evidently it is to be taken as known to those drafting the 2005 Order that the procedures of such states, which do not have the common law, would differ, and perhaps significantly so, from those applicable in England and Wales. One illustration is that such states (which include Italy) simply may not have the notion of pleas of guilt, on which the court will act ordinarily without further enquiry in the way our (common law) jurisdiction does. The use of the word ‘conviction’ in article 21(2) has to be read with all that in mind.”

The Explanatory Notes to the 2002 Act (which refer to the equivalent provision in s.447(2) of the 2002 Act) suggest that the provisions defining “external orders” in the 2005 Order are to be defined widely:

“599.

Section 447(2) makes an external order, which is made in relation to the recovery of the proceeds of crime, enforceable in the United Kingdom regardless of the form it takes. It could be an order made against a person (an ‘in personam’ order) or an order made against property (an ‘in rem’ order, as in civil forfeiture proceedings in the USA). It could be a forfeiture order (an order changing the title of property), an order to a person to pay a sum of money or some other kind of order.

600.

The external order must have been made by an overseas court (as defined by subsection (10)). It is immaterial what kind of court proceedings the external order is made in. It could be made in criminal proceedings, civil proceedings or some other court proceedings. However, non-court orders such as ‘administrative’ confiscation orders made by police officers and similar authorities are excluded from this scheme.”

Additionally, as the Romanian authorities’ request is one to which the TCA applies, the 2005 Order must be approached by reference to the overall purpose and relevant provisions of Title XI: see arts.665(1) and (2) of the TCA. In Wieromiejczyk v DPP [2025] 1 WLR 1111, Sir Nigel Davis (delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)) explained (at 1124-1125) that, in construing art.7 of the 2005 Order (which sets out the conditions for making a restraint order following an external request) where a request is made under Title XI of the TCA, a broad and purposive and practical approach is appropriate:

“33.

In the present context, we consider that a broad and purposive and practical approach is appropriate such that we need not ourselves engage further in a general consideration of the effect of section 29. It would be an extremely sensitive and disruptive matter to say in the present context that elements of the long-standing requirements expressly set out in the domestic legislation in article 7 of the 2005 Order by way of conditions have in effect been disapplied or overridden by article 656(5) and/or article 689(2) of the TCA. That, in our judgment, is not a conclusion readily to be reached; and there is here, in our judgment, no conflict between the respective provisions sufficient to require such a ‘modification’ of article 7 in these respects, even if that were permissible (which is debatable in the light of what we have said above). It is in this context to be borne in mind that, whilst for obvious policy reasons this part of the TCA relating to provisional measures is drafted in generally prescriptive terms, a degree of deference to the domestic law of the requested state is acknowledged in the first part of article 656(3). It is also to be borne in mind that the appraisal by the Crown Court as to the satisfaction of the conditions in article 7 of the 2005 Order is to be undertaken by reference to the information provided in the external request submitted by the requesting member state itself. Further, the requesting state can be taken to be aware of the requirements of article 7 of the 2005 Order and to have addressed them. If that is duly done, the Crown Court would have no reason or basis not to accept what it said. In that way, in the assessment of whether the first condition or second condition, as the case may be, is satisfied there would be no ‘challenge’ to the substantive reasons for the requested measure and mutual conformity can be achieved. Moreover, it has never been suggested, so far as this court is aware, that the elements of article 7 of the 2005 Order were not required to be satisfied if the Crown Court were to make a Restraint Order pursuant to an external request in accordance with the regime previously applicable under the 2014 Regulations and when the UK was a member state of the European Union. It would be surprising if a contrary result were intended to be reached, by reference to the TCA, following Brexit.”

In construing the three conditions set out in art.21 of the 2005 Order, I see no reason to depart from the Court’s approach to the two conditions in art.7 in Wieromiejczyk. In my judgment, a broad and purposive and practical approach is appropriate in construing those conditions, including the first condition in art.21(2) that the external order was made consequent on the “conviction” of the person named in the order, and no appeal is outstanding in respect of that conviction. In so doing I do not see any conflict between the respective provisions in art.656(5) and/or art.689(2) of the TCA sufficient to require such a “modification” of art.21 in these respects by invoking s.29 of the 2020 Act.

From that legal framework I draw together the following principles to construe and interpret the word “conviction” in art.21(2).

As to the first stage of the enquiry, the “substance of the matter” is that the Defendant was found guilty after a trial. On appeal, he was again found guilty: see the Appeal Court’s judgment at p.502, set out at [21] above. That finding of guilt was confirmed by Judge Stoicescu in the judge’s response dated 3 October 2025, where he said this:

“… the Panel of 5 judges (the Appeal Court) found [the Defendant] guilty and held that his actions constituted the offence of influence peddling …”,

although, due to the relevant limitation period in Romanian law, no sentence could be imposed by the Appeal Court. Moreover, the making of the confiscation order by the Appeal Court (i.e., the External Order) required a finding of guilt in criminal proceedings and a connection to the property in question.

As to the second stage, under English law, the word “conviction” in and of itself is, as I have set out from the relevant authorities, ambiguous, and its meaning depends upon the context in which it is used. It is a feature of both common uses that a conviction arises in criminal proceedings and involves either a finding or an admission of guilt, although sometimes (depending on context) it may extend further so as to include the final disposal of a case in the form of sentence: see Dines, at [26].

By that measure, and in my judgment, both the first and second stages are satisfied. Additionally, the provisions of Title XI of the TCA are significant. By Article 670(5)(d), the Crown Court may refuse an external request if it (emphasis added):

“does not relate to a previous conviction, or a decision of a judicial nature or a statement in such a decision that an offence or several offences have been committed, on the basis of which the confiscation has been ordered or is sought.”

This article mirrors art.18.4(d) of the 1990 Strasbourg Convention, (Footnote: ³) which provides in relative part:

“4.

Co-operation under Section 4 of this chapter may also be refused if:

…

(d)

the request does not relate to a previous conviction, or a decision of a judicial nature or a statement in such a decision that an offence or several offences have been committed, on the basis of which the confiscation has been ordered or is sought;

Here, at both stages the Romanian High Court was sure to the criminal standard that the Defendant had committed an offence. Applying the “broad and purposive and practical approach” enjoined in Wieromiejczyk, it is clear that the External Order was made consequent on the conviction (i.e., a finding of guilt) by the Appeal Court. The Appeal Court’s judgment is final and conclusive, notwithstanding the Defendant’s pending appeal to the European Court of Human Rights. Without a finding of guilt in criminal proceedings, a confiscation order could not have been made by the Appeal Court.

In oral submissions to me, the Defendant pointed out that he had no criminal record. He relied upon the email which he sent to the CPS shortly before the 22 September 2025 directions hearing, and the Certificate stating that he had “no criminal record”. But, as Mr Ciuciu explained in his email of 3 October 2025 (see [27], above), the fact that a custodial sentence could not be imposed because of expiry of the limitation period under Romanian law does not change the criminal nature of the confiscation order. The “termination of the criminal proceedings” is described by him as a particular feature of the Romanian criminal justice system (I note, just like the “sentenza di patteggiamento” in Italian law, considered in Dines), and is equivalent to a criminal conviction, even though no prison term can be imposed or enforced.

In further oral submissions before me, the Defendant sought to argue that monies which consist the Property are legitimate. For this, he relied upon on the email dated 10 November 2020 from Detective Constable Elliot Toms, an officer attached to the National Terrorist Financial Investigation Unit in Counter Terrorism Policing at the Metropolitan Police who had conduct of the application for an Account Freezing Order at Westminster Magistrates’ Court (2019/2020). As far as I can see from DC Toms’ email, there are no representations to that effect in the email, and the Defendant did not provide anything further to support his contention outside of an email to Dr Kamanitz dated 7 December 2025 and documents attached thereto. No application to renew the Account Freezing Order in the Magistrates’ Court was pursued by police because DC Toms had learned of the Restraint Order made by this Court.

As to the Defendant’s contention that these funds are legitimate, that is not a matter for this Court to consider. Both the Trial Court and the Appeal Court concluded that the Defendant was the beneficial owner of the funds held in Intermell’s Bilderlings account. It follows that the funds in that account comprise the Defendant’s “realisable property” within the meaning of art.49(1) of the 2005 Order. Even if the funds in both accounts were legitimately derived, because the External Order is a “money order” in a specified sum, it may be enforced against any of the Defendant’s realisable property, regardless of the source: see arts.28(2) and 49(1).

So far as Intermell is concerned, Dr Kamanitz initially informed the CPS that he would seek the discharge of the Registration Order and that Intermell opposed the appointment of a receiver. Despite this, Dr Kamanitz did not submit any material to advance Intermell’s position, nor did Dr Kamanitz or anyone else attend the hearing before me on Intermell’s behalf, despite Intermell being on notice of it. Intermell was joined in the criminal trial in Romania and was represented there throughout by the Defendant, who held signed powers of attorney in this connection. Both the Defendant and Intermell challenged the freezing orders previously made by the Romanian High Court, but those appeals were dismissed on 1 September 2019.

All that said, it is plain to me that, so far as the Romanian authorities are concerned, the External Order was validly made following a finding of guilt, and confirmed on appeal, and should be enforced. Although the External Order was made more than two years ago, no attempt has been made by the Defendant to realise the Property to satisfy the External Order.

I return to art.27 of the 2005 Order, which sets out the requirements for the appointment by the Court of a receiver. On the evidence which I have considered, I am satisfied that:

I am satisfied that the Property is “realisable property” within the meaning of art.49(1) of the 2005 Order. I make the following findings in relation to the Property, having carefully considered the facts and matters set out in Mrs Chalk’s Witness Statement dated 2 May 2025, the judgments of the Trial Court and the Appeal Court, and the Defendant’s submissions:

I am further satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for the Court to exercise its discretion to appoint a receiver to realise the Property in accordance with the terms of the draft order served with the Application.

Since the conditions for the appointment of a receiver are satisfied, and it is apparent to me that the Defendant will not pay the External Order himself, I shall appoint a receiver to enforce the External Order.

I will make an order in terms of the draft order accordingly.