R v Michael Patrick Spencer

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to these offences. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person’s lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with s.3 of the Act.

The Defendant Michael Patrick Spencer is charged with two Counts of sexual assault, contrary to s.3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. He is a sitting Member of Parliament, having been elected to the House of Commons in 2024 for Central Suffolk and North Ipswich. The offences are said to have taken place at a well-known private members’ club in the West End of London on 12 August 2023.

The Defendant first appeared before Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 16 June 2025 following charge by postal requisition. He elected trial by jury, and was sent by the Chief Magistrate to this Court centre for trial. At that hearing, and on the Defendant’s application, the Chief Magistrate made an order withholding his residential address from being given in open court. In so doing the Chief Magistrate exercised a common law power, having been satisfied that, if the Defendant’s home address (where the Defendant lives with his wife and two young children) would be given in open court, it would breach the Defendant and his family’s Article 2 rights (the right to life) under the European Convention on Human Rights (the “ECHR”), and that such an order was necessary taking into account the public interest in open justice. The Chief Magistrate also made an order under s.11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, prohibiting publication of the Defendant’s address. The basis of the Defendant’s application was that, as a sitting MP, he is at a heightened risk of threat and attack given the spate of violent, occasionally fatal, assaults and other attacks on MPs and the targeting of their home addresses. There was limited direct evidence before the Chief Magistrate about the risks specific to the Defendant and his family, but the Chief Magistrate was prepared to make the orders up to the date of the first hearing in this Court so that further evidence about risks specific to the Defendant could be gathered. And so the Defendant’s address on the sending sheet was recorded as “MP for Suffolk”.

When the matter first came before me on 14 July, Eleanor Laws KC (who appears with Orla Daly for the Defendant) sought the two orders’ continuation. Although neutral on that application as the Prosecution was before the Chief Magistrate, Polly Dyer (who appears for the Prosecution) invited the Court to hear evidence about the risk assessment since carried out by the authorities in relation to disclosure and/or publication of the Defendant’s residential address. She invited me to sit in private, and for that hearing to be held ex parte, to allow the Court to receive evidence which the Prosecution said was subject to public interest immunity (“PII”, which used to be known as Crown privilege). I did so. After hearing that evidence, I heard submissions from Ms Laws (who had not been made aware of the evidence I had received at the ex parte hearing in private) in open court. I invited and received submissions from the press about the application. I reserved judgment, and continued the orders made below to preserve the position in the interim.

This is my reserved judgment.

There is no statutory requirement that a defendant’s address be read out in court or disclosed to the press. The practice has, however, developed that a defendant’s home address is part of his or her identity, and so should normally be made public. Consistent with that practice, a protocol is in place whereby HM Courts and Tribunal Service can share a defendant’s addresses with the press. A judicial direction is required to withhold that information.

The Judicial College guidance published in Reporting Restrictions in the Criminal Courts, July 2023 (the “Guidance”) sets out the general rule, at page 3:

“the general rule is that justice should be administered in public… Therefore, unless there are exceptional circumstances laid down by statute and/or common law, the court must not … impose permanent or temporary bans on reporting of the proceedings or any part of them including anything that prevents the proper identification, by name and address, of those appearing or mentioned in the course of proceedings”.

The starting point is the principle of open justice – court hearings, and the information required to be given during them, should be held in public. As such, before information can be withheld, a power to permit such withholding of information must exist either at common law or in statute.

This overarching principle of open justice is rehearsed in section 2.1 of the Criminal Practice Directions 2023. It provides:

“2.1.1

The general principle is that the administration of justice must be done in public, the public and the media have a right to attend all court hearings, and the media is able to report those proceedings fully and contemporaneously. [See Khuja v Times Newspapers Ltd [2019] AC 161.]

2.1.2

The open justice principle is reflected in Crim.PR 6.2(1) which requires the court, when exercising its powers in relation to reporting and access restrictions, to have regard to the importance of dealing with criminal cases in public and allowing a public hearing to be reported to the public.”

Rule 6.2 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2020 (“Crim.PR”) continues:

“(2)

The court may determine an application or appeal under this Part—

(a)

at a hearing, in public or in private; or

(b)

without a hearing.

(3)

But the court must not exercise a power to which this Part applies unless each party and any other person directly affected—

(a)

is present; or

(b)

has had an opportunity—

(i)

to attend, or

(ii)

to make representations.”

The Crown Court has an inherent jurisdiction to govern its own procedure: see British Broadcasting Corporation [2015] AC 588, at 601 per Lord Reed JSC. Magistrates’ Courts possess the same inherent jurisdiction: R v Malvern Justices; Ex parte Evans [1988] QB 540, at 551 per Watkins LJ. That includes in relation to the withholding of an address. That power is longstanding and precedes the coming into force of the ECHR through its enactment in our domestic law in the Human Rights Act 1998.

The notes to r.6.1 of the Crim.PR reflect this position, including that restriction may only occur in “exceptional circumstances”:

“The court has an inherent power, in exceptional circumstances—

(a)

to allow information, for example a name or address, to be withheld from the public at a public hearing;

(b)

to restrict public access to what otherwise would be a public hearing, for example to control disorder;

(c)

to hear a trial in private, for example for reasons of national security.”

If the court determines to exercise its common law power to withhold the disclosure of a defendant’s address to the public, a reporting restriction may be issued pursuant to s.11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 to enforce the order. The making of a s.11 order is not mandatory where the court exercises its underlying power to withhold an address, but may be considered advisable so as to avoid confusion if, for instance, a member of the press were to write to the court and request confirmation of the defendant’s address after the hearing (as is the press’s right: see further, below).

Section 4.4 of the Guidance provides:

“At common law, the court only has power to withhold material from the public in court where it is satisfied that, if the name or matter was to be heard in open court, it would frustrate or render impractical the administration of justice and that the order is necessary taking into account the public interest in open justice. Blackmail victims are normally granted anonymity on these grounds … . Other arguments commonly raised by applicants rely on the ECHR Article 2 (right to life) or Article 8 (right to privacy) and these are weighed against Article 10 (freedom of expression).”

In sum, the principles derived from the authorities (as set out in the Guidance and elsewhere) are as follows:

In R (Marandi) v Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2023] EWHC 587 (Admin), Warby LJ helpfully set out the legal position in cases such as this, at [15] to [17]:

“15.

The argument then and now turns on the proper application to this case of the principles, uncontroversial in themselves, which are identified in four key authorities: R (Rai) v Winchester Crown Court (Rai), Khuja v Times Newspapers Ltd (Khuja), ZXC, and Del Campo v Spain (Del Campo).

16.

Rai was the defendant to a charge of murder. She sought and obtained an order that her address should be withheld from the public and an RRO [reporting restriction order] under s 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. She relied on her Article 8 rights. The decision of the Crown Court to discharge that order was upheld by the Divisional Court ([2021] EWHC 2751 (Admin), (Rai (DC)) and by the Court of Appeal ([2021] EWCA Civ 604, [2021] 2 Cr App R 20 (Rai (CA)). In Rai (CA) the court approved the following summary of the relevant principles contained in the Judicial College Guide to Reporting Restrictions in the Criminal Courts (the current (2022) edition is in identical terms):

•

The general rule is that the administration of justice must be done in public; the public and the media have the right to attend all court hearings and the media is able to report those proceedings fully and contemporaneously.

•

Any restriction on these usual rules will be exceptional. It must be based on necessity.

•

The burden is on the party seeking the restriction to establish it is necessary on the basis of clear and cogent evidence.

17.

The court held that these principles apply ‘across the board’, including in cases involving rights under Article 8, in which ‘any restriction on the … media’s ability to report them must fulfil a legitimate aim and be necessary, proportionate and convincingly established’ by the production of ‘clear and cogent evidence’: see Rai (CA) at [23]. At [24]-[28] the court noted that the leading authorities, whilst recognising that in such a case the court must conduct a balancing process, emphasise the great weight to be given to the open justice principle. Two key passages from well-known Supreme Court decisions were cited:

(1)

In re S (A Child) [2004] UKHL 47, [2005] 1 AC 593 [18], where Lord Steyn, having set out the famous balancing exercise at [17], went on to identify ‘the general rule’ that ‘the press, as the watchdog of the public may report everything that takes place in a criminal court’, adding that ‘in European and in domestic practice, this is a strong rule. It can only be displaced by unusual or exceptional circumstances’.

(2)

Khuja [23], where Lord Sumption, for the majority, pointed out that:-

‘… in deciding what weight to give to the right of the press to publish proceedings in open court, the courts cannot, simply because the issues arise under the heading “private and family life”, part company with principles … which have been accepted by the common law for many years … and are reflected in a substantial and consistent body of statute law as well as the jurisprudence on art.10 …’.”

Consistent with that summary, and as set out at page 28 of the Guidance:

“It follows that a defendant in a criminal trial must be named save in rare circumstances. [R v Marines A, B, C, D & E [2013] EWCA Crim 2367 [84]] It is not appropriate therefore to invoke the s.11 power to withhold matters for the benefit of a defendant’s feelings or comfort [Evesham Justices ex parte McDonagh [1988] QB 553] or to prevent financial damage or damage to reputation resulting from proceedings concerning a person’s business. [R v Dover JJ ex parte Dover District Council 156 JP 433, DC] Nor can the power be invoked to prevent identification and embarrassment of the defendant’s children, because of the defendant’s public profile. [Crawford v DPP, The Times, 20 February 2008, R v Marines A, B, C, D & E [2013] EWCA Crim 2637]”

In the Magistrates’ Court, Ms Laws KC submitted the orders made were necessary to protect the Defendant and his family’s Article 2 rights. She said there was clear and cogent evidence to demonstrate that publication of the Defendant’s residential address would create, or materially increase, a risk of death or serious injury. She pointed to threats and attacks made upon MPs now at unprecedented levels of both frequency and seriousness. In addition to the recent arson attacks on properties connected to the Prime Minister, Ms Laws submitted a number of MPs had been critically injured in violent assaults and, in the cases of Sir David Ames MP and Jo Cox MP, murdered.

To support these submissions, Ms Laws relied upon a House of Commons Committee Report published on 23 May 2025 which made a number of recommendations to HM Government in respect of ongoing threats to MPs and the particular security risks they and their families now face. Paragraph 15 of the Report says this:

“Attacks on MPs are not new, as we are daily reminded by the four shields in the House of Commons Chamber commemorating Airey Neave MP, Robert Bradford MP, Sir Anthony Berry MP and Ian Gow MP, murdered between 1979 and 1990, which sit alongside the shields commemorating Jo Cox MP and Sir David Amess MP, and the plaque marking where Spencer Percival was assassinated in 1812. However, witnesses told us that the current nature of threats and abuse is a significant change from recent history. We heard from Chief Inspector Bryan Duffy, the lead officer for Op Bridger (the policing initiative for security of MPs and general election candidates), that: ‘Over the last four to eight years, we have just seen a change in society in terms of how debate and politics are conducted. It has veered towards one end of the spectrum: something more direct, attacking, that does not expect anybody to fire back, or for justice to follow, is now an expectation’.”

Such is the severity of the increased threat that the recommendations in that Report called for a full review of electoral law to ensure that no home addresses are published for candidates standing for Parliament.

Ms Laws did not seek to place any restriction in relation to the Defendant’s identification or in relation to any factual matters concerning the allegations against him. He is a Member of Parliament, and she said would doubtless be described as such in any report in the press. The suffix “MP” would likely appear with his name. In those circumstances, Ms Laws submitted there could be no reasonable suggestion that publication of the Defendant’s residential address was necessary to distinguish him from any other individual, and, in any event, there was no public interest in the Defendant’s address being published.

During the course of the submissions before him, I am told the Chief Magistrate was shown a letter from the Ministry of Justice regarding the recent release of a convicted terrorist to the Defendant’s constituency. The Chief Magistrate directed the Prosecution to provide evidence of any risk to the Defendant presented by this person by 30 June 2025, and the Defence to serve any application for the extension of the orders together with any evidence in support by 7 July 2025.

By letter dated 30 June 2023, the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (the “BBC”) Legal Department wrote to the Court setting out its submission that the orders made by the Chief Magistrate should not be continued. The BBC submitted that the orders represented an unjustified interference with the important principle of open justice. It relied upon the Guidance, and said that the principle is particularly significant in circumstances where a Member of Parliament has been charged with a serious criminal offence; it is essential that all people are, and are seen to be, equal under the law.

The BBC argued the default position of reporting a person’s address is fundamental to reporting criminal proceedings accurately, as it ensured the correct person is identified as the defendant. The fact that this Defendant is a Member of Parliament is, in the BBC’s submission, a wholly inadequate justification for deviating from this default position, especially in the absence of compelling evidence to support a such derogation from normal principles.

As far as the Defendant’s Article 2 (and, if applicable, Article 3) ECHR rights are concerned, this was not, said the BBC, a case where there were specific safety concerns about the Defendant but rather general concerns about his safety. It submitted the Defendant had not provided evidence of anything other than unparticularised concerns about the risk of potential harm. Information that a convicted terrorist had been released into his constituency – untethered from any specific and direct implication – fell well short of the clear and cogent evidence the law requires to justify any derogation from the open justice principle. General concerns about safety are not, the BBC submitted, sufficient to impose a reporting restriction about a defendant’s home address based on their ECHR rights: R (Rai) v The Crown Court at Winchester [2021] EWHC 339 (Admin). Relying on Lord Hoffman’s speech in Re Officer L [2007] 1 WLR 2135, at [20], the BBC submitted that, to engage Articles 2 and/or 3 of the ECHR, the risk to life must be “real and immediate”, with an objectively verifiable basis.

As I mentioned, at the outset of the hearing before me Ms Dyer invited the Court to sit in private, and for that part of the hearing to be held ex parte, for the Court to receive evidence which Ms Dyer submitted attracted PII . Ms Laws KC did not object, nor did the members of the press present. Parts of this open judgment which follow under this heading are redacted to preserve PII.

The Court and the Defence had already had sight of a document from the Prosecution prepared by an officer of the Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection unit of the Metropolitan Police dated 10 July 2025 (the “PaDP briefing note”) which set out in general terms the security arrangements for Members of Parliament. Parts of it attract PII. The document made two disclosures. First, it said that the convicted terrorist released into the Defendant’s constituency was not assessed as a specific risk to the Defendant or to MPs generally. Second, it provided an explanation of the general advice given by the police to all MPs to remove their address from open sources on the internet.

…

Ms Dyer produced a second document, entitled “PII material”, setting out in part the security assessment in place for the Defendant. This document was not provided to the Defendant or the Defence. Ms Dyer told me that its contents could be spoken to by Detective Inspector Lee Barnard of the Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection Unit, who could give evidence in private and ex parte to explain the position. This was not a situation where Part 15 of the Crim.PR applied, and I agreed to do so to assess whether the evidence adduced by the Prosecution attracted PII. I was mindful that departure from the general principle of open justice is permitted where necessary under the Court’s inherent power to control its own proceedings in order to ensure fairness and the just conduct of criminal proceedings: Ali [2020] 1 WLR 402, [35] to [39], and [48]. Assessing a claim to PII satisfies that necessity.

There are occasions where the courts must consider material which might prejudice an important public interest. In determining whether PII applies, the Court is to apply the test of whether there is a real risk of serious prejudice to an important and identified public interest. If the material does not satisfy that test, it does not attract public interest immunity: see H [2004] 2 AC 134, at [27] and [36].

Having heard evidence from DI Barnard in private and ex parte, and having considered the material in the document entitled “PII material”, I am satisfied that it attracts PII. …

…

DI Barnard told me there was no real and immediate risk to life specific to the Defendant and/or his family that police had identified. This evidence did not attract PII. …

Having received this evidence, I sat again in open court.

Ms Laws KC relied upon the submissions she made below. She pointed to section 4.4 of the Guidance (see [13] above), which goes on to say:

“Where a court exercises its powers to allow a name or any other matter, such as a defendant’s home address, to be withheld from the public in criminal proceedings, the court may then, as a second step, make such directions as are necessary under s.11 [of the Contempt of Court Act 1981] prohibiting the publication of that name or matter in connection with the proceedings”.

Ms Laws submitted the Guidance clearly envisioned the Court’s common law power may be used to prevent publication of a defendant’s address. It was, she said, necessary for the Court to continue with the current restriction on publication of the Defendant’s address, taking into account the public interest in open justice. She submitted there is a generalised threat to the safety of serving MPs at the present time, and that appeared to be accepted by the Prosecution. She relied upon what she said was the ample evidence of serious attacks on MPs in recent years, some fatal. Police were clearly concerned that there should be no unnecessary publication of MPs’ addresses where this can be avoided.

In later written submissions I invited from the Defence on points made in the BBC’s letter of 30 June 2025, Ms Laws KC and Ms Daly sought to distinguish R (Rai) v The Crown Court at Winchester [2021] EWHC 339 (Admin) from this case, as Rai involved no evidence even of a generalised threat to the defendant in that case. They submitted the press had been free to report on all aspects of the facts of this case, including making clear the identity of the Defendant and precise details of the allegations he faces. Ms Laws and Ms Daly submitted there could be no legitimate public interest in additionally reporting details of the Defendant’s home address. His identity is clear and cannot be confused with any other person. To argue that preventing publication may “open the floodgates” is to ignore the specific threat posed to MPs. Ms Laws and Ms Daly further relied upon the PaDP Briefing Note, which said this:

“In February 2024, the Home Office launched the Defending Democracy Policing Protocol, Operation Bridger was called upon to expand its remit to cover all elected officials, due to serious concerns about the safety of those who stand for office. For context, the DDPP was launched shortly after the high profile protests that took place outside the home address of Tobias Ellwood MP.”

In sum, Ms Laws KC and Ms Daly submit there is no public interest in details of the Defendant’s home address being published. Any balance to be struck between principles of open justice and restricting publication of that “irrelevant” detail ought to be exercised in favour of minimising risk and continuing the orders for the time being to prevent publication.

In a later written submission on 15 July 2025, Ms Daly drew my attention to a selection of posts on the social media platform X (formerly Twitter) commenting on the 14 July hearing. One of them posted a picture of the Defendant, and wrote a disparaging commentary about the allegations made against him, including, at the very end of the post, “Purge the House. Clean the halls. Start again.” That post had received some 4.3k views when the image was captured. A post below it in the “most relevant replies” said this:

“They used to burn down the houses of MPs they didn’t like back in the 1800’s, I believe”.

The very clear implication from this was a suggestion this might happen in the Defendant’s case.

Brian Farmer of BBC News, Suffolk made very able submissions on behalf of the press present at the hearing in open court. He referred me to the gov.uk website publication “Jurisdictional guidance to support media access to courts and tribunals: Criminal courts guide”, which lays down general guidelines directed to HM Courts and Tribunals Service staff in support of the open justice principle. Section 1 of this publication provides as follows:

“Although journalists are often in court to report on particular proceedings, you may still be contacted outside a hearing to verify the facts about a case they have heard about or to get details of a specific case after the event. You can release factual information that is said or read out in open court, contained within a court document that is open to public inspection, or placed on a public notice board.”

Section 2, which is headed “Information you must provide to the media”, provides as follows:

“Where you have the relevant information and the case is ongoing (or the verdict is less than six months ago), you must supply the following details on request from a member of the media (in court or by phone/email) in line with the Criminal Procedure Rules:

…

(f)

the identity of … the defendant, the parties’ representatives, including their addresses … .

Please note that in order to comply with the obligation in relation to the identity of the defendant, you should also provide the media with defendant’s address, age and where it is provided, date of birth.”

Mr Farmer submitted it was a matter of routine for the press to report a defendant’s residential address and date of birth, and that it was fundamentally important to do so to ensure the defendant was properly identified. Mr Farmer urged me to be wary before departing from the general principle of open justice, particularly so in this case because the Defendant had failed to identify a risk or risks specific to him based upon clear and cogent evidence. Moreover, Mr Farmer told me the Defendant’s home address in Suffolk could be found by conducting a few basic online searches, such that the orders made below by the Chief Magistrate served no real purpose.

It seems to me that the Defence submissions developed beyond those in the application below, which relied solely upon the Defendant and his family’s Article 2 ECHR rights to life, to include a more generalised submission to rely on the common law power to restrict publication where, should the Defendant’s residential address be heard in open court, it would frustrate or render impractical the administration of justice such that the orders made below were necessary taking into account the public interest in open justice. I take that developed submission first.

As I mentioned, the law does not require a defendant’s address be read out in court or disclosed to the press. The practice which has developed before the Magistrates’ Courts is that a defendant’s home address is part of his or her identity and so normally should be made public. Consistent with that practice, a protocol has been put in place whereby HM Courts and Tribunal Service can share a defendant’s addresses with the press upon application by a member of the press in furtherance of the principle of open justice. A judicial direction is required to withhold that information.

Rule 5.8 of the Crim.PR provides that, where anyone, including a member of the public or a reporter, requests information about a case:

“(4)

Subject to paragraph (5), the court officer must supply to the person making the request—

…

(f)

the identity of—

(i)

the prosecutor,

(ii)

the defendant, including the defendant’s date of birth,

(iii)

the parties’ representatives, including their addresses, and

(iv)

the judge, magistrate or magistrates, or justices’ legal adviser by whom a decision at a hearing in public was made;

…

(h)

details of any reporting or access restriction ordered by the court;

…

(5)

The court officer must not supply the information requested if—

(a)

the supply of that information is prohibited by—

(i)

a reporting restriction …”.

It is immediately apparent that r.5.8(f) does not require the Court to provide to the press a defendant’s residential address, contrary to the impression which might be taken from the gov.uk website publication referred to by Mr Farmer. The underlying purpose for doing so given by Mr Farmer is to ensure a defendant is not misidentified with anyone else who might share the same name.

For the reasons advanced by Ms Laws KC and Ms Daly, I cannot see how that could apply in this case: the Defendant is well-known as an MP, his identity is clear, his photograph widely available online, and I very much doubt he could be confused with any other person. The rationale for the press reporting the Defendant’s residential address falls away on that basis alone.

Having conducted the required balancing exercise and giving great weight to the open justice principle, in my judgment there cannot be any public interest in the Defendant’s home address being aired in open court and reported publicly by the press. The Defendant is well-known, even if only as a result of the allegations made against him. He is the sitting member for Central Suffolk and North Ipswich, and an address – to the extent one is needed to properly identify him – can be given as the House of Commons, SW1. I do not consider that disclosure of the Defendant’s home address would serve the proper administration of justice; rather, it is necessary to withhold it to ensure that the security measures put in place by police for the protection of MPs such as the Defendant are not frustrated. I realise this is an exceptional course to take, and I bear in mind the House of Commons Committee Report about ongoing threats to MPs and the particular security risks they and their families face which I quoted above. No restriction is in place in relation to the Defendant’s identity or in relation to any factual matters concerning the allegations against him. The orders were not made for the Defendant’s benefit or comfort; rather, they were made because the value of the security measures in place for the Defendant and his family (which includes protecting the identity of his home address) outweigh the necessity for his home address to be published in open court.

In answer to the BBC’s other written submissions, the Defendant is not subject to different treatment to others. All defendants must be properly identified before the courts, and this Defendant is. The orders made below should continue for those reasons alone. They were necessary and properly made, and they take into account the public interest in open justice. To that extent, I find the withholding of the Defendant’s home address is necessary to ensure that the security arrangements in place for him as a sitting MP are not frustrated or jeopardised. The withholding of this information is necessary for that purpose. While Mr Farmer’s point that the Defendant’s Suffolk home address might easily be found through internet searches, the evidence I received shows that active steps have been taken to remove this information from online and elsewhere. Disclosing it in open court would defeat those steps and make the address readily identifiable should the press report it.

If I am wrong on the Defence’s developed submission I must consider the Defence’s primary submission made before me and below, which centred on the Defendant and his family’s Article 2 ECHR (right to life) rights. I shall also consider Article 3 (right to freedom from serious physical harm or torture) in this context. Those rights, of course, are absolute, and cannot be weighed against Article 10 (which encompasses the principle of open justice and the rights of the freedom of the press). In so doing , I remind myself that the Defendant must be able to satisfy the Court that the risk of death or serious harm is real and immediate, and this evidential burden can only be satisfied by reference to clear and cogent evidence of the risks on which he relies.

This is a very high threshold. It is meant to be for the important reasons identified in the authorities. I am not satisfied by the evidence I heard sitting in open court and in private that a real and immediate risk of death or serious harm to the Defendant and/or his family is present. I am quite sure that such a risk exists and is not fanciful, particularly so in light of the submissions made by Ms Laws KC and Ms Daly after the hearing, including the X tweets I have referenced. I do not think it likely, however, that such a risk is real and immediate. I find it more likely that the risk level is assessed at a low level commensurate with the vast majority of MPs who are either recently elected, or without high office or other profile. This is not a case like Rai, where there was no evidence even of a generalised threat to the defendant. I recognise the position can, of course, quickly change.

It is regrettable that the spontaneous, ill-informed, vitriolic and reactive commentary in the X tweets was published shortly after the hearing: they add very little if anything to properly informed and responsible reports about these criminal proceedings, proceedings which, I should add, are sub judice and subject to the strictures imposed at law both by the Contempt of Court Act 1981 and the common law. I make it perfectly clear those strictures apply equally to publications on social media platforms such as X.

So, had the submissions been advanced solely relying upon the Defendant and his family’s ECHR rights, I would have refused to continue the orders made below for the lack of clear and cogent evidence of a real and immediate risk of death or serious harm to the Defendant and/or his family.

For the reasons which I have given, the orders made below must continue. I order accordingly.