R v Luke Jacob Pearce

The provisions of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (the “1996 Act”) apply. Under those provisions, it is unlawful to publish in the United Kingdom a written report of a ruling made under s.40 of the 1996 Act or proceedings on an application for a ruling to be made under s.40, or to include in a relevant programme for reception in the United Kingdom a report of such matters, if (in either case) the report contains any matter other than that permitted.

This is my judgment following an application by the Defendant, Luke Jacob Pearce, made pursuant to s.40 of the 1996 Act, for a ruling on a question of law at a pre-trial hearing.

The Defendant is charged on an Indictment containing two counts of misconduct in public office, contrary to common law. Those charges arise out of the Defendant taking and distributing photographs of human remains found in a motor vehicle in the aftermath of a fatal car accident, while in the employment of the Metropolitan Police Service (the “MPS”).

Counts 1 and 2 of the Indictment allege:

“Count 1

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE

MISCONDUCT IN A PUBLIC OFFICE.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE

LUKE JACOB PEARCE on the 16th day of July 2024 while acting as a public officer, namely a civilian staff of the Metropolitan Police Service, wilfully misconducted himself and without reasonable excuse or justification to such a degree as to amount to an abuse of the public’s trust in him namely abused his position as a civilian police staff in that he used his personal mobile phone to take photographic images of human remains within the interior of a BMW vehicle index number SA60ODO recovered from the scene of a triple fatality Road Traffic Collision and shared by airdropping the images with Sam Walker a Metropolitan Police Service sub-contractor without any legitimate policing purpose.

Count 2

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE

MISCONDUCT IN A PUBLIC OFFICE.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE

LUKE JACOB PEARCE on the 16th day of July 2024 while acting as a public officer, namely a civilian staff of the Metropolitan Police Service, wilfully misconducted himself and without reasonable excuse or justification to such a degree as to amount to an abuse of the public’s trust in him namely abused his position as a civilian police staff in that he shared on IMessage a social media platform the photographic images containing human remains from the scene of a triple fatality Road Traffic Collision with a member of the public called Theresa Pearce without any legitimate policing purpose.”

The question of law that arises is whether the Defendant is a “public officer” for the purpose of the offence of misconduct in public office. It is common ground (and, in any event, the position in law) that the existence or otherwise of a public office is a question of law for the judge: see Cosford [2014] QB 81, at [38] per Leveson LJ (as he then was) giving judgment of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division).

The relevant facts about the duties undertaken by the Defendant are agreed, at least for the purpose of this application. If there had been a question as to the facts of the Defendant’s duties, any decision as to the facts would have been one for the jury.

Misconduct in public office is a common law offence not defined in any statute. It requires that:

It is the very first part of the first requirement – that of a “public officer” – with which this application is concerned.

As the authors of the Law Commission’s issues paper on misconduct in public office observed, (Footnote: ¹) the term “public office” lacks clear definition yet is a critical element of the offence, and the types of duty that may qualify someone to be a public office holder are ill-defined. This ambiguity generates significant difficulties in interpreting and applying the offence.

Attorney-General’s Reference (No.3 of 2003) set out the first comprehensive review of the constituent elements which make up the offence, but it provides little assistance in determining this element of the offence as in that case (which concerned a police officer) there could be no doubt that a police officer was a public office holder. Other cases, however, have found the following positions to constitute “public office” for the purpose of the offence: (Footnote: ²)

The century-old case of Whitaker sets out the most often cited common law definition of “public officer”, where Lawrence J (giving judgment for the Court of Criminal Appeal) said (at 1296):

“A public officer is an officer who discharges any duty in the discharge of which the public are interested”,

or, in other words, that a public office should be defined in terms of its functions, not status. The definition in Whitaker is a broad one.

In Attorney-General’s Reference (No.3 of 2003), in referring to the potential for unfairness if those holding a public office (such as police officers) are to be liable to a sanction not applicable to those in private employment who do similar work, the Court said (at [62]) this potential unfairness added weight to their conclusion that the offence should be strictly confined. Having found so, the Court did not go on to develop the point or to consider further the question of what, in that case, constituted a public office, given there could be no doubt that a police officer is the holder of a public office.

Both Cosford and another case, Mitchell [2014] EWCA Crim 318, are judgments of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) delivered by Sir Brian Leveson P. In Cosford his Lordship said (at [34]) that any limit on the scope of who is a public office holder should focus on the position held by the defendant:

“Nothing in the authorities justifies the conclusion that the ‘strict confinement’ should be to the position held by whomsoever is carrying out the duty: rather, it should be addressed to the nature of the duty undertaken and, in particular, whether it is a public duty in the sense that it represents the fulfilment of one of the responsibilities of government such that the public have a significant interest in its discharge extending beyond an interest in anyone who might be directly affected by a serious failure in the performance of the duty.”

In Mitchell, the President of the Queen’s Bench Division (as he had then become) went on to say that the proper approach to the question of defining a public office involved asking three questions:

“First, what is the position held? Second, what is the nature of the duties undertaken by the employee or officer in that position? Third, does the fulfilment of those duties represent the fulfilment of one of the responsibilities of government such that the public have a significant interest in the discharge of that duty which is additional to or beyond an interest in anyone who might be directly affected by a serious failure in the performance of that duty?”

The defendant in Mitchell had been travelling in the rear of an ambulance with a female patient. CCTV from the rear of the ambulance appeared to show that, during the course of the journey, he sexually touched the conscious patient a number of times. The defendant was held to not to be a public officer because, although the public had a significant interest in the maintenance of a paramedic service, they did not have a significant interest in the performance of the duties of each individual paramedic.

The most recent authority on the meaning of “public office” is Evans [2025] 4 WLR 104. In Evans, the defendant was employed as an “operational support grade” in a prison. Part of his duties involved conducting prisoner welfare checks during the night shift, but he failed to do so in breach of his duty. A vulnerable prisoner sustained fatal injuries during the night, and the defendant was charged and convicted of misconduct in public office. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) (Holroyde LJ, May, and Wall JJ) held that, although the categories of activity which might be held to be a public office were not closed, the elements of the offence of misconduct in public office were clearly established in the authorities; that, in considering whether a defendant was acting as a public officer for the purposes of the offence, the focus had to be on the duties and responsibilities of the defendant, not the overall responsibility of the organisation or body by which he was employed, and the proper approach was to ask the three questions posed by Sir Brian Leveson P in Mitchell, i.e.:

From these authorities the following general principles can be drawn: (Footnote: ³)

As I mentioned, the relevant facts are agreed at least for the purposes of this application. The two counts on the Indictment allege the “public office” held by the Defendant was that of “a civilian staff of the Metropolitan Police Service”. There is no dispute about the Defendant’s employment as civilian staff of the MPS, or the nature of the Defendant’s role.

The Defendant was employed as a Pound Assistant (Band F) at the Perivale Vehicle Pound in Walmgate Road, UB6 7LR. A copy of the job advertisement for this role appears as an appendix to this judgment. It sets out a job description and the duties and responsibilities involved as a Pound Assistant.

Emma Weir was the Defendant’s line manager at the times material to the Indictment. As part of the Operational Support Services team, she was a member of MPS staff and the Pound Manager based at Perivale Vehicle Pound. She had held this role since February 2023, and was the Defendant’s line manager from April 2023 until 19 July 2024. She describes the Defendant’s roles and responsibilities as: (Footnote: ⁴)

“- Supervising the loading and unloading of recovery vehicles. ·

-

Processing vehicles upon their arrival to the Car Pound, including confirming the vehicle’s identity, the accurate completion of vehicle removal forms and inspecting the vehicle for damage.

-

Conducting vehicle inspections on their arrival, and safely and securely handling items that may be found including property, cash, drugs and weapons.

-

Using specialist vehicle moment equipment to move vehicles that do not drive around the Car Pound.

-

Restoring vehicles to members of the public that have been processed at the Front Counter. This could be directly to the claimant, or via a third-party recovery operator.

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Restoring property to members of the public that have been processed at the Front Counter. This includes accessing the vehicle and obtaining any specific property that they have asked for.

-

Limited admin tasks such as updating Vehicle Movements and Searches onto the ELVIS system[ (Footnote: ⁵)].”

These described tasks largely align with the advertised duties and responsibilities. She adds:

“Luke would have come into direct contact with members of the public when restoring vehicles and property.

During his time at Perivale Vehicle Pound, Luke did not have access to [the] PNC[ (Footnote: ⁶)].”

It seems that inputting vehicle details on the MPS computer systems (or at least causing such details to be added) was not limited to MPS employees. In this case, it appears that two employees of C&S Motor Group, the MPS vehicle recovery contractor engaged to recover the BMW motor vehicle referred to in the Indictment and transport it to Perivale Vehicle Pound, dealt with the initial entry. Matthew Jupp, who is employed by the MPS as the Service Delivery Manager (Specialist Removals and Contact Centre) attached to the Vehicle Recovery and Examination Services and the contract manager for C&S Motor Group, says: (Footnote: ⁷)

“I checked the ELVIS record for the vehicle and saw the E955 was added by Kuldip DAGEN, but completed by Dhobir AZAD. As the contract manager for C&S Motor Group, I contacted Jade McKENNA who is the Operations Manager within C&S Motor Group … to establish both Kuldip and Dhobir’ [sic] involvement in the recovery.”

While the Defendant was required to conduct vehicle inspections on arrival, and to safely and securely handle items that may be found (including property, cash, drugs and weapons), his role did not involve the securing, handing or preservation of evidence. David Cox, another Pound Assistant employed by the MPS at Perivale Vehicle Pound, says that: (Footnote: ⁸)

“[MPS] policy states that staff are not to search vehicles that have been involved in crime or a fatality”.

The factual context in which these offences are said to have occurred is also relevant. Emma Weir explains that it was not common or expected for human remains such as those found in the BMW motor vehicle to be left in a vehicle upon arrival at Percival Vehicle Pound. (Footnote: ⁹) She also notes what she says was a concerning dismissive attitude of other members of MPS staff involved in the recovery of this motor vehicle. She describes her efforts to bring the matter to the attention of the Forensic Collison Investigations Unit; their view was that “there definitely shouldn’t be” human remains like those found in the vehicle. From that it would seem the Defendant should not have been exposed to or expected to handle human remains of the like he had been in the course of his work as a Pound Assistant.

As I have set out, the proper approach to determine whether someone is the holder of a public office is the three-part test enumerated by Sir Brian Leveson P in Mitchell. I consider each of these questions in turn below.

What position the defendant held

This is not disputed. At the relevant time, the Defendant was employed by the MPS as a Pound Assistant, a civilian staff member.

What duties were attached to that position

This is not disputed. The duties attached to that position are set out in the advertised job description and in the evidence given by Emma Weir, the Defendant’s line manager, and David Cox, his colleague.

The nature of the duties undertaken by the Defendant were the subject of careful written and oral submissions by Ms Rowan and Mr Reid. It seems to me that, contrary to Mr Reid’s submissions, the nature of the Defendant’s responsibilities were that of a low-level civilian employee. The Defendant worked alongside third-party contractors performing not dissimilar functions. Shortly put, his role was to unload motor vehicles, complete paperwork upon their arrival, and then move the vehicles around the pound, to clean up the pound, and work at the front counter returning motor vehicles to the public. Those tasks were in addition to some basic administrative tasks.

Mr Reid points to what I consider might be fairly described as puff set out in the job advertisement (his emphasis):

“This is an exciting time to be working as a Pound Assistant for the Metropolitan Police Service. In addition to large-scale transformation, there’s the unique and ever-evolving challenge of policing London. This means that as a Met employee, there are more opportunities for you to get involved in making London the safest global city in a time of unprecedented change within the UK’s largest Police Service.

The Vehicle Recovery and Examination Service (VRES) is a key part of the Metropolitan Police Service’s drive to tackle vehicle crime on the streets of London.  We work to remove, recover, examine, restore and dispose of vehicles that are involved in collisions and serious organised crime or seized under Police powers for no insurance or unlicensed use. We work around the clock to support frontline policing.

VRES operate out of two forensic vehicle Pounds at Perivale (Ealing) and Charlton (Greenwich). We process around 40,000 vehicles every year; dealing with everything from motorcycles to large goods vehicles and coaches.”

That description, however, falls under the heading “About the Met”, and, in my judgment, more properly describes the wider role played by the VRES. It was not, for example, part of the Defendant’s role to get involved in “policing London”, or to “Tackle vehicle crime on the streets of London”, or to conduct any forensic or other “examination” of vehicles seized or impounded. He did not seize motor vehicles “under Police powers”; rather, as a Pound Assistant at Perivale Vehicle Pound, he worked “to support frontline policing”.

The Defendant’s role did not involve examining or searching motor vehicles involving crime or a fatality; rather, his role was limited to “inspecting” vehicles on their arrival, and “safely and securely handling items that may be found including property, cash, drugs and weapons”. That “inspecting” role might otherwise be performed by employees of C&S Motor Group, the third-party contractors employed by the MPS in recovering and removing motor vehicles from scene of crime or motor vehicle accidents. There is no evidence to suggest the Defendant played any role in the gathering or preservation of evidence for the MPS, even though the vehicle pound at Perivale is described as a “forensic vehicle Pound”. As David Cox says, MPS policy is that the Defendant was not to search motor vehicles involved in crime or a fatality.

Nor did the Defendant assist in the investigation of offences, as the (retired police officer) civilian defendant in DL did. He did not have access to data beyond that collated for the purpose of checking motor vehicles in and out of the pound through ELVIS. Although the evidence in this respect is not immediately clear, it seems other non-MPS employees such as those working for C&S Motor Group also had access to or provided input for ELVIS. There is no evidence that the data stored on ELVIS was sensitive or confidential. Moreover, the Defendant did not have access to sensitive police intelligence stored on the PNC. He was not in a position of trust attendant with any of these indicia.

Although the enquiry is fact-specific, it seems to me that the Defendant’s role can be clearly and materially distinguished from civilian employees who in the past have been found to be in public office in breach of trust. I take three such cases – Bowden [1996] 1 WLR 98; Attorney-General’s Reference (No.140 of 2004) [2004] EWCA Crim 3525; Gallagher [2010] EWCA Crim 3201 – where the defendants were found to be in positions of significant trust and abused that position.

In Bowden, the defendant was a maintenance manager with the Local Authority. He was responsible to his employers for the upkeep of their council housing and in that capacity was accountable for the receipt and disbursement of public money. The control of public funds in such a manner meant that he was in public office for the purpose of this offence. Here there is no evidence the Defendant was in control of public funds.

In Attorney-General’s Reference (No.140 of 2004), the defendant was a DVLA employee who, contrary to the Data Protection Act 1998, obtained the names and addresses of 13 vehicle owners. He was found to be in a position of trust, such that his activity damaged confidence in the way in which confidential DVLA records were kept and maintained only for the public purpose. Here there is no evidence the Defendant had access to records which did no more than log vehicles in and out of the pound.

In Gallagher, the defendant was employed by Merseyside police as a civilian call handler. His partner was arrested for drugs offences; she was on maternity leave, but her friend, the defendant’s co-defendant, who also worked for the police in the Crime Recording Unit, was working that day. The defendant contacted the co-defendant after his partner’s arrest and, as a result, the co-defendant accessed the police computer system on 43 occasions over a long period, and made numerous searches in respect of a second man and the drug seizure that had taken place. It was held that that offending involved a significant breach of trust in accessing confidential sensitive data on police systems relating to ongoing criminal investigations. Again, here there is no evidence the Defendant had access to records which did no more than log vehicles in and out of the pound.

In my judgment, none other of the Defendant’s roles and responsibilities relied upon by Mr Reid take the Defendant’s role outside that of a low-level civilian employee. Put simply, his job was to “process” vehicles, “dealing with everything from motorcycles to large goods vehicles and coaches”, undertaking the range of low-level roles and responsibilities set out by Emma Weir in her evidence.

To sum up the position on nature of the Defendant’s duties, I cannot accept that, properly considered on the evidence, the Defendant’s defined roles and responsibilities take him outside that of a low-level civilian functionary not entrusted to perform police-like functions. Had, for example, forensic evidence in the form of human remains been present in a motor vehicle, the Defendant was not expected to deal with it. The evidence is that human remains such as those found in the BMW at Perivale should not have been there.

Other matters relied upon by Mr Reid do not take the Prosecution’s case any further. There is no evidence that the Defendant was specially vetted for the role, apart from the Defendant completing a course in “Security Clearance Type – RV/CTC” (and, in any event, there is no evidence what that course required or involved). Mr Reid relies on the Defendant’s training record for something called “CONNECT”, but, again, there is no evidence as to what this is or how it might put the Defendant in a position of trust. Mr Reid submits the “CONNECT” holds sensitive and confidential information, and that the Defendant had access to it, but, again, there is no evidence to support this submission.

Mr Reid further points to the Defendant being subject to a counter terrorism check prior to employment; again, there is no evidence as to who amongst MPS employees are subject to such checks, or why such checks are required or what they involve. Mr Reid also prays in aid the MPS code of ethics and the principles on social media use, but I cannot see how that puts the Defendant in a position of trust given (as Mr Reid submits) these principles must apply to all MPS employees – whether in public office or otherwise.

Nor does the fact the Pound Assistants are required to wear a police-issued uniform and are provided with personal protective equipment assist the Prosecution’s case: it suggests no more than, like other employees, the Defendant was required to wear particular work clothes or protective equipment provided by his employer for that purpose.

Whether the fulfilment of those duties represented one of the responsibilities of government such that the public had a significant interest in the discharge of that duty which was additional to or beyond an interest in anyone who might be directly affected by a serious failure in the performance of that duty

I do not consider the Defendant’s fulfilment of the duties which I have set out and described above represent the fulfilment of one of the responsibilities of government. The individual duties which he undertook, as set out in the advertised job description and in Emma Weir’s evidence, must be distinguished from that of the wider duties undertaken by the MPS upon which Mr Reid sought to rely.

As I have pointed out, the puff relied upon by Mr Reid in the job description speaks to the function of the VRES within the MPS to remove, recover, examine, restore and dispose of motor vehicles involved in collisions and serious organised crime. Some of those functions – like that of removing and recovering motor vehicles – were contracted out to third parties like C&S Motor Group. Other functions – like examining vehicles – did not form part of the Defendant’s role. As the role description says (my emphasis):

“Our Pound Assistants work as a critical part of our team to process vehicles that we receive and restore in our forensic vehicle pounds. You’ll be interacting with colleagues within the Pound (including forensic vehicle examiners and collision investigators), alongside customers and recovery contractors on a daily basis to ensure that we handle vehicles safely and legally. Vehicles that enter into our vehicle pounds may be stolen, seized for motoring offences, or requiring forensic vehicle examination so it is essential that our Pound Assistants follow the rigorous operating policies and procedures that we have in place. As a Pound Assistant, you’ll oversee the signing-in and inspecting of vehicles upon arrival, and the storage of vehicle across the car pounds. This means that you’ll be required to inspect vehicles for damage and property, monitor the safe operation of recovery operators, and move disabled vehicles around the car pound using specialist plant equipment that we provide”,

but, as David Cox says in his evidence, the Defendant was not supposed to search motor vehicles involved in crime or a fatality. Rather, he was required to follow the “rigorous operating policies and procedures” put in place by the MPS, but there is no evidence as to what those policies and procedures were outside of the wider roles and responsibilities that I have already mentioned. The Defendant’s duty was to:

“oversee the signing-in and inspecting of vehicles upon arrival, and the storage of vehicle across the car pounds”,

and it was only in this connection that he was:

“required to inspect vehicles for damage and property, monitor the safe operation of recovery operators, and move disabled vehicles around the car pound using specialist plant equipment”.

In performing these functions, and outside of any special position of trust, it seems to me that the public does not have a significant interest in the discharge of the Defendant’s duties additional to or beyond an interest in anyone who might be directly affected by a serious failure in the performance of his duty. While it may be that an individual member of the public may have an interest in the Defendant’s failure in the performance or discharge of his duties (to the extent, for example, that he might damage a motor vehicle when unloading or moving it at the pound), in my judgment the public at large does not have a significant interest in the discharge of that duty.

Mr Reid submits that the Defendant’s role exposed him to the handling of property involved in fatal accidents, and, as such, the public have a significant interest in the proper and dignified handling of that material. I do not think that submission can be sustained on the evidence. It might have been said about the MPS’s third-party contractors, but, in any event, as Emma Weir says, “there definitely shouldn’t be” human remains of the like found in the vehicle which the Defendant handled, and so it could not have been anticipated that the Defendant would encounter material such as this. The Defendant’s duties and responsibilities are distinct from the overall responsibility of the MPS.

Nothing in the job advertisement or in the evidence of Emma Weir suggests this Defendant would be charged with the public duty of proper or dignified handling of human remains, yet it is contended by the Prosecution that he be so charged as a result of a happenstance that ought not have occurred at all. For the Prosecution to look to this Court to impose such a duty ex post facto would be to ignore the very clear authorities on the matter and the clear evidence that no such duty was expected of this Defendant. Such an approach suggests a retrospective application of the law to facts, rather than the proper approach, which is the reverse.

For all those reasons, I find the Defendant is not a “public officer” for the purpose of the two offences of misconduct in public office charged in the Indictment.

Following the handing down of this judgment on 14 November 2025, the Prosecution offered no evidence against the Defendant. I ordered that a verdict of not guilty be recorded against pursuant to s.17 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, and I discharged the Defendant from the Indictment. It follows that these proceedings have concluded and this judgment may now be published pursuant to s.41(6) of the 1996 Act.