Sessions House,
Lancaster Road,
PRESTON PR1 2PD
Before :
HIS HONOUR JUDGE BURROWS
(sitting as a nominated judge of the Court of Protection at Tier 2)
Between :
LANCASHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL | Applicant |
- and - | |
BM (by his ALR, Philippa Curran) | Respondent |
Re BM (Deprivation of Liberty)
Leanne Jones (instructed by the Local Authority Solicitor) for the Applicant
Holly Littlewood (instructed by Southerns Solicitors) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 15th September 2026
Draft Judgment Circulated: 16th September 2026
JUDGMENT
This judgment was delivered in public, and the proceedings are subject to the Transparency Order dated 15th April 2026. The anonymity of BM must be strictly preserved, and nothing must be published that would identify BM, either directly or indirectly, including by identifying any of the other persons or entities anonymised in this judgment. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.
HIS HONOUR JUDGE BURROWS:
Introduction
This judgment follows a remote hearing on 15th September 2026 where I was required to determine one issue, namely whether BM is deprived of his liberty in the circumstances in which his care is provided and where he lives. As recently as 1st June 2026, this would have been an entirely straightforward case. Applying the “acid test” from the Cheshire West case, the Court would have determined that he was deprived of his liberty. However, on 2nd June 2026, the Supreme Court reversed itself and replaced that test with a multifactorial and case specific, and therefore more nuanced, approach as a in A Reference by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland of a devolution issue under paragraph 34 of Schedule 10 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 [2026] UKSC 16 (the NI case).
I now have to apply that new approach to BM’s case. I have been supplied with excellent Position Statements and oral submissions by Leanne Jones for the LA and Holly Littlewood for P.
The Supreme Court’s intention is that making decisions of this sort should be capable of efficient, relatively speedy despatch. That is what I intend to achieve here. But in recognition of the arguments put forward, I decided to deliver a short judgment.
Background
BM was 16 years of age at the time of this judgment. He was born abroad. The family moved to England when BM was approximately four years old.
The evidence throughout the proceedings demonstrates a loving and committed parental relationship. Both parents remain important attachment figures for BM, and he continues to enjoy and seek physical affection and contact with them. Weekly family-time continues. He misses them when they leave, and he derives benefit from contact. The parents now accept that BM presently requires local authority care notwithstanding the emotional difficulty of that position for them.
BM attended Primary School, which was positive and successful. Things became more difficult in the transition from primary to secondary school, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences.
By Year 8, BM’s behaviour had become increasingly challenging. His school attendance deteriorated. When he was there he was repeatedly excluded.
Significantly, BM has had extremely limited formal education since then.
A recurrent theme within the evidence is the increasing severity of emotional dysregulation, rigidity and ritualistic behaviour, intolerance of interruption to his agenda, destructive behaviour, anxiety, and difficulties coping with demands.
By 2024-2025 BM required substantial support packages within the family home, supervision levels reached 3:1 and 4:1 at various stages, police intervention was occasionally necessary. Property damage occurred. Incidents occurred on a daily basis. Constant supervision was necessary.
By March 2025, the LA had to take public law action. In March 2025, an interim care order was made and BM moved to unregulated residential care. By June 2025, Her Honour Judge Bancroft made a final care order endorsing the LA’s permanence plan, which was for BM to remain in residential care. With no doubt heavy hearts, BM’s parents consented to this.
BM moved to Placement 1, under the care of Agency 1 in March 2025. He was extremely dysregulated and unsettled at that time. At the beginning of the placement incidents requiring intervention occurred multiple times daily. Connection with carers was limited. Demands were frequently met with physical reactions.
The evidence suggests significant improvement thereafter. By late 2025 and throughout 2026 incidents reduced dramatically, communication improved, trusting relationships developed, independence increased, access to the community expanded, and BM became more emotionally regulated. These improvements are all evident from the educational psychologist’s report, the care planning materials, the social work evidence and, indeed, the party position statements.
Diagnosis, functioning and assessed needs
There is no dispute that BM has autism spectrum disorder and severe learning disability. He exhibits many of the features associated with PDA (Pathological Demand Avoidance). Although there is no formal diagnosis of this condition, there was a referral to Alder Hey for a specialist assessment.
The Education Psychologist’s “Advice” contains a valuable formulation. BM uses very limited verbal language. He mainly communicates his wants and needs. He relies heavily on gesture, vocalisation and behaviour to communicate. This requires familiar adults to interpret subtle cues. This is important because BM becomes rapidly dysregulated if misunderstood. He exhibits rigidity, namely extreme adherence to routines. BM will insist on completing particular tasks and will experience distress when prevented from doing so. He has difficulty tolerating changes of plans. His behaviour is closely linked to anxiety, the need for predictability, sensory intolerance and the need for control.
BM’s social functioning has been assessed. He forms trusting relationships with familiar adults. He has very limited peer relationships. He struggles with shared activities. He requires support to engage socially.
BM’s sensory evidence demonstrates his preference for low stimulus environments and sensitivity to visual clutter. He has sensory seeking behaviours, and he uses repetitive activities for regulation.
Not surprisingly with these features, BM is identified as depending greatly on trusted adults. He has attachment vulnerabilities. He is vulnerable because of the separation from his parents. There is no doubt, it is confirmed and agreed between the parties, that BM will have a life-long need for significant support.
The capacity assessment completed by Sophie Hopcroft concluded that BM lacks capacity regarding residence and care. The assessment found that BM is unable to understand relevant information, retain that information, use and weigh information, or communicate a capacitous decision regarding residence and care. The Best Interests Meeting records that although BM can recognise people, express simple feelings and communicate immediate preferences, he is not able to understand the purpose of the care plan, the restrictions within the plan or their implications for him.
Having identified his needs, it is important to outline briefly how they are met. There is a Care Plan of 7th August 2026, and BM also has a Positive Behaviour Support Plan (PBS). He lives in a solo residential placement which has been specifically adapted to meet his needs. It is highly individualised and personalised. The environment is intentionally low stimulus and predictable.
The restrictions in place are outlined in Ms Jones’ position statement for the LA and are derived from the social worker’s evidence:
BM is not free to leave at any time;
He is under continuous visual supervision;
There are locked doors and windows to prevent absconding;
There is a minimum of 3:1 staffing 24 hours a day;
There are wake and watch staff;
There are locked doors within the home (for the safe storage of medication and harmful products);
Prescribed medication given to BM (Melatonin), although it is not used as restraint;
There is community access which is subject to a dynamic risk assessment based upon behavioural presentation, and
There is a use of physical restraint as a last resort to keep BM and those around him safe- restraint method being PMVA
Ms Jones goes on (para 6):
Whilst restraint is authorised this is always used as a last resort. BM’s care staff are attuned to his presenting behaviours and can very often redirect him when he becomes dysregulated or heightened. In the last 3 months there have been 3 episodes of physical restraint. These are detailed in the witness statement of Sophie Hopcroft, dated 12 August 2026 [E43]. Whilst there have been incidents over and above this involving BM’s heightened behaviour, for example attempting to break furniture or items in the placement, care staff have successfully redirected BM without any physical restraint.
As far as contact with his parents is concerned, something he values, this takes place away from both BM’s placement and the family home. It takes place once a week in the community in the presence of support staff. The reason for this is because of BM’s compartmentalising. If his parents were to visit him at his placement, it could cause him distress and possibly undermine the placement.
BM has access to the sensory hive on a weekly basis. A peer of his has recently sought him out, and he has accepted this. It appears this is unusual.
Although BM enjoys visits to special places, he is described as a home bird.
It seems that BM's wishes and feelings can be ascertained to a significant degree. The evidence consistently demonstrates that BM regards the placement as his home, he enjoys living there, has formed meaningful relationships with his carers, participates willingly in the activities available to him and derives comfort from the routines and predictability of the placement. Equally, the evidence demonstrates that he continues to value his relationship with his parents and enjoys regular family contact.
However, I do not consider that the evidence permits reliable findings regarding BM's wishes and feelings about the restrictions themselves. Whilst BM's conduct plainly evidences contentment with his lived experience, there is insufficient evidence that he appreciates the nature and effect of the restrictions imposed upon him so as to express a meaningful view about whether those restrictions should continue. His wishes and feelings are therefore ascertainable in relation to the life he presently lives, but not in relation to the legal question of whether that life involves a deprivation of his liberty.
The law and the competing submissions
Ms Jones for the LA argues that BM is not deprived of his liberty, but, in any event he is able to valid consent to the restrictions. Ms Littlewood argued that BM is deprived of his liberty and is not able to give valid consent to his restrictions.
I do not intend to go into any detail as to the NI case and the wider implications of that ruling. We all know that in place of the Cheshire West acid-test, the Supreme Court in NI returned to the interpretation placed on deprivation of liberty by the ECtHR. My approach to that evaluation is outlined in detail in Salford City Council v AR [2026] EWCOP 45 (T2), particularly from [28] onwards. In that case, I considered a number of matters, derived from the NI judgment:
The relevance of the setting not being a prison or secure psychiatric facility
The purpose of the placement
The relative normality of the placement
Protection rather than punitive reasons for the restrictions
The relevance of objection, acquiescence and consent
I have considered the decisions of Mrs Justice Theis, Vice President of the Court of Protection, albeit sitting in the Family Division in children’s proceedings in Essex County Council v MH (etc) [2026] EWHC 2328 (Fam). At [66] she lists “relevant considerations for the court to take into account in undertaking this evaluation can include:
The degree of control exercised over that person.
The extent to which their movements are restricted.
The opportunities available to maintain relationships.
Participation in ordinary circumstances.
The duration of the arrangements.
The purpose and necessity of the arrangements.
Whether less restrictive alternatives exist.
Ms Littlewood stated that this was a finely balanced case. At the beginning of her submissions, she suggested that the ALR did not (or would not) take a position on whether BM was deprived of his liberty. I am not sure why that should be so. In any event, the impression I got, as I have said, is that the ALR submits that he is. She focused very helpfully in reaching that position on certain features of BM’s situation that she said were important.
Firstly, the sheer level of restrictions: 3:1, locked in, under continuous supervision, and the care plan including the use of restraint. Secondly, there is the lack of communication with others. He has no mobile phone. He has been out of normal education for a significant period of time, although I was told that BM has recently completed a AQA in cooking, and is to start soon and AQA in gardening. Visits from his parents are very limited. The ALR posited that he is isolated from the outside world.
It seems to me that the exercise I must undertake as a result of the NI case involves a holistic evaluation of BM’s situation including the factors outlined above. There is no single predominant factor. I have to consider all relevant features of BM’s situation in order to determine whether he is deprived of his liberty.
I start with the purpose of the care plan and the restrictions it involves. As outlined above, BM requires very intensive supervision and control due to the nature of his disabilities. Sadly, there is a proven track record of how badly things can go wrong for him when his environment is over-stimulating, where people who do not know him very well may cause him distress in the way they communicate with him, and the way they interpret his communication with them. The restrictions on BM are not just necessary to protect him or the wider public from harm; they are necessary to give him a life that he can enjoy. A life that is fulfilling for him. Without those restrictions, BM will be liable to abscond sometimes and place himself at risk. Without those restrictions, BM’s life would be over stimulating and would be characterised by anxiety and fear. The restrictions are not just to keep him safe, they are there to enable him to live the best life he can.
The restrictions are very intensive. That is a factor that in many cases would tip the balance towards them being a deprivation of P’s liberty.
The same is true of what Ms Littlewood referred to as isolation: not going to normal school and meeting his peers. Not meeting peers pretty much anytime. And there are restrictions on his family seeing him and him seeing them. Those visits never take place at the family home or the placement. He is not allowed to use a mobile phone. This is something which, post NI, has now to be factored into the Article 5 evaluation. With NI, contact is an important feature in the normality of a placement and the ability of the person there to engage in normal things.
I am also satisfied that BM thrives in his present placement and regards it as his home. He experiences the placement as a place of safety. He seeks out carers, forms meaningful relationships with them, willingly accesses activities with them and repeatedly demonstrates attachment to the placement itself.
As Mrs Justice Theis observed in Essex County Council v MH and ST, NI requires a broad evaluative assessment of the individual's concrete situation, including the person's own experience of the arrangements, wishes and feelings, level of contentment and any signs of objection. In ST's case the restrictions were experienced as oppressive and were actively resisted by her. She repeatedly absconded, objected to the arrangements and regarded the deprivation of liberty order itself as something which encouraged her to run away. By contrast, the evidence concerning BM points in the opposite direction. He experiences the placement as home, seeks out carers, enjoys activities, has formed meaningful relationships with those supporting him and returns willingly following family contact. Far from resisting the arrangements, the evidence demonstrates that he derives comfort, stability and security from them.
I was also referred to Oxfordshire County Council v P & G [2026] EWCOP 33 (T2) and Re Mustafa (A Child)[2026] EWHC 2159 (Fam). In my judgment those authorities are not inconsistent either with NI or with my own decision in Salford City Council v AR. Oxfordshire was principally concerned with whether apparent acceptance of arrangements amounted to valid consent where there was genuine uncertainty concerning the person's understanding of their situation. Mustafa demonstrates that a person who lacks capacity under the MCA may nevertheless possess sufficient practical understanding of their circumstances to provide valid consent for Article 5 purposes. The authorities demonstrate that contentment is not the same thing as consent. Equally, valid consent does not require capacity within the meaning of the MCA. The concept lies somewhere between those two positions.
Evaluation and decision: objective element
Weighing all the evidence together, and considering BM's situation as a whole, I have concluded that the arrangements do not amount to a deprivation of liberty for the purposes of Article 5. I acknowledge that this is a finely balanced case. The restrictions are extensive. Their intensity would, prior to the decision in NI, have resulted in a finding of deprivation of liberty. However, the current exercise is not a mechanistic one. The restrictions must be understood in the context of BM's disabilities, the purpose they serve, the life they enable him to live, the relative normality of the arrangements for somebody with his needs and, importantly, his own experience of them.
I have already referred to the significant restrictions that exist. They include 3:1 staffing, continuous supervision, restrictions on his ability to leave independently, environmental controls and the possibility of restraint. Those are all matters which weigh in favour of a finding of deprivation of liberty. I also accept the force of the ALR's submission that BM is not living the life of an ordinary teenager. He is not in formal education. He has very limited peer interaction and aspects of his life are substantially controlled by others.
However, those features cannot be viewed in isolation. Similar levels of supervision were required within the family home before his removal into care. They would have to be present wherever BM lives. The restrictions serve a protective and enabling purpose. They are not punitive. They permit BM to live in an environment which he experiences as safe, predictable and supportive. His placement bears little resemblance to detention in any ordinary sense. Unlike ST, BM does not experience the arrangements as oppressive. Viewed as a whole, they are more accurately characterised as an intensive and highly individualised package of disability support than as confinement. Accordingly, I conclude that BM is not deprived of his liberty.
Could BM have given valid consent?
It is therefore unnecessary for me strictly to determine the issue of valid consent. However, because the issue was fully argued before me, I shall record my view. Had it been necessary to determine the point, I would not have found that valid consent had been established. In my judgment consent must retain some meaningful content. It cannot be reduced merely to contentment or compliance. I accept that a person may lack capacity under the MCA whilst nevertheless possessing sufficient practical understanding of their circumstances to consent for Article 5 purposes, as demonstrated by Mustafa.
However, I also accept the cautionary approach adopted in Oxfordshire where genuine uncertainty exists regarding whether apparent acceptance truly amounts to consent. In my judgment BM's evidence demonstrates contentment, attachment, trust and acceptance of his lived experience. It does not demonstrate sufficient appreciation of the restrictions themselves or of the arrangements under which he lives. In that respect I regard his circumstances as closer to Oxfordshire than Mustafa. Accordingly, had I concluded that the objective element of confinement was established, I would not have found valid consent proved. However, because I have concluded that the arrangements do not objectively amount to a deprivation of liberty, that issue does not affect the outcome of the application.
Will BM’s rights be protected?
Having made that decision, there is one other issue I need to consider, namely BM's Article 8 rights. I am satisfied that BM's Article 8 rights are protected. He is a child subject to a care order. He has a social worker. There are regular meetings at the Local Authority to discuss, evaluate and modify his care plan. The Independent Reviewing Officer (IRO) remains involved in his case. In addition, he will continue to receive support under the statutory leaving-care framework. There is therefore no need for this Court to put in place any scheme of directions for the matter to be brought back before it.
That is the judgment.