AR & Ors, Re

The Issue

The Public Guardian has applied for determination of whether lasting powers of attorney granted by AR, HR and MH are valid. If the instruments are determined not to have been validly executed, the Public Guardian seeks an order directing cancellation of their registration.

The linking factor between the instruments is that Robert Cornford acted as certificate provider. The Public Guardian has concerns that:

The Public Guardian has informed Mr. Cornford and the Court that the current three cases are ‘test’ cases, with a further 24 matters ‘on hold’ pending the outcome of these proceedings [67].

Matters considered

I have considered all matters filed in a composite bundle for the hearing listed on 24^th, 25^th and 26^th June 2026, including:

I heard oral evidence from AR, from EH and JA (both daughters of MH), and also from Robert Cornford.

The Lasting Powers of Attorney in these proceedings

Two of the donors in these proceedings, AR and HR, are married to each other. The third donor, MH, is unconnected to them other than by Mr. Cornford acting as their certificate provider.

AR 2001959301: The application proceeds on the basis that AR has had at all times, and still retains, relevant capacity. It is common ground that AR intended to execute lasting powers of attorney both for property and affairs, and for health and welfare. He confirmed orally that he consents to the making of the Public Guardian’s application, as distinct from agreeing that the Public Guardian’s position as to validity is correct.

A copy of each of AR’s LPA documents (without any mark of registration) is included in the hearing bundle [90 for property, 114 for welfare]:

HR 2002806301: the application proceeds on the basis that HR had at all times, and still retains, relevant capacity. It is common ground that HR intended to execute lasting powers of attorney both for property and affairs, and for health and welfare:

MH 2001961201: following a General Visitor assessment [494] commissioned by the OPG, the application proceeds on the basis that MH now lacks capacity to “deal with the concerns that have been raised, revoke [his] LPAs or apply to the Court to cancel [his] LPAs.”[425] However it is common ground that, at the relevant time, MH intended to execute lasting powers of attorney, both for property and affairs and for health and welfare.

By order of District Judge Grosse made on 6^th August 2025 and issued on 18^th August 2025 [390], the attorneys’ powers have been suspended pending further order.

By separate order also made by District Judge Grosse on 6^th August 2025 but not issued until 8^th September 2025 [394], JA and EH have been appointed, jointly and severally, as interim property and affairs deputies for MH.

Law and Procedural requirements

In order to understand the Public Guardian’s concerns it is necessary first to set out the legal framework in respect of lasting powers of attorney.

Fundamentally, a lasting power of attorney is an exercise of choice, by an adult who has mental capacity to make that choice (“the donor”), to give someone else (“the attorney”) lawful authority to make decisions about their (the donor’s) property or welfare, including when the donor no longer has capacity – sections 9(1) and 9(2)(c) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (“the Act”).

In Public Guardian v. RI [2022] EWCOP 22 [A90] at paragraph 16 it was determined by Mr. Justice Poole that the relevant information for capacitous execution of a lasting power of attorney is:

“a.

The effect of the LPA.

b.

Who the attorneys are.

c.

The scope of the attorneys’ powers and that the MCA 2005 restricts the exercise of their powers.

d.

When the attorneys can exercise those powers, including the need for the LPA to be [registered] before it is effective.

e.

The scope of the assets the attorneys can deal with under the LPA.

f.

The power of the donor to revoke the LPA when he has capacity to do so.

g.

The pros and cons of executing the particular LPA and of not doing so.”

The process of creating (“executing”) an LPA does not involve a ‘best interests’ decision by anyone. The donor is making a capacitous decision, and their choice of attorney(s) may therefore be as ‘wise’ or not as any other capacitously-made decision. However, there are some constraints in the system:

Central to these proceedings is the requirement, pursuant to paragraph 2(1)(e) of Schedule 1 of the Act, that the instrument includes –

“a certificate by a person of a prescribed description that, in his opinion, at the time when the donor executes the instrument -

(i)

the donor understands the purpose of the instrument and the scope of the authority conferred under it,

(ii)

no fraud or undue pressure is being used to induce the donor to create a lasting power of attorney, and

(iii)

there is nothing else which would prevent a lasting power of attorney from being created by the instrument.”

The person who provides the required certificate is referred to, unsurprisingly, as the ‘certificate provider.’ The Lasting Powers of Attorney, Enduring Powers of Attorney and Public Guardian Regulations 2007 (“the Regulations”) specify who may discharge this role:

“8 Persons who may provide an LPA certificate

(1)

Subject to paragraph (3), the following persons may give an LPA certificate –

(a)

a person chosen by the donor as being someone who has known him personally for the period of at least two years which ends immediately before the date on which that person signs the LPA certificate;

(b)

a person chosen by the donor who, on account of his professional skills and expertise, reasonably considers that he is competent to make the judgments necessary to certify the matters set out in paragraph (2)(1)(e) of Schedule 1 to the Act.

For convenience, I shall refer to the matters which have to be certified, as set out at paragraph (2)(1)(e) of Schedule 1 to the Act and paragraph 18 above, as “the certificate provider judgments”.

The wording of Regulation 8(1)(b) causes me to pause. Whose ‘reasonable consideration’ of competence is required? Is it the choosing donor, or the person who is chosen? After careful consideration, I am satisfied that it is the latter: the ‘who’ refers to ‘the person chosen’. There is no other part of making a lasting power of attorney which imposes on the donor any requirement to act ‘reasonably’, and reasonableness is not an inherent part of capacitous decision-making. On the other hand, it is sensible to expect reasonableness from a person holding out ‘professional skills and expertise.’ The OPG has clearly understood the regulation this way, and I agree.

So, the required elements of Regulation 8(1)(b) are as follows:

To be clear, this understanding of Regulation 8(1)(b) means that there is no expectation on the donor to check or verify the skills or expertise which the potential certificate provider holds out. The donor is entitled to rely on the potential certificate provider’s own self-assessment of suitability.

Regulation 8 then proceeds by giving examples of professions which satisfy paragraph (1)(b) and expressly disqualifying persons of specified relationships to the donor:

“(2)

The following are examples of persons within paragraph (1)(b) –

(a)

a registered health care professional;

(b)

a barrister, solicitor or advocate called or admitted in any part of the United Kingdom;

(c)

a registered social worker; or

(d)

an independent mental capacity advocate.

(3)

A person is disqualified from giving an LPA certificate in respect of any instrument intended to create a lasting power of attorney if that person is –

a.

a family member of the donor;

b.

a donee of that power;

c.

a donee of –

i.

any other lasting power of attorney, or

ii.

an enduring power of attorney,

which has been executed by the donor (whether or not it has been revoked);

d.

a family member of a donee within sub-paragraph (b);

e.

a director or employee of a trust corporation acting as a donee within subparagraph (b);

f.

a business partner or employee of –

i.

the donor, or

ii.

a donee within sub-paragraph (b);

g.

an owner, director, manager or employee of any care home in which the donor is living when the instrument is executed; or

h.

a family member of a person within sub-paragraph (g).

(4)

….”

The disqualified relationships may be seen as a ‘bottom line’ – persons with these connections to the donor are definitely not appropriately placed to act as certificate provider ie Regulation 8(3) limits the range of persons who can satisfy Regulation 8(1)(a). In contrast, the “examples” of persons within Regulation 8(1)(b) are an illustrative range of persons whose professional skills and expertise make it reasonable for them to consider themselves competent to make the certificate provider judgments. The ordinary understanding of “examples” makes clear that the list in Regulation 8(2) is not intended to be exhaustive ie there is room left for others not expressly included. However, the examples given suggest an expectation of membership of a regulated profession or experience with health or incapacity issues.

The ‘certificate’ to be completed is section 10 of the prescribed form. It fills a single page, and sets out – for the ready assistance of anyone contemplating its completion – much of the framework established by Regulation 8:

This warning relates to another section of the Regulations, which stipulates the order in which the various stages for valid creation of an LPA must be undertaken:

“9 Execution of instrument

(1)

An instrument intended to create a lasting power of attorney must be executed in accordance with this regulation.

(2)

The donor must read (or have read to him) all the prescribed information.

(3)

As soon as reasonably practicable after the steps required by paragraph (2) have been taken, the donor must –

(a)

complete the provisions of Section 1 to 7 of the instrument that apply to him (or direct another person to do so); and

(b)

subject to paragraph (7), in the presence of a witness –

(i)

sign Section 9 of the instrument if the instrument is intended to create a lasting power of attorney for property and financial affairs (Form LP1F); or

(ii)

sign Sections 5 and 9 of the instrument if the instrument is intended to create a lasting power of attorney for health and welfare (Form LP1H);

(4)

As soon as reasonably practicable after the steps required by paragraph (3) have been taken –

(a)

the person giving an LPA certificate,

(b)

…

must complete the LPA certificate at Section 10 of the instrument and sign it.

(5)

As soon as reasonably practicable after the steps required by paragraph (4) have been taken –

(a)

the donee, or

(b)

if more than one, each of the donees,

must read (or have read to him) all the prescribed information.

(6)

As soon as reasonably practicable after the steps required by paragraph (5) have been taken, the donee or, if more than one, each of them –

(a)

must complete the provisions of Section 11 of the instrument that apply to him (or direct another person to do so); and

(b)

subject to paragraph (7), must sign section 11 of the instrument in the presence of a witness.

….”

So, the steps to creating an LPA are clear and the order in which they are to be taken is mandatory: the donor’s parts first, then the certificate provider’s part, finally the donee’s part.

How Mr. Cornford came to act as certificate provider

There is no requirement or opportunity at section 10 of the prescribed form to indicate which of the two possibilities of Regulation 8(1) underpins the choice of certificate provider – whether the donor chose them as a person ‘known to [the donor] personally for a period of at least two years’ or because of their ‘professional skills and expertise.’

In the matter of MH, there is no suggestion that Mr. Cornford knew MH personally. The undisputed evidence, given orally by EH, is that she saw Mr. Cornford at a stall on Bicester Market. She asked him lots of questions and, being satisfied with the answers, they agreed for Mr. Cornford to meet MH.

So, for MH, Mr. Cornford’s suitability to act as certificate provider undisputedly depends upon him satisfying the requirements of Regulation 8(1)(b) – that, on account of his professional skills and expertise, he reasonably considered himself competent to make the certificate provider’s judgments.

The situation is less clear cut for AR and HR:

Regulation 8(1)(a) does not concern itself with how a certificate provider is ‘known personally’ to a donor – it is not a requirement of ‘friendship.’ What matters is why the donor chose the certificate provider. On this point, I prefer the evidence of AR. I am satisfied that, cordial though relations were, AR and HR were all times treating Mr. Cornford’s involvement in the process of executing their LPAs as a matter of his business (and in that sense ‘professional’) skills and activities. Sadly, in so far as Mr. Cornford perceived underlying ‘friendship’, his perception struck me as somewhat aspirational, rather than real. Mr. Cornford himself, albeit reluctantly, appeared to accept RC’s evidence too. So again, in respect of the LPAs of AR and HR, Mr. Cornford’s eligibility to act as certificate provider depends upon him satisfying the requirements of Regulation 8(1)(b).

My conclusion that all of the three donors in the current proceedings chose Mr. Cornford to act as ‘professional’ certificate provider, rather than on the basis of personal acquaintance, is consistent with Mr. Cornford’s own evidence on his working practices. I record that evidence here, mindful of the possibility of further applications to follow from this judgment. When asked how long he had known donors, Mr. Cornford’s response was “Mostly only a short time. I acted as their instructed will writer/estate planner as per my training. Always following an initial meeting either in person or via a remote meeting platform such as Zoom.” [F704] It is clear that Mr. Cornford was generally considering himself competent to make the certificate provider judgments.

These proceedings

The issues raised in these proceedings first came to the attention of the Court of Protection because one of its regional judges, sitting in another jurisdiction, had concerns. Following determination of the case of Signance Ltd. v. Trusted Wills & Estate Planning Ltd J1QZ6E98, a judge of the County Court sent an e-mail in the following terms:

“I write to you in your capacity as Senior Judge of the Court of Protection. On 16.2.23 I heard a civil claim which concerned me. As I am authorised to hear Court of Protection cases I felt obliged to make you aware of the circumstances.

The case was between two small limited companies as above. At the material times the Defendant had two directors being Robert Clive Cornford and David Gerald Slora. I know nothing about Mr Slora and he did not appear in court. There was a consultancy agreement between the companies. In due course the Claimant found out about Mr Cornford’s past and promptly terminated the agreement. The information was also disclosed to at least one third party. The Defendant then refused to pay the Claimant’s invoices and the debt which was the subject of the civil case. Bearing in mind the issues in the case I had both witnesses swear in, hence everything said was under oath. As you would expect the trial was recorded.

In 2013 Robert Clive Pannell was convicted of defrauding a company and creditors and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment. He was disqualified as a director for 7 years. In 2016 he gave an undertaking to the Insolvency Service not to be a director for 13 years, ie until 2029; this is recorded on Companies House website under reference INV4161061. At some stage after his conviction he changed his surname to Cornford. He has been a company director in breach of the order and the undertaking. He resigned as director of the Defendant company, MTW Mortgage Claims Ltd and My Trusted Wills and Estate Planning LLP on 19 December 2022, quite probably due to the Claimant’s actions. At the date of the trial on 16.2.23 he was still a shareholder in the Defendant company.

The business of the Defendant company included drafting wills and LPAs and setting up trusts, further details can be seen on the website mytrustedwills.co.uk. I am told Mr Cornford has neither been personally appointed as executor nor attorney as part of his trade. I am inclined to believe this as the claimant confirmed it and I believe her to be honest. However having seen the Terms of Business on the Defendant’s website I see the Defendant company can be appointed as executor and trustee; I admit to not asking this question during the trial. I accept will writing and preparing LPAs is completely unregulated, however uncomfortable the concept may be in these circumstances. It troubles me to think of a convicted fraudster visiting clients including the old and vulnerable and quite probably being given details of all their assets. To my mind such a person is not fit to advise on either the disposal of such assets on death and even less to act as executor (even if by a limited company). I have similar concerns regarding advising on the granting the power for others to deal with assets via an LPA. The prospect of his involvement in Health and Welfare LPAs is no more appealing.

Mr Cornford has most definitely been providing certificates for LPAs as confirmed during the trial. The persons who may provide such a certificate are set out in Lasting Power of Attorney, Enduring Power of Attorney and Public Guardian Regulations 2007, Regulation 8. I have grave doubts whether Mr Cornford falls within Reg 8(2) as a person “who, on account of his professional skills and expertise, reasonably considers that he is competent to make the judgments necessary…”.The examples of such people in Reg 8(2) all have proper professional qualifications. Moreover MCA Schedule 1 para 2(e)(ii) requires a certificate provider to guard against fraud and undue pressure. The clear implication is that the certificate provider should be a proper and fit person. To my mind without a reliable certificate the whole LPA process falls down. It is troubling that Mr Cornford has provided certificates, and for all I know may continue to do so. It is perhaps surprising Regulation 8(3) does not include persons of an unsavoury background as being disqualified to provide certificates.”

In response to this e-mail, on 4^th March 2023 I made an order [678] – in which the full text of the e-mail is set out - ‘of the court’s own motion’ directing the Public Guardian to file a report pursuant to section 49 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 addressing:

The Public Guardian duly filed a report by Helen Journaux (Head of Risk, Assurance and Governance) dated 12^th April 2023 [681]. The report identified matters in which Mr. Cornford was known to have been involved in various capacities, and set out steps which would be taken by the Office of the Public Guardian.

On 17^th April 2023 I made a further order [698] which noted, at recital 2, that no further order was considered necessary in light of steps which the Office of the Public Guardian proposed to take; and concluded the ‘own motion’ proceedings.

The Public Guardian subsequently made the current applications:

Mr. Cornford filed COP5 Acknowledgments objecting to each application:

After the suspension of MH’s LPAs but before the issue of the interim deputyship order, EH [399, 1^st September 2025] and JA [403, 2^nd September 2025] both filed COP5 Acknowledgments, confirming their wish to be appointed as deputies. The wording at box 3.2 is similar in each COP5. Mr. Cornford sought to suggest that there was something sinister in this. I do not agree. It is apparent, because they say so expressly (“the invalidation of the LPAs leaves my father without a legally appointed attorney. My sister and I…”), that EH and JA filed these COP5 Acknowledgments in response to the suspension order and after consulting each other. There is nothing improper in that.

The three applications initially proceeded separately but by February 2026 they had all been referred to me. On 12^th February 2026 I made a single order [651] which:

Mr. Cornford attended the directions hearing on 22^nd April 2026 in person. Directions were given [659] providing for final evidence and listing of this hearing.

The factual background

For clarity I have set out in a schedule to this judgment a chronology of the relevant events and dates which now fall to be considered.

It is a matter of public record that the respondent to these proceedings has been convicted of fraudulent trading contrary to section 993(1) of the Companies Act 2006 [F730]. The offences took place between 22^nd January 2009 and 29^th March 2012. At St Albans Crown Court on 6^th December 2013 His Honour Judge Warner sentenced Mr. Cornford to 5 years’ imprisonment and disqualified him from being a director for 7 years following completion of sentence. [80]

A conviction for fraud is ‘spent’ from the end of the period of 7 years beginning with the day on which the sentence is completed. It has been confirmed to the Office of the Public Guardian by His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service [87] that Mr. Cornford’s sentence was completed on 21^st November 2018, so his conviction is ‘spent’ with effect from 21^st November 2025.

Mr Cornford now accepts that he subsequently gave a further undertaking not to act as a Director before 2029.

At the time of his conviction, the respondent to these proceedings was known as Robert Parnell. He assumed the name of Robert Cornford by deed on 22^nd July 2016 [567]. At that time, his sentence was not yet completed and his period of disqualification had not yet expired.

The s49 report of the OPG sets out [687], using information from Companies House, that Mr. Cornford was appointed to the following company directorships in his new name after his conviction and during the period of his disqualification:

Mr Cornford’s account is as follows:

After his release from prison Mr. Cornford took up a role as “a self-employed will writer/estate planner” [703, in an e-mail to the OPG investigator timed at 17.16 on 10^th July 2023]. In respect of this role his account is as follows:

In so far as Mr. Cornford relies on the training he received from The Will Writing Partnership to demonstrate ‘professional skills and expertise’ for the purposes of Regulation 8(1)(b), I note that the certificates he provided [707 – 713] indicate a total of 33.5 hours of ‘basic estate planning’ and CPD training plus a ‘Foundation Course - Post Course’, between 23^rd October 2019 and 25^th May 2023. This is not nothing but is clearly significantly less than what is normally to be expected of professionals in the examples of Regulation 8(2).

In so far as Mr. Cornford relies on a ‘kitemark’ of his association with both The Will Writing Partnership and The Society of Will Writers, I note Mr. Cornford’s account that he has tried, but been unable, to file evidence from each:

So, the information before the Court from The Society of Will Writers is merely by way of e-mail communications, without any statement of truth and without any testing by cross-examination. That information is as follows:

Given that the period of Mr. Cornford’s membership of The Society of Will Writers was after his conviction and entirely within the period before that conviction was ‘spent’, it is perhaps trite to observe that the ‘purpose’ of the Society as avowed by Mr. Belcher is clearly not being achieved. Mr. Cornford’s account is yet more dispiriting: that he was neither asked about convictions nor given a form to complete when he joined the Society as an affiliate member, and that he subsequently “confirmed [his] conviction to Anthony Belcher in a face-to-face meeting and my membership was not cancelled.” [152]

The first issue: Mr. Cornford’s suitability to act as certificate provider

The Public Guardian considers that the factual background of conviction and disqualification render Mr. Cornford ineligible to act as certificate provider, because they demonstrate “extremely poor judgment and a disregard for law” [87]. Mr. Cornford’s “apparent disregard for his own fraudulent actions prior to being convicted in 2013, the fact that [he] changed his name following his convictions, [his] disregard for his disqualification, and his willingness to continue to breach undertakings”, mean that he could not reasonably have believed that he was competent to act as a certificate provider.

Mr. Cornford does not accept that the circumstances of and around his conviction put him outside the scope of Regulation 8(1)(b):

Mr. Cornford does not accept that holding directorships when disqualified from doing so puts him outside the scope of Regulation 8(1)(b):

Mr. Cornford does not accept that his change of name was intended to, or did, facilitate concealment of his conviction from persons to whom knowledge of it would be relevant.

My impression of Mr. Cornford was that he was well-presented and courteous, such as might lead a person to repose trust in him. He was certainly keen to justify himself, falling occasionally into belligerence, but this seemed to me to be a misguided attempt to adopt a style of litigation learned in a very different kind of court. It stopped when he was called to order. His most outlandish suggestion, that Mr. McQuade’s role at the OPG included a ‘performance based bonus, based on a target set for rejections and a cost centre set up for such recharges”, was hastily withdrawn when it was pointed out to him that such a serious allegation required some evidential basis. More often, Mr. Cornford’s demeanour actually suggested a degree of vulnerability. I do not doubt the authenticity of Mr. Cornford’s shock at his custodial sentence, or of his expressed fear that these proceedings may lead to his return to prison. (I have assured him that this is unlikely.) Overall I observed a significant dissonance between how Mr. Cornford sees himself, and what his criminal record indicates about him.

The Public Guardian contends that Mr. Cornford has been ‘evasive’ about his conviction, including at the hearing, and as to how the Society of Will Writers came to know about it. Under cross-examination, his explanation was convoluted but first he gave the impression that he disclosed the information voluntarily, only later accepting that a complaint had been made which included information about the conviction, and his conversation with Mr Belcher was part of responding to that complaint. In my view the Public Guardian’s assessment of his evidence in this regard is accurate.

It was clear to me that Mr. Cornford was very aware at the time of the ‘advantages’ of not having to make a written application to the Society of Will Writers for the kind of membership which he first took up - there was not a point where he was directly required to answer a question about his criminal record. In my view, if the Society of Will Writers wishes to be taken seriously in its stated purpose, this procedural lacuna is an obvious matter to address. On the other hand, I acknowledge that Mr. Belcher did not explain the complaint in such engagement as he voluntarily gave to these proceedings, and he declined to engage formally when asked by Mr. Cornford. I place no weight on Mr. Belcher’s ‘evidence’.

Overall, it was clear to me that Mr. Cornford wishes to escape the consequences of his conviction for fraud. He did not volunteer information about his conviction either to the Society of Will Writers or when holding himself out to others as having some expertise in matters involving judgment and trust. He did not say to AR, HR or MH anything along the lines of ‘I have this conviction. I’m trying to move past that but I tell you now so that you can make a fully informed decision about whether you want to instruct me to act as certificate provider.’ (Ms. Lloyd’s closing submissions confirmed that there was no evidence Mr. Cornford gave this information to any of the people for whom he acted as certificate provider.) Rather, Mr. Cornford made a judgment that LPA donors did not need to know this information. I consider that this reflects very poorly on his judgment as a certificate provider.

As far as I am aware AR and HR, who retain relevant capacity, have not been asked if they would have changed their choice of certificate provider had they known at the relevant time of Mr. Cornford’s conviction, but I infer from their consent to the Public Guardian’s applications that they are at least concerned about this information. And from his daughters’ position in these proceedings, I infer the same in respect of MH. Plenty of others have drawn equivalent conclusions:

I note that a conviction for fraud is very likely to be incompatible with any of the roles identified at Regulation 8(2) as ‘examples’ of persons who do come within Regulation 8(1)(b). It is reasonable to assume that the standards expected of exemplars should also inform the standards expected of others wishing to fall within Regulation 8(1)(b). In contrast, absence from the list of persons expressly disqualified from acting as a certificate provider does not positively imply suitability. The list at Regulation 8(3) focuses on connection to the donor, to address risks of conflict of interest, rather than characteristics required to come within Regulation 8(1)(b).

Fraud involves criminal dishonesty. In my judgment, a conviction for fraud is simply incompatible with acting in the role intended to provide some safeguard in respect of the serious matters involved in a certificate provider’s judgments.

Mr. Cornford’s suitability deficit is further compounded by his holding of directorships during a period of disqualification. His explanations of ‘mistake’, mental ill-health and stress may invite sympathy but they do not exculpate his actions. He was acting unlawfully in taking up directorships when he did. I agree with Ms Lloyd that Mr. Cornford’s attempts to respond to her questions on this issue were ‘evasive and contradictory.’ This is not conduct of a type reasonably to be expected of a person acting in the role intended to provide some safeguard in respect of the serious matters involved in a certificate provider’s judgments.

Moreover, in respect of Mr. Cornford’s ‘professional skills and expertise’ in respect of lasting powers of attorney, it has to be said that his own evidence is underwhelming:

In my judgment, Robert Cornford could not reasonably have considered himself competent to make the judgments required of a certificate provider.

That conclusion is sufficient to conclude these proceedings. It means that the certificate which Mr. Cornford provided for each of the six instruments under consideration fails to meet the requirements of Regulation 2(1)(e). Therefore the instruments fail to meet the requirements of section 9(2) of the Mental Capacity Act 2025 and so fail to create valid lasting powers of attorney. I must therefore direct the Public Guardian to cancel their registration.

However, since I have heard argument on the Public Guardian’s other two concerns and mindful that these three applications have been made as ‘test’ cases on which other applications will depend, I will now go on to consider those other concerns.

The second issue: whether Robert Cornford did actually satisfy himself of required matters

To recap, as set out at paragraph (2)(1)(e) of Schedule 1 to the Act and paragraph 12 above, the certificate provider confirms that:

“(i)

the donor understands the purpose of the instrument and the scope of the authority conferred under it;

(ii)

no fraud or undue pressure is being used to induce the donor to create a lasting power of attorney, and

(iii)

there is nothing else which would prevent a lasting power of attorney from being created by the instrument.”

The Public Guardian is concerned that Mr. Cornford has given only “generic answers” when asked how he satisfied himself of the specific requirements, and in reality he took no proper steps to consider the matters he purported to certify.

The Public Guardian points to the lack of any contemporaneous records of any steps taken by him when acting as certificate provider, and in particular AR’s evidence that, as a GP, he knew something about powers of attorney and so, when it came to creating his, “there was not much discussion” about it.

Mr. Cornford’s account is as follows:

Even on his own evidence, it is not possible for the Court to conclude that Mr. Cornford did actually satisfy himself of the matters required in the certificate provider’s judgments. He does not claim to have explored with the donors their understanding of the purpose or scope of lasting powers of attorney.

It is of course necessary to retain a sense of proportionality. Reliance on his ‘acquaintanceship’ with AR and HR over a sustained period, knowing them both to be health professionals with a good level of understanding about lasting powers of attorney, is perhaps sufficient; but simply asking MH if he was under pressure, whilst his daughters were making a cup of tea close by, is too cursory. At best, Mr. Cornford made assumptions. More probably, he simply did not consider the substance of what he was certifying. He treated all cases as the same (‘generic’), which is why he cannot give individual explanation of steps he took in respect of individual donors.

The absence of any contemporaneous records is, in my view, significant. All of the professionals given as examples in Regulation 8(2) would regard it as normal practice to keep a contemporaneous note of discussions underlying their decisions.

The impact of my conclusion on the second issue of these proceedings is limited in respect of each of the lasting powers of attorney actually under consideration: there is no argument that AR or HR in fact fell outside the matters which Mr. Cornford certified, it is not part of the Public Guardian’s application that MH did either, and my conclusion as to the first issue in these proceedings already requires that registration of the LPAs is to be cancelled. However, more generally, the significance of the conclusion on this second issue of these proceedings should be to put beyond doubt that the OPG and the Court expect certificate providers to take their duties seriously, and to be able to demonstrate that they have done so.

The third issue: whether the process of execution complied with legal requirements

As set out in Regulation 9 and paragraph 26 above, the legal requirement is that the donor’s parts are signed first, then the certificate provider’s part, and finally the attorney’s part. It is fairly obvious that the intended means of demonstrating that this process has been followed is completion of the ‘date’ box for each signature truthfully in the correct order.

AR 2001959301: in communications between AR and the Office of the Public Guardian, AR’s account of how his prescribed form was completed has not been consistent:

HR 2002806301:

MH 2001961201:

Mr. Cornford’s account is as follows:

The Public Guardian’s position is that the six instruments under consideration were “all submitted to the OPG with incorrect dates”, and the evidence overall demonstrates that signatures were not applied in the correct order. In particular:

It is clear and undisputed that Mr. Cornford routinely told donors for whom he acted as certificate provider that the date could and would be added administratively at some point after the signatures had all been collected. He followed a practice of using ‘Do Not Date’ stickers. I agree with the Public Guardian that the only logical purpose of such an approach is to preserve the possibility of signatures being added in an order deemed convenient, as opposed to the order which meets the legal requirement. Inevitably, it means that Mr Cornford was knowingly submitting to the OPG – or allowing to be submitted by the administrative part of the organisation through which he worked – incorrect documents.

The donors and attorneys acknowledge that they went along with the ‘Do Not Date’ process, because they relied on the ‘expertise’ of Mr. Cornford – who was charging for the service, at least as part of a package.

That being the evidence, the Court cannot be satisfied that any of the instruments currently under consideration were executed in the correct order. In so far as the final account of AR and HR allows for the possibility of the correct order having been followed, the reliability of their account is undermined by earlier versions. In respect of MH, I prefer the account of his daughters to the account of Mr. Cornford, given that they did this process only once, whilst he is unable to produce any contemporaneous evidence to support his ‘generic’ answers and positively supported entering an entirely fictitious date for all signatures.

On the balance of probabilities, I conclude that the process of executing all six instruments currently under consideration failed to comply with the legal requirements of Regulation 9. Accordingly, pursuant to paragraph 18(a) of Schedule 1 of the Act, I must direct the Public Guardian to cancel their registration.

CONCLUSIONS

All three of the Public Guardian’s concerns are well-founded.

In my judgment, given his conviction for fraud and his disqualification from acting as a director at the time when AR, HR and MH sought to execute lasting powers of attorney, Mr. Cornford could not reasonably have considered himself competent to make the certificate provider judgments. Therefore the certificate he provided fails to meet the requirements of Regulation 2(1)(e). Additionally, I am not satisfied that Mr. Cornford did actually satisfy himself of the matters required in the certificate provider’s judgments; and I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that none of the six instruments currently under consideration were executed as required by Regulation 9. Accordingly, the registration of all of them must be cancelled.

AR and HR, for as long as they retain capacity to do so, may simply execute new lasting powers of attorney if they so wish. The appointment of EH and JA as property and affairs deputies for their father MH should now be remade, on a final basis.