The Chief Constable of Devon & Cornwall Police v Patricia Shorthouse

In case number L00TQ030, the applicant is the Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall Police, represented by Mr Barratt. The respondent is Patricia Shorthouse, represented by Mr Cuddihee.

Ms Shorthouse is very well known to this court. She was the subject of a two-year injunction order under the Antisocial Behaviour Crime and Policing Act 2014, which started on 3 April 2024 and expired on 2 April 2026.Ms Shorthouse has appeared in court on countless occasions for breach of that order.

On 24 April of this year, I made a fresh injunction order under the same Act. Ms Shorthouse must not, by virtue of paragraph 1(a), act in an antisocial manner. That is to say in a manner that causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to any person. By virtue of paragraph 1(b) she must not use offensive, aggressive of obscene words or gestures in a public place such that it causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to any person.

Paragraph 2 of that order required Ms Shorthouse to leave 26 Shakespeare Close by 4 o'clock on 27 April, and, having done so, not to enter or attempt to enter Shakespeare Close.A power of arrest was attached.

That is an order that expires on 23 April 2028. It was made final by his Honour Judge Mitchell I believe on 11 May. I have not seen a final copy of that order. I anticipate that it still expires on 23 April 2028. On 11 May, his Honour extended the terms that I have outlined so that Ms Shorthouse is required to leave Torbay by 26 May, which is next Tuesday.

I have a certificate of service, which confirms that Ms Shorthouse was served personally with my injunction on 25 April of 2026.

On the Friday -- 8 May -- she was arrested by PC Tucker-Swift outside of 26 Shakespeare Close. It was suspected that she was under the influence of alcohol. She appeared before a court on 11 May. I believe also on 9 May. That case was adjourned until 27 May.

On 16 May -- so three weeks after the injunction was made -- Ms Shorthouse was again arrested for breaching paragraphs 1(a) and (b). She came before the court this Monday and she was remanded in custody so that she could obtain legal representation.

The evidence that I have in support of the case today is found in the statement of PC Tucker-Swift. That is not dated, but that is in relation to 8 May incident. Then I have the police statements of PC Heath, 16 May, PC Hopkins of 11 April, and Mr Ganesh Ojah who was the owner/manager of the Hudson Hotel on Babbacombe Road, which is in Torquay. His statement is also dated 16 May.

Regarding 16 May, Police Officers attended at the hotel, Hudson Hotel at Babbacombe Road, I believe on 15 May. On the attendance of PC Heath and PC Petherick, a hotel staff member told them that Ms Shorthouse was not welcome because of her unacceptable behaviour.

After she had packed, they helped her to leave the hotel. Having seen the videos, I accept their evidence that that is when Ms Shorthouse behaviour badly deteriorated.The statements say and the video evidence that I have seen today confirms that she was swearing, shouting and screaming, despite multiple warnings from the police.

She told the officers to "fuck off" and swore at them continuously. She screamed loudly and swore repeatedly towards the officers and the hotel owner. It is clear that she was heavily intoxicated. On leaving the hotel again was swearing, screaming and said "fucking arseholes from Devon and Cornwall Police". She was arrested at that point and transported to custody.

It is said that during transportation she kicked PC Petherick, who was driving, to the left side of his head and attempted to bite the other officer, PC Heath, to his shoulder. However, the claimant states that aspect goes to aggravation rather than to the actual breach itself, the claimant accepting that the purpose of an injunction is to protect the public. The next morning she was then arrested for breach of the injunction.

Mr Ojah's statement describes how Ms Shorthouse screamed and swore within the hotel and outside screamed and swore at passers by. He also described how, in the early hours of 16 May, he rang the police and reported Ms Shorthouse for being under the influence of alcohol, screaming, shouting, being abusive and swearing at him, and she said "fuck you" and stuck her middle finger up at him. He said that he was shocked by this and that guests witnessed her behaviour and that he had to apologise to the guests for her behaviour and for their sleep disturbance. He says in his statement in his nine years of being a hotelier her, Ms Shorthouse's, behaviour is the worst he has ever seen.

Ms Shorthouse today admits breaching the injunctive order that I made on 24 April.

So just dealing with that first.I find that to the criminal standard of proof, Ms Shorthouse has breached paragraphs 1(a) and (b) and paragraph 2 of the injunction, and she is in contempt of court.

Turning then to sentencing, I remind myself, as Mr Cuddihee has done so, that the objective of sentencing is to ensure future compliance with the order, punishment and rehabilitation, those objectives having been set out in the case of Wigan Borough Council v Lovett [2023] 1 WLR 1443.

He also reminds me, as the case does, of the various options that the court has. They are: committal to prison; a suspended order for committal to prison; adjourning the consideration of a penalty; a fine; or no order.

I remind myself that the general principle is that custody is reserved for the most serious of breaches and for less serious cases where other methods of securing compliance with the order have failed. A custodial sentence should not be imposed if an alternative course is sufficient and appropriate.

I need to consider a penalty for each breach found proved. Any term of imprisonment may be concurrent or consecutive to each other. A consideration needs to be given to the totality of the penalties imposed, per paragraph 43 of the Lovett case.

If I do decide to impose a term of imprisonment, that terms should always be the shortest term which will achieve the purpose for which it is being imposed. If custody is appropriate, the length of the sentence should be decided without reference to whether or not it is to be suspended.

In my judgment, an adjournment of the sentence as a deterrent and to secure a means of compliance would, with the history of this case, serve no purpose. Similarly, a fine does not appear appropriate on the facts of this case. I need to consider and ask myself, "Is the custody threshold passed?" In my judgment, it clearly has.

Ms Shorthouse's behaviour is completely deliberate. Whilst it is argued that the 8 May was very minor and does not pass the custody threshold, I disagree. Given the very persistent breaches, it has to be, in my judgment, marked by custody.

I have regard to Ms Shorthouse's again persistent abusive conduct on 16 May and the impact of that behaviour on Mr Ojah.

The contempt is so serious that only a custodial penalty is appropriate.

I have considered the degree of harm and the degree of culpability in relation to each matter. I have been taken to the well-known table which is set out in the Civil Justice Council report approved in the Lovett case. The table is a helpful table, bearing in mind that sentencing is fact specific.

Regarding the 8 May, Ms Shorthouse was in knowing breach of an order served on her two weeks before. She was aware that she should not be there. Mr Cuddihee said she knew she should not be there and she took a risk. There is no evidence that her presence there caused any harm or distress. It was a deliberate breach of level A and of harm category level 3.

Regarding the events of 15/16 May, that was a deliberate and serious breach. Ms Shorthouse is clearly an intelligent lady. She knows what she cannot do. There is evidence of alarm caused to Mr Ojah. It is high culpability and level A, but again with the harm category of level 3.

The appropriate starting point for both is one month, the range being adjourned consideration to three months.

I need to ask whether I should make adjustments to the starting point. I take into account some aggravating elements when I think about the seriousness of the breaches. There is a marked history of disobedience with court orders. Ms Shorthouse only went three weeks before breaching this latest order. In fact, less than that; two weeks before breaching the order and then a further breach the week after.

Ms Shorthouse has a lengthy criminal history. She now has 58 convictions for 95 offences. Many convictions against emergency workers. She has a very poor compliance history with civil court orders. These are clearly aggravating features.

Her behaviour impacted, on 16 May, on guests of the hotel. Mr Ojah states it also impacted on his reputation, which he has worked hard to establish.

The police statements do not really do justice to what the video shows. In 20 minutes of footage, Ms Shorthouse is screaming at the top of her voice, swearing repeatedly, both inside and outside of the hotel. It is a significant disturbance. She took valuable time away from police officers in having to assist her.

What are the elements which decrease the seriousness of what has happened or amount to any person mitigation? I have seen a letter that Ms Shorthouse wrote to the judge on 17 May. It is a well-crafted letter and it shows me that she is highly educated. She in fact says she has two degrees. I am told today can she speak very good French.

It states that her mother, uncle and grandfather were in the police and she has a deep respect for the emergency services and is upset to come to the attention of the police so often. She says that she is not in a relationship with Mr Radford and she is not living at Shakespeare Close.

She also says in that letter that the civil injunction was imposed because of domestic abuse and that she has had the courage to seek help from local agencies. She tells me about her health.

I am afraid this letter does not help me much in mitigation. Her deep respect for the emergency services is not very well reflected by her approach, certainly on 16 May.I am afraid she is misguided when she says the injunction was due to domestic abuse. It is in place because of her own behaviour. She has no insight.

However, Mr Cuddihee today has offered further mitigation in aid of her. That she wants to move. She has a clear plan to move to Dorset, then later to France to make a fresh start. That she wants to move on. That she offered no resistance to the injunctive order. That these two breaches are the first breaches of this injunctive order. He also points to her history of alcohol issues and her lack of good health, which he says had a really significant impact on her mobility and led to the difficulties in leaving the hotel. I do acknowledge that from viewing the videos.

Perhaps the best mitigation that he can offer is that she has given early guilty pleas and I do accept has offered a guilty plea at the first available opportunity following legal advice.

Having considered all of that, this is my judgment.

I am going to sentence Ms Shorthouse to a sentence of imprisonment for the first breach of 8 May to two weeks. That is fourteen days. I am going to sentence her to the second breach a sentence of imprisonment of twenty-eight days. So that is for breach of paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the order.Those are to run concurrently.

Ms Shorthouse has served the equivalent of twenty-two days in custody already by virtue of her remand this weekend and this week and just before she came to court earlier this month.

So the sentence that I pass upon Ms Shorthouse is twenty-eight days, less twenty-two days for the time spent in custody on remand. So that is a total sentence of twenty-eight days less twenty-two days. So that gives six days left.

Standing back, in my judgment, that sentence is just and proportionate. I am not going to suspend the sentence of imprisonment. No previous sentence passed has secured her compliance.

If I have got my maths right, that means that Ms Shorthouse will be released in three days' time and will be free to leave and go to Dorset, and I very much hope that she keeps that promise and does move on.

Ms Shorthouse will be advised, I am sure, that she has the right to apply to the court to be discharged and of her right to appeal.

That is my judgment.

I will make an order for costs as asked.