Edmund Hodder v Peacekeepers Foundation

This is my reserved judgment in the Claimant’s application for strike out, or in the alternative summary judgment, in respect of the Defence in claim 774MC171. I heard this matter remotely on Microsoft Teams on 12 March 2026. It became apparent that, given the issues involved in the application, I would not be able to give an ex tempore judgment within the 90 minutes allocated to this hearing. I heard from the Claimant, and from Mr Marc Horn as director of the Defendant. I have listened very carefully to what each of them had to say, and have given careful thought to their arguments, both oral and written.

For the reasons given below, the application for strike out is granted in part, and summary judgment is granted on the balance. It follows that Mr Hodder’s claim succeeds.

The Defendant, a registered company, is an organisation promoting the view that the authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom is subject at all times to the consent of an individual. That is, that unless an individual expressly consents to a statute (and presumably also delegated legislation made under statute) being binding on them, it is of no legal effect. This view is a sub-set, or at least shares significant commonality, with those advanced by “Organized Pseudo-legal Commercial Argument Litigants”, as described in the Canadian case of Meads v Meads [2012] ABQB 571. The Defendant’s views are, of course, complete legal nonsense; this judgment will not be a recitation of the reasons why.

The Defendant runs, via its website, what it calls the “No Obligation Challenge”, whereby a prize fund is payable to anybody who can disprove the Defendant’s beliefs. The fund is the amalgam of donations made by members of the public, who are encouraged by the Defendant’s exhortation that: “The more you pledge, the greater the embarrassment of their failing to prove that an obligation can exist without agreement”.

The Claimant asserts that the “No Obligation Challenge”, in the terms set out on the Defendant’s website, amounts to a unilateral offer that he accepted by submission of a document to the Defendant on 3 December 2025. The Claimant claims the amount of the fund offered at the time of his submission, in the sum of £23,665.

The Defence resists the claim on two bases. First, that the Claimant’s document did not comply with the terms of the unilateral offer, and that the Claimant did not therefore successfully accept any unilateral offer that had been made. Second, that the terms and conditions of the Defendant’s website, accepted by the Claimant by his use of the website, made clear that “the website provided no goods or services, contained no offers or invitations to treat, and was not intended to create legal relationships”. No other basis is advanced as to why the matters forming part of the “No Obligation Challenge” do not amount to a unilateral offer.

The Claimant’s application to strike out the Defence under CPR 3.4(2)(a) on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success relies on challenges to these defences. First, the Claimant argues that the terms and conditions of the Defendant’s website – the existence and scope of which he does not challenge in this application – were not successfully incorporated into his contract with the Defendant, and that they do not preclude the existence of a contract. Second, the Claimant argues that the terms of the “No Obligation Challenge” have been complied with, and that the Defendant’s objection is little more than a recitation of its pseudo-legal position on the sovereignty of Parliament.

The application for summary judgment under CPR 24.3 is pursued on the same basis: that such matters have no real prospect of succeeding at trial, and that there is no other compelling reason for disposition in that forum.

The Claimant also argues that the Defence ought to be struck out under CPR 3.4(2)(c) as an abuse of the Court’s process.

I remind myself of the principles applicable to applications for strike out, and for summary judgment. These areas have been subject to much analysis in the case law, in detail with which I am familiar but that I do not need to recite in a judgment of this sort. I therefore confine myself to the following general principles.

In respect of strike out under CPR 3.4(2)(a): the pleadings are not a ‘starting point’, but the key document by which a claim (or defence) is put, understood and determined; consideration is of the coherence and validity of the pleadings in their own right, not by reference to matters not contained within; as a quid pro quo the party in question benefits from a presumption that any facts pleaded are true and provable; litigants-in-person are not afforded leniency by their status on substantive matters; but as quid pro quo, the Court reads such pleadings without undue technicality; once the discretion to strike out is engaged, the Court must apply the overriding objective to consider whether strike out is the proportionate response.

In respect of summary judgment under CPR 24.3: the threshold is that a party’s case must be realistic as opposed to fanciful, but the party need not show that it will probably succeed at trial; a “realistic” claim carries a degree of conviction, and is more than merely arguable; the Court should not conduct a “mini-trial” of a factual issue, but is obliged to consider the evidence as it stands (mindful of course that it may be incomplete); complex cases are less likely to be suitable for summary judgment; if a case does not have a realistic prospect of success then the Court is likely to grant summary judgment.

There is one matter that I consider can be determined using the principles of strike out, being the assertion in the Defence that:

“In any event, the website was governed by Terms and Conditions at all relevant times stated that the website provided no goods or services, contained no offers or invitations to treat, and was not intended to create legal relationships.”

“The Claimant agreed to those Terms by using the website and does not plead that they were invalid or unenforceable.”

The terms relied on by the Defendant are as follows:

“This website provides no goods or services: contains no offers or invitations to treat, and is not intended to create any legal relationships, and does not require consideration for its use”.

The Defendant’s position, as explained to me during the course of submissions although not using the same language, is that the acceptance of these terms amounts to contractual estoppel in line with Springwell Navigation Corporation v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2010] EWCA Civ 1221. That is, they are a warranty of a particular state of affairs – in this case that no contract comes into existence between the parties – that debars the Claimant from later asserting that such a contract has come into existence.

The fallacy is such an argument is plain from its statement. In order to rely on the terms, the Defendant would have to show their contractual nature, premised as pleaded on the Claimant’s agreement. If however they are enforceable, their effect is that no contract can come into existence, which must, given the wide scope of the terms (that is, they are not limited to contracts of any specific type) include the contract by which they obtain their force. The argument is circular, and therefore provides no relief for the Defendant. As such, it plainly discloses no reasonable grounds for defending the claim, and is liable to be struck out.

Strike out does not automatically follow from this finding. However, the point is not one that is redeemable by any re-formulation or amendment. There is no less drastic, or more proportionate, course of action that could remedy the Defendant’s argument. The proper exercise of my discretion is therefore to strike out this part of the Defence as set out above under CPR 3.4(2)(a). Had I not struck it out, I would have ordered summary judgment on this part of the Defence for the same reasons albeit applying the test in CPR 24.3

This decision is separate from the point made in the defence about intention to create legal relations, which I deal with separately below. This is that matter that would, if proven, amount to a defence to the claim, as it would preclude any contract having come into existence between the Claimant and the Defendant. It is not amenable to strike out.

Likewise, if the Claimant has not performed the obligation required by him under the “No Obligation Challenge”, then no unilateral contract could ever have come into existence. The Defence attempts to put a gloss on this point, reflecting the Defendant’s arguments that I discuss in the context of summary judgment, but reading the Defence without undue technicality, the thrust of the point is set out. This aspect is not properly analysed through the lens of the Court’s jurisdiction to strike out a statement of case.

The nature of the exercise in determining an application for summary judgment is wider than that for an application to strike out. In particular, the Court can (and in these circumstances, must) consider the wider evidential picture, and seek to determine on a summary basis the substantive merits of arguments advanced in the Defence as applicable to the facts of the instant case. The Claimant and the Defendant had the opportunity to, and in fact did, present evidence to the Court for the purposes of these applications.

Both parties made points about the admissibility of the other’s evidence on the basis that it was said to be served late. The evidence provided by both was clearly relevant, and both parties were able to make submissions to me with reference to it. While a failure to provide evidence in advance of an application such as this in like with the provisions of the CPR is plainly a significant and serious breach, and lacks any proper explanation, in all the circumstances the overriding objective tends firmly towards the third stage of the test in Denton v White [2014] EWCA Civ 906 being made out, and I grant both parties any relief from sanction required.

The availability of this evidence does not, of course, mean that the Court is to conduct a “mini-trial” of the matter, which is of benefit to nobody. Where there are disputes of fact between the parties, summary judgment may not be appropriate for this reason. The situation is however different when dealing with disputes of law. Per Moore-Bick LJ in ICIChemicals and Polymers Ltd v TTE Training Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 725 at [12] – [14]:

“12.

In my view the judge should have followed his original instinct. It is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple: if the respondent's case is bad in law, he will in truth have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim or successfully defending the claim against him, as the case may be. Similarly, if the applicant's case is bad in law, the sooner that is determined, the better.”

“13.

In cases where the issue is one of construction the respondent often seeks to persuade the court that the case should go to trial by arguing that in due course evidence may be called that will shed a different light on the document in question. In my view, however, any such submission should be approached with a degree of caution. It is the responsibility of the respondent to an application of this kind to place before the court, in the form of a witness statement, whatever evidence he thinks necessary to support his case. Where it is said that the circumstances in which a document came to be written are relevant to its construction, particularly if they are said to point to a construction which is not that which the document would naturally bear, the respondent must provide sufficient evidence of those circumstances to enable the court to see that if the relevant facts are established at trial they may have a bearing on the outcome.”

“14.

Sometimes it is possible to show by evidence that although material in the form of documents or oral evidence that would put the documents in another light is not currently before the court, such material is likely to exist and can be expected to be available at trial. In such a case it would be wrong to give summary judgment because there would be a real, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success. However, it is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may turn up which would have a bearing on the question of construction.”

Specifically in respect of the construction of documents, I note the words of Jacob LJ in Khatri v Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank BA [2010] EWCA Civ 397 at [4] and [5]:

“4.

I would only add this – that one has to be careful not to take the last point too far when the case concerns construction of a written contract. The factual matrix is key to understanding what the parties must have intended by the words they used. But it far from follows that the need to know what that matrix was requires a full trial with discovery, evidence and cross-examination of witnesses. If there is no actual conflict of evidence on a relevant point of background matrix, it is only when there really are reasonable grounds for supposing that a fuller investigation of the facts as to the background might make a difference to construction that the court should decline to construe the contract on a summary judgment (including strike out) application.”

“5.

The court should not be over-astute to decline to deal with the construction of a contract summarily merely on the basis that something relevant to the matrix might turn up if there were a full trial. Most disputes as to “pure” construction of a contract will be suitable for summary determination because the factual matrix necessary for its construction will itself be determinable on that application.”

The issues in this case are all, properly analysed, matters of law, or at the very least do not require the Court to resolve disputes of fact where any further evidence could reasonably be anticipated beyond that which the parties have had the opportunity to submit in advance of this application.

The interpretation of the “No Obligation Challenge”, a written offer, and therefore the interpretation of the obligation that the Claimant was required to meet in order to accept the offer, is a question of law: Pioneer Shipping Ltd v BTP Tioxide Ltd (The Nema) (No. 2) [1982] AC 724. There is no particular dispute over the factual context in which the contract is made; I have been presented in the evidence produced for this application with various screenshots showing the state of the Defendant’s website at the relevant time, and emails back and forth between the parties. These documents of course speak for themselves. The same applies to the Claimant’s submission to the “No Obligation Challenge”.

Neither party advanced to me the existence of any further factual detail said to be important to the meaning of any contract, and nor can I envisage sensibly any such further information that could come to light at this stage that would assist in this exercise. Any evidence the parties would wish to give about their subjective understanding of the terms or meaning of any contract would be irrelevant. The issue is therefore eminently suitable to be determined by summary judgment, and to postpone it as the Defendant argues on the basis that the issue must be resolved at trial is, in my view, to hope that “something may turn up”.

The remaining issue is in my view, also entirely suitable for disposition under CPR 24.3. The question of whether the parties had any intention to create legal relations between them is determined objectively. That is, the Court will consider the communication between the parties, and the circumstances as known by the reasonable person in their position: Barbudev v Eurocom Cable Management Bulgaria EOOD and others [2012] EWCA Civ 548 at [30], RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Muller GmbH & Co KG [2010] UKSC 14 at [45]. The Claimant and Defendant agree that the terms relied on by the Defendant as negating such intention could be accessed by a hyperlink at the bottom of the Defendant’s website, and I have been presented with a screenshot agreed to be accurate in this regard. The Claimant accepts, at least for the purpose of the application, that the terms are as set out in the Defence (and Mr Horn’s objection that they are not in evidence for this application therefore takes the matter nowhere, notwithstanding that the Defendant could have presented them to the Court). The same consideration applies as I have just set out as to the interpretation of these terms; the parties have had sufficient opportunity to present the relevant evidence to me, and there is no further evidence that could meaningfully assist me. Indeed, the Defendant’s case begins and ends with the existence of the terms.

Had I been required to determine the point, I would have reached the same conclusion with respect to the incorporation of the terms, which has become moot by virtue of my earlier decision on strike out. Whether or not unsigned terms have been incorporated into the contract depends on whether they have objectively been brought to the attention of the Claimant. That is, whether enough has been done by the Defendant to bring them to the attention of a reasonable person in the Claimant’s position: Parker v South Eastern Railway (1877) 2 CPD 416. There also no dispute that the Claimant was in fact aware of the terms before the contract was made, having queried them by email on 19 or 20 September 2025. The same general considerations about evidence would have applied.

The Defendant’s final objection to determining these matters under CPR 24.3 is that the case is complex, document-heavy, and involves uncertain law. I cannot accept any of these submissions. The points in dispute are self-contained, subject to well-established rules and principles, require limited evidence, and are of the sort that the Court is used to dealing with on a daily basis in claims of all values. The Defendant’s skeleton argument and accompanying documents are lengthy, but in substance are repetition of the same few points. There are only a handful of relevant documents. The only particular legal complexity highlighted by Mr Horn was that the rules on unilateral offers set out in Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1893] 1 QB 256 (discussed in more detail below) is said to have been overruled by later authorities such as Parker-Grennan v Camelot UK Lotteries Ltd [2024] EWCA Civ 185. These later authorities do not concern unilateral offers at all, and the decision in Carlill is still good law; the Defendant is simply incorrect here. The issues of incorporation, and acceptance of a unilateral offer, are entirely separate. There is no legal uncertainty whatsoever.

I have taken full account of the fact that the Defendant is not legally represented. The manner in which I have taken account of this is by giving a purposive approach to Mr Horn’s submissions, and actively clarifying the matters relevant to my decision with Mr Horn. The accommodations required for litigants in person do not of course extend to applying a different (in this case, lower) threshold to the tests under CPR.

I therefore consider that such matters are appropriate for summary judgment, and assess them accordingly in line with the test in CPR 24.3.

Given my decision to strike out this part of the Defence, the question of whether or not the Defendant has a real prospect of showing that these terms as set out in the defence were incorporated into the contract becomes moot. Given that I heard submissions on the point I however indicate that, had I been required to do so, I would not have granted summary judgment on this issue. The Claimant had actual knowledge of the terms before the contract was made, and this in itself must call into question whether or not the rules on reasonable notice as set out in Parker v South Eastern Railway (1877) 2 CPD 416 and Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1987] EWCA Civ 6 apply at all. (I pause here to note that Mr Horn took a procedural point in relation to this argument, it being suggested that to rely on the principle from Interfoto was an additional cause of action by the claimant. This is incorrect; the point arises as a legal riposte to the defence to the claim). I note that the authors of Chitty on Contracts do not deal at [16-007] to [16-015] with the situation where a claimant is in fact aware of the terms later said to have not been incorporated by reasonable notice. In any event, the fact that the Claimant was himself able to identify the terms is certainly evidence, perhaps even strong evidence, that a reasonable person would be so able. I would therefore have concluded that the Defendant had a real prospect of success on this point. What is certain however is that the issue is academic, as for the reasons discussed above, the terms cannot have the effect contended for by the Defendant.

The more promising avenue for the Defendant, although as will be explained not a sufficiently promising avenue to resist an application for summary judgment, is that the terms form part of the wider circumstances that, as a whole, indicate that the parties did not intend to create legal relations.

In assessing whether or not parties to a contract had such objective intention, the Court must consider whether or not the agreement is commercial in nature; if so, there is a heavy onus on the party asserting that no such intention arises: Edwards v Skyways Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 349, 355. In contrast, where the agreement falls within the private, or social and domestic sphere, the opposite presumption applies: Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571, 578.

The words used by parties can specifically demonstrate an intention not to be legally bound, at least at that moment, for example when an otherwise sufficient agreement is expressed to be “subject to contract”, or as in Rose & Frank Co v J.R. Crompton & Bros Ltd [1925] AC 445, binding only in honour. The existence of such words is however not determinative, as seen in cases such as Edwards, Hanjin Shipping Co Ltd v Zenith Chartering Corp (The Mercedes Envoy) [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 559 and Mansion Place Ltd v Fox Industrial Services Ltd [2021] EWHC 2972 (TCC).

On their face, the terms express a plain intention on the part of the Defendant not to contract with anybody, ever. If this were the sole document passing between the parties, this may have been the end of matters. However, in determining the application under CPR 24.3 I must have regard to the evidence currently available as to the whole course of communication between the Claimant and the Defendant, and consider what the reasonable person would understand their intentions to be. There is considerable evidence that suggests, strongly as I find for these purposes, that the reasonable person in the parties’ position would have concluded that the Claimant and the Defendant did intend to enter into legal relations, regardless of the terms. In particular, I take account of the following.

First, the Defendant’s website encourages donations to the “No Obligation Challenge”, with the words “The more you pledge, the greater the embarrassment of their failing to prove that an obligation can exist without agreement”, alongside listing the names of donees and the sum donated. The page on which the “No Obligation Challenge” is advertised to potential participants presents in prominent wording: “SHOW USE THE EVIDENCE”, “WIN THE PRIZE” (these words are circled), and “TAKE THE CASH!”.

There is a striking analogy to the case, much beloved of first-year law students, of Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1893] 1 QB 256. In that case, the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company had, unwisely as it transpired, promised by advert to pay £100 to anybody who used the smoke ball as instructed but nonetheless caught influenza, and further advertised that £1,000 was deposited with a named bank for the purpose of “shewing our sincerity in the matter” (the “matter” being of course making any necessary payments). The Carbolic Smoke Ball Company argued that the promise was a ‘mere puff’ – that is, a statement lacking, in particular, the necessary objective intention to amount to an offer. Lindley LJ’s infamous riposte to this argument was as follows:

“Now, for what was that money deposited or that statement made except to negative the suggestion that this was a mere puff and meant nothing at all? The deposit is called in aid by the advertiser as proof of his sincerity in the matter — that is, the sincerity of his promise to pay this 100l. in the event which he has specified.”

I have in mind that the exact issue in this case is not precisely the same. Lindley LJ was here concerned with whether the terms of the advert objectively communicated a sufficient intention to contract at that time and on those terms to be capable of amounting to an offer, provided the other necessary elements of an offer were present (as discussed in other parts of the judgment). The issue here is slightly different, in that I am concerned with whether the parties had objectively expressed an intention to contract with each other at all. The underlying principle is however of equal applicability in both circumstances. Of the current scenario, Lindley LJ may well have queried what was the reason for the fund and its prominent advertisement in such terms if not to show the Defendant’s sincerity in making good any claim against it. The natural inference of the Defendant’s communications, judged objectively, is that there is an intention to distribute the fund should a submission disprove the Defendant’s position. The fund is, in this regard, an expression of confidence by the Defendant in the veracity of their position.

Second, I consider an email of either 19 or 20 September 2025 – the exact date does not matter, as in either event it before the Claimant made his submission – the terms of which the Defendant accepts. In this email, Mr Horn on behalf of the Defendant states that: “IF YOU CAN PRODUCE EVIDENCE THAT STATUTE LAW IS THE SUPREME SOURCE OF AUTHORITY SUPREME OVER ALL ELSE THEN YOU WOULD GET THE PRIZE MONEY – BUT YOU HAVE NOT DONE SO”. The context of this email is what the Claimant refers to as “Pre-Action Correspondence”, but is in fact part of an exchange between the Claimant and the Defendant in response to a previous submission by the Claimant in September 2025 (not relied upon substantively for the purposes of this claim). The communication by the Defendant is however unambiguous in communicating that payment of the “No Obligation Challenge” fund would forthcoming if the terms of any contract were met.

Third, in this same email, and in the context of the Claimant querying the validity of the terms, Mr Horn writes on behalf of the Defendant that: “THE PEOPLE WHO HAVE PLEDGED ONCE THEY SEE THE EVIDENCE THEN THEY WILL BE GOOD TO THEIR WORD”. The inference is the same as above.

Fourth, in an email to the Claimant of 16 September 2025, of the same type of that of 19 or 20 September referenced above, Mr Horn on behalf of the Defendant writes that “For these reasons, your claim to the prize money is denied”. The objective inference here is plain: that there was no principled reason why a claim could not be properly made against the “No Obligation Challenge” fund, albeit the Claimant’s submission had not, according to the Defendant, met the criteria.

Fifth, as part of the general donation process to the Defendant’s cause – that is, not to the “No Obligation Challenge” specifically - a user of the Defendant’s website in September 2025 was presented with a page setting out various “Contribution Terms and Conditions” to which they are directly asked to “Accept” by way of clicking a button so marked. These terms relate to how donations would be used, particularly in relation to funding court cases. I bear in mind that these conditions were unlikely to be strictly required in a contractual sense; an individual donating to the Defendant generally is not contractually required to consent to the exact purpose for which their donation is to be used. That being said, the relevance is that the Defendant was clearly communicating in contractual language, in direct contradiction to the terms now relied on to resist this claim. This contention directly undermines the weight to be given to the terms on their face.

There is one matter that I disregard. The Claimant invites me to take account of changes that were made to the Defendant’s website in January 2026, after the date it is alleged that the contract was concluded. Therse changes include express reference at the point of submission to “Participation and Publication Terms”, which state that the “No Obligation Challenge” is a “public accountability mechanism” and is not, among other possibilities, a contract. The Claimant suggests that this is evidence that the Defendant knew that the previous state of its website was insufficient to preclude any intention to create legal relations. I cannot accept this argument. Even if this were the Defendant’s motivation, a party’s own view of whether or not they may have in the past objectively acted in a certain manner is simply irrelevant to the objective question.

I reiterate that I am not determining the issue on its merits, but considering whether the Defendant has a real prospect of successfully defending the claim on this basis. The evidence here is overwhelming against the Defendant, leaving aside even questions of whether this is truly a commercial scenario in which the Defendant should bear a heavy onus. The only communication giving any indication that there is no intention to create legal relations, and the only communication relied on by the Defendant on this point, is the terms. The Defendant’s contention is based on the premise that a unilateral statement by them is sufficient to negative any intention to create legal relations regardless of any contrary statements elsewhere, or contrary indications in the wider context. Had the terms been a joint document reflecting the parties’ joint intentions, there would have been great force to this point. However, the terms are unilateral. The Claimant makes the point in the email of 19 or 20 September that he disagrees that they have any force, and the Claimant’s position has always been that the parties were, or would be, intending forming a contract. The evidence, set out above and taken as a whole, plainly shows that the Defendant’s communications at the time evinced the same objective intention. The Defendant’s position was instead that the terms of the “No Obligation Challenge” had not been, and would not conceivably be, complied with. I cannot conclude that the Defendant has a real prospect of successfully defending the claim on this basis.

In these circumstances, the presumption is that summary judgment is to be granted unless there is some other compelling reason why the matter should be disposed of at trial. There is no such reason here. There is no prospect of further evidence becoming available that the Defendant could not have put before the Court on this application, there is nothing in the Claimant’s conduct that would justify refusing summary judgment, the law is not complex or uncertain, and the issue is not of any wider public importance.

There is no issue as to what the Claimant did in order to, on his case, comply with the terms of the “No Obligation Challenge”. This issue is instead of whether the Claimant complied with the terms of the offer, and is therefore a matter of contractual construction. That is, the Court would at trial be required to determine the natural and ordinary objective meaning of the words setting out the “No Obligation Challenge” as understood by the reasonable person in the position of the parties (with the knowledge they had, or had available to them) at the time. The principles of contractual interpretation have been subject to much discussion in the higher courts, with which I am familiar. The best exposition of the law as it stands is, for present purposes, that set out by Popplewell J (as he was) in Lukoil Asia Pacific Pte Ltd v Ocean Tankers (Pte) Ltd (“The Ocean Neptune”) [2018] EWHC 163 (Comm) at [8]:

“The court's task is to ascertain the objective meaning of the language which the parties have chosen in which to express their agreement. The court must consider the language used and ascertain what a reasonable person, that is a person who has all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract, would have understood the parties to have meant. The court must consider the contract as a whole and, depending on the nature, formality and quality of drafting of the contract, give more or less weight to elements of the wider context in reaching its view as to the objective meaning of the language used. If there are two possible constructions, the court is entitled to prefer the construction which is consistent with business common sense and to reject the other. Interpretation is a unitary exercise; in striking a balance between the indications given by the language and the implications of the competing constructions, the court must consider the quality of drafting of the clause and it must also be alive to the possibility that one side may have agreed to something which with hindsight did not serve his interest; similarly, the court must not lose sight of the possibility that a provision may be a negotiated compromise or that the negotiators were not able to agree more precise terms. This unitary exercise involves an iterative process by which each suggested interpretation is checked against the provisions of the contract and its commercial consequences are investigated. It does not matter whether the more detailed analysis commences with the factual background and the implications of rival constructions or a close examination of the relevant language in the contract, so long as the court balances the indications given by each.”

The page setting out the “No Obligation Challenge” sets out various text. The following is that relevant to the term of the offer.

At the top is the heading “The Challenge”, with the following text underneath (the emphasis is in the original):

“5 figures now for a simple piece of paper produced by parliament where it says parliament can do whatever it wants!!! Show us parliament can impose its will on any individual without a binding obligation entered into by freewill [sic]”, followed by a smile emoji.

The page is then split into four boxes.

The reasonable observer would consider that these last words, as shown by their definition as the “Challenge Criteria”, communicate the terms of the offer, or at least its core. The Defendant’s skeleton argument seeks to re-cast the “criteria” of the “No Obligation Challenge” to include the words at the top. This is not at all consistent with the expressly described and self-contained “Challenge Criteria” box on the web page. The reasonable observer would note that the words in that box are more specific than the general overview at the top of the page, and that the wording of this general overview is an exhortation to participate. The words “simple piece of paper”, against the purposive background to the “No Obligation Challenge” discussed below, cannot be a literal instruction; not least where the submission method is electronically via the Defendant’s website. The words “where it says” are, against the same background, equivalent to a call for “evidence”. The words “produced by parliament” are, in substance, the same as “legislative” on any approach. Overall this interpretation aligns with the purpose of the “No Obligation Challenge” discussed in more detail below; the Defendant’s does not at all. I do not consider that the Defendant has a real prospect of showing to the contrary at trial.

It is useful to next set out the matters that the Claimant says amount to his performance. The Claimant submitted a three-page document to the Defendant on or around 3 December 2025. It gives the impression of having been written at least in part, by a large language model (often, but erroneously, referred to as an “AI” or “artificial intelligence”). I should also point out that a document submitted by the Defendant (“Section D – Authority Summaries of Propositions of Law”) has plainly been created in such a way and was of no assistance to the Court.

The Claimant’s submission refers to the Act of Settlement 1700, the Bill of Rights 1689, Theft Act 1968 and Juries Act 1974. The cases of R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the EU [2017] UKSC 5 and Re: Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603 are cited, along with quotations from the judgments. There is also reference to the “Finance Act / Income Tax Acts” and “Public Health Acts”.

The Defence on this point is set out as follows:

“On [the Claimant’s] own case, the task required production of a single, express legislative document meeting specific criteria. Instead, he submitted argument, interpretation, and commentary.”

“Acceptance of a “unilateral offer capable of acceptance by performance” occurs only by exact performance of the stated condition, not by persuasion, re-interpretation, or rewriting”

I took care to clarify with Mr Horn the Defendant’s position on whether each of these legal authorities were “written”, “publicly available” and “legislative”. The Defendant’s position was that: all the matters referred to in the Claimant’s submission were “written”, the statutes were “legislative”, and that all the sources referred to were publicly available save perhaps for Re: Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603. The Defendant’s gloss on this was that there was no statute with the name “Finance Act / Income Tax Acts” or “Public Health Acts”. I can, regrettably, only characterise the Defendant’s position here as a poor attempt to feign ignorance; there are various Finance Acts, Income Tax Acts and Public Health Acts of various years to which the Claimant’s submission is plainly referring.

I also took great care with Mr Horn to understand the interpretation of the terms of the “No Obligation Challenge” for which the Defendant would contend at trial. Mr Horn indicated that the Defendant’s interpretation comprised the following. First, that naming a statute was insufficient, and that to comply with the terms of the offer, a submission must set out the exact words of the statute. Second, and building on the first point, that the words of the statute submitted must be exactly, or at least extremely similar to, the words of the “No Obligation Challenge”. That is, that the legislation is in express terms that “[parliament]can lawfully (as legislatively defined in the Act of Settlement 1700 as an individuals [sic] birthright) create an obligation that binds any individual or group of individuals”, or at least extremely similar. The basis on which Mr Horn makes this submission is, at least in part, based on the reference to a “simple piece of paper produced by parliament where it says…” on at the top of the relevant web page.

I do not consider that the Defendant’s proposed interpretation of the “No Obligation Challenge” has a real prospect of success at trial.

Starting with the language of the offer, the second course proposed by Popplewell J, the Defendant’s call is for the submission of “written publicly available expressed legislative evidence” (my emphasis). The word “evidence” is wider and more open-textured in meaning than a simple quotation. Evidence is a word and a concept familiar to the Court, being in its natural sense information that tends to support or refute a particular matter. Evidence can be presented directly, or by directing a reader to consider a particular matter by reference. This natural meaning does not support the interpretation for which the Defendant contends, either in the sense that exact words of the statute must be presented as part of a submission, or on the sense that only a direct and exact (or near-exact) legislative statement of the principle would suffice.

The Defendant’s suggestion, as set out in the defence, that “evidence” is different in absolute terms to “argument”, “interpretation” and “commentary” is correct only at a very high level of generality in the circumstances of this case. The Defendant invited evidence dealing with a power within the constitution of a common law legal system, a system that is built to at least some extent on matters such as argument and interpretation. While “argument”, “interpretation” and “commentary” are not of course of the same exact nature as “evidence”, their similarity in the context of the “No Obligation Challenge” is sufficient that the Defendant’s position that only exact words stating the exact effect fell within the meaning of the latter, and that everything else was the former, is wholly unsustainable.

Going next to the cross-check identified by Popplewell J, the commercial background to the “No Obligation Challenge”, as expressed in the website text I have set out above, tends firmly to the same conclusion. The Defendant’s views on the issue of parliamentary sovereignty are clear: that Parliament, in their erroneous view, does not have the power to impose binding obligations on individuals without their consent. The “No Obligation Challenge” invites submissions that deal with that proposition, and more specifically those that can “rebut” it. The issue is squarely one of substance, not of form.

I have in mind that, had the Defendant wished to limit the scope of the “No Obligation Challenge” to the interpretation now contented for, there is no reason it could not have done so. I suspect, although I make no finding to this effect, that the reason is that to do so would have laid bare the folly of the Defendant’s position.

Taking the issue to its conclusion, it is plain that the Claimant’s submission to the “No Obligation Challenge” contained “evidence”, as properly understood.

I remind myself that I am not making findings as if this were a trial, but determining only whether the Defence has a real prospect of success. Even taking into account this threshold, I cannot escape the conclusion that the provisions of CPR 24.3 are met out. Having carefully evaluated the position, the Defendant’s case on this point is largely, if not wholly, hopeless. In any event, the Defendant’s case has no real prospect of success.

That is strictly the end of the matter. It is not for the Court, or for the Claimant, to consider defences or positions that have not been advanced by the Defendant. Absent a defence with a real prospect of success, and there being no compelling reason for the matter to be disposed of at trial and summary judgment ought to be granted. There is no such compelling reason, as set out earlier in my judgment.

In any event, had I been required to consider the Claimant’s interpretation of the “No Obligation Challenge”, I would have reasoned as follows:

The Claimant asserts that he has been the victim of “doxing” (the unauthorised and malicious disclosure of personal information, often addresses) by the Defendant in a YouTube video, which is itself a recording of a meeting attended by supporters of the Defendant, and in posts made by the Defendant and their supporters on Facebook and Telegram.

The YouTube video shows a copy of the Claim Form in this matter, redacted to obscure the Claimant’s personal details, but with his date of birth still visible. The Claimant brought this to the Defendant’s attention, and the video was edited such that the Claimant’s date of birth was blurred.

The Telegram posts link to the YouTube video, and do not add anything independent.

The Facebook posts were made by an individual who I shall refer to only as “CB” on 7 and 8 February 2026. CB attended part of the hearing as an observer, but I am not aware that she has any formal role with the Defendant, or acts on behalf of the Defendant in any way. She is however a supporter of the Defendant, and I have no doubt that the Defendant would (or at least ought) to have been aware of these posts, and would have been able to at least ask CB to remove them, even if CB would have been at liberty to decline.

The posts tag the Claimant, and identifies him as somebody who has attended events protesting aspects of the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, suggests that he “would like to see people bankrupted for not paying a tax on their home” (a reference to CB’s view that council tax is not enforceable), makes links between the taxes the Claimant (rightfully) believes are lawfully due and the Government’s military assistance to Ukraine, and accuses the Claimant of being “quite content” with what CB describes as a “Stasi court system”. CB comments that “Edmund would see me imprisoned for not paying my council tax” and states that he is “a disgrace to freedom”. The overall tone of the posts are patronising and mocking.

The threshold for behaviour sufficient to amount to an abuse of the Court’s process is high. Examples in the authorities include: issuing claims without the intention of pursuing them, litigating for a collateral purpose, unethical private investigation techniques, perjury or the forgery of documents, or recklessness as to the truth of allegations supported by a statement of truth.

None of the Defendant’s behaviour, or indeed that of CB, is pleasant. It is clearly designed to mock and humiliate the Claimant within the community of the Defendant’s supporters. That is however different to its wider effect. I consider that the reasonable person viewing the YouTube video, and the social media posts, would readily identify that the Defendant and their supporters were “Organized Pseudo-legal Commercial Argument Litigants” who found puerile amusement in mocking those who disagreed with their legally nonsense arguments. That is, the reasonable person is would likely not take against the Claimant as a result of the social media posts or YouTube video.

In respect of the disclosure of personal information, this is limited. The Claimant’s affiliations with “anti-lockdown” causes must have come from his publicly available social media, and his privacy settings must have been such to allow unconnected individuals to tag him in posts. These are of course the Claimant’s own decisions. The Claim Form is, under CPR 5.4C(1)(a), a document that is available to non-parties – that is, the public – as a matter of course. This does not of course excuse the use of such documents as part of a course of conduct that would otherwise be unlawful or abusive, but I am mindful that the disclosure of court documents per se is not necessarily improper. In this scenario, the Defendant took significant measures to redact the document before showing it as part of the YouTube video. Whether or not the retention of the Claimant’s date of birth was deliberate or accidental, it does not meet the threshold of behaviour required to strike out a statement of case, particularly where a later redaction took place and there is no ongoing harm. I remain of this conclusion taking the Defendant’s conduct in the round.

This aspect of the Claimant’s application is of course academic given my other findings. If however I had been required to determine it, I would not have struck out the defence on this basis.

I grant summary judgment on the claim, and grant the application for strike out in part. I therefore give judgment in favour of the Claimant for the sum claimed, £23,665 plus interest in a sum to be determined.

I will list the matter for a hearing to dispose of consequential matters. I invite the parties to agree, if possible, in advance of that hearing, issues of interest and costs, and to inform the Court. If not, I will hear submissions at that hearing.