Tracy James Newport & Anor v Marion Jayne (aka Marion Baker, Marion Davies, Elaine Marion Jayne, Marion Jayne Davies)

This is an application by notice dated 6 February 2026 on behalf of the Claimants for an injunction that the Defendant, Marion Jayne, be forbidden, whether by herself or by instructing or encouraging or permitting any other person, from disposing of the property known as The Swan, High Street, Cinderford, GL14 2SQ, and then the title number is given, also known as The Fern Ticket, and also New House, Hillcrest Road, Berry Hill, Coleford, GL16 4RG, and then the title number is given. It is supported by the written evidence of the First Claimant in a witness statement dated the same date.

The application is made in a claim in which the claim form was issued or, at any rate, dated 6 November 2023 and it was marked, in the form that I have seen, as having been served on the Defendant on 3 June 2024. The claim alleged the Claimants had occupied the property knows as The Fern Ticket, although also, previously, The Swan, as a public house and bar with accommodation above, since December 2019 and that the Defendant unlawfully evicted them from the premises in June 2023, and changed the locks.

The litigation has not been fully fought out, because the Defendant did not acknowledge service or put in any defence. A request was made for judgment in default in November 2024, but there was some problem with the request and it had to be returned and redone. Judgment for the Claimants was, therefore, entered for damages to be assessed on 23 December 2024. On the same date, it was transferred from the Civil National Business Centre, where it had started life, to the County Court at Gloucester and Cheltenham.

In January 2025, on 14 January, District Judge Singleton required the Claimants to file a schedule of damages. That schedule was duly filed. On 10 March 2025, the same District Judge required the Defendant to file a counter schedule by 14 April 2025. This did not happen. The judge, therefore, on 7 May 2025, required the Defendant to file the counter schedule by 9 June 2025 and, in default of so filing it, barred her from opposing the quantum claimed in the sum of £182,961. The Defendant did not comply.

Subsequently, there was, therefore, a request for judgment on the basis that the Defendant was, indeed, debarred from opposing the quantum. The request for judgment was made on 11 August 2025, in the total sum of £227,777.02, which includes both interest and costs, and judgment was given for the Claimants for that sum by the County Court, on 27 August 2025, payable immediately.

There has, since then, been some difficulty in enforcing the judgment debt. Eventually, on 6 February this year, the Claimants issued their application, to which I have already referred, for an injunction to restrain the sale of the two properties mentioned, The Fern Ticket and the New House.

On 9 February, so just a few days after the application was issued, Deputy District Judge Hansen gave some directions for the service of documents, requiring position statements from both sides and directing a listing of the application on 26 February 2026.

The hearing of 26 February 2026 directed by Deputy District Judge Hansen did not, in fact, take place. Instead, on the day before, Deputy District Judge Blitz vacated the hearing, because it was for a Freezing Injunction under CPR rule 25.1(1)(f), which can be dealt with in the County Court only by certain circuit judges, of whom I am one, and he also ordered that the Claimants’ application for a Freezing Order should be relisted before such a circuit judge.

Because it has been relevant in the hearing today, I mention that, on 11 February 2026, a third party called Simplii Property Limited made an application for various orders, including one that that company should be joined as a third party, but also that an order should be made setting aside the default judgment of 27 August 2025. That application was not directed by Deputy District Judge Blitz to be heard by me, today, and indeed, it is one which can be dealt with perfectly properly by a District Judge sitting in Gloucester. After hearing from both Mr Aynsley on behalf of the Claimants and Mr Trowell, Director of Simplii Property Limited, I decided that I would not hear that application today.

I notice, also, that there was a notice of hearing which Mr Trowell told me about, relating to his company’s application to set aside the order. However, I had to tell him that this was not something which I had directed to be sent and I had not understood that I would be dealing with that matter today. That is still something that may happen. It should happen, because he has issued an application and it should be dealt with.

That is, in brief terms, the background. As I say, the application is supported by the witness evidence of the First Claimant, which I have read. The Defendant has not in any way engaged with this application and, in particular, has not filed any evidence in opposition to it.

One other important feature of this litigation is to note that, on 18 December last year, District Judge Napier, here in Bristol, made an order in separation litigation, reference M00GL524, between Simplii Property and Ms Jayne, the Defendant in this case, in which the judge declared that Simplii Property might, on behalf of Ms Jayne by reason of powers of attorney which it held from her, execute any transfers to give effect to a sale of and purchase agreement between them. However, he also ordered that, in the event that there was such a sale, the net proceeds of that sale should be paid into court. I was told by Mr Trowell that the position is that, since that order was made, there has been an exchange of contracts between Ms Jayne and Simplii Property Limited, but that Simplii Property Limited is looking to market the property by way of subsale and that no completion, therefore, has yet taken place of the agreement for sale between those parties. Accordingly, there are not yet any net proceeds of sale to be paid into court. There is no fund in court for this purpose.

In these circumstances, I have to consider whether it is appropriate to grant a Freezing Injunction. The injunction is sought simply in order to cover the period before the Civil National Business Centre can deal with the application made by the Claimants for Charging Orders over these properties. This is because, under the rules, in the present circumstances, an application for a Charging Order in the County Court has to be dealt with by the Civil National Business Centre, unless it is an application for a Charging Order over a fund in court and, at present, as I have already said, there is no fund in court. It is not clear to me how long it will take for the Civil National Business Centre to deal with the application for Charging Orders against these properties.

In relation to that, I just mention the position of Simplii Property Limited. That company claims to have a beneficial interest in the properties by virtue of the exchange of contracts between itself and Ms Jayne. It is, therefore, in a position to object to the making final of any Charging Orders against these properties. I am not concerned, at this stage, with whether such a Charging Order should be made, in the interim or a fortiori, whether one should be made final, but Simplii Property will have its opportunity to deal with that application, in due course, if it is made. So far as, at that stage, of course, if it is well advised, it will seek to put in the documents which relate to its interest in the properties, the agreements between the parties and so on.

Coming back to the question of the injunction that is sought, the test laid down for Freezing Injunctions falls into three parts. The first, and this relates, really, to cases where there has not yet been a trial and the injunction is being sought right at the outset of the claim, is that the Claimant should have a good arguable case on a substantive claim within the jurisdiction of the Court. There is no need for me to deal with that, in this case, because the Claimants have a judgment already. The second part of the test is whether the Defendant has assets in the jurisdiction. I have not heard from the Defendant, but it is plain on the evidence that the Defendant does, indeed, have assets within the jurisdiction. Indeed, that is precisely the basis of the application for a Charging Order. Thirdly, is there a real risk of dissipation or secretion of assets which would render the enforcement of the judgment nugatory?

Of course, I do bear in mind, first of all, the order of District Judge Napier, in the other litigation ending 524, which he made on 18 December, that the net proceeds of sale should be paid into court. But, as I have been told by Mr Trowell, that has not happened yet, because, although contracts have been exchanged, they have not been completed. So the matter remains where it originally was, namely that the legal owner of the properties is still Ms Jayne, even if Mr Trowell’s company claims to have a beneficial interest in those properties. If it does, then of course, to the extent that it has a beneficial interest, that means that Ms Jayne will have a right to the net proceeds of sale of the monies. So I can really put the order of District Judge Napier on one side. But I do bear in mind that Ms Jayne has not engaged at all with these proceedings. We have no evidence from her.

The evidence I do have from the Claimants is evidence of failed businesses of hers, of the use of alternative names, aliases, as they are sometimes referred to. There is also evidence of her suffering from credit history problems, leading to a difficulty in obtaining legal assistance and engaging a solicitor who will be satisfied, for the purposes of the anti-money laundering rules, that the provenance of her funds is acceptable. She also seems to be difficult to find. I was told by Mr Trowell that she is, currently, somewhere about 200 miles away.

In addition to all of those things, we have the fact that there has been litigation between Simplii Property and Ms Jayne herself, which has led to orders being made against her, not only in relation to the order of District Judge Napier, but also in some other litigation between them. We have the fact that we do not have before the Court details of the sale agreements which are said to have been made between Simplii Property and Ms Jayne. We have the fact that there has been no substantial compliance or, indeed, any compliance by the Defendant with the order of Deputy District Judge Hansen. The whole position of the assets of Ms Jayne is shrouded in mystery and seems very precarious.

In these circumstances, I am entirely satisfied that there is a real risk of dissipation of assets, which would render the enforcement of the judgment nugatory and I will, therefore, grant a Freezing Injunction over these assets, that is to say, and I wish this to be clearly understood, the two properties of Ms Jayne or, in the event that they have in any way been dealt with, the proceeds of that dealing. I will grant that injunction over until a period which I will discuss with counsel for the Claimants, so as to satisfy the need for protection, in the interim before the Charging Orders applied for are granted, if they are granted.